gpg 1997 no - complete pictureregulations.completepicture.co.uk/pdf/planning/enforcing...
TRANSCRIPT
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION Page9
PREFACE OF DOS AND DON’TS Page11
CHAPTER 1 Page13
Stating theauthority’senforcementpolicy
Introduction1.1 Why apolicy is needed1.2 Reviewingthepolicy1.3 Thepolicy statement1.4-1.5 Formulatingthepolicy statement1.6-1.7 The availabilityof appealcostsin enforcementproceedings1.6 Unreasonable behaviour1.7 Surcharge only for“wilful misconduct”
CHAPTER 2 Page16
Investigating allegationsof unauthorised development
Introduction2.1 Establishingtheplanning history
2.2 Recordingthe investigation
2.3 Citizen’s charterstandards
2.4 The authority’s investigativepowers
2.5-2.7 The planningcontraventionnotice
2.8 Compensationfor loss ordamageresultingfrom subsequentstop notice
2.9 Accessto HM LandRegistry2.10-2.11 Othersourcesof information in theCouncil’s records
2.12 Theright of entryto land for enforcementpurposes
2.13 Theduty to administeracautionduring investigation
CHAPTER 3 Page20
Decidingwhetherto takeformal enforcementaction
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The requirementof “reasonableness”3.3 The Local GovernmentOmbudsman’sjurisdiction3.4 Theimportanceof judicial authority
3.5 Government’splanningguidance
3.6 Substantiatingadecisionnot to takeenforcementaction
3.7-3.8 Thealternativecourseof granting planningpermission3.7 Informing neighboursandinviting views3.8 Otherconsultation3.9-3.10 Timing of the authorisationto issueanenforcement notice3.11-3.12Consideringwhetherit is “expedient”to issuean enforcementnotice
3.13-3.15“Issueestoppel”
3.13 The leadingcases
3.14 Inapplicableto planningmerits
3.15 Inapplicableto noticesquashed on proceduralgrounds
CHAPTER 4 Page 25
Issuinganenforcementnotice
4.1 Introduction—whatis meantby “issuing” a notice
4.2 Properauthorisation toissue anotice
4.3 Delegationof functionsto acommittee4.4 Delegationof functionsto an authorisedofficer
CHAPTER 5 Page 27
Formulatingthe termsof anenforcementnotice
5.1 Introduction— the needfor clarity andprecision
5.2 The legislativerequirements
5.3-5.4 Statingthemattersconstitutingtheallegedbreachof planning control
5.5-5.6 Nullity andinvalidity
5.7 Alleging separatebreachesof planningcontrol in onenotice
5.8-5.9 Categorisingtheallegedbreach
5.8 The two typesof breach
5.9 Issuingnoticesin thealternative5.10-5-12 Specifyingthe stepsrequiredby the enforcementnotice
5.10 Precisionneededfor subsequentprosecution
5.11 Basicprinciples
5.12 Examplesof unenforceablerequirements
5.13 Makingthe developmentcomplywith the termsof aplanningpermission
5.14-5.15Discontinuanceof useof land or restorationto its previouscondition
5.14 Takingcarenot to requiremorethan is justified
5.15 Removingoperationaldevelopmentat the sametime5.16 Remedyingany injury to amenitycausedby the breach
5.17-5.18“Under-enforcement”
5.17 Section173(11)
5.18 Confirmingdeemedpermissiononcenoticecompliedwith
5.19-5.22 Specifyingtheeffectivedate ofanenforcementnotice
5.19 A calendar date
5.20-5.22Relationshipto date ofserviceandperiod for appeal
5.22 Effectof Sections175(4) and289(4A)
5.23-5.25 Specifyingthecomplianceperiodin anenforcementnotice
5.23 The requirementto specifyandthepowerto extend
5.24-5.25How long to allow
5.26-5.27 SpecifyingtheLPA’s reasonsfor issuingthe notice
5.26 Requirement ofRegulationsand examplenotices
5.27 Whyreasonsare neededandwhat theyshouldcontain
5.28-5.30 Specifyingthe enforcementnotice land
5.28 Requirement ofRegulationsandthe needfor precision
5.29 Why aplan is best5.30 Whenaplan is not essential5.31 Explanationof the enforcementappealprovisionsandprocedure
CHAPTER 6 Page 36
The responseto anenforcementnoticeappeal
6.1 The statutoryright of appeal
6.2-6.5 The groundsof appeal
6.2 The sevengrounds
6.3 Ground (a) andthe deemedapplication
6.4 Grounds(b), (c), (d) and (e) (the“legal grounds”)
6.5 Grounds(f) and(g)
6.6-6.7 The enforcementappealprocess
6.6 Theneedfor promptresponses andthepursuitof anegotiated settlement
6.7 Thethreetypesof procedure
6.8 Requirements tobe fulfilled by theLPA6.9 Inquiry appeals
6.10 Public notification of the inquiry andappeal
6.11 Powerto quash theenforcement noticeon proceduralgrounds
6.12-6.14Possiblewithdrawalof an enforcementnoticeduringthe appeal6.12 Monitoring representationsandconsideringpossibledefects
6.13 Noticesissuedin the alternative
6.14 Notification of the withdrawal6.15-6.17Inquiry appeals:preparingfor the inquiry
6.15 How bestto presentthe evidence6.16 Documentaryevidence
6.17 Recordingdevelopmentssinceissuingtheenforcementnotice
6.18 The onusof proof
6.19 The testapplicableto evidence
6.20. Possiblegrantof planningpermission onappeal6.21 Award of costsin enforcementappealproceedings
6.22-6.26Scrutinisingthe appealdecision
6.22 How to implementor whetherto challenge6.23 If the decisionis favourableto theLPA
6.24 If the decisionis unfavourableto theLPA
6.25 Whetherto challenge and, ifso, whichprocedure touse6.26 Thepossibilityof a submissionto judgment
CHAPTER 7 Page44
Serving astopnotice
7.1 Purposeof a stopnotice7.2-7.5 The scopeof a stop notice
7.2 Mustderivedirectly from the enforcementnotice
7.3 Stopping anactivity onall or partof thesite
7.4 Prohibitory,not remedial
7.4 Stopping anancillaryor incidentalactivity
7.5 Whatcannotbeprohibited7.6 Authority for serviceof a stopnotice
7.7-7.9 Therecipientof astop notice
7.7 Therequirementfor service
7.8 Displayinga sitenotice7.9 Annexing a copyof theenforcement notice
7.10 Time-limit for compliancewith a stopnotice7.11 Whenthe effectof a stopnoticeceases
7.12 Formulating the termsof a stopnotice
7.12 The needfor precisionto providea basisfor prosecution
7.13 Mattersof factand degree
7.14 Assessingastopnotice’s likely consequences
7.15 Prosecutinga stopnoticecontravention
7.16 Injunction in supportof a stopnotice7.17-7.19The LPA’s possible liabilityto compensationwhereastop noticeis served
7.17 Exaggerationof therisk7.18 Whencompensationis payable
7.19 Time-limit for claiming compensation
CHAPTER 8 Page50
Servinga breachof condition notice(BCN)
Introduction
8.1 A summaryprocedure
8.2-8.4 ChoosingbetweenaBCN andanenforcementnotice
8.3 Some advantagesof a BCN
8.4 Possibledisadvantagesof a BCN8.5 The recipientof a BCN
8.6-8.7 Formulatingthe termsof a BCN
8.8 The complianceperiod
8.9-8.11 The defenceagainstprosecution
8.9 Section 187A(11)(a)
8.10 Section 187A(11)(b)
8.11 Theonusof proof tobe dischargedin relyingon thesedefences
CHAPTER 9 Page 54
Obtaininganenforcementinjunction
9.1-9.3 Thestatutory provisions9.4-9.8 The scopeof anenforcement injunction9.4 “Apprehended” breach ofplanningcontrol9.5 Whento seekan injunction
9.6-9.8 Relevantcaselaw
9.9 Thepersonalnatureof injunctive proceedings
9.10 Procedurewhere aperson’sidentity is unknown9.11 A possibleundertakingin damages
9.12 Failure to observethe requirementsof an injunction
9.13 Consideringwhetherto initiate injunctive proceedings
CHAPTER 10 Page59
“Default” actionto securecompliancewith enforcementnotice
10.1 The “default” power10.2 Thescopeof defaultaction
10.3 Thepossibilityof judicial review
10.4-10.6 Practicalarrangementsfor taking defaultaction
10.4 Organisation, publicityandpolice presence
10.5 A list of matters to consider andwhetherto seekan injunction
10.6 The offenceof wilful obstruction10.7 The LPA’s powerto recovertheir expensesof defaultaction
10.8-10.9 Subsequentreinstatementof works which hadbeenremoved
10.8 Giving noticeof intention to takedefaultaction10.9 The offenceprovisionsof section181(5)
CHAPTER 11 Page 62
Prosecutingenforcementnoticeoffences
Introduction11.1 Whetherto prosecuteand penalties11.2 Prosecution,“default” actionor both?
11.3 The two categoriesof offence
11.4-11.6Offencecommittedby the owner of land11.4 Section179(1)and(2) andchange of ownership11.5 The defenceunder section179(3)11.6 The defence under section179(7)11.7-11.8Offence committedby someonewho controlsor has aninterestin theland11.7 Section 179(4)and(5)
11.8 Thepower to permitan activity tobe carried on11.9 Thenatureof an enforcementnoticeoffence11.10-11.12Challengingthe validity of anenforcement noticein prosecutionproceedings11.10 The provisionsof section285
11.11-11.12Useful case law
11.13-11.14Presenting theprosecution’scaseeffectively in Court11.13 EnsuringMagistrates appreciatetheseriousnature oftheoffence11.14A stepby step approach11.15 Applicationby the defendantfor anadjournment11.16 Further appeal to Court ofAppeal(Criminal Division)11.17-11.19Thepenalties onconvictionof an enforcementnoticeoffence11.17 Thepenalties available tothe Courts11.18-11.19Taking account of financial benefitfrom theoffence
CHAPTER 12 Page68
Efficient andeffective organisationof planningenforcement
12.1 Complexityand theneedto co-operateandorganise12.2 Action or reaction
12.3 Setting priorities12.4 Targettime-limits forprogressingenforcement action12.5-12.7Documentingthe case
12.5 Maintaininggood records
12.6 Whatacaserecordshouldcontain12.7 Usingcomputersfor recordingandbudgetarycontrol
12.8 Theorganisation ofthe enforcementteam
Introduction
Enforcing planning control
Good practice guide for local planningauthorities (LPAS)
INTRODUCTION
Sections 1 to 11 of the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 (“1991 Act’), together withrelated secondarylegislation,Departmentof the EnvironmentCircular 21/91 and17/92and
PlanningPolicy GuidanceNoteNo 18 (PPG18),publishedin December1991,represented
theculminationof the Government’s responseto, and implementationof, mostof the
recommendations madeby RobertCarnwathQC, in his 1989 report“Enforcing Planning
Control” (ISBN 0 117521949).
2. The report’s final recommendationwasthat considerationshouldhe givento the
preparationof a practicemanualfor LPAson all aspectsof (planning)enforcementwork.
3. Thisguide is the Government’s responseto that final recommendation.
THE PURPOSE OF THE GUIDE
4. It wasrecommendedthat the guide shouldcoverbestpracticewith regardto investigation,
negotiation,drafting andprocedure,appeals,prosecution,stopnotices,injunctions,default
actionandotheraspectsof the system,andincludeexamplesfrom actualcases.The twelve
partsto this manualattempt toaddressthesefundamentalrequirementsandare prefacedby
a brief summaryof “dos” and“don’ts”.
5. Thereis inevitably someoverlapwith the proceduraladvicenow containedin the
consolidatedandup-datedplanningenforcement Circular10/97,andevento someextentwith thepolicy advicecontainedin PPG18.The primary intentionof this guide,however,
is that it shouldsimply complementthosepublications. It is not intendedto give furtherpolicy guidanceor to duplicatethe proceduralguidancein the Circular. It is recognised
that the Departmentof the Environment,TransportandtheRegionsis not itself involved
in mostof the day to daydevelopmentcontrol processesthat concernLPAs. Its primary
role is confinedto providing, throughParliament,thelegislative enablingframeworkand
powersfor LPAs to usein the courseof this work, to providingpolicy andproceduralguidance,and toits statutoryduties,throughthe Secretaryof Stateor PlanningInspectors
actingon his behalf, in determiningappealsagainstenforcementnotices. It is alsorecognisedthat the appealprocess,in which the Departmentandits PlanningInspectorate
agencyare mostdirectly involved,will often form only a small part of the totalworkinvolved in enforcingplanning controlin any particularcase. Many LPAs will already
havedevelopedtheir own effectiveandperfectlyacceptablemethodsof undertakingall the
practicalwork involved in enforcingplanningcontrol. If thosemethodsare alreadyproven
to be effective, it may bereasonableto continueto usethem.
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EnforcingPlanningControl
6. The manualis not only intendedto assistprofessionalPlanningstaff in LPAs. It isaddressedequally to LPA lawyers,administratorsandinvestigatingstaff, suchasEnforcementOfficers,aswell asto thosemembersof a LPA involved in delegatingvariousenforcementpowersto officersand committees,or who are involved in takingdevelopmentcontrol decisionsthemselves.It will also be ofhelpto thoseconcernedwith thedevelopmentcontrolof listed buildings andconservationareas,minerals,hazardoussubstancesandprotectedtrees.
EXAMPLES FROM CASES
7. Throughoutthe text, efforts have beenmadeto include referencesto the mostup to date,
relevantjudicial authoritiesknownaboutatthe time ofpublication. Wherepossible,casecitationsusedare takenfrom full casereportscontainedin theJournal ofPlanning&EnvironmentLaw (JPL), asthis is thepublicationthoughtmost likely to bereadilyavailable toLPA officers. Wherea full casereport is not knownto beavailable,judgmentsummarieshave beencited, takenfrom JPLbulletins(the greenpagesprecededby theletter “B”) or EstatesGazette casesummaries(the loose,green“EGCS” inserts). Otherreports citedaremainly takenfrom Property,PlanningandCompensationReports(P&CR) andJustice ofthe Peace &Local GovernmentLaw (JP).
10
Introduction
DO DON’T
Have an enforcement policy Enforce solely to regularise acceptable development
Have regard to judicial authority Enforce solely to obtain a fee
Have regard to the provisions of the Give weight, either way, to the factdevelopment plan and other material that the development has already taken place
Have regard to national policy guidance Have regard to other immaterial (non-planning)considerations
Have regard to procedural advice in Let protracted negotiation delay essentialDOE/WO Circulars and use the enforcement actionexample/model notices as guides
Investigate complaints thoroughly and Be overtaken by time limits for enforcementact promptly
Keep accurate records, including Forget to consult other departments andphotographs where possible sources of information
Respect complainants’ confidentiality
Prevent delay by ensuring that a properly delegatedperson is always available to take urgentaction/decisions when needed
Be prepared to give reasons for taking Act without proper authority accordingenforcement action or ignoring a to Standing Ordersbreach or inviting an application for permission
Use the appropriate investigative powers Seek to restore land to a better condition than it was inbefore the breach took place
Be prepared to justify using those powers Be too legalistic
Use HM Land Registry and own records Be unduly cautious about serving stop notices
Maintain close liaison between Council Departments Hesitate to issue enforcement notices in the alternative,if unsure of the nature of the breach
Have regard to the provisions of the Police and Ignore other uses on land in mixed use whenCriminal Evidence Act 1984 when interviewing formulating allegations, or the provisions ofpersons suspected of criminal offences section 173(11)
Be aware of the Local Government Ombudsman Require “immediate” compliance with an enforcementnotice (that does not give a period)
Keep up to date with reported case law and keep Forget that a neighbouring LPA may have relevantstaff informed by circulating it experience or be a source of advice
11
Statingthe authority’senforcementpolicy
CHAPTER 1
Stating the authority’senforcement policy
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The planningauthority’s decisionwhetherto take enforcement actionmustalways bewell-
founded.Whetherit is “expedient” for the authorityto initiate formal enforcementaction,
to remedyor stopanallegedbreachof planningcontrol, requiresthoroughassessmentof therelevantfactors in every case.That assessmentis mademoredifficult if the authorityhavenotproducedaclearstatementof enforcementpolicy to provideadecision-makingframework.Paragraph9.1 of thebooklet entitled“A CharterGuide: DevelopmentControl”
(publishedjointly by the NationalPlanningForum,Departmentof theEnvironmentand
theWelshOffice) states—
“The Council’spolicy on enforcementwill be publicised.It will explain theCouncil’senforcementproceduresandpractice.”
1.2 Whatthe authority’senforcementpolicy statementshouldsaydependspartly on thejudgement ofthe PlanningCommittee,advisedby their officers, on whatresourcesshouldbe allocated to the task of enforcingplanning controlefficiently andcost-effectivelyintheir administrativearea.The businessof investigatingandremedyingallegedbreaches of
control is usuallylabour-intensive.Theresourcesallocated forthispurposeshouldtherefore
beregularly reviewedas local circumstanceschange.It is recommendedthat thisshould
takeplace at leastoncea year,possiblyto coincide withthe annualbudgetprocess.
Reviews shouldbe basedon up-to-date informationaboutenforcementactivity and trends,using IT equipmentto maintainaccuraterecordsandretrievedata.
THE POLICY STATEMENT
1.3 A statementof enforcementpolicy will addresssomeor all of thefollowing issues—
(1) the mainplanningpolicies applicablein theCouncil’s administrativearea,as statedin
their developmentplan;
(2) the typeandincidenceof enforcementproblems;
(3) the resources(financialandstaff) to be devotedto enforcingplanningcontrol,aspartof theauthority’splanning functionor in associationwith theirotherenforcementresponsibilities;
(4) theprocedurefor dealingwith complaintsaboutallegedlyunauthoriseddevelopment;
(5) anyspecialplanningenforcementissuesthe authoritymayanticipate(egunlawful
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EnforcingPlanningControl
DO DON’T
Allocate the necessary resources to see action Forget to enter action in the register of enforcement andthrough to the end stop notices and breach of condition notices
Delegate sensibly (the next committee meeting may Forget to withdraw a redundant notice in good timebe too late)
Make sure action is properly authorised Forget that BCNs are available for some breaches
Be clear and precise in specifying breaches Ignore the possible advantages of “default’ action over
and requirements prosecution
Use plain language Hesitate to challenge an appeal decision that is clearlydefective
Be prepared to use all the enforcement powersavailable, commensurate with the seriousnessof the breach
Use the provisions of sections 171 B(4)(b) Forget some Magistrates’ Courts see few enforcement
and 289(4A) cases
Make sure the reasons for issuing the enforcement Try to prosecute an owner under section 179(4)notice match its requirements
Stick to procedural time-limits or ask forjustifiable extensions
Be prepared to counter requests for adjournment
Set priorities for enforcement action Ignore the benefits of computerised record-keeping
Involve the police if trouble is expected Ignore the safety of staff
Have regard to the Council’s obligations under Be strong with the weak and weak with the strongother legislation which may be invoked as aresult of enforcement action
Be flexible and consider Qenuine alternative Be influenced by threats or other irregular pressures
solutions
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EnforcingPlanningControl
winning andworking of minerals;unauthorisedwaste-tipping;or the frequent
stationing of residential caravanson privately ownedlandwithoutplanning
permission);and
(6) how the authority intends tomonitor new building activity onsiteswhere the building
controlfunction is not beingcarriedout by the authority.
FORMULATING THE POLICY STATEMENT
1.4 Thestatementof enforcementpolicy shouldbe formulatedby referenceto—
(1) nationalpolicy in PlanningPolicyGuidanceNote (PPG)18, “Enforcing Planning
Control”;
(2) relevant statementsin the authority’sdevelopmentplan;
(3) the needto maintain the integrity ofspeciallyprotectedareas,including National
Parks,Areasof OutstandingNaturalBeauty,Sitesof SpecialScientific Interest and
ConservationAreas; and
(4) the needto achievea reasonable balancebetweenprotectingamenityandother
interestsof acknowledgedimportance throughoutthe authority’sareaandenabling
acceptabledevelopment totakeplace,eventhoughit may initially havebeen
unauthorised,
1.5 The authority should haveregard,where appropriate,to the provisionsin section73A oftheTown andCountryPlanningAct 1990,asamended.Theseprovisions enableplanning
permissionto be grantedfor buildingsor worksconstructedor carriedout, or a useof landinstituted,without planningpermission.The authority’sapproachto enforcing planning
control overunauthorised developmentshouldnot thereforebe stricter, for planning
purposes,than it would be whenconsideringthemeritsof aprior applicationfor planningpermissionbeforedevelopmentstarts.The authority shouldnotusetheir enforcement
powerssolely to compelsomeonewho has carriedout unauthorised developmentwhich is
acceptable onits planningmerits,without the imposition ofany planning conditions,to
paytheplanning applicationfee theauthoritywould havereceivedif an applicationhad
beensubmittedto them.
THE AVAILABILITY OF APPEAL COSTS IN ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
1.6 Appealcostsmay beawardedagainstthe authoritywhere someonewho appealsto the
Secretaryof State against anenforcement noticecanshowthat theauthority behaved
“unreasonably”during the enforcementproceedings,if the appellantincurs unnecessary
expensein pursuingthe appeal.A detailedexplanationof “unreasonable”conductis in
paragraphs21 to 28 of Annex3 to DOECircular8/93. In brief, whenconsideringwhether
to usetheir discretionaryenforcementpowers,the authoritywill be expectedto ensurethattheir decisionto issuean enforcementnotice takesfull account of relevantjudicial
authority, policy guidancein PPG18 and anywell-publicisedappeal decisions.
1.7 Nevertheless,the authority shouldnot be inhibitedfrom taking enforcementaction whichthey consideressentialin the public interestby any suggestionthat individual membersof
the Planning Committeecouldbe “surcharged”if thereis asubsequentawardof appeal
14
The responseto an enforcementnoticeappeal
(6) that the stepsrequiredby the notice to be taken,or the activities requiredby thenotice to cease,exceedwhat is necessaryto remedyany breachof planning control
which maybe constitutedby thosemattersor, as the casemaybe,to remedyany injury
to amenitywhich hasbeencausedby anysuchbreach(ground (f));
(7) that anyperiodspecifiedin thenotice in accordancewith section173(9) falls short of
whatshouldreasonablybe allowed(ground(g)).
6.3 The appealon ground(a) is anappealsolelyon planningmerits.Thisgroundof appealis
directly linked to the “deemed”applicationfor planningpermissioninherentin an
enforcementappeal,for which section177(5)of the 1990 Act provides.In most cases,an
administrativefee is payable(in accordancewith a tariff prescribedin the Planning
Application FeesRegulations)to theSecretaryof Stateandthe LPA asa contribution
towardstheir expensesin dealingwith thedeemedplanningapplication.Whenthis fee is
not paidwithin the time-limit specifiedfor it in eachcaseby the Secretaryof State,section
177(5A)of the 1990 Act providesthat the appealon ground(a) andthe deemedplanning
applicationwill lapse.The appealcanthenonly proceedon whicheverof grounds(b) to
(g) the appellanthasselected.
6.4 Grounds(b), (c), (d) and(e) are usuallyknownas the “legal grounds” of appealbecause
theyare eachconcernedwith mixed issuesof factandPlanningLaw. An appellantwho
relieson any of thesegroundswill haveto providerelevantfactsto supportthem.This
processwill usuallyinvolve adetailedexaminationof theplanninghistoryof the
enforcementappealsite.
6.5 Grounds(f) and(g) deal, respectively,with whetherthe LPA’ srequiredremedialstepsin
the enforcementnoticeare excessivefor their purpose;andwhetherthe specified
complianceperiod is shorterthanshouldreasonablybe allowed.Thesetwo groundsarenot
concernedwith theplanningmerits of the allegedbreachor with any legal issuewhich may
be involved in the appeal.
THE ENFORCEMENT APPEAL PROCESS
6.6 Becausethesubmissionof a valid enforcementappealsuspendstheeffect of the
enforcementnotice,it is vital for theLPA’ sofficers to respondpromptlyto the Planning
InspectorateAgency’ srequestsfor information.Quick responseswill enabletheappealto
be processedefficiently andeven-handedlytowardsboth principal parties.Unlessthe
LPA’s responseis promptandhelpful, a stalematecanresultwhich brings the entire
planningenforcementprocessinto disreputeandis likely to provokecriticism from any
neighboursof the sitewhoseamenityis adverselyaffectedby thebreachof control. If the
LPA considerthereis a realisticprospectthat negotiationwith the appellantcouldresult in
withdrawalof the appeal,or of the enforcementnotice,theyshouldpursuenegotiations
vigorouslyduringthe appealand inform the PlanningInspectorate’scaseofficer aboutwhat
progressis being made.
6.7 Mostenforcementappealsare decidedby “an appointedperson”,who is a Planning
Inspectorto whom the Secretaryof State’sjurisdiction to determinethe appealis formally
transferred.Thereare threeproceduresfor processinganddecidingtheappeal—
(1) by a public inquiry (including a site-inspection):an inquiry will usuallybe heldwhen
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Statingthe authority’senforcementpolicy
costs againstthe authorityfor “unreasonable”conduct.Theprovisionsof section20(1)(b)
of theLocalGovernmentFinanceAct 1982enablethe auditor to certify thatan amountis
duefor recovery where“a losshasbeenincurredor deficiency causedby the wilful
misconductof anyperson”.It seemsmostunlikely that a PlanningCommittee’scollective
decision,evenif it is contraryto officers’ advice,would everamount to“wilful misconduct”,
unlessit wasmadefor an improperpurpose.
Enforcing PlanningControl -
CHAPTER 2
Investigating allegations ofunauthorised development
INTRODUCTION
2.1 At the outset,thoroughinvestigation ofthefactsof any allegedlyunauthorised
developmentis vital to effectiveenforcementof planningcontrol.Theplanning historyofthe relevantparcelof land must be establishedas accuratelyas practicable,usingall the
availablesources(including the knowledgeof theParishCouncil and local residents).
2.2 A completedocumentaryrecordof all investigationis essential.Whereverpossible,it
shouldincludephotographicrecordswhich are signedanddatedby thepersontaking the
photographs.All photographicrecordsshouldhe supplementedby a locationplan showing
the positionfrom which eachphotographwastaken.
CITIZEN’S CHARTER STANDARDS
2.3 Thejointly publishedDOE, WelshOffice andNationalPlanningForumbookletentitled
“Planning—CharterStandards”(April 1994) recommendsto planningauthoritieswhat
constitutesa goodstandardof planningenforcementservice,asfollows—
(1) acknowledgingsomeone’scomplaintwithin threeworking daysof receivingit;
(2) treatingthe complaint as confidential,as far as possible,within the authority;
(3) visiting the siteof the allegedlyunauthorised developmentand ascertainingwhat
activities are taking placethere;
(4) writing to the complainantagain,within fifteen working daysof the complaint,
explainingwhataction the authorityproposeto take,or why they think no formal
enforcement actionis needed;and
(5) telling the complainantabout theauthority’sdecisionto takeformal enforcement
actionwithin ten working daysof the authority’smaking thatdecision.
THE AUTHORITY’S INVESTIGATIVE POWERS
2.4 The planning authority havethreemain investigativepowersfor planningenforcement
purposes.They are—
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Investigating allegationsof unauthorised development
(1) section330of theTown and CountryPlanningAct 1990: this powermay be usedinorder to obtain relevantinformation at an earlystageof theenforcementprocess.
Receiptof a noticerequestinginformationwhich is clearly being soughtfor a possible
enforcementpurposemay suffice to prompttherecipientto remedythe apparently
unauthoriseddevelopmentstraightaway,without any formalenforcementaction.(The
recipientof the noticemustbeeitherthe occupierof thepremisesor the person
receivingrentfor them.)
(2) section16 ofthe Local Government (MiscellaneousProvisions)Act 1976 : these
provisionsare primarily intendedto enabletheauthority to establishthe factsabout
ownershipof land.The requisitionmay bedirectedto theoccupier,any freeholder,
mortgageeor lessee,anypersonreceivingrent from the land,andanypersonwho is
legally authorisedto manageor arrangethe letting of the land.
Two offencesmay arise fromtheseprovisions,namely—
(a) failure to respondto the noticewithin the statedtime-limit; and
(b) furnishing information which the defendantknows to be false, orcontainsa
recklesslymadefalsestatement.
On conviction of eitheroffence,the maximumsummarypenaltyis £5,000.
(3) section171Cofthe Town and CountryPlanningAct 1990: these provisionsenablethe
authorityto servea “planningcontraventionnotice”, as describedin paragraphs2.5 to
2.7 below.-
THE PLANNING CONTRAVENTION NOTICE
2.5 The planningcontraventionnotice (PCN) is intendedto bethe main methodby which
the planning authorityobtain information aboutallegedlyunauthoriseddevelopment.
Guidanceon how to usethis typeof notice is givenin Annex 1 to DETR Circular 10/97.A
model PCN is provided in the Appendixto Annex 1.
2.6 ThePCN may also beusedto invite its recipientto respondconstructivelyto theplanning
authority by discussinghow anysuspected breachof control may besatisfactorily remedied.This might include,for example,a discussionwith officers orelectedmembers about
whetherconditional planningpermissionmight be grantedfor whatever developmentismutually agreedto havetakenplace.This is an optionalprocedure,for usein appropriate
circumstances.No face-to-facediscussionneedbe offeredin caseswhere theplanning
authorityconsiderit unnecessaryor unhelpful,or whereit would delayurgently required
enforcementaction.
2.7 Judgmentgiven in the High Court on 19 December1994,in thecaseof R v TeignbridgeDistrict Council ex parte TeignmouthQuayCoLtd [1995] JPL 828,held that, while the
PCN procedurewasnotasdraconianas an enforcementnotice,it wasnevertheless“an
intrusive procedure”which shouldnot be deployedunlessit appearedto theplanning
authority that a breachof planningcontrol might havetakenplace.It follows from this
judgment thatthe authority shouldneveruse aPCN to carry out an investigative“trawl”,
just tosatisfy themselves aboutwhatactivities are takingplaceon aparcelof land.Beforea
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EnforcingPlanningControl
PCN is served,the authoritymust havesomeprima facieevidenceto justify their suspicionthat abreachof planningcontrol is takingplace,or hasoccurred,on theland to which the
noticerelates.
COMPENSATION FOR LOSS OR DAMAGE RESULTING FROM SUBSEQUENTSTOP NOTICE
2.8 Section186(5)(b)of the 1990 Act providesthat, in theeventof a claim forcompensation
for loss or damageresultingfrom a stop noticeprohibiting someactivity on the land by
someonewho wasstatutorily requiredto provide information to the authority,no
compensationis payablein respectof loss ordamagewhich couldhave beenavoidedhad
he or sheprovidedthe requiredinformation,or hadotherwise co-operatedwith the
planning authoritywhenrespondingto their notice.Theseprovisionsshouldhelp to
providea financialincentivefor the recipientof anyof thesethreetypesof notice to replyfully andtruthfully to a requestfor information. The modelPCN in the Appendix to
Annex 1 to DETR Circular 10/97mentionsthe effectof theseprovisionsin Schedule2(paragraph 4).Therecipientof sucha noticeshouldbe specificallywarnedaboutthem
where theauthority anticipatea subsequent decisionto serveastop noticebecausethe
apparentbreachof control is particularly serious.
ACCESS TO HM LAND REGISTRY
2.9 Wheretheauthority cannotobtainessentialinformation aboutland ownership,or they
suspectthat falseor incomplete informationhasbeensubmittedto them in responseto a
requisition, it maybe worthwhile to seekinformationfrom HM Land Registryaboutthe
identityof peoplewho havea legal interest inaparcelof land.TheLandRegistry now
maintainsan “open” registerof interestsin- land.The registeris being progressively
extendedandwill eventuallyinclude all land in EnglandandWales. Forland whichhas
beenenteredon theregister,the authority shouldbe ableto obtain informationfrom the
relevantDistrict LandRegistry’sChiefRegistrar.
OTHER SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN THE COUNCIL’S RECORDS
2.10 Staffresponsible forinvestigatinganysuspected breachof planningcontrol shouldbearin
mind thatotherDepartmentsof the Council may alreadypossessrelevantfactual
information aboutthecurrentownershipor use of aparticularparcelof land,or its history
havingregardto theprovisionsof the DataProtectionAct 1984.For example,information
may have beenobtainedfor Council Tax assessmentpurposeswhich would help to establish
the legalstatusor ownershipof land.
2.11 It is particularly importantthat theplanning authoritydo notoverlookanyrelevant
informationavailableto the Council for Building Regulationspurposes.Sometimes,a
personwho hasnot obtainedtherequisiteplanningpermissionfor developmentwill have
soughtandreceiveda Building Regulationsapproval.Thisoftenmeansthat aperson
responsiblefor building controlhasinspected,or will inspect,thebuilding work taking
placeon theland.The authority shouldensurethat effectiveliaison arrangementsfor
transmittinginformationalwaysoperatebetween staffin their PlanningDepartmentand
thoseresponsiblefor building control.Thiswasemphasisedby the High Court’s judgment,
on 31 July 1986,in thecaseof R v BasildonDistrict Council ex parte Martin Grant Homes
18
Investigatingallegations ofunauthorised development
Ltd [1987] JPL 863:theCourtheld that,wherethe Council’sPlanningCommitteehadgranted planningpermissionfor ninedwellingsandassociateddevelopment,theymustbedeemed tohaveknownof a Building Regulationsconsent grantedby the Councilafewweeksearlier for the samedevelopment.In a report published on15 July 1992 (ManchesterCity Council,ComplaintsNos. 90/C/2240and91/C/1726),the Local GovernmentOmbudsman stated,asa principle,thatthereis maladministrationwhere alocal authority’sbuilding controlstaffdo not notify theplanningstaffwhentheybecomeawareof apossiblebreach ofplanning control.
THE RIGHT OF ENTRY TO LAND FOR ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES
2.12 Sections196A, 196Band196C oftheTownandCountry PlanningAct 1990 provide theplanningauthority’sauthorisedofficers with the right to enterlandfor enforcementpurposes. The powers are limited to what is considered essential to enable the authority toenforceplanning controleffectively in most situations theirofficers are likely to meet.Annex 5 to DETR Circular10/97 explains indetail-howthesepowersarebestused.
THE DUTY TO ADMINISTER A CAUTION DURING INVESTIGATION
2.13 Provisionsin sections66 and67 of the Police and CriminalEvidenceAct 1984 requirea
caution tobe administeredin certaincircumstanceswhenacontraventionis being
investigated,or, during an investigation,whenit is first suspectedthat an offencehasbeen
committed.(It shouldbe notedthat the powerto enterland andcarry out an investigation
for planningenforcementpurposes doesnot dependon a prior suspicionthatsomecontraventionof PlanningLaw has occurred.)A code of practice,knownas “CodeC”(Codeof Practice forthe detention,treatmentandquestioningof personsby policeofficers), hasbeenissuedby the HomeSecretary.It explains when,andin whatterms,acautionmustbe given during an investigation.Theplanningauthority’sSolicitoror LegalAdviserwill be awareof the requirementsin the Police andCriminal EvidenceAct 1984andwill be able to advise the authority’sofficers aboutwhenandhow it should beappliedin practice.
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Enforcing PlanningControl
CHAPTER 3
Deciding whether to take formalenforcementaction
INTRODUCTION
3.1 The decisionwhetherit is “expedient”(as in section 172(1)(b)of theTown andCountry
PlanningAct 1990) to takeformal enforcementaction in any caseis within thelocal
planningauthority’s sole discretion.Theauthority must haveregardto relevantplanning
policies in their developmentplan andtheparticular circumstancesof any alleged,or
suspected,breachof planningcontrol.But the authority’s discretionis not “unfettered”.
THE REQUIREMENT OF “REASONABLENESS”
3.2 The decisionmustnot be“unreasonable”in the judicial senseof “Wednesbury
unreasonable”.This meansthat it mustnotbe basedon irrationalfactors;or taken without
proper considerationof the relevantfactsandplanning issues;or basedon non-planning
grounds.For example,it would notbe reasonablefor the authority to seekto remedya
noise-nuisanceby issuingan enforcementnoticeunlesstherewerealso relevantplanning
reasonsfor requiring theuse ofland whichis causingunacceptablelevelsof noiseto
neighboursto ceaseor besubstantiallymodified,Generallyspeaking,if a decisionto take
enforcementaction is unreasonable,theremedylies in an appealto the Secretaryof State
againsttheenforcementnotice.The appealwill consider whetherthereis a proper
planningcasefor thenotice.Althoughit rarelyhappens,an authority’sdecisionto take,or
not to take,enforcementactionmay be challenged,in theHigh Court, by wayof an
applicationfor leaveto bring judicial review proceedings.The Courtis likely to accept
jurisdiction to considerjudicial reviewonly wherethe rightof appealis not appropriate,
suchas whereit is allegedthat the enforcement noticewas issuedin badfaith or wasnot
properly authorised.Similarly, adecisionnot to takeenforcementactionwill not be
reviewableunlessit is basedon an errorof law, or is arbitraryor capricious.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT OMBUDSMAN’S JURISDICTION
3.3 Many investigationsof allegedor suspectedbreaches ofplanningcontrol resultfrom
neighbours’complaintsto the authorityaboutnuisance.It follows that, in deciding
whetherto takeformalenforcementaction,the authoritymust observedecision-making
proceduresenablingthem to satisfyany complainantsthatwhateverdecisionis eventually
takenis well-foundedin all respects.Decisionswhetherto takeformal enforcementaction
are regularlyfeaturedin reportsby the LocalGovernmentOmbudsmaninto alleged
“maladministration”.The Ombudsmanheld in onesuchcase(BassetlawDistrict Council,
20
Decidingwhetherto take formalenforcementaction
ComplaintNo. 90/7/1723,reportissuedon 7 May 1992) that, wherethereis evidenceof a
breachof planningcontrol, therewill be maladministrationunlessthe planning authority
eithersolicit an applicationfor planningpermissionto legitimise the situation,or consider
taking enforcementaction. In this context,it is vital for the authority to maintaina
properlydocumentedrecordof their investigation ofeachcaseandof thereasons whythey
decidedto take, or not to take,enforcementaction. Providedsucha recordis maintained,
it shouldusuallybe sufficientto convincethe LocalGovernmentOmbudsmanthat no
maladministrationhas occurred.
THE IMPORTANCE OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
3.4 The planning authoritymustalwayshaveregardto relevantjudicial authority in deciding
whetherformal enforcement actionis appropriate.Thereare manyrelevantcases,of which
the most importantare mentioned inthe Encyclopediaof PlanningLaw andPractice
publishedby Sweet& Maxwell Ltd. Wherethereis any doubtexpertlegal adviceshouldbe
obtainedbeforeadecisionis taken. Inexceptionalcases,it may beprudent toseek
Counsel’sopinion on matterswherethereis apparently conflictinglegal opinionor judicial
authority.Although thefee for Counsel’sopinionmay seemcomparativelyexpensivein
this context,it may laterprove to be well worthwhile, especiallyif it meansthat the
authority decidethecorrectcourseof action,andsuccessfullydefend any appealor court
challenge.It will be evenmoreworthwhileif it enablesappealsto be avoided.
GOVERNMENT’S PLANNING GUIDANCE
3.5 TheGovernment’s planningpolicy guidanceon the generalapproachto enforcementand
the criteriafor taking enforcementactionin someof themost frequentlyencounteredcases
of unauthorised developmentare statedin paragraphs5 to 18 of PPG 18 (“Enforcing
PlanningControl”). The decisiveissuefor the planning authorityto considerin eachcase
is whetherthe allegedbreachof control would unacceptablyaffectpublic amenityor the
existinguse oflandor buildings meritingprotectionin the public interest.It is also
important toensurethat anyenforcementaction whichthe authority decideto takeshould
be commensuratewith the seriousnessof the breachof control it is intendedto remedy.
SUBSTANTIATING A DECISION NOT TO TAKE ENFORCEMENT ACTION
3.6 Althoughthe planning authorityhavediscretionto takeformal enforcementactionwhen
it appearsto them “expedient”to do so,it is equally importantto ensurethat adecisionnot
to initiate enforcement actionis well-founded.This is becauseof possiblejudicial review.
The High Court’s judgment, on29 July 1994,in the case of Rv SevenoaksDistrict Council
ex partePalley [1995] JPL 915,illustratestheway in which the Court mayintervene
(following a judicial review application)to quashadecisionnot to take enforcement
actionwheretheapplicant inthe judicial reviewproceedingswas aneighbouring
landowner.In brief, the point at issuein this case waswhetheraparcelof landwasbeing
usedfor “agriculture” or wasin mixed usefor agricultural activitiesanda tradeor business.The Judgeheld that theCouncil’sofficer should havemadefurtherenquiriesto determine
whetherthe use ofthe landwasfor thepurposeof a tradeor business.Suchenquirieswere
not madeandthe questionwasnot addressedin the Council’s officer’s report tothe
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Enforcing PlanningControl
Planningsub-committee.A laterdecision, basedon theseenquiries,not to take
enforcementactionwasthusflawed andwasconsequentlyquashedby the Court.
THE ALTERNATIVE COURSE OF INVITING A PLANNING APPLICATION
3.7 Wheneverit is appropriate,the usualalternativeto taking formalenforcementaction is to
invite a retrospectiveplanning application.In approachingthis possibility, the LPA should
considerthe meritsof grantingplanningpermissionfor unauthoriseddevelopment inthe
sameway astheywould approachaplanning applicationfor proposeddevelopment.The
fact thatthe developmenthasalreadytakenplaceshouldmake nodifferenceto the LPA’s
considerationof its merits.
3.8 TheLPA would needto takeinto accounttheviews of neighboursandother interested
parties.
(1) otherDepartmentsof the authority (egthe EnvironmentalHealthDepartmentif the
developmentinvolvesnoise-nuisance);
(2) the local highwayauthority;
(3) statutoryconsultees(eg theEnvironmentAgency if thedevelopmentinvolvesactualor potential pollutionof a water-course).
TIMING OF THE AUTHORISATION TO ISSUE AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE
3.9 Becausethe provisionsof section172(1)of the 1990 Act enablethe LPA to issuean
enforcement notice“where it appearsto themthat therehasbeenabreachof planning
control,...“ it is vital that, when authorisingthe issueof a notice,thereis some
evidenceavailableto themto show that theallegedbreachhasoccurred.It follows from
theseprovisionsthat the LPA cannotlawfully authorisethe issue of an enforcement
notice in anticipationof a breachof control. (Theseprovisionsdo not applyto a
planning enforcement injunction,wheretheprovisionsof Section187B(1) of the 1990
Act enable an “actualor apprehendedbreachof planning control tobe restrainedby
injunction,...”).
3.10 The requirementthat someevidenceof a breachof controlshould existcanproduce
practicaldifficulties whenit is unclearwhetheranew useof land is merely temporaryor is
intendedto be permanent. Thesedifficulties canbeparticularly troublesomewherea
landowneror occupierclaims thata newusebenefitsfrom”permitteddevelopment”rights
grantedby virtue of provisionsin the GeneralPermitted DevelopmentOrder. This is
illustratedby the circumstancesof the High Court’s judgment inthecaseof R v Rochester
upon MedwayCity Council ex parte WendyHobday[1990] JPL 17. In that case,the LPA’s
decisionon 17 November1987 purportedto authorisethe issueandserviceof an
enforcementnoticeon or afterthefifteenthdayof markettradingat a time whenonly 7days’tradinghadelapsed.It wasclaimedthat theactivity thenbenefitedfrom “permitted
development” rightsin the GeneralDevelopmentOrder, current atthat time, which
allowedtheholdingof a temporarymarketon notmorethan 14 daysin anycalendaryear.
If theyconsidered,as in this case,thenewuse was atemporaryone,the LPA couldonly
22
Decidingwhetherto take formalenforcementaction
authorisethe issueof anenforcement noticeafter theperiod of “permitted development”hadexpired. Subsequently,theLPA decidedthat thenew usehadbecomepermanentandsought,at meetingsin March andApril 1988,to ratify the resolution of17 November1987.TheCourt’s judgmentheld that, becausetheoriginal resolutionwas invalid, it couldnot subsequentlyberatified.
CONSIDERING WHETHER IT IS “EXPEDIENT” TO ISSUE AN ENFORCEMENTNOTICE
3.11 Theprovisionsof section 172(1)(b)enablethe LPA to issueanenforcementnotice where
it appearsto them “expedient toissue thenotice, havingregardto the provisions ofthedevelopmentplanand to anyothermaterialconsiderations.”It follows from theseprovisionsthat thequestion of“expediency”is a discretionarymatteron which the LPA
must themselvesdecidein theparticular circumstances of eachcase.Providedthe LPAhaveproperlydirected themselves inrelationto considering anyrelevantprovisions ofthedevelopmentplanand anyotherconsiderationswhichare clearly material for aplanningpurpose,their decisionwhetherto issueanenforcementnoticeshould becapableof
withstandingany criticism that it wasnot well-founded.
3.12 Occasionally, somebodywith a privateinterest inthe land,or in someneighbouringparcel
of land,may representto the LPA that enforcementactionshould betaken to protect,or
to further,thatprivate interest. Thishappenedin the case ofPerry v Stanborough
(Developments)Ltd and WimborneDC and Dorset CC [1978]JPL 36, where aneighbouring landowner sought to compeltheLPA to enforce aplanningcondition
requiring an estate road to befully madeup to the adjoiningboundary ofthe developer’sland. Inrefusingtheapplication,theCourtheldthatParliamenthadexpresslyleft it to theLPA to decidewhetherenforcementactionwasdesirableor not. Thefactthat theLPA had
imposedaplanningconditionin relationto thedevelopmentof onepieceof landcouldnot mean thattheLPA necessarilyhadan obligationto enforceit for the benefit oftheowner ofanotherpieceof land.
“ISSUE ESTOPPEL”
3.13 Judicialauthority hasestablishedthat the legalconceptin privatelaw knownas “issue
estoppel”appliesin strictly limited circumstancesto the LPA’s decisionwhetherto initiate
enforcementaction. Thetwo leadingcases(whichare judgmentsgiven in the Houseof
Lordson 14 December1989) arecited asThrasyvoulouv Secretaryof Statefor the
EnvironmentandHackneyLBC; andOliver and Othersv SecretaryofStatefor the
EnvironmentandHaveringLBC [1990]59 P&CR 326. Briefly summarised,thejudgementsmeanthat thelegal conceptof “res judicata” (literally, the matter havingbeenjudged)appliesto decision-makingon appealson grounds(b) to (e) in section174(2) of the 1990Act (knownas the“legal groundsof appeal”).Thus, once a mixedissueof law and fact(forexample,whethera particular change ofuseof landamounts inlaw to a “material changeof use”) hasbeendecidedin an enforcementappeal,theLPA are “estopped”(that isprecluded)from subsequentlymaking the sameallegation in alaterenforcementnotice,inthe absenceofany materialdifferencein thefactsofthe use.Thisconceptextends to anyattemp,ttheLPA might make todescribea particularuseof landin different termson asubsequentoccasionif the reality is that the actualuseof the landwas thesameon bothoccasions.The practicalconsequenceis that,once anissueof factandlaw hasbeendecided in anenforcementappeal,andtherehasbeenno furthersuccessfulappealagainst
23
Enforcing PlanningControl
it (under section289 ofthe 1990 Act) to the High Court, the LPA cannotre-openthat
particularissueby taking furtherenforcementactionon it.
3.14 Issueestoppeldoesnot applyto anydecisionon planningmerits (ground(a) andthe
deemedplanning applicationin an enforcementappeal) becausea decisionwhetherto
grantplanningpermissiondoesnotdependon questionsof law andfact: it is anexerciseof
thedecision-maker’splanning judgement.
3.15 Issueestoppeldoesnot applywherethe Secretaryof Statehasallowedan appeal and
quashedan enforcement noticeon proceduralgrounds,in accordancewith the powerin
section 176(3)(b)of the 1990 Act. In thecaseof R v WychavonDC andSecretaryof State
for the Environment exparteSaunders[1991] EGCS 122, theHigh Courtheld that a
decisionto allow an appealandquasha noticeon proceduralgroundsdid not confer any
legal rights on thedevelopmentallegedin the notice.
24
Issuing anenforcementnotice
CHAPTER 4
Issuing an enforcementnotice
INTRODUCTION
4.1 The provisionsof section172(1)of theTown andCountryPlanningAct 1990enablethe
LPA to issueanenforcement noticewheretheyconsidertherehasbeena breachof
planning controlandit is expedient toissuethe notice.What is meantby “issuing” an
enforcement noticeis not definedin the 1990Act. TheDepartmentof the Environment,
Transportandthe Regionsinterpretsthis termasmeaningthat the LPA shouldproducea
properlyauthorisednoticewhich is thenretainedin their documentaryrecordof
enforcementnotices.Copiesof eachenforcement noticehaveto be servedon specified
persons whohave aninterestjn therelevantland.
PROPER AUTHORISATION TO ISSUE A NOTICE
4.2 Becauseanenforcement noticeissuedwithout properauthorisationis likely to be
vulnerable tolegalchallenge onthe groundthatit is “a nullity” (and, thus,of no effect), it
is vital to ensurethat every enforcement noticeis properly authorised.The relevant
provisionsfor dischargeof a local authority’sfunctions, includingissuingenforcement
notices,are in section101 of theLocal GovernmentAct 1972.Among otherthings, they
enablean authorityto arrangefor the dischargeof anyfunctionsby acommittee,a sub-
committeeor anofficer of theauthority.It shouldalwaysbe clearfrom an authority’sstandingordershow theirplanningenforcementfunctionsare to be exercised,especiallywhenthereis a scheme fordelegationof functionsto officers.
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO A COMMITTEE
4.3 The provisionsof section101 of the Local GovernmentAct 1972 donotenablea LPA to
delegatethe functionof issuinganenforcementnoticeto oneelectedmemberof anauthority,evenif that memberis the chairmanof the authority’sPlanningCommittee.Thisis becausetherecannotlegally be a“committeeof one”. But the functioncanbe delegated
to a particularofficer. Thisdistinction is explained intheHigh Court’s judgment given on14 November1985 in the caseof R v SecretaryofStatefor theEnvironmentex parte
Hillingdon LBC [1986]JPL 363.Therecouldbe goodreason why decisionmakingwasentrustedto anofficer of theCouncil,who wouldhaveno party politicalallegiance,whereasthe samecouldnot be saidof an individual electedmember.In dealing with theneedtoestablisha procedurefor emergencyauthorisationof enforcement actionwhena PlanningCommitteemeetingwas not scheduled,Woolf J gavehis opinionthat it would be difficult to
fault a procedurewherebydecisionswere takenby a duly authorisedofficer, pursuantto
section101 of the 1972 Act, in consultationwith the electedCommitteechairman.
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EnforcingPlanningControl
DELEGATION OF FUNCTIONS TO AN AUTHORISED OFFICER
4.4 A schemefor delegation ofplanningenforcementfunctionsto anauthorisedofficer, or
officers, shouldbe clearlystatedin an authority’sstandingorders.If a specifiedChief Officer
(eg the BoroughSecretaryor CountySolicitor) is authorisedto issueenforcementnotices,
thepersonholding thatpost is not requiredto authorise eachnoticepersonally:someoneproperlyactingon theChief Officer’s behalfmaydo so. TheHigh Court’s judgment inthe
case ofCheshireCC v Secretaryof Statefor the Environment[1988] JPL30, held that theCountyCouncil’ssenior assistantsolicitor could properlyauthorisetheissueof an
enforcement noticealthoughthe Council’sdelegationwasexpresslyto theCounty
Solicitor.
26
Formulatingtheterms of anenforcementnotice
CHAPTER 5
Formulating the terms of anenforcement notice
INTRODUCTION
5.1 Once theLPA havedecidedto issueanenforcementnotice,it is vital to considerwith the
utmostcare howto formulatethe termsof thenotice.Thisrequiresclarity andprecisionin
the useof language.Enforcementnoticesare not improvedby the inclusionof legalistic
termsorobscure expressionswhich canonly be understoodby experiencedpractitioners.
Time spent onformulating thetermsof an enforcementnotice,so that theyare
immediatelycomprehensibleto a laypersonreadingit,,will usuallybe repaid lateron,
especiallyif eventuallythe noticehasto providethe foundationfor acriminal prosecution,
in accordancewith the provisionsof section179of theTown andCountryPlanning Act
1990.
THE LEGISLATIVE REQUIREMENTS
5.2 Thelegislativerequirementsof avalid enforcementnoticeare statedin section173 of the
1990 Act. It is essential for thenotice to—
(1) statethematterswhich appearto the LPA to constitutethebreachof planningcontrol
(subsection(1)(a));
(2) statethe LPA’s opinion on which of the two paragraphsin section171A( 1) of the
1990Act [defining what constitutesabreachof planningcontrol] is theone relating to
the allegedbreach (subsection(1 )(b));
(3) specifytheremedialstepswhich the LPA require to be taken,or the activitieswhich
the LPA requireto cease,in orderto achieve,wholly or partly, anyof the alternative
purposesdefinedin subsection(4) of section173 (sub-section(3));
(4) specifythe calendar dateon which thenotice is to takeeffect(subsection(8));
(5) specifythe complianceperiodwithin which anyrequiredremedialsteps areto be
taken(subsection(9));
(6) specifythe LPA’s reasonsfor issuingthenotice (subsection(10) andregulation3(a) of
theEnforcementNoticesandAppealsRegulations1991);
(7) specifythe preciseboundariesof the land to which thenotice relates(subsection(10)
andregulation3(b) of the EnforcementNotices andAppealsRegulations1991);
27
EnforcingPlanningControl
(8) be accompaniedby an explanatorynotegiving information to the recipientof every
copyof thenoticeabout theright of appealto the Secretaryof Stateandthe appeal
procedure(subsection(10)andregulation4 of the EnforcementNotices andAppeals
Regulations1991).
Theserequirementsarediscussedin thefollowing paragraphs5.3 to 5.31.
STATING THE MATTERS CONSTITUTING THE ALLEGED BREACH OFCONTROL
5.3 Therequirementto statethemattersconstituting, inthe LPA’s opinion,the allegedbreach
of planningcontrol is fundamental totheentire enforcementprocess.This is becausethe
statementof the allegedbreachmay subsequentlyhaveto providethe foundationfor—
(1) theserviceof astopnotice,to reinforce the effectof theenforcementnotice;or
(2) theSecretaryof State,or aPlanningInspector,to considerany mattersarisingfrom a
valid appealundersection174of the 1990 Act; or
(3) in theeventof subsequentnon-compliance withan effectiveenforcementnotice,acriminal prosecutionby theLPA (under section179 of the 1990Act) for thatoffence,
in which an allegedcontraventionof thenotice’s requirementswill haveto be proved
“beyondreasonabledoubt” (thecriminal standard ofproof).
Thus,unlessan enforcementnotice’s allegationis firmly founded,from the outset,on
factual information about thesuspectedbreachof control, theLPA may well experience
difficulty at a laterstageof enforcementproceedings.
5.4 Theleadingstatementof the legally correctapproachto the contentof an enforcement
notice is found in Lord JusticeUpjohn’s judgment intheCourt of Appeal, on12 December
1962,in thecaseof Miller-M cadv Minister of Housingand Local Government[1963] 1
Al 1 ER459,wherehesaid that the recipientof anenforcementnotice “is entitled tosay
thathe mustfind out from within thefour cornersof thedocumentwhathe is requiredto
do or abstainfrom doing”. Lord JusticeUpjohn alsoidentified a testto be appliedin
decidingwhetheranenforcementnoticesatisfiedthe statutoryrequirement.He saidthe testmustbe: doesthenotice tell him fairly whathe hasdonewrongandwhathe
must do to remedyit?”
NULLITY AND INVALIDITY
5.5 LPAs are naturallyconcernedto ensurethat any enforcementnotice theymay issue isnot
subsequentlyfound to be a “nullity” or “invalid”. In thecaseof Miller-M eadv Minister ofHousingand Local Government,Lord JusticeUpjohn distinguishedbetweenthesetwo legal
concepts.A notice is “bad on its faceanda nullity” if someonecannottell in what respecthe hadallegedlyfailedto complywith a condition, orcouldnot tellwith reasonable
certaintywhat steps mustbe taken toremedytheallegedbreach.Sucha noticewould be
“so much wastepaper”;and,for that reason,therewould be no need(andthusthereis no
statutorypower) to quashit. In contrast,wherethereis afundamentalerror in thenotice,
which is demonstrableby referenceto evidentialfact (suchas allegingdevelopmentwithoutplanningpermissionwhen inlaw no permissionis required),thenotice will be
28
- Formulatingthe termsof an enforcementnotice
invalid. When thosefactsare adduced- for example,in adjudicationon anenforcementappeal- thenoticemaybe quashedfor invalidity.
5.6 Thedistinctionbetween nullityandinvalidity wasfurtherexaminedin theCourtofAppealCriminal Division’s judgmenton 11 April 1995,in thecaseof R v Wicks [1996]160 JPL743. In thatcasetheCourt distinguishedbetween“defectson thefaceof a noticerenderingit a nullity” and“thosematterswhich mayrendera notice invalid”. The Court
heldthatno evidencewould be required if adefendantallegedthatan enforcement noticewas anullity: this is becauseit would benecessaryto showthat thenoticewas “patentlydefectiveon its face”,as amatterof law. “Invalidity” involved different considerations.Theissuewould bewhethertherehadbeenprocedural irregularityor deficiency,or theLPA hadbeen“Wednesburyunreasonable” in takingthedecision toissuethe notice.In thosecircumstances,it wouldbe necessaryto considertheevidence abouttheLPA’s processinconsideringenforcement actionandthedecision toissuea notice. Onlythe High Courthadthe power to quash anenforcement noticeon invalidity grounds:no criminalcourthad thatpower.
ALLEGING SEPARATE BREACHES OF PLANNING CONTROL IN ONE NOTICE
5.7 Whereenforcement actionis authorisedagainst separatebreaches ofplanning controlinvolving activities on thesameparcelof land, it is prudentto considerwhetherto stateeach allegation in aseparateenforcementnotice.The decision onhowmany notices toissuewill usuallydependon thecomplexityof activities onthe site andthe planninghistory of the land. If the LPA arefacedwith a particularlycomplicated situation,it maybe
preferableto use aseparateenforcementnotice to allegeeach breachof control.But the
High Court’s judgmenton 8 May 1992,in the caseof ValentinaofLondonLtd and
RoundaletLtd v SecretaryofStatefor the Environmentand Islington LBC [1992]JPL 1151,is authorityfor theview thatallegationsaboutamaterialchangeof use andabout
operational developmentcanbeincludedin the sameenforcementnotice; and thiswould
be normalwherethe allegationsrelateto connectedmatters,eg whatwould be submitted
in oneplanning applicationfor proposeddevelopment.
CATEGORISING THE ALLEGED BREACH
5.8 Subsection(l)(b) of section173 of the 1990Act requirestheLPA to statetheir opinionon which of the two paragraphsin section171A( 1) of the 1990 Act is the one relating to
theallegedbreach. The twoparagraphsare —
(a) carrying out development withoutthe requiredplanningpermission;or
(b) failing to comply with anyconditionor limitation subjectto which planning
permissionhasbeengranted.
In mostcasesit shouldnotbe difficult to makethis distinction satisfactorily,dependingon
the facts andplanninghistory.
5.9 It is sometimesnot clearfrom theplanninghistory andthecurrentcircumstances oftheland how the allegedbreachis most accurately stated. Inthatevent,thereis no objectionto issuingtwo notices“in the alternative”relating to thesamebreach.For example, where
29
EnforcingPlanningControl
it appearsthat anadditional, unauthorisedusehasbeenstartedin a recentextension toa
building, it may wellbe prudent toissue a“material changeof use”andan “operational
development”notice.If, during thecourseof an enforcementappeal againsteachof two
noticesissuedin the alternative,it is clearthatonenotice is preferableto the other, the
LPA shouldbe readyto withdraw the alternative noticeso that the expenseinvolved in
dealingwith two appealsis reduced.Wherethe LPA haveclearlystatedthat two notices
havebeenissued “inthe alternative”and onenotice is subsequentlywithdrawnbecauseit is
acknowledgedto be superfluous,theLPA will notnormally be at risk of an awardof appeal
costs againstthem onthegroundthat theybehaved“unreasonably”(asinterpretedin DOE
Circular 8/93) by issuingtwo notices.
SPECIFYING THE STEPS REQUIRED BY THE ENFORCEMENT NOTICE
5.10 It is essential forthestepsrequiredby an enforcementnotice to be formulatedwith the
utmostprecision.This is because,in the eventof subsequentprosecution(under section
179 of the 1990 Act) for anoffenceof contraveningthe notice,any uncertaintyabout the
requiredstepswill tend to defeatthe prosecution’s(the LPA’s) case.Thiswasclearlystated
by JudgeWoolley in Mold CrownCourt, on 26January1988,in the case ofWarringtonBC
v Garvey [1988] JPL 752, when he said—
“He [the Judge]did not seeit asany partof his role in acriminal caseto construeanything
benevolentlyin favourof the localplanningauthority, or in the contextof a criminal case
in favourof theprosecution.If therewasuncertainty,if therewasdoubt, if oneor moreof
the essential ingredientsof anoffencewereconsideredto be dubious,it wasnot hisduty
and indeedit would be contraryto his duty, presidingas he did in acriminal trial to
construethemin favour of the Prosecutionandagainstthe Defendant
In that case,theJudgewent on to find irregularities in eachof the enforcementnoticeson
which theprosecution’sindictment relied.Consequently, hedirectedthejury to returna
“not guilty” verdict on eachcount inthe indictment.
5.11 Thereis no certainmethodof successfullyspecifyingtherequiredstepsin every
enforcementnotice.Sometimes thestepsmay be quitestraightforward(eg. “ceasethe use of
the building as a dwelling house”);or severaldifferent stepsmaybe required(eg. “ceasethe
use ofthe landas a haulagecontractor’sdepot”; “removeall the woodenpalletsstacked on
the land”; and “remove the diesel fuel storage tank from the land”.); or a series of steps maybe requiredin accordancewith differentcomplianceperiodsin orderto achievesatisfactoryconditions on the site. The two vital considerations in formulating the required steps are—
(1) to express them precisely in plain language, so that anyone subsequently required toimplementthe stepswill not be left in doubtaboutwhat is required; and
(2) to ensurethat the steps donotgo beyondwhat needsto be requiredin order to remedy
any breach of control or any injury to amenity on the enforcement notice site: this is to
safeguardthe LPA’s interestagainst anysubsequentappealon ground.(f) in section
174(2)of the 1990 Act.
5.12 Thefollowing are examplesof requiredstepswhich areunlikely to be enforceablein practice—
(1) “return the land to thephysicalcondition inwhich it wasbeforethe breachof control
occurred”;
(2) “take all possiblestepsto minimise noise andfumesfrom activities on the land”;
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Formulatingthe terms of anenforcementnotice
(3) “carryout acomprehensivelandscapingscheme onthe boundaryof the site, to the
local planningauthority’s satisfaction”.
MAKING THE DEVELOPMENT COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF A PLANNINGPERMISSION
5.13 The provisionsof section173(4)(a) of the 1990 Act enable anenforcementnotice to
requirestepsto be takenfor the purposeof “remedyingthebreachby makingany
developmentcomplywith the terms (includinganyconditionsandlimitations) of any
planningpermissionwhich hasbeengranted inrespectof the land,...”Any such
permissionmay havebeengrantedby the LPA themselves (in responseto a planning
application),or by theGeneralPermittedDevelopmentOrder (“the GPDO”). Wherethe
permissionwasgrantedby the LPA, it is importantto ensurethat therequiredstepsare
reasonablein the particularcircumstancesof thedevelopmentascarriedout (eitherwholly
or partly)andare not adisproportionateremedy.Forexample,if a dwellinghousehasbeenbuilt 3.0 metresnearerto the neighbouringsiteboundarythan indicatedon the approved
plans,it maywell notbe justified to requirethedemolition of thebuilding andits re-
construction intheexactlocationshownon theplans,unlessthis is the only way to
remedywhat would otherwiseamountto unacceptableoverlookingof the neighbouring
dwelling. Insteadof demolition,the LPA might considera requirementfor remedialworks
to makethedevelopmentacceptable,suchasno openingwindows or the useof opaque
glazing.
DISCONTINUANCE OF USE OF LAND OR RESTORATION TO ITS PREVIOUSCONDITION
5.14 Theprovisionsof section173(4)(a)of the 1990 Act also enablean enforcementnotice to
requirestepsto be takenfor thepurposeof “remedyingthebreach..., by discontinuingany
useof theland or by restoringthe landto its conditionbeforethebreachtookplace.”
Thesestepsshouldenablethe LPA to respondflexibly to mostbreaches ofcontrol. In
consideringwhatwasthe conditionof the landbeforethe breachoccurred,it is importantnot to imposeexcessiverequirementsfor the sakeof tidying up aderelictsite. If there is
photographicevidence(including reliablydatedaerial photographs)of the previous
conditionof the site, they may beuseful in supportingthe casefor this type of requirement.
5.15 Thereis judicial authority to supportthe view that,wherethebreachof control involvesa
materialchangeof use ofland, a restorationrequirementmayextendto remedying“operationaldevelopment”which hasbeencarriedout as partandparcelof thechangeof
use.Forexample,in thecaseof Murfitt v SecretaryofStatefor theEnvironmentand East
CambridgeshireDC [1980] JPL 598,the High Courtheld that somehardstandingwhichhadbecome“immune” from enforcementaction,becauseit hadbeenlaid downmorethan
four yearsbeforethedate oftheenforcementnotice,could neverthelessbe requiredto be
removedbecauseit wasan integralpart of the materialchangeof useof thelandfor
parkingheavygoodsvehicles.
REMEDYING ANY INJURY TO AMENITY CAUSED BY THE BREACH
5.16 The provisionsof section 173(4)(b)of the 1990 Act enablean enforcementnotice to
require, alternatively,stepsto be takenfor the purposeof “remedyingany injury to amenity
which hasbeencausedby the breach”.While this provides thepossibilityof tailoring the
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Enforcing PlanningControl
requiredsteps,so that they matchtheremediationprocesson the land as closely as possible,
it is essential forthis typeof stepnot to be oppressive.This is emphasisedby theuse ofthe
words“wholly or partly” in the precedingsub-section173(3).
“UNDER-ENFORCEMENT”
5.17 “Under-enforcement”(namely,requiringstepsto be takenwhich do not fully remedythe
breachof control allegedin the enforcementnotice)haslongbeena familiar processfor
LPAs, althoughtherewaspreviously some legaldoubtaboutwhetherit wasproperly
authorisedby theenforcementprovisions.Thecombinedeffectof subsections(3), (4) and
(11) in section173 of the 1990 Act is to removeany legaldoubt thatunder-enforcementis
permissible.Theeffect of theprovisionsin section173(11)of the 1990Act is that where —
(1) theLPA have“under-enforced”(by requiring less onerousremedialstepsto be taken
than might havebeenrequired);and
(2) therecipientof thenotice has compliedwith all therequiredsteps,
planningpermissionis granted(by deemingprovisions)for retentionof any operational
developmentor continuationof any activities which werewithin the scopeof the alleged
breachof controlbutnot subjectto anyof therequiredsteps.Thus,whenconsidering
possibleunder-enforcement,the LPA needto assesswhat the practicalconsequenceswill
be,in eachcase,if “deemed”permissionsubsequentlyappliesto any developmentor
activities remainingon theland after compliancewith the enforcementnotice’s
requirements.
5.18 Thereis no legislativerequirementfor the LPA to notify the recipientof an “under-
enforcing”notice that, on compliancewith its requirements, planningpermissionwill be
“treatedas having beengranted” fortheretentionof operational developmentor
continuanceof someactivities not includedwithin the scopeof the requiredsteps.
Nevertheless, foravoidanceof possibledoubt(especiallyif theownershipof the land
subsequently changes),it will usuallybe prudentfor the LPA to give written notice ofwhat
they regardas thepermission deemedto have beengrantedby virtue of section173(11).
Thisnotification could also berecordedin theregisterof enforcementnoticesmaintained
by virtue of therequirementsof section188of the 1990 Act.
SPECIFYING THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE
5.19 Theprovisionsof section173(8) of the 1990 Act require that anenforcementnotice “shall
specify the date on which it is to take effect and, subject to sections 175(4) and 289(4A),shall takeeffecton thatdate”.Thisdateis known as the effectivedateof thenotice.It mustbe a calendardate.It is insufficiently precisefor theeffectivedateto be stated,
for example,as “30 daysafter serviceof thenoticeon all recipients”.
5.20 The effectivedate ofa notice is directly relatedto—
(1) therequiredprocedurefor servinga copy of thenoticeon the peoplewith an interest
in theland (by virtue of section172(3)(b)of the 1990 Act); and
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Formulatingtheterms of anenforcementnotice
(2) the requirementsfor submittingan appealto the Secretaryof State againstthenotice
(by virtue of section174 of the 1990Act).
5.21 The provisionsof section 172(3)(b)of the 1990Act requirethat serviceof an enforcement
noticeshall takeplace “not less than 28 daysbeforethe datespecifiedin it as thedateon
which it is to takeeffect”. Thus thereis effectivelya minimumperiodof 28 daysbetween
the dateon which everyonewith an interest inthe landmusthave beenservedwith a copyof thenoticeandthe dateon which the noticecomesinto force.This required28-day
periodneedsto becarefully consideredwherethereare numerousrecipientsof an
enforcement noticewho are to beservedby postaldelivery. It may beprudentto allow amarginof severaldaysabove theminimumperiodof 28 days sothat everyrecipientof a
copy of the noticewill receiveit not less than 28 daysbeforetheeffectivedate.
5.22 Theprovisionsof sectionl74(3)(a) of the 1990 Act statethatanenforcementappealto
the Secretaryof Stateshall bemade“beforethe datespecifiedin the enforcementnoticeas
thedateon which it is to takeeffect ....“. The effectivedate in the noticealsoprovidesthe
time-limit within which anyenforcementappealto the Secretaryof Statemust be
received.Any appealwhich is not receivedby thePlanningInspectorateAgency(which
receives appealson the Secretaryof State’s behalf)beforetheeffectivedatein the notice
will usuallyberegardedas notvalidly made.Moreover,by virtue of theprovisionsof
section 175(4)of the 1990 Act, thesubmissionof avalid appealto theSecretaryof State
suspendstheeffectof theenforcement noticeuntil the appealis finally decidedor
withdrawn,exceptin onecase.The exceptionis wheretherehasbeena furtherappealto
the High Court, on apoint of law, againstthe Secretaryof State’sor a PlanningInspector’s
enforcementappealdecisionat first instance.In thatevent,theprovisionsof section289(4A) ofthe 1990 Act enablethe High Court, or the Court of Appeal, to orderthat the
enforcementnoticeshallhaveeffectwholly or partly until those litigation proceedingsare
finally decidedandanyre-determinationof the appealby the Secretaryof State hasbeen
issued. If the Court makes such an order, it can also impose such terms as it thinks fit,including a requirementthat theLPA give anundertakingasto damageswhich mayresult
from bringing the enforcementnotice into effect, or suchotherundertakingas theCourt
may requirefrom the LPA. In thecaseof RogerBownand RB TransportLtd v Secretaryof
Statefor the Environmentand HarboroughDC [19961JPL B130, the High Court directed,
on 29 February1996,that the enforcementnoticeshouldtakeeffectpendingfinal
determinationof an appealto theCourt againstthe Secretaryof State’s appealdecision,
becauseconsiderableharm, in termsof safety,anddamageto the environmentwas likely to
be causedby the continuationof the appellants’activities.
SPECIFYING THE COMPLIANCE PERIOD IN AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE
5.23 Section 173(9)of the 1990 Act providesthat anenforcementnotice “shall specifythe
periodat theendof which any stepsare requiredto have beentakenor any activities arerequiredto haveceased andmayspecifydifferentperiodsfor different steps oractivities;
. This is usuallyknown as the complianceperiod.Additionally, section173A(1)(b)of
the 1990 Act providesthat theLPA “may waiveor relaxany requirementof sucha notice
and,in particular,mayextendany periodspecifiedin accordancewith section173(9).”
5.24 The provisionsof section173 and173A do not indicatewhat factorsthe LPA should
considerin decidinghow long thecomplianceperiodfor taking anyremedial action
requiredby the enforcementnoticeshouldbe.Thelimiting factor derivesfrom theprovisionsof section174(2)(g) of the 1990 Act which enable anenforcementappealto be
33
Enforcing PlanningControl
basedon the groundthat the complianceperiodspecifiedin thenotice “falls short of what
should reasonablybe allowed”. Theseprovisions effectivelyoblige theLPA to considercarefully what therecipientof the enforcementnoticewill haveto do, in practice, to carry
out the required remedialstepsand,consequently,how much time it is reasonableto permit
for thatpurpose.This will clearly dependon the particular circumstancesof eachcase.If
the requirementsare unusuallyonerous(egremedyingthe effectsof a large-scalewaste-
tipping operationby removinglargequantitiesof wasteby lorry), or the work involved can
only be carriedoutduring suitableweatherconditions,it may beadvisableto discussthe
matter withtheowneror operatorof the enforcement noticesite, with a view to agreeing
on amutually acceptablecomplianceperiod. If anysuchnegotiations takeplace,the LPA
shouldnotoverlook the interestof any local residentsor otherneighboursof thesite whose
amenityis seriouslyharmedby thebreachof control. If the LPA alsoserveastopnotice,to
reinforcethe effectof therelatedenforcementnotice, theprohibition in thestopnotice
will normallyremaineffective fortheduration oftheenforcementnoticecompliance
period.
5.25 In decidingon the complianceperiod’sduration, theLPA shouldbearin mind that staff
resourceswill usuallyhaveto be devotedto monitoring remedialwork while it takesplace
on the enforcement noticesite. This suggeststhat theperiodshouldbe asshort as canreasonablybe allowed.A helpful rule of thumbis that the complianceperiodshouldnot
normallyexceedoneyear,unlesssomeexceptional circumstancejustifies it. If a compliance
periodis to exceedoneyear,the LPA shouldconsider whetherthe bettercourseis to granta time-limitedplanningpermissionfor whateveractivity is to takeplace on the site.
SPECIFYING THE LPA’S REASONS FOR ISSUING THE NOTICE
5.26 Theprovisionsof regulation3 of the Town andCountryPlanning(EnforcementNotices
andAppeals) regulations1991 (SI 1991/2804)(“the 1991 Regulations”)requireevery
enforcementnotice the LPA issueto specifythe reasons whythey considerit “expedient”toissuethe notice. The example enforcementnoticesin Annex 2 to DETR Circular 10/97
indicatehow reasonscanhelpfully be statedin the text of the notice.
5.27 Thereasoningprocessis importantas ameansof explainingto the recipientof any
enforcementnoticewhy, in the LPA’s view, enforcementaction is justified. Evenif the
recipientof the noticehas previouslyrefusedto discussthe allegedbreachof control with
the LPA’s officers, apersuasivestatementof reasonsmayhelp to convincehim that nothing
is likely to be gainedfrom submittingan appeal againstthenotice.And, in the eventof an
appeal,the Secretaryof Stateor a Planning Inspectorwho is to decidethe appealwill
critically examinethe statementof reasonsin orderto assessthemeritsof enforcement
actionon planninggrounds.Thestatementof reasonsshouldalwayscorrespondclosely to
anyreasoningin aCommittee reportwhich recommendedissuingthe enforcementnotice.
If the PlanningCommitteeauthorisedthe issueof an enforcementnotice for different,or
additional,planningreasons,theseshouldbe includedin theLPA’s statementof reasonsfor
issuingthe notice.
SPECIFYING THE ENFORCEMENT NOTICE LAND
5.28 The provisionsof section172(2)of the 1990Act statethe requirementto servea copy of
an enforcement noticeon the owner and occupier“of the landto which it relates”.
34
Formulatingthetermsof anenforcementnotice
Regulation3(b) of the 1991 Regulationsrequiresanenforcementnotice to specify “the
preciseboundariesof theland to which the notice relates,whetherby referenceto a plan
or otherwise”.It is becausean effectiveenforcementnoticealsobecomesa “local land -
charge”(which is materialfor anyconveyancingpurposes)that theseprovisionsstrongly
emphasisethe importanceof preciselydefining the boundaryof the enforcementnotice
site.
5.29 Thebestway of definingthe boundaryof a site is by referenceto anOrdnanceSurveybase
map,to ascaleof not less than 1/2500. If thepreciselocation of a building, or an area
wherea materialchangeof usehasallegedlyoccurred,on enforcementnotice land, is in
doubt, the LPA shouldarrangefor it to be accuratelysurveyedbeforethe enforcement
noticeplan is finalised.Thiswill help to minimise thepossibility that the notice maybe
quashed,on appealto the Secretaryof State,becausethe locationplan (and,consequently,
the enforcementnotice) is fundamentallydefective.
5.30 Although the inclusionof a locationplan is usually the mosteffectiveway of specifyingthe
enforcementnotice land, this procedureis not essentialin every case.The High Court’s
judgmenton 9 July 1991,in the caseof Wiesenfeldv SecretaryofStatefor theEnvironment
and BarnetLBC [1992] JPL 556,held that the words“or otherwise”in regulation3(b) of
the 1991 Regulationsindicatedthat someflexibility is intended.Thereis no needfor the
site-boundaryto be identified by its lengthor thepointsof the compass.Where
appropriate,a verbaldescriptionof thesitewould suffice, includingmerelythe addressof
the premises,bearingin mind that, in conveyancingpracticein urbanareas,it was
sufficient to rely on the addressof the site as the meansof ascertainingits boundary.
EXPLANATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT APPEAL PROVISIONS ANDPROCEDURE
5.31 The provisionsof Regulation4 of the 1991 Regulationsrequirethat every copy of an
enforcementnoticeservedby a LPA beaccompaniedby an explanationwhich includesthe
following matters—
(1) a copy of sections171A, 171Band172 to 177 of the 1990Act, so that the recipientis
awareof the enforcementappealprovisionsandprocedures,including the groundson
whichan enforcementappealmay be submitted;and
(2) notificationof the time-limit within which an enforcementappellantmustspecifythe
groundson which the appealis madeandthe factson which eachgroundof appeal
will be supported.
Thereis no needfor the LPA to setup their own arrangementsto fulfil theserequirements.
The Departmentof the Environmentsupply, throughthe PlanningInspectorateAgency,
anofficial explanatorybooklet aboutthe entireenforcementappealprocessanda stock of
enforcementappealforms,which canbeusedwheneveran enforcementnotice is issued.
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CHAPTER 6
The responseto an enforcementnotice appeal
THE STATUTORY RIGHT OF APPEAL
6.1 Section174 of theTown andCountryPlanning Act1990 (“the 1990 Act”) providesa right
of appealto theSecretaryof Stateagainstan enforcementnotice.The peopleentitled to
appealare definedas—
(1) “a person havinganinterest in the land”: this meansanyonewho possessesa legalinterest
in the parcelof land to which thenoticerelates,butdoesnot includea trespasser;and
(2) “a relevantoccupier”:section174(6)of the 1990 Act definessuchan occupieras “a
personwho (a) on the dateon which the enforcementnotice is issuedoccupiesthe
land to which thenotice relatesby virtue of a licence;and(b) continuesso to occupy
the land whenthe appealis brought”.
Anyonewho is within the legal scopeof thesetwo categoriesof appellantmay appeal
againsta relevantenforcementnotice,regardlessof whethera copyof the noticewasserved
on themindividually (asrequiredby section172(2)of the 1990 Act).
THEGROUNDSOFAPPEAL
6.2 Section 174(2)of the 1990 Act provides sevengroundsfor an enforcementappeal,as
follows—
(1) that, in respectof anybreachof planningcontrolwhich maybe constitutedby themattersstatedin thenotice,planningpermissionought tobe grantedor, asthecase
maybe,the conditionor limitation concernedought tobe discharged(ground(a));
(2) that those mattershave notoccurred(ground(b));
(3) that those matters(if theyoccurred)do notconstitutea breachofplanning control
(ground(c));
(4) that, at the datewhenthe noticewas issued,no enforcementactioncouldbe taken in
respectof any breachof planning controlwhich maybe constitutedby those matters
(ground(d));
(5) that copiesof the enforcementnoticewerenotservedas requiredby section172
(ground(e));
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EnforcingPlanningControl
thereis aconflict of evidenceaboutoneof the“legal grounds”of appealin section
174(2) of the 1990 Act andtheevidenceof witnessesneedsto betestedin cross-
examination;
(2) by a hearing (including a site-inspection):this proceduremaybe apt whereoneof theprincipal parties hasaskedto be“heard” but theformality of a public inquiry is not
considerednecessary;
(3) by written representations,with or without a site-inspection:this procedurewill be usedwheneverbothprincipal partiesacceptit andthePlanningInspectorateconsidersthat
an inquiryor hearingis unnecessary.A site inspectionmaynotbe necessaryif the‘‘planning merits” of theappealdo not fall to beconsidered(because,for example,the
fee for the deemedapplicationhasnot beenpaid) andthe appealrevolvessolely
aroundthe legal interpretationof agreedfacts. As soonasthey are awarethat an
enforcementappeal hasbeenvalidly made,the LPA’s officers shoulddecidewhat
proceduretheywill ask the PlanningInspectorateto adopt.Thisdecisionshouldtake
accountof the mattersat issuein theappealandthe resourcecoststhe LPA will incur
in respondingat all subsequentstagesof their preferredprocedure.It shouldbenoted
that when oneparty has exercisedthe right to be heard,thePlanningInspectorate,
actingon behalfof the Secretaryof State,will decidewhetherahearingor inquiry will
be held, taking into accountthe circumstancesof eachappeal,including any
preferences alreadyexpressedby the principalparties.
REQUIREMENTS TO BE FULFILLED BY THE LPA
6.8 PartIII of theTown andCountryPlanning(EnforcementNoticesandAppeals)
Regulations1991 (SI 1991/2804) imposescertainproceduralrequirementson theappellant
andthe LPA in anenforcementappeal.Therequirements ontheLPA are—
(1) within 14 daysfrom being givennoticeof the enforcementappeal,to sendthe
Secretaryof Statea copy of the enforcementnoticeanda list of the names and
addressesof the peopleon whom a copy of the noticewasserved,as requiredby section
172(2)of the 1990 Act (regulation6);
(2) wherea local inquiry is to be held andthe datefixed for holdingthe inquiry is less
than 18 weeksafter thedate ofthe Secretaryof State’swritten notice ofhis intention
to causean inquiryto be held (the “relevant date”),to submit astatementof the
LPA’s proposedsubmissionson the appealat least6 weeksbeforethe inquiry date
(regulation7);
(3) in anyothercasewherea local inquiry is to be held,to submit thatstatementnot later
than12 weeksafter the“relevantdate” (regulation7); and
(4) whereno inquiry is to beheld, to submit their statementof caseno later than 28 days
afterthe dateof theSecretaryof State’srequestfor it (regulation7)
TheLPA’s statementsin sub-paragraphs(2), (3) and(4) abovemust include—
(a) asummaryof theLPA’s responseto each groundof appeal;and
38
The responseto anenforcementnotice appeal
(b) a statementwhethertheLPA would be preparedto grantplanningpermissionfor
the allegedbreachof control and,if so, particularsof any conditions theywouldwishto haveimposedon any suchpermission(regulation7).
The LPA’s statementsshouldbe entirely consistentwith the LPA’s reasonsfor taking
enforcementaction.But theyshouldnot be over-elaborateor legalistic.A clearly and
succinctlyexpressedstatement, whichis readilycomprehensibleto theappellant andany
“interestedpersons”,will best fulfil this requirement.
INQUIRY APPEALS
6.9 WhereaPlanningInspectoris to holda public local inquiry into an enforcementappeal,
theprovisionsof the Town andCountryPlanning(Enforcement)(InquiriesProcedure)
Rules1992 (SI 1992/1903)prescribe theappealprocedure.The LPA’s officers who are to
participatein an enforcementappealinquiry shouldbe familiar with all therequirementsof
theseRules.In particular,theLPA’s officersshouldcarefully considerwho is to leadthe
authority’scaseat the inquiry andthe witnessesthey intend to call in supportof their case.
Wherea witnessrepresentinganotherauthority (eg theCountyCouncil ashighwayauthority) oranotheragency(egthe EnvironmentAgency commentingon awater quality
issue) isto be called, it is vital to ensurethat the witness’sevidenceis directly relevant,
professionallypresentedandentirely consistentwith theLPA’s case.
PUBLIC NOTIFICATION OF THE INQUIRY AND APPEAL
6.10 Rule 11 of the EnforcementInquiriesProcedureRulesprescribesthe procedureto befollowed in publicly notifying the arrangementsfor an inquiryinto an enforcementappeal.
In appealswherea local inquiry is not beingheld, regulation8 of theEnforcementNotices
andAppealsRegulationsprescribesthe notificationof the appealwhich theLPA mustgive
to occupiersof propertyin thelocality of the enforcementnoticesite and anyotherpeoplewho, in the LPA’s opinion, are affectedby theallegedbreachof planning control.
POWER TO QUASH THE ENFORCEMENT NOTICE ON PROCEDURALGROUNDS
6.11 Provisionsin section176(3)(b) of the 1990 Act enabletheSecretaryof Stateto allow an
appealandquashtheenforcementnotice if the LPA fail to comply with anyproceduralrequirementin PartII of the EnforcementNoticesandAppealsRegulations,other thanthe
requirementto give public notification of theappeal.The Department’sexperienceis that
this discretionarypower is only rarelyused.Whenits useis beingconsidered,theLPA will
be givenadequatewarningandshouldthentake immediatestepsto submit the required
information or statement(preferablytransmittingit by fax),
POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE DURING THE APPEAL
6.12 As an enforcementappealproceedsto thepoint at which a public inquiry or site-inspectionis to take place,the LPA’s officers shouldmonitorall statementsandrepresentationsthe appellant andany “interestedpersons”make.TheLPA’s officersshould
alsoconsider anyadvice issuedby the PlanningInspectorateduring theappeal’sprocedural
39
Enforcing PlanningControl
stage.If officers concludefrom their considerationof anotherparty’sstatementsthat an
enforcementnotice is fundamentallydefective,so that it cannotbe correctedin theappeal
decision(using theSecretaryof State’spowerin section176(1) of the 1990Act), they
shouldtakestepsto withdraw thenotice assoonaspracticable.If the appellant,or anagent
on the appellant’sbehalf,warnsthe LPA that the notice is fundamentallydefectiveandthe
warning is ignored,or rejectedwithout adequatereasons,theLPA will be at riskof having
theappellant’sappealcostsawardedagainstthem if the notice is quashedby the Secretary
of Stateor a PlanningInspector.
6.13 If two enforcementnotices havebeenissued “inthe alternative”andit becomesclearthat
oneof them is superfluous,the LPA shouldtakestepsto withdraw the superfluousnotice as
soonas practicable.To safeguardthe authority againsta possibleawardof the appellant’s
costs,theLPA shouldexplain that the noticeis beingwithdrawnbecauseit is no longer
considerednecessaryto maintainit, as the serviceof two noticeswasprecautionary.
6.14 Wheneveranenforcementnotice is withdrawnduring the appealprocess,theLPA should
ensure,in accordancewith the provisionsof section1 73A(3) of the 1990 Act, that
notification of thewithdrawal is givento everyonewho haspreviouslybeenservedwith a
copy of it, or who would be servedif the noticewere re-issued.Therelevantentry in the
LPA’s enforcementnotice registershould also bedeleted.
INQUIRY APPEALS: PREPARING FOR THE INQUIRY
6.15 In preparingfor an inquiryinto an enforcementappeal,the LPA’s officers will needto
considerhow bestto presenta thoroughlyco-ordinatedandwell substantiatedcaseon the
authority’sbehalf, especiallyif theappealinvolvesa lengthy planninghistory, or
complicatedlegal issues, orboth. It is essentialto decide,well beforethe inquiry, how each
witness’sevidencecanbestbe presented.In giving evidenceas to the facts,it is always
preferableto rely on awitness whocanspeakfrom personalexperience: for example,an
EnforcementOfficer who hasobservedthe appeal siteovera long period,or a neighbour of
the site who haskept detailedrecordsof activities takingplace onthesite on recorded
dates,maybe betterequippedto give evidencethana PlanningOfficer who mayonly have
visitedthe site intermittently. If technicalevidenceis neededto supportthe LPA’s case,the
authority’sofficers should ensurethat responsibility forit is allocatedto someone(possiblya
consultant)who is professionallycompetentto dealwith therelevantissuesand to
withstandany detailedcross-examination.
6.16 Particularcaremustbe taken inproducingthe relevantdocumentaryevidence.Thismay
includesworn affidavits, copiesof any planningpermissionrelating tothe appealsite,
previous “establisheduse”certificates,correspondencewith officers about activitieson the
site, andrepliesto requestsfor theappellant toprovide information (including,for
example,theresponseto aplanningcontraventionnotice).Photographicevidence,
including aerialphotographs,canbeparticularly useful in anenforcementappealin
establishingwhatactivities were takingplaceon thesite in the past.If photographsare to
be submittedin evidence,they mustbe of sufficiently good quality to enablethe activities
on the site to be establishedsatisfactorily andreliably dated.
40
Theresponseto an enforcementnoticeappeal
6.17 The LPA’s officers shouldbearin mind that further development, includingnewactivities,
may takeplaceon the appeal siteat any time after anenforcement noticehasbeenissued.
It is thereforeprudent tokeepthe appealsite underregularobservationand torecord any
significantdevelopment whichmayoccur betweenservingcopiesof the enforcementnotice andthedateofa public inquiry or site inspection.If possible,aphotographicrecord
of newdevelopmentor activities shouldbe made.Sometimes,the owneror occupierof the
appeal sitemay takestepsto “tidy up” the site in advanceof the PlanningInspector’s site-
inspection.It is thereforeimportant tohavea witnessavailableto give first-hand evidence
about theconditionof the appealsite, andtheactivities taking placeon it, on the date of
issueof theenforcementnotice.
THE ONUS OF PROOF
6.18 The appellant’sandthe LPA’s respectiverole in an enforcementappeal inquiryis
sometimes misunderstoodbecausetheenforcementnotice is mistakenlyregardedas ifit
wereanindictment incriminal proceedings.An enforcementnotice is a statementthat,in
theLPA’s opinion, a breachof planningcontrol appearsto havetakenplaceon the land.
Theenforcementappealenablesthe recipientof thenotice to rebut the LPA’s opinion
that a breachappearsto haveoccurredor, if a breachof control is admitted,to maintain
that planningpermissionshouldbegrantedfor it. It follows that the onusof proof in an
enforcementappealis on the appellant toshow, byvirtue of the materialfactsadducedin
supportof any of the grounds(b) to (e) in section174(2)of the 1990 Act, that the appeal
shouldbe allowed.The onusin the appealis not on the LPA to show that the appeal
shouldbe dismissed,althoughin practicethat may well constitute theLPA’s main line of
argumentat the inquiry in responseto any legalgroundof appeal.
THE TEST APPLICABLE TO EVIDENCE
6.19 Proceedingsat anenforcementappealinquiry takeplacebeforean administrativetribunal
(constitutedby thePlanning Inspectorin person). Theyare not Courtproceedings.It
follows that thecorrecttestapplicableto the submittedevidenceis what is calledthe “civil
standard of proof’ whichinvolvesthe tribunal’sassessment“on the balanceof
probabilities”.This is a lessdemandingstandard ofproofthan thetestusedin criminal
proceedings,which is “beyondreasonabledoubt”. If there is a conflict of evidenceon a
materialfactor facts,it is the PlanningInspector’sresponsibilityto decide,on the balance
of probabilities,which evidenceis to be preferred.
POSSIBLE GRANT OF PLANNING PERMISSION ON APPEAL
6.20 If the appealis proceedingon ground(a), including the “deemed”planning application,
theLPA’s officerswho are to attendthe inquiry shouldagreeon acontingentlist ofplanningconditionsfor submissionat the inquiry if thePlanningInspectoris mindedto
grantplanningpermissionfor thedevelopmentinvolved in the allegedbreachof control,or partof it. The submissionof a list of conditionsdoesnot imply that the LPA concede
thatplanningpermissionshouldbe granted:it simply registersthe LPA’s concernthat any
permissionwhich may begrantedshouldbe effectivelycontrolled by the suggested
conditions.If authority to take enforcement actionhasnot beendelegatedto the LPA’s
officers, orwheresuch authorityhasbeendelegatedbutauthority to grantpermission,or todetermineconditions,hasnot been,
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it maybe advisableto obtain therelevantPlanningCommittee’sapproval foranyproposed
list of conditionsto be submittedat an inquiry.
AWARD OF COSTS IN ENFORCEMENT APPEAL PROCEEDINGS
6.21 Eachparty to an enforcementappealmay applyfor an awardof its appealcostsagainst
anotherparty, regardlessof the procedureusedto processanddecidethe appeal.Thereis
someevidencethatLPAsare generallyreluctantto pursuethe possibilityof a costs
application,especiallyin written representationsenforcementappeals.Enforcement action
is oftenlabour-intensiveandtheinquiry appealprocessusually involves theproductionof
documentary evidenceandthe attendanceof witnessesat an inquiry, causingtheLPA
substantialexpense.It is thereforeprudentalwaysto consider whethera costsapplicationagainstthe appellantis justified. As with anyotherappealcostsapplication,the LPA will
haveto showthat the appellant’sbehaviourin the appealproceedingswas“unreasonable”
(asthat termis in interpretedin DOECircular8/93) and that, consequently,theLPA haveincurred unnecessaryexpenditurein the appealprocess.Theguidancein the Circular
includesillustrative examplesof whatmay amountto “unreasonable”conductin an
enforcementappeal.By the sametoken,theLPA’s officers should ensurethat their own
conduct in the appealproceedingsis reasonableat all times, so that theydo not put the
authorityat risk of an awardof appealcostsin theappellant’sfavour.
SCRUTINISING THE APPEAL DECISION
6.22 The PlanningInspector’sor Secretaryof State’sdecisionletter shouldbe scrutinisedto
establishwhat furtheractionmay benecessary,dependingon theoutcomeof the appeal.
6.23 If the enforcement noticeis upheld,officers will needto considerwhatfurther stepsmaybe
neededto ensurecompliancewith its requirements.If these involveasubstantialamountof
remedialwork (egthe removalof largequantitiesof wastematerialor scrap fromthe site),
it is prudent todiscusswith the landowneror occupierof the sitehow thework is to be
carriedout and,if possible, agreea timetablefor it to be donewithin the compliance
period.The provisionsof section173A(1)(b)of the 1990 Act enablethe LPA to extend
the complianceperiod at anytime if it is clearly reasonableto allow moretime for any
particularly onerousrequirement.
6.24 If the appealsucceeds,officers will occasionallyneedto consider whetherthereare grounds
for seekingleavein the High Court to appeal againstthedecision,on a pointof law, in
accordancewith the provisionsof section289 of the 1990 Act. The time-limit for this typeof appealis 28 daysfrom thedate ofreceiptof the decision letter,althoughthe Court has
discretionto admita late leaveapplication inexceptionalcircumstances.This type of
appealwill normally needto be assessedby an experiencedPlanninglawyer, or it may well
be prudent toobtain Counsel’sopinionbefore anydecision is taken toincur theadditional
expenseof an appealin the High Court.
6.25 An applicationundersection288 ofthe 1990 Act canonly be usedto challengeadecision
to grantplanningpermissionunderparagraph(a) of section177(1) or to dischargea
conditionor limitation underparagraph(b) of that section.Unlike an applicationunder
section289,a section288 applicationdoesnot requirethe leaveof the Court, but it mustbemadewithin 6 weeksof the date ofthedecisionletter andtheCourthasno discretionto
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The responseto anenforcementnoticeappeal
extendthis time-limit. However,while a successfulapplicationundersection288 cansecurethequashingof a decisionto grantplanningpermissionor to dischargeacondition
or limitation, it cannotsecurethereinstatementof an enforcementnotice whichmayhave
beenquashedat thesametime by theappealdecision.Only an application undersection289 cando that.Moreover,in thecaseof Gill v Secretaryof Statefor the Environmentand
North WarwickshireBC [1985]JPL 710,it washeld that adecisionto grantplanning
permissionundera formercomparableprovisionto section177(1) of the 1990 Act, could
be challengedundereitherof the formerprocedureswhich are now providedby sections
288 and289 of the 1990 Act.
6.26 In decidingwhetherto appealin the High Court, theLPA’s officers shouldbearin mind
that,unlessthe appealdecisionis successfullychallengedby an appealto the Court, thetermsof the decisionwill apply in all respects.Thus, if (for example)the text of the
decisionlettercanvassesanumberof possibleplanningconditions whichtheInspectorintends toimposeon a conditionalgrantof planningpermission,butonesuchcondition is
clearlyomitted from the actualgrantof permission,that deficiencycanonly be remedied
by way of a furtherappealto theHigh Court. Indecidingwhetherto appeal againsttheappealdecision,theLPA’s officers should beawarethat a well-foundedappealmaynot
necessarily involvea full hearingby a DeputyJudgein theCourt. This is becausethereis a
legalprocess,known as “submissionto judgment” which enablesthe Secretaryof State
formally to concedethat the decisionwas legally defectivein oneor morerespectsand,
consequently,to agreewith theLPA that it should be“remitted” to theSecretaryof State
for his re-determination.Whenthe Department(actingthroughthe TreasurySolicitor’s
Departmentasagent)agreesto this process,theLPA’s litigation costsin bringing the
appealin the High Court will normallybe metby theDepartment.
Enforcing PlanningControl
CHAPTER 7
Serving a stop notice
PURPOSE OF A STOP NOTICE
7.1 Becausean appealto the Secretaryof State(undersection174 of theTown andCountry
PlanningAct 1990)effectivelysuspendsanenforcement noticeuntil the appealis finally
determined,or the noticeis withdrawn, the stopnoticeprovisions(in sections183 to 187 of
the 1990Act) enablethe LPA to dealeffectivelywith the interim situation.Theseprovisions
enablethe LPA to serve astopnotice, prohibitingthecarrying out,on the enforcement
noticeland, of any activity which is within thescopeof thebreachof control allegedin the
enforcementnotice.The stopnoticemayrequire anysuchactivity to ceaseuntil thedatewhenthe complianceperiodspecifiedin the relatedenforcementnoticeexpires.
THE SCOPE OF A STOP NOTICE
7.2 Thestopnoticeprovisionsof the 1990 Act are legally constructedso that what is
prohibitedby thenoticemustderiveentirely from the relatedenforcementnotice.
Consequently,if the LPA anticipatehaving to servea stopnotice,they shouldconsiderits
scopewhenthe enforcementnotice is being formulated.
7.3 Theprovisionsof section 183(1)of the 1990 Act enablethe LPA to prohibit the carrying
out of an activity “on land to which the enforcementnotice relates,or any part of that land
specifiedin thestopnotice.” It follows from theseprovisionsthat the activity to be
prohibitedmustbetaking placesomewhereon theparcelof land comprisingthe
enforcementnoticesite. Thus the activity need notbe taking placeon the entire
enforcement noticesite: it might be confinedto a specific areaof thesite, eg aparticular
building from which noise,fumesanddustare beingemitted;or aportionof thesitewhere
openstorageof scrapmaterialsis unacceptablebecauseof the height at which the scrapis
piled. In decidingwhetherto limit thestopnotice to partonly of theenforcementnotice
site,the LPA will needto consider whetherthe activity to be prohibited is capableof
readilybeingmoved aroundto any otherpart of the site, egopenstorageof pallets:if so, it
will usuallybe prudent tomakethestopnoticeapply to the entire enforcementnotice site.
7.4 An “activity” which astop noticemayprohibit is definedin section183(2) of the 1990 Act
as—
any activity specifiedin theenforcementnoticeas anactivity which the local planning
authority requireto ceaseand anyactivity carriedout as partof that activity or associated
with that activity.”
Becausea stop noticeis prohibitory, it is not apt forusein any circumstancewhich requires
somepositiveaction to betaken inresponseto it. A stop noticecanonly compel an
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Serving astopnotice
activity to cease,orreduceor minimise thelevel of an activity. Providedthe activity to beprohibited is within the scopeof the breachof control allegedin the enforcementnotice,a
stop noticemay applyto it. Thus,wherean enforcementnoticeallegesamaterialchange
of useof land,a stopnoticemayprohibit anactivity which is ancillaryor incidental to the
changeof use (eventhoughanenforcementnotice itself couldnot be directedagainst an
ancillaryor incidentaluse).
7.5 By virtue of section183(4)and(5) of the 1990 Act, a stopnotice cannotprohibit—
(1) theuse ofany building as a dwellinghouse;
(2) thecarryingout of anyactivity if the activity hasbeencarriedout (whether
continuously or not)for aperiod ofmorethanfour yearsendingwith thedate of
serviceof the notice.For this purpose,any period duringwhich theactivity wasauthorisedby planning permissionis not counted.
AUTHORITY FOR SERVICE OF A STOP NOTICE
7.6 It is importantto obtainproperauthorisationfor serviceof astopnotice,eitherfrom the
relevant committeeor theCouncil’sofficer to whomauthority to proceedwith servinga
stopnoticehasbeendelegated.Although thereis no right of appealto the Secretaryof
Stateagainsta stbpnotice,it canbe challengedon the groundthat it wasnotproperly
authorised,or that the decisionto issueit was“Wednesburyunreasonable”.A challengeon
this basismaybebroughtby seekingleave, in theHigh Court, to bring judicial review
proceedings,or by wayof the defenceto aprosecution undersection187 of the 1990Act
for contraveningthe prohibition inthe stopnotice.
THE RECIPIENT OF A STOP NOTICE
7.7 Therequirementfor serviceof a stopnoticeon interestedpeopleis less rigorousthan for an
enforcementnotice.Section 183(6)of the 1990 Act providesthat a stop notice“may be
servedby the local planning authorityon anypersonwho appearsto themto havean
interest intheland or to be engagedin anyactivity prohibitedby thenotice”. Nonetheless,it is prudentfor the LPA to makethoroughenquiryinto the identity of theowner, andany
otheroccupieror operator,of the stop notice landso thatany subsequentallegationof
defectiveserviceprocedurescanbe effectivelyrebutted.
7.8 Section 184(6)of the 1990 Act containsusefulsupplementary provisionsenablingtheLPA
to displaywhatis calleda “sitenotice” on the stopnotice land.The three-foldpurposeof a
sitenotice is—
(1) to statethat a stop noticehasbeenservedandthatanypersoncontraveningit maybeprosecutedfor an offenceundersection187 of the 1990 Act;
(2) to give thedatewhenthestopnotice takeseffect; and
(3) to indicatethe stopnotice’srequirements.
Whereverthereis difficulty in establishingtheidentify of everyonewho mayhave an
interest inlandto which a stopnoticewill apply, it would be prudent toensurethatat least
onesitenoticeis prominentlydisplayedon any stop noticesite.
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7.9 Theprovisionsof section184(1)of the 1990 Act requirethat a stopnoticemust referto
the enforcement noticeto which it relatesandhavea copyof that notice annexedto it.
TIME-LIMIT FOR COMPLIANCE WITH A STOP NOTICE
7.10 Theprovisionsof section184(2)of the 1990 Act requirethata stopnoticemustspecifythe
dateon which it will takeeffect. This mustbe acalendardate. It is referredto as the
effectivedate.In section184(3)of the 1990Act, thereare specifiedlimits on the effective
date. In normalcircumstances,thelimits are—
(1) notearlier than3 days after thedateon which the stop noticeis served;and
(2) not later than 28 daysafter the dateon which thenotice is first servedon any person.
The three-daytime-limit for bringing a stopnotice into force canbe waivedif the LPA
considerthereare “special reasonsfor specifyingan earlierdateanda statementof thosereasons is served with the stop notice.” These provisions (in section l84(3)(a) of the 1990Act) enablea stop noticeto bebroughtinto force immediatelywherethe LPA considerthat the activity to be prohibited is so environmentallyharmful, or likely in practiceto be
irremediable,that it is imperativeto prohibit it at once.
WHEN THE EFFECT OF A STOP NOTICE CEASES
7.11 The provisionsof section184(4)of the 1990Act statethat astop noticewill ceasetote
effectivewhen—
(1) theLPA withdraw therelatedenforcement noticeor that notice is quashedin
proceedingson an enforcementappealto the Secretaryof State,or in any judicial
review by theHigh Court;
(2) the complianceperiod in the enforcement noticeexpires(so that it then becomesa
criminal offencenot to carryout the requiredremedialsteps);
(3) the LPA withdrawthestopnotice.
FORMULATING THE TERMS OF A STOP NOTICE
7.12 Aswith the termsof an enforcementnotice,it is vital that the termsof a stop noticeare
formulatedwith theutmostclarity and precision.Sincethereis no right of appealto the
Secretaryof Stateagainstastopnotice,thereis no opportunityfor any draftingdeficiency
in it to be corrected afterit hasbeenserved.The allegedbreachof planningcontrol will
have beenstated inthe enforcementnotice to which the stop noticeis related.But, unlike
the enforcementnotice,the stopnotice doesnotspecifyanyrequiredstepsto be takenfor a
remedialpurpose.Thestop noticesimply prohibitsall the activitiescomprisedin the
allegedbreachof control,or certainof thespecifiedactivities at which the LPA have
decidedto directthe notice. In the eventof asubsequentcontraventionof a stopnotice,
the LPA may needto initiate prosecutionproceedingsundersection187 of the 1990 Act,
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Serving astop notice
which would requiretheLPA to prove“beyondreasonabledoubt” (the criminal standard of
proof) that theprohibition hadbeencontravenedby thedefendant.Thetermsof the
notice mustprovidethe basisfor any suchprosecution.
7.13 It ishelpful in formulatingthe termsof a stop noticeto recall that the High Court’s
judgmenton 16 July 1986,in the caseof R vRunnyinedeBC ex parteSarvanSinghSeehra
[1987] LGR 250,held that questionsof fact anddegreeare frequentlyencounteredin
PlanningLaw and thereis no objection to incorporatingsuchmattersinto enforcement
andstopnotices,eventhoughthe resultcreatesuncertaintyasto the standard of conduct
requiredin orderto comply with the notices.Thepoint at issuein that case wasthe alleged
imprecisionof theprohibition inRunnymedeBC’s stopnotice,as follows—
“Use of the landfor thepurposesof religious meetingsandservicesandfor the purposesof
religious devotion otherwisethan as incidental to the enjoymentof the dwelling houseas
such.”
It was arguedon Mr Seehra’sbehalfthat the wordsafter“religious devotion” madethe
prohibition inthestopnotice toouncertainforhim to be confidentof holdingreligious and
devotionalmeetingsathis homein Chertseyin sucha wayas to avoidcontraveningit. He
soughtjudicial review in orderto havethe stopnoticequashedby the Court or to obtain a
declarationthat it was invalid or void. Mr JusticeSchiemannrefusedthe applicationon the
groundthat, althoughMr Seehrahadwell-foundedworriesabout thetermsof thestop
notice,they did not result in the stop noticebeing regardedas void. The noticegavethe
recipientan indication of whathe mustdo andwhat he mustnot do; andtherewasno need
(in the Judge’sview) for a precisespecificationof the numberof people,or the amountof
noise,or whateverit may bethat is complainedof, beforea stopnoticehas anyvalidity.
ASSESSING A STOP NOTICE’S LIKELY CONSEQUENCES
7.14 Becausea stopnoticecanhaveimmediatelyseriousconsequenceson a business,
Governmentguidancein Annex 3 to DETR Circular 10/97advisesthata “cost/benefit
assessment”shouldbe carriedout. Thepurposeof this exercise,which need notbe over-
elaborate,is to examinethe foreseeablecoststo thecompany,operatoror landowneragainst
whoseactivities thestopnotice is directed,andthebenefitto amenityin the vicinity of the
sitewhich is likely to result.The High Court’s judgmenton 12 October 1994,in the caseof
R v ElmbridgeBC ex parteWendyFair MarketsLtd [1995] JPLB36, heldthat thesame
guidancein thepreviousCircular (DOE Circular 21/91) wasadvisoryandnot binding onthe LPA if theycould showadequatereasonsnot to follow it. The LPA in this case
(involving landin theMetropolitanGreenBelt) wereawareof the effect thestop notice
would haveon marketoperators, tradersandcustomers;andtherewasevidencethat theyhadweighedevidenceof that effectagainstthe seriousnessof the GreenBelt objection.
They werenot requiredto go into a “more detailedeconomicexercise”.The Courtshould
not substituteits own view for thatof the LPA on the expediencyof servinga stopnotice.
PROSECUTING A STOP NOTICE CONTRAVENTION
7.15 Unlike an enforcement notice contravention, which can be remedied by the LPA's own“default action” (by virtue of the provisions in section 178 of the 1990 Act), a stop notice
contraventioncanonly be dealtwith by initiating prosecutionproceedingsundersection
187 of the 1990 Act. To emphasisethe seriousnessof contraveninga stopnotice,the LPA
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shouldalwaysconsidera possibleprosecutionas soonas they have evidenceof an offence.If
thereis likely to be delayin hearingthe casein the Magistrates’Court or Crown Court, the
LPA should emphasisethe seriousnessandurgencyof the caseto the Court’s administrators
andask foran “expedited”hearing.
INJUNCTION IN SUPPORT OF A STOP NOTICE
7.16 Eventhoughtheyhaveserveda stopnotice,the LPA mayfind that it is deliberately
contravenedandthehearingof aprosecution undersection187 of the 1990 Act cannotbe
arrangedquickly. In that event,the LPA maywish to seekan interlocutory(that is,
interim) injunction to restraintheprohibitedactivity. In a caseinvolving Tower Hamlets
LBC andacompanyknown as PeachbarLimited, Mr JusticeBrookegrantedsuch aninjunction on 18 December1989 in circumstances wherecriminal proceedingson the stop
noticeoffencecould notbe heardby the ThamesMagistrates’Court until 22 February1990.When PeachbarLimited challengedtheHigh Court’s grantof an interlocutory
injunction, theCourt of Appeal (Civil Division) held, in a judgmentgivenon 20December1989,that theJudgein the High Court wasentitled totakeinto accounttheflagrantanddeliberatebreachof PlanningLaw in weighing“the balanceof convenience”in
theCouncil’s applicationfor an injunction;and it wasnot for theCourtof Appeal to
interfere in aquestion whichwasfor the High CourtJudge’sdiscretion,unlessit couldbe
said thathis decisionwas soclearly wrongthat it wasgenuinelyperverse.In this case,the
Judge’sdirectionsto himselfwere “impeccable”andtheCourt of Appealdismissed
PeachbarLimited’s appealagainstthe grantof the interlocutoryinjunction.
THE LPA’S POSSIBLE LIABILITY TO COMPENSATION WHERE A STOPNOTICE IS SERVED
7.17 SomeLPAs are reluctantto servea stopnotice,evenwherethey considerit is justified,
becausethey believe,or areadvisedby officers, that thereis asubstantialrisk of having to
pay compensationfor financial losswhich therecipientof thestop noticemay incur. In
practice, this risk is often exaggerated.Thereis no evidenceof frequentor substantial
paymentsof compensationhavingto be madeby LPAs who servestopnoticeswhich are
legally well-founded.
7.18 Section186(1) of the 1990 Act providesthat,on servingastopnotice,the LPA will only
haveto pay compensationif thefollowing circumstancesarise—
(1) therelatedenforcementnotice is quashed,on appealto theSecretaryof Stateon one
of the grounds(b) to (g) in section174(2) of the 1990 Act: this meansthatcompensationis not payablewhenthe relatedenforcementnotice is quashed ona
“ground (a)” appealbecauseplanningpermissionis granted;
(2) the relatedenforcementnotice is varied(otherwisethan on a “ground (a)” appeal)so
that any prohibitedactivity in thestopnoticeceasesto be arelevantactivity within
theenforcementnotice;
(3) theLPA decideto withdrawtherelatedenforcementnotice for somereasonotherthantheir decisionto grantplanningpermissionfor thedevelopment towhich the
enforcementnotice relates;
(4) the LPA decideto withdrawthestopnotice.
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Servingastopnotice
And, evenif theLPA incur a liability to pay compensationfor oneof thesefour reasons,that liability may be reducedor eliminatedin anycasewheretheclaimantwasrequired,by
a planningcontraventionnoticeor other formal requisitionfor information,to provideinformation to the LPA anddid not provideit or did not otherwiseco-operatewith the
LPA whenrespondingto the notice. Thepurposeof theseprovisionsis to ensurethat
someonewho fails to providetheLPA with requiredinformation,or pursuesa courseof
non-cooperationwith theLPA, shouldnotbe able to obtain anycompensationfor loss ordamagewhich couldhave beenavoidedif he or shehadprovidedtherequiredinformation
or co-operatedwith theLPA.
7.19 Thereis a 12-monthtime-limit (runningfrom the date ofthe decisionon the relatedenforcementnotice appeal,or thedate ofwithdrawing theenforcementnoticeor stop
notice)on claimingcompensationfor loss or damagedueto a stopnotice.The usualapproach,if liability is admitted,is for the LPA andthe claimantto agreeon the amountof
anycompensation whichmaybe payable.If agreementon the amountpayablecannotbereached,the disputeis normally referredto the Lands Tribunal for decision.
Enforcing PlanningControl
CHAPTER 8
Serving a breach of conditionnotice
INTRODUCTION
8.1 The provisionsof section187A of the TownandCountryPlanning Act1990 enablethe
LPA to servea “breachof conditionnotice”. This typeof noticehasbeenavailablesince
July 1992.It providesa summaryprocedurefor theLPA to securecompliancewith
conditionsimposedon agrantof planningpermissionfor carryingoutany development of
land. (By virtue of section187A(13)(a)of the 1990 Act, “conditions” includes
“limitations” on agrantof permission,suchas,for example,the limitations on certain
“permitteddevelopment” rightswhich are grantedby virtue of the GeneralPermitted
DevelopmentOrder.)
CHOOSING BETWEEN A BREACH OF CONDITION NOTICE AND ANENFORCEMENT NOTICE
8.2 Whenconsideringhow bestto securecompliancewith a planningcondition, the LPA will
often haveto choosebetweenservinga breachof conditionnoticeand issuingan
enforcementnotice.Thischoicemaynot bea simple matter:someof the relevantfactors
are explained inthe following paragraphs8.3 and8.4.
8.3 Some advantagesof servinga breachof conditionnotice are—
(1) becausethereis no right of appealto the Secretaryof Stateagainstthe notice,its effect
cannotbe suspendedby meansof an appeal;
(2) if the “person responsible”for securing compliancewith anyconditionsis in breachof
the notice,a criminal offenceoccursandmaybe prosecutedimmediatelyin theMagistrates’Court,wherethe maximumpenaltyon conviction is £1,000;
(3) thethreatof beingprosecutedfor contrayeninga breachof conditionnoticemay
suffice to persuadethe recipientof it to comply with the conditionwithout further
actionby the LPA.
8.4 Somepossibledisadvantagesof servinga breachof conditionnotice are—
(1) becausethereis no right of appealto theSecretaryof State,thenoticecannotbe
correctedif it containssomesignificantdefect;
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Serving abreachof conditionnotice
(2) if someonewho is in breachof the notice is prosecuted,the onusof proof is on theLPA to show“beyondreasonabledoubt” (the criminal standard of proof)that an
offencehas occurred;
(3) if the noticecanbe shownto be fundamentallydefective,or theLPA exceed their
powerin servingit, thenotice may bequashed,by the High Court, on judicial review,
thusdelayingthe enforcementprocessandcausingexpensefor the LPA;
(4) if someonewho hasbeenprosecutedandconvictedof an offenceof contraveninga
breachof conditionnoticestill persistsin contraveningit, thereis no “default” power
for theLPA to entertheland andcarry out anyworkswhich may berequiredby the
notice.
THE RECIPIENT OF A BREACH OF CONDITION NOTICE
8.5 Thepersonon whom a breachof conditionnoticemay beservedis referredto in
section187A(3) ofthe 1990 Act as—
(1) “any personwho is carryingoutor hascarriedout thedevelopment”(paragraph(a));
or
(2) “any person havingcontrolof theland” (paragraph(b)).
The definitionof the first categoryis self-explanatory,but it is elaboratedby
section187A(13)(b)of the 1990 Act which providesthatcarryingout any developmentis
to include “causingor permittinganotherto do so.”Thus,for example, wheretheownerof
a building which is beingconvertedto adwellinghouseinstructsaconstructioncompanyto
carry outconversionwork which contravenesaplanningcondition, a breachof condition
noticecanbe servedon the building’s owner orthe constructioncompanyor both. The
definitionof thesecondcategory(“any person havingcontrolof the land”) is specifically
limited by subsection(4) of section187A so that the breachof conditionnoticeservedon
suchapersoncanonly relateto “conditions regulatingtheuse ofthe land”. Forexample,
wherea housebuilderhascarriedoutresidentialdevelopmentof 20 housesincontraventionof aconditionrequiringa specifiedtypeof roof-tile to be usedon all the
houses,andthe houseshaveall beensold to individual owner-occupiers,thebreachof
conditionnoticecouldnot be served,eventhoughtheowner-occupiershavecontrolof theland,becausethis typeof planningcondition is not a conditionwhich regulatestheuseof
the land.
FORMULATING THE TERMS OF A BREACH OF CONDITION NOTICE
8.6 The provisionsof section187A(5)and(7) of the 1990 Act requirethat abreachof
conditionnoticemust—
(1) specifythe conditionwith which, in theLPA’s view,the recipientof thenoticehas
failed to comply;
(2) specifythe stepswhich the LPA considerought tobe taken,or theactivities which
ought tocease,to securecompliancewith thespecifiedcondition;
(3) statethe period allowedfor compliancewith thenotice.
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Enforcing PlanningControl
8.7 It is vital to stateall thetermsof a notice withthe utmostclarity and precision,bearingin
mind that anyprosecutionof a contraventionof thenoticewill result in theMagistrates’
Court’s examination ofits termsin the minutest detail. Thisis particularly relevantto therequiredsteps,wheretherecipientof the noticemustnot beleft in anydoubtaboutexactlt
what hasto be done,or what mustcease,in orderto complywith whatevercondition is
specifiedin the notice.
THE COMPLIANCE PERIOD
8.8 The provisionsof Section187A(7) ofthe 1990Act prescribethat the complianceperiod in
abreachof conditionnotice is to be—
(1) a periodnot less than 28 days,startingwith the date ofserviceof the notice (paragraph
(a)); or
(2) the initial complianceperiod,extendedby aperiodto be specifiedby a furthernotice
servedon thepersonresponsible(paragraph(b)).
Section187A doesnot prescribeany criteria for the LPA to usein decidingwhat
complianceperiodto specifyin the notice.But, sincesection1 87A(11) (a) providesa
defencefor apersonwho is prosecutedfor contraveninga notice that “he took all
reasonablemeasuresto securecompliancewith the conditionsspecifiedin the notice”, the
LPA shouldensurethat thecomplianceperiodprovidesa reasonabletime to accomplish
whateverthe notice requires.Whena substantialamountof work is neededto comply fully
with acondition, it maybe advisablefor theLPA to try to agreeon the duration ofthe
complianceperiodwith thepersonon whom the notice is to be served,eventhoughwhat
is to be requiredis at theLPA’s discretion.
THE DEFENCE AGAINST PROSECUTION
8.9 Section1 87A(11) of the 1990 Act providestwo statutorydefencesagainstprosecutionfor a
personchargedwith the offenceof contraveningabreachof conditionnotice.As
mentionedin theprecedingparagraph8, the mainavailabledefenceis that theperson
charged“took all reasonablemeasuresto securecompliancewith the conditionsspecifiedin
the notice”. It is for theCourt todecidewhat it wasreasonablefor the personprosecutedto
do in theparticular circumstancesof the caseto achievecompliancewith the conditionsin
thenotice.
8.10 Thedefencein section187A(11)(b) ofthe 1990 Act is confinedto “any person having
control of the land”: consequently,this defenceis available foran offenceinvolving a
breachof a conditionregulatingtheuseof the land.Sucha personmayclaim that “he no
longerhadcontrol of theland” at the time theoffencewasallegedto havebeencommitted.
8.11 Anyonewho seeksto rely on eitherof thesedefencesmustprovethe defenceon the
balanceof probabilities.It is not for theLPA to proveeitherthat the defendantdid not
takeall reasonablestepsto securecompliancewith the conditions;or that aperson(in the
caseof section187A(2)(b) and(4)) still hadcontrol of the land on the datewhenthe
noticewasserved.
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Servinga breachof condition notice
8.12 A breachof conditionnoticewill continueto haveeffectin a recurringsituation,eg if aBCN requiringa breachto stopis compliedwith but thebreachlater recurs,theoriginalnoticecanbe enforced afreshandanew noticeis not normallyrequired.Onceserved,it
will continuein forceuntil withdrawn.Section 187A(8)providesthat theperson
responsibleis in breachof thenotice if at any time afterthe endof the complianceperiod thenoticehasnot beencompliedwith, Evena successfulprosecutiondoesnot preventa
furtherprosecution inrespectof thesamenotice (section187A( 10)). However,the
“personresponsible”mustbe thesameor anew noticewill needto beservedon thenewpersonresponsible.
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EnforcingPlanningControl
CHAPTER 9
Obtaining an enforcementinj unction
THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
9.1 Section187B(1)of theTown andCountryPlanningAct 1990 providesa wide-ranging
powerfor the LPA to obtain aplanningenforcementinjunctionwhenacourt orderis
neededto restrainabreachof planning control. Theprovisionsare asfollows—
“Where a local planning authorityconsiderit necessaryor expedientfor any actualor
apprehendedbreachof planningcontrol tobe restrainedby injunction, theymayapply to
the court for an injunction, whetheror not they haveexercisedor are proposingto exercise
anyof their otherpowersunder thisPart.”
Section 187B(4)of the 1990 Act explainsthat “the court”meansthe High Court or the
CountyCourt.
9.2 The Court’spowerto grantan injunction is wide-ranging.Section187B(2)of the 1990 Act
provides—
“On an applicationundersubsection(1) thecourtmay grantsuchan injunction as the
court thinks appropriate forthepurposeof restrainingthebreach.”
9.3 Theseprovisionshave beenin force sinceJanuary1992.They are availablein additionto
thepowers conferredby section222 of the LocalGovernmentAct 1972,which enablea
local authorityto institute any legalproceedingsin their own namewherethey considerit
expedientfor the promotionor protectionof the interestsof the inhabitantsof their area.Thepreferable course,in dealingwith any actualor allegedbreachof control for which
injunctive relief is to be sought,is for the LPA to usethe provisionsin section187Bof the
1990 Act.
THE SCOPE OF AN ENFORCEMENT INJUNCTION
9.4 The scopeof an injunctionwhich maybe soughtundersection187Bof the 1990 Act is
apparentlyvery wide. It mayapply to “any actualor apprehendedbreachof planning
control”. In this context“apprehended”is takenasmeaningananticipatedbreachof
control,eg.whereit is clearthat preparationsare being madeto establishapermanent
residentialcaravansite; or amajor waste-tippingoperationis aboutto start; or mineral
extractionis aboutto re-startat a long sincedisusedlimestonequarry—all without the
planningpermissionrequiredin eachcase.
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Obtaininganenforcementinjunction
9.5 An injunctionmaybe soughtat any stageof the planningenforcementprocess,eitheras
the LPA’s preferredremedyor in additionto someotherformal enforcementaction. For
example,if anenforcementnotice requiring theuseof landfor scrap-metalrecoveryto
ceaseis suspendedby an appealto theSecretaryof State,but therecoveryoperationsare
extendedto a two-shift systemandweekendworking, it maybe justified to seekaninjunction to restraintheextendedworking; or if, despitebeingprosecutedby theLPA for
contraveningan effectiveenforcementnotice,the operator ofahaulagebusinesscontinues
to defy the notice,seekingan injunction may betheLPA’s only effectivecourseof action.
Wheninitiating injunctive proceedingsby virtue of section187Bof the 1990 Act, the LPAdo nothaveto show that the grantof an injunction is theonly availableremedy:it is
sufficientfor the LPA to “considerit necessaryor expedient”for the breachto be restrained
by an injunction.
9.6 Judicial authorityhasestablishedthat the High Court or CountyCourtshouldapply the
injunctive provisionsin section187Bof the 1990 Act flexibly, with properregardto the
underlyingplanning controlenforcementsituation.This canbe seenfrom the Court ofAppeal’sjudgmenton 7 February1994in the case ofRunnymedeBC v Harwood [1994]
EGCS23. In that case,thedefendant(Mr P C Harwood)hadsoughtpermissionfor the
changeof useof formerfarm-land,nearEghamin Surrey,to usefor the maintenance andrepairof commercialvehiclesfor a period offive years;and,separately,to converta former
agricultural buildingon the landto residentialuse.Theplaintiff (Runnymede BC)refused
both applicationson 20 August1993, butboth developments wentaheadwithout
permission.In initial injunctive proceedingsin the High Court, theJudgegrantedfourinterlocutory (that is, interim) injunctions.Among them, oneinjunction restrainedMr
Harwoodfrom continuing tousethe landfor the storageof motorvehicles;and anotherrestrainedhim from moving or causingor permittingany personto move into occupation
of aparticularbuilding on theland.Just underthreeweekslater, theseinjunctionswere
dischargedby anotherHigh CourtJudgewhenMr Harwoodundertookto prosecute
planningappealsagainstRunnymedeBC’s refusalof permissionwith all due diligence.The
reasonfor the Judge’sdecisionwasthathe consideredagrantof interlocutoryrelief, in
advanceof the latertrial of the action,would prejudicethedefendant’schanceof resisting
theCouncil’scaseat thetrial becauseMr Harwoodwould then no longerbe on theland,or living in the building, if an interim injunction weregranted.In reachingthis conclusion,
theJudgeapplied legalprincipleslaid down in theearlier injunctive caseof East
HampshireDC v Davies [1991] 2 PLR 8 which precededthenew powersin section187Bof
the 1990 Act. The Courtof Appealheldunanimouslythat the High CourtJudgehadmisdirectedhimself in concentratingon theinterlocutorynatureof theapplicationand in
applying the principlesstatedin the caseof EastHampshireDC v Daviesto an application
undersection187B of the 1990Act. TheCourt of AppealstatedthatParliamenthad
clearlyenactedapower for theCourt tograntan injunctionto enforceplanningcontrol
overactualandapprehended breachesof control; and it couldnothave beenParliament’s
intention, wheretherehadbeenan actualbreach,that thepowershouldonly be
exercisableat thetrial of the action,with interlocutoryapplicationsconfinedto preserving
the “statusquo” until the trial. Accordingly, theCourt restoredthe injunctions,as soughtby the Council, but suspendedthe effectof the injunctionrelatingto the particular
building on the landuntil theplanningappealhadbeendetermined.
9.7 In another judgment given on 7 February 1994, in the case of Croydon LBC v Giadden andAnother [1994] EGCS24, theCourt of Appealheld thatsection187Bof the 1990 Act was
drawnon the statutory assumptionthat an actual,aswell asan intended,breachof
planningcontrolcouldbe restrainedby injunction. Therefore,theword “restrained”had to
begiven a wider, and inthe contextmore natural,meaning.Oncethatwasdone,it was
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EnforcingPlanningControl
obvious that amandatoryinjunction (asopposedto a merelynegativeinjunction) wasnot
excluded.It appearsto follow from this judgment thatthe High Court or CountyCourt
may grantan injunction, undersection187Bof the 1990 Act, requiringsomeaction to be
taken todealwith the breachof control.
9.8 In a judgmentgiven on 29 March 1995, in thecaseof HambletonDC v Bird and Another
[1995] EGCS67, the Court of Appealoverturnedthe CountyCourt’s refusalof aplanning
enforcementinjunction againstan extendedgypsyfamily on the groundthat thefamily
might haveanarguable casefor thegrantof planningpermissionif they re-appliedto
HambletonDC for it, andthe overall public interestdid not (in theCountyCourt’sview)
justify grantingan injunction which would causegrossdisruptionto the family group.The
Court of Appealheldthat the possibility of planningpermissionbeinggranted infuture was
not a legitimate reasonfor refusingan injunctionto restrainabreachof the law. It wasfor
the planning authority,andnot the Courts,to consideranyplanningapplication inthe
light of policy considerations.It wasnot for the Courtsto usurpthe decision-making
function ofthe Council.Where thebalanceof public interestin suchmatterslay wasfor
the planning authority,not the Judge.The Court of Appealheld that the respondents(the
gypsies)had demonstratedaconstantintention to remainin residenceat the farm and
break thelaw, which couldnotbe tolerated.Accordingly, theCourt grantedthe injunctionsoughtby HambletonDC, butsuspendedit for threemonths toenablethe extendedgypsy
family to makealternativearrangements.In giving judgementon 7 July 1995,in the caseof
South HamsDC v Halsey [1996] JPL 761,the Courtof Appealdismissedanappealagainstthe High Court’s mandatoryinjunction requiring demolitionof part of a building as
requiredby an enforcementnotice.TheAppeal Courtheld thatwhile it wasopento a
defendantto assertthat theenforcementnoticewas anullity, thepresentnotice wasnot a
nullity (in thesenseof Miller-Mead); that althoughthe defendanthadbeenacquitted in
the CrownCourt on a prosecutionundersection179, the Council’s applicationfor an
injunctionundersection187Bwasnot an abuseof process;andthatsection187Bconferred
wider scopeandapplicationthanwasthe caseunderthe previouscommonlaw, andwas
wide enoughto allow the grantof mandatoryinjunctions(see alsoCroydonLBC v
Gladden). In R v Basildon DC ex parte Clarke [1996] JPL 866, on 21 December 1995,where theCounty Court hadrefusedto adjournproceedingson the injunction to allow the
applicationfor judicial review to be disposedof, the High Court notedthe variouscasesinwhich the complexrelationshipsbetweeninjunctionsandjudicial review hadarisen,and
soughtto establishamorestreamlinedapproach.The proceduralpointshighlightedby the
caseswereconsideredlikely to be ofno morethan theoreticalrelevancein the majority of
cases.It was heldthat if somethinghadgoneseriouslywrong with the procedure,whether
in the initiation of the injunctionproceedingsor in any otherway, therewasno reasonwhy
the County Courtcould notproperlytakeit into accountwhendecidingwhetherto grant
or refusethe injunction.
THE PERSONAL NATURE OF INJUNCTIVE PROCEEDINGS
9.9 Unlike anenforcementnoticeor a stopnotice,a planningenforcementinjunction is not
primarily directedat the parcelof landon which thebreachof control is taking place.
Injunctive proceedingsare “personal”in thesensethat the LPA seeksto obtain an order
from theCourt to restraina person,or anumberof people, whomust eachbe cited by name
in theLPA’s application,from carryingon the breach.It follows that, in assessingwhat is
called“the balanceof convenience”in thedecisionwhetherto grant injunctive relief on
the LPA’s application,the Court will haveto weigh thepublic interest(which the LPA
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Obtaininganenforcementinjunction
represents)againsttheprivateinterestof thepersonor peoplewhomtheLPA seektorestrain..Thisdiffers from,for example,the processof an enforcementappealwherethe
decision-makeris concernedwith whether theappealshouldsucceed onits legalor
planningmerits.And, evenif the Court concludesthatan interlocutoryinjunction should
begranted,its effect may besuspendedfor a specifiedperiodso that the defendanthastimein which to makesuitablealternativearrangementsfor whateveractivity is to be restrained.
TheCourt may requirethe plaintiff (theLPA) andthe defendantto appearin personat the
endof an initial periodof suspensionof an injunction, so that thebalanceof convenience
canbe reassessed.
PROCEDURE WHERE A PERSON’S IDENTITY IS UNKNOWN
9.10 Although it will usuallybe necessaryfor theLPA’s applicationto theCourt to citethe
nameof anypersonor personsagainst whoman injunction is sought,section187B(3)of
the 1990 Act enablesRulesof Court to providefor such aninjunction to be issuedagainsta
personwhoseidentity is unknown.Thisrule-makingpowerhasbeenusedto makeOrder
110 in the Rulesof the SupremeCourt (insertedby SI No. 1992/638 fromApril 1992) and
to insert Order 49,rule6, in the CountyCourtRules1981.Theseproceduralrulesspecify
thedocumentary evidencethe LPA will be expectedto provide if theyseekaplanning
enforcementinjunctionagainstapersonwhoseidentity is unknown.
A POSSIBLE UNDERTAKING IN DAMAGES
9.11 Anotherexampleof thepersonalnatureof injunctive proceedingsis that, where theCourt
grantsan interlocutoryinjunction, pendingthe eventualtrial of the actionor theoutcome
of aconcurrent enforcementappeal,theJudgehasdiscretionto requirethe personseeking
the injunction to give what is called“an undertakingin damages”to the personor peoplewhom the injunction will restrainduringthe interimperiod.The purposeof such an
undertakingis to providefinancial compensationfor theinjunctedpersonif a substantive
injunction is not grantedat the eventualfull trial of the action,or if it is subsequently
shownthat no breachof planningcontrolhas occurred.TheJudgein the interlocutoryproceedingswill exercisethe Court’sdiscretion in the particular circumstancesof eachcase.
Moreover,it shouldnot necessarilybeassumedthat anundertakingin damageswill be
required.In the case ofKirkleesMBC v WickesBuilding SuppliesLtd [199213 All ER 717,theHouseof Lordsheld (in aSundaytradingcasewherethe local authorityhadsought an
injunctionundersection222 of the LocalGovernmentAct 1972) that theCourtneednot
necessarilyrequirethe authorityto give an undertakingin damages wheretherequirementwould effectively result in thefailure of the law enforcementprocess.
FAILURE TO OBSERVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF AN INJUNCTION
9.12 Any failure to comply with the termsof an injunction is alwaysan extremelyseriousmatter.
(A personwho doesnot comply is in contemptof the Courtandis technicallyknown as a
“contemner”.)Theprovisionsof Order45, rule 5, of the Rulesof the SupremeCourtgive
the Court discretionto commit to a termof imprisonmentsomeonewho refusesor neglects
to do somethingrequiredby aCourt orderwithin the time specifiedin the order.But, as
with the grantof an injunction,the Court hasdiscretionto decidewhethera term of
imprisonmentis appropriatein the particular circumstancesof anycontemptit hasto
consider.How thatdiscretionmay be exercisedin the case of aplanningenforcement
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injunction is illustratedby the Court of Appeal’s judgment, on4 October1993, in thecase
of Quildford BC v Valler and Others (Times Law Report, 15 October1993),where
Guildford BCsoughtto enforcethe termsof an injunction undersection187Bof the 1990
Act againsta groupof gypsieswho continuedto occupya residentialcaravansiteon their
privately ownedlandin theCouncil’sarea.In earlierproceedingsin theHigh Court, on 20
April 1993 [1993] EGCS78, Mr Justice Sedleyhadconcludedthatcommittal to prison for
contemptshouldnot be orderedunlessthedefendant’sconductinvolved a degreeof fault
or misconduct.In this case,theJudgeconsideredthat thegypsieshaddoneall theycould
possiblydo to find acollectivesiteandthe Councilcould suggestno alternativesite in their
area.Accordingly, as therewasno evidenceof wilful or deliberate disobedienceof the
Court’s order,nor anywilful refusal or neglectto comply with it, thedefendant’scontempt
could notattracta prison sentence.TheCourt of Appealheld that the High CourtJudge
had takentoonarrowa view of the Court’spowerto sentencea contemner toa prison
term. The judgmentheld,instead,that theHigh Courthad jurisdiction to commita
contemner toprison for negligentlyfailing to complywith an injunction.Thiswas
necessaryto enablethe Court toact as aguarantorof therule of law.However,thepower
wasdiscretionaryandenforcementwasnot automaticallyavailableat thedemand ofthe
plaintiff whoserights werebeinginfringed. In conclusion,the Courtof Appealalsoheld
that the High Court hadbeenright not to imposea prisonterm in this casewherean order
of committal would havefaced the particulargroupof gypsieswith a stark choicebetween
imprisonmentand abandoningtheir communalexistence.Thereappearsto be no
conclusiveauthorityon theeffectof acontemner’sreleasefrom prison on the injunction.
However,in thecaseof In re Barrell Enterprises[1973] 1WLR 19, the Courtof Appealheld
thataperson shouldbe releasedafter six monthsimprisonmenteventhoughtherewasno
likelihood of hercomplyingwith the injunction in respectof which shewas in contempt.
This suggeststhat the Court assumedthat shewould not beimprisonedagainfor the same,
continuingcontempt.
CONSIDERING WHETHER TO INITIATE INJUNCTIVE PROCEEDINGS
9.13 The decisionwhetherto initiate injunctive proceedingsmustalwaysdependon the
particular circumstancesof an actualor apprehendedbreachof control. It shouldnormally
bea corporate decision, involvingthe Council’s PlanningandLegal Departments.The
legalconsiderationsmay be socomplexthat it is prudentto obtain a Counsel’sopinionon
themerits of thecaseas partof thedecision-makingprocess.If Counseladvisesthat thereis
an arguablecasebutthat it is almostcertainto fail, therewould needto be extremely
exceptional circumstancesto justify bringingthe proceedings.In any event,if proceedings
are to bebrought in the High Court, Counselwill haveto be instructed,and it is always
difficult to instruct Counselto advocatea casewhich he or she hasadvised against.What
mattersis whetherthegrantof an injunction is theonly effectivemeansof taking
enforcementaction in the particular circumstancesfacedby theCouncil.
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“Default” actionto secure compliance withenforcementnotice
CHAPTER 10
“Default” action to securecompliance with enforcementnotice
THE “DEFAULT” POWER
10.1 Section178 of theTown andCountryPlanningAct 1990 enablesthe LPA to take action
where,on expiry of theenforcementnoticecomplianceperiod, the requiredstepshavenot
beentaken,by carryingout “default” action themselvesandrecoveringtheir reasonable
expensesfrom the then ownerof the enforcementnotice land.Theprovisionsof section
178(1)of the 1990 Act are—
“Where any stepsrequiredby anenforcementnotice to be takenare not takenwithin the
periodfor compliancewith the notice,the local planning authoritymay—
(a) enterthe landandtakethe steps;and
(b) recoverfrom thepersonwho is thenthe owner ofthe landany expensesreasonably
incurredby them in doing so.”
Since thescopeof this powerwasextendedby provisionsin the Planning and
Compensation Act1991,someLPAshavefound it themosteffectiveandeconomicalway
of securing compliancewith anenforcementnoticewherethe owneror occupierof the
land is reluctantto carry out therequirements.In somecases,a formalnotification of the
LPA’s intention to carryoutrequiredworks on a futuredatehaspersuadedthe owner or
occupier to do what is required.
THE SCOPE OF DEFAULT ACTION
10.2 While it is now clearthat the scopeof theLPA’s “default” actionextends tothe whole
rangeof stepswhich may berequiredby virtue of the provisionsin section173(3)to (7) of
the 1990 Act, particularcareis essentialwhenaction is taken tocompela useof landto
cease.Forexample, where the requiredsteps areto ceasethe useof privately ownedland as
a residentialcaravansiteand toremoveall thecaravansstationedon the land, if the LPA
arealso the housingauthority,theywill needto considerwhat statutoryduty theymay
havetowardspeoplewho could be homelesson eviction from thesite. If the LPA are not
the housingauthority,theywill needto considerthehousingauthority’sposition.
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THE POSSIBILITY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
10.3 TheLPA’s decisionto take“default” actionmay be challengedby a leaveapplicationto
seeka judicial reviewof thedecisionin the High Court,on the groundthat it is
“Wednesburyunreasonable”.In that event,theLPA will needto showthat theyhaveacted
reasonably(in the “Wednesbury”sense)by consideringall the relevantcircumstances
before deciding to take action. In the case of R v Greenwich LBC ex parte Patel [1985] JPL851, the Courtof Appealdiscussedthecircumstancewheredefaultactionwasto be taken
againstan owner of landwho hadnot beenservedwith a copyof an enforcementnotice
(because hisexistencewasentirely unknown tothe LPA),andconsequentlyhadnot
appealedagainstit, but wasableto adducefactswhich might haveresultedin a successful
enforcementappeal.The Courtconcludedthat, in a caseof this kind, the LPA ought to
investigatethe relevantfactsbeforedecidingto take“default” action.If the LPA failed to
investigatethe facts,it would amountto unreasonableconduct; and,while theCourt could
not itselfquestionthevalidity of the extantenforcementnotice,the Court would be
entitled toreviewthedecisionto initiate “default” action.
PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR TAKING DEFAULT ACTION
10.4 Default actionmust beplanned,organisedand implementedwith the utmostcare. While
suchactionmay well stimulatepublicity, which the LPA maywelcome(or even
encourage),on the groundthat theywill be seento be determinednot to toleratepersistent
contraventionof an enforcementnotice,theowneror occupierof the sitemaystrongly
resent,andpossiblytry to preventimplementationof, the authority’sdecision.Theremay
evenbe threatsof violenceor an anticipatedbreachof thepeace.If that is expected,the
co-operation ofthelocal constabularyshouldalwaysbesought.
10.5 Among the practicalmatterswhich theLPA needto considerwhenplanning defaultaction
are—
(1) exactly whatmustbe done (includingany necessaryoperational developmenton the
land) in orderto carry out the requiredstepsin the enforcementnotice;
(2) what is thebesttime ofdayto carry out theoperation andhow longit is likely to take;
(3) who is bestequippedto carryout theoperation—theCouncil’sstaffor aprivate
contractor;
(4) whetherany special powersof entry areneeded;
(5) whatother local authorityservicesneedto be involved, egthe Social Services
Department;
(6) if chattels(egcaravans,cars,working equipment)are to be removedfrom the land,wheretheycanbe storedsecurelyuntil their ownercanretrievethem.
If abreachof the peaceor any moreseriousdisturbanceis anticipated,it maybeadvisable
for theLPA to seekaninjunction undersection187Bof the 1990 Act as aprecautionand
to encourage any necessarypolice presence.
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“Default” actionto securecompliancewith enforcementnotice
10.6 Section 178(6)of the 1990 Act creates anoffenceof wilful obstructionof any personwho
is exercisingtheLPA’s powerto take“default” enforcementaction.The offence is triable
summarilyin theMagistrates’Court, wherethemaximumpenaltyon conviction is £1,000.
In anyproceedings forthis typeof offence,theLPA will be requiredby the Courtto prove
their case“beyondreasonabledoubt” (the criminal standard ofproof). If the LPA
anticipate,in any casewheredefaultaction is to be taken,thereis likely to be wilful
obstructionby theowner oroccupiersof the enforcementnoticesite, it is asensible
precautionto warnthoseconcernedthat they will risk criminal prosecutionif obstruction
occurs.
THE LPA’S POWER TO RECOVER THEIR EXPENSES OF “DEFAULT” ACTION
10.7 Theprovisionsof section 178(1)(b)of the 1990 Act enabletheLPA “to recoverfrom the
personwho is thenthe owner ofthe land any expensesreasonablyincurredby them” in
taking defaultenforcementaction. Regulation14 of theTown andCountryPlanning
GeneralRegulations1992 (SI 1992/1492)applies theprovisionsof sections276, 289and
294 of thePublic HealthAct 1936 for this purpose.By virtue of regulation14(2) of the
GeneralRegulations1992,theLPA’s expensesin taking defaultactionbecomea legal
chargeon theland to which the enforcementnotice relatesuntil the expensesare fully
recovered.This chargeis bindingon successiveownersof theenforcementnotice land.
SUBSEQUENT REINSTATEMENT OF WORKS WHICH HAD BEEN REMOVED
10.8 The provisionsof section181 of the 1990Act dealwith thecircumstance where,in
contraventionof aneffectiveenforcementnotice,anydevelopmentis carriedouton land
by wayof reinstatingor restoringbuildings or works which have beenremoved oraltered in
compliancewith the notice.If the LPA proposeto take“default” action (in accordance
with section178of the 1990 Act) for thepurposeof removingor alteringthe buildings or
works resultingfrom this further reinstatementor restoration,theprovisionsof section
18 1(4) requirethem to give the ownerandoccupierof the enforcementnotice landnot
less than 28 days’notice oftheir intention to takesuchaction.There is no specific
requirementabouttheway this noticeshouldbe givento theownerand occupier:the
provisionsof section329of the 1990 Act thusapply in thenormalway. If notice is to be
givenby letter, it would be advisableto sendit by recordeddeliveryservice.It is
noteworthythat the only requirementto give notice ofan intention to take“default”
action,is in respectof suchaction taken intheseparticularcircumstances.
10.9 Section181(5)of the 1990 Act makesit an offencefor someoneto carry out, without
planningpermission,anydevelopmenton land by way of reinstatingor restoringbuildings
or works which have beenremovedor alteredin compliancewith an enforcementnotice.
On summaryconvictionfor this offencein the Magistrates’Court, themaximumpenaltyis
£5,000.Although thereis no statutorydefenceagainstprosecutionfor this offence,section
181(5)(b) providesthatno person shall beliable for a separateoffenceundersection
179(2)of the 1990 Act of failure to takeany stepsrequiredby an enforcementnoticeby
way of removalor alterationof whathasbeenreinstatedor restored.
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CHAPTER 11
Prosecutingenforcementnoticeoffences
INTRODUCTION
11.1 Section 179 of the TownandCountryPlanning Act1990 providesthat acriminal offence
occurswhere therequirementsof an effectiveenforcement noticeare contravenedafterthe
dateon which the complianceperiodstated inthenotice expires.Onceacompliance
period in an enforcementnoticehasexpiredandthereis evidenceto show,“beyond
reasonabledoubt” (thecriminal standard ofproof), that anyrequirementin the noticehas
been,or is being,contravened,it is opento theLPA to initiate a prosecutionof theoffence.
Whetherprosecution inthe Court is the most appropriatewayto achievecompliancewith
• an effectiveenforcement noticeis for theLPA to decide.In somecases,it may suffice for
the LPA to warnof their intention to prosecuteif, during the complianceperiod,someone
is seento makeno seriouseffort to takethe stepsanenforcementnotice requires.
11.2 TheLPA shouldconsidercarefully what is likely to be themostefficient andcost-effective
wayof compelling someonewho is contraveningan enforcementnotice to comply with its
requirements.If it is knownthatprosecutionproceedingswill resultin substantialdelayin
remedyingthe effectsof a breachof control, theLPA may preferthe alternativecourseof
taking “default” actionundersection178 of the 1990 Act. Or it maybe expedient
simultaneouslyto initiate prosecutionproceedingsandtake“default” action,especiallyif
the offenceis blatantandcausesseriousenvironmentalharm.
11.3 Section179 of the 1990Act providesfor two separatecategoriesof enforcementnotice
offence,dependingon whetherthe defendantis theowner ofthe landor not. Thesetwo
categoriesaredescribed,respectively,in the following paragraphs11.4 to 11.6 and11.7 to 11.8.
OFFENCE COMMITTED BY THE OWNER OF LAND
11.4 Section179(1)and(2) of the 1990 Act providefor anoffenceto be committedby the
owner oftheenforcementnotice land,as follows—
“(1) Where,at anytime after the endof the period for compliancewith an enforcement
notice,any steprequiredby the notice to be takenhasnot beentakenor any activity
requiredby the notice to ceaseis beingcarriedon, the personwho is thenthe owner of
the land is in breachof thenotice.
(2) Wherethe owner ofthe land is in breachof an enforcementnoticehe shallbe guilty of
anoffence.”
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Prosecutingenforcementnoticeoffences
It is clearfrom theseprovisionsthat, to beguilty of an enforcementnoticeoffence,an
owner ofthe landmustbe thelegalownerthroughouttheperiod duringwhich theoffence
is allegedto haveoccurred.If ownershipof theland transfersto anotherpersonandthe
offencecontinues,or it is resumedby anotherpersonaftera successfulprosecutionof the
previousowner,the subsequentownerbecomesliable to prosecution.
11.5 Section 179(3)providesa defenceagainst prosecutionfor an owner ofenforcementnoticelandwho shows“that hedid everythinghe couldbe expectedto do to securecompliance
with the notice”.This defenceprovisionis availableto enableadefendantto submit to the
Court that, in the particular circumstancesof anyprosecutionproceedings,he or sheislegally or practicallypreventedfrom achieving compliancewith an enforcementnotice.
Forexample,the ownermayhavegranteda leasein specific termswhich preventhim orherfrom stoppingthelessee’sactivities in contraventionof the enforcementnotice.The
natureof this defencewasconsideredby theHigh Court inthe caseof Kent CC v JohnABrockman.In judgmentgiven on 10 October1993,[1994] JPL B27, theCourtheld that it
would becontraryto the tenetsof criminal law to find somebodyguilty of notdoing
something which theyweregenuinelyincapableof doing. If a defendantwasgenuinely
incapacitated,evenif hehaddonenothing,he could still makeouta defencebecausehe
couldnot be expectedto do anything.The Magistrates’Courtor CrownCourt shouldbe
fairly rigorousin the proof they demandedof adefendant,and“not allow itself to be
hoodwinkedby protestationsof impecuniosityon behalfof anindividual”. In giving hisjudgmentLord JusticeSimonBrown said—
“It is clearly imperativethat land shouldnot be left in an unsatisfactorystate,perhapsas a
public eyesore,unlessa landownerhastakenevery practicalstepto overcomehis financial
problemsin complyingwith the requirementsof the enforcementnotice,to the extentifneedbe ofselling his land, if that is possible,to ensurethat it will be put into a proper
state.”
11.6 The ownerof the land (andanyotherdefendant)hasa furtherdefence,in section179(7)
of the 1990Act, namelythat he or she hasnotbeenservedwith a copy of theenforcement
noticeandthe noticeis not containedin the enforcementnotice register(which the LPA
are requiredto keep,by virtue of section188 of the 1990 Act), if suchapersoncanshow
that he or shewasnot awareof theexistenceof the notice.
OFFENCE COMMITTED BY SOMEONE WHO CONTROLS OR HAS ANINTEREST IN THE LAND
11.7 Section 179(4) and(5) of the 1990Act providefor an offenceto be committedby
someonewho controlsor hasan interest inthe enforcementnotice land,asfollows—
“(4) A personwho hascontrol of or an interest inthe land to which anenforcement
noticerelates(other thanthe owner)mustnot carry on any activity which is required
by the notice to ceaseor causeor permit such anactivity to be carriedon.
(5) A personwho, at any time after theendof theperiod for compliancewith thenotice,
contravenessubsection(4) shall beguilty of anoffence.”
Thissecondcategoryof offencerelatesspecifically to someonewho exercises legalcontrol
over theenforcementnoticeland(eg. asub-tenantoperatinghis or her ownbusiness)orsomeonewho has aseparatelegal interest inthe landfrom theowner’s interest. These
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provisionswereconsideredby the Queen’sBenchDivisionalCourt, on 11 May 1994,in the
case ofHolmesandAnother v Bradford MCC (Times Law Report,19 May 1994).The
Court held that anowner ofenforcementnotice land couldnot be properlychargedunder
section179(4)of the 1990Act.
11.8 The question whethera personwho is to beprosecutedfor this secondcategoryof offence
hasthepowerto permit acontraveningactivity to be carriedon (asin section179(4)of
the 1990 Act) maybe especiallydifficult for the LPA to addressin prosecutionproceedings.
Judicial authoritysuggeststhat apersonis unlikely to beheld by theCourt tohave
permitted someoneelseto carry onan activity unlesshe or she hasthe legalpowerto forbid
the activity and hasnot takenreasonablestepswhich are opento him or her to preventit.
THE NATURE OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE OFFENCE
11.9 In a judgment relating tothepreviousenforcementnoticeoffenceprovisions(in section
89(5) of the Town andCountryPlanningAct 1971) in the case of Rv Collett and Others
[1994] 2 All ER372, the Courtof Appealheld,on 21 October 1993,that this offenceis an
offenceof “absoluteliability”. Whilst, in the Court’s view, thepresumptionremainedthat a
“guilty mind” (“mens rea”)wasrequired foracriminal offenceto have occurred,that
presumptioncouldbe setasideif the properconstructionof the statutoryprovisions madeit
plain thatParliamentdid not intend that it should benecessaryto establisha “guilty mind”,
particularly if that approachwould appearto promotetheobject ofthestatute.It follows
from this judgmentthat, in bringingenforcementnoticeprosecutionproceedingsunder
what is now section179 of the 1990 Act, the LPA are not requiredto provethat the
defendantknewof theexistenceof theenforcementnotice beforehe or shecanbe
convictedof acriminal offence.The Courtof Appeal, in thecaseof R v Collett, also
specifically gaveits view that “the policy of the Act wasto imposeabsoluteliability so asto
encouragevigilanceon the partof the landownersandusers.”
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE INPROSECUTION PROCEEDINGS
11.10 Theeffect of provisionsin section285 of the 1990 Act is to limit verygreatly the scope for
challengingthe validity of an enforcementnoticeby way of a defenceagainstprosecution
undersection179of the 1990 Act. The provisionsof section 285(1)and(2) are—
“(1) Thevalidity of anenforcementnotice shallnot, exceptby way of anappealunder
PartVII be questionedin anyproceedingswhatsoeveron anyof thegroundson which
such anappealmay bebrought.
(2) Subsection(1) shallnot applyto proceedingsbroughtundersection179 againsta
personwho—
(a) hasheld an interest intheland sincebeforethe enforcementnoticewas issued
under thatPart;
(b) did nothavea copy of theenforcementnoticeservedon him underthatPart;and
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(c) satisfiesthe Court—
(i) thathe did not know andcould notreasonablyhavebeenexpectedto know that
the enforcement noticehadbeenissued;and
(ii) thathis interestshave beensubstantially prejudicedby the failure to servehim
with a copyof it.”
Thus,apartfrom this very limited defenceavailableto someonewho canproveto the
Court thathe or sheis within thescopeof section285(2), theonly way to challengethe
validity of an enforcement noticeis by an appeal againstit (to the Secretaryof State)
undersection174of the 1990 Act.
11.11 How the validity of an enforcement noticemight be challengedwasconsideredby the
Court of Appeal’sjudgementin the caseof R v Wickson 11 April 1995,[1996] JPL 743.
The Courtheld that,so long as an enforcementnoticewasnotanullity, it wasan
enforcementnoticeandwould remainsountil quashed;and,for an offenceundersection
179(2)of the 1990 Act to be proved,therewasno requirementfor theprosecution to call
evidencethat the LPA’s decisionto issuethe noticehadbeen“intra vires”. Only theHigh
Court hadthepowerto quashan enforcementnotice (in judicial reviewproceedings);nocriminal court had such a power. If an allegation about the validity of a notice wasraisedin criminal proceedings,thecriminal court might thenhaveto considermattersof
planningpolicy, which werenot appropriate,whereassuchmatterswerethe everydayconcernof “Crown Office list” Judges,who dealtwith judicial review applications.And the
judicial reviewprocedureshouldnot bebypassedby someoneservedwith an enforcementnotice. Accordingly, it wasnotproperto challengethe LPA’s decisionto issuean
enforcementnotice,on thegroundof “Wednesburyunreasonableness”,by wayof a defence
to an indictmentallegingan offenceundersection179(1)of the 1990 Act.
11.12 Thepracticaleffect of the provisionsof section 285(1)of the 1990 Act is further illustrated
in theHigh Court’s judgement,on 22 February1996,in thecaseof ValeofWhiteHorse
DC v Treble-Parkerand Another[1996] EGCS40.The Magistrates’Court haddismissed
two informationslaid by theCouncil undersection179 of the 1990 Act. Thequestionfor
the High Court todecide,on the Council’sappeal,waswhethertheprovisionsof section
285(1)of the 1990 Act precludedthe Magistratesfrom allowingevidenceshowingstorage
of vehiclestaking place morethan 10 yearsbeforeserviceof the enforcementnotice; orwhetherthe Magistrateswererequiredto allow such evidenceto enabletherespondentsto
establishtheir defence.TheHigh Courtallowedthe Council’sappeal,setasidethe
acquittal,andremittedthecaseto the Magistrates’Court. TheHigh Court held that it wasnotopento the defendantsto arguein the Magistrates’Court that their useof land was
“immune” from enforcementaction.Theproperremedyhadbeenfor thedefendantsto
appealto theSecretaryof Stateagainsttheenforcementnotice; but theyhadpreviously
withdrawntheir appealandtheprovisionsof section 285(1)of the 1990 Act now
precludedthemfrom raisingthese argumentsin their defenceagainstprosecution.
PRESENTING THE PROSECUTION’S CASE EFFECTIVELY IN COURT
11.13 Some LPAsareconcernedthatcertainMagistrates’Courtsdo not appearfully to appreciate
the seriousnatureof theoffencefor which section179 of the 1990 Act provides.In
discussionbetweenofficials of the Magistrates’Associationandthe Departmentof theEnvironment, the Associationhaspointedoutthat eachMagistrates’Courthaslittle
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practicalexperienceof enforcement noticeprosecutions andit is thereforehelpful for theLPA’s prosecutorto explainfully to the Court the context inwhich the allegedoffencehas
occurred.
11.14 Dependingon thecircumstancesof thecase,the following approach shouldusuallyhelptheCourtfully to appreciatethe strength ofthe prosecution’scase—
(1) explain that the provisionsof section179 of the 1990Act makeit a criminal offence
to contravenethe requirementsof an enforcementnoticeafterthe reasonablyallowed
complianceperiodhasexpired;
(2) describetheprocedureadoptedby the Council to enforceagainstthe particular breach
of planningcontrol, including thetime it hastakensincethe dateof issue ofthe
enforcement noticeandtheresult of any appealto the Secretaryof State;
In the case of Rv Sandhu[1996],TLR 2 January1997,the Court of Appealheld,on 10
December1996,that toadduceevidencewhich wentbeyond proofof elementsnecessaryto
be established foranoffenceof strict liability wasnot an optionalextrafor the prosecution;andto adduceinadmissibleevidencewhich wasprejudicialto thedefendanthad tobe
objectionable.(Although this caseconcerneda listedprosecution,it appearsto be apt alsoto planningenforcementprosecutionproceedings.)In the light of this case,evidence
concerningsuchmattersaswhetherthe offenceis blatant,carelessnessor negligence, thedegreeof harmto amenityin the neighbourhoodof the site thathasresultedfrom the
offence;the maximumpenaltyavailableandan attemptto relatethepenaltyto theestimatedamountof profit accruingfrom theoffence,andthe prosecution’scostsin bringing
the caseto Court, is irrelevantto the issueof proving the offence,andinadmissible.
However,it might be relevantto the Court’s assessmentof theappropriatepenalty.
APPLICATION BY THE DEFENDANT FOR AN ADJOURNMENT
11.15 Sometimesanapplicationis madeto the Court on thedefendant’sbehalffor an
adjournment(whichmay bean adjournment ofthe hearingor of theCourt’s sentence
whenthe defendanthasbeenfoundguilty), on the groundthat a retrospectiveplanning
applicationhasbeensubmittedto the LPA andremains undecidedor the outcome ofaplanningappealto the Secretaryof Stateis awaited.Any suchapplicationshouldnormally
be resisted,citing in supportof theprosecution’scasethe judgement oftheQueen’sBenchDivisionalCourt, on 12 February1993,in the caseof R v BeaconsfieldMagistratesexparte
South BucksDC [1993] JPLB53. The Courtheld in that casethat “as a generalrule, theMagistratesmustdealwith the matterforthwith, unlessthereis aprospectthat the
planningapplication’sfatewill beknown shortly.” Section180(3)of the 1990 Act mayalso
usefully be cited.Thismakesclearthatasubsequentgrantof planningpermissiondoesnotaffect theliability of any personfor an offencein respectof failing, meanwhile,to comply
or securecompliancewith therequirementsof an enforcement(or breachof condition)
notice.
FURTHER APPEAL TO COURT OF APPEAL (CRIMINAL DIVISION)
11.16 Occasionally,a convictedpersonappealsagainstconvictionfor anenforcementnoticeoffenceto the Court of Appeal (CriminalDivision). In that event,the casemust takeits
turn with otherappealsbeforethe Courtfor seriouscrime wherethe appellantmay be
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servinga termof imprisonment.However,the Courtof Appeal(Criminal Division) isawarethat an appellant convictedof anenforcement noticeoffencemay havea particular
incentive todefer,for as longas possible,thesuccessfulresolutionof thecasebecauseit will
effectivelyfrustratetheprosecutingLPA’s interest incompletingthe planningenforcementprocess.It is thusopento theLPA to request an“expeditedhearing”by theCourt. This
canbe doneby arrangingfor the LPA’s Solicitor to write personallyto the Court’sRegistrar,explaining thenatureof thebreachof control andits impacton amenityin the
neighbourhood.It is alsohelpful to inform the Registrar aboutanyotherproceedings
againsttheappellantwhich dependon theoutcome ofthe appealto theCourt of Appeal
(Criminal Division)..
THE PENALTIES ON CONVICTION OF AN ENFORCEMENT NOTICE OFFENCE
11.17 Section179(8)of the 1990 Act specifiesthe penaltieswhich the Court may imposeon
convictionof an enforcementnoticeoffence.Theyare —
(1) on summaryconviction intheMagistrates’Court, a fine not exceeding£20,000;and
(2) on convictionon indictment intheCrown Court, a fine of an unlimitedamount.
Thereis no powerto sentencea convicteddefendantto a termof imprisonmentunder
section179 ofthe 1990 Act. But someonewho defaultson paymentof a fine imposed
undersection179(8)maybe imprisonedas afine defaulter,at theCourt’s discretion.
11.18 Section 179(9)of the 1990 Act providesthat, in deciding theamountof anyfine for an
enforcement noticeoffence,the Court shallin particular haveregardto anyfinancial
benefitwhich hasaccruedor appearslikely to accrueto the convictedpersonin
consequenceof the offence.Theseprovisionsare specificallyintendedto enabletheCourt
to takeinto accountthe profitability of an enforcementnoticeoffenceto theconvictedperson.It is thereforeadvisablefor the LPA’s prosecutorto drawtheCourt’s attentionto
the availability of this power and,whereverpossible,to offer theCourt someestimateofthe financial gainresultingfrom commissionof the offence.
11.19 Subsection(9) doesnot lessentheconcurrentobligationof the Court, whenimposinga
fine, to haveregardnotonly to the seriousnessof the offence,butalso thefinancial
circumstancesof the offender.(Sections18(2) and(3) of theCriminal JusticeAct 1991.)The Court of Appeal, on1 December1995,in the case of Rv Browning[1996] 1PLR61, in
substitutinga fine of £1,000for thefine of £25,000imposedin the Crown Court,emphasisedthat the amountof fine shouldnotbe fixed solely by referenceto the accrued
benefit,and thatregard shouldalsobehad tothequestion oftheability to pay.
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CHAPTER 12
• Efficient and EffectiveOrganisation of PlanningEnforcement
INTRODUCTION
12.1 Planningenforcementis the most technicallycomplexcomponentof thedevelopment
control régime. To beeffective, it requireswhole-heartedco-operationbetweenpeoplewith
experiencein a rangeof professionalandinvestigative disciplinesat eachsuccessive stageof
the enforcementprocess.Occasionally,thatprocess maybe prolongedandmakeunforeseen
demandson theLPA’s staffandfinancial resources.UnlesstheLPA’s enforcementfunction
is efficiently organised, resourceswill be wasted andthe authority’sperformancewill not
reachacceptablestandards.It maybedesirableto seekspecialistCounsel’sopinion when
dealingwith difficult casesinvolving problems/areasof law with which theauthority is not
familiar.
ACTION OR REACTION
12.2 Thetraditional approachto planningenforcementis to confinethe activity mainly to a
responseto neighbours’complaintsof allegedbreaches ofcontrol.Whetherthe LPA can
takea more positiveapproachwill dependon the resourcesmembersare willing to commit
to this function.To confinethe enforcementfunction to a reactiveresponsemay sometimes
storeup moredifficulty for thefuture. In allocatingthe Council’sresources,it must be
recognisedthatplanningenforcementactivity is almostalwayslabour-intensive.Thorough
investigationof therelevantplanning historyandpainstakingevaluation ofthefactsare
the foundationfor effectiveenforcement.Neithercanbe obtainedcheaply.
SETTING PRIORITIES
12.3 Enforcementcasesmustbe progressedquickly at every stage.Becausenotevery casecanbe
given toppriority, it is essentialto establisha setof prioritieswhich will enable
enforcementstaffto maximisetheir output.Settingpriorities is a matterfor eachLPA to
addressin their own development controlcontext. Anexample ofa possibleorderof
priorities might be on thefollowing lines—
(1) anyunauthoriseddevelopmentwhich causesimmediateand irremediableharmin the
locality;
(2) unauthorised demolitionor partial demolitionof a buildingwhich it is essentialto retain;
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(3) breachof a conditionwhich resultsin seriousharmto amenity in the neighbourhood;
(4) unauthorised developmentin a NationalPark,AONB or ConservationArea;
(5) any unauthoriseddevelopmentwhere thetime-limit for enforcementactionwill expire
within thenext six months.
In someareas,theLPA maybe facedwith numerouscasesof onetype of particularly
harmfulor prevalentunauthoriseddevelopment, suchashome-workingwith noisy
equipment, mini-caboffices,or take-away food premises,making it essentialto establish
and maintainfirm control overevery incident ofthatcategoryof developmentas soonas it
appears.In this situation, enforcementactionmust bedetermined andwell-publicised.
TARGET TIME-LIMITS FOR PROGRESSING ENFORCEMENT ACTION
12.4 Whenformalenforcementactionfollows from a neighbour’scomplaint,the LPA should
havetargettime-limitswithin which they anticipatetaking eachstepof the enforcement
process.The time-limits will dependon the resourcesallocatedto planningenforcement
functions.Successivestepsmight be—
(1) acknowledgethe complaintandobtain any supplementaryinformationrequired to
investigateit;
(2) investigatethe current factsand the planninghistory;
(3) produceasituationreport, includingany legaladvice on issuesarisingfrom the
investigation;
(4) submit aconsideredrecommendationto the appropriatedecision-maker(usually the
PlanningCommitteeor anofficer with delegatedauthority);
(5) obtain andrecordthedecisionon enforcementaction;
(6) implementthe decision;
(7) reportthe decisionandinitial outcometo thecomplainant;
(8) monitor thepracticaleffectof implementingthedecision;
(9) reviewthe needfor possiblefurtherenforcementaction.
Whenthedecisionat sub-paragraph(5) aboveis to issueanenforcementnoticeandit results
in anappealto the Secretaryof State,eachstageof the appealprocessmustbe supervisedto
ensurethat the LPA’s responseto the appealis on time and,if appropriate,approvedby the
Planning Committeeor officer with delegatedpower.Whetherto servea stopnotice,if one
hasnot alreadybeenserved,shouldbe consideredas soonas anappealis notified to the LPA.
If the appealprocessproveslengthy,the needto serve astopnoticeshouldbe reviewedat
pre-arrangedintervals.
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DOCUMENTING THE CASE
12.5 Throughoutthe enforcementprocessit is essentialto maintaina complete,accurateand up-
to-daterecordof all investigationcarriedoutandassessmentof theresults.This is particularly
important incaseswherethe initial decisionisnot to initiate formal enforcementaction: if it
is necessaryto return to thatcasein future, officerswho will thenhaveto dealwith it will be
ableto establishthe relevantfactsquickly.
12.6 The case-recordshouldcontainthe following information—
(1) the alleged breachof control (asnotified to the LPA);
(2) thedate offirst notification;
(3) the identityof thecomplainant;
(4) theaddressof thesite;
(5) theidentity of the site’sownerandanyseparateoccupier;
(6) briefdescriptionof the site (including anyrelevant photographs, whichshouldalways
be dated);
(7) the allegedbreachof control (as establishedby theLPA’s officers,following initial
investigation);
(8) summaryof thefactual evidence;
(9) summaryof theplanninghistory;
(10) planningpolicies applicableto thesite;
(11) summaryof recommendationon enforcementaction;
(12) implementationof LPA’s decision;
(13) if an enforcementnotice is issued—
(a) date ofissue;
(b) intendedeffectivedate;
(c) datecomplianceperiodexpires;
(d) summaryof requiredsteps;
(e) dateon which any appealis notified;
(f) actualeffectivedate
[A similarrecord shouldbe maintained foranyotherformal enforcementactiontaken.]
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(14) resultof formalenforcementaction;
(15) summaryof anysubsequentmonitoring of the site.
12.7 Documentingand processinga casecanbecarriedout moreefficiently if computerisedand
word-processingsystemsare used.Computerisedsystemsare particularly valuable for
keeping enforcementrecordsup-to-date;enablingrecordsto be quickly accessed;and
providing informationwhich canbe usedto assesswhetherthe runningcost of the
enforcementprocessis beingkeptwithin budget.
THE ORGANISATION OF THE ENFORCEMENT TEAM
12.8 There is no “right” and“wrong” way to organiseanddeploy thepeoplewho are responsiblefor the LPA’s enforcementwork. It is generallytrue that the moreenforcementwork the
authority’sofficers areengagedin the moreefficient andeffectivetheybecome.Because
enforcing planningcontrol is becomingsteadilymorespecialised and publicexpectations
are moredemanding,it is usually preferableto maintaina specialised“enforcement team”
wherethevolume of case-workis sufficient to justify this approach.LPAs shouldensurethat legal advice is availableat short noticewhere required.
Printed in the United Kingdom for The Stationery Office
N34219 C15 8/97 (19585)
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