g.r. no. 169077_ august 31_ 2006

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  • 8/10/2019 G.R. No. 169077_ August 31_ 2006

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    EN BANC

    G.R. No. 169077, August 31, 2006

    T H E PE O PL E O F T H E PH I L I PPI NE S , PL AI NT I FF-

    APPE L L E E , VS . NI CANO R S AL O M E , ACCUS E D-

    APPE L L ANT .

    D E C I S I O N

    AZCUNA, J.:

    For review is the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on June 15,

    2005 in CA-G.R. CR. No .- H. C. N o. 00767, entitled "People of the

    P hi li pp in es v . N ic an or S al om e," a ff ir mi ng t he d ec isio n, d at ed A pr il 3 , 2 00 1,

    of the Regional Tr ial Court of Vi rac, Catanduanes, B ranch 43, in Cr iminal

    Ca s e N o . 2 53 6, f in di ng a pp el la nt g ui lt y b e y on d r e a son a b l e d o u b t o f thec ri me o f r ap e a ga in st t hi rt een -y ear ol d S al ly I da na n, a nd i mp os in g u pon h im

    the death penalty.

    The antecedents are:

    O n F eb ru ar y 1 8, 1 99 8, u pon t he co mp la in t o f S al ly I da na n, an i nf or ma ti on

    was filed against appellant under the name Canor Sabeniano. Appellant,

    however, filed a motion for reinvestigation on the ground that his name is

    Nicanor Salome and not Canor Sabeniano.

    An amended inf ormat ion was fi led on Augus t 26, 1998 accus ing C ANOR

    SABENIANO also known as NICANOR SALOME , of the crime of

    R AP E defi ned and penali zed under Ar ti cl e 3 35 of the revi sed Penal C ode,

    a s a me nd ed b y Rep ub li c Ac t 7 65 9, c om mi tt ed a s f ol lo ws:

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    That on or about or within the period comprised between July 1, 1997

    t o Jul y 3 1, 1 99 7 i n t he m or ni ng , i n [ B] ar an ga y L ou rd es, [ M] un ic ip al it y

    of Pandan, [P]rovince of Catanduanes, Philippines, within the

    jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of

    f or ce a nd i nt im id at io n, an d w it h t he us e o f a b lad ed we apo n, wi ll fu ll y,unlawfully and feloniously, did lie and succeeded in having carnal

    knowledge of SALLY IDANAN, a minor who was then 13 years old

    at the time of the commission of the offense.

    That the commi ssi on of the cri me was aggravated by dwelli ng the f act

    t hat t he cr ime was commit ted ins ide t he house of the of fended par ty.

    C ON TR AR Y T O L AW .[1]

    S al ly I dan an , f if te en y ea rs o ld , s in gl e, an d a r es id ent o f L our de s, P an dan ,

    Catanduanes testified before the trial court that she personally knew

    appellant because they used to be neighbors. In 1997, they transferred

    r esid en ce b ut a pp el la nt w ou ld f re qu en tl y p ass b y t he ir p la ce .[2]

    Sometime in J uly of 1997, Sally, then thirteen years old, was sleeping with

    h er t hr ee- ye ar o ld b ro th er i ns id e t he ir h ou se wh en a pp el la nt e nt er ed t he ir

    hous e. She was awakened by the pres ence of the latter who, allegedly, was

    poking a knife at the base of her neck. While holding the knife with one hand,

    a pp el lant un dr es sed he r wi th h is o ther han d. He t hr ea te ne d h er t hat h e wo ul d

    kill her and her family if she would tell anyone about the incident. After

    un dres si ng her , appell ant fo rced her to li e down. He remov ed his s hor ts an dund er wear. He t hen s pread her legs and ins er ted his peni s i nto h er vagi na.

    Accord ing t o Sall y, sh e j us t clo sed her ey es whil e appell ant had hi s way wit h

    her. She did not call for help because she was afraid that nobody would be in

    the next house which was about 800 meters away.[3]

    She cannot r emember how long appel lant r emained on t op of her but bef orehe left, he reiterated his threat to kill her and her family if she told anybody of

    wh at ha ppe ned . Af ter t ha t, s he wou ld f req uen tly s ee app el lant b ut t he l at te r

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    never spoke to her.

    Fearful for her life and for her family's safety, she did not inform anyone of

    t he i ncident . Alt hough it ent ered her mi nd t hat s he coul d be p regnant, s he l eft

    her province to work as a domestic helper in the house of SPO2 ConstantinoB. Saret in Wes t C rame, San Juan, Manila.

    On Novem ber 12, 199 7, she had a pelvi c ultrasound examination which

    confirmed her pr egnancy.[4] Upon learning this, she reported the rape

    incident to the police on November 17, 1997. She executed a sworn

    statement and filed a complaint.

    A c ri mi na l co mp la in t f or r ape w as i ni ti at ed b ef or e t he M uni ci pal Cir cu it T ri al

    Court ( MC TC ) of Pandan-Caramoran, Pandan, Catanduanes. Appellant

    pleaded not guilty to the charge during the arraignment.

    E vi de nce f or t he p ro se cut io n c ons is ted p ri mar il y of S al ly 's n ar ra ti on o f t he

    inci dent, and the testimony of Ma. Luz T. Santos , Medico Legal Officer of

    t he P hi li pp in e N at io na l P ol ic e ( PN P) Cri me L ab or at or y, o n t he m ed ic o- le ga lr ep or t i ssued b y Dr . A nt ho ny Josel it o L la ma s[5] who examined Sally.

    Ma. Luz T. Santos, while referr ing to the medical report, explained that the

    hymen has a deep healed l aceration at 6:00 o'clock pos iti on but she cannot

    determine as to the time when it was inflicted. [6] D u e t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

    vag inal canal was s ti ll nar row wi th p ro minen t r ugos it ies , Sal ly has not yet

    given birth although she was 18 to 19 weeks pregnant counting from the lastd ay of h er me ns tr uat ion whi ch was on J uly 5 , 19 97 . On cr os s- ex ami nat io n,

    Santos declared that she was uncertain as to the exact date of sexual

    intercourse that caused the pregnancy of Sally, and that said act may have

    occurred days before or after July 5, 1997 on account of the fact that the life

    span of an average sperm cell lasts for three days.[7]

    E vid en ce f or t he de fens e, o n t he o ther h an d, con si st ed of th e t es tim on ies o f appellant, Salvador Villarey and Manny Torralba.

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    App ell ant den ied h avi ng r aped Sal ly and o ff er ed t he def ens e o f al ibi . He

    claimed that in the month of July 1997, he went fishing at the sea of Gigmoto,

    C at an du an es o n t hr ee d if fe re nt d ay s b ut c ou ld n ot e xa ct ly r em em be r w he n.

    Villarey and Torralba corroborated the fact that they went fishing withappellant in J uly of 1997. They maint ained, however, that while they had

    been appellant's fishing companions, they would go their separate ways after

    f ishi ng a nd we re n ot a wa re o f a ppe ll an t's a ct ivi ti es a ft er t ha t.

    On Ap ril 3 , 2 00 1, t he t ri al c ou rt re nd er ed i ts de ci si on co nvi cti ng a pp el la nt o f

    t he cr ime of r ape and sent encin g hi m as f ol lo ws:

    W HE RE FOR E, f in di ng t he ac cu se d N ic an or S al om e a ls o k no wn as

    C an or Sab edi ano GUIL TY beyo nd r eas onabl e d oub t o f t he cr ime of

    R ape wi th t he us e o f a deadl y weap on, com mit ted i ns ide t he dwel ling

    of the offended party, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of

    the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, he is

    hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to give monthly

    support in the sum of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos to theoffs pri ng of complainant Sally Idanan born on April 11, 1998, and to

    indemnify Sally Idanan in the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000. 00)

    Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

    S O O RD ERED .[8]

    Due to the impos ition of death penalty on appellant, the case was directly

    elevated to this C ou rt fo r review. Subsequently, however, t he c as e was

    referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review pursuant to our

    ruling in People v. Mateo.[9]

    T he C our t o f Ap peal s, af ter re vi ewin g t he cas e, ren der ed i ts Deci sio n on

    June 15, 2005 affirming the conviction of appellant, with modifications:

    WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 3, 2001 of the trial court isaffirmed subject to the following modifications:

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    (1) The award of civil indemnity on the amount of P50,000.00

    i s i nc re as ed t o P 75 ,0 00 .0 0; a nd ,

    (2) Appellant is ordered to pay private complainant moral

    damages of P75,000.00 and exemplary damages of

    P25,000.00.

    Pursuant to A.M. No . 0 0- 5- 03 -S C (Amendments to the Revised

    R ul es o f C ri mi na l P ro ce dur e t o g ov er n De at h P ena lt y C as es ) wh ic h

    took into effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated andc er ti fi ed t o t he S up rem e Cou rt f or i ts a ut om at ic r ev ie w.

    S O O RD ERED .[10]

    Appellant assigns the following errors:

    I

    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED I N GIVING WEIGHT AND

    CREDENCE TO THE UNCONVIN CING AND IMPROBABLE

    T ES TI MO NY O F P RI VA TE C OM PL AI NA NT S AL LY I DA NA N;

    AND,

    II

    T HE TR IAL COUR T ER RED I N APP RECI ATI NG DWELLI NG

    A S A N A GG RA VA TI NG CIRCU MS TA NCE.

    As a rule, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is

    g en er al ly ac co rd ed t he hi gh es t d eg ree o f we ig ht an d r es pe ct , i f no t f in al it y,

    f or the r eas on that the t rial judge has the unique oppor tuni ty t o observe the

    demeanor of witnesses while testifying.[11]

    I n g ivi ng cred ence t o t he Sal ly' s te st imony , th e tr ial co ur t no ted th at s he did

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    n ot h av e an y i mpr oper m ot ive ag ai ns t app el lant ot he r t han h er d es ir e t o t el l

    t he t ru th an d o bt ai n r ed re ss f ro m t he c ri mi na l ac t.[12]

    In the commission of rape, it is usually only the rape victim who can attest to

    its o cc ur ren ce,[13]

    and if the lone testimony of the victim is credible,convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things,

    i t is compet ent to est abli sh the gui lt of t he accus ed .[14] This is even more so if

    it involves the testimony of a rape victim of tender or immature age such as in

    the inst ant cas e. Thus, if the vict im is a young, immature girl , her tes timony is

    given credence by the courts [15] b e c a u se n o o n e w o u l d c o n t r i v e a r a p e

    sto ry , a ll ow a n e xam in at io n of h er p ri va te p ar ts a nd sub je ct he rsel f t o scr ut in y

    at a public trial if she is not motivated solely by a desire to have the culpritapprehended and punished.[16]

    A pp el la nt a sser ts t ha t t he c on du ct o f p ri va te c om pl ai na nt d ur in g a nd a ft er t he

    commission of the offense militates against her credibility because it is

    inconsistent with human experience. She did not shout nor offer any

    r es is ta nc e as e xpe ct ed o f a wo man be in g s ex ua ll y a bus ed . S he l ik ewi se ke pt

    t he inci dent t o hers elf unt il she l earned of her pr egnancy th ree mont hs l ater .Appel lant fu rt her cl aims t hat t here i s no evid en ce t hat he thr eatened her or

    her family or that he prevented her from reporting the incident to

    anybody.[17]

    The C our t finds not hing incredi bl e in Sall y' s behavior. She woke up wi th

    appellant poking a knife at the base of her neck. The act of holding a knife,

    by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, andt hr eat eni ng the vi cti m wi th a kn if e i s suf fici en t t o b ri ng her t o sub missi on . Th e

    victim's failure to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist

    d oes no t n egat e t he co mmi ss io n of r ape .[18] A s noted by the trial court:

    The fact that the accused did not shout or resist when her shorts and

    pant y were remo ved becau se of fear (TSN , Oct. 21, 1999 , p. 12)

    d oe s n ot l es sen c om pl ai na nt 's cr ed ib il it y. T o a n i nn oce nt g ir l w ho wa sthen barely thirteen (13) years old, the threat engendered in her a well -

    grounded fear that if she dared r esis t or frustrate the bes tial desir es of

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    the accused, she and her family would be killed. Intimidation is

    addr es sed t o the mind of the vi cti m and i s, t heref ore, s ubjecti ve. It mu st

    be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the

    time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.

    T he wor ki ngs o f th e human mi nd wh en pl aced under emot ional s tres sa re u np re di ct ab le an d p eop le r ea ct d if fe re nt ly . I n suc h a g iv en sit uat io n,

    s ome may sho ut; s ome may faint; a nd s om e m ay b e s ho ck ed into

    sen si bi li ty ; w hi le o th er s m ay o pe nl y w el co me t he i nt ru si on . ( Pe op le v .

    C ab ra di ll a, 1 33 S CR A 4 13 ( 198 4) ). T he t es t f or i ts s uf fi ci en cy u nd er

    Article 335 of the revised Penal Code is whether it produces a

    reasonable fear in the victim that if she resists or does not yield to the

    bestial demands of the accused, that which the latter threatened to dowould happen to her, or those dear to her, in this case, her family.

    Where such degree of int imidation exi sts , and the victim is cowed into

    submission as a r es ul t t he re of , thereby r endering r esis tance futile, it

    w ou ld b e ext re mel y u nr eas onab le to e xp ect t he vi ct im t o r es is t wi th al l

    her might and str ength. And even if s ome degr ee of res istance would

    n ev er th el es s be f ut il e, o ff er in g n on e at a ll ca nn ot a mou nt t o co ns en t t o

    the sexual assault. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such

    character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force or

    intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused

    had in mind. ( Peopl e v. Savell ano, 57 SCR A 320 (1974)) .

    Likewise, Sally's delay in reporting the incident to the authorities is

    u nder st and abl e. I t i s no t unco mmon f or yo ung gi rl s to con ceal f or s om e t im et he assa ul t a ga in st t hei r vi rt ue b eca use o f t he t hr ea ts o n t hei r l iv es.[19] Failure,

    t her ef or e, by t he vi ct im t o f il e a co mp lai nt p ro mp tl y t o t he p rop er au tho ri ti es

    would not neces sarily destroy the truth per s e of the complaint nor would it

    impair the credibility of the complainant, particularly if such delay was

    satisfactorily explained.[20] As a matter of fact, delay in reporting a rape case

    d ue t o t hr eat s i s j usti fi ed .[21] As the Court held in People v. Ballester:[22]

    Neither can appellant find refuge in complainant's failure to promptly

    report the sexual assault to her relatives. Long silence and delay in

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    reporting the crime of rape has not always been construed as an

    indication of a false accusation. In fact this principle applies with greater

    force in this case where the offended party was barely twelve years

    old, and was therefore susceptible to intimidation and threats of

    physical harm.

    Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual

    expectations of everyone. Different and varying degrees of behavioral

    r es po ns es i s e xp ec te d i n t he pr oximi ty of , or in conf ro nti ng, an aber rant

    ep is ode . I t i s s et tle d t hat d if fer en t peo pl e r eac t di ffe re nt ly t o a gi ve n s it uat ion

    or type of situation and there is no standard form of human behavioral

    response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightfulexperience.[23]

    A pp el la nt f ur th er d en ie s h av in g r ap ed S al ly , a sser ti ng t ha t h e we nt f ishi ng o n

    three occasions in July of 1997. Denial, however, is inherently a weak

    d ef en se a nd c an no t p re va il o ve r t he p os it iv e d ec la ra ti on s o f t he v ic ti m.[24]

    F or t he defense of alibi and denial to prosper, appellant must prove by

    positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for himto have been physically present at the scene of the crime or its immediate

    vicinity at the time of its commission.[25]

    Her e, a ppel lant f ai led t o s ho w th at it was p hys ical ly i mpo ss ib le f or hi m t o b e

    at the house of Sally when the crime was committed. As the trial court aptly

    held:

    The defense offered by the accused that he could not have raped the

    comp lai nant because he went f ish ing t hr ee ( 3) ti mes i n t he month o f Jul y

    1 997 i n S icmi l, Gi gmo to, C at and ua ne s ( TS N, F eb rua ry 8, 20 00, p. 3 )

    is sorely inadequate to overcome the evidence adduced by the

    prosecution relative to his guilt, considering that his absence for only

    three (3) days could not prevent him from committing the offense in t he

    r emaining twenty-eight (28) days of the month. I n any event, a probe

    i nt o t he a cc used 's a li bi r ea di ly y ie ld s t he l at te r's i nh er en t w ea kn ess. I t i s

    settled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must

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    e st ab li sh t he p hy si cal i mp os si bi li ty f or h im t o h ave b ee n p res ent a t t he

    scene of the crime at the time of its commission (People v. Cristobal,

    G.R. No. 116279, January 29, 1996) In the ins tant case, the accus ed

    failed to demonstrate such impossibility.

    The allegation in the Information that the offense was committed within

    the period comprised between July 1, 1997 to July 31, 1997,

    sufficiently informs the accused of the approximate time of commission

    of the offense and affords him opportunity to show that he could not

    have committed the crime on any of the thirty-one (31) days of July

    1997...

    Additionally, Manny Torralba, one of the accused's fishing

    companions, declared that they went home from fishing everyday

    (TSN, February 28, 2001, p. 6) and that every time they went home

    from fishing, they parted ways as each went to his own home, and

    would not know what the accused would be doing while he was at his

    own home (Idem, p. 9). Thus, even in those days when the accused

    w e n t t o f i sh o u t a t se a , t h e a c c u se d 's p r e se n c e i n t h e h o u se o f t h ec omp lai nan t wh er e t he s ub jec t o ff ens e was c om mi tt ed w as f ar f ro m

    impossible.[26]

    T he C ou rt n ot es t ha t a pp el la nt d o es n o t d e ny t he e xi st en ce o f t he knife

    du ri ng t he comm issi on of th e rap e. Thi s Cour t sustain s the f indi ng t hat t he t rial

    co ur t di d no t err i n conv ict ing appe ll ant o f t he cr im e of r ape p er pet rate d wi th

    the use of a deadly weapon. The presentation of t he knife is not neces sar y tohis conviction, in light of the victim's unwavering testimony as to how

    a ppe lla nt , ar med wi th a k ni fe, t hr eat ened an d ra ped h er .

    This is consistent with this Court's ruling in People v. Degamo:[27]

    It is settled that the non-presentation of the weapon used in the

    commission of rape is not es sential to the conviction of the accused.

    The testimony o f t he r ap e victim that appellant w as a rm ed with a

    d eadly weapo n when he commi tted t he cr ime i s s uf fi cien t t o es tabl ish

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    the fact for so long as the victim is credible. It must be stressed that in

    rape, it is usually only the victim who can attest to its occurrence and

    t hat i s why cou rt s s ub ject t he t es ti mony of th e al lege d vi cti ms t o s tri ct

    scr ut iny b ef or e r el yi ng on i t f or th e co nv ict io n of th e acc used .

    e op le v . P hi li pp in es V it an cu r [28] also illustrates this principle:

    T he f ac t t ha t t he w ea po n w it h which co mplai nant clai med s he was

    i nt im id at ed b y a cc used -a pp el la nt c ou ld n ot b e p re se nt ed i n c ou rt c ou ld

    not impeach private complainant's credibility as the weapon is not

    essential to the prosecution of rape cases. What is important is that

    because of force and intimidation, private complainant was made to

    submit to the will of accused-appellant. . .. [T]he test is whether the

    t hr eat o r i nt imi da ti on p ro du ces i n t he m in d o f a r ea so nab le p er so n f ear

    that if she persists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the

    t hr ea t wi ll b e c ar ri ed o ut .

    Appellant committed t he cr ime of rape with the us e of a bladed weapon, the

    i mp os ab le pe na lt y of w hi ch i s reclusion perpetua to death in accordance

    with Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659:

    A RT I CL E 3 3 5 . W h e n a n d h o w r a p e i s c o m m i t te d . Ra p e i s

    committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the

    following circumstances:

    By using force or intimidation;1.

    When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise

    unconscious; and

    2.

    When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.3.

    The crime of rape shall be punished by re cl u si o n p e rp e tu a.

    Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly

    w e a p o n o r b y t w o o r m o r e p e r so n s, t h e p e n a l t y sh a l l b e reclusion

    perpetua t o d ea th .

    Wh e n e v e r b y r e a so n o f o r o n o c c a si o n o f t h e r a p e , t h e v i c t i m h a s

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    become insane, the penalty shall be death.

    In addition, and in relation to the second assignment of error, the crime of

    rape is aggravated by dwelling.[29] As the Court of Appeals noted:

    T he re i s n o q ue st io n t ha t t he a me nd ed i nf or ma ti on suf fi ci en tl y a ll eg ed

    " th at t he co mmi ss ion o f t he cr im e was ag gr av at ed by d we ll ing t he f ac t

    t hat t he cr ime was co mmi tt ed i ns ide th e hou se of t he of fend ed par ty. "

    Accused-appellant does not dispute that the crime was committed

    i ns ide th e v ict im' s h ou se. Howe ver , he po si ts t hat t he p ro sec ut ion mu st

    prove the absence of provocation by Sally.

    I t s uf fi ce s t o s ta te t ha t p ri va te c om pl ai na nt c at eg or ic al ly t es ti fi ed t ha t

    she was sleeping inside her house when appellant came and

    perpetrated the crime. This is proof enough of the absence of

    provocation on the part of private complainant. For a sleeping thirteen

    (13) - year old barrio girl cannot pos sibly give any kind of provocation

    to appellant under the circumstances.

    Since the crime of rape was committed by appellant with the use of a

    deadly weapon, punishable by r eclu si on p er pe tu a to death, the

    presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, without the

    presence of any mitigating circumstance, justified the trial court's

    imposition of the death penalty.[30]

    The above ruling is in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code

    which provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penaltyc om po se d o f t wo i nd iv is ib le p en al ti es , t he g re at er p en al ty s ha ll b e a pp li ed

    w he n a n a gg ra vat in g c ir cu msta nc e, suc h a s d we ll in g i n t hi s c ase, i s p re sen t i n

    the commission of the offense.

    In People v. Alfeche ,[31] w he re in t he c om pl ai na nt , e mp lo ye d a s a d om esti c

    h el per , was in si de the hou se of h er em pl oy er wh en s he was r aped by t he

    appellant who was armed with a deadly weapon, the Court considereddwelling as an aggravating circumstance in convicting the latter, and affirmed

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    t he t ri al co ur t's i mp osit io n o f t he g re at er p ena lt y, wh ic h i s d ea th.

    T he C our t of Appeal s, i n af fi rmin g t he con vic ti on o f h erei n ap pel lant and th e

    imposition of the death penalty, concluded that:

    The Court, therefore, has no recourse but to apply the law and affirm

    the trial court's imposition of the death penalty. This is without

    prejudice, of course, to the provisions of section 25, R.A. 7659

    r eg ar di ng t he pos sib le exer ci se of t he par do ni ng power o f th e Of fi ce of

    t he P resid ent u po n t he f ina li ty o f t he d ea th sent en ce.[32]

    In light, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act

    P ro hi bi ti ng t he I mpo si ti on of De at h P en al ty i n t he P hi li ppi ne s, " w hi ch was

    s ign ed i nt o l aw b y P res id ent Gl or ia M acap aga l- Ar ro yo o n J un e 24 , 20 06,

    t he i mp osit io n o f t he d ea th p en al ty ha s b ee n p ro hi bi ted .[33] The law provides:

    SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby

    prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One

    Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the

    Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is hereby repealed.R ep ub li c A ct No . S ev en T ho us an d S ix H un dr ed F if ty -Ni ne ( R. A. N o.

    7659) , ot her wis e known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other l aws ,

    e xe cu ti ve o rd er s a nd d ec ree s, i ns of ar a s t he y i mp os e t he d ea th p en al ty

    a re h er eb y r ep ea le d o r a me nd ed a cc or di ng ly .

    SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be

    imposed:

    (a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes

    u se of t he nomencl atur e of th e p enalt ies of t he Revi sed Pen al C ode; or

    (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not

    make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal

    Code.

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    S EC TI ON 3 . P er so ns c on vi ct ed o f o ff en se s p un is he d w it h reclusion

    perpetua, or whos e sentences will be reduced to re cl u si o n p e rp e tu a,

    by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.

    4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as

    amended.

    Aft er a thor ough r ev iew of the r ecor ds , t he Cour t agr ees with t he eval uati on

    of the evidence by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

    Pursuant to the new law, even as the Court sustains the conviction of

    appellant, the penalty imposed upon him should be reduced to reclusion

    erpetua, but appellant shall not be eligible for parole under the

    Indeterminate Sentence Law.

    T he C ou rt , l ik ew is e, a ff ir ms t he ci vi l i nd em ni ty aw ar de d b y t h e C o ur t o f

    Appeals to Sall y in acco rdance wi th the rul ing i n Peopl e v. Sambr ano [34]

    which states:

    As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of

    the attending qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the

    d eat h pen al ty, t he c iv il i nd emn it y f or t he v ic ti m s ha ll be P 75, 000 . .. .

    Als o, in rape cases , moral damages are awarded without the need of

    proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim

    h as suf fe re d mo ral i nj ur ie s e nt it li ng h er t o suc h a n aw ar d. H ow ev er , t he

    trial court's award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should also be

    i nc re as ed t o P 75 ,0 00 p ur su an t t o c ur re nt j ur is pr ud en ce o n q ua li fi ed

    r ap e. L as tl y, ex em pl ar y da ma ges i n t he am oun t of P 25 ,00 0. 00 i s a ls o

    called for, by way of example, and to protect the young from sexual

    abuse.

    It should be noted that while the new law pro hibits the imposition of the

    death penal ty, t he penalty provi ded f or by l aw for a heinous of fense is st ill

    d eat h a nd t he of fen se i s sti ll h ei no us. Conseq uen tly , t he civ il in dem ni ty f or t he

    victim is still P75,000. On the other hand, the automatic appeal in cases

    w he n t he t ri al co ur t i mp oses t he de at h p en al ty wi ll hen ce fo rt h no t ap pl y, sin ceits imposition is now prohibited, so that there is a need to perfect an appeal,

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    if appeal is desired, from a judgment of conviction for an offense where the

    penalty imposed is re c lu si on p e rpe t u a in lieu of the death penalty purs uant

    to the new law prohibiting its imposition.

    WHEREFORE, t h e D e c i si o n o f t h e Co u r t o f A p p e a l s i n CA - G .R. CR.No.-H.C. No. 00767, dated June 15, 2005, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar

    as the convict ion of appell ant and the amount of damages are concer ned.

    The sentence that shall be imposed upon appellant, however, is

    MODIFIED. In vi ew of R epubli c Act No. 9346 prohi bit ing the impos itio n

    of the deat h penal ty, appel lant is hereby s entenced t o reclusion perpetua

    without parole.

    No costs.

    SO ORDERED.

    a ng an ib an , C .J ., Pu no , Qu is um bi ng, Y nar es -S ant ia go, S and ova l-

    Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,

    T i ng a, C h ic o- N az ar i o, G ar c ia and V el as co , J r. , J J. , concur.Corona, J., on leave.

    [1] C A R ol lo, p .1 10.

    [2] Id. at 23.

    [3] Ro ll o, p .2 0.

    [4] S all y g av e b ir th i n t hei r r es iden ce i n Lo ur des , P an da n, C at an duan es on

    Ap ril 11, 19 98 .

    [5] Dr. Anthony J os elito Llamas had been dismis sed f rom the s ervice at thet ime of t he tr ial.

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    [6] TSN, September 17, 1999, p. 5.

    [7] C A Rollo, p. 33-34.

    [8] R ec or ds , p p. 3 3- 34 .

    [9] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640: "While the

    F undamental Law req uir es a mandat or y revi ew by the Su preme C our t of

    c as es w he re t he p en al ty i mp os ed i s re cl u si o n p e rp e tu a , life imprisonment or

    d ea th , n ow he re , h ow ev er , h as i t p ro sc ri be d a n i nt er me di at e r ev ie w. I f o nl y t o

    ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion perpetuao r l if e i mp ri son men t i s i mpo sed , t he Cou rt no w de em s i t w ise an d c om pel li ng

    to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is

    elevated to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all

    possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded an

    accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can be overdone. A prior

    d et er mi nat io n b y t he C ou rt o f App eal s on , pa rt icu la rl y, t he f ac tua l i ss ue s,

    would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, r ec lu si on p er pe tu a or life

    imprisonment, it could then rend er j udgment imposing the corresponding

    penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and

    e le va te t he e nt ir e r e c o r d s of t h e c as e t o t he S up re me C ou rt f or i ts f in al

    disposition."

    [10] R ollo, p. 18.

    [11] People v. Olivar, G.R. No. 138725, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA

    489.

    [12] R ec or ds , p p. 1 55 -1 56 .

    [13] Peo ple v. Deg amo , G . R . N o . 1 2 1 2 1 1 , A p r i l 3 0 , 2 0 0 3 , 4 0 2 S C R A133.

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    [14] Peole v. Purazo, G.R. No. 133189, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 541.

    [15] People v. Alberio, G.R. No. 152584, July 6, 2004, 433 SCRA 469.

    [16] People v. Cultura , G.R. No. 133831, February 14, 2003, 397 SCRA

    368.

    [17] R ec or ds , p p. 5 2- 58 .

    [18] People v. Emilio, G.R. N os . 1 44 30 5- 07 , February 6 , 2 00 3, 3 97

    S CR A 6 2.

    [19] Peo ple v. Manalo , G .R. N o s. 1 4 4 9 8 9 - 9 0 , Ja n u a r y 3 1 , 2 0 0 3 , 3 96

    S CR A 5 73 .

    [20] People v. Ramirex, Jr., G.R. No. 149531, July 22, 2003, 407 SCRA

    191.

    [21] Peo ple v. Jun as , G . R . N o s . 1 4 4 9 7 2 - 7 3 , S e p t e m b e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 3 , 4 1 1

    S CR A 1 20 .

    [22] G.R . No. 152279, January 20, 2004, 420 SC RA 379.

    [23] Peopl e v. Gonz ales , G . R . N o . 1 4 1 5 9 9 , J u n e 2 9 , 2 0 0 4 , 4 3 3 S C R A

    102.

    [24] Peopl e v. Rosa rio , G . R . N o . 1 4 4 4 2 8 , A u g u s t 6 , 2 0 0 3 , 4 0 8 S C R A

    430.

    [25] People v. Magallanes, G.R. N o. 13 62 99 , August 29 , 2 00 3, 410

    S CR A 1 83 .

    [26] R ec or ds , p p. 1 53 -1 54 .

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    [27] S upra, note at 13.

    [28] G. R. No. 128872, November 22, 2000, 414 SCR A 345.

    [29] Dwelling is considered as an aggravating circumstance primarily because

    of the sanctity of the privacy the law accords to the human abode (People v.

    Del os Sa nt os , G. R. No. 134 525 , F ebr uar y 28 , 2 003 , 39 8 S CR A 43 6) .

    [30] C A R ol lo , p p. 1 20- 121.

    [31] G.R. No. 124213, August 17, 1998, 294 SCRA 358.

    [32] CA Rollo, p. 122.

    [33] R ep ub li c Ac t No . 9 34 6 t oo k e ff ec t i mm ed ia te ly a ft er i ts p ub li ca ti on i n

    two newspapers of general circulation, namely, Malaya a n d Manila Times

    on June 29, 2006 in accordance with Secti on 5 ther eof.

    [34] G. R. No. 143708, Februar y 24, 2003, 398 SCRA 106.

    OSJurist.org

    Page 17 of 17