[g.r. no. l-8437. november 28, 1956.] estate of k. h. hemady, deceased, vs. luzon surety co.,...

8/13/2019 [G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.] ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claim

1/48

[G.R. No. L-8437. November 28, 1956.]

ESTATE OF K. H. HEMADY, deceased, vs. LUZON SURETY CO., INC., claimant-Appellant.

Appeal by Luzon Surety Co., Inc., from an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, presided by Judge Hermogenes Caluag,

dismissing its claim against the Estate of K. H. Hemady (Special Proceeding No. Q-293) for failure to state a cause of action.

The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each

subscribed by a distinct principal and by the deceased K. H. Hemady, a surety solidary guarantor) in all of them, in consideration of

the Luzon Surety Co.s of having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors. The twenty counterbon ds, o

indemnity agreements, all contained the following stipulations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Premiums. As consideration for this suretyship, the undersigned jointly and severally, agree to pay the COMPANY the sum of

________________ (P______) pesos, Philippines Currency, in advance as premium there of for every __________ months or

fractions thereof, this ________ or any renewal or substitution thereof is in effect.

Indemnity. The undersigned, jointly and severally, agree at all times to indemnify the COMPANY and keep it indemnified and

hold and save it harmless from and against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges, and expenses of

whatsoever kind and nature which the COMPANY shall or may, at any time sustain or incur in consequence of having become surety

upon this bond or any extension, renewal, substitution or alteration thereof made at the instance of the undersigned or any of them or

any order executed on behalf of the undersigned or any of them; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to pay, reimburse and make good to

the COMPANY, its successors and assigns, all sums and amount of money which it or its representatives shall pay or cause to be paid,

or become liable to pay, on account of the undersigned or any of them, of whatsoever kind and nature, including 15% of the amount

involved in the litigation or other matters growing out of or connected therewith for counsel or attorneys fees, but in no c ase less than

P25. It is hereby further agreed that in case of extension or renewal of this ________ we equally bind ourselves for the paymen

thereof under the same terms and conditions as above mentioned without the necessity of executing another indemnity agreement forthe purpose and that we hereby equally waive our right to be notified of any renewal or extension of this ________ which may be

granted under this indemnity agreement.

Interest on amount paid by the Company. Any and all sums of money so paid by the company shall bear interest at the rate of 12%

per annum which interest, if not paid, will be accummulated and added to the capital quarterly order to earn the same interests as the

capital and the total sum thereof, the capital and interest, shall be paid to the COMPANY as soon as the COMPANY shall have

become liable therefore, whether it shall have paid out such sums of money or any part thereof or not.

x x x x x x x x x

Waiver. It is hereby agreed upon by and between the undersigned that any question which may arise between them by reason of

this document and which has to be submitted for decision to Courts of Justice shall be brought before the Court of competent

jurisdiction in the City of Manila, waiving for this purpose any other venue. Our right to be notified of the acceptance and approval of

this indemnity agreement is hereby likewise waived.

x x x x x x x x x

Our Liability Hereunder. It shall not be necessary for the COMPANY to bring suit against the principal upon his default, or to

exhaust the property of the principal, but the liability hereunder of the undersigned indemnitor shall be jointly and severally, a primary

one, the same as that of the principal, and shall be exigible immediately upon the occurrence of such default. (Rec. App. pp. 98- 102.)

The Luzon Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds it had executed in consideration

of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12

per cent interest thereon.

Before answer was filed, and upon motion of the administratrix of Hemadys estate, the lower court, by order of September 23, 1953

dismissed the claims of Luzon Surety Co., on two grounds:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) that the premiums due and cost o

documentary stamps were not contemplated under the indemnity agreements to be a part of the undertaking of the guarantor

(Hemady), since they were not liabilities incurred after the execution of the counterbonds; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) tha

whatever losses may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his death he ceased to be guarantor.

Taking up the latter point first, since it is the one more far reaching in effects, the reasoning of the court below ran as

follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The administratrix further contends that upon the death of Hemady, his liability as a guarantor terminated, and therefore, i n the

absence of a showing that a loss or damage was suffered, the claim cannot be considered contingent. This Court believes that there is

merit in this contention and finds support in Article 2046 of the new Civil Code. It should be noted that a new requirement has been

added for a person to qualify as a guarantor, that is:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary integrity. As correctly pointed out by the

Administratrix, integrity is something purely personal and is not transmissible. Upon the death of Hemady, his integrity was not

transmitted to his estate or successors. Whatever loss therefore, may occur after Hemadys death, are not chargeable to his estate

because upon his death he ceased to be a guarantor.

Another clear and strong indication that the surety company has exclusively relied on the personality, character, honesty and integrity

of the now deceased K. H. Hemady, was the fact that in the printed form of the indemnity agreement there is a paragraph entitled


2/48

Security by way of first mortgage, which was expressly waived and renounced by the sec urity company. The security company has

not demanded from K. H. Hemady to comply with this requirement of giving security by way of first mortgage. In the supporting

papers of the claim presented by Luzon Surety Company, no real property was mentioned in t he list of properties mortgaged which

appears at the back of the indemnity agreement. (Rec. App., pp. 407-408).

We find this reasoning untenable. Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), as well as under the Civil Code of 1889 (Article 1257)

the rule is that

Contracts take effect only as between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in the case where the rights and obligati ons arising

from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.

While in our successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value of the

inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to the rights of the deceased but also

to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code (and Articles 659 and 661 of the preceding one) expressly so provide

thereby confirming Article 1311 already quoted.

ART. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of

the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by operation of law .

ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his death.

In Mojica vs. Fernandez, 9 Phil. 403, this Supreme Court ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights of succession are subrogated to all the ri ghts and obligations of the deceased

(Article 661) and cannot be regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate

of the deceased (Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil. 44).

x x x x x x x x x

The principle on which these decisions rest is not affected by the provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure, and, in ac cordance

with that principle, the heirs of a deceased person cannot be held to be third persons in relation to any contracts touching the rea

estate of their decedent which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythey take such property

subject to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.

(See also Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. (No. 6) p. 2874 and de Guzman vs. Salak, 91 Phil., 265).

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the provision in our Rules of Court that money

debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The

reason is that whatever payment is thus made from the estate is ultimately a payment by the heirs and distributees, since the amount of

the paid claim in fact diminishes or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.

Under our law, therefore, the general rule is that a partys contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the succ essors. The

rule is a consequence of the progressive depersonalization of patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Po lacco, hascharacterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved

into a relation from patrimony to patrimony, with the persons occupying only a representative position, barring those rare cases where

the obligation is strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of its performance by a specific person and by no

other. The transition is marked by the disappearance of the imprisonment for debt.

Of the three exceptions fixed by Article 1311, the nature of the obligation of the surety or guarantor does not warrant the conclusion

that his peculiar individual qualities are contemplated as a principal inducement for the contract. What did the creditor Luzon Surety

Co. expect of K. H. Hemady when it accepted the latter as surety in the counterbonds? Nothing but the reimbursement of the moneys

that the Luzon Surety Co. might have to disburse on account of the obligations of the principal debtors. This reimbursement is a

payment of a sum of money, resulting from an obligation to give; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand to the Luzon Surety Co., it was

indifferent that the reimbursement should be made by Hemady himself or by some one else in his behalf, so long as the money was

paid to it.

The second exception of Article 1311, p. 1, is intransmissibility by stipulation of the parties. Being exceptional and contrary to the

general rule, this intransmissibility should not be easily implied, but must be expressly established, or at the very least, clearly

inferable from the provisions of the contract itself, and the text of the agreements sued upon nowhere indicate that they are non-

transferable.

(b) Intransmisibilidad por pacto. Lo general es la transmisibilidad de darechos y obligaciones; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryle

excepcion, la intransmisibilidad. Mientras nada se diga en contrario impera el principio de la transmision, como elemento natural a

toda relacion juridica, salvo las personalisimas. Asi, para la no transmision, es menester el pacto expreso, porque si no, lo convenido

entre partes trasciende a sus herederos.

Siendo estos los continuadores de la personalidad del causante, sobre ellos recaen los efectos de los vinculos juridicos creados por sus

antecesores, y para evitarlo, si asi se quiere, es indespensable convension terminante en tal sentido.

Por su esencia, el derecho y la obligacion tienden a ir ms all de las personas que les dieron vida, y a ejercer presion sobre los

sucesores de esa persona; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycuando no se quiera esto, se impone una estipulacion limitativa expresamente de


3/48

la transmisibilidad o de cuyos tirminos claramente se deduzca la concresion del concreto a las mismas personas que lo otorgon.

(Scaevola, Codigo Civil, Tomo XX, p. 541-542) (Emphasis supplied.)

Because under the law (Article 1311), a person who enters into a contract is deemed to have contracted for himself and his heirs and

assigns, it is unnecessary for him to expressly stipulate to that effect; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryhence, his failure to do so is no sign

that he intended his bargain to terminate upon his death. Similarly, that the Luzon Surety Co., did not require bondsman Hemady to

execute a mortgage indicates nothing more than the companys faith and confidence in the financial stability of the surety, b ut not tha

his obligation was strictly personal.

The third exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are not transmissible by operation of

law. The provision makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or obligations are extinguished by death, as

is the case in legal support (Article 300), parental authority (Article 327), usufruct (Article 603), contracts for a piece of work (Article1726), partnership (Article 1830 and agency (Article 1919). By contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate guaranty or

suretyship (Articles 2047 to 2084) contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the guarantor or the surety.

The lower court sought to infer such a limitation from Art. 2056, to the effect that one who is obliged to furnish a guarantor mus

present a person who possesses integrity, capacity to bind himself, and sufficient property to answer for the obligation which he

guarantees. It will be noted, however, that the law requires these qualities to be present only at the time of the perfection of the

contract of guaranty. It is self-evident that once the contract has become perfected and binding, the supervening incapacity of the

guarantor would not operate to exonerate him of the eventual liability he has contracted; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand if that be true

of his capacity to bind himself, it should also be true of his integrity, which is a quality mentioned in the article alongside the capacity.

The foregoing concept is confirmed by the next Article 2057, that runs as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ART. 2057. If the guarantor should be convicted in first instance of a crime involving dishonesty or should become insolvent, the

creditor may demand another who has all the qualifications required in the preceding article. The case is excepted where the creditor

has required and stipulated that a specified person should be guarantor.

From this article it should be immediately apparent that the supervening dishonesty of the guarantor (that is to say, the disappearance

of his integrity after he has become bound) does not terminate the contract but merely entitles the creditor to demand a replacement of

the guarantor. But the step remains optional in the creditor:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary it is his right, not his duty; chan

roblesvirtualawlibraryhe may waive it if he chooses, and hold the guarantor to his bargain. Hence Article 2057 of the present Civil

Code is incompatible with the trial courts stand that the requirement of integrity in the guarantor or surety makes the latters

undertaking strictly personal, so linked to his individuality that the guaranty automatically terminates upon his death.

The contracts of suretyship entered into by K. H. Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the

nature of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his eventual liability thereunder

necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give rise to contingent claims provable against his estate under

section 5, Rule 87 (2 Moran, 1952 ed., p. 437; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit, 43 Phil. 810, 814).

The most common example of the contigent claim is that which arises when a person is bound as surety or guarantor for a prin cipawho is insolvent or dead. Under the ordinary contract of suretyship the surety has no claim whatever against his principal until he

himself pays something by way of satisfaction upon the obligation which is secured. When he does this, there instantly arises in favor

of the surety the right to compel the principal to exonerate the surety. But until the surety has contributed something to the payment of

the debt, or has performed the secured obligation in whole or in part, he has no right of action against anybody no claim that could

be reduced to judgment. (May vs. Vann, 15 Pla., 553; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryGibson vs. Mithell, 16 Pla., 519; chan

roblesvirtualawlibraryMaxey vs. Carter, 10 Yarg. [Tenn.], 521 Reeves vs. Pulliam, 7 Baxt. [Tenn.], 119; chan

roblesvirtualawlibraryErnst vs. Nou, 63 Wis., 134.)

ForDefendantadministratrix it is averred that the above doctrine refers to a case where the surety files claims against the estate of the

principal debtor; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand it is urged that the rule does not apply to the case before us, where the late Hemady

was a surety, not a principal debtor. The argument evinces a superficial view of the relations between parties. If under the Gaskell

ruling, the Luzon Surety Co., as guarantor, could file a contingent claim against the estate of the principal debtors if the latter should

die, there is absolutely no reason why it could not file such a claim against the estate of Hemady, since Hemady is a solidary co-debtor

of his principals. What the Luzon Surety Co. may claim from the estate of a principal debtor it may equally claim from the estate ofHemady, since, in view of the existing solidarity, the latter does not even enjoy the benefit of exhaustion of the assets of the principal

debtor.

The foregoing ruling is of course without prejudice to the remedies of the administratrix against the principal debtors under Articles

2071 and 2067 of the New Civil Code.

Our conclusion is that the solidary guarantors liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such event, the Luzon Surety Co.

had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estates

liability for premiums and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon Suretys claim did s tate a cause

of action, and its dismissal was erroneous.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is reversed, and the records are ordered remanded to the court of origin, with instructions to

proceed in accordance with law. Costs against the Administratrix-Appellee. SO ORDERED.


4/48


5/48

G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A. PACHECO,

VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO,Petitioners,vs.LORENZO LAXA,Respondent.

It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of sound and disposing mind at the time of

the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the mannerprovided in his will so long as it is legally tenable.1

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2of the June 15, 2006 Decision3of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which

reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186.The assailed CA Decision granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.

SO ORDERED.5

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution6which denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.

Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala"7(Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was

read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will andtestament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 38and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.9

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The

three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures below its attestation clause10and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,1

in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife CorazonF. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:

x x x x

Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, Ihereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and CORAZON F.LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legalage, Filipinos, presently residing at Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE ROSSLAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to bequeath since they are the children o f the spouses;

x x x x

[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties mentioned in this last will and testament, I am alsobequeathing and giving the same to the spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them to offer

masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpondsituated at San Antonio, I likewise command to fulfill the wishes of D[]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as stated in mytestament. x x x12

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely,

Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.13Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she whoraised and cared for Lorenzo since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United States ofAmerica (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition14with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probateof the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt1


6/48

There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13, 200015allowing Lorenzo to present evidenceon June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament ofPaciencia on September 13, 1981.16The Will was executed in her fathers (Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other witnesses,Francisco and Faustino.17Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures on all its four pages.18She likewise positively identified thesignature of her father appearing thereon.19Questioned by the prosecutor regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that

her father had a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.20The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her name. Because ofthis, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.21

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition22to Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that theproperties subject of Paciencias Willbelong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right tobequeath them to Lorenzo.23

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar, Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B.

Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L. Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition24contending that Paciencias Will wasnull and void because ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to Article 1049,

paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.25Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo wasdisqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the USA.26Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issuedin favor of Antonio.27

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition28asking the RTC to deny the probate of Paciencias Will on the

following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapableto make a Will at the time of its execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of

the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; that the signature ofPaciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did notintend the document to be her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation29reiterating their opposition to the

appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order30denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to be appointed administrator since the former isa citizen and resident of the USA while the latters claim as a co-owner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been established.

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled for cross-examination by the petitioners. Shetestified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of theexecution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place.31

Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his fathers

condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court tosupport this allegation.32

For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and hisaunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with him and his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between himand Paciencia was like that of a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia was aspinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias death, she did not suffer from any mental disorder and was of

sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencias death throughFaustino; and he was already residing in the USA when the Will was executed.33Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in threedifferent documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencias signature because he accompanied her in her transactions.34

Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation, violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in

the Philippines when the same was executed.35On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly after herarrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.36

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins.37She claimed to have helped in the household chores in the house of

Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until evening and that during the period of her service in the sa id household, Lorenzoswife and his children were staying in the same house.38She served in the said household from 1980 until Paciencias departure for the USA onSeptember 19, 1981.39

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to sign at the latters house.40Rosie admitted, though,

that she did not see what that "something" was as same was placed inside an envelope.41However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino tofirst look for money before she signs them.42A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonios mother and

brought with her the said envelope.43Upon going home, however, the envelope was no longer with Paciencia.44Rosie further testified that Pacienciawas referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.45

On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" wasbased on her personal assessment,46and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.47

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt.48He identified the Will and testified that he had seen the said document beforebecause Paciencia brought the same to his mothers house and showed it to him along with another document on September 16, 1981.49Antonio
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt15http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt49http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt48http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt47http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt46http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt45http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt44http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt43http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt42http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt15


7/48

alleged that when the documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned.50According to him, Paciencia thought that the documentspertained to a lease of one of her rice lands,51and it was he who explained that the documents were actually a special power of attorney to lease andsell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family uponher death.52Upon hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: "Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my properties?" Who isLorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my properties. Why should I die already?"53Thereafter,

Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, "I know nothing about those,throw them away or it is up to you. The more I will not sign them."54After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio kept theunsigned documents

and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.55

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision56denying the petition thus:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b) disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 ofPaciencia Regala.

SO ORDERED.57

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longerpossessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have testamentary capacity.58

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The appellate court did not agree with the RTCsconclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed the Will. It ratiocinated that "the state of being magulyandoes not make a

person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will."59Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not

able to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegationthat Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.60

Petitioners moved for reconsideration61but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution62dated August 31, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the following errors:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE OF PACIENCIAS WILLDESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

EVIDENCE ON RECORD;

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS FAILED TO PROVE THATPACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED63

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to warrant its allowance for probate.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt50http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt53http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt53http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt53http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt54http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt54http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt54http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt55http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt55http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt55http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt57http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt57http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt57http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt58http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt58http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt58http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt59http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt59http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt59http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt60http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt60http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt60http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt61http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt61http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt61http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt62http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt62http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt62http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt63http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt63http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt63http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt62http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt61http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt60http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt59http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt58http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt57http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt56http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt55http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt54http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt53http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt52http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt51http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt50


8/48

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a Will in probate proceedings.64This is expressly provided for in Rule 75,Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which states:

Rule 75

Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary.

Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution.No will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in theproper court. Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with theformalities prescribed by law.65These formalities are enshrined in Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written bysome other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of thetestator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and everypage thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page

thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latterwitnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain acopy of the will, or file another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix,Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states thecritical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses attested and

subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in theWill may be authentic although they question her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was "magulyan" or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of testamentarycapacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for Reconsideration66filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only "magulyan" but was actuallysuffering from paranoia.67

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfitto execute a Will.68Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be whollyunbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his

bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that

would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra.Limpins testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily executed the Will. "Thetestimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful andintelligent."69More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwiselies on the oppositor. Article 800 of the New Civil Code states:

Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt64http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt64http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt64http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt65http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt65http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt65http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt66http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt66http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt66http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt67http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt67http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt67http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt68http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt68http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt68http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt69http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt69http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt69http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt69http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt68http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt67http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt66http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt65http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt64


9/48

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of thewill; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the willmust prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, theburden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantialevidence was presented by them to prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of her bounty and thecharacter of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:

A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of

her faith be observed upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and the properties she is bequeathingto LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2) children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not included thereinas devisee.70

Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and trickery cannot be used as basis todeny the probate of a will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute the document that will distribute his/her earthlypossessions upon his/her death. Petitioners claim that Paciencia was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the

execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit; and thatassuming Paciencias signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These are grounded on the alleged conversation betweenPaciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son and that love even extended to Lorenzoswife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise

their nephews and nieces and treat them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many familydiscords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his family is different fromher relationship withpetitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married andalready has children, highlights the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to supportthe authenticity of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress, influence of fear or threats, undue and improper influence, pressure

fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature, are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worthstressing that bare arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move the Court to uphold

said allegations.71Furthermore, "a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution oftestamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would

have to depend largely on the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased]."72

Court should be convinced by the evidence presented before it that the Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court was not complied with. Itprovides:

RULE 76

Allowance or Disallowance of Will

Section 11.Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested.If the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and thenotary in the case of wills executed under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be produced andexamined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present inthe Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be taken. If any or all of them testify against the dueexecution of the will, or do not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be allowed if the

court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented that the will was executed and attested in the mannerrequired by law.

If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3) witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declarethat the will and the signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses, and if the court deem it necessary,expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but one witness, Francisco, are stillliving.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt70http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt70http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt70http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt71http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt71http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt71http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt72http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt72http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt72http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt72http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt71http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt70


10/48

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily explained during the probate

proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to braindamage. To prove this, said witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin,suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not even remember hisdaughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite

ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination.We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witnessand of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony

proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not

be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just because all theattesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from theattesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law."731wphi1

Moreover, it bears stressing that "[i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the authenticity and due execution of the will x x xin question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling."74"Thevery existence of [the Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the manner therein

provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full effect independent of the attitude of the parties affectedthereby."75This, coupled with Lorenzos established relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, asopposed to the total lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the balance in favor of theauthenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 are AFFIRMED.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt73http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt73http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt73http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt74http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt74http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt74http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt75http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt75http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt75http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt75http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt74http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/apr2012/gr_174489_2012.html#fnt73


11/48

G.R. No. L-10907 June 29, 1957

AUREA MATIAS,petitioner,

vs.HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALEZ, ETC., ET AL.,respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Petitioner Aurea Matias seeks a writ of certiorarito annul certain orders of Hon. Primitivo L. Gonzales, as Judge of the Court of First Instance ofCavite, in connection with Special Proceedings No. 5213 of said court, entitled "Testate Estate of the Deceased Gabina Raquel."

On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and

testament of her aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at the age of 92 years. The heir to the entire estate of the deceasedexceptthe properties bequeathed to her other niece and nephews, namely, Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos M atias and Rafael

Matiasis, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia Salud, a first cousin ofthe deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will, and, after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respon dent Judge, issued anorder, dated February 8, 1956, sustaining said opposition and denying the petition for probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter onappeal to this Court (G.R. No. L-10751), where it is now pending decision.

Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of thedeceased, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The motion was set for hearing on February 23, 1956, on which date the court postponed

the hearing to February 27, 1956. Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last mentioned. Instead, he filed an urgentmotion praying for additional time within which to answer the charges preferred against him by Basilia Salud and for another postponement of said

hearing. This motion was not granted, and Basilia Salud introduced evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent Judge by an order,

dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and gross negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as special administratorof the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as special administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece, Miss Victorina

Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that "Basilia Salud shall be helped byMr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed as co-administrator."

On March 8, 1956, Aurea Matins asked that said order of February 27, 1956, be set aside and that she be appointed special co-administratrix, jointlywith Horacio Rodriguez, upon the ground that Basilia Salud is over eighty (80) years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the

duties of said office, and that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person appointed by the latter as executrix of her allegedwill. This motion was denied in an order dated March 10, 1956, which maintained "the appointment of the three above named persons"BasiliaSalud, Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud"for the management of the estate of the late Gabina Raquel pending final decision on the probate of thealleged will of said decedent." However, on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud tendered her resignation as special administratrix by reason of physical

disability, due to old age, and recommended the appointment, in her place, of Victorina Salud. Before any action could be taken thereon, or on March21, 1956, Aurea Matias sought a reconsideration of said order of March 10, 1956. Moreover, on March 24, 1956, she expressed her conformity tosaid resignation, but objected to the appointment, in lieu of Basilia Salud, of Victorina Salud, on account of her antagonism to said Aurea Matiasshe (Victorina Salud) having been the principal and most interested witness for the opposition to the probate of the alleged will of the deceased

and proposed that the administration of her estate be entrusted to the Philippine National Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the Bank of the PhilippineIslands, or any other similar institution authorized by law therefor, should the court be reluctant to appoint the movant as special administratrix ofsaid estate. This motion for reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1956.

Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud requested authority to collect the rents due, or which may bedue, to the estate of the deceased and to collect all the produce of her lands, which was granted on June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said respondentsfiled another motion praying for permission to sell the palay of the deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the province of Cavite, which

respondent judge granted on June 10, 1956. Later on, or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present action against Judge Gonzales, andVictorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for the purpose of annulling the above mentioned orders of respondent Judge, upon the ground that the same had

been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In support of this pretense, it is argued that petitioner should have preference in the choice of special administratrix of the estate of the decedent, she(petitioner) being the universal heiress to said estate and, the executrix appointed in the alleged will of the deceased, that until its final disallowance

which has not, as yet, taken place she has a special interest in said estate, which must be protected by giving representation thereto in themanagement of said estate; that, apart from denying her any such representation, the management was given to persons partial to her main opponent,namely, Basilia Salud, inasmuch as Victorina Salud is allied to her and Ramon Plata is a very close friend of one of her (Basilia Salud's) attorneys;that Basilia Salud was made special administratrix despite her obvious unfitness for said office, she being over eighty (80) years of age and blind;that said disability is borne out by the fact that on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud resigned as special administratrix upon such ground; that the Rules

of Court do not permit the appointment of more than one special administrator; that Horacio Rodriguez was removed without giving petitioner achance to be heard in connection therewith; and that Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud were authorized to collect the rents due to the deceased andthe produce of her lands, as well to sell her palay, without previous notice to the petitioner herein.

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the scope of his jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion; thatpetitioner can not validly claim any special interest in the estate of the deceased, because the probate of the alleged will and testament of the latter

upon which petitioner relieshas been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of the proceedings for his removal; and that VictorinaSalud and Ramon Plata have not done anything that would warrant their removal.


12/48

Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to sanction fully the acts of respondent Judge, for the following reasons:

1. Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for his removal, dated February 17, 1956, the record shows that petitioner

herein received copy of said motion of February 24, 1956, or the date after that set for the hearing thereof. Again, notice of the order of respondentJudge, dated February 23, 1956, postponing said hearing to February 27, 1956, was not served on petitioner herein.

2. In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the dismissal of Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment ofRamon Plata, as specialadministrator of said estate. Petitioner had, therefore, no notice that her main opponent,Basilia Salud, and the latter's principal witness, Victorina

Salud, would be considered for the management of said. As a consequence, said petitioner had no opportunity to object to the appointment of BasiliaSalud as special administratrix, and of Victorina Salud, as her assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956, to this effect, denied due

process to said petitioner.

3. Said order was issued with evident knowledge of the physical disability of Basilia Salud. Otherwise respondent Judge would not have directed thatshe "be assisted and advised by her niece Victorina Salud," and that the latter "shall alwaysact as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud."

4. Thus, respondent Judge, in effect, appointed three (3) special administratorsBasilia Salud, Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata. Indeed, in theorder of March 10, 1956, respondent Judge maintained "the appointmentof the three (3) above-named persons for the management of the estate ofthe late Gabina Raquel."

5. Soon after the institution of said Special Proceedings No. 5213, an issue arose between Aurea Matias and Basilia Salud regarding the person to beappointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased. The former proposed Horacio Rodriguez, whereas the latter urged the appointment of

Victorina Salud. By an order dated August 11, 1952, the Court, then presided over by Hon. Jose Bernabe, Judge, decided the matter in favor ofHoracio Rodriguez and against Victorina Salud, upon the ground that, unlike the latter, who, as a pharmacist and employee in the Santa Isabel

Hospital, resides In the City of Manila, the former, a practicing lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of the City of Cavite, is a

resident thereof. In other words, the order of resident thereof. In other words, the order of respondent Judge of February 27, 1956, removingRodriguez and appointing Victorina Salud to the management of the estate, amounted to a reversal of the aforementioned order of Judge Bernabe ofAugust 11, 1952.

6. Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Gabina Raquel was denied by respondent Judge, the order to this effect is not, as yet,final and executory. It is pending review on appeal taken by Aurea Matias. The probate of said alleged will being still within realm of legal

possibility, Aurea Matias hasas the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrumenta special interest to protect during the pendency

of said appeal. Thus, in the case ofRoxas vs. Pecson*(46 Off. Gaz., 2058), this Court held that a widow, designated as executrix in the alleged willand testament of her deceased husband, the probate of which had denied in an order pending appeal, "has . . . the same beneficial interest after thedecision of the court disapproving the will, which is now pending appeal, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the appellatecourt."

7. The record shows that there are, at least two (2) factions among the heirs of the deceased, namely, one, represented by the petitioner, and another,to which Basilia Salud and Victorina Salud belong. Inasmuch as the lower court had deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator,

justice and equity demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.

The rule, laid down inRoxas vs. Pecson(supra), to the effect that "only one special administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily" theestate of the deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The lower court appointed therein one special administrator

for some properties forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties thereof. Thus, there were two (2) separate andindependent special administrators. In the case at bar there is only one(1) special administration, the powers of which shall be exercised jointly bytwo special co-administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not squarely in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts to

appoint several special co-administrators (Lewis vs. Logdan, 87 A. 750; Harrison vs. Clark, 52 A. 514; In re Wilson's Estate, 61 N.Y.S. 2d., 49;Davenport vs. Davenport, 60 A. 379).

Wherefore, the orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside. The lower court should re-hear the matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguezand appointment of special administrators, after due notice to all parties concerned, for action in conformity with the views expressed herein, withcosts against respondents Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata. It is so ordered.


13/48

G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911

BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.

NARCISA RIMANDO,defendant-appellant.

CARSON, J.:

The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the court below,

is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and theother subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large

room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the

outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

A majority of the members of the court is of opinion that this subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and the other

subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of course, disposes of the

appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree admitting the document to probate as the last will and testament of the deceased.

The trial judge does not appear to have considered the determination of this question of fact of vital importance in the determination of

this case, as he was of opinion that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil. Rep., 541) the alleged fact

that one of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the testator and the other describing witnesses signed the instrument

in the inner room, had it been proven, would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution of the will. But we are unanimously

of opinion that had this subscribing witness been proven to have been in the outer room at the time when the testator and the othersubscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument in the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching

of those signatures under circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the witness in the outer room. This because the line of

vision from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been impeded by the curtain

separating the inner from the outer one "at the moment of inscription of each signature."

In the case just cited, on which the trial court relied, we held that:

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw

each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their

mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each

signature.

But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of eachsignature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and

the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of each othe

[g.r. no. l-8437. november 28, 1956.] estate of k. h. hemady, deceased, vs. luzon surety co.,...

Documents