graeme r. newman human security: a world view of homicide and rape

7/28/2019 Graeme R. Newman Human Security: A World View of Homicide and Rape

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Human Security:A World View of Homicide and Rape

Graeme R. Newman

Commissioned by the

Human Security Centre

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A Primer on International Crime Statist ics

There are generally four sets of internationally constructed crime data:

The UNCJ S (The United Nations Survey of Crime and Criminal J ustice

Systems),;

The homicide data generated by the WHO as part of its international

recording of diseases;

The INTERPOL (International Police Organization)

The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS).

Each of these has particular strengths and weaknesses. The WHO data

represent statistics that are generated by a different kind of bureaucracy (the

medical and hospital organizations) so that they give a different picture of

homicide than do either the UNCJ S or INTERPOL data. While WHO uses the

legal- sounding definition of homicide of intentional homicide the recording of

the crime is based on a diagnosis as to the cause of death. The UNCJ S and

INTERPOL data produce statistics that have been generated by policing and

criminal justice organizations of various kinds, so in general terms. The UNCJ S

and the INTERPOL data produce roughly similar data, though there are somesignificant differences in places, particularly in regard to the definitions of

offences1. The UNCJ S data are highly political in nature, since they represent

the official statement by each country of its crime and justice situation. Thus, the

data may be filtered through a countrys diplomatic or foreign relations

bureaucracies. INTERPOL data may be slightly less official in the sense that the

reporting agencies are essentially policing agencies, so that the data, in some

instances, may represent more closely the policing activity of each country. The

levels of homicide reported by the UNCJ S and INTERPOL tend to be higher than

those for WHO, which may be caused by a variety of factors, including reporting

and recording practices. The ICVS obtains data by interviewing samples of

1The problems of interpreting international crime statistics have been extensively discussed in the

literature. See: Newman, Graeme R. (1999). Global Report on Crime and Justice. UNODC. New York:

Oxford.

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individuals concerning their experience of crime victimization. It therefore

provides a different unofficial measure of crime. The main drawback in regard

to the present chapter is that, obviously, homicide data cannot be collected.

For this chapter we use the INTERPOL data because we want to show crime

trends for as long a period as possible. The INTERPOL data have been collected

since the 1950s, whereas the UNCJ S data began collection in 1970, and reliably

since 19752and the ICVS has only been conducted since 1987

Introduction

In this chapter we examine the extent and distribution of two major threats to

human security, homicide and rape. These are crimes that resonate strongly in

any community and that contribute heavily to peoples perception of the danger

of crime and threats to their security. We have chosen homicide as the main

indicator of a crime that is a threat to communities because it is generally

accepted as the more reliably and highly reported crime in most countries and

the crime that has least difficulties in variation in definition across countries.

Rape, a high profile crime when it is reported in the media, is a crime with a

history of low reporting by victims so it provides a contrast to homicide statistics.

Nevertheless, even taking into account the difficulties in reporting and comparing

these statistics across nations, the statistics of both these crimes provide a rough

insight into the extent to which violent crimes of the most frightening nature are

distributed around the world.

A World View of Homicide

While there are some well known difficulties in collecting and interpreting

international crime statistics, such as differing reporting and recording practices,

2 Combining the data sets was not feasible because the data sets are sufficiently different that this would

have created an artificial split in 1970.

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recent world events have accentuated these difficulties even more. Figure 1,

displaying the homicide rate for the world,3serves to introduce this problem. We

may make the following observations:

The most striking characteristics of the trend line are the two peaks thatoccur in 1976 and 1994.

If we ignore the two spikes, we could conclude that the homicide rate has

been relatively stable over time.

The decade of the 1990s appears to show an increase in the homicide

rate, even if we excluded the peak of 1994, though this increase simply

brings the rate back to what it was in the 1950s.

Figure 1: World homicide rate 1959-2001

3 Of course, the data presented do not contain data from every country of the world. There are several

methodological difficulties here: First, the number of countries for each year changes from year to year.

Only about 20 per cent of countries report data every year. Thus, the makeup of the world each year is

composed of a different array of countries. Second, over the 40 year period, the number of countries in theworld has increased dramatically. Some countries have also ceased to exist, and others have been reborn as

new countries. Borders have been redrawn. Thus, what countries constitute the world is always in flux.

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The peaks are largely caused by two countries: Rwanda in 1994 and Lesotho in

1976 when both countries experienced genocide and civil strife. World crime

rates can be influenced greatly by one or two extreme cases. For example, a

serial killer committing crimes for a period of one or two years is not going to

influence the murder rate in any particular country to any serious degree.

However, events in a nation such as mass killings resulting from civil war or

genocide may influence the world rate of violent crime markedly. The effects of

these different recording practices are clearly apparent when trends are

examined according to region (Figure 2) and level of development (Figure 3).

The differing recording practices according to region or level of development are

most likely the result of bureaucratic smoothing. Countries that do not have awell established independent bureaucracy for the maintenance of social accounts

are less resistant to external forces, so are more likely to adhere to established

practices of statistical recording. Bureaucracies, particularly those in western

democracies, are well known for their resilience and their resistance to external

events, even political influences. They have established procedures and systems

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that respond to new events slowly. Countries with less sophisticated or

entrenched bureaucracies are more easily affected by major events such as

genocide or civil strife, and may also be less independent of political

manipulation. Thus, homicides that occur as a result of terrorist events are more

easily incorporated into the records of crime4. Furthermore, in many countries

there is no clear distinction between the military bureaucracy and the policing

bureaucracies, so that social accounts may more easily reflect casualties of war

or civil strife as records of criminal activity. In the USA for example, the distinction

between the military and the policing bureaucracies (and even those between

local policing bureaucracies and national or regional policing bureaucracies) has

been assiduously maintained, though there are current attempts to overcome

these bureaucratic divisions in the US governments war against terrorism.

Therefore, it is much more difficult for such killings that result from terrorism to

make their way into the national crime statistics of such a country. To different

degrees, this observation probably applies to all countries with well established

traditional policing and social accounting bureaucracies. We should expect,

therefore, that the trend lines of such countries will show much smoother lines,

without sudden peaks and valleys. This differential patterning in homicide rates is

well demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2: Regional5homicide rate, 1961-2001

4

It should be noted that in the case of international statistics of INTERPOL and the UNCJS both sets ofhomicide statistics are essentially reflective of a countrys national statistics and are prepared by officers

within that country. Officers working for the international organizations that collate the statistics aregenerally not free to add or otherwise change the categories of statistics reported to them by contributing

nations.5 One of the difficulties in comparing regions over time is that borders change and so do regions. In

addition, it is difficult to infer from some of the regional breakdowns what exactly each region represents

whether a geographic, cultural or economic attribute. The regions that we have adopted, which are largelythose used by major international organizations are a mixture of geographic and cultural attributes. See the

appendix for the regional classification of countries.

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Regional comparisons

In Figure 2 we see that the trend lines of the New World, Western Europe, and

Asia do not display any major peaks and valleys. However, those for Latin

America and Africa display considerable numbers of peaks, most likely caused

by the incorporation of killings resulting from civil strife that occurred in those

regions over the past 40 years6. It is of interest that the trend lines of Central and

Eastern Europe remained relatively smooth until the civil strife of the 1990s that

brought about the development of new states. These Central and East European

states had well entrenched bureaucracies. Thus there are no sudden peaks and

valleys, but a steep increase at the beginning of hostilities then a leveling off.

The great diversity in rates of homicide among the various regions of the world

suggests that not a lot can be concluded in regard to a true homicide rate of the

world by examining a combined world rate as shown in Figure 1, except that as

noted earlier, if we ignore the volatility the overall trend is relatively flat. It is

apparent also that it may be misleading to infer from examining even the regional

6The year 1959-60 has been excluded from this graph because it was dominated by Colombias extremely

high rate of almost 200 per 100,000 which would have made the rest of the chart difficult to read because

of the necessity to extend the X axis.

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rates that all the countries in a particular region display the same kinds of rates,

whether it be overall level or volatility. This is because as we have seen,

individual countries, if they report the homicides resulting from civil strife, may

dominate a particular regional rate. Nevertheless, it would also be a mistake to

dismiss the data completely, since they do at some level, represent the countries

experience of homicide. In each case, the data are not so much an invention of

crime reporting bureaucracies, butare in fact a response to actual homicides (or

attempted homicides, depending on the circumstances) that have, after a

complex system of reporting and recording, ended up in the nations official

statistical records.

Developing and industrial comparisons

Another way to examine the diversity of rates that lie behind the overall world

rate is to compare the rates of industrial and non-industrial countries, sometimes

called developing and industrial countries. This classification can only be very

rough, and is usually based on various indicators such as gross domestic

product, levels of employment in agriculture, industrial output, etc. The

economies of countries become more complex with industrial and technological

development. This results in many different changes in their societies: population

movements from country to city, increases in the amount of civil and criminal law

to cope with the more complex relationships among people and institutions, and

thus the expansion of governmental and non-governmental bureaucracies to

cope with the increased demands of civil, criminal and administrative law.

Comparing countries roughly divided into developing and industrial over time is

especially difficult, since some countries (unfortunately relatively few) have in fact

developed considerably over the 42 years in question. Prime examples are

Singapore and Hong Kong (not to mention of course, that Hong Kong is no

longer a separate country, but is part of China). Both these countries were

categorized as developing countries well up until the 1970s. Today, they are

clearly well placed in the industrial group. Thus, Figure 4 should be taken only as

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a rough indication of the differences between developing and industrial countries

in the production of homicide rates. We would expect, however, that those

countries with well developed economies and therefore bureaucracies, to show

smoother trend lines, and those of developing countries to display more volatility.

We can see in Figure 3 that this expectation is clearly confirmed.

Figure 3: Homicide rate, 1959-2001 by development

Finally, we should understand that the volatility of homicide rates is relative. One

could conclude from the data presented so far that Western Europe a bastion of

industrialized nations would display little if any volatility. If we examine the

trends of homicide rates for each of these regions we see that they display their

own peaks and valleys, though of course in the scale of things, the fluctuations

for industrial countries is nowhere near as great as for less developed regions

such as Africa and Latin America. Figure 4 shows that Western Europe

experienced a big spike in 1959, largely affected by Spain which reported a

homicide rate of 80.01 in 1959, and 78.69 in 1960. The Basque ETA Militar

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movement became active in 1959, and Spain at that time was a much less

developed country than today.

Figure 4: Homicide rate, 1959-2001, Western Europe

A World View of Rape7

It is well known that the reportability of rape that is, the extent to which

individuals or victims report this crime to the police or authorities is very low in

many countries less than 50%. However, the U.N. Global Report on Crime and

Justice observed that the reporting by countries (not individuals) of their rape

statistics had increased dramatically during the 1990s. This was taken to indicate

an increased awareness of countries of the seriousness with which this crime is

now viewed throughout the world. Thus, the trend displayed in Figure 5 should

be interpreted with care. It may not indicate a true increase in the world rape rate,

but rather the increased reporting of rape and sexual assault.

7 See appendix for supporting data.

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There are also difficulties in definition. Until 1976, INTERPOL collected only sex

offences statistics from countries, with no indication as to what portion of these

offences was rape. After 1976, INTERPOL collected statistics on both rape and

sex offences, thus making the trend line for the 40 year period difficult to

interpret. Furthermore, the category sex offences is highly ambiguous and

difficult to define cross nationally. In fact it reveals a major difficulty in interpreting

rape statistics: there may be vastly different cultural standards as to how sexual

assault is perceived, and what it constitutes to either a victim or witness of a

sexual assault. Thus, the complex process of how such a crime becomes a

crime that is, the factors that contribute to an event being reported to the police

as a crime, and subsequently the police recording that event as a rape or sexual

assault may differ substantially across countries. Finally, the actual legal

definitions of countries of rape may vary accordingly. For example in Canada8,

rape is classified as an assault and is not recorded as a separate crime.

Figure 5: World rape rate, 1977-2001

8 See Statistics Canada: http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/legal02.htm.

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The constant volatility in the rape rates displayed in Figure 5 is probably the

result of the haphazard reporting and hence the recording -- of the crime in

many countries. Nevertheless, the trend line of Figure 5 is highly suggestive of

an overall increase in the rape rate throughout the world. We should repeat,

however, that this increase may be a function of the increase in numbers of

countries reporting this crime, not an increase in the true prevalence of rape.

Perhaps a better way to think of this increase is that it displays an increasing

awareness of countries (and individuals) of the seriousness of rape as a crime

and the increased willingness to report it. In other words, the world is discovering

the extent of rape that has always been there.

It is possible to discern some contrasting patterns according to regions, some of

which are quite striking. Figure 6 displays the rape rates according to world

regions. We can see that the

Figure 6: Regional rape rate, 1977-2001

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rates are highly volatile in the new world, Africa and Latin America. The peaks in

rape for Africa occur in 1994 and 1997 years in which civil strife resulted in

mass rapes in Rwanda and Lesotho respectively.

However, the most striking finding is that of the rape rate for the New World

which is overall higher than any other region. This finding is consistent with that

reported in the UN Global Report. It also holds even if we use the broader

definition of sex offences and include the additional years from 1959-1976

(Figure 7). Thus, it is likely not a function of the differing definition of rape or sex

offences in the new world countries. It may, however, indicate one or both of two

possibilities: that rape is a more highly reported crime in those countries than in

other countries of the world, or that the true rape rate in these countries is in fact

higher than other regions. Since in many respects countries of the new world are

similar economically and perhaps culturally to those of Western Europe, it is

highly likely that the rape rates of the New World do, to some degree, reflect

higher true rates of rape. This finding is also supported by the International Crime

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Victimization Surveys9though this measure of rape is also in question, since it

surveys sexual assaults not rape, and it is very likely that the answers

individuals provide to this question are strongly affected by cultural perceptions

as to what constitutes a sexual assault. Cultures where sensitivity to the issue of

rape is high are more likely to report rape to officials, whether these are police or

victim survey interviewers.

Figure 7: Regional rates of sex of fences, 1959-2000

Thus it is likely that these regional differences shield other factors that contribute

to the higher reporting of rape. Figure 8 suggests that this may be in fact the

case. Industrial countries report a much higher rate of rape than do developing

countries. It is likely that this dramatic difference is the result of two factors: The

9 Van Dijk, Jan (1999). The experience of crime and justice. In, Graeme R. Newman (Ed.) Global Report

on Crime and Justice. UNODC. New York: Oxford.

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higher official sensitivity to rape as a crime in developed countries, and the well

established bureaucratic recording of the crime. It is likely that many more crimes

of rape and sexual assault are recorded in countries that have a highly

sophisticated crime recording bureaucracy. In many of these countries public

campaigns by various interest groups have fought for many years to raise the

sensitivity and awareness of policing bureaucracies to the problem of rape.

Second, it is widely reported that the status of women in many developing

countries, especially countries of the African Continent, is one where women are

exploited and cannot say no to men, where much rape of women and young

girls occurs in domestic situations and is seen as normal behavior.10 It is also

apparent from Figure 8 that the rape rate of developing countries has increased

substantially in the last 5 years, suggesting that the campaign to increase

awareness of individuals and authorities concerning rape may be having an

effect.

Figure 8: Rape rate, 1977-2001 by development

10 South Africa has extensively documented this problem. See: Rape: Silent War on South African

women. BBC. April 9, 2002.. 24,892 rapes were reported in South Africa in 2002, many of these againstchildren. The cultural attitudes of men against women, particularly that men do not see their acts as

criminal, is identified as a prime reason for the extent of rape in this country.

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We have mentioned the spikes in rape rate in the African region, and its effect on

the overall world rape rate. The relationship between rape and wars of all kinds is

well established.11We can see in Figure 9 that a bulge in the rape rate of Central

and Eastern Europe has found its way into the official reporting of rape during the

Balkan wars, where rape as an act of war and genocide has been well

documented.

11 For a theoretical and historical overview see: Rape as a Weapon of War by

Claudia Card.Hypatia Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1996)

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Figure 9: Rape in Central and Eastern Europe

Are rape and homicide increasing throughout the world?

It depends which countries and regions. The volatility of the rape statistics makes

it difficult to draw any firm conclusions. However, if we examine the rape rate forWestern Europe (Figure 10) we see a typical trend produced by bureaucratic

smoothing. In this case, it is quite clear that the rape rate is increasing steadily

but there is no way to determine whether this is a result of better reporting and

recording procedures, or because the incidence of rape has in fact increased. As

for homicide, because of the extreme volatility of the rates, it is impossible to

determine. If we exclude the countries in which the homicide rates have been

dramatically increased by civil strife, the overall world rate and even regional

trends show no substantial increases.

Figure 10: Rape in Western Europe

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Are homicide and rape linked?

If we count those countries showing any indication of an increase in either rape

or homicide in the last decade of the 20th century, there is a firm indication that

both these crimes have increased during that decade for close to half the

countries (Figure 11) but also evidence of decreases in a substantial number of

countries too. Of those countries reporting an increase in homicide at any point in

the 1990s decade, half also reported increases in rape12. An examination of

specific countries reporting increases in both crimes does not reveal any

particular profiles that would link the two. This does not of course mean that rape

is not linked to homicide in countries experiencing civil strife simply that in

countries where civil strife is not dominant (the majority of countries) the rape

rate does not appear to be linked to homicide rate.

12 See Appendix 1 for classification of countries.

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Figure 11: Percent of countries reporting increase or decrease in rape and

homicide, 1990-2000

Are rape and homicide connected by region?

Figure 12 shows the overall rankings from highest to lowest rates of homicide

and rape according to geographical region. There is not a lot of consistency,

except to show that two regions, those of Africa and Latin America are ranked at

the top of the chart for both homicide and rape.

Figure 12: Rankings of regions according to overall rape (1977-2001) and

homicide (1959-2001) rates13.

Ranking Homicide Rape

High Africa

Latin America

New World

Africa, Latin America

Middle Central and Eastern

Europe, New World

Western Europe, Central

and Eastern Europe

13 These are computed from the means of all years reported. However, the differences are clearly

discernible in the regional charts. See Appendix for supporting data.

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Low Western Europe, Asia Asia

These rankings generally confirm findings from other data such as those of the

UN Global Report. In general, it does appear that countries that have a strong

traditional culture such as those of Western Europe and Asia may exhibit lower

rates of homicide and rape than countries that are new that is to say, formed

within the last 200-300 years (North America, Central and Eastern Europe).

Speculations concerning the rates of homicide and rape throughout the

world

Sociologists have argued that over long periods of time crime is a stable

phenomenon that shows intermittent fluctuations that depend on particular

historical periods or events14. Its stability is guaranteed by the routine behaviors

of the organizations set up to police crime, and the fluctuations in the response of

those organizations to political, religious and other aspects of social and

economic life. The theory is that crime control, of which the reporting and

recording of crimes is an integral part, helps define the boundaries of acceptablebehavior. From a world perspective, this means that we should see an ebb and

flow of rape and homicide (and other kinds of crime as well) across time and

place, but that the overall trend should be relatively flat. There should be

considerable geographical variations in the extent of crime, depending upon the

frontiers of social life that are being tested. As we noted above, the world

homicide rate since 1959 is roughly stable over time, with intermittent

fluctuations, and variation according to region. If there has been a slight increase

in the rate, it is just as likely that this increase is a result of increasing reporting

and recording of crime rather than an increase in the crime itself.

14 Erikson, Kai T. (1968). Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance. NY: Allyn and

Bacon..

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It is, perhaps, an understatement to call homicide and rape types of behavior that

explore the boundaries of acceptable behavior, for these behaviors threaten the

very security of individuals, and as well where homicide and rape are part of

terrorism and war, threaten whole societies, cultures and even nations. Yet there

are, and have been, societies where rape and homicide are seen as acceptable

ways of regulating social life15. We would like to think that the latter kinds of

societies are typical of primitive societies. But a moments reflection reveals that

this is a serious mistake. For the extent to which humans are able to justify the

use of violence in order to achieve particular political, ideological or religious

ends has never been so sophisticated as it is in the 21st century. And the extent

to which civil societies have collapsed under major historical forces into violence

has been nothing short of remarkable in recent years.

Ten historical changes influencing world and regional crime trends

The following factors, obviously interrelated, have been shown to have affected

crime rates throughout the world, or may be expected to do so in the foreseeable

future.

1. Civil str ife

Civil wars and insurrections resulting in killing, rapes and genocide have affected

the human security of peoples throughout the world and throughout history.

Whereas, before World War 2, most wars were wars fought between countries

(foreign wars) the majority of wars in the late 20th century and in the 21st century

are internal. The majority of civil wars reached their height in the 1980s, declined

somewhat in the 1990s, but have remained at close to double the number and

duration compared to the 1960s and 1970s.16The forms of this civil strife are

fairly standard. Their appearance is most commonly in conflict between ethnic

15Marongiu, Pietro and Graeme R. Newman (1987 ). Vengeance: The Fight Against Injustice. NJ:

Littlefield Adams.16 Staff (2003). The global menace of local strife The Economist, May 24, pp.23-25.

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groups, but their sustenance and underlying force is that of loot and pillage.

Many insurrections are begun or led by unpaid soldiers who depend on looting

villages for their livelihood. Where countries are blessed with rich resources,

these resources are typically converted into weapons of war, and by the common

soldier into the acquisition of personal items and food. Theft, rape, murder,

assault, robbery all these traditional crimes are part of civil strife.

2. Globalization

There are four significant aspects of globalization that have affected world crime

trends: (a) the globalization of mass media, (b) the expansion of world trade and

capital markets (first started in the building of the Suez Canal in 1858), (c) thetremendous advances in transportation of people and products around the world,

and (d) the revolution in communications technology. Much civil strife could not

be sustained without the help of multi-national organizations, particularly the

banking structure that makes it possible for money to be moved quickly and

efficiently around the world17. The globalization of mass media has exported

many highly effective techniques of propaganda and opinion influence. Much of

this can be traced back the USA of the 1960s and 1970s, when the riots and

demonstrations of the peace movement helped bring the Vietnam war to a halt.

Mass demonstrations staged for TV have been a common ploy ever since, and

applied expertly in the Middle East demonstrations against Israel, the US and

others. Graphic displays of the results of civil strife and war are commonly shown

on the mass media: mutilated bodies, explosions, shooting to death, to name just

a few. People throughout the world have experienced or seen these images as

much or more than those of the public executions common in many countries up

to and throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. Unless one lives in a closed

society, it is hard not to be affected by the constant presence of the mass media.

Finally, people and products can be moved efficiently around the world, making

17 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/FATDocs_en.htm.

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trade in people18, weapons19, and stolen goods much easier. Globalization has

produced wonderful opportunities for trade and commerce, but it has also

brought new opportunities for criminal activity, whether by rogue states with their

own agendas, or non-state organizations such as Al-queda.

3. The international ill icit drug trade

Many of the least developed countries have resorted to the cultivation of drugs

that can be sold on the illicit drug markets. The globalization of world trade and

new efficiencies in shipping and transportation, have served to increase the

opportunities for international drug trade considerably over the last twenty

years20

. Organized crime of various kinds promotes this trade, which hasbecome a prime area of activity in which organized crime and terrorist

organizations have joined forces, or at least worked together according to their

mutual interests. This occurred, of course, in Afghanistan where local and

international organized crime groups worked with the Taliban and Al-Queda21.

Collaboration between terrorists, organized crime and local farmers in producing

illicit drugs also occurs in many parts of Latin America22and shows no signs of

abating, in spite of bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce it.

4. The ready availability of weapons

The world seems awash in weapons of all kinds23. There is little doubt that the

ready availability of weapons made possible by extensive arms trading in Africa

18 Project on Trafficking in Women and Children. Johns Hopkins University.

http://www.protectionproject.org/main1.htm.19

Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/.20 United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC). (2003). Global Illicit Drug Trends.http://www.unodc.org/unodc/global_illicit_drug_trends.html.21 Perl, Raphael F. (2000). Taliban and the Drug Trade. US Department of State. CRS Report for

Congress, October. http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdf.22 Tate, Winifred (1999). Colombias Role in International Drug Industry. Foreign Policy in Focus.

Volume 4, Number 30. November (updated June 2001).23 Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.

http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/.

23
http://www.protectionproject.org/main1.htmhttp://www.smallarmssurvey.org/http://www.unodc.org/unodc/global_illicit_drug_trends.htmlhttp://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdfhttp://www.smallarmssurvey.org/http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdfhttp://www.unodc.org/unodc/global_illicit_drug_trends.htmlhttp://www.smallarmssurvey.org/http://www.protectionproject.org/main1.htm


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has fuelled African wars. In 1999, Central African countries were importing

weapons from Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, China and North Korea,

South Africa and Brazil. In some African countries an AK47 automatic rifle could

be bought for as little as $6.24Developing nations are the major recipients of

arms exports from the leading arms manufacturers which are (in order) USA ,

Russia and France. From 1994 to 2001, developing countries accounted for 68%

of all arms deliveries (and of these Middle Eastern states were the highest

importers). In 2001 the value of all arms transfer world wide was $26.4 billion.25

Although this amount was down substantially from previous years because of the

global recession, it nevertheless remains an incredibly lucrative business and

ensures the ready availability of weapons for those who want them (if they have

the cash).

5. The revolution in information technology

The revolution in communications technology has made it far easier for criminal

organizations to communicate and organize their activities. The ubiquitous cell

phone is seen in the hands of terrorists almost as commonly as is the AK47.

Laurent Kabila the infamous guerilla fighter who overthrew Mobutu Sese Seku

boasted that all he needed was $10,000 and a satellite phone to start a

revolution.26Cell phones are a small part in the revolution in communications

technology, which in turn is a small part of the broad revolution in information

technology. It is hardly a revolution but more an ongoing, relentless force for

innovation. It has created many avenues for terrorism: whether through easier

communication across borders, making it easier to organize terrorist cells in

many different countries, or the availability of information concerning a range of

terrorist activities, not to mention simple and sophisticated bomb making. It has

also created the opportunity for a new kind of terrorism: cyber-terrorism that can

24 BBC News (1999). World: Africa Light weapons trade 'fuels African wars'. Thursday, July 15.

Published at 14:17 GMT 15:17 UK: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/394786.stm.25

Grimmett, Richard F. (2002). Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1994-2001. USDepartment of State. Report for Congress.: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/12632.pdf.26 Staff (2003). The global menace of local strife The Economist, May 24, pp.23-25.

24
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taught in the many privately funded -- though in some instances with heavy

governmental subsidies -- religious schools that promote fundamentalism and

instrumental violence as part of their educational program. These schools

operate throughout the Middle East, including Israel28and in Southeast Asia.

7. Population transformation.

Perhaps the most fundamental change ongoing in societies today and few

regions of the world are exempt from it is the massive transformation of

populations in regions and countries. This is occurring as a result of three

significant facts: (a) the general decline in the birth rates of populations in the

developed world, with some countries such as Italy having a negative rate, (b)the extremely high proportion of populations in many north African countries that

are young, and (c) the tremendous movement of peoples from poorer countries

to richer countries through migration whether legal or illegal. In Europe, the

change has been swift and dramatic, though governments have been slow to

recognize it29. As far as crime is concerned, a couple of simple facts tell it all.

There are twice as many Albanians in Italian prisons as there are Albanians in

Albanian prisons and over 50% of inmates in prison in the Netherlands are

foreign born30. What these statistics say about the immigrants who are in prison

and about the governments who have put them there is another matter. We

simply point to this transformation as an indication that the radical changes in

population must affect crime trends both nationally and internationally. And

finally, the rising numbers of refugees that have resulted from civil strife, which in

turn is related to other serious problems such as the spread of diseases that

thrive as a result of that strife: malarial strains transported from one region of the

world to another, or HIV spread by terrorist soldiers add to the misery of migrants

28 Armstrong, Karen (2000). The Battle for God. NY: Alfred A. Knopf.29 Brenninkmeijer, Olivier (2001).Internal Security Beyond Borders: Public security in Europe and thenew challenges to state and society. Berlin: Peter Lang. Chapters 5 and 6.30

Newman, Graeme R., Joshua Freilich and Gregory Howard (2003). Exporting and ImportingCriminality: Incarceration of the Foreign Born.International Journal of Comparative and Applied

Criminal Justice. January.

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and the demands on governments to cope with these public health issues which,

it is now clear, interface with security and crime prevention issues (see following

chapter).

8. Rise of the surveillance society

All of the above historical processes combine to produce the conditions under

which the surveillance society societies based on the necessity to maintain

close control over their populations will rise and flourish. While there are many

aspects of the surveillance that concern critics of society, the one that is most

relevant to the production of crime trends is the increasing use of technologies

that allow for the tracking of persons and objects such as electronic tracking tags,geographic positioning systems, data-mining and tracking of spending patterns31.

All of these technologies are increasingly used by governments, private

individuals, corporations and businesses. There are many thousands of cameras

distributed throughout large cities of the world, monitoring traffic patterns,

watching individuals pay for items at a check-out, monitoring activity at major

shopping areas and crowded streets. The internet has also allowed for the

unique possibility of individuals, using fake names (usernames) to hang out in

any chat room of their choice and pretend to be someone they are not. The

scene is in fact one of mutual surveillance. It is not one so much of big

brother but of little brothers spying on each other32. This general ambience of

surveillance and the socialization of individuals into accepting it (since they

participate both as observers and as the observed) has laid the foundation for the

widespread use of surveillance technologies by governments and businesses.

This has made it possible for police departments to adopt surveillance

technologies to an extent that would have been unimaginable just ten years ago.

31Huang, Gregory T. (2003). Casting the wireless sensor net. Technology Review. July/August. 51-56.

32 Newman, Graeme R. and Ronald V. Clarke (2003). Superhighway Robbery: Preventing ecommerce

crime. London: Willan.

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9. Merging of policing with intelligence.

Although relatively common in some Asian police forces, the collection,

maintenance and use of data concerning all individuals, and tracking where they

go, is increasingly becoming a policing function. This has been fuelled by therecent application of mapping to identify hot spots of crime, and the discovery by

police departments that simply mapping crime data was not enough to allow the

development of effective police action. Needed also was information concerning

many other attributes of a geographic area, including highways, detailed traffic

and street information, power grids, railways, population density, shopping mall

locations, etc. all of this information not necessarily related to a particular

crime, but all of it needed in order to get an overall picture of a crime scene, and

more importantly to take steps in order to prevent crime from occurring. One can

easily recognize that this information is in fact the kind of information that those

working in intelligence collect and analyze. So here the sheer availability of the

technology has created the opportunity for police to spread their interests into the

realm of an area traditionally thought of as that of intelligence. Since 9/11 in the

USA the extreme concern created by possible terrorist acts has created an

ambience of fear and the acceptance by citizens for as much surveillance and

control as needed to prevent another 9/11 even though there are continuing

public debates concerning excessive use of surveillance by the federal

government.

10. The merging of pol itical with traditional crime.

Not only is policing merging with intelligence, but also political crime is merging

with traditional crime, which of course feeds back into the merging of policing

with intelligence as the police are pressured more and more by governments to

respond to terrorism as well as perform their other traditional policing functions.

As we have already noted, much civil strife is in fact perpetrated by individuals

who act and behave like violent criminals. The results are the same, if not far

more serious in consequences for victims. Furthermore, the evidence for the

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merging of terrorism with organized crime whether in the realm of drug dealing,

people smuggling, or terrorism claiming political or religious justifications is now

clear. Individuals move between these activities easily. For example, J onas

Savimbi, Angola guerilla leader amassed a multi billion dollar fortune selling

alluvial diamonds and ivory stolen by his men. As some have suggested,

rebellion in many instances has become a business venture33. Terrorist groups

use traditional organized crime techniques such as kidnapping and extortion to

raise money for weapons. The cultivation and sale of drugs is used by organized

crime to raise much needed cash for weapons that are then used to topple

governments not friendly towards their drug trade34. Thus, just as organized

crime has become part of the fabric of many societies developed and

developing alike -- terrorism has also blended into organized crime and has in

some countries become routinized, providing long term career opportunities for

young men who have little prospect of doing anything else with their lives.

These historical forces, viewed negatively (creating opportunities for violence and

crime) feed a sense of powerlessness of each successive generation. But

viewed positively, the incredible progress in technology and globalization has

brought peoples of the world closer together than ever before. The opportunities

to help each other have never been so great, and the opportunities to prevent

and reduce crime are greater now than any other time in human history. The

following chapter outlines an approach to make the best of these opportunities.

33 Staff (2003). The global menace of local strife The Economist, May 24, pp.23-25.34 RFE/RL Organized Crime and Terrorism Watch: http://www.rferl.org/corruptionwatch/.

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APPENDIX

SUPPORTING DATA FOR HOMICIDE GRAPHS (FIGURES 1-4)

Homicide Rates by Year and Region*

WORLD

AFRICA

ASIA LATIN CEEUR WESTEUR

NEWWORLD

INDUST-RIAL

DEVELOP-ING

1959 11.04 8.53 6.31 177.09 . 12.39 1.94 9.53 11.941960 9.14 5.41 5.68 116.19 . 11.33 4.88 7.55 10.291961 5.35 7.81 5.67 7.67 . 2.93 4.58 3.49 6.411962 5.22 6.98 5.60 10.52 . 2.69 1.95 2.54 6.281963 5.23 6.61 5.62 10.26 . 2.58 1.87 2.37 6.331964 5.43 7.65 5.91 12.93 . 2.30 1.93 2.26 6.821965 4.89 4.23 5.85 4.90 . 2.28 2.19 2.21 6.051966 5.22 6.98 5.88 5.21 . 2.15 2.19 2.09 6.50

1967 5.61 4.55 6.24 25.71 . 2.45 2.03 2.25 6.951968 5.62 4.87 6.13 28.17 . 2.50 2.26 2.31 6.891969 5.72 4.80 6.53 13.52 . 2.53 2.55 2.32 7.311970 6.02 4.60 6.77 16.01 . 2.69 3.01 2.43 7.671971 4.63 7.03 4.67 5.19 1.59 2.82 3.23 2.47 5.611972 4.55 7.83 3.82 5.71 2.20 3.04 . 2.59 6.441973 3.70 4.51 3.66 7.53 . 2.93 3.42 2.53 4.241974 3.33 5.18 3.09 5.93 . 3.06 2.52 2.56 3.701975 10.34 46.59 3.25 5.19 . 3.17 2.66 2.58 26.581976 11.74 45.90 4.61 32.23 . 3.11 2.79 2.53 30.161977 5.04 3.89 4.41 9.53 . 3.40 8.70 4.61 5.77

1978 3.51 7.61 3.57 11.33 . 2.81 2.48 2.27 4.751979 4.09 3.75 3.12 7.13 3.45 3.17 9.15 4.91 3.601980 4.45 3.97 3.63 5.11 . 3.53 9.49 5.16 4.051981 5.24 16.44 5.46 5.01 . 3.93 4.88 3.10 7.901982 3.32 6.66 1.79 5.04 . 3.82 5.09 3.22 3.451983 5.44 4.15 5.14 10.79 3.75 4.08 7.72 4.75 5.801984 5.21 5.70 4.95 4.09 3.72 4.33 7.46 4.84 5.371985 5.10 5.05 4.88 6.31 3.50 3.58 7.47 4.49 5.421986 4.17 5.68 3.21 6.24 5.00 3.48 8.04 4.64 3.961987 5.88 4.80 6.47 6.88 3.80 3.26 7.88 4.45 7.231988 4.43 8.84 3.37 6.69 3.80 3.51 7.91 4.58 4.361989 4.44 3.89 3.43 8.27 6.62 3.83 8.41 5.37 3.911990 4.43 4.42 3.05 8.31 7.22 4.41 8.73 5.83 3.621991 5.81 4.17 3.71 25.10 7.53 4.73 9.04 6.15 5.601992 5.62 5.39 2.62 7.13 10.65 5.04 9.24 6.92 4.021993 4.46 6.33 2.15 9.98 13.12 5.37 9.12 7.77 2.701994 35.86 605.45 .92 13.50 13.97 5.09 8.51 7.69 51.211995 8.70 20.02 2.21 31.34 13.79 4.89 7.60 7.54 10.421996 7.41 27.70 2.20 21.65 13.15 4.65 6.90 7.07 7.59

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WORLD

AFRICA

ASIA LATIN CEEUR WESTEUR

NEWWORLD

INDUST-RIAL

DEVELOP-ING

1997 6.54 28.91 3.03 20.24 13.39 3.89 6.38 6.64 6.501998 10.49 24.19 3.70 23.98 12.73 4.01 4.00 6.49 13.221999 8.89 25.35 2.62 11.52 13.89 3.09 3.88 7.04 10.17

2000 8.26 6.16 3.67 33.43 14.12 2.88 5.31 6.55 11.232001 10.62 46.19 2.26 25.47 20.78 3.15 5.46 6.45 31.63Total 43 43 43 43 22 43 42 43 43Mean 6.7480 24.9949 4.2056 18.93038.7170 3.8335 5.3531 4.5386 9.0605Median

5.3538 6.3292 3.7107 9.9782 7.3716 3.2582 4.9840 4.5781 6.4139

* Numbers in red are estimates.

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Countries report ing homicide from 1959-2001

CASESIncluded Excluded Total

Year N PercentN Percent N Percent1959 41 20.8% 156 79.2% 197 100.0%1960 51 25.9% 146 74.1% 197 100.0%1961 56 28.4% 141 71.6% 197 100.0%1962 58 29.4% 139 70.6% 197 100.0%1963 54 27.4% 143 72.6% 197 100.0%1964 59 29.9% 138 70.1% 197 100.0%1965 63 32.0% 134 68.0% 197 100.0%1966 67 34.0% 130 66.0% 197 100.0%1967 68 34.5% 129 65.5% 197 100.0%1968 72 36.5% 125 63.5% 197 100.0%

1969 72 36.5% 125 63.5% 197 100.0%1970 69 35.0% 128 65.0% 197 100.0%1971 65 33.0% 132 67.0% 197 100.0%1972 60 30.5% 137 69.5% 197 100.0%1973 56 28.4% 141 71.6% 197 100.0%1974 53 26.9% 144 73.1% 197 100.0%1975 39 19.8% 158 80.2% 197 100.0%1976 38 19.3% 159 80.7% 197 100.0%1977 56 28.4% 141 71.6% 197 100.0%1978 37 18.8% 160 81.2% 197 100.0%1979 69 35.0% 128 65.0% 197 100.0%

1980 63 32.0% 134 68.0% 197 100.0%1981 45 22.8% 152 77.2% 197 100.0%1982 40 20.3% 157 79.7% 197 100.0%1983 88 44.7% 109 55.3% 197 100.0%1984 86 43.7% 111 56.3% 197 100.0%1985 92 46.7% 105 53.3% 197 100.0%1986 89 45.2% 108 54.8% 197 100.0%1987 83 42.1% 114 57.9% 197 100.0%1988 76 38.6% 121 61.4% 197 100.0%1989 91 46.2% 106 53.8% 197 100.0%1990 89 45.2% 108 54.8% 197 100.0%1991 103 52.3% 94 47.7% 197 100.0%1992 91 46.2% 106 53.8% 197 100.0%1993 84 42.6% 113 57.4% 197 100.0%1994 98 49.7% 99 50.3% 197 100.0%1995 93 47.2% 104 52.8% 197 100.0%1996 112 56.9% 85 43.1% 197 100.0%1997 117 59.4% 80 40.6% 197 100.0%1998 114 57.9% 83 42.1% 197 100.0%

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1999 89 45.2% 108 54.8% 197 100.0%2000 65 33.0% 132 67.0% 197 100.0%2001 32 16.2% 165 83.8% 197 100.0%

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SUPPORTING DATA FOR RAPE GRAPHS (FIGURES 5-9)

Rape Rates by Year and Region

WORLD

AFRICA

ASIA LATIN CEEUR

WESTEUR

NEWWORLD

INDUST-RIAL

DEVELOP-ING

1977 6.27 7.08 1.59 12.96 . 4.23 27.37 11.651.75

1978 3.81 8.13 2.55 16.72 . 4.90 6.58 4.363.03

1979 6.33 4.58 1.34 11.11 . 4.84 32.92 14.131.81

1980 6.89 4.83 1.41 10.67 4.38 5.27 32.17 14.882.03

1981 4.73 13.51 2.75 9.23 . 5.01 12.45 5.22 3.991982 4.02 3.79 1.65 8.37 . 4.93 10.20 4.50

3.321983 6.27 4.92 1.58 6.55 5.82 5.16 32.09 13.55

2.191984 6.57 5.13 1.53 6.26 6.11 6.36 34.06 15.96

2.101985 6.41 3.33 1.51 5.38 5.60 6.00 34.94 15.67

1.921986 7.19 4.49 3.36 5.40 5.80 6.07 35.91 16.04

3.621987 9.24 2.65 2.20 5.60 4.60 6.08 37.40 16.242.86

1988 6.84 2.59 2.82 8.40 4.10 6.52 37.60 16.243.04

1989 7.13 3.09 2.98 10.57 6.98 7.02 38.10 13.463.37

1990 8.59 3.67 3.36 5.58 7.26 7.23 49.16 16.533.67

1991 8.05 3.50 1.27 5.91 7.51 7.53 50.61 18.281.99

1992 10.29 3.98 1.66 6.73 7.35 7.70 42.59 15.602.85

1993 7.43 4.20 3.10 9.04 7.59 8.04 40.64 15.383.31

1994 9.08 46.52 3.10 8.72 7.16 8.32 39.16 15.395.91

1995 11.91 32.50 1.75 5.81 6.66 8.63 37.03 14.059.00

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1996 11.00 23.46 1.70 12.48 4.79 8.54 36.08 14.298.11

1997 8.63 34.16 1.72 7.99 5.54 9.75 35.69 13.515.99

1998 5.77 4.41 2.38 8.82 5.17 10.27 . 6.37

5.221999 7.16 26.60 1.43 5.16 5.25 8.68 . 5.638.33

2000 9.21 32.10 2.37 8.06 5.14 10.42 . 6.4212.59

2001 13.01 10.54 2.98 9.16 5.48 14.58 31.77 15.987.29

Total 25 25 25 25 20 25 22 25 25Mean 7.6726 11.7503 2.164

18.4272 5.913

67.2843 33.3870 12.7730

4.3714Media

n

7.1584 4.8314 1.753

9

8.3693 5.700

0

7.0236 35.8034 14.2909

3.3238

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Countr ies Reporting Rape Rates from 1977 to 2001

CasesIncluded Excluded Total

N Percent N Percent N Percent1977 51 25.5% 149 74.5% 200 100.0%1978 37 18.5% 163 81.5% 200 100.0%1979 59 29.5% 141 70.5% 200 100.0%1980 60 30.0% 140 70.0% 200 100.0%1981 39 19.5% 161 80.5% 200 100.0%1982 37 18.5% 163 81.5% 200 100.0%1983 79 39.5% 121 60.5% 200 100.0%1984 77 38.5% 123 61.5% 200 100.0%1985 86 43.0% 114 57.0% 200 100.0%1986 84 42.0% 116 58.0% 200 100.0%

1987 71 35.5% 129 64.5% 200 100.0%1988 70 35.0% 130 65.0% 200 100.0%1989 80 40.0% 120 60.0% 200 100.0%1990 82 41.0% 118 59.0% 200 100.0%1991 94 47.0% 106 53.0% 200 100.0%1992 83 41.5% 117 58.5% 200 100.0%1993 74 37.0% 126 63.0% 200 100.0%1994 82 41.0% 118 59.0% 200 100.0%1995 88 44.0% 112 56.0% 200 100.0%1996 104 52.0% 96 48.0% 200 100.0%1997 105 52.5% 95 47.5% 200 100.0%

1998 100 50.0% 100 50.0% 200 100.0%1999 81 40.5% 119 59.5% 200 100.0%2000 64 32.0% 136 68.0% 200 100.0%2001 36 18.0% 164 82.0% 200 100.0%

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Bahamas, Bermuda,Bulgaria, Cameroon,Cayman, Chile, Columbia,Cote Divoire, Denmark,Fiji, France, Gabon,

Germany, Hong Kong,Hungry, India, Italy,Kiribati, Libya, Macao,Maldives, Malta,Myanmar, Netherlands,Peru, Philippines,Portugal, Saint Vincentand the Grenadines,Senegal, Seychelles,Singapore, Swaziland,Switzerland, Syria,

Thailand, Turks andCaicos, Uganda, Englandand Wales, NorthernIreland, USA, Zimbabwe.

Brunei, Burundi,Cayman, China, Korea,Czechoslovakia,Denmark, Djibouti,Dominica, Spain, USA,

Greece, Hong Kong,Hungry, Indonesia,Liechtenstein,Luxembourg, Maldives,Malta, Mauritius,Monaco, Mongolia,Myanmar, NewZealand, Peru, Qatar,Russian Federation,Samoa, Slovenia, Syria,Ukraine, Venezuela,

Lithuania, Macao

*Countries in red also reported increases in rape

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CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES

DevelopingCountries

Aden, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua& Barbuda , Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain,

Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bolivia,Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Solomon, West Indies, Brunei,Burkina, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cayman,Central Africa, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Columbia,Congo, Costa Rica, Cote Divoire, Croatia, Cyprus,Dahomey, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic,Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon,Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea,Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran,Iraq, Ivory Coast, J amaica, J ordan, Kenya, Khmer, Kiribati,Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein,

Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaya, Malawi,Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico,Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua,Niger, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Oman,Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru,Philippine, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts, SaintLucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome& Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, SierraLeone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Surinam,Swaziland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,

Tonga, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and Caicos,Uganda, Uruguay, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan,Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia,Zimbabwe, British Virgin Islands,* Guiana*

IndustrialCountries

Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria,Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Hong Kong,Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary,Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, J apan, Kazakhstan, Korea,Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova,Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, SlovakRepublic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Englandand Wales, Scotland, North Ireland, USA, USSR

Note: * only included in the rape analysis, but not in the homicide analysis

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Region CountriesAfrica Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina, Burundi,

Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Congo, Cote Divoire,

Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana,Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya,Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco,Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome& Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia,Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Asia Aden, United Arab Emirates, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China,Cyprus, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, J apan, Iran,Iraq, J ordan, Khmer, Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon,

Macao, Malaya, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal,Oman, Pakistan, Philippine, Qatar, Saudi Arab, Singapore,Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen

Latin Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados,Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman, Chile, Columbia, CostaRica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, J amaica,Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico,Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Surinam, Trinidad,Turks and Caicos, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guiana*

Central and

Eastern Europe

Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia,

Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania,Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, RussianFederation, Slovenia, Ukraine, USSR, Yugoslavia

Western Europe Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland,Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands,Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Englandand Wales, Scotland, North Ireland

New World Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USANote: * only included in the rape analysis, but not in the homicide analysis

graeme r. newman human security: a world view of homicide and rape

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