grassroots biosecurity initiativesfile/bwc_msp_2008-presentation-maurer.pdf · december 3, 2008....
TRANSCRIPT
Grassroots Grassroots BiosecurityBiosecurity Initiatives: Initiatives: A New Tool for Synthetic Biology PolicyA New Tool for Synthetic Biology Policy
Stephen M. MaurerGoldman School of Public PolicyUniversity of California at [email protected]
Biological Weapons Convention2008 Meeting of States PartiesDecember 3, 2008
Why Would We Want a Community-Level Initiative?An Historically Plausible Idea.
Physics Today (Feb. 1976)
A Contemporary Example: Enforcing Minimum Screening Standards
The Problem: Global MarketsPowerful Commercial Tools.Beyond Regulation and
Treaties?
The Solution: Global Markets?!Not “Stakeholders” and
“Dialogue.”Price Signals
and Standards.New Scientist (Nov. 12, 2005)
Our Experiment: Synthetic BiologyBerkeley, Munich and Afterward.
A Conventional Policy Analysis
How Does Synthetic Biology Add to the BW Risk?Resurrecting Controlled/Extinct PathogensTraditional Engineered ThreatsAdvanced/Emerging Threats
“Technical Solutions for Biosecurityin Synthetic Biology” (April 2, 2008)http://www.ia-sb.eu/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/iasb_report_biosecurity_syntheticbiology.pdf
Designing Community-Level Responses (I)
Resurrecting Controlled/Extinct Pathogens
Goal: Uniform, Strong Screening Standards
Designing Community-Level Responses (I)
Analysis:No Company (Country) Loses Business.
Good News: Incentives to Defect are Weak.
But: Lack of Focal Point, Incentives to Defect.
Establishing and Stabilizing a Standard.
Designing Community-Level Responses (I)
Tactics:Code of Conduct
Seal of Approval
(Grant restrictions, Consumer pledge?)
Open Blackwatch
The BCW Can Help.
Designing Community-Level Responses (II)
Traditional Engineered Threats:Goal:
Improved Screening Technology.Analysis:
Better Use of Existing Screening Effort.Tactics:
Sharing Virulence Data (ViREP)SafeguardOpen Blackwatch (again)?
Designing Community-Level Responses (III)
Advanced/Emerging Threats:Goal:
Learn, Develop, and Apply Principles.Analysis:
Biosecurity is an Empirical DisciplineTactics:
PortalInformation Sharing: Article and Database
http://gsppi.berkeley.edu/EoC/uc-berkeley-synthetic-biology-security-program
The Lessons So Far…
A New and Sometimes Powerful Lever
Academic and Commercial Communities Have Global Reach.
Solutions Cross National BordersHarmonization is Automatic
Academic and Commercial Communities are NimbleA Fast Way to Get Things Done
Academic and Commercial Communities are Flexible
Biosecurity is an Experimental DisciplineWe Must Be Able to Try and Fail and Try Again
The Lessons So Far, ctd…
Diplomacy vs. Markets – A False ChoiceIs It Enough?
Nature (Sept. 25, 2008)
Next Steps
Implementing the Munich AgendaNext Talk: Code of Conduct
An Opportunity for this meetingAdvanced ProjectsLet’s [email protected]
Grassroots Grassroots BiosecurityBiosecurity Initiatives: Initiatives: A New Tool for Synthetic Biology PolicyA New Tool for Synthetic Biology Policy
Stephen M. MaurerGoldman School of Public PolicyUniversity of California at [email protected]
Biological Weapons Convention2008 Meeting of States PartiesDecember 3, 2008