greeceintheeuropeanunion - video.minpress.grvideo.minpress.gr/€¦ · aboutgreece 147...

about GREECE 145

GREECE IN THE EUROPEAN UNIONA Political / Institutional Balance Sheet

byMichael Tsinisizelis

Professor, University of Athens

This balance sheet finds the EU in themidst of yet another seriousand prolonged crisis. Rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by Franceand the Netherlands inMay-June 2004meant that the long overduereform of the working of its institutions is still pending with all thenegative consequences associatedwith that. The situation currentlyseems so delicate that no easy way forward can be foreseen. Nev-ertheless a number of different scenarios have appeared by variousactors although none seems to be gaining the necessarymomentumto produce the necessary consensus. The so called “reflection period”seems to be de facto extended up to 2009, the year of the next elec-tions for the European Parliament. Thingshave changed considerablysince the last publication of the volume at hand. The EU has already27members and a number of countries in theWestern Balkans arein a process of rapprochementwith the EU. Although the further en-largement of the EU does not seem to be a popular choice, it alsonecessitates a further treaty reform given that the Treaty of Nice cur-rently in force did not anticipatemore than 27members. Neverthe-less, Greece is one of the eighteen member states that havealready ratified the Constitutional Treaty.

about GREECE146

GREECE and the WORLD

In attempting to present a balancesheet on the relations between amember state and the EEC, weusually have to come to termswith an immense amount of rele-vant information. Books, mono-graphs and research theses havebeen and are being produced at animpressive rate throughout andoutside the European Union. Thisholds equally true for the relationsbetween Greece and the EEC.

Herewe are concernedwith the po-litical / institutional affects ofmembership and in European pol-icy terms with aspects of the do-mestic foundations of the Greekpolicies vis-a-vis Europe. In fact, weare concerned in this chapter withan outline of themain effects of EUmembership upon the operation ofthe Greek political institutions.

A HISTORICAL OUTLINEGreecewas the first country to signan Association Agreement withthe EEC as early as 1961 (appliedfor in 1958, in force since 1962).The “Athens Agreement” was aim-ing at the accession of Greeceinto the EEC within 22 years. TheAgreement was partly frozen forseven years (1967-1974), at the ini-tiative of the Commission of theEEC, (nowadays the EuropeanCommission) as a reaction to themilitary regime that assumed pow-er in Athens in 1967 (April, 21) andre-entered into force on the restora-tion of a liberal parliamentaryregime in 1974. Almost immediate-ly (as a result of the Cyprus im-broglio and of a deepening eco-nomic crisis that was beginning toshow its teeth) theNewDemocracyGovernment then in power underK. Karamanlis, crowning its novel

political project of liberal bourgeois(Mavrogordatos 1984), applied forfull membership to the EEC inearly 1975. Greece joined the EEC,as its tenth member, in 1981.

The collapse of themilitary regimein 1974, the “Metapolitefsis”, hashad important consequences forthe political system of the country.It is probably fair to suggest thatthis was not far short of a politicalrevolution on a number of counts.The population became consciousof the virtues of RepresentativeParliamentary Government, sec-ondly, in association with the for-mer, the Greek Communist Partybecame legal after almost 30 years(since 1947). Thirdly, the anticom-munist ideology, a pillar of the pre-coup state was driven ad absur-dum, forthly, in completion of the“liquidation of the past image” pol-icy pursued by the Government theday the monarchy was brought toan end through the December1974 free and fair referendum.Fifth, the composition and struc-ture of the political personnelchanged radically.

The issue of EECmembership wasentangled in the general back-ground of xenophobia that owes itsexistence to the history of themodern Greek state -that was revi-talised and expanded in socialterms in 1974- due to British andNATO inaction to prevent or reversethe Turkish invasion of Cyprus,their alleged action to prevent theGreekarmy from landing on the is-land and on top of the alleged roleand support of the USAwith regardto the military regime. For, a pop-ulation accustomed to real or per-ceived threats to its national in-tegrity throughout the years of its

about GREECE 147


existence as an independent stateunder International Law, wouldbe easily drawn by arguments ofthe kind. Andreas Papandreou'sPASOKskillfullymanaged to utiliseupon this element and in thespace of seven years managed tocapture 48% of the vote and ahandsomemajority in Parliamentin the 1981 elections (actually,PASOK in three consecutive elec-tions in 1974, 1977 and in 1981 al-most doubled its share of the voteeach time!). The irony of historyhad brought to power a politicalparty that was elected on a ticketto withdraw from the EEC, at thetime that Greece was becoming afull member! Ironically enough,the government of the day whichmanaged the accession of thecountry in the EEC, a fact which bynow is regarded as themost signif-icant post World War II improve-ment in the status of the country

in the international system, lost theelections held immediately afteraccession. Contemporary Euro-pean history abounds with suchironies starting from the 1946British General elections.

To be fair to the anti EEC forces,however, the EEC at the time rep-resented no more than a merecustomsunionwith a few commonpolicies, hit by the consecutive en-ergy crises of the ’70s and be-trothed in fierce debates internallyover budgetary contributions. TheEMS in 1979 was the more impor-tant institutional development ofthe period but this, to reinforce thepoint, was arranged outside theTreaty frameworkat the time. To befair, there was noway for PASOKorany of the parties of the “Left”, oranybody else for that matter thatcould have foreseen the dramaticsystemic changes of the 1989 Eu-

Signing the Treaty of Greece’s Accession to the E.E.C. (1979)

about GREECE148


ropean annus mirabilis or thosethat began in the EEC a few yearslater with the introduction of theSingle European Act (SEA) –1987–and the consecutive Treatychanges in the ’90s. On top of thatPASOK came to power with a clearsocial agenda as its top prioritywhich was long overdue in Greecebut not easily reconciled with theconditions of the EuropeanSystemof Cooperation - in spite of the ex-istence of all sorts of non tariff bar-riers to trade not only betweenGreece and the rest of the EEC butalso in intra-EEC trade.Mitterand’sFrance and Papandreou’s Greecewere singled out in the literatureas examples of the limitations ofeconomic interdependence on au-tonomous policy making.

On top of that as Fatouros (1992)pointed out that the issue of theentry of the country into the EECbecame part in the old cleavagebetween “westernizers” and “tra-ditionalists”. This cleavage drawsits existence in the years before theindependence of the modernGreek state in 1831. This cleavagerefers to the age-old question as towhether Greece belongs to the“East” or to the “West”. The “West-ernizes” (modernizers) historicallyidentified, grosso modo, with therational inquiry and the politicalliberalism of the Continent, asometimes cosmopolitan view ofthe world, whereas the “Eastern-ers” (traditionalists) were repre-sented chiefly by the OrthodoxChurch advocating the defenseof the status quo, e.g. religion, tra-dition and social hierarchy. A clearindication that this cleavage isstill active, reminiscent and echo-ing perhaps of the early, but stillactive, religious cleavages in Eu-

rope, was given by the recent con-troversy over religious identifica-tion in the Identity Cards betweenthe state and the churchwhich hastormented the country for almostfourteen months after the 2000elections. On these grounds thechallenge facing the country uponentry into the EEC in 1981 was asValinakis (1994) pointed out, howto bridge the gap between its po-litical, economic and cultural iden-tity as a western European nationwith its East European location andtraditions. This rather schizo-phrenic situation probably is agood explanatory variable ofmuchof the problems that the countryfaced inside the EEC/EU.

This, inter alia, may be due to thefact that the country joined theCommunity on political rather thaneconomic grounds. Certainly, itseems, the charismatic authorityand consummate statesmanshipof K.Karamanlis, PrimeMinister atthe time, has been instrumental tothe success of the Greek applica-tion, as much as it was a result ofthe influence of the Franco (D'Es-taing) - German (Schmidt) ententein the EEC.

In Greek eyes, the new (as from1974) situation in the neighbor-hood of the country necessitatedadditional structures of support inits international relations In internalpolitical terms the EECwas seen as(a) the additional support requiredfor the protection of the new andfragile liberal Parliamentary regime,and (b) the political and economiccontext which would facilitate theeconomic development of thecountry. The strategy of theGovern-ment of the day was based on atheory of induced modernization,

about GREECE 149


e.g. that the country as a wholewould have to adjust to this newandmuch more competitive envi-ronment or else. In short, “Right”vs. “Left”, “East” vs. “West” (andpossibly “Third World” vs. “East”and “West”), these cleavages (andtheir by-products) initiallymarkedthe development of the Greco-EECrelations.

The first PASOK EEC years (1981-1989) went through a number ofphases. The impassioned anti-EEC stance of the Party during itsopposition years was to a large ex-tent responsible for a good part ofthe problems that the countryfaced inside the EEC. For, if any-thing this posture educated ac-cordingly the grassroots andmoreimportantly the cadre of the party,that is to say the very people thatwere responsible for the creationand implementation of Govern-ment policies both in Greece aswell as in the EEC institutions.The second phase of the PASOKat-titudewasmarkedwith the “mem-orandum to the EEC” of March1982 whose main aim has beenthe increase in funding of theGreekeconomyby the EEC, and thechange was completed with thesupport offered to the Single Euro-pean Act (S.E.A.) probably themost important liberal project inthe history of the EEC/EU.

The 1989 annusmirabilis in Europeand internal developments inGreece led to a significant changein PASOK’s attitude vis- a-vis theEEC. The collapse of the former So-viet block and the “Europa offen-heit” policies of the formerWarsawPact countries seeking rapproche-ment with all western dominatedinternational institutions -from

NATO to the OECD- made the EECa desirable reality. The anti-impe-rialist / anti-western attitude in PA-SOK tumbled down although resur-faces in times of crises such as therecent Yugoslav and Gulf ones, ina large chunk of the party and thesociety, a fact that the leadershipof that party must take into ac-count. Thismay be an explanatoryfactor of the reasons of the Greekinsecurity feelings during the re-cent Balkan bewilderment overthe collapse of the Yugoslav feder-ation and its still pending issues.This dormant legacy of the past isstill part of the “zero point energy”political culture of the country.

The 1989 - 1990 political criseswith the formation of three consec-utive ecumenical governmentsended with PASOK loosing the1990 elections after a decade inpower and returning to oppositionuntil the premature downfall of theNew Democracy Government ofthe day. At the 1994 elections PA-SOK returned to power. In 1996 A.Papandreou, the founder of PASOKand Prime Minister of the countrydied, and K.Simitis was elected asparty leader and consequently asthe newP.M. The election ofSimitisto the leadership of the party sig-nified a radical change to the pro-file of PASOK. The “Allagi”(Change) slogan used during thePapandreou years acquired astrong modernizing dimension,which was exemplified by a num-ber of institutional changes re-garding Education (Metarithmisi)and the Local Authorities (Kapodis-trias Program) as well as changesat the level of economic policymaking. The Simitis Governmenthelped to change the attitude ofthe country vis- a-vis Europe. The

about GREECE150


primary objective of the Govern-ment of the day evolved aroundthe entry of the country in theEconomic and Monetary Unionand the satisfaction of the Maas-tricht criteria, the change of the“blacksheep” image of the countryin the EU.

The new Government of the coun-try after the 2004 general electionsunder K.Karamanlis had the ardu-ous task to organize the 2004Olympic Games and conclude itsmany overdue constructions(roads, the Olympic Stadium etc.)which naturally became its topand only priority for the best partof that year.

The new Government actively pur-sued the conclusion of the entrynegotiations in the EU of Bulgariaand Romania, continuing the poli-cies of its predecessors and veri-fying the existence of a strategicconsensus on European Affairs.For, the country is now borderingwith other countries of the EU of-fering important developmentalpossibilities for some of its less de-veloped regions in the north. Ontop of that these countries are ofgreat economic significance giventhe important investments by4,700 Greek companies andbanks with total investments ofover 14 billion Euros.

On the other Balkan fronts the sit-uation appears to bemore compli-cated as the Kossovo and Fyrom is-sues are in need of further discus-sions. Both issues are of obviousimportance for the stability of theregion although the recent renam-ing of the Petrovats airport toAlexander the Great!!! directlycontravenes the 1995 interim

agreement between the two sidesin the UN. Similarly the UN propos-als on the future of this Serbregion does not seem to acquirethe agreement of both sides.

PARLIAMENT, STATE ANDPUBLIC ADMINISTRATIONThe literature on the democraticdeficit in the EU has blown out ofproportion during recent years.This has been a structural problemof the EEC on account of the logicof the neofunctionalist CommunityMethod and its legal guaranteesthat has helped to shape the inte-gration process by affording roles,powers and capabilities to theEuropean Institutions and espe-cially the European Commission, inthe policymaking process. This on-going debate though hashelped tobring to a wider attention issuescentral to parliamentary democra-cies as those related to the legit-imization of the policy processes,or those that are related with thevery physiognomy of the EuropeanSystem of Cooperation and its fu-ture directions.

It is probably fair to suggest that theoverall influence of the Parliamentin foreign policy formulation ismarginal. This is true in the case ofthe European Policy of Greece,which is regarded, technically atleast, aspart of the international re-lations of the country in spite of theoccasional declarations to the con-trary by various influential individ-uals inside or outside themain po-litical parties. This attitude is grad-ually altered given the evolution ofthe EU systembut it is fairly early toconcludeon the implicationsor theextent of such a change. Themostimportant function that the 1975

about GREECE 151


and the 2000 constitutions recog-nise in the field of foreign policy forthe Parliament is the ratification ofinternational treaties, on the countprovided for by the new art.36para.2.

The position of the country in theEuropeanSystemof Cooperation isusually being discussed in the Par-liament on the occasion of moregeneral debateson “the state of thecountry” between party politicalleaders, or on the eve ofmajor Eu-ropean Councils, a practicemostlyused duringmore recent years dueto the rapid developments in theEEC since the mid ’80s.

The role of the GreekParliament inthe case of the incorporation ofEEC legislation isminimal. IndeedLaw945/1979, bywhich the Acces-sion Treaty was ratified, stipulates

that the final responsibility for theincorporation of the EEC legislationin the Greek Legal order rests withthe Executive of the country on thebasis of the general authorisationof art.43 Para 4 of the 1975 consti-tution, e.g. through PresidentialDecrees. Earlier, from the periodbetween 1975-1979, during thissecond phase of the Associationyears, the Parliament has been in-volved four times in legislation ofrelevance to the EEC. For example,once in the Community and in thespace of nine years (1983-1993)only 31(!) laws were ratified byParliament. This number includesalso all themajor pieces of EEC leg-islation such as the AccessionTreaty, the S.E.A, and the Treaty onEuropean Union.

Parliamentary committees for thescrutiny of Community Legislation

The celebration for the 25 years of Greece as a member of the E.U.

about GREECE152


(the likes for ex. the House ofLords Select Committee on Euro-pean Integration) or for the closestpossible involvement in EECpolicymaking of the Parliamentary insti-tutions (Folketing) are known forquite some time in the EEC andtheir cases are well documented.The Greek Parliamentary commit-tee on European Integration is amixed committee consisting of 24MPs (12) andMEPs (12) and one ofthe vice chairmen of the House asthe chairman of the committee(Total 25). It was set up by a deci-sion of the Chair of the House onthe 13th of June 1990. Both MPsand MEPs are voting membersand are chosen on the basis of theelectoral strength of their partiesat both the National and the Euro-pean Parliaments although theelectoral system is not the same inboth instances.

Anastopoulos (1993), Makridim-itris-Passas (1992) and Spanou(2001) discussed the problemsthat the Greek Public Administra-tion faces within the EEC.Hellinocentrism, defensive atti-tudes, a narrow financial approachas well as inflexibility are some ofitsmajor shortcomings. As a resultthe credibility of the Administrationin the EEC is seriously impeded.Passas (1993) points out that in or-ganisational terms themain prob-lem seems to lay in the poor coor-dination between the verticallyorganised units, the understaffingof those units and the widemobil-ity of personnel mainly throughparty political activity.

As a result of EECmembership thestyle of policymaking has becomemore open involving experts fromother Departments/ Ministries as

well as independent experts.Ioakimides (2001) talks about the“de-externalisation of foreign pol-icy …in the sense that many ‘out-siders’ seek to influence foreignpolicy outcomes”.

Internally the responsibility forEuropean issues was given to theMinistry of the National Economyand formost of the time to theSOE–The Council of Economic Advis-ers–, a unit of strategic importancewithin theMinistry of the NationalEconomy, both of which at thetime under Minister Arsenis (aswas previously the case underMinister Manos and under thelate Minister Genimatas, MinisterPapantoniou and the currentMin-ister Alogoskoufis) had almostabsolute authority on issues ofeconomic policy broadly con-ceived, following a politics/ eco-nomics dichotomy. Graduallythough under the influence of cer-tain “economism” in the percep-tions of the implications of theSin-gle European Act and of the Treatyon European Union, but also dueto the poor comparative economicperformance of the country, theMinistry of National Economy hasacquired the best part of the re-sponsibility for European Affairs.This process of power reallocationbetween the various Ministriesbecame all the more obvious dur-ing the term of the previous Gov-ernment (1996-2000) given thevery difficult yet unprecedentlysuccessful effort to join the thirdstage of the EMU and satisfy theMaastricht criteria - a task consid-ered at the time asmission impos-sible. Reduction of Public debt, re-duction of the Public deficit, low-ering of the interest rates andmonetary and fiscal stability -

about GREECE 153


macroeconomic stabilisation- onthe basis of the 1993 and 1994convergence programs -all thesepushed the Ministry of NationalEconomyat the centre of the game.Of course this has been a sourceof tension between the variousMinistries, which is compoundedby the fact that to all intents andpurposes the EEC Council of Min-isters is a “legal fiction”. More dif-ficult problems arise out of the al-location to the various Ministriesof funds from the Structural Funds-a sine qua non for the conver-gence and rationalisation of theGreekeconomywith interesting de-centralizing implications for the po-litical system as a whole- and thevarious financial instruments aris-ing out of the 1988 restructuring ofthe Funds and the various reformssuch as those included in theCommission’s Agenda 2000. Con-flicts between the various Min-istries are solved at a higher level,at the cabinet level (at KISIM) oreven personally by the PrimeMin-ister. Itmust be said, however, thatin general the effectiveness ofsuch bodies of collective respon-sibility as the cabinet (KISIM), is atbest dubious.

Considerable efforts have beenundertaken inmore recent years tochange the prevailing culture inthebureaucracyand check these ofits aspects that are not consideredfriendly to the citizen. The creationof theOmbudsman in 1995 and thesettingupofanumber of Independ-ent Authorities on the EU or Euro-peanmodelsdealing inter aliawiththe protection of civil rights helpedto re-emphasise the obvious pointthat the citizen is at the centre ofany political system and alsohelped the corroborationofpolitical

democracy in Greece. Communityfunds are also used to modernisethe public bureaucracy throughthe application of a vast number ofprograms introducing and extend-ing the application of informationtechnologies –e-administration–or improve the skillsof civil servantssuch as for example the “Politeia”program. Transparency is slowlybut steadily being introduced in thesystem but on the whole asIoakimides (2001) argued thesechanges (andothersaswell) helpedto rebalance state–society relationsin favour of the latter. It should bementioned, however, that in spiteof the various EU initiatives on is-sues traditionally outside the polit-ical agenda,mobilisationandquan-tifiable public awareness havebeen rather low. Environmentalmovements, feminist movementsetc. or any of those included in In-gelhart’s typologies, do not seemto be able to mobilise citizens atany impressive rate. On top of thatpolitical parties were quick to in-clude suchpost–materialist issuesin theirmanifestosprecluding thusthe development of such move-ments. Civil society is still in astate of development.Migration onthe other hand has been a totallynew issue tobedealtwith in thepo-litical system. It is a direct result ofthe post -1989 developments andalso touches upon the foreign pol-icy of the country. Greece hasbeentraditionally a labor exporting coun-try where throughout the 20th cen-turymigration flowswere recordedtowards the more developedeconomiesof the countriesofwest-ern Europe, the USA and Australiawhile repatriation flows occurredfrom theprosperousGreekcommu-nities in Africa and the Asiaminor1.Data show that the vast number of

about GREECE154


migrant workers originates fromBalkan neighboring countries al-though there seems to be alsomi-gration flows similar to the rest ofthe EU.

Interest groupsThemodern Greekstate grew up ina hostile neighborhood whosecontinuous turbulence triggered aseries of political crises internally.Thus the centralization of the po-litical systemwas the inevitable re-sult, with theGreekstate in the roleofmodern Leviathan or a Colossusbutwith “feet of clay”, asMouzelis(1990) colorfully suggested. Tradi-tional political parties with exten-sive networks of clientelistic rela-tions, offering, inter alia, publicsector enrollment, became thechief stabilization mechanism insupport of the system.

On the EEC/EU issues PASEGESand theGovernmentof the country,through a process of consultation,manage to adopt a unanimousstance in the Community arenas inmost cases. This may also be ex-plainedwith reference to the impor-tanceof the agricultural economyofthe country. Indeed, agriculturalcontributes 17.4% of the grossvalue added in Greece and ac-counts for 31.3%of thevalueof totalexports. Still 20%approx. of the to-tal labor force is employed in theagricultural sector but the numberis steadily declining. The existenceof the CAP has been the chief pa-rameter of successiveGovernmentsin their decision to associate, joinand finally stay in the EEC, in spiteof the comparatively poor supportfor the Mediterranean productionunder the CAP regulations. The de-fenseof thenational interest, there-fore, requires unanimity at the EEC

level. On the other hand GSEE isoneof the twopeakunions (theoth-er one isADEDY representingpublicsector employees stricto sensu)and is member of the ETUC, theworkers confederationsumbrella or-ganisation at the EEC level.

GSEE appears at the top of an or-ganisational pyramid in which theunions of the private aswell as thewider public sector (banks, com-mon utilities organisations etc.) arerepresented. Today the picture isone of extreme apportionment asthere are over 5000 first rankunions and 84 federations. Ameasure of the lackof political au-tonomy of the organisationmay begiven by the fact that in every in-stance until 1989 the leadership oftheGSEEwasof the sameparty po-litical affiliation as the Governmentof the country. Nevertheless, at thenational level the organisationhas developed a network of link-ages with the Ministry of Employ-ment, especially so after the Am-sterdam Treaty and the Lisbon Eu-ropean Council, although currentlythe country lacks a clear forum forthe dialogue between the socialpartners. Through party politicalconnections the GSEE remainedcalm for the time required for thecountry to join the Euro zone, buttension has grown once again dueto the failed attempt by theGovern-ment to reform the social securitysystem, an itemwhich triggered aserious party and Governmentalcrisis andwhich resulted in the re-formulation of the Government inOctober 2001.

The SEV (Federation of Greek In-dustries) is an active participant inUNICE and has developed closelinks with the EU institutions

about GREECE 155


through its Bureau in Brussels. TheSEV consists of mainly big indus-tries (two out of three more prof-itable industries of the country) in-cluding those representing multi-national capital. In contrast withthe other two organisations re-ferred to above, the SEV exhibitsa higher degree of political auton-omy which is probably better ex-plained with reference to the im-portance of its political resources,e.g. its significance in economicterms. More recently the SEV, withthe occasional hitches, acted as apowerful ally to the efforts to ratio-nalise the public sector and theeconomy and attain theMaastrichtcriteria although tension betweenthe two sides grew as a result ofGovernment hesitation to deregu-late further the economy.

Throughout the term of the previ-ous and the present Governmentunder Simitis, the quest of theadaptation of the society to thenew European environment tooka more concrete form. For it wasnot only the efforts of the countryto join the third and final stage ofthe EMU but also a number of ef-forts internally to streamline thevarious sectors of the economyand the society to be able toadapt best to the new and moredifficult environment. The initia-tive internally depended on thepremise that at the present stageof development of the EuropeanSystem of Cooperation competi-tion is not only about firms but ex-tends to competition of systems,modes of organisation, and finallyto roles and identities. Educationand the system of local authori-ties were chosen as the first sec-tors to adapt. Both of these initia-tives were not without problems

and revealed the limits of theadaptive capacity of the sectorsconcerned and perhaps of thesociety as a whole. Wider Euro-pean initiatives such as the Sor-bonne, the Bologna, and recentlythe Prague Declarations, coincid-ed with internal reforms and trig-gered a wider debate internally.The “Ekpedeftiki Metarrithmisi” of1997-2000 was a vigorous effort-at considerable political cost- tomodernize the educational sys-tem at all levels, focusing thoughat the secondary level (Lyceum).Party political considerations, tra-ditional attitudes, financial con-siderations and opposition frominterest groups (OLME - DOE) ac-tive in Education -teachersunions- in defense of the statusquo stood well in the way. Inspite of the above-mentioned dif-ficulties the program was carriedthrough. Serious oppositionagainst Government initiatives toimplement agreed European widepolicies within the “BolognaProcess” on Quality Assurancewere also recorded. This was amajor initiative -and long overdue-of the Karamanlis Government inpower since 2004 with a hand-some majority in Parliament. Thenew, as from 2004, Minister forNational Education and ReligiousAffairs, Mrs Giannakou, was thenext in line to introduce longoverdue reforms to the laws gov-erning the country’s tertiary edu-cation, e.g. Universities and Tech-nological Universities. Constitu-tional reform and especially re-form of art.16 of the Constitutionto enable the private sector to beassociated with tertiary educationwas the last piece in Governmentsdrive to modernize the system.Again party political considera-

about GREECE156


tions and fierce opposition fromleft wing teachers unions and stu-dent organizations stand on theway. PASOK, nowdays themain op-position party went out of its wayand abandoned the constitutionalreform process unable to manageintraparty hostility especially onthe reform of art.16 in spite of itsleadership pledge to support Gov-ernments initiative.

On the other hand “Kapodistrias”-the name of the founder of theModern Greek state- was given tothe program to rationalize the sys-temof local authorities. The pictureof the system before the Kapodis-trias plan was one of extreme frag-mentation in that there existed5,999 koinotites-anything withless than 10000 inhabitants (com-munes) –and 304 demoi– any-thing with more than 10,000 in-habitants. The plan aimed at thereduction in the overall numbers torationalize the system and stream-line expenditure, given that thesebodies heavily depend on statefunding for their survival. Althoughthe program was carried throughit is still in need of further actionfor its stabilization. In essencethe plan helped to accommodatethe EEC inspired decentralizationprocess of the political systemwhich has started off as early as1984 when the country was divid-ed into 13 regions for the purposesof the EEC’s regional policy. Al-though this has been for sometime amere administrative division-a nominal devolution- it was in1994 that the first sub-governmentelections were held (prefecturecouncils) which added an interest-ing new dimension to the politicalsystem as a whole (Tsinisizelis1996, Ioakimides 2001).

PUBLIC OPINION ANDEUROPEAN INTEGRATIONData on the public opinion coverthe period from 1974 to 2000. Insome cases, the data used relateto shorter periods, as from 1981(Greek entry in the EEC).

Generally speaking Greek publicopinion is responding within thetrend recorded for the rest of theEUmembers although it seems tobe more responsive to develop-ments not immediately associatedwith the EU per se and which arerelated to the “zero point energy”culture referred to above. In this re-gard I am inclined to treat thesedata with caution, especially thoserelated to the CFSP or the CFSDP.That is to say high politics, even incases not related with the EU areaffecting the attitude towards theEU itself.

A big majority was recorded infavour of the unification attemptsinW.Europe in every instance dur-ing the period 1983-2000. Of therespondents to the questionwhether they were in favour ofthe efforts to unifyW.Europe 40%on average replied that they werestrongly in favour, 30% were infavour to some extent (70% ap-prox. these two categories togeth-er), whereas only approx. 15%were found to be against to someextent or very much against theunification attempts.

In every instance during the 20years period those of the respon-dents that considered the EEC asa “good thing” were considerablymore than those that consideredit as a “bad thing” by a factor of 2.5up to 1983 and by a factor of 5 - 10from then onwards with a peak of

about GREECE 157


75% vs. 6% in 1990 (a factor of 13approx). Data as to the feeling ofthe respondents as to whethertheir country has benefited fromthe EEC show that since 1989 on-wards the percentages in favour ofEuropean Unification match withthose that feel that their countryhas benefited from the EEC. Inevery other instance up to 1989(1980 - 1993) those of the respon-dents that thought that their coun-try has benefited from the EECaremore by a factor of 2 than thosethat thought the opposite. If we ob-serve the trend in both questionswe may conclude that the anti -EEC attitude is declining sharplyfrom 1990 onwards as it becameapparent that the EU is the onlyblock of stability in Europe and asthe real situation in the former So-viet block countries was becomingapparent.

A similar point can be made withrespect to the feelings of the re-spondents had the EEC beenscraped. It is only since 1988 thatthose who replied that they wouldlave been indifferent had the EECbeen scrapped were less thanthose that replied that they wouldhave been sorry! Still 10%of the re-spondents (average 1981 - 1998)declared that they have been re-lieved had the EECbeen scrapped.This percentage declines thoughfrom 1986 onwards to a mere 4%in 1990 from the 50% that it stoodduring the second six months of1982 and becomes irrelevant fromthen onwards.

The Macedonia question at itspeak at the beginning of the ‘90sand the war on Yugoslavia at theend of the ‘90s are the only in-stances during which support for

the European integration actuallydeclines. By the same token, it in-creases during instances that theEU is seen, as protective of the na-tional interests of the country suchas is the case during the immedi-ate aftermath of the Helsinki Euro-pean Council with reference tothe Greco-Turkish relations. Onthe whole, available Eurobarome-ter data show that there is a widesupport for European Integration–amongst the highest in the EU–which slightly declines in time ofinternational criseswhich are seenas affecting vital national interests.

Similar trends are recorded in the2006 Eurobarometer Survey with57% of the respondents evaluat-ing positively the country’s partic-ipation in the EU. Greeks tend totrust the EU by a margin of 65%which is the third highest afterSlovenia (70%) and Romania(67%) although 34% of the re-spondents expressedmistrust, atany rate considerably less than theEU average (40%).

Concluding Remarks

Greece has been amember of theEEC / EU twenty six years. Nowa-days, the situation seems to havebeen stabilised since the threema-jor parties in Parliament, e.g. NewDemocracy, PASOKand the smallerAlliance of the Left (Synaspismos)are unanimous that the countrymust positively adapt in the newEuropean environment and this at-titude is uniquocally supportedby a huge majority of the popula-tion. With the exception of thesmall Greek Communist Party noother party denies European Inte-gration.

about GREECE158


TheEuropeanpolicyofGreece ispri-marily the responsibility of theGov-ernment of the country. At the soci-etal level the pattern seems thesame:partypolitical interventionen-sures that no other formof politicalrepresentation is capable of chal-lenging that authority. At the Euro-pean level the relationsbetween theGovernment and the organised in-terests still project “abilliardball im-age”asdifferentactorspromote thesamepositions in different fora. Toa certain extent this is a structuralproblem in the sense that thediffer-ing levelsofeconomicdevelopmentbetweenGreece and the other EECmember states facilitate a com-promise internally on the need forpore resources from the variousCommunity funds.Thishasbeen themainconcernof theGreekEuropeanpolicy since 1981. Internally, al-though improvements are requiredin a number of issues, the politicalsystem has become more open,more transparent and less cen-tralised through itsEUmembership.

European and International reali-ties have considerably alteredsince the entry of the country in theEEC /EU. In the space of just fifteenyears the original EEC treatieshave been extensively modifiedcreating a system of multilevelgovernance in search of its phys-iognomy. The country even con-templates to join in any high pol-itics enhanced cooperation struc-tures that may appear. This de-notes the tremendous changesthat this country has undergonefrom a state of denial to one of themore pro-integrationist memberstates.

1 I am not reffering to repatration flows asa result of Balkan or Grec0-Turkish warssuch as in 1922.

USEFUL LINKS

www.ypex.gov.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/European+Policy

greeceintheeuropeanunion - video.minpress.grvideo.minpress.gr/€¦ · aboutgreece 147...

Documents