greek neo-nationalism

8/7/2019 Greek Neo-nationalism

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ECPR Joint Sessions, Edinburgh 2003

Workshop 16: Politics and Memory

Context, Process and Strategy in the Use of Memory:

Remembrance, Neglect and Erasure in Greek Neo-Nationalism

Dr. Kostas A. Lavdas Dr. Nikos Papadakis

Department of Political Science

University of Crete74 100 Rethymnon

Greece

DRAFT

The paper explores the use of Greek history in the discourse of Greek neo-nationalism as a

case study of discursive practices involved in the management of collective memory. Against

a background of essentially monocultural state building, political and policy discourse in

todays Greece faces two distinct but interrelated challenges: Europeanization, consisting of

interactions between European and domestic political and socio-economic patterns, and

multiculturalism, brought about in part through sharply increased levels of immigration from

the Balkans and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The paper is a tentative attempt to identify the

ways in which Greek neo-nationalism uses collective memory in order to legitimize its views

on inclusion/exclusion and the defining features of Greekness. We search for both path-

shaping and path-dependency of neo-nationalism in Greece and focus on the programmatic

discourse of political, intellectual and religious actors. The paper is organized around three

sets of issues: (a) the contextually embedded discourses which constitute the neo-nationalist

field, (b) the use of memory as well as that of neglect and of erasure processes employed by

nationalist discourses, and (c) the attempted construction, within Greek neo-nationalism, of a

value system that represents a counterproposal to tolerance and agonistic respect, adopting an

aggressive stance vis--vis multiculturalism and drawing on selective readings as well as the

use of collective memory.


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1. Introduction

What strikes one in comparative studies of contemporary Greek political culture is the

extent to which Greeks express an interest in politics and at the same time appear to

possess a rather positive view of politics (in fact, much more positive than the view

taken by respondents in other Southern European states Italy, Portugal, Spain).

What makes this finding even more intriguing is that it is combined with

comparatively low levels of overall citizen satisfaction (for overviews see

Charalambis & Demertzis 1993: 219-240 and Demertzis 1997: 107-121). One

possible explanation can be sought in the prevalence in modern Greece of a certain

utilitarian approach that subjugates the public sphere to the exigencies of the

private.1 Yet the centrality of conceptions of politics in Greek public life may also

be approached in terms which consider the possibility that expressed interest in

politics may be genuine (i.e., political) after all (see Contogeorgis 1998). It can be

suggested, from this perspective, that the aforementioned utilitarianism is

associated with a certain individualism which is in fact predicated on a historical

sense of a frustrated valued alternative. It is an individualism which evolves in a

cultural context which historically encouraged person-to-person contact in clientelistic

relations and in which the Protestant and especially Puritan conceptions of self-

control, duty and calling had been absent.

The interest in and the role played by politics in Greek society and in the

discursive mechanisms through which events, institutions and even subjects become

knowable in the Greek context has been noted by various writers.2 Research on

interest in and concern with politics has usually been subsumed under studies aiming

to explicate different aspects of modern Greek political culture in terms of a dualistic

construction of the relations between traditionalism and Westernization

1Charalambis & Demertzis (1993: 223). These authors argue that the underdeveloped conception of

the public character of the political (what they call the privatization of the public) can account for

the fact that Greek political culture is characterized by a merging of the public and the private []

That is why the Greek [interest in politics] is really not paradoxical. Provided that politics is regarded

in private terms, there is no antithesis between high political interest and low political efficacy (1993:

224).

2

For different analyses which converge on this see Demertzis (1994; 1997); Contogeorgis (1998: 12,59).


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(Diamandouros 1983; 1993). A different approach has aimed to avoid the neat

juxtaposition of traditional and modern and has viewed the relations between the

traditional and the modern elements in terms of a syncretism which evolves in

asymmetric ways (Demertzis 1994; 1997). From a different anthropological

perspective and one which aims to pursue the traditional modern dualism a bit

further, Faubion investigates the relations between cultural classicism and

historical constructivism as regimes of signification. The former concerns the ethic

of conviction which was associated with what Geertz has called nationalist

essentialism. The latter refers to the specifically Greek modernity, the multitude of

structured dispositions and practices which signify the way of being modern in a

particular country (Faubion 1993).3 It has been argued that in this context, and against

the background of changing stimuli, different conceptions of politics emerge and from

in distinct discursive contexts, constituting a complex and multi-layered political

culture (Lavdas 1997, 2000a, 2000b). In any event, the particular mix of religious

peace, individualism, relative tolerance and decreased state interventionism in

religious and cultural affairs which contribute to tie the new social welfare goals of

the state with to the new self-reflective and self-governing principles of

individuality in the context of the risk societies (Rose & Miller 1992: 173- 205

and Shapiro 1992) and came to characterize developments in various West European

contexts failed to become the dominant pattern in the making of the modern Greek

state (Chiotakis 1999, Papadakis 1998, 2001, 2002).

As a result, the dual challenges of multiculturalism and Europeanization

appear critical for contemporary Greek political culture. Ethnocentrism and

xenophobia appear strengthened while multiculturalism is considered a central issue

in political, intellectual and religious discourses. Do ethnocentrism and xenophobia

constitute a form of defense in the context of increased and increasing cultural

diversity? Or do they perhaps reflect primarily the action and strategies of specific

3 Faubion (1993), who locates his historical constructivists among the more cosmopolitan circles of

Greeces urban elites, aims to supplement Webers hermeneutics of technical rationalism with the

hermeneutics of another modernity, another way of being modern, which appears to come the more

fully into its own the farther one moves away from the Occidents core [] the attempt itself seems to

me all the more urgent as more and more of the worlds peoples find themselves not simply at

modernitys threshold but too often pushed abruptly and unceremoniously beyond it, at bestimperfectly aware of the diversity of alternatives they have available (1993: 11).


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interest groups? How is neo-nationalism legitimized and how does it attempt to utilize

collective memory and perceptions of national history?

2. The issue

The present paper explores the use of Greek history and cultural legacy in the

discourses of Greek neo-nationalism as a case study of discursive practices involved

in the management of collective memory. Against a background of essentially

monocultural state building, political and policy discourse in todays Greece faces two

distinct but interrelated challenges: Europeanization, consisting of interactions

between European and domestic political and socio-economic patterns, and

multiculturalism, brought about in part through sharply increased levels of

immigration from the Balkans and Eastern Europe in the 1990s. The aforementioned

interrelated challenges can be associated with a new strengthening of Greek

nationalism. But at the same time a new ideological trend appeared in the 1990s:

Modernization. It was based on a combination of several ideological dimensions

and trends (pro-Europeanism, individualism, need for strengthening civil society,

contraposition to national political archaisms etc) and involved an holistic critique

of any kind of nationalism, without however necessarily neglecting nationalistic

references from its own political discourse (Gavriilidis 2002: 566). In any case, a new

ideological enemy was born and nationalism needed new forms of legitimization.

The paper seeks to identify the ways in which Greek neo-nationalism uses

collective memory and cultural legacy in order to legitimize its views on

inclusion/exclusion and the defining features of Greekness. It explores both path-

shaping and path-dependency of neo-nationalism in Greece and focuses on the

programmatic discourse of political, intellectual and religious mega-actors. It should

be noted at this point that the present paper is based on a preliminary conceptual-

definitional taxonomy regarding the trends and groups that constitute Greek neo-

nationalism (main sensitizing concept of the study/ see Strauss & Corbin 1990: 41-

47). Attempting a first grounded approach in the researching field and taking into

consideration the self-definition procedure of the several neo-nationalistic groups

and mega- actors, one can easily trace two main currents: (a) the radicals

(intellectuals and activists), whose political culture is marked by extremist elementsand who tend to adopt a pure nationalist point of view, and (b) the neo-orthodox


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(mainly intellectuals but also certain church figures), who attempt to formulate a

political strategy, based on an active synthesis between ancient Greek political culture

(drawing from selective readings of the classic texts see Lavdas 2000a-b) and the

Christian Orthodox conception of society, culture and nation.

3. Sketching the historical background

While it is undeniable that European political liberalism exerted considerable

ideological influence on nineteenth and twentieth century Greek political

developments (see Kitromilides 1994), and ideas of universalism, rights and rule of

law became central to political discourse after 1800, there were various factors which

ultimately constrained and limited the impact of liberalism. On the eve of the war of

independence a loose coalition around a counter-enlightenment proved successful

and was able to influence the direction also of the nationalist movement. As

Henderson put it in the conclusion of his study, liberalism [was] not victorious

(1971: 199). But the stronger contender was, in fact, republicanism, and

republicanism was also not victorious. Not republicanism but frustrated republicanism

provides the discursive context for the new reconceptualization of politics after the

1840s. It was the frustration of republican ideas which gave birth to political as well

as conceptual transformations and the interlinking of established, emerging and

suppressed meanings in the development of Greek political culture.

The predominance of the counter-enlightenment coalition was facilitated

by the emerging discourse of nationalism. The transition to national identities, which

took place at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Southeastern

Europe, constrained certain aspects of the liberal ideas while also evolving in

interaction with some other aspects. It also marked the end of a shared Balkan

mentality.4 As Kitromilides notes, the European Janus, wearing the two faces of

Enlightenment and of power politics, brought with it the logic of nationalism,

impregnated Balkan politics with violence, suspicion and fear and destroyed the

common world of Balkan Orthodoxy (Kitromilides 1996: 186).

4Elements of a Balkan mentality, made possible through a framework of communication (Orthodox

religious culture) and a certain political context (Ottoman rule) shared by peoples across Southeastern

Europe, can be said to have existed among the Orthodox Christians in pre-nationalist Balkan society ofthe eighteenth century (Kitromilides 1996).


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The beginnings of exclusionary notions of politics and the political originate

with the articulation of nationalist discourse in the nineteenth century. There is a shift

from the approach to politics in terms of real or imagined continuities as an activity

worthy of Hellenism, to politics as activity in the context of a polity based on the

development of a statal-national consciousness. The declaration of independence in

1821 (and subsequent declarations and provisional constitutional documents) placed

the new state unequivocally in the European family of states (see, e.g., Varouxakis

1995: 16-19). At the same time, these declarations included strong republican

elements. As it turned out, experience with republican government after the formal

establishment of the modern Greek state in 1830 was considerable but interrupted.

There were declarations by Greek National Assemblies in republican directions even

before the establishment of the Greek state, during the war of independence. Despite

manifestations of a strong (although by no means unanimous) preference for a

republican constitution, geostrategic realities, foreign influences and domestic

complications eventually led to the imposition of monarchy in 1832. The domestic

conditions played a significant role: as I noted above, on the eve of the war of

independence a loose coalition around a counter-enlightenment was able to

influence the direction also of the nationalist movement. The idea of founding

(Pocock 1988) implicit in the republican declarations was consequently defeated by a

combination of geostrategic realities, foreign interference and domestic coalition

politics.

After the 1830s, however, it became evident once again that different socio-

political factions championed different models of government. Those who favored a

stronger process of state-building pushed for a centralized state with strong executive

and rationalized administrative structures. On the other hand, those who wished to

retain the power of local notables had a preference for more decentralized

governmental structures. Despite the influence of the Enlightenment and of aspects of

liberalism, the power structure of the new state was based on a conservative coalition

that proved inimical to the widespread acceptance of liberalism and human rights

theories (see Kitromilides 1994).


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4. Greekness as an imagined community: neglecting the reality of coexistence

and indicting multiculturalism

human substance is.in its actuality the ensemble of

the social (and historical) relations

(Karl Marx, 6th Thesis on Feuerbach)

Cultural diversity, the multicultural condition favors the tendencies towards the

collective release from traditional identities and the construction of post-traditional

identities (Habermas 1989: 317). This development, and the need for resistance are

the focal points of Greek neo-nationalist rhetoric. Subsequently, neo-nationalists

gradually turn to the type of ideology, more familiar to the identity-construction

process: namely to the intrinsic traditional dimension of ideology, based on

tradition, legacy and collective memory (see Rude 1995: 22). More specifically:

The concept of Greekness is based on the hypothesis of an orthodox way of

living that incorporates difference in a careless hubbub, while anything else that

is still culturally- politically different but not incorporated is a hurricane of clans

(Zouraris 1986: 336). An imagined community, in Benedict Andersons terms (1983),

is constructed in these terms. This construction is based on exclusionary procedures.

In the official site- mailing list of Greek nationalist networks (Aspis, Hellada and

so on), nationalism is conceptualized as both

-the individual well-developed national consciousness and

-the worldview based on the domination of the National Interest upon every other

individual, collective or transnational interest.

Greek neo-nationalists seem to search for legitimization in ideologically neutral

references to citizenship as active membership of a polity5. But this is not all.

According to the more radical Greek Neo-Nationalists, nationalism is (a)

fundamentally linked to the Greek Orthodox doctrine, (b) combined by definition with

old Greek virtues such as patriotism, and (c) differs in a fundamental way from

European and American imperialism and various forms of internationalism. The

mission of any Greek neo-nationalist is the perseverance of collective memory, the

maintenance of Greek History in an active way and the constant fight against

5 For the use of the term citizenship in this study see Lavdas 2001: 3.


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globalization and neo-class universalism (http://aspis2000.tripod.com/index.htm)

and the effects of the globalised information and image control to governance and

national/ state independence (see Yannaras 2001: 141). Conditio sine qua non for the

achievement of the principal neo-nationalist aims is the struggle against the new intra-

systemic enemy, the new Trojan Horse: multiculturalism. It is worth quoting at

length: It is extremely dangerous to permit the entrance and the habitation of the

hordes of stowawies. Do we really want our children to co-exist with 5 millions of

Albanians, overwhelming schools, streets, labor market, even our army? Lets leave

the theory of tolerance behind usThe only actual superiority is the attempt to

protect national character and our historical heritage which are constantly threatened.

We claim the right to national independence and there is no state apparatus able to

defeat us. At least till there are Ancient Greek Columns standing un-defeated and

Greek people keeping alive the ancestral genes. The real dilemma is not nationalism

or multiculturalism but nationalism or barbarism

(http://aspis2000.tripod.com/news.htm). Professor Tzanis, an eminent member of the

nationalist Network 216, appeals to Herodotus in order to claim that alliance with

barbarians against Greek patriotism is the ultimate betrayal (Tzanis 1988: 15).

Such forms of ordering and classification, based on the management of

collective memories and cultural heritage, are produced as the effects of specific

power-relations and function to govern individuals differentially, taking into

consideration their ethno-cultural origin (Popkewitz 2000: 190- 191 and

Popkewitz & Brennan 1998). But could this be legitimized in the context of a

rather successful sustained republic?

5. A Republic under fire

The critical ontology of self.should be conceptualized as a

attitude, ethos, a philosophical life, where critique on what we

are is a simultaneous historical analysis of our (imposed)

limits. (M. Foucault: 1984: 50).

6

The title of Network 21 refers directly to the Greek National Liberation Struggle against theOttoman Occupation, begun in March 25th of 1821.


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There can be little doubt that the Third Republic (since 1974) represents the

most successful period of sustained democratic government in the history of the

modern Greek state. One of the first gestures of the democratic regime of 1974, the

legalization of the Communist Party, proved a key development on the road to a

stable political order. It was also the first step in the recognition of the divisive

other (the communists and the defeated bloc of the civil war).

The liberal political regime, however, has been far from immune from direct

and explicit attacks by neo-nationalist circles. In a sense, this is not unique to

contemporary Greek experience. When the supranational enemy ("communist

threat") disappeared, references to the universal values underpinning liberal regime

forms gradually weakened and many western states turned to their national features

and values, in order to legitimize their power structures (Papadakis 2002). The

coidentity between national competitiveness and state development, and the

conception of the new "geo - economists" that the economic prosperity of a country

and, ultimately, its systemic balance and growth are determined by its success in the

world markets (see Krugman 1994: 29-30), legitimize exclusions on a supra national

level and intensify systemic antinomies and collective fears. In Greece, rising levels

of unemployment maximize the threat that many Greek citizens feel, viewing

numbers of (usually undocumented) immigrants to invade and to form a new labor

reserve army (Reservenarmee in Marxs terms)7. The Greek Government

facilitated the de jure integration of the immigrants (green card procedure). This

fact in combination with the increasing formation of distinct and stable minorities,

regenerate issues of power sharing, and probably will open the door to questions of

ethnic representation in government. These, contextually embedded, qualitative and

quantitative changes become apparent in neo-nationalistic discourse, which turns

more and more to the collective anxieties and insecurities of native Greeks, trying to

benefit from them. Greek nationalists usually attempt to

- turn to their advantage in their political rhetoric the perception shared by many

Greek citizens that the co-existence of different ethnocultural groups in the

same national context can provoke socio-political and economic instability,

7

It is noteworthy that, as Thurow suggests, not a vacancy was created in Europe (in total) at the period1975 1995 (Thurow 1996: 55- 62).


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- contextually legitimize their request on the economic marginalisation of

immigrant groups 8.

It is useful, at this point, to focus on specific issues associated with Albanian

immigrants, who consist the vast majority of the immigrant population in Greece. The

rejective (usually hostile) references to Albanians are often

-combined with the demand for preserving national purity and

-encouraged by a broader contraposition to specific ethnocultural groups (Hebrews

included)9.

Since race is a social construct rather than a biological fact (see, e.g., Omi &

Winant 1994)10, we can easily trace in these references the combination of the two

main forms of racism that attempt to smite the multicultural condition: Bigotry-hatred

racism and superiority racism (see Blum 1998: 94). Albanians have often been targets

of racial bigotry, in the context of Greek neo-nationalism,

8 Such a marginalisation could, of course, lead to legitimized discrimination in the work place

which normally results in hardships more bitter than cultural imperialism (Coulby 1997: 34).

9 Significant elements of anti-Semitism can be traced in the discursive context of Greek neo-

nationalism (including neo-orthodox circles). In several cases it is mixed with a broader criticism to

Israels Middle- Eastpolicy.Prof. Tzanis, referring to the Old Testament, ascertains that it s rather

impossible to detail all the (religious and political) texts that develop hatred and racism among young

Israelites. Through the chosen-doctrine, young Israelites are provided with the alibi to misbehave

against Life and to commit crimes against Humanity (Tzanis 1990). International Zionism is accused

of

utilizing the chosen-rational in order to achieve global domination and manipulate other

people, in cooperation with corrupted opinion makers in Greece and all over the world,

being the actual racism and the original capitalism (Tzanis 1998: 68- 69).

Prof. Yannaras accuses Greek politicians for their admiration of the dynamic presence of the Hebraic

Diaspora. But the real aim of this presence in the international context, is (and has always been) the

historic maintenance of an introvert nationality, and the protection and promotion of the interests of the

Israeli State all over the world. Hebrewism has never been a supranational cultural proposal. It

undoubtedly represents the more ancient and admirable monotheistic religious tradition.But it is

traditionally identified with a specific self-excluded national unity. On this ground, the aim of the

Hebraic Diaspora could be the securing of power in the international relations rather than the catalytic

role to the cultural development (Yannaras 2001: 185- 187).10 This leads us to recognise the multiplicity of relations of power surrounding race (Apple 1996: 15).


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-either being thought of as national threats (bigotry-hatred racism based on, still

existing, memories of the Greek- Albanian War),

-or because of specific beliefs in their cultural and political inferiority.

The case of Ulysses Tsenay in 1999 can be used to illustrate the point. Ulysses

Tsenay, a 15th years old immigrant student in Greece, was offered by the school

administration the privilege of keeping the Greek flag for the school parade, in the

context of the official commemoration of Greek participation in the 2nd World War;

this is a typical gesture for the best student of each class. The fact that U. Tsenay was

an Albanian immigrant provoked an impressive polemic among politicians,

intellectuals, journalists, parent associations and teachers. The Greek Minister of

Culture considered it an explicit and welcome development towards tolerance, while

many radical neo-nationalists considered the fact that Albanians vested the symbol

of the Liberation of OUR North Hepyrus from the Albanians as an horrible insult

and a unheard of historic paradox (http://aspis2000.tripod.com/index.htm).

In addition, a new kind of (intellectual) polemic was initiated on the occasion

of Ismael Kantares assault to Orthodox Christianity, during the crisis in Kosovo.11

This assault, combined with Julia Kristevas openly hostile critique of Orthodoxy (Le

Monde, 19/4/1999), was considered as the intellectual outcome of a coordinated

public opinion making procedure against both Orthodoxy in general and Greek

culture in particular (see Yannaras 2001: 140). At this point we should mention that

dogmatic religious differences (Filioque) were explicitly mentioned in the polemic

(legitimising management of collective memory).

Narratives of national alienation and potential symbolic disclocation

constitute substantial components of the aforementioned rhetoric. This is one of the

main similarities between the radicals and the more intellectual, milder neo-

nationalism. Prof. Zouraris discourse, Network 21 views and neo-orthodox

rhetoric are rather illustrative.

The glorious ancient spirit is combined with the emancipatory dimension

of Greek Orthodoxy. They are both considered to be the substantial parameters of

Greek identity. Greekness should be collectively memorized as a global vision, as

the only alternative to the materialist, instrumental, now monetarist Europe: Greece

11

According to Kantare there is a kind of historical addiction of Orthodoxy towards the slaughteringof its enemies (Le Monde, 18-19/4/1999).


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survived due to the national struggles and its constantly developing culture (Ramfos

1996: 39). In this case, cultural history is reinvented in order to de-legitimise the

European ghost. The main counter-argument to the new Europeanized political

culture is the ancestral global modernism , that should never permit the simulation

de l assimilation (Zouraris 1986). Since a cultural decadence is ascertained in both a

national and international level12, and no persuasive equivalent of a national identity

is provided in the context of EU, a return to cultural basics can provide Greece with a

remarkable comparative advantage: Greece undoubtedly has an advantage over the

rest of western countries, due to the fact that its Ancient and Christian foundations are

the main western cultural substructures (Ramfos 1996: 56 and Kalioris 1994). This

potential return is immersed in a context of political theology, that produces a

teleology: Whoever is able to read the historical signs can easily detect a

significant turn, emerging as the inevitable necessity of the global community. A

turn towards the Hellenic word view, the Hellenic values (Tzanis 1988: 7). In fact,

this teleology constitutes the legitimizing basis of the proposed ideology of

Hellenism, through the constant and multi-prismatic strategies in the use of

memory. However, policy and subsequent strategies are usually based on a

frame of teleological outlines in order to create ideology (see Laclau 1994).

The supposed cultural decadence is facilitated by the utilitarian dimension of

western democracies, that explains the remarkable convenience regarding the

assimilation of the American modus vivendi (Yannaras 2001: 148). The

utilitarian dimension has been instrumentalised by the political unification of Europe,

neglecting both the ancient Greek claim for a political concurrence between truth

and community and the Christian political ideal (Yannaras 1993: 27- 28 and

Yannaras 1990: 13, 16)13.

This new instrumentalism seems to be the explanatory basis for the de-

institutionalization of memory in the Greek Educational System14: We are

12Greece is deconstructed and collapses.We have in our souls the smell of the historical end of

our race (Yannaras 1987: 11).

13This ideal focuses on the political communication between persons and not individuals (see Yannaras

1983: 5.6 and Yannaras 1984).

14

The emphasis laid, by the neo-nationalists, to the educational policies and institutions can beeasily explained. Education in societies in transition, towards multiculturalism, challenges


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proud of our ancient ancestors, while our vast majority never had the slightest

touch with their texts and thought; Our official education almost excludes such a

contact (Yannaras 2001: 160). The official history taught in Greek schools is

accused of discharging references to main historical episodes (1821s Greek

Libertarian Revolution, War against the German- Italian invasion during the

Second World War) from any patriotic emotion, in order to ensure the

luxury of peace by all means and national costs. This supposed neglect of the

actual collective war memory from the official curricula is combined to the

ongoing erasure of cultural pride, religious faith and folk devotion (Yannaras

1998).

According to the Greek neo-nationalists, the strategy of neglect of war

memory and cultural- religious experiences in the name of peace,

- facilitates the de-nationalization of the Greek youth, promoted by a

clan of fanatics in the Ministry of Education (Yannaras 1998),

- is facilitated by the un-restricted use of Turkish in Greek schools

(especially in Thrace, where a Muslim minority exists/ see Pettifer 1994)

and the tendency of the Greek State towards a legislation that will

encourage an analogous treatment to the Albanian and other minority

languages15,

- deprives the nation from the necessary alertness of anger (Yannaras

1998).

For one more time, what is really asked is to return to the teaching of a history

that identifies the state with the city states of the fourth century BC and thus

with Hellenic civilization (see Psomiades & Thomadakis 1993), recapitulates and

institutionalizes the memory of heroic wars and tends to bury the states recent

existing curricula, for it brings together the three main processes of political socialization (Bell

1996: 203 and Bell 1991):

promotion of citizenship, through initiating students into the rights and duties of a

citizen in a host culture,

the process of intensifying cultural influence through mutual contact, and

re-socialization of adults (see Mangan 1990).

15 Linguistic and religious issues are remarkably interrelated with the imaginary and actual

collective construction of national identities. Lets not forget that in the French case, by a

process of religious and linguistic intolerance the state of France has almost succeeded indistinguishing itself as the nation of France (Braudel 1990).


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history of internal warfare and conflict (Coulby 2000: 352- 353). Such a

restoration of a state-endoresed curriculum that promotes the formation of

nationalism while lacks cosmopolitanism (Massialas 1995) could easily

exacerbate tensions with internal minorities and bordering states. But such a

potentiality doesnt seem to bother the Greek neo-nationalists.

In this line of thought, the only convincing counter- argument against this

normative eudaemonism (Yannaras 1993: 24) is a national strategy of exodus from

the constellation of utilitarian- political rationalism. The politics of memory (a

combination of the ancient legacy to the Christian political thought) are used here in

order to legitimize the contraposition to both the doctrinal intellectualism (of the

European Enlightenment) and the juristic moralism of Romeo-Catholicism that

promote the claim for the individualistic self-containment towards the individual

finalism (Yannaras 1993: 45). In other words, the contraposition to the civic religion

(in Daniel Bells terms/ 1962: 400), whose focal point is the modern type of

democracy: Democracy in modernity concerns individual rights that derive from

the institutionalized system of Justice.The norms of such rights refer to the

consolidation of both the individual and collective interests rather than the creation of

a society based on human relations. Modern Democracys rationale is the rationale

towards the individual secureness against power (Yannaras 2001: 101).This model

of democracy is not democratic enough, according to the intellectual neo-orthodox

circles. The politics of History and Memory are utilized in a comparative way in order

to construct their counter- argument: Unlike the ancient Greek model of Democracy,

the modern one aims at utility rather than truth, at manageable usefulness rather than

substantive and genuine way of life (Yannaras 2001: 101). The intellectual neo-

nationalist discourse adopts an equivalence rationale. It identifies Individualism

with Western Democracy and Modernity in order to reveal the structural causality (in

Althussers terms/ see Althusser 1965 and Scott 1995: 166) tha t over-determines the

ongoing cultural decline: Democracy in Modernity preconditions human substance

as a self-interested, self-existent interest- unit, aiming at the disciplined symbiosis of

individuals, in the context of an utilitarian pattern (Yannaras 2001: 101- 102).

What is systematically neglected in this discourse, is the reality of European

integration and its possibilities for cultural interaction. A whole series of discursive

strategies is predicated on this neglect. But any kind of discourse, in order to produceand transmit new types of power and undermine the existing ones (Foucault 1984:


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100), presupposes a framework of objectivity that comprises the polity and the

cultural sphere (Thompson 1990). The historical-comparative argument can play a

significant role here. And it does. Formal types of cultural interaction are accused of

being the most effective form of cultural imperialism, through the cultural

interpenetration and citizens manipulation by a foreign country. The history of

institutions such as the French Institute, the Goethe Institute, and so on, in Greece

confirm the realism of such investments (in money and human recourses), in the

context of a broader political strategy (Yannaras 2001: 41).

It is interesting to note that, while Italian neo-nationalists and especially

Alleanza Nationale return to D Annuncios ideas in order to gain justification (see

Hamanmaa 2002), Greek neo-nationalists re-invent European intellectuals and ancient

Greek philosophers. In fact they selectively re-invent old references to the Greek

Universal Uniqueness, in order to document the inter-historical unity of the Greek

spirituality (Karagiannis 2003). Prof. Zouraris evokes Rene Chars hymn to the

Greek guidance to human emancipation, Prof. Ramfos approaches Russian Orthodoxy

and Dostoyievskys ideas on individual consciousness of the holistic responsibility,

while Prof. Yannaras recommends Greek politicians to be taught by the history

of the Russian Diaspora and take into consideration the Russian orthodox

heritage and its influence to the western intellectual life-course (Yannaras

2001: 186). Within this intellectual context, the Greek neo-nationalism

counterproposes an alternative, historically embedded internationalism in order

to reinforce its arguments against a united Europe, which is rather an historical

coincidence than an idea (Ramfos 1996: 15). Since Europeanness is contextually

divided, we (Greeks) need the political construction of a new national strategy than

the maintenance of the disparities of the European ethnic co-existence in the name of

the EU. Ramfos points out that national strategy is not of course a matter of

dealing and of adaptation to the economic priorities of EU (Ramfos 1996: 39 &

14).

What is particularly interesting in this context is the fact that Greek intellectual

neo-nationalism uses arguments against European multiculturalism similar to the ones

used by segments of British Eurosceptic media. The lack of a European vision and the

symbolic unmasking of European realities can only be replaced by reinforced

national strategies (see Ramfos 1996: 14 & 21- 24 and Anderson 2002). A mildform of nationalism could be the prime mover towards this strategy.


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The ex uterus of Europeis nullified in the context of the E. U...Greece

and the Western World have a interrelated fate: For Greece the fate of desolation for

the Western World the most advantaged solutions according to Zouraris (1986: 326).

And Greeks should take this into consideration. What is actually happening here is

that descriptive and interpretative discourse meet, revealing another aspect of the

relation between structure and action: the dimensions and the origins of the relation

between collective and individual will and the causes of their (real or constructed)

antinomies (see Thompson 1990: 127- 130). An inclusive culture could not be based

in exclusion. The abandonment of the European Vision (exclusion) is legitimized by

the appeal of the universalistic dimension of purely Hellenic culture, mixed with

the inborn universalism of the Orthodox Religion. Prof. Yannaras ascertains:

Greekness was always the historical flesh of the church universality, due to its

intrinsic universal dimension (Yannaras 2001: 166). Greekness is panhuman

and modern Greeks, the native agents of the Greek spirit, should just preserve

their universalistic heritage and origin. Within this context, Greekness is re -

conceptualized as an a priori and undoubted inclusive culture: Each individual

in this Earth has a potential, secret Hellenic insight. As soon as he/she become

aware of it, this insight is transformed in a insistent quest of the main duty

(Tzanis 1988: 9), namely the maintenance of the values of the Greek

cosmopolitism, the ideology of Hellenism (Tzanis 1988: 17-18).

Simultaneously, a procedure is taking place; typical to nationalistic discourse.

The over-estimation of the national characteristics of a nationality facilitates its

isolation and introversion (see Arvanitopoulos 1997): Prof. Tzanis . Such phenomena

are not rare in the E.U., so long as economic integration takes precedence over

political integration. Still, the EU can already be considered an emerging political

system of a non-state type, providing the stimulus and the framework for rethinking

the links between national political institutions, EU legitimacy and collective identity

(Lavdas 2001: 1-2). Greek neo-nationalist strategy, based on patterns which recycle

introvert discourses, loose this specific historical opportunity to rethink and

reformulate.


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6. Prometheus bound: Greek nationalism restated

To conclude this tentative discussion: it would appear that a certain discursive

strategy is constructed by different tendencies of Greek neo-nationalism. The theory

of nationalism is restated, while the evolving discourses of national identity and

nationalism

-are based on a mixture of imaginary significances (perennial identity, reinvention of

the historical legacy, etc) and phylogenetic memories (that are encouraged by recent

international trends towards forms of a new genetic determinism),

-are virtualized by constructed dilemmas, usually transformed in the main

components of a political rhetoric against multiculturalism16,

-are contextually embedded, through strategic references to actual social problems,

such as unemployment,

-are activated by the neglect of EU realities and the simultaneous indictment of any

kind of multiculturalism (minorities, immigrants etc) and

-are legitimized through constant references to Greek History and Cultural Legacy,

which is (or at least it should be) the ne plus ultra limit (in Vicos terms) to national

social and educational policies17.

16 We should take into consideration the fact that multiculturalism is, in any case, the most complicated

challenge to traditional models of democracy (see Dahl 2000: 240- 241). In addition, the analysis of the

recent French and Dutch elections has renewed discussions on the possible directions taken by a new

working- class or unemployed conservatism. In any case we shouldnt forget that in nationalist

ideologies and discursive practices, cultural multiplicity is historically taken to be a threat, on the

ground that it means change or even splintering off (see Hertzfeld 1987: 41).

17 Prof. Yannaras has attacked state educational policy and specifically certain new Greek school

textbooks because of their perceived focus on peace and tolerance and the subsequent neglect of

both

- the references to the Greek national liberation wars and struggles against their traditional enemies,- the lived aspects of national particularities, cultural pride and religious faith (Yannaras 1998).


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