www.gobiernolocal.org

Green PaperIntermediate Local Governments in SpainDiagnosis and Proposals to Strengthen the Institutional value of Intermediate Governments in the Autonomic Model

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1

Introduction

Introduction

1. The aim of this Green Paper is to provide a study of intermediate local governments and, in particular, the provincial councils in Spain. Such an analysis is urgently required, as after more than 30 years of constitutional development, it has become clear that the local institutional system is still a matter of unfinished business in our constitutional model from the territorial perspective. These pages provide a diagnosis of the current situation in intermediate local governments, as well as a large number of proposals or suggestions to be considered as options when implementing the reforms required in local government.

2. A large number of reasons could be given to explain why the local government institutional system (and, the topic of interest here, intermediate local governments), has not be completely closed, or to be more precise, is still an open process. Also, as will be seen, there are numerous unknown factors and uncertainties regarding the future of these levels of intermediate local governments. This report discusses, if not all, then, at least, the most important of these.

3. On a strictly methodological level, it should be stressed that this Green Paper has an essentially institutional focus. Both its content and conclusions and recommendations are aimed principally at civil society (i.e. the Spanish public, the end receivers of all political-administrative activity at this level of government), as well as the political representatives and leaders of central, autonomous and local structures.

4. At this critical time for Spain, at the start of the second decade of the 20th century, one cannot ignore the fact that certain political proposals have called into question the current basis and structure of local governments and, with of more relevance to this paper, particularly, there are voices that raise doubts about the role of the provincial councils as organs of provincial government and administration under the regimen general or Spanish general system 1.

5. These proposals have been launched without the necessary calm and reflection that a modification of the institutional architecture of this nature requires. It is also true that the constant, intense pressure from ‘the markets’ on the complex situation of the Spanish economic-financial system (and, in particular, the ‘sovereign debt’) during 2010 has uncovered a wide and improvised catalogue of ‘solutions’ to these challenges. And among these solutions, as is well known, are ones involving redesigning the municipal map and questioning certain levels of local government in Spain.

6. The purpose of the Green Paper is not to run away from debate, but it needs to be clear from the start that the scope of this report goes way beyond this contingent debate and is based more on strategy

1 [Translator’s note. This is the system of government applicable to most of the Spanish provinces (provincial councils); the exceptions are: the Balearic Isles (island councils), the Canary Isles (island councils known as cabildos) and the Basque Country and Navarre, whose provincial councils are governed by the regimen foral.]

2

Rafael Jiménez Asensio

than conjecture, while also providing a diagnosis of the current situation. Institutional reform in Spain and, of more relevance to this paper, the reform of local governments, is a strategic need of the first order (in other words, a ‘structural reform’) to redesign the system of distributing territorial responsibilities, thus making the country much more institutionally competitive and, consequently, strengthened in terms of economic, social and political development.

7. Indeed, political institutions are also ‘social infrastructures’ which tangibly contribute to a country’s economic development. And in this light, everything that strengthens intermediate local government institutions will also have the indirect effect of strengthening the political system and the economy, as well as the wellbeing of the citizens themselves.

8. Having said this, one needs to be fully aware that the institutional nature of intermediate local governments is, in many respects, fragile. This is particularly so in the case of provincial or ‘general system’ councils. This institutional fragility is particularly notable in its effect on democratic legitimacy, the distribution of powers and the funding system. As will be seen, to this institutional fragility must be added the inexistence of a common template for the provincial councils (in organisational, not institutional terms), as under the guise of a uniform system there are substantial differences in distribution of powers and organisation.

9. It is true that this does not occur, or only to a lesser extent, in other forms of intermediate local government (such as historical territories and the Balearic and Canary Island councils), which have stronger institutions, both in terms of the direct democratic legitimacy of their representative bodies and in terms of their wide range of powers and organisational design. For the moment, we shall leave to one side the also substantial differences in their funding models (at least with regard to the historical Basque territories and the Comunidad Foral of Navarre).

10. Conceptually, it is worth distinguishing between two basic types of intermediate local government: firstly, those that are firmly based in the Constitution itself (i.e. those that are based on constitutional recognition of the province or island); and, secondly, all intermediate local governments that have arisen out of the general provisions in the text of the constitution, regulations that are specified to varying degree in statutory texts and legal creations. The former (except in the case of constitutional reform) are untouchable by the legislator, while the latter, unless recognised by statutes, are accessible through legislation. To simplify, one may refer to ‘first-level’ and ‘second-level’ intermediate local governments, at least with regard to their constitutional guarantees.

11. The main subject of this Green Paper is ‘first-level’ intermediate local government (provincial councils, historical Basque territories and the Balearic and Canary Island councils). And within these intermediate local governments, it should be made clear that the main focus of attention and most of the proposals in this report are aimed at the reality of the general system provinces and, more specifically, the provincial councils. This report does not look at the unique case of the consells de vegueria2, included in the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia and recently developed by laws passed by the Catalan Parliament. The unequivocal terms of Sentence 31/2010, applying this reality to the provinces (and the provincial councils) and reserving for the state legislator the definition of the electoral system, the institutional organisation and (to a large extent) the funding system, means this level of government tends to be subsumed by the provincial councils (although their representative bodies are to be known as consells de vegueria in the near future).

12. The last part of the Green Paper briefly analyses other institutional realities in ‘first-level’ intermediate local governments other than the general-system provincial councils, as their form of government and

2 [Translator’s note. This is the name of the provincial councils after

the administrative redistribution of Catalonia.]

3

Introduction

particularly, one of distributing attributes in what may be termed a multi-coloured map of local structures interspersed with more than evident high transaction costs and fiscal impacts.

16. A report on intermediate local governments in Spain must bear in mind this ‘plural institutional reality’ and, thus, be capable of identifying the deficit represented by this model both in the distribution of power and in institutional organisation and funding. The diagnosis of the current state of intermediate local governments is a key element in order to formulate specific measures for improvement and, above all, to attempt to create a definitive territorial organisation in Spain.

17. And, to this end, it should be remembered here that the Democracy and Local Government Foundation has distributed a survey to all ‘first-level’ intermediate local governments (except the single-province autonomous communities, as these cannot be considered as such), the main aim of which is to produce a picture, however approximate, of the current situation at these levels of intermediate local government with regard to three points: a) the organisation and personnel structure of these bodies; b) the services provided as priorities; and c) the expenditure structure of these intermediate local governments.

18. The Democracy and Local Government Foundation would like to express its gratitude for the excellent response to this survey, both on the part of the bodies that are on the Foundation’s board and those that are not. The results obtained provide a significant sample which, at the very least (as reflected in the different sections of this report) permits the diagnosis, conclusions and recommendations of this report to be drawn up on an empirical basis or ‘platform’, and, therefore, to frame them within the ‘institutional reality’ that can occasionally be somewhat removed from the regulatory texts themselves. Having said this, the urgency with which Green Paper has been written has prevented a full statistical study and comprehensive analysis of the data from being presented. This is now being prepared

system of power distribution is a good reference point for how these levels of intermediate local government are evolving in relation to the traditional master model. However, it must be asked to what extent these institutional structures are strictly speaking ‘intermediate local governments’ or something distinct (a key case here are the historical Basque territories, which differ significantly from the configuration of these local bodies, but the Balearic and Canary Island councils also have significantly unique features).

13. Autonomous communities consisting of a single province should be treated differently. These are not, strictly speaking, a level of intermediate local government, although the old provincial council functions have been ‘integrated’ into their powers. To put it another way, the single-province autonomous communities are bodies completely different in nature to strictly local ones, although they absorbed the ‘province’ as a local body. This, though, is not through the Constitution but the express decisions of the ordinary state legislator (Law on the Autonomous Process) and basic legislation, although with clear precedents in some (not all) of the single-province autonomous community statutes of autonomy.

14. What is termed here, simplified to some degree, as ‘second-level’ intermediate local government is also the subject of this Green Paper. These are sometimes (at least potentially) authentic local government levels and other local intermediate bodies, whose effective coordination depends on a variety of circumstances, some legal (metropolitan areas and regions) and others based on the wishes of the local bodies that constitute them (consortiums and associations of municipalities).

15. For the purposes of this report, the point of interest in these ‘second-level’ intermediate local governments lies in the problems of coordination arising between the province as a local body and the aforementioned structures of second-level intermediate local government (or bodies). This is not only a problem of ‘institutional coexistence’, but also, more

4

Rafael Jiménez Asensio

also the case that in 2005 the Ministry of Public Administrations promoted a White Paper on Local Government Reform, which included the specific treatment of the province as a local body. And, finally, in 2007, the Democracy and Local Government Foundation, together with Barcelona Provincial Council, published a number of reflections from an internal, comparative point of view whose subject was intermediate local government.

22. But despite these important contributions and others from different forums and institutions, the members of the Democracy and Local Government Foundation, on 9 September 2010, saw the need, at that time, to promote a reflection with an institutional scope, analysing specifically the role of intermediate local governments in Spain and drawing conclusions and recommendations to highlight the value of the provincial councils and other intermediate local governments in the autonomous communities, as well as introducing into the political agenda the need to strengthen this intermediate level institutionally, with the aim of effectively reinforcing the local government system in Spain.

23. It is also true, and should not be born in mind at this time, that the province as a local entity has been the subject of numerous, extremely relevant academic studies from the perspective of public law and, in particular, administrative law. Indeed, the doctrine of administrative law (and, to a much lesser extent, constitutional law and public finance) has made important contributions to the analysis of the province in the constitutional and statutory framework. Rigorous academic collective and individual works have been produced specifically discussing the province, as well as numerous articles and studies on the same topic. As far as possible, these important contributions have been taken into account in the writing of this report.

24. Thus to greater or lesser extent, this Green Paper combines a series of approaches in the analysis of this institutional reality. Indeed, notwithstanding that the legal-constitutional and administrative analysis will

by the Foundation and will be published as an appendix to this report in the forthcoming months.

19. Clearly, the diagnosis should be accompanied by proposals. The idea that drives the reflections in this Green Paper is none other than the strengthening of the institutional quality of our intermediate local governments, with the aim of structuring a rational system for distributing responsibilities over the different territorial levels of government, boosting the implementation of effective and efficient government and administrative structures and guaranteeing sufficient funding for these levels of government so that they can provide these services properly with the end goal of ensuring that the public (either directly or through the municipalities) receives better public services.

20. Therefore, the report does not seek ‘self-satisfaction’ regarding our current intermediate local governments. This report demonstrates in detail how the road towards institutional improvement is a wide one. And this is a necessity, given that the main basis for the production of this Green Paper is none other than a belief in the ‘reinventing or reestablishment’ (we may also term the process ‘updating’) of the provincial councils and other intermediate local governments in Spain, with the idea of making these institutions a paradigm of good government and good administration, competing efficiently in the institutional market and at the forefront of economic and social development in the territories. All these are circumstances that must qualitatively improve the position of the public, as the end receivers of the governmental actions of these institutions.

21. The current panorama provided by intermediate local governments is the result of many years’ (over 30) contingency and, to a degree, improvised government. It is also the result, as will be seen, of their long and eventful historical process. The lack of collective reflection on this specific point is highly illustrative. It is true that the Expert Committee report of 1981 discussed the role of the province within the framework of the (at that time) ‘slow-route’ statutes of autonomy. It is

5

Introduction

misses, belongs to a small group of people who participated directly in producing its final draft and to the coordinators of this report, for the parts designated to them.

28. As previously stated, the Green Paper was produced from a large number of contributions on specific topics, written by numerous university lecturers, experts, top civil servants, intermediate local government managers and magistrates. In any event, the contents of the Green Paper is not binding to the contributors, as their reflections, opinions and judgements have in some cases been faithfully followed, in others only to a limited extent and on a few specific occasions, the report has distanced itself from these points of view. However, this report would not have been possible without their important contributions. The Green Paper writing and coordination team would like to express their thanks for all these contributions, which had to be prepared at very short notice. It is also the aim of the Democracy and Local Government Foundation, once the Green Paper has been published, to disseminate these important contributions in order to further enrich debate on the issue.

29. Furthermore, it is clear and should be acknowledged here that the writing of the Green Paper would not have been possible without the important contribution of members of the Horizon Planning Group for provincial councils, set up within the Democracy and Local Government Foundation at the start of 2010. Made up of qualified civil servants and top-level directors from a number of provincial councils, it was a key element in intelligently combining the conceptual frameworks of the problem with the generally unknown institutional reality. Its work as a true strategic reflection group, its important conceptual and empirical contributions and, above all, its work in reviewing and enriching the report and producing the final draft of the conclusions and recommendations were extremely important in the process of producing this report.

30. In the light of the above, it should be absolutely clear that the Democracy and Local Government

undoubtedly play a part in the development of this report, the current situation in Spanish intermediate local governments cannot be fully understood without specific reference to their historical formation process, as well as the through a necessary comparison of ‘our model’ of intermediate local governments with those in other European Union countries. In any event, the definition of the constitutional (and statutory) scope of provincial autonomy is also a first step to a proper understanding of the issue.

25. The Green Paper also aims to approach an institutional analysis from the perspective of the form of government (electoral system and institutional system) and its organisation, stressing the problems regarding qualified public employment that is essential at this level of intermediate local government for its functions to be carried out.

26. Together with the above, the necessary focus on power distribution (which is at the epicentre of the reflections and proposals given here) is complemented by a number of references, albeit succinct, to the public policies currently being implemented by provincial councils. And, indeed, a report on intermediate local governments cannot overlook the key issue of funding, which, notwithstanding its individual treatment in a specific section in this Green Paper, is present at different points in the report. There can be no doubt that this pairing of issues (powers/funding) is the basis of the institutional redesign (and possibly strengthening) of intermediate local governments and, in particular, the provincial councils.

27. A large number of people have participated, directly or indirectly, in producing this report, and are expressly acknowledged in the Appendix. Many of them prepared initial papers which were later developed by the coordinators, the Foundation’s Horizon Scanning Group and, in particular, the writers of the report. However, it should be stressed here that although the Green Paper was commissioned from the Foundation and is based on the abovementioned papers, the authorship of the report, and thus both its hits and

6

Rafael Jiménez Asensio

Foundation and, more specifically, its members may not necessarily agree with all the content, proposals or critical diagnoses contained in the Green Paper. The reality of intermediate local governments is highly plural and it is often, quite frankly, difficult (if not impossible) to mould it into uniform parameters of analysis. What the Democracy and Local Government Foundation does take responsibility for are the Green Paper’s ‘Conclusions’ and ‘Decalogue of Recommendations’ because, as stated above, they were produced by an expert group set up by the Foundation, including directors and top civil servants from different intermediate local governments.

31. In brief, the Green Paper is intended as an instrument for reflection to open a calm, rational and productive debate on the current state and future perspectives of the provincial councils and other intermediate local governments in Spain, with the end goal of collaborating in the required proposals for the reform of the Spanish institutional system, aimed at rationalising the dysfunctions in the current model. In any event, the starting point of this report is clear: intermediate local governments (and, in particular, the provincial councils) are essential and a necessity as a means, firstly, to strengthening local autonomy and, secondly, to providing better public services.

7

Conclusions

the first case, the state has a federal structure and a limited territorial area, which makes the creation of another level of government between the municipality and ‘the Land’ superfluous. In the others, the small population, on the one hand, and the existence of administrative regions, on the other, make this level of intermediate local government unnecessary.

b) In all the countries analysed, except Spain, the electoral systems (with variants that do not need analysing here) are based on principles of direct election.

c) The general rule, also with the unique exception of Spain, is that such intermediate local governments have material powers, which in some cases are complemented by purely functional powers. The latter are greater in countries where municipal atomisation and fragmentation predominates. In any event, such material powers that are assigned vary from one context to another depending on the institutional role intended for intermediate local government within the architecture of public administration in the state in question.

d) The funding systems, once again with the exception of Spain and one or two other countries (such as Germany), are relatively dependent on funding through transfers, although in some models funding through specific local government taxes is the dominant element (Nordic countries).

1. One constant fact that is clearly shown by the comparative analysis of European Union countries carried out in this Green Paper, is the diversity in the forms of intermediate local governments, as a result, to some degree obviously, of the different existing constitutional contexts, the form of the state, the different traditions and historical evolution processes in each case, as well as the local government reforms implemented in these countries in recent decades.

2. However, despite these noticeable differences and the local government reform processes in a lot of these countries, a general trend towards strengthening the role of intermediate local governments can be observed. Of particular interest to this report is the case in the Southern European countries, whose distinguishing feature is ‘political localism’, resulting in a clear tension between the need to strengthen local governments and the fragmentation that exists, which substantially weakens their management capacity. The need to strengthen the second step of local government in these cases is obvious if one wants to strengthen local governments institutionally.

3. The panorama revealed in intermediate local governments in the different European Union countries analysed does, however, offer a number of strong ideas that should be born in mind for a clearer idea of the extent of the problem in Spain. These are:

a) Almost all the country’s analysed have levels of intermediate local government, with the exceptions of Austria, Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal. In

Conclusions

8

Conclusions

c) Over time, and due to this dual condition, the province has taken on substantive or material powers of a certain importance. It has not always been limited to exercising functional powers; however, the gradual process by which it has been stripped of such powers, has eventually led to such a situation.

d) The political regime under Franco was possibly one of the periods that most precipitated the decline of the provincial institution as a local entity, above all through the loss of the (still limited) provincial autonomy that had been acquired.

e) At the time of the Spanish Constitution of 1978, the province had become an institution highly susceptible to the new airs of territorial demands that started to take shape in the years of the political transition. The provincial electoral legislation, approved during the constitutional process, opted for indirect democratic legitimisation of provincial government. However, the Spanish territorial situation was already incubating a change of considerable size.

7. The province (with the obvious exception of the autonomous communities, constituted from the second transitory provision of the Constitution) had a key role in the process of creating the autonomous community system, in accordance with the so-called principio dispositivo 3. And the presence of the provincial institution in the Constitution is certainly highly evident. However, its double (and, up to a point, confusing) characterisation of the province as a local entity, on the one hand, and a territorial division fulfilling the activities of the sate, on the other, does not help in the process of strengthening the idea of provincial autonomy.

3 [Translator’s note. This is the principle in the Spanish constitution by which each community is able exercise the right to self-organisation.]

4. The formation process of provinces as local entities in Spain is a complex and lengthy one. Throughout the process there is an evident tension between the initial configuration of the province as the executive branch of the state administration in the territory, and its subsequent configuration as a ‘dual model’ through the figure of the civil governor (a two-headed figure that represented the central government while also being president of the provincial council), finally ending up as a local body granted with autonomy.

5. Indeed, this historical process has been littered with innumerable reforms of the local system, in a sort of never-ending circle. Institutional stability of the province has not been, in logical correlation with the country’s political-constitutional instability, the dominant theme in this historical process.

6. It is worth briefly discussing some of the complementary ideas to the above, with regard to the historical formation process of the provinces described in this report:

a) The province as a local entity found serious difficulties in establishing an effective position in the development of the liberal Spanish state in the 19th and 20th centuries. Except for the occasional period of progressive liberal governments (the sexenio revolucionario, the period from 1868-1874), the province did not acquire express recognition as a local body until, paradoxically, the Provincial Statute of 1925, during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Even so, interference from the state administration still continues.

b) It should be stressed that the electoral systems for provincial councils have not only been based on indirect suffrage; there have also been limited experiences of direct suffrage and other mixed electoral systems. However, the (old) judicial division has been omnipresent as the electoral constituency since 1835, although occasionally reorganised through the figure of the districts.

9

Conclusions

11. In this context, it may be concluded that constitutionally guaranteed provincial autonomy has experienced a gradual yet permanent process of erosion as a consequence of its case-by-case legal interpretation and the enormous diversity of statutory regulations that, with the aim of making the principio dispositivo effective through a recognised and constitutionally guaranteed institution, have designed the role and function of the provincial institution in both the ‘first-generation’ and ‘second-generation’ statutes. Redirecting this process towards more rational parameters requires either a modification of basic legislation in the terms discussed or a change in constitutional and ordinary jurisprudence that partially modifies the blurred lines protecting provincial autonomy. In brief, the provinces are political institutions of the constitutional state. And, for one reason or another, this dimension needs to be reinforced.

12. The current municipal fragmentation in Spain necessarily requires an intermediate level of government that guarantees municipal autonomy, to ensure that it is truly effective. The province is the most appropriate intermediate government step due to tra dition, management capacity and experience in exercising these functions, as well as its proven institutional strength compared to other emerging institutional formulas that have so far failed to crystallise.

13. But it is not only local fragmentation that objectively justifies the province as intermediate local government, given that, based on terms of efficiency, certain powers, whether functional or material, are most appropriately distributed to a territorial level of government, such as the province.

14. The provincial level of government is justified both as a core part of intermunicipality and as a local government with a framework of its own attributes, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle (and above all with the aim of preventing powers ‘jumping’ from the local to the autonomous level). Indeed there are

8. Provincial autonomy is recognised in the constitution, and is no less than that foreseen for the municipalities. However, the means of institutional guarantee has clearly proved insufficient to fully safeguard provincial autonomy from a gradual stripping of powers, as it is only serves to prevent the suppression of the institution and, possibly, avoid a complete stripping of its attributes.

9. The fundamental problem with this (limited) expression of provincial autonomy lies mainly in the power that the principio dispositivo has acquired in this area. The statutes of autonomy have regulated the province in different ways and to differing degrees of intensity, limiting the extent of provincial autonomy. This, however, was by choice, given that the internalisation of the province could have led (and in some cases did lead) to a strengthening of the intermediate local government level, rather than a stripping of the provincial government level. Thus it is the combination of the Constitution and the statutes that has, in the end, defined the effective extent of provincial autonomy in each case. This internalisation of the province in the autonomous structure has clearly weakened it, unmitigated by the ‘second-generation’ statutes of autonomy, despite the greater treatment of local government and the better treatment of the province in some cases.

10. This fragmented or ‘variable geometry’ landscape of provincial autonomy is not in itself negative, except that it results in a weakening of the provincial institution. And, if this were the case, this effect could only be lessened through a constitutional reform that better defines its content (a somewhat unlikely hypothesis) or a modification of basic local government legislation that, in accordance with the most recent doctrine of the Constitutional Court of Spain, establishes a series of material areas as principles or minimum standards of the distribution of powers that should be assigned to provinces, notwithstanding that such powers may be exceeded by the statutes themselves or, more precisely, the laws that develop them.

10

Conclusions

adapted to the present situation). Furthermore there is no scrutiny of governmental management by the electorate, nor, strictly speaking, provincial election campaigns, thus limiting the effectiveness of the democratic principle.

18. Notwithstanding the opinions expressed in this Green Paper suggesting the implementation of a direct representation system in the provincial institution, justified through the recognition of the province’s material powers, it remains appropriate and reasonable that the political parties reach an agreement on the type of electoral system that is eventually implemented. In any event, it is now essential for the current situation to be reassessed with the aim of strengthening the institutional role of the provincial councils and, above all, to stress their democratic legitimacy. To this end, a process of reflection on the reform of their electoral system should be initiated with a view to choosing one of these three alternatives: a) reforming the current system of indirect representation; b) implementing a system of direct representation; and c) incorporating a mixed system. This process should be linked to reform of the power distribution system. Furthermore, the provincial institutions should promote systems of transparency, strengthen the statute of opposition 4 and introduce good government codes, with the aim of strengthening the institution’s democratic quality.

19. The electoral system, together with many other factors, has determined the model or institutional organisation and the administrative structure of the provincial councils. The current form of provincial government is founded on traditional parameters and has the same government structure as the general system municipalities (thus, it is the same as the small and medium-sized municipalities). Elements that strengthen the role of the plenary council as the organ of control and oversight of the provincial government and the approval of regulations need to be incorporated

4 [Translator’s note. This is a statute on the constitutional right of parties not in government to exercise critical opposition and propose alternatives to government policies.]

local powers that, for reasons of scale, need to be exercised by a local government other than municipal, such as the province.

15. The provincial council, in its current constitutional configuration, is the representative body of the province and exercises its ‘government and administration’. Therefore, the provincial council is an organ of government that exercises political and not just administrative functions, which has to prioritise its decisions as well as its resources. The role of the provincial councils as ‘provincial government’ needs to be strengthened. Also, in the fields of functional attributes, there is an effective route to establishing political priorities through, for instance, a system of agreement with the municipalities and of evaluation of such policies.

16. Current provincial powers are open and imprecise, which directly affects the organisational design of the provincial administrations, thus producing a high degree of plurality and giving rise to very different models. If it is true that the required institutional organisation is a common factor, then it is also the case that the general and institutional provincial administration offers a wide range of options depending on the public policies that each provincial body develops. It would be reasonable for the different provincial councils to have a common basic organisational framework, without impeding the principle of self-organisation in each case.

17. With regard to the representative nature of the institution, the provincial council has indirect democratic legitimacy, due to the representation system established by the electoral organic legislator (based on the model established in 1978). This system differs from the provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government and has the effect of deactivating, if only in partially, the political potential of the institution as a fully representative local government, due to the distance created with its own citizens. The current system also has a number of dysfunctions, both in representation and in the design of the electoral constituencies (a model which, in any case, should be

11

Conclusions

g) Commitment to recruiting professional public directors who implement top-down modernisation processes on the respective organisations.

h) An investment in the institutional strengthening of HR in the councils, both for endogenous reasons (recruiting talent and seeking excellence) and exogenous reasons (support for the municipalities from qualified professionals).

i) A strengthening of current staff in line with the increasing implementation of technology and specialisation based on needs, as well as building professional career models in the culture of performance and evaluation.

j) Boosting the knowledge society and network management.

21. The provincial councils need to promote (in cases where they have not already done so) a modernisation process, and introduce a process of continual innovation into their daily operation, with the aim of encouraging the principle of good administration, to become ‘the institutional mirror of the municipalities’ through best management practices, thus gaining legitimacy through the efficiency that is essential to strengthening its institutional role, which is even more urgent in a period of major fiscal crisis. This is the immediate challenge for the 2011-2015 mandate. At stake is a major part of its future.

22. Through the 1985 Law on the Foundations of Local Government, the provincial councils have been given a number of functional or instrumental powers, mainly consisting of conceiving the provincial body in terms of service to the different municipalities. This basic legislative option contrasts sharply with the situation existing in European Union countries and, furthermore, differs from the traditional configuration of the province in our institutional system of distributing public responsibilities.

23. The constitutional state model, from the perspective of territorial organisation, has led to an

into provincial institutional organisation. The configuration of the provincial government also needs to be strengthened, with its own executive powers coordinated around the figure of the president and governing body. This does not in any way imply replicating the municipal form of government of large cities at the provincial level, given that this has much room for improvement and a minimum institutional organisation has to be established appropriate to the real needs of the province (and its powers), permitting the ulterior purpose of the provincial self-government principle.

20. The provincial councils should make a firm commitment to strengthening institutional legitimacy based on improving their efficiency. This requires such institutions to introduce a culture of organisational ‘reinvention’, ‘innovation’, ‘modernisation’ and ‘paradigm change’ based on the following foundations:

a) Promoting a results-oriented management culture, which enables the impact of policies to be measured before, during and after their implementation.

b) A simplification and rationalisation of the administrative structures and especially their institutional administration.

c) Continuous improvement in their management processes, with a constant simplification of procedures and the elimination of administrative burdens through the development of ICTs.

d) Commitment to an administration that provides quality services.

e) Development of the innovation and design of local policies.

f) Optimisation in the management of financial resources, which, as well as being more transparent and efficient in terms of control, enables the cost of public services to be known.

12

Conclusions

tasks needs to be undertaken, similar to that of the Andalusian Law on Local Autonomy.

b) Recognition of a number of service-providing powers must be given to the provinces, whether for reasons of scale or because some are already exercised de facto and others are perfectly identifiable based on a series of indicators.

c) Provincial powers in terms of territorial and urban planning must be strengthened, both for economies of scale, but also in certain cases due to the need for ‘creating distance’ between specific interests and the centres of political decision making.

d) Also, the province should be given powers over intervention in private activities and development in a number of areas.

28. This institutional redesign of local powers immediately raises the problem of who and how to make it effective. Unless the Constitution is reformed in this direction, the only possibility of strengthening the role of the province as a local entity with its own powers is through, firstly, reforming basic state legislation with regard to local government and, secondly, the internalisation of these intervention lines by the different autonomous legislators.

29. With regard to the first point, it is considered necessary for the new basic local government regulations currently being drawn up to reflect the need to strengthen provincial council powers, assigning them not just functional powers but determining that they should also intervene in specific material areas. The areas where the provincial councils can effectively provide their own services and exercise powers are, among others, the environment, economic and social development, territorial planning, culture and immigration.

30. With regard to the second point, this must start from the position that the statutes of autonomy creating a highly plural reality with regard to the position of the

evident institutional strengthening of the autonomous communities and a process of (relative) internalisation of local governments, most noticeably in the case of the provinces. This process, which could have had various outcomes, has however led, firstly, to a gradual stripping of provincial powers in favour of the autonomous community and paradoxically, to a degree of functional overlap or duplication of its attributes, which in some cases has produced intermediate local government levels and local bodies of the same nature, other than the province, creating an sense of lack of intermunicipal coordination, as well as eroding the powers of the province.

24. The analysis of provincial powers must be based on criteria of their own constitutional and institutional legitimacy and, in particular, their democratic dimension (which has already been examined) and institutional efficiency, results or performance. From this point of view, constitutionally the province has sufficient legitimacy, but, in terms of powers, significant advances can be made to optimise it and strengthen its institutional legitimacy.

25. The strengthening of this constitutional and, above all, institutional legitimacy has to be based on the attribution of a set of new powers at the provincial government level, which have a material or substantive content. This does not mean that the current powers or, in particular, those relating to assisting the municipalities cannot be not maintained.

26. In any event, powers need to be reassigned to strengthen the political importance of the province, based on three criteria: asymmetry, diversity and flexibility.

27. This quantitative and qualitative increase in municipal powers must cover three areas. These are:

a) Assistance and cooperation must be maintained as one of the core powers (given the consideration of the province as a ‘grouping of municipalities’), but a differential analysis of the different assistance

13

Conclusions

agents and an important source of funding for the municipalities. With regard to the exercising of substantive powers, there are two areas in particular in which intermediate local governments have had larger expenditure: the production of social assets (promotion and dissemination of culture, social welfare, fire prevention and fighting, healthcare services, hospitals and health centres) and economic assets (roads, basic infrastructures, transport and environmental protection).

35. The funding system organised to support this pattern of expenditure varies according to the intermediate local government in question. Although the Balearic and Canary Island councils enjoy a better funding system based on greater financial autonomy (higher income through participation in taxation), the autonomy and financial sufficiency of the general system councils is seriously impeded. A large percentage of the funding for general system councils (a little over 80% of their total income) comes from transfers from the state and, in some cases, the autonomous communities.

36. Without doubt, this system of funding based mainly on transfers turns the general system councils into dependent institutions. One must also add to this problem the fact that there are significant differences in the amounts transferred between one council and another. Some general system councils receive much larger funding than others. Although the population criterion would appear an adequate basis for distributing resources, other variables need to be introduced into the funding model, such as geographic spread or inter-territorial solidarity, which could justify given asymmetries in the distribution of resources.

37. Thus, the funding model for provincial councils leaves room for qualitative improvements, especially if the distribution of powers is redesigned, as urged by this report. In brief, it is a matter of making them much less dependent on funding by transfer, thereby strengthening their autonomous income through their own taxes, but especially by participating in state and autonomous community tax collection, corresponding

province in the local government systems. The most thorough solution to strengthening the powers of the province (notwithstanding the possibility of such an effect arising through the new basic local government framework) must lie in the signing of a new state pact (or at least a formal policy with a broad consensus) between the different political parties regarding the general lines for redesigning the system of local powers, with the aim of assigning the province those powers which, for reasons of scale or efficiency, should be developed at intermediate local government levels.

31. The relatively marginal position of the province compared to the municipality is not only observable in the area of powers, but is also clearly present in the field of funding. The intermediate local governments in Spain (general-system provincial councils and Balearic and Canary island councils) represent a small part of local public spending: 13.5%.

32. This fact is clearly indicative of the small part played by intermediate local governments in Spain. In the system of local government as a whole, the municipality is the body that manages most of the resources and intermediate local governments, especially general system councils, are relegated to merely providing assistance and complementing the municipalities with marginal management of local public spending.

33. Despite this context, some intermediate local governments have undertaken important work, not only in assisting and cooperating with the municipality but also in exercising a number of material or substantive powers. Here, the contrast between powers attributed by the legislator and those truly exercised can be clearly observed.

34. If one analyses the spending of intermediate local governments, it may be concluded that their work in providing assistance and cooperation translates into the transfer of large amounts of resources between organisations, above all town councils and consortiums. Thus, intermediate local governments become investing

14

Conclusions

41. It may be asked to what extent this lesser (or less intense) dedication by single-province autonomous communities to their supposed local dimension has led to a decline in the principle of local autonomy, both from the provincial point of view (the interests of the province are ignored due to a lack of provincial bodies to defend them) and the municipal point of view (the municipalities do not receive assistance and cooperation from the second level of local government, as it does not exist). The local political community, consisting of municipalities and provinces, is not coordinated in this case: it is quite clear that the autonomous community is not a ‘grouping of municipalities’.

42. Without doubt, the recovery of the provincial councils in the single-province autonomous communities is, today, a completely unfeasible goal. Despite this, overcoming these limitations means institutional solutions must be sought through specific bodies where the municipalities can assume a co-decision-making role in subjects that affect them (e.g. drawing up and approving the works and services plan).

43. In the Canary Isles, the councils have been configured as hybrid, or double-natured institutions: they are considered autonomous and local institutions at the same time. Created in 1912, the Canary Island councils are now the intermediate local government par excellence in the Canary archipelago. The special regime for these councils established by the Canary Islands’ Statute of Autonomy and the basic and autonomous legislation make these institutions that are clearly different from the general-system provincial councils in matters of the powers exercised, the electoral system, their organisation and operation and their funding system.

44. The Canary Island councils have a broad range of substantive or material powers, making them much more than simply a complementary institution that exercises instrumental support functions for the municipalities, as is the case of general-system provincial councils. In practice, the volume of powers transferred to these councils is considerable; thus

logically to the responsibilities they have assumed. Obviously, this reform should be carried out in the framework of the long overdue reform of the local funding system.

38. However, intermediate local government in Spain does not end with the provincial councils, as there is a broad institutional spectrum which, for different reasons and causes, has led to an institutional intermunicipality map in the autonomous communities that is highly varied and lacking in a common pattern. Indeed, the singularities of the islands significantly qualify the specific nature of these intermediate (local) governments. The same is true with the Basque or Navarran provincial councils, based on the first additional provision of the Constitution. However, this also combines with the ‘integration’ (i.e. suppression) of the provincial councils into the single-province autonomous communities.

39. To this institutional conglomerate of intermediate local governments may be added others that, with a statutory or legal basis, have been created by the autonomous communities: regions and metropolitan areas. And together with these are other intermediate structures (normally with the purpose of managing ‘given’ public services), such as associations of municipalities or consortiums, whose proliferation in local government is a perfect example of the weakness of the intermunicipality systems, which should revolve around the province as a constitutionally guaranteed local body.

40. In the single-province autonomous communities, the provincial councils underwent a process of integration, which in practice meant suppression. The organic disappearance of the provincial councils meant that the autonomous administration assumed a dual role and, therefore, became responsible for defending both the autonomous interests and, when required, the local interests of the province. However, of these two, the autonomous ‘soul’ always defeated the local one, as the latter was gradually diluted until it had been all but reduced to a directorate-general of an autonomous government ministry.

15

Conclusions

have ‘their own powers’ in a broad range of substantive or material areas. These are powers specifically for the councils, protected by the statutes. This recognition of a broad range of specific and substantive powers is accompanied by an electoral system the gives the island councils direct democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, statute and autonomous legislators have decided to replace the form of organisation and operation of the provincial councils of the general system, initially applicable to these councils, and to implement a parliamentarian form of government.

49. All these changes in the distribution of powers, in the electoral system and in organisation and operation, have established the Balearic Island councils as autonomous institutions, institutionally strengthened and with their own profiles, with all the subsequent advantages.

50. The three historical Basque territories, Álava, Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, are governed by institutions with an institutional structure or form of government that differs greatly from the general-system provincial councils. This unique profile has developed under the first additional provision of the Constitution.

51. The singularities of the Basque provincial councils compared to those of the general system include their institutional nature and their organisation and form of elections, their powers and the funding system. With regard to their nature, the Basque provincial councils are hybrid institutions: they are public territorial bodies that are branches of the autonomous community government and local bodies at the same time, similar to the situation in the single-province autonomous communities. With respect to their organisation and electoral system, the Basque provincial councils have exercised their powers of self-organisation and have been structured as a parliamentary system, enjoying direct democratic legitimacy.

52. The powers of the Basque provincial councils cover a wide range of substantive or material powers, thus differing from the complementary or instrumental

they are institutions that exercise a significant degree of power. Secondly, these councils enjoy direct democratic legitimacy. The election system is similar to the direct democratic election system of the municipalities and differs from the indirect electoral systems of the general-system provincial councils.

45. With regard to their organisation and functioning, the basic legislation regarding the island councils of Tenerife and Gran Canaria ensures that the organisation system for large city councils is applicable to them, too. The Parliament of the Canary Isles has decided to apply this system to the councils of La Palma and Lanzarote as well. The island councils of Fuerteventura, La Gomera and El Hierro are organised and operate under the provincial council general system.

46. Finally, the characteristic in which the Canary Island councils most differ from the general-system provincial councils is that the former enjoy extensive autonomy and adequate funding. These councils are the intermediate local governments that have received the highest income per inhabitant (€ 884 per capita), although they are also affected by the current global economic crisis.

47. The Balearic Island councils have a dual nature: firstly, they are autonomous institutions and, secondly, they are the islands’ bodies of government and, therefore, local institutions. After the 2007 reform of the statutes, the hybrid nature of these island councils was confirmed, stressing their autonomous aspects. It is still to be seen how this might affect their local nature. In any event, the 2007 statute reform produced the institutional strengthening of the councils in all aspects. The Balearic Island councils are organised as autonomous institutions, which defend their own interests and undertake their own substantive political activity, over and above the merely complementary and instrument function of the general-system provincial councils.

48. This institutional strengthening is undoubtedly clearer in the distribution of powers. The island councils

16

Conclusions

that is economically inefficient and lacking in rationality, which also threatens the constitutionally recognised and guaranteed provincial autonomy.

57. The region’s area of action may be inserted into the province’s field of powers or a differentiated intermediate local body. The likelihood of the region establishing itself as an intermediate local government with its own unique features differing from the province could make sense in cases where unique or specific regions are created, although such circumstances would have to be coordinated within a system of relations with the provincial council. As an intermediate local government, it could be an appropriate formula of intermunicipality in the case of single-province communities.

58. To date, the function of the regions in the local institutional system has shown no signs of being an appropriate solution. Therefore, if a clarification of, and distinction between, the powers of the provinces and the regions cannot be provided, it does not seem reasonable to replace the provincial councils with the regions, as this would favour fragmentation (and a degree of competition) of the idea of ‘local political community’, of which so many regions are a part.

59. The metropolitan area is a local body, whose existence is determined by the autonomous legislator, who also establishes its final configuration as a territorial or institutional body and its legal system, always respecting basic state regulations. The autonomous internalisation of this type of body is also very intense.

60. The current legal design permits the autonomous legislator to establish the metropolitan area under the form of a territorial or general public administration or an institutional or specialised public administration. Only when the metropolitan area is established as a territorial or general public administration may it be categorised as an intermediate local government in the strictest sense. In the latter case, it may only be termed an intermediate local body.

functions exercised by the general-system provincial councils. Undoubtedly, some of the material powers are explained by historic rights.

53. Finally, one of the most important differences is that the Basque provincial councils enjoy a funding system that guarantees extensive autonomy and adequate funding. The Basque provincial councils are responsible for raising taxes and distributing them throughout the government agencies with powers in the Basque Country. The Basque provincial councils have become the key administration, as a tax-collecting and -distributing body, of the Basque Country.

54. The region in Spain has had a weak and, in some cases, inexistent implementation in the local institutional framework. It is not specifically mentioned in the text of the Constitution. Nor does the Law on the Foundations of Local Government provide much more detailed regulation of the regional body. Thus, the region is a creation of the autonomous communities, often somewhat removed from the local sphere (that of the municipalities and above all the provinces) and a form of alternative (although unstated) to the provincial level of government.

55. There are different autonomous options with respect to the division of the territory into regions. The regional division may be generalised to the whole autonomous community or may be made on a case-by-case basis through the approval of specific legislation. The degree of internalisation of the regional body is not homogenous to all the autonomous communities. The statutes of autonomy differ in the treatment given to the region.

56. The construction of intermunicipality, therefore, in the pluri-provincial autonomous communities that have opted for the region, involves a complex coexistence between province and region, above all because no one has known (or wanted) to establish a distribution of powers to the region different to that of the provinces. The result is a model of duplicated intermunicipality and concurrent powers,

17

Conclusions

is none other than the limited management capacities of many municipalities, while, on the other, it is a sign that the province (or some provinces) have been replaced in exercising the powers they are now required to develop.

64. The province, in its capacity as a core body of intermunicipality should, in any event, participate actively in the establishment of consortiums and also promote the creation of associations of municipalities where required, offering such bodies any technical assistance they require. It cannot be sidelined or ignored in these processes, as has happened in a number of recent cases of the institutionalisation of associations of municipalities or consortiums. Thus, it would be worthwhile to clarify what the functions of these institutions are and to prevent provincial powers overlapping or being duplicated, except, in the case of consortiums, when the provincial body is a key part of the consortium’s governing body.

65. It is intolerable that such entities concurrently assume powers already assigned to the province (general assistance for, and cooperation with, the municipalities). Therefore, the right of association of the municipalities must respect the autonomy of the province, as constitutionally recognised and guaranteed, whose essential core lies in the existence of a ‘differentiated functional area’ where the provinces enjoy their own decision-making powers, identified by the Constitutional Court, with the function of assisting and cooperating with the municipalities in their territory.

66. Overcoming these and other possible tensions between the provinces and formulas of municipal association involves providing an appropriate match between both realities. Such a match must surely involve promoting such formulas of association, but also clearly establishing their limits. And, equally, it involves a clear delimitation of the position and functions of the province in our local system, including establishing the role of the province in relation to the associated municipalities.

61. Today, the limited implementation of the metropolitan area in Spain as a solution designed by the basic legislator to tackle problems arising from the metropolitan phenomenon appears evident, contrasting with the rise of this local government formula in Europe and the rest of the world. The errors in its design may be obvious. The central problem with the concept of the metropolitan areas is, undoubtedly, that they are bodies created by the autonomous community and introduced with varying degrees of success into the existing local reality. An improvement in the basic regulatory framework of the metropolitan areas, favouring greater protagonism for the municipalities affected and the provincial councils in the creation and management of this type of body could provide the metropolitan areas with a more comfortable presence in the ‘local political system’. Thus, the provincial councils should provide institutional leadership in the process of establishing the metropolitan areas.

62. Having seen the limited implementation of the metropolitan area, it can be seen that what works in practice are alternative techniques to confront the metropolitan phenomenon, such as associations of municipalities and consortiums, which due to their voluntary nature and flexibility have been remarkably successful as a solution for metropolitan issues, without initially being designed by the legislator for this purpose. The province, region or island could also take on metropolitan functions as a separate internal organisation given specific functions, in the part of the territory where the metropolitan area is located. The creation of metropolitan areas in the framework of the province could also be the ideal institutional solution to realise the idea of an integrated and coherent ‘local political community’, into which the metropolitan reality could be comfortably inserted.

63. Intermunicipality has undergone an intense process of plural coordination (or variable geometry) through the proliferation or multiplication of associations of municipalities and consortiums. And, on the one hand, this process highlights an evident problem, which

18

Conclusions

of considerable inefficiency. Planning intermunicipality does not mean denying or reducing the complete effectiveness of the organising principle of each local body or preventing forms of voluntary municipal grouping; it only means restructuring the local government space on the basis of rationality, with a constant view to providing better services to the public at a lower cost.

67. In brief, the province (and, specifically its representative or governing body, the provincial council) must be organised as the central pillar of intermunicipality within a coherent, rational and efficient local political system. The current fragmentation, overlap and duplication of different levels of intermediate local government (as well as local bodies of the same character) offer a panorama

19

Decalogue of Recommendations

institutional architecture, with the sole exception of the islands.

3. The current municipal fragmentation, as well as the exercise of certain powers or the provision of certain services for reasons of scale, directly places the province as the most appropriate step in intermediate government, due to tradition, experience and management capacity, to coordinate intermunicipality. Institutional solutions emerging from other intermediate local governments (complementary or alternative to the province) have not, to date, produced satisfactory results, a fact which further justifies the existence of the province (together with the islands) as a core element of intermunicipality.

4. With the aim of strengthening the institutional and democratic legitimacy of the provincial councils (and possibly adapt them to the provisions of the European Charter of Local Self-Government), and to give such institutions greater representation and visibility, a process of reflection on the reform of the provincial council electoral system should be initiated, looking at these three solutions: a) reforming the current system of indirect representation; b) implementing a system of direct representation; and c) incorporating a mixed system. Improving the democratic quality of the institution and its good governance also requires transparency, strengthening the statute of opposition and establishing codes of good government in the provincial institutions.

On the basis of the discussion in the Green Paper and its conclusions, a number of recommendations may be suggested for evaluation by both legislators and political bodies with powers to promote a process of adapting local governments to the reality of the second decade of the 21st century.

The recommendations are:

1. Any reform or modernisation process of the provincial councils has to act on the three key pillars on which provincial public administration is based: the powers, the form of government (electoral system and institutional organisation) and funding. Mitigating the process of erosion undergone by the provinces in Spain, as a consequence of the fragile protection provided by the institutional guarantee and their diverse status in the different autonomous systems, requires greater definition of these pillars in basic legislation, as well as greater receptiveness by jurisprudence of the central role of the provinces in a coordinated intermunicipal system.

2. Intermunicipality, notwithstanding the powers available to the autonomous communities to adapt it to their specific territorial conditions, is an issue with inevitable implications for the organisation of the state, as depending on the degree of strength of this intermunicipal system, its local autonomy will be protect to a differing degree. The province, as determined by the Constitution, must be the central part of the basic intermunicipal

Decalogue of Recommendations

20

Decalogue of Recommendations

systems in the framework of a performance evaluation culture.

i) Promoting the knowledge society and network management.

7. The province must move forward in strengthening its own powers, with the aim of reinforcing its institutional legitimacy and developing its role as a territorial political power. The recognition of the provincial council’s powers must be aimed towards improving the efficiency of the local government system as a whole. To this end, material or substantive powers may be attributed to the provinces, while also maintaining and improving the functional powers they currently exercise. Furthermore, the powers they already exercise should be recognised, whether these are their own or exercised through a delegation system (in cases where the powers are those of the autonomous community). This strengthening of the provincial councils’ powers must be made effective, either through the reform of basic legislation or by a readjustment of local powers on the part of the autonomous legislator in accordance with the subsidiarity principle (as included in some of the statutes).

8. The relatively marginal position of the province compared to the municipality may also be observed in the field of funding, possibly due to the reduced powers that are currently given to these public territorial governments. However, the provinces are investment agents and an important source of funding for municipalities through the services they provide. Furthermore, they spend considerable amounts on the production of social and economic assets. Thus, funding for the provincial councils must be matched to the powers they currently exercise, and a provincial funding system must be established that is less dependent on transfers and more closely linked to the powers granted to them, with the aim of improving their autonomy and providing sufficient funding. The qualitative improvement of the provincial funding system must take place within

5. The form of government of the provincial councils is based on traditional parameters: it is identical to that of the general-system municipalities. Elements need to be incorporated into the provincial institutional organisation that strengthen the role of the plenary council as the organ of control and oversight and approval of regulations, while the configuration of the provincial government also needs to be strengthened, with its own executive powers coordinated around the figure of the president and governing body.

6. Also, the provincial councils, in order to fully develop their institutional duties, must strengthen their legitimacy through efficiency, by gradually implementing an organisational paradigm change based on the following premises:

a) Promoting a results-oriented management culture linked to measuring the impact of policies.

b) Simplifying and rationalising its administrative structures.

c) Implementing continuous improvement in the management processes with the support and development of ICTs.

d) Commitment to an administration that provides quality services.

e) Optimising the management of economic resources to achieve greater transparency and efficiency in terms of the control and cost of services.

f) Introducing a professionalised structure for directors.

g) Innovating and designing local public policies.

h) Investing in people as the most important asset that organisations have. In particular, recruiting experts and establishing professional career

21

Decalogue of Recommendations

10. In brief, a wide consensus is required (possibly even through a state pact) between the different political parties represented in the constitutional state parliament, whose purpose is to establish the foundations of a rational and efficient intermediate local government planning process and which revolves around the provincial councils and Balearic and Canary Island councils, as the keys to implementing the principle of local autonomy and thus safeguarding municipal autonomy or the capacity to prioritise policies required by our town councils. Providing better public services in terms of efficiency must lie behind all of these political decisions. Reorganising the local government space and, specifically, intermediate local governments is a structural reform required to strengthen the quality of our institutions and provide better services to the public.

the framework of the future legal reform of local funding and obviously in parallel with the new definition of the institution and powers of the provincial governments in new basic local government legislation.

9. The provincial councils and other intermediate local governments must play a leading role in the drawing up of future basic local government legislation, with the aim of specifying in these regulations the reinforcement of the provincial level as the hub of intermunicipality, and as local government with its own powers. The core character of the province in the intermunicipal architecture must contribute to overcoming the current confusion regarding

this institutional space, with the largely disorganised multiplication of intermediate local government levels and local bodies of the same character.

www.gobiernolocal.org