groupthink_lecutre_final
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- 1. GroupthinkSteve Shore, MBA, PMP, CSSGB
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2. Introduction to Groupthink
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Groupthink: Background
Term from Yale social psychologist Irving Janis in 1972.
Researched why a team reaches an excellent decision one time, and a
disastrous one the next.
Groupthink model designed to help teams prevent bad
decisions.
4. Groupthink: Background cond
Participants have need for consensus.
Alternatives not fully analyzed.
Decision makers have desire to be an accepted member of a
group.
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Groupthink: 8 Symptoms
A Highly Cohesive Group
1.An illusion of invulnerability creates excessive optimism and
encourages extreme risk taking.
Unquestioned belief in the groups inherent morality. Members ignore
the ethical or moral consequences of their decisions.
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Groupthink: 8 Symptoms cont
Closed-mindedness
3.People rationalize in order to discount warnings or other
information that might lead the members to reconsider their
assumptions.
4.Stereotyped views of others.
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Groupthink: 8 Symptoms cont
Pressures Toward Uniformity
5.Shared illusion of unity.
6.Minimize the importance of counter-arguments.
7.Direct pressure on any member who expresses arguments against the
group.
8.Members who protect the group from adverse information.
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Part 2: NASAs History
9. NASAs Origins: The Space Race Begins
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October 4, 1957: The Soviet Union launches Sputnik.
October 1, 1958:Congress creates NASA.
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Project Mercury 1961-1963
1958:Project Mercury initiated.
Mercury 7 astronauts signed-up.
Alan Shepard: In space on May 5, 1961 for 15 min, 28 seconds.
11. President Kennedy Sets the Stage
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May 25, 1961: President Kennedy initiated the Apollo program in a
speech to Congress.
September 12, 1962: Speech to Rice University.
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Project Gemini 1962-1966
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Apollo 1 Setback
January 27, 1967:Apollo 1 fire during launch simulation killed
"Gus" Grissom, Ed White, and Roger Chaffee.
A review board formed.
The board noted several organizational-related factors that
contributed to the accident.
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Apollo Program 1963-1972
December 21, 1968:Apollo 8 circles the moon.Astronauts read from
the Book of Genesis on December 24th.
15. History Made: Apollo 11 on July 20, 1969
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Apollo 13
17. Successes in the 1970s
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18. The Shuttle Program Begins
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The 1980s
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The 1980s
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The Challenger Disaster: January 28, 1986
Mission STS-51L
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The Hubble Telescope Story
23. The 1990s and the ISS
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The Columbia Disaster: February 1, 2003
Mission STS-107
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Part 3: Lessons Learned
26. Evaluation of NASAs Culture
Culture of invulnerability, built upon technological
successes.
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Leadership traditionally based on technical people that were
degreed in hard sciences, which created a culture based on common
attributes.
Promoted better, faster, cheaper not quality, risk, and
safety.
Management had a pattern of ignoring or suppressing constructive
conflict.
Management lost their ability to accept criticism, which led them
to reject recommendations.
27. Evaluation of NASAs Culture
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Engineers felt they had to prove that situations were unsafe,
rather than proving things were safe.
No consensus on the definition of risk.
It is believed that the various project managers felt more
accountable to their managers than to the overall shuttle
program.
NASA managers evaded safety regulations in order to maintain the
aggressive launch schedule.
28. Evaluation of Challenger Disaster
Launch postponed 3 times. NASA fearful American public would regard
agency as inept if delayed further.
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Challenger launched at lowest temperature in shuttle program.
Morton Thiokol engineers argued they did not have enough data to
determine if O-rings would properly work below 53F.
Post-disaster analysis revealed probability of disaster >
99%.
Both NASA managers and engineers knew about O-ring design flaw
since 1977, but never addressed the issue.
Poor communications were vague and open to interpretations.
The company stated that lower temperatures are in the direction of
badness for O-rings...
Engineers at Rockwell International expressed concerns about ice
buildup, but managers restated the concerns in a passive way,
leading mission control to disregard the concerns.
29. Evaluation of Columbia Disaster
Disaster tied to management not understanding the tradeoffs between
the conflicting goals of cost, schedule, and safety.
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Engineers knew the shuttle was being hit by foam on nearly every
flight, but decided condition was of no immediate consequence, and
might be a maintenance problem to be addressed at a later
time.
Unfortunately, many of the checks-and-balances put in place after
Challenger had been removed in the name of faster and
cheaper.
On the missions 2nd day, engineers suspected there was damage to
the orbiter. NASA managers decided to limit the investigation on
the grounds that little could be done even if problems were
found.
30. Groupthink Symptoms Applied to Events
Having a Highly Cohesive Group:The illusion of invulnerability
creates excessive optimism and encourages extreme risk
taking.
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When engineers raised the possibility of catastrophic O-ring
issues, a NASA manager nonchalantly pointed out that this risk was
true of every other flight we have had."
The O-ring seal is a critical failure point without backup.A NASA
manager testified we were counting on the backup O-ring to be the
sealing O-ring under the worst case conditions.
Knowing what I know now about gas entering the shuttles wing, do I
believe the mission I was on was any more risky than I thought it
was when I took off?No.Astronaut Mary Ellen Weber, following May
2000 mission.
31. Groupthink Symptoms Applied to Events
Hear no evil.See no evil.Speak no evil.
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There is a shared illusion of unanimity because silence means there
is consent.
Pressuring People Towards Uniformity:
In the Columbia disaster, the same engineers that identified the
problem did not speak-up and express their concerns for fear of
being ridiculed and losing their jobs.
Pressure people who expresses counter-arguments.
Morton Thiokols Senior Vice President urged the Vice President of
Engineering to take off your engineering hat and put on your
management hat."
Protect the group from adverse information and troublesome
ideas.
Morton Thiokols expert on O-rings stated to the Rogers Commission
that he was not even asked to participate in giving input to the
final decision.
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Preventing Groupthink
Assign each member the role of critical evaluator with permission
and encouragement to freely air objections and doubts.
Managers shouldnt express opinions when assigning tasks.
Set up several independent groups to work on the same
problem.
All effective alternatives should be openly examined.
Members should discuss ideas with trusted people outside of the
group.
Invite outside experts into meetings. Group members should be
allowed to discuss with and question the outside experts.
At least one group member should be assigned the role of Devil's
Advocate. This should be a different person for each meeting.
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Summary
Mindset is to not rock the boat.Group members avoid promoting
viewpoints outside the comfort zone of consensus thinking.
Ideas are not critically analyzed because members want to minimize
conflict.
Individual doubts are set aside as few alternatives
considered.
Minimal or no re-examination of alternatives that may have been
initially discarded.
Expert opinions and negative information is rejected.
In the end, groups make hasty, irrational decisions.
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References
Carveth, Rodney and Claire Ferraris.NASA and the Columbia Disaster:
Decision-making by groupthink?2003, Association for Business
Communication Annual Convention.
Bond, Timothy; Robert Dimitroff; Lu Ann Schmidt.Organizational
Behavior and Disaster: A Study of Conflict at NASA.June
2005.Project Management Journal.
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB).
Bazerman, Max and Dolly Chugh.Decisions without blinders.Harvard
Business Review.January 2006.