Ed MillerGTO VS EXPLOITATIVE

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GTO means “Game Theory Optimal”

Game Theory is a branch of math used to analyze games to

develop optimal strategies

GTO has a very specific, mathematical definition—most of

what people call “GTO” isn’t actually what GTO is

WHAT IS GTO?

When smart people refer to GTO and poker, they are talking

about using a specific set of mathematical techniques to

analyze the game in order to derive perfect (i .e., optimal)

strategies

Real 6- and 9-handed poker is too complex to get perfect

solutions for, so most GTO analysis involves making

simplifying assumptions and solving for optimal solutions of

the simplified game

WHAT IS GTO? (CONT.)

Nothing else! If you aren’t using game theoretic techniques to

attempt to solve for optimal game solutions, it’s not GTO.

PokerSnowie (not to pick on them, just as an example) is NOT

GTO. Snowie doesn’t use game theory to derive its strategy. It

uses neural networks. This has nothing to do with GTO.

My book, Poker’s 1%, is NOT GTO. There is l ittle to no math in

that book, let alone game theory math.

WHAT ISN’T GTO?

The allure of GTO is that it is an unexploitable strategy that

beats all other strategies.

If one somehow could play the true GTO optimal solution for a

game, you could play “like a robot” without making reads or

deviations of any kind and be nearly guaranteed to profit.

WHY GTO?

A theoretical person playing a GTO strategy, however, would

not be guaranteed to win the maximum in any game.

While GTO strategy is unbeatable, against any other given

non-GTO strategy, it is not the maximum winning strategy.

In real games, especially with bad players, EXPLOITATIVE

strategies win more money.

WHY NOT GTO?

The best way to learn to be exploitative is to understand what

a GTO-like strategy looks like.

In my book, Poker’s 1%, I present the concept of a frequency -

based, static strategy

Frequency-based because you are most worried about the

frequencies with which you take every action

Static because the strategy doesn’t adjust to how your opponents

play

SO WHAT’S THE FUSS?

The idea is not that frequency-based, static strategies are the

best strategies to use in $2-$5 live games. THEY ARE NOT.

The idea is that once you understand how to build a

frequency-based, static strategy, you can also build a better

exploitative strategy. This is what you will use to make more

money.

SO WHAT’S THE FUSS? (CONT.)

There’s one property of poker strategies that may surprise you

As soon as your opponent veers away even slightly from a GTO

strategy, you should play the counter-strategy 100% of the

time

A FUNNY THING HAPPENS…

The simplest GTO example

$100 pot. River. Two players. First player checks. Second player has

$100 and can choose between checking back and betting all -in.

First player has 100% bluff-catchers when he checks. How often

should second player bet and how often should first player call?

Second player should be 100% of value hands and half as many

hands as bluffs. This offers 2-to-1 odds to call and a 1/3 chance to

win.

A FUNNY THING HAPPENS… (CONT.)

Say second player has 40 combinations of value hands that beat the

bluff-catchers that player 1 has. He should bet 60 hands total: all 40

value hands and an additional 20 hands as bluffs.

Second player gets even money on a bluff (betting $100 to win

$100). Therefore, first player should call 50 percent of the time.

GTO strategy: 2nd player bets 60 combos. When 2nd player bets, 1st

player calls 50% of the time.

A FUNNY THING HAPPENS… (CONT.)

EV for 2nd player on a bet and call is (40($200) + 20( -

$100))/60 = $100

EV for 2nd player on a bet and fold is $100

EV for 1st player on a call is 40( -$100) + 20($200) = 0

EV for 1st player on a fold is 0

1st player cannot improve by calling more or folding more

A FUNNY THING HAPPENS… (CONT.)

But what happens if 1st player decides to fold more

regardless?

Say 2nd player has 200 hands total. 40 value hands and 160

that can’t beat a bluff -catcher.

At 50% calling rate, if 2nd player decides to bluff all hands, his

EV is

EV = (0.2)(0.5)($200) + (0.2)(0.5)($100) + (0.8)(0.5)(-$100) +

(0.8)(0.5)($100) = $30

This is the exact same EV you got when you bluffed only 20

combos [EV = (60)($100) + (140)($0)]

A FUNNY THING HAPPENS… (CONT.)

But now look what happens if you drop the calling rate to 45%

EV of the GTO strategy is stil l the same (60)($100) +

(140)($0) = $30.

EV of betting 100% of hands, however, is now

EV = (0.2)(0.45)($200) + (0.2)(0.55)($100) + (0.8)(0.45)(-

$100) + (0.8)(0.55)($100) = $37

Bluffing 100% of hands > GTO strategy

A FUNNY THING HAPPENS… (CONT.)

When one player deviates even slightly from GTO (i.e., 50%

calling rate to 45% calling rate), the other player should

abandon GTO strategy entirely and pursue 100%

counterstrategy (i .e., bluffing with 20/160 combos to bluffing

all 160 combos)

This change happens immediately. The slightest deviation

from GTO from an opponent demands a complete shift to the

counter-strategy.

This is mathematically true even if calling rate is 49% or

49.9%. The correct strategy against a 49.9% calling rate

would be to bluff 100% of hands.

A FUNNY THING HAPPENS… (CONT.)

What does this mean? In many, many circumstances, the

concept of maintaining “balance” is complete BS. The most

unbalanced strategy possible will be the best one.

The trick to this game is to know which side of equilibrium

GTO strategy your opponent is on at all times. For this, you

must have some sense what the GTO strategy might look like.

A NEW NOTION OF “BALANCE”

GTO is a theoretically optimal strategy that can be derived

mathematically (but that is far, far too complex for 6- or 9-

handed NLH for it to be calculated already)

The main reason to understand GTO strategy as a $2-$5 player

is so that you can know which side (call too much/fold too

much) of GTO your opponent is on so you can play the

appropriate counter-strategy.

You will apply this counter-strategy nearly 100% of the time.

SUMMARY SO FAR

A relatively loose player raises to $25 from the cutoff after a

player limps. Stacks are $1,000.

You 3-bet to $75 from the button. Everyone folds to the raiser,

who calls. This player you expect to call nearly 100% of the

time.

He called too much. But the problem with calling too much

early is that it all but forces you to fold too much on later

streets because there are only so many good hands on any

board.

A SIMPLE $2-$5 EXAMPLE

There’s $162 in the pot and $925 behind. If you bet $100,

$250, and $575 on the flop, turn, and river, you will keep your

bet size on each street fairly close to 2/3 pot.

If you bluff with a 2/3 pot bet, it shows an immediate profit if

you win the pot more than 2/5 = 40% of the time.

Therefore, your opponent must defend at least 60% of hands

at each point to deter you from bluffing 100% of hands.

A SIMPLE $2-$5 EXAMPLE (CONT.)

In fact, it’s worse than that

You are bluffing with equity in most cases, which means that the

break-even point for bluffing is even lower.

Your opponent might raise early in the hand preferentially with the

strongest hands. These are the hands he would be most inclined to

call all three streets with, and he’s eliminating this possibility by

raising them early.

A SIMPLE $2-$5 EXAMPLE (CONT.)

I ’ve made the most basic Game Theory argument with

extremely rough calculations, but it’s clear that no sane

person will defend frequently enough from this point forward

to deter you from bluffing.

Therefore, it’s clear once the player calls the 3-bet light that

he will be, from that point forward, in the “fold too much”

camp.

You can bluff 100% of hands (or close to it).

You should without a doubt bluff all hands that have any

reasonable equity when called.

A SIMPLE $2-$5 EXAMPLE (CONT.)

So I have shown fairly simply that it must be profitable to

bluff postflop in this scenario. But that doesn’t necessarily

mean that you should fire all three barrels.

What if your opponent folds a ton on the flop and again on the

turn?

At that point, he may have a tight and strong enough range to

defend against the river bluff appropriately.

He could even be overdefending against the river bluff at that

point, which swings your counter-strategy to a bluff

percentage of 0%.

FIRE ALL THREE BARRELS?

GTO and other static strategies (like in Poker’s 1%) are NOT

THE MOST PROFITABLE way to play $2-$5. Don’t try to play

l ive games with these strategies.

The purpose for studying them is so that you can understand

which side of the optimal strategy your opponents fall in

various situations.

Then you apply your counter-strategy as aggressively as you

can.

THE BOTTOM LINE

Read my book Poker’s 1%. Again this is NOT a GTO book. But

it is a good place to start if you are brand new to these ideas.

Matthew Janda

Will Tipton

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