38 Accord 13

Guatemala’speace process:context, analysis andevaluation

Enrique Alvarez with

Tania Palencia Prado

T he peace accords finalized in December 1996brought a formal end to a war that had lastedintermittently for 36 years. They included almost

200 substantive commitments that, if fulfilled, wouldbring significant changes to the structure of theGuatemalan state and society and go some way towardsaddressing issues that many believe are the underlyingsource of protracted conflict. The scope of the accordswas due partially to several mechanisms that enabledrepresentatives of organized sectors of civil society todiscuss problems largely untouched in public discoursefor decades. Through these discussions and subsequentlobbying efforts, civil society representatives helped toshape a negotiating agenda and then contributedproposals on how to address substantive issues. Thepeace process was entwined with moves towarddemocratization beginning in the mid-1980s; it helped tocreate the space for peacemaking and was, in turn,strengthened by social mobilization around the peaceprocess. These domestic trends were supported byinternational pressure and involvement. Yet despite thepotential in the accords, it has proven exceedinglydifficult to consolidate the process. Implementation hasbeen either slow or blocked and the necessaryconstitutional reforms were defeated in a nationalreferendum. Nevertheless the experience laid thegroundwork for potential change to a more inclusivesociety, both by providing an opportunity for thoseoutside the established elite to voice their opinion in thepolicy arena for the first time and by raising expectationsfor a more participatory democratic state and society.

Conflict and warGuatemala is composed of four main peoples speaking atleast 23 languages. Approximately 60 per cent of thepopulation are part of the 22 ethnic groups comprisingthe Mayan people who, along with the Garifuna andXinca peoples, have experienced systematic oppressionfor the past five centuries, including forced labour untilthe mid-twentieth century. Yet a Ladino (mestizo peopleidentifying with Spanish cultural heritage) elite hasdominated a state that denied this diversity andmonopolized political, economic, and ideological power.Social exclusion has been compounded by the socio-economic structure. In this predominantly agrariansociety, 65 per cent of the fertile land is owned by 2.1per

President Alvaro Arzú lights a peace flame, December 26 1996. Besidehim is Commander Rolando Moran of the URNG.

Source: Rene P

Enrique Alvarez was a founder member of

the Civil Society Assembly, representing the

investigative research sector. He was a

member of the Accompanying Commission

from October 1997 until January 2001. He

currently works as director of Incidencia

Democrática, a research institute.

Tania Palencia Prado is a Guatemalan

researcher who has written extensively on

the war and civil society participation in the

peace process. She has served as a

consultant to numerous international

organizations, including the

Lutheran World Federation.

Guatemala’s peace process

cent of the population, creating the basis for profoundinequality. Furthermore, with the lowest tax rates in LatinAmerica, the state has had few resources to provide evenbasic services or to support development. The old landedfamilies have exerted disproportionate influence ongovernance and the military has considered itself as theguarantor of the state and defender of the existing socialorder and intermittently installed military rulers. With theexception of a brief democratic opening from 1944-1954that was crushed by a US-sponsored invasion, citizenswere largely excluded from political participation untilthe mid-1980s. These factors led to a weak state,incapable of responding to the needs of most of its population.

The armed insurgency originated initially in the ranks ofthe military in reaction to the 1954 counter-revolutionand subsequent repression. In 1960 a group of officersinstigated an unsuccessful uprising and fled into exile.They later joined with other groups, including the smallcommunist party, to develop a leftist guerrilla movement.In the 1970s, large numbers of Mayan activists joined andtheir communities subsequently became vulnerable tothe military’s counter-insurgency campaigns. In early1982, the various insurgency groups united in the UnidadRevolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG).

In response to the URNG’s effectiveness, Gen. Efrain RíosMontt presided over a ‘scorched earth’ campaign in thehighlands. According to the report of the officialCommission for Historical Clarification, this campaignresulted in the genocidal massacres of some Mayancommunities, with the annihilation of more than 440villages, the death of up to 150,000 civilians from mid-1981 to 1983, and the displacement of over a millionpeople. Unions, popular organizations and politicalopposition groups were eradicated and many activistsassassinated, ‘disappeared’ or exiled, leading to thedecimation of their organizational structures.

The army’s counter-insurgency campaign greatlyweakened the URNG. Sensing its tactical advantage andfacing international isolation in the midst of an economicdownturn, the military took steps to return the country tocivilian rule. In 1984, the military called a NationalAssembly to promulgate a new constitution. In the 1984-85 general and presidential elections, the mostprogressive contestant – the centre-right ChristianDemocratic party led by Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo – wonamidst a relatively high voter turnout. Many interpretedthe result as a rejection of authoritarianism andmilitarism. Although the military retained the balance ofpower, civilian authorities governed the countrythereafter. Some Guatemalans see this period as thebeginning of the democratic transition, whereas othersidentify the signing of the accords almost ten years lateras the real turning point. Yet the greater politicalopenness from the mid-1980s led to important changesand, eventually, movement towards promoting apeaceful settlement to the armed conflict as the armygradually lost much of its control over the process.

Moving toward peaceThese domestic events were highly influenced by globaland regional developments. The 1979 victory of theSandinista revolution in Nicaragua meant that muchgreater attention was given to the revolutionarymovements in El Salvador and Guatemala, thrusting theregion into the centre of the polarized dynamics of theCold War with high levels of US intervention. Several LatinAmerican countries realized that they should support aresolution of the Central American conflicts independentof US involvement. In 1983, Colombia, Mexico, Panamaand Venezuela formed the ‘Contadora Group’ that, for thefirst time, recognized the political origins of the wars. Thenew civilian government of President Cerezo soonadopted a policy of ‘active neutrality’ identifying theunderlying causes of the regional conflicts as distinctfrom the East-West confrontation.

39

40 Accord 13

Acronyms

ASC Civil Society Assembly

CACIF Coordinating Committee on Farming,Commercial, Industrial and FinancialAssociations

CNR Commission for National Reconciliation

COCIPAZ Civil Coordinator for Peace

COPMAGUA Coordination of Organizations of theMayan People of Guatemala

CSC Civil Coordinating Sector

FRG Guatemalan Republican Front

GND Grand National Dialogue

INC National Consensus Forum

MINUGUA United Nations Mission for the Verificationof Human Rights

SEPAZ Secretary of Peace

UNAGRO National Farming and Ranching Union

URNG Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

Guatemala Within this context, Central American presidentsgathered in Esquipulas, Guatemala in 1986 to discussregional peace issues. They agreed to increase economiccooperation, to oppose the US-supported ‘contras’fighting the Sandinista government and to promote thedemocratic reconstruction of the region. In August 1987,the presidents met again at Esquipulas II. Adopting amodified version of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias’regional peace plan, they signed an agreementarticulating the principle of democracy as theprerequisite for conflict resolution and detailingstandards that each government was expected to fulfil topromote peace.

It was initially difficult to implement the Esquipulas IIagreement in Guatemala, where both the URNG and thearmy demanded that the other fulfil certain pre-conditions before negotiations could begin. The URNGmaintained an ambiguous position: it supported theprovision for a national dialogue but simultaneouslydemanded the removal of counter-insurgency measures.The army’s position was more radical: the guerrillas wouldhave to disarm before engaging in dialogue. Neitherenvisioned initiatives to involve civil society in the debate.Yet in de-emphasizing military strategies, the Esquipulas IImeeting helped to stimulate the development of newsocial groups in favour of peace, largely spearheaded byreligious organizations, who slowly generated publicpressure for dialogue.

Yet Guatemalan society lacked a unified voice on how toachieve peace; nor did it have a civil, economic or politicalleadership that could envision peacemaking as a roadtoward national cohesion in the future. The principaldividing lines were between the powerful establishmentgroupings – the chamber of commerce, the agrarian-export oligarchy and the military – versus the popularmovements including peasant associations, trade unions,indigenous people, and cooperatives. The latter tendedto ally with other, mostly urban, social groupings – suchas the opposition political parties, most church groups,universities and research centres, and small industries – todiscuss and promote the social changes they believednecessary to end the war and build peace. Most of thepopular groupings were, however, relatively new and hadweak links with broad social constituencies and the widerpublic. Nevertheless, these more progressive groupingsbecame the national engine enabling peace talks.

The Catholic Church played an important leadership rolein stimulating public opinion in favour of both a nationaldialogue and ‘humanization of the war’ through trying tofind solutions for structural problems. Partially at theinstigation of church officials, the government-formedNational Reconciliation Commission (CNR) convened aGrand National Dialogue in 1989. It provided the firstformal opportunity for civil society to articulate theirdiverse perspectives about the war and identify the

41Guatemala’s peace process

substantive issues later incorporated into the negotiatingagenda. A significant outcome was the increasedexpectation that wider society should be involved in thenegotiations. It helped put the conflict into the sphere ofpolitics and to de-emphasize military ‘solutions’. Thefollowing year, the CNR held talks with the URNG inNorway, under the auspices of the Lutheran WorldFederation. The negotiations resulted in the signing ofthe Oslo Accord in March 1990, committing the parties toa political solution to the conflict. The next significantcontribution of civil society was to recognize the URNG asa legitimate party to the negotiations. This came out ofthe series of five meetings (the ‘Oslo consultations’) heldbetween the URNG with each of the five sectoralgroupings following on from the Oslo Accord. Theseconsultations in turn paved the way for officialnegotiations between the government and the URNG,initially mediated by a Guatemalan Catholic bishop and –after those talks broke down – subsequently by theUnited Nations.

During the early years of peace talks, particularly between1991-93, the establishment groupings were gripped byinternal struggles over the issues of reform that wereincreasingly integral to the peace process. Within themilitary, there were divisions between the ‘hard-line’members and the ‘constitutionalists’, with the formerdeeply opposed to talking with the URNG and the lattermore open to the negotiation process. While most withinthe business and agro-export elite demanded a militaryresponse to the URNG, some recognized the need tomodernize and improve Guatemala’s international image.Yet virtually all were reluctant to discuss, much lessaddress, the social problems that were included on thenegotiating agenda. When President Serrano attemptedto suspend the Constitution in May 1993, however, thebusiness sector joined with the other social groupingsand with the military’s constitutionalists in an impromptuNational Consensus Forum to successfully prevent thecoup and demand democracy. For the first time, therewas visible national consensus on the fundamental valueof a democratic system of government.

This experience led to conditions that re-invigorated thepeace process, with the military generally favouringnegotiations. In 1994, bilateral talks between thegovernment and the URNG – mediated by the UN andsupported by key countries in the ‘Group of Friends’ –resumed again in earnest. They agreed to create a CivilSociety Assembly (ASC) involving the diverse sectors oforganized society to discuss the substantive issues on thenegotiation agenda and provide recommendations tothe negotiators. Most of the ASC’s recommendationswere incorporated into the final accords – thus makingcivil society a vital, if non-decision making, presence inthe negotiations.

Sequence of mechanisms

1987Aug

Esquipulas IICentral American governments agree aframework to promote peace in the region.

1997Oct

Commission on National Reconciliation (CNR)Body appointed by the government to overseeimplementation of Esquipulas agreement.

1989Feb - Oct

Grand National DialogueTalks sponsored by CNR with participation of 47 civil organizations with 84 delegates;excluded the URNG and boycotted by army,government and business elites. The GNDcomprised 15 work ing commissions to discusssubstantive issues related to the conflict.

1990March

Oslo AccordCNR and URNG agree to consultations betweenURNG and Guatemalan society.

1990

El Escorial, Spain: Delegation of 10 politicalparties – URNG promises not to interfere withelections and parties commit to holding aNational Constituent Assembly and need forconstitutional modifications.

‘Oslo consultations’ : URNG meetings withvarious sectors are facilitated by the CNR andobserved by a UN representative

O ttawa, Canada: Business sector (CACIF) –Separate communiqués are signed expressingcommitment to negotiations.

Quito, Ecuador: Religious groups – emphasis on need for national consensus andrespect for human rights.

1991April

Mexico AccordGovernment and URNG agree a negotiatingagenda & process; no formal role for civilsociety in the peace negotiation process.

1993May - June

Instancia Naciona l de Consenso(National Consensus Forum)A broad coalition of civic and establishmentgroupings is formed to resist President Serrano’sattempted ‘self-coup’ and restore democracy.

1994Jan

Acuerdo Marco (Framework Accord) Establishes UN-mediated bilateral peacenegotiation.

27 May - 1 June

31 Aug - 1 Sept

24 - 26 Sept

1994May

Civil Society Assembly (ASC) The ASC is formed, comprising 11 sectoralgroupings. They are convened in an assemblychaired by Bishop Quezada to prepareconsensus documents to feed into the bilateral negotiations.

199629 Dec

Agreement on a Firm and Lasting PeaceFinal agreement signed by the Government and URNG that brings the 10 previous accords into effect.

199916 May

National Referendum Electorate votes on constitutional amendmentsto incorporate the peace accords; but with only17% turnout, the amendments are rejected.

Metepec, Mexico: Unions & popularorganizations – joint declaration that peacemust be based on transformation of structuralproblems generating conflict.

23 - 25 Oct

Atlixco, Mexico: Academics, Cooperatives,Small Businesses – joint declaration asks CNRto organize a similar process between sectorsand government.

27 - 28 Oct

42 Accord 13

Yet after fulfilling its original mandate, the ASC began tofragment. Amidst accusations about the progressivesectors’ dominance, representatives disagreed overwhether the ASC should define a new role to maintain itsvoice in the peace process. Ultimately, the debates withinthe ASC did not carry over into significant influence onimplementing the accords – although some sectorscontinued to exert influence in both society and politics.

Furthermore, the ASC was not the only civil societychannel for influencing the talks. The main businessassociation, the Coordinating Committee on Farming,Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations (CACIF)had refused to join either the ASC or the earlier GrandNational Dialogue, though it did hold talks with theURNG in the Oslo consultations. When the negotiatorsdiscussed the agenda on socio-economic and agrarianissues, the CACIF successfully lobbied against key ASCrecommendations. They were able to substitute many oftheir own recommendations for inclusion in the finalagreement – a source of great disappointment for manyof the ASC members, who eventually endorsed itnonetheless. Many believed that this compromisemarked a national consensus for reform.

Challenges of implementationBy the end of 1996, the negotiators had concluded sixsubstantive and five operative accords. Theseagreements mapped steps for ending the militaryconfrontation and set forth guarantees of reforms toaddress some of the underlying social and structuralissues, grouped into accords on: human rights; a truthcommission; the resettlement of refugees and displacedpeople; the identity and rights of indigenous peoples; the socio-economic and the agrarian situation;strengthening civilian power and the role of the armed forces; and reform of the Constitution andelectoral system.

A variety of mechanisms were created to supportimplementation of the accords, with the UN given anoverall monitoring role. An Accompanying Commission(Comisión de Acompañamiento) was created as thehighest body for interpreting the content and spirit of theaccords and facilitating their implementation inaccordance with the agreed schedule – which only itcould change through the unanimous decision of allmembers. The Commission comprised tworepresentatives each from the government and theURNG, one from the Congress, and four ‘notable’ citizens,with the UN Mission head as an observer. It had noenforcement powers but operated instead by workingwith the other bodies. These included ‘paritarian (equallyrepresentative) commissions’ of government andsectoral representatives to discuss issues related to theimplementation of specific provisions in the accords.There were also ‘non-paritarian commissions’ with onlycivil society representation. However none of these

commissions were given any decision-making authorityand there were no defined channels to translate theiradvice into public policies. Furthermore, theadministrative body charged with overseeing theprocess, the Secretary of Peace (SEPAZ), was not givendecision-making power over the national budget or thepolicies and programmes of government ministries. Ittherefore had few instruments to make changes to fulfilthe provisions. Implementation relied instead on thegovernment to initiate programmes and Congress topass legislation.

Although many of the provisions were implementedmore or less according to the agreed timetable, the mostfar-reaching provisions have yet to be fulfilled. There havebeen a number of particularly problematic areas. Thebiggest setback was the failure of the referendum toamend the Constitution. Constitutional amendmentswere needed to establish the agreements as ‘accords ofstate’ rather than reversible political agreements; withoutthem, the government lacked the legal basis forreforming the army or the judiciary and for implementingmany of the provisions of the indigenous rights accord.After two and a half years, the struggle to make thosechanges was lost.

It was initially anticipated that thirteen key provisionswould be incorporated into the Constitution. To do this,they would need to be approved by a two-thirds majorityvote in the Congress and then by the electorate in anational referendum. The process first stalled in a lengthycongressional drafting process, where parties used theopportunity to add 37 other items – many on issuesdesigned to give them partisan advantage. The eventualreferendum required voters to respond with a simple yesor no vote to four sets of questions that incorporated 50different reforms. Many analysts believe that this designwas inherently confusing and therefore conducive to a‘no’ outcome. The government did not undertake apublic education campaign to inform the electorateabout the proposed changes, although the UN mountedan extensive dissemination effort. Initial opinion pollssuggested most of the electorate did not know about thereforms or were undecided – but an overwhelmingnumber of those who did know about it claimed theywould vote in favour. Then a highly effective ‘no’campaign was mounted by conservative sectors and theprivate media. The pro-reform forces conducted agenerally lacklustre campaign only shortly before thevote – although the indigenous sector was moreeffective in reaching their constituency. In the end, with aturnout of only 17 per cent of the voting age population,the ‘no’ vote prevailed. With significant variationsbetween rural and urban areas, the outcome was largelydecided by voters in the capital; the greatest variationwas between Mayan-majority regions returning a ‘yes’ vote and Ladino-majority areas – where the war was notexperienced directly – voting against the changes.

This defeat was compounded by the failure to implementtax reforms needed to provide domestic financing toimplement many of the accords – particularly the socio-economic provisions. The Accords specified thatGuatemala’s tax base would be raised to twelve per centof GNP by 2000. Despite early optimism that many in theindustrial and agro-export sector recognized the need forreform, they effectively blocked it. The governmentseemed reluctant to alienate its conservative supportbase by pushing through reforms, nor did it mobilizesupport from sectors that would benefit most. Thegovernment of President Arzú, who won power in 1996,introduced a package of property tax reforms in 1998 butdropped them after public protest and asked to re-schedule implementation of this part of the Accords. Inresponse, from 1999-2000, the AccompanyingCommission, with the participation of all the socialsectors, convened negotiations of a ‘Fiscal Pact’ to createa new tax structure, as well as the political andinstitutional reforms needed to implement the accords.The pact was signed in May 2000 and approved by theheads of the executive, legislative and judicial branchesof government. The necessary legislation was, however,diluted in the congress, which only approved a partial taxreform, leaving this important aspect of the peaceagreement unfulfilled.

Despite these setbacks, the Accompanying Commissiontried to keep the process moving. In addition toconvening the Fiscal Pact process, in August 2000 itinitiated a process to agree a new timetable forimplementing the unfulfilled provisions – culminating ina Presidential Act signed that December in a ceremonywitnessed by 12,000 people. When this also failed toachieve tangible results, a number of members resigned. Although the Commission continues to exist in form, it has almost no influence. Today the accordshave no status as legal obligations of the state; thelegislative agenda necessary to make them such hasnot been supported by the majority of

Congressional representatives.

The November 1999 elections were dominated by thefar- right Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) partyfounded by Gen. Ríos Montt, thus putting those stronglyopposed to reform in power. A new, leftist party partiallycomprising former URNG members also gained seats.Although it may become an important political force,thus far leftist groups have not been effective thus far inpromoting and enacting the accords – in part becausethey were unable to lead a political or social movementto support implementation.

Prior to and during the peace talks, Guatemalan civilsociety leaders developed the capacity to influence thenegotiations. But after the accords were signed, thisexperience and capability was not channelled effectively– partly because there was no institutional mechanism toenable it formally. Instead, each sector tended toconcentrate on its own interests, creating a socialvacuum incapable of formulating or promoting an overallpeace agenda. Paradoxically, with internal social sectorsweakened, the international community has become theonly actor with sufficient leverage to keep the peaceagreement on the national agenda.

ConclusionsIn the early years of the new century, Guatemala isexperiencing a critical transition. The new dispensationhas not been consolidated in part because the oldmilitary and economic structures that generated conflictare largely untouched. The rejection of the constitutionalreform package revealed the weakness of the pro-peacesocial movements and their ability to mobilize broadpublic constituencies to take a stand. It demonstrates theprofound challenge of supporting a negotiated transitionto a democratic and egalitarian society in a countrytraumatized by decades of war and centuries ofinstitutionalized racism. Yet against the long history ofauthoritarianism and systematic exclusion, theinvolvement of representatives of diverse sectors of theGuatemalan public in defining the substantive agenda ofthe peace talks and in shaping the accords that emergedfrom them was ground-breaking. Especially significantwas the crucial role played by Mayan organizations, whomade progress in legitimizing their voice and issues inthe mainstream of Guatemalan politics and socialdiscourse. With sufficient continued pressure for change,it is likely that the process and events that led to thesigning of the Accords will, despite all the difficultiesalong the way, come to be seen as a turning point inGuatemalan history.

Guatemala’s peace process 43

Election workers prepare ballots for the national referendumon constitutional reforms, 13 May 1999, Guatemala City.Source: Jorge Uzon/AFP