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Practical Network Security: Basic Tools & Techniques Guevara Noubir Northeastern University [email protected] G. Noubir Tools 1 1

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Page 1: Guevara Noubir Northeastern University noubir@ccs.neu · 2016-05-12 · – Ransomeware(CryptoLocker) innovate using Bitcoinand Tor hidden services – Embedded systems: Access Points,

PracticalNetworkSecurity:BasicTools&Techniques

[email protected]

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Lesson Outcomes: you need to be able to

• Describeanddiscussthevarioussecuritythreatstocomputernetworks– Recon&Infogathering,Probes&Scans,NetworkVulnerabilities,Applications/OSVulnerabilities

• Describewellknownandcommonlyusedtechniquesforeachofthethreats

• Describeanddiscussdefenses

• Practicethetoolswithinlaboratoryassignments

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Reading

• Too many books, forums, websites!

• Counter Hack Reloaded, Ed Skoudis, 2006, Prentice-Hall• Old but the approach & principles remain the same• Many of the techniques or variants still work against

many systems specially older technologies recently bridged to the Internet

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DiscussionPoints

• Threats:BasicNetworkReconandInfoGathering• Threats:MoreIntrusiveProbesandScans• Threats:NetworkVulnerabilities

– NetworkArchitectureVulnerabilities– DenialofService(DoS)

• Threats:Application/OSVulnerabilities– RemotetoLocal(R2L)Attacks– UsertoRoot(U2R)akaPrivilegeEscalation– AttackerAccessMaintenance(rootkits,etc)

• DefensesReviewed– Firewalls,IntrusionDetection,etc.

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ThreatstoCommunicationNetworks• Securitywasanadd-ontomanynetworkprotocols• Wiredandwirelessnetworksstillhavemajorvulnerabilities

– Motivationevolvedfrompursuitoffametofinancialandpolitical– BGPhijacking(e.g.,2005google hijackingbycogent,2008youtube hijackingtoPakistan,

2008USUniversitiestoIndonesia,2010ChinaTelecom,201422x30secondsx19ISPstostealBitcoins)

– Viruses,wormsandbotsaremorestealthytoday• 2008-20015 conficker infected2-15millionwindowsservers• Stuxnet, Flametargetedworms;RedOctober

– Malwareledtoanundergroundeconomy“MPack issoldascommercialsoftware(costing$500to$1,000US), andisprovidedbyitsdeveloperswithtechnicalsupport andregularupdatesofthesoftwarevulnerabilities itexploits.”

– Ransomeware (CryptoLocker)innovateusingBitcoin andTorhiddenservices– Embeddedsystems:AccessPoints,TargetPointofSale,Cars

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Recon&InfoGathering

• SocialEngineering:“theweakestlink”,– Physicalorautomated(e.g.,phishing)– Defenses:userawarenesshttp://www.darkreading.com/security/news/208803583/banking-on-security.html

• PhysicalSecurity– Physicalaccess,theft,dumpsterdiving– Defenses:locks,policies (access,screensavers,etc.),encryptedfilesystems,

papershreddershttp://gizmodo.com/5056749/mi6-camera-with-secret-images-bought-on-ebay-for-30

• WebSearchingandOnlineRecon– Checkcompanywebsite,getcontactnames,lookforcommentsinhtml,etc.– UseSearchEngines:Google!, forums todiscovertechnologies inuse,

employeenames,etc.– Defenses:“SecurityThroughObscurity”,Policies

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Recon&InfoGathering

• Physicalsecurityandpoliciesarestillamajorconcern

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Recon&InfoGathering• whois databaseviaInternic (.com,.net,.org)

– Publicly-availablestartingplacefordeterminingcontacts,nameservers,etc.

– Querylistedregistrarfordetailedwhoisentriesincludingcontacts,postaladdress,nameservers,emails(andformatsofemail)

– E.g.,useInternic,NetworkSolutions– Also:UseARINtofindIPblocksfororganizations!Howaboutmobile?

http://www.arin.net/index.shtml– Whois toolunderUNIX

• whois infoisnecessarybutshouldbelimitedtorequiredminimum

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Recon&InfoGathering• DNSInterrogation

– Tools:nslookup,dig,host,axfr– Usingthenameserver,doazonetransfer(type=any)tolistallpublic

hostsinadomainandmore(ls -d x.com.)– Defenses:Don’tleakunnecessaryinfo

• Don’tuseHINFO,TXTrecordsatall,limithostnames• Restrictzonetransfers!Limittoonlysomelocalmachinesand/orsecondaryDNSserversthatneedit(allow-transferdirectiveinBIND)• Configure firewalltoblockTCP53excepttothesehosts(UDPusedforlookups, TCPforzonetransfers)• TransactionSignatures (TSIGsecurity)fortrustedhosts• SplitDNStodiscriminatebetweeninternalandexternalhosts

–Externalnodesonlyneedtobeabletoresolveasubset ofnames

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IntrusiveScansandProbes

• FromInsecureModemstoInsecureAccessPoints– Past:WarDialers(ToneLoc,THC-Scan),DemonDialers,RogueRAS– Today:WarDriving - RogueandinsecureWirelessAccessPoints[detectRF

signal2Kmawayusinghigh-gainantennas,NetStumbler,Wellenreiter,kismet,ESSID-Jacktools]

•ScanofInternetUncoversThousands ofVulnerableEmbeddedDevices•https://www.infosecisland.com/articleview/1567-Scan-of-Internet-Uncovers-Thousands-of-Vulnerable-Embedded-Devices.html

– Defenses:Conductperiodic sweeps/checks,createpolicies,cryptoWPA2/802.1x,VPN,explicitlyprohibiting behavior (WEP,TKIParebroken)

• DetermineifaNetworkedHostisAlive– ICMP(Ping, EchoRequest/Reply)Sweeps– TCP/UDPPacketSweeps(“TCPPing”)– Defenses:Configure firewalls,borderrouterstolimitICMP,UDPtrafficto

specificsystems.MonitorwithIDS– Problemswiththeseproposed defenses?

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WirelessSpreadingofInfections

• Wi-FiProtectedSetup(WPS)Flaw

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VulnerabilityAssessmentaWardriving Experiment

WPS+WEPAPsgivesawirelesslyconnectedgraph! 12

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IntrusiveScans&Probes• PortScanningusingnmapTCPConnect,TCPSYNScans

– TCPACK,UDPScanning– TCPFIN,XmasTree,NullScans(ProtocolViolations)– Somesneakierthanothers• Ex:TCPSYNdoesn’tcompletehandshakesoconnectisn’tloggedby

manyapps(ifopenwegetSYN-ACKresponse,ifclosedwegetaRESETorICMPunreachableornoresponse)

• Ex:ACKscancantricksomepacketfilters.IfwegetaRESET,packetgotthroughfilteringdevice==“unfiltered”.IfnoresponseorICMPunreachable,portispossibly“filtered”

• Setsourceportsoitlooksmore“normal”e.g.TCPport20• Usedecoystoconfuse,idlescanning,TimingOptions,Basic

Fragmentation

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IntrusiveScans&Probes

• Nmap (continued)– CombinationsofthesescansallowNMAPtoalsoperformActiveOS

Fingerprinting/Identification• BasedonadatabaseofOScharacteristics• AlsomeasuresISNpredictability (IPspoofattacks)

– Defenses:tweakloggingandmonitoring• Firewalls/routersshould logthings likethis(e.g.SYNscans)andIDSshouldnotepatternsofbehavior• Useofstateful firewallsforpacketfiltering?• Scanyourownsystemsbeforeattackersdo• Closeportsandremoveunnecessaryapplications:netstat –nao

• All-PurposeVulnerabilityScanners– Automatetheprocessofconnectingandcheckingforcurrent

vulnerabilitiese.g.,OpenVAS,Nesssus

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IntrusiveScans&Probes• RudimentaryNetworkMapping

– Usetraceroute todetermineanaccesspathdiagram• DifferentpacketsmaytakedifferentroutesthroughdifferentinterfaceswithdifferentACLs• UDP(UNIX)vs.ICMPTimeExceeded(Windows)

– Cheops,VisualRoute,NeoTrace,Cacti,Nagios,Icinga– Defenses: Limitping(e.g.,webserverbutnotmailserver orhosts?), filterICMPTTL

exceeded,etc.

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Tools

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NetworkAttacks:TrafficSniffing

• Sniffing– Stilllotsofunencryptedprotocolsincommonuse

•E.g.,predatordrones/skygrabber:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126102247889095011.html– SnifferslikeTcpDump,wireshark,cain &abel– Defenses:Useencryptedprotocolreplacements

•E.g.IPSEC,SSH,HTTPS,SFTP,PGPformail,etc

– TargetedSnifferslikeDsniff understandspecificprotocolsandcanpickoutcertaintypesoftraffic

•PasswordsinFTP,Telnetsessions,etc• SniffingonSwitchedNetworks

– MACFloodingresultsinsomeswitchesforwardingpacketstoalllinksafteritsmemoryisexhausted

– SpoofARPs fromlegitimatehoststoreceivetheirpackets,constructaMan-In-The-Middlescenario

– Dsniff toolswitharpspoof,dnsspoof,webmitm,sshmitm– Ettercap tool:portstealing

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NetworkAttacks

• SniffingonSwitchedNetworks(cont’d)– Defenses:nohubs,staticARPtableswherenecessary(difficultto

manage),arppoisoningdetection,e.g.,DMZs,ArpON,DHCPsnooping,arpwatch

• DNSSpoofing– Multiplepurposes:blackholingandset-upformitmattacksorsite

redirectstoattackerreplica• DoSSH/HTTPSPreventtheseattacks?

– Notnecessarily;builtontrustrelationships•UsersmustbecarefultouseonlyHTTPSsiteswithvalidcertificates•MustwatchoutforSSHwarningmessagesifkeysdon’tmatchpreviouslyrecordedkeys

– Theseproblemsallowforman-in-the-middlescenarios

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NetworkAttacks:RemoteIPSniffing• IPAddressSpoofing

– Simplespoofing:justchangethepacket’sIPaddress– Moredangerous:underminingUNIXr-commands(rsh,rhosts),

exploitingtrustrelationships• MustbeabletopredictsequencenumberssinceattackerneverseesSYN-ACK(differentLANs)• DoS thelegitimatehostsoitcan’tsendRESET

– Defenses:Makesuresequencenumbersarenotpredictable(vendorpatches,etc)don’tuser-commands,don’tuseIPaddressesfor“authentication”

– Also:ingress/egressfiltering,denysource-routedpackets

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R2L,U2RAttacks

• Remote2LocalAttacks:MostlyBufferOverflowsinOSandnetworkedapplications– ProcessorandOS-specific– Overflowstack,injectshellcodetodosomething

•Alsoheap,array,integeroverflows,etc.– R2L=remotetolocal;

•Exploitflawonremotelisteningapplicationtoobtainlocaluserprivileges– U2R=usertoroot;

•Exploitflawonsystem(ex:setuid) forprivilegeescalation– Often,backdoorscreatedviaNetcat,TFTP,Inetd

• In-depthdiscussionoutofscopeforthispresentation,unfortunatelybutdothelabs!

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Web-basedAttacks

• Web-basedflawsimportanttobewaryof– Ex:IISunicode flawsallowattackertoescapewebrootdirectoryandrunacommand

asIUSRtouploadacopyofnetcat andsendbackashell...(vendorR2L)• Accountharvesting(differentmessages forincorrectusername/password),

sessiontracking(tools:Achiles,Paros),• SQLInjection

– Injectunexpectedmishandleddataintowebapps,expandedinsidethequeryforsurprisingresults

– Example:PoorlyconstructedSQLqueriesallowattackerto“piggyback”aquerymodifierinaPOST,I.e.listmyinfo.asp?ID=0;deletefromusers

• Cross-SiteScripting(XSS)– Insertscripteddataintowebapps,whichprocessandreturncontentcontainingthe

scripting(sendcookiestoamaliciousthirdparty,etc.)– Persistent(e.g., savedonserverandservedtousers)vs.non-persistentXSSattacks

(e.g., scriptembeddedinurl sentthroughphishing,notsanitizedbyserver,executedonbrowserclient)

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ExampleSQLInjection• C#codetoformsql query

string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE user = ”’" + userName + ”’ AND itemname = ‘" + ItemName.Text + ”’";

sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);

• IfuserTomenters"name' OR ‘1’=’1"

• Queryexpandsto

SELECT * FROM itemsWHERE user = ’Tom’AND itemname = ‘name’ OR ‘1’=‘1’;

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R2L/U2RandWebAppVulnerabilties

– Defenses:Beawareofstandardsolutionstotheseproblems,relyon“whathascomebefore”

– Defenses:Patch,patch,patch,patch,anddetecttoo• Practiceresponsible coding forsecurityawareness

–Bewarestrcpy!– Defenses:Practiceresponsible(“safe”)codingforsecurityawareness

• BufferOverflows:(Example)bewarestrcpy,monitormailing lists(e.g.,bugtraq),usenonexecutable stackdmesg | grep '[NX|DX]*protection’sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=1• WebApplications: (Example)Don’trelyonhidden fields fordatasecurity,usedstoredprocedureswithinputvalidation(e.g.,quotesescaping)

– Wheredoattackersgofromhere?• Usethisinformation togetto“thenextstep”• Oncerooted, installationofrootkits,logcleaners,etc.

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PasswordCracking

• GuessingPasswordsviaLoginScripting• Better:ObtainWindowsSAMorUNIX/etc/password

(/etc/shadow,/etc/secure)– Crackers:JohntheRipper(UNIX),Cain&Abel

• DictionaryvsBrute-ForcevsHybridmethods• Defenses:

– Strongpasswordpolicy,password-filteringsw– Conductyourownaudits– Useauthenticationtoolsinsteadifpossible– Protectencryptedfiles(shadowing,getridofMSLMreps,etc.)

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AdobeBreach(October2013)

– Passwordsencryptedwith64bits3DESinECB• Nothashed,notsalted,notinCBC,notAES

25Source: Naked Security

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AdobeBreach(October2013)

• ECB,nosaltingÞ samepasswordresultsinthesamehashÞ combiningthehintsmakesheguesseseasy

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DenialofService• Remotelystoppingservice

– land(usessameip src anddst),jolt2(ip fragmentbadlystructuredno0offset),teardrop(overlappingfragments),etc.

– Mostlyolderexploits,preyonflawsinTCPstack– Defenses:patcheverything,keepuptodate

• Remotelyexhaustingresources– Synflood:sendlotsofSYNs– Smurf:directedbroadcastattack– Defenses:

• Adequatebandwidth, redundantpaths,failoverstrategies• Increasesizeofconnectionqueue ifnecessary• Trafficshapingcanhelp• Ingress/Egressfilteringatfirewall,border routers• SYNcookieseliminateconnectionqueue

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DistributedDenialofService• BotnetsDDoS (butalsoadware,scareware,spam,spyware,

ransomware)– Takesadvantageofdistributednatureofthe‘Net,useamplifiersand

bouncers– Botsliveonnumeroushosts,remotelycontrolledthroughpublicIRC

channels,DGA,fastflux,twitter,etc.• Examples:conficker,mariposa,TDL4• Bandwidthcapabilityofhundreds ofgbps (2014NTPreflectionattack,2015wirelessrouters)

– Newerthreatsfeatureencryptedclient-servercommunication(sometimesstealthyviaICMP,etc.),decoycapabilities,built-inupdaters,andavarietyofattacktypes

• Harderandhardertotracesources:subvertingprivacyinfrastructure->OnionBot

– Defenses:Considerallpreviousadvice.Also,doyourparttokeepzombiesoffsystems

• DetectandRemove– Bestdefenseisrapiddetection;workwithyourISPtohelpeliminate

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DenialofService

• DoS(allforms)sometimesusedasdiversionstohide“real”attacks– Floodingbehaviorcanhelptoconcealsomethingmuchmoreseriouse.g.,DNSpoisoning

– Bealert!

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Defenses

• It’sanarmsraceandthereisnobulletproofsolutiontoday

• Defenseindepth– A bestpracticestrategydevisedbytheNSA– Amulti-layereddefenseapproach– People,Technology,Operation– https://www.nsa.gov/ia/_files/support/defenseindepth.pdf

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All-PurposeDefenses1• StayuptodatewithOSservicepatchesandsecurity-listmailings[most

important!]• Followprincipleofleastprivilegewithuseraccounts• Hardenyoursystems

– Closeallunused ports,don’t runservicesyoudon’tneed– DoyoureallyneedaCcompileronyourwebserver?

• Findyourvulnerabilitiesbeforeattackersdoandcheckregularly– ProbingTools,VulnerabilityScanners,etc.

• Centrallylogallrelevantinformationandmonitorasappropriate– Networkmonitoring packages,IntrusionDetectionincluding fileintegrity

checksforsystemexecutables– E.g.snort,AIDE,tripwire

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All-PurposeDefenses2

• UseofEncryptionwherepossibleforcommunication– Non-snakeoilcertificatesforproductionsystems

• GoodSolidPolicies,RecoveryPlans– Scriptedpost-mortemsimportantsonoon-the-spot-decisions

• Ofcourse…RegularBackupsofcrucialdata!– Beabletorecovercriticalsystemswithlittlenotice,thinkaboutdatamirroringandredundancy

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Defenses:Firewalls1

• StatefulPacketFilters– Rememberearlierpackets– Allownewpacketsoriginatingfromoutsideinonlyiftheyareassociatedwithearlierpackets

• Proxy-BasedFirewalls– Operatesattheapplicationlevel,soit“knowswhenasessionispresent”

– “Safer”butoperatedifferently;lowerperformanceandyoumayneedfeaturesofpacketfilter

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Defenses:Firewalls2• AudityourFirewallwithadequatetools

– Determinewhichpacketsareallowedthroughafirewallorrouter– UtilizesTTLfieldofIPheader,giventwoIPaddresses– Responsefrom“onehopbeyond”indicatesportisopen– Usethisinformationtohardenyourfirewall,configureitforaminimal

setofrules!– IsitworthfilteringICMPtimeexceededmessages?Wouldcripple

attacker’sbutmaypresentadministrativeproblems

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Defenses:IntrusionDetection

• DeployanIDSto“watch”forsuspicioustrafficonyournetwork– Equivalentofanetworkwatchguard,“headsup”– Mustkeepituptodate– NIDSvs.HIDS

• Problems:InformationCorrelation– Howtocorrelatetoprovide“scenarioviews”?– Mustcarefullytunetofindrelevantinformation,limitfalsepositivesandwastedtime

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Defenses:IntrusionDetection2

• Problems:IDSEvasion– Attackersmesswiththeappearanceoftrafficsoitdoesn’tmatcha

signature•Fragmentation

–Somecan’thandleitatall,otherscanquicklybecomeexhaustedwithafloodoffragments-- failopenorclosed?–TinyFragmentAttack(IDSlooksforportnumbertomakefilteringdecisions,firstpacketissosmallitdoesn’t haveit)–FragmentOverlapAttack(secondfragmentoverlapsandwritesover“okay”portnumberwith“sneaky”one)–FragRouter Tool

•Minormodifications topopularattacks(ex:overflowstrings)–WhiskerandNikto CGIscannertoolsprovides:URLencoding(unicode),directoryinsertion,fakeparameter,sessionsplicing,manymoreatapplicationlevel(ex:HTTP)

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Moreon…

• SessionHijackingMechanisms• Netcatusage,othercommontools

– ngrep,LSOF,LogAnalyzers,MonitoringTools• MuchmoreinthewayofR2L,U2Rmethodsanddefenses

– BufferOverflows,PrivilegeEscalation,XSS• WirelessSecurity• Backdoors/Rootkits/Trojans

– VulnerabilityMaintenance,logcleaners

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SomeTools• JohnTheRipper,L0phtCrack(LC4/5),Cain&Abel• Ethereal,wireshark,tcpdump,snoop• Ettercap,hunt,arpwatch• IPFW,IPTables,IPF,firewalk,nmap,etc.• Dsniff• FragRouter• Snort,ACID,• AIDE,Tripwire• OpenVAS,Nessus,Whisker• Netcat,Nagios,Cacti

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WebLinks• www.securityfocus.com(inc.BugTraq)• cve.mitre.org• icat.nist.gov• www.cert.org• www.packetstormsecurity.org• www.packetfactory.net• www.phrack.org• www.honeynet.org• www.owasp.org

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