GuidetoCountingElectoralCollegeVotes

andTheJanuary6,2021MeetingofCongress

ByJoshuaMatz,NormanEisenandHarmannSingh

January4,2021

TableofContents

COUNTINGELECTORALCOLLEGEVOTESANDTHEJANUARY6,2021

MEETINGOFCONGRESS............................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................................1

I. CongressionalCountingProcedures(3U.S.C.§15)...................................1

II. RoleoftheStateExecutiveinCertifyingElectors........................................7

III. Sham“Alternative”SlatesofElectors...............................................................8

IV. PriorObjections:TwoExamples......................................................................11

V. ThePresidingOfficer’sRoleisMinisterial...................................................12

VI. Conclusion..................................................................................................................18

APPENDIX:HISTORICALEXAMPLESOFOBJECTIONSUNDERTHEECA........19

I. Hawaii,1960.............................................................................................................19

II. Florida,2000.............................................................................................................21

III. NorthCarolina,1968.............................................................................................24

IV.Ohio,2004..................................................................................................................26

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INTRODUCTION

AJointSessionofCongresswillcommenceonJanuary6,2021inthechamber of theHouse of Representatives to count electoral votes receivedfromthestates.ThisJointSessionoccurspursuanttotheTwelfthAmendmentoftheConstitution,whichdescribesthefundamentalproceduresforelectingthe President and Vice President. But the Twelfth Amendment is silent onmanykeypoints—afactthatwascastintostarkrelieffollowingthedisastrouselection of 1876. In response, Congress enacted the Electoral Count Act of1887(“ECA”),whichnowcomprisesmostofTitle3of theU.S.Code.By itsplainterms,theECAgovernstheproceedingsoftheJointSession.Inaddition,theHouseandSenatehistoricallyhaveexercisedtheirpowerundertheRulesof Proceedings Clause of the Constitution to adopt a concurrent resolutionspecifyingtheapplicationoftheECA’sprocedurestotheJointSession.

InPartI,thisguidesurveystherulessetforthinTitle3andhowthoserulesapplytotheJointSession.ItalsoaddresseshowtheJointSessionwilllikelyunfold in lightofobjections thatmaybe lodgedagainstcertainslatesthatwerecertifiedbystateexecutivesandupheldbythecourts.PartIIstepsback toexplaina foundationof thisprocess: stateexecutivecertificationofelectors.Part III contrastsvalidslatesofBiden-Harriselectors(ascertainedand certified by state executives)with the shamTrump-Pencepresidentialelectorswhoclaimtohavevotedindefianceofstatelawandpopularwill.PartIVdescribestwohistoricalexamplesofobjectionsattheJointSession:namely,NorthCarolinain1969andOhioin2005.Finally,PartVunpacksandspecifiestheministerialrolethattheVicePresidentproperlyplaysattheJointSession.

Our bottom line is simple: The voters have chosen Joe Biden andKamala Harris as the next President and Vice President. The Biden-Harriselectorshavebeenproperlycertifiedunderapplicablestateandfederallaw,andthosecertificateshaverepeatedlybeenupheldbythecourts.UndertherulessetforthintheECA,itisinconceivablethattheJointSessionwillreachanyresultotherthanarecognitionoftheelectionofBidenandHarris.Thereisnolegitimatebasisforobjections,andiftheyaremadetheywillrepresentaninsulttothevotersandtoourdemocracy.TheremaybesoundandfuryonJanuary6,butitwillnotchangetheoutcome.Asthelawrequires,Congresswill accept the properly certified slates of Biden-Harris electors from allcontestedstates.

I. CONGRESSIONALCOUNTINGPROCEDURES(3U.S.C.§15)

Title3,Section15oftheU.S.CodeestablishesaprocedureinCongressforthecountingofelectoralvotes.Unfortunately,itdoessowithlanguagethatlaypeopleandlawyersalikecanfindchallengingtountangle.Wesummarizehow ballots are counted and what happens if there is a dispute. We thendescribehowthoseruleswillbeoperationalizedonJanuary6,2021.

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Tostart,bothhousesofCongressconveneat1p.m.onJanuary6intheHouseofRepresentativeswiththeVicePresident(inhisorherofficialcapacityas thePresident of the Senate) serving as the presiding officer of the JointSession.1 The Vice President proceeds alphabetically through the states,opening “all the certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of theelectoral votes” and handing them to “tellers” separately appointed by theHouseandSenate,whoreadthemaloudtothelegislators.2Oncethevotesarecounted,theresultisdeliveredtotheVicePresident,whoannouncesthestateofthevote,whichislaterenteredintotheJournalsoftheHousesofCongress.3

As each certificate purporting to constitute electoral votes is readaloud, the Vice President should call for objections, if any; regardless ofwhethertheVicePresidentdoesso, legislatorsmaymakeobjectionsat thispoint.4AnyobjectionmustbemadeinwritingandsignedbybothamemberoftheHouseandamemberoftheSenate.5Ifanobjectionarises,theSenateimmediately withdraws to its chamber, and each house of Congress mustseparatelyreachitsowndecisionastotheobjection.6Oncethehouseshave

1“CongressshallbeinsessiononthesixthdayofJanuarysucceedingeverymeetingoftheelectors.TheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesshallmeetintheHalloftheHouseofRepresentativesatthehourof1o’clockintheafternoononthatday,andthePresidentoftheSenateshallbetheirpresidingofficer.”3U.S.C.§15.2“TwotellersshallbepreviouslyappointedonthepartoftheSenateandtwoonthepartoftheHouseofRepresentatives,towhomshallbehanded,astheyareopenedbythePresidentoftheSenate,allthecertificatesandpaperspurportingtobecertificatesoftheelectoralvotes,whichcertificatesandpapersshallbeopened,presented,andacteduponinthealphabeticalorderoftheStates,beginningwiththeletterA.”Id.3“Andsaidtellers,havingthenreadthesameinthepresenceandhearingofthetwoHouses,shallmakealistofthevotesastheyshallappearfromthesaidcertificates;and the votes having been ascertained and counted according to the rules in thissubchapterprovided,theresultofthesameshallbedeliveredtothePresidentoftheSenate,whoshall thereuponannounce thestateof thevote,whichannouncementshallbedeemedasufficientdeclarationofthepersons,ifany,electedPresidentandVicePresidentoftheUnitedStates,and,togetherwithalistofthevotes,beenteredontheJournalsofthetwoHouses.”Id.4“Uponsuchreadingofanysuchcertificateorpaper,thePresidentoftheSenateshallcallforobjections,ifany.”Id.5“Everyobjectionshallbemadeinwriting,andshallstateclearlyandconcisely,andwithoutargument,thegroundthereof,andshallbesignedbyatleastoneSenatorandoneMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesbeforethesameshallbereceived.”Id.6 “Whenallobjections somade toanyvoteorpaper fromaState shallhavebeenreceivedandread,theSenateshallthereuponwithdraw,andsuchobjectionsshallbesubmitted to the Senate for its decision; and the Speaker of the House of

footnote continues

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bothvoted,they“immediatelyagainmeet”andtheVicePresidentannouncestheresult.ItislikelythatnovotesorpapersfromanyotherstatemaybeacteduponbytheVicePresidentortheJointSessionuntilanobjectionisresolved.7

Title3providesrules toaddresswhathappenswhenaprocedurallyproperobjectionislodged.Theserulescontemplatetwobasicscenarios:thesubmissionofasinglecertificateofelectoralvotesfromagivenstate,andthesubmissionofmultiplecertificatesofelectoralvotesfromagivenstate.Withrespect to both scenarios, “[a]t almost every turn, the ECA seeks to limitcongressionaldiscretionandtoconfinetheroleoftheSenateandtheHouse.”8

TheJanuary6,2021JointSessionwillfaceasinglecertificatescenario.AsweexplainbelowinPartII,eachstatehastransmittedtoCongressasinglecertificate of electoral votes bearing a certification by the state executiveunder 3 U.S.C. § 6. And as we demonstrate below in Part III, the paperssubmittedbyshamTrump-Penceelectorsareso faciallydefectivethat theymustbedisregarded.Thus,theonlyslatesofelectoralvotesproperlybeforeCongressfromtherelevantstatesarethoserecordingBiden-Harrisvotes.

TheECAisclearonwhathappensinthiscircumstance.WhenCongressispresentedwithonlyasinglecertificatefromastate,andthatcertificatehasbeen lawfully certifiedby the state executiveunder3U.S.C. §6, itmustbecountedunlessboththeHouseandtheSenateeachseparatelyvotetorejectit.9Inotherwords,ifthereisanobjectionandeithertheHouseortheSenatevotestoacceptthesinglecertificate,itmustbecounted.10

Representatives shall, in like manner, submit such objections to the House ofRepresentativesforitsdecision.”Id.7 “When the two Houses have voted, they shall immediately againmeet, and thepresiding officer shall then announce the decision of the questions submitted.Novotes or papers from any other State shall be acted upon until the objectionspreviously made to the votes or papers from any State shall have been finallydisposedof.”Id.8CassSunstein,Post-ElectionChaos:APrimer,1,5(SSRNOctober23,2020).9“[N]oelectoralvoteorvotesfromanyStatewhichshallhavebeenregularlygivenbyelectorswhoseappointmenthasbeenlawfullycertifiedtoaccordingtosection6ofthistitlefromwhichbutonereturnhasbeenreceivedshallberejected,butthetwoHousesconcurrentlymayrejectthevoteorvoteswhentheyagreethatsuchvoteorvoteshavenotbeensoregularlygivenbyelectorswhoseappointmenthasbeensocertified.”3U.S.C.§15.10TheECAdoesnotaddressascenarioinwhichthereisasinglecertificatethatisnotcertifiedbytheexecutiveofthestatepursuantto3U.S.C.§6.Butthisscenarioisnotapplicablein2020,sinceallstateexecutivessubmittedcertificatesofascertainment.

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BecauseitisinconceivablethattheHousewillvotetorejectcertifiedBiden-Harrisslates,therecanbenodoubtthatthevotescastbyBiden-Harrisslateswillbecounted.Ultimately,thatwillprovetobetheendofthestory.

Of course, the Senate is almost equally unlikely to reject anyBiden-Harrisslate.OnlyahandfulofRepublicandefectorswoulddeprivetheGOPofthemajorityneededforafutilevotetorejectacertifiedslateofBiden-Harriselectors—andRepublicanSenators includingRomney,Murkowski,Toomey,Collins, Cassidy, and Sasse have already publicly stated their opposition tocallstorejectcertifiedslatesofelectors.11Theywill likelyhavecompanyinthat position: The Majority Leader of the Senate has already made hisinclinationsknown,andhiscaucustendstofollowwhereheleads.12

Senators Cruz, Johnson, Lankford, Daines, Kennedy, Blackburn, andBraun—joinedbySenators-ElectLummis,Marshall,Hagerty,andTuberville—have declared that theywill “vote on January 6 to reject the electors fromdisputedstatesasnot‘regularlygiven’and‘lawfullycertified’(thestatutoryrequisite),unlessanduntil[an]emergency10-dayauditiscompleted.”13Thelanguageofthisstatementisrevealing.Byadmittingthat“regularlygiven”and“lawfullycertified”are“thestatutoryrequisite,”thisgroupquotedlanguagefromthesectionoftheECAthatappliessolelytoasingle-certificatescenario:thephrase“lawfullycertified”appearsonlyoncein3U.S.C.§15andreferstothecriteriafor“aState...fromwhichbutonereturnhasbeenreceived.”14

While3U.S.C.§15allowsobjectionstoasinglecertifiedslateifitsvoteswerenot“regularlygiven”or“lawfullycertified,”thereisnolegitimatebasis

11 See Joint Statement from SenatorsManchin, Collins,Warner, Cassidy, Shaheen,Murkowski, King, Romney, Hassan, and Durbin (Jan. 3, 2021) (link); RomneyStatement On Certification of Presidential Election Results (Jan. 3, 2021) (link);ToomeyStatementRegarding theCertificationof thePresidentialElectionResults(Jan.2,2021)(link);Murkowski:Iwillvotetoaffirmthe2020election(Jan.2,2021)(link);WhatHappensonJanuary6th(BenSasse,Dec.30,2020)(link).12 See Alex Isenstadt, Hawley faces heat from Senate Republicans over ElectoralCollegeplans,POLITICO(Dec.31,2020).13 See Joint Statement from Senators Cruz, Johnson, Lankford, Daines, Kennedy,Blackburn,Braun,Senators-ElectLummis,Marshall,Hagerty,Tuberville(January2,2021)(link).14“[N]oelectoralvoteorvotesfromanyStatewhichshallhavebeenregularlygivenbyelectorswhoseappointmenthasbeenlawfullycertifiedtoaccordingtosection6ofthistitlefromwhichbutonereturnhasbeenreceivedshallberejected,butthetwoHousesconcurrentlymayrejectthevoteorvoteswhentheyagreethatsuchvoteorvoteshavenotbeensoregularlygivenbyelectorswhoseappointmenthasbeensocertified.”3U.S.C.§15.

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foranysuchobjectionhere.Asscholarshaveexplained,avoteisnot“regularlygiven”whentherearecleargroundsforobjectingtotheelectors’conductinoffice:forinstance,iftheyvotedonthewrongday;votedforsomeonewhoisconstitutionally barred from serving as president; or accepted a bribe inexchangefortheirvote.15NoneoftheBiden-Harriselectorshavemisusedtheiroffice thatway.Turning to the “lawfully certified”prongof theECA, this istriggeredonly inextremely irregularcases: forexample,whenanelector isconstitutionally ineligible to hold the office of elector; if the elector haspurportedtovoteonbehalfofajurisdictionthatisnoteligibletoparticipateintheElectoralCollege;oriftheelectorwasnotactuallyentitledtoexecutivecertificationunderstatelaw.16YetallBiden-Harriselectorsareeligibletoholdthatposition,hailfromjurisdictionsentitledtovoteintheElectoralCollege,andpossessexecutivecertificationsthatarevalidunderstate lawandhavebeenupheldbyeverystateandfederalcourttoconsiderthatquestion. 17

Withrespecttothevague,ever-shifting,never-evidencedallegationsoffraud advanced by President Trump and his allies, dozens of courts haveconsideredtheseandrelatedclaimsandeverysingleonehasfoundthemtolackmerit.AsJudgeStephanosBibasoftheU.S.CourtofAppealsfortheThirdCircuit pointedly remarked: “[F]air elections are the lifeblood of ourdemocracy.Chargesofunfairnessareserious.Butcallinganelectionunfairdoesnotmakeitso.Chargesrequirespecificallegationsandthenproof.Wehaveneitherhere.”18Indeed,formerAttorneyGeneralWilliamBarr(likemanyothers)hasunequivocallyaffirmedthat therewasno“fraudonascale thatcouldhaveeffectedadifferentoutcomeintheelection.”19Andhistorymakesclearthatunsubstantiatedallegationsoffraud“maynotaffordapretextforusurpation by Congress of the very power which the [ECA] intends torepudiate;thatis,thepowertoreopenallaspectsoftheelector’selection.”20Accordingly,theBiden-Harrisslateswillunquestionablybecounted,andJoeBidenandKamalaHarriswillbedeclaredthewinnersoftheelection.

15See,e.g.,StephenA.Siegel,TheConscientiousCongressman'sGuidetotheElectoralCountActof1887,56FLA.L.REV.541,619&n.474(2004).16Seeid.at619-621.17Id.at622;seealsoid.at619-621.18DonaldJ.TrumpforPresidentv.Boockvar,No.20-3371(3dCir.Nov.27,2020).19 See Matt Zapotesky et al., Barr says he hasn’t seen fraud that could affect theelectionoutcome,WASHINGTONPOST(December1,2020).20 See id. at 624; see also id. at 622-624; Sunstein, Post-Election Chaos, at 12(surveyinghistoricalsourcesandconcludingthat“todisallowvotes,thefraudmustbeshowntobeveryclear”).

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ThatwouldremaintrueevenifmultipledocumentspurportingtobecertificatesofelectoralvoteswereputbeforeCongress. Inaddressingwhathappensinmultiple-certificatescenarios,3U.S.C.§15reliesinsubstantialpartonthe“safeharbor”provisionof3U.S.C.§5.Simplyput,ifastatehasdefinedrules beforeElectionDay to resolve any contests or controversies, and theapplication of those rules after ElectionDay successfully results in a “finaldetermination”ofsuchdisputesbysixdaysbeforetheElectoralCollegemeets,thentheelectorstherebycertifiedare“conclusive.”21Thisyear,theElectoralCollegemetonDecember14,sothesafeharbordeadlinewasDecember8.

WheremultiplecertificatesofelectoralvotesareputbeforeCongress,theECAoffersthefollowingbasicframework:

• WhereCongresshasreceivedmultiplecertificatesandoneenjoyssafeharborstatus,thesafeharborcertificateiscounted(andtheothersarenot)solongasthevotesonthatcertificatewere“regularlygiven.”22

• WhereCongresshasreceivedmultiplecertificatesandnoneenjoyssafeharborstatus,thenthestatuteprovidestwobasicrules.First,ifboththe House and the Senate agree onwhich certificate to accept, that

21 “If anyState shallhaveprovided,by lawsenactedprior to theday fixed for theappointmentoftheelectors,foritsfinaldeterminationofanycontroversyorcontestconcerningtheappointmentofalloranyoftheelectorsofsuchState,byjudicialorothermethodsorprocedures,andsuchdeterminationshallhavebeenmadeatleastsix days before the time fixed for themeeting of the electors, suchdeterminationmadepursuanttosuchlawsoexistingonsaidday,andmadeatleastsixdayspriortosaid time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in thecountingof the electoral votes asprovided in theConstitution, andashereinafterregulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State isconcerned.”3U.S.C.§15.

22“IfmorethanonereturnorpaperpurportingtobeareturnfromaStateshallhavebeenreceivedby thePresidentof theSenate, thosevotes,andthoseonly,shallbecountedwhichshallhavebeenregularlygivenbytheelectorswhoareshownbythedeterminationmentioned in section 5 of this title to have been appointed, if thedetermination in said section provided for shall have been made, or by suchsuccessorsorsubstitutes,incaseofavacancyintheboardofelectorssoascertained,ashavebeenappointedtofillsuchvacancyinthemodeprovidedbythelawsoftheState.”Id.Asexplainedabove,onlyinexceptionalcaseswouldvotesnotbe“regularlygiven”—for example, if they were cast on the wrong day, were cast for someone who isconstitutionally barred from serving as president; or were induced throughcorruptionortheacceptanceofabribe.

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certificatediscounted.23Andsecond,iftheHouseandSenatedisagreeonwhichcertificatetoaccept,thenwhichevercertificatewascertifiedby the executive of the state is counted.24 This latter rule is oftendescribedasthe“gubernatorialtiebreaker”provisionoftheECA.25

Althoughwebelieve thatCongressmustandwillproceedunder thesingle-slate scenario on January 6, a multiple-slate procedure would notchangetheoutcome.MorethanenoughelectorstoguaranteetheselectionofBidenandHarriswerecertifiedbeforethesafeharbordeadlineofDecember8.26AndbecauseeveryBiden-Harrisslatewascertifiedbyitsstateexecutive,thegubernatorialtiebreakerprovisionensurestheywillbecountedsolongasasinglechambervotestodoso—aforegoneconclusion.

II. ROLEOFTHESTATEEXECUTIVEINCERTIFYINGELECTORS

Aswe have noted, itmatters under the ECAwhich slate of electorsbears a certification from the state’s executive.That isbecause3U.S.C. §6assignsthe“executiveofeachState”theresponsibilityforcertifyingelectors—and3U.S.C.§15incorporatesthatunderstandingintoitsrulesforcountingvotes.TofurtherunpackSection6,itveststhreedutiesinstateexecutives:

• First, “as soon as practicable” after “the final ascertainment” ofelectors—“underandinpursuanceofthelawsofsuchStateprovidingfor such ascertainment”—the executive must send a certificate ofascertainment to the U.S. Archivist setting forth the names of the

23“InsuchcaseofmorethanonereturnorpaperpurportingtobeareturnfromaState, if there shall have been no such determination of the question in the Stateaforesaid,thenthosevotes,andthoseonly,shallbecountedwhichthetwoHousesshallconcurrentlydecidewerecastbylawfulelectorsappointedinaccordancewiththe lawsof the State, unless the twoHouses, acting separately, shall concurrentlydecidesuchvotesnottobethelawfulvotesofthelegallyappointedelectorsofsuchState.”Id.24“ButifthetwoHousesshalldisagreeinrespectofthecountingofsuchvotes,then,andinthatcase,thevotesoftheelectorswhoseappointmentshallhavebeencertifiedbytheexecutiveoftheState,underthesealthereof,shallbecounted.”Id.25Section15anticipatesathirdscenarionotremotelyhereatissue:“ButincasethereshallarisethequestionwhichoftwoormoreofsuchStateauthoritiesdeterminingwhatelectorshavebeenappointed,asmentionedinsection5ofthistitle,isthelawfultribunalofsuchState,thevotesregularlygivenofthoseelectors,andthoseonly,ofsuchStateshallbecountedwhosetitleaselectorsthetwoHouses,actingseparately,shallconcurrentlydecideissupportedbythedecisionofsuchStatesoauthorizedbyitslaw.”

26SeeNationalArchives,“2020ElectoralCollegeResults”(link).

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electors and “the canvass or other ascertainment under the laws ofsuchStateofthenumberofvotesgivenorcastforeachperson.”

• Second,theexecutivemust“delivertotheelectors...onorbeforethedayonwhich theyarerequiredbysection7of this title tomeet,sixduplicate-originalsofthesamecertificateunderthesealoftheState.”

• Finally, ifthere“shallhavebeenanyfinaldeterminationinaStateinthemannerprovidedforbylawofacontroversyorcontestconcerningtheappointment”ofelectors,theexecutiveshall“assoonaspracticableaftersuchdetermination”send“acertificateofsuchdetermination.”

Notably,while federal lawestablishestheserules, it isstate lawthatdefineswho“theexecutive”isinanygivenstate;thatpersonismostoftenthegovernor or secretary of state. State law also defines the procedures—including a popular vote—that control the executive’s authority to identifywhichelectors shouldbe certified.Thus,whetheranexecutive certificationhasbeenproperlygivenforpurposesof3U.S.C.§6isfundamentallyastatelawmatter—onethattheJointSessionhashistoricallyrespected.

ConsistentwiththeECAandeachstate’s laws,theNationalArchivistrecognizestheappropriatestateexecutivesandpoststheirascertainmentsonitswebsite.As explainedabove in thediscussionof congressional countingrules,certificationby“theexecutive”under3U.S.C.§6iscritical.Assuch,thepowertocertifyunderSection6 is takenveryseriously. Inthiselection,allstateexecutiveshavelongsinceperformedtheirofficialcertificationduties—including,ofcourse, theexecutiveswhocertified306Biden-Harriselectors.And every one of these certifications has (if disputed) been upheld by thecourts.Thus,theelectorsreflectingthepopularvoteineachstatehavemetandvoted in themannerrequiredbystate law,and theseslatesofelectorshavebeendulycertifiedbytherelevantstateexecutiveunderrulescodifiedinstatelaw.ThosearetheonlylegitimateelectorsthatshouldbeconsideredbytheJointSessionand,undertheECA,theyaretheelectorswhosevoteswillstand.

III. SHAM“ALTERNATIVE”SLATESOFELECTORS

IthasbeenreportedthatsupportersofPresidentTrumphavegatheredin various locations around the country and declared themselves to beelectoralslates.27Thereisnolegalbasisforsuchself-selection:thevotesoftheelectorswhowonthepopularvoteinastate,andwhosevictorywascertified

27NickCorasaniti&JimRutenberg,No,therearen’t‘alternateelectors’whocanvoteforPresidentTrump,N.Y.TIMES(December15,2020).

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bythatstate’sexecutivepursuanttostatelawprocedures,aretheonlyonesthatcount.IneverystatewhereJoeBidenwonthepopularvote,thesolelegalslateofelectorsishisslate.AnyonepurportingtomeetandcastanElectoralCollegevoteforTrumpinastatehelostisasham.TotheextentsuchshamelectorshavetransmitteddocumentstotheJointSession,itwouldbeproperforVicePresidentPencetodisregardthemoutright:theycannot“purport”toconstituteelectoralvotesundertheECAbecauseofclearfacialdeficiencies.VicePresidentPencemightalsoseekunanimousconsenttodisregardtheseshamvotes.Ofcourse,ifhedoesopenandreadsuchdocuments,MembersoftheHouseandSenateshouldbepreparedtosubmitobjections.

Here,wewillidentifythreeconsiderationsbearingontheassessmentofanypaperssubmittedbyshamTrump-Penceelectors.

First,fortheelectorsofacandidatewholostthepopularvoteofastatetomeetandsendacertificatetoCongress—andtodosocontrarytostatelawprocedure—isanti-democraticandoffensive.Nearly160millionAmericanshavevoted.Manyofthemdidsoundertrulyextraordinarycircumstances—sometimesriskingtheirhealthtocastaballot.Anyclaimthatthecandidatewho lost the popular vote can try again later in Congress in hopes ofoverturning the will of themajority is anti-democratic. No group of failedcandidates,merelybycallingthemselves“electors,”canundoanelection.

Second,statelawscreateclearrulesandproceduresforidentifyingandcertifyingpresidentialelectors.Byvirtueofthoserules,theshamelectorshavenoauthoritytospeakforanystate.Indeed,ineverystate,theslateofelectorsforeachpartywaschosenwellinadvanceofElectionDay.See,e.g.,Ariz.Rev.Stat.§16-344;Ga.Code§21-2-172;25Pa.St.§2878;Wis.Stat.§8.18;Mich.Comp. Laws §§ 168.42. Every state further provides that the only lawfulpresidentialelectorsarethosewhowonthepopularvote.See,e.g.,Ga.Code§21-2-499(“TheGovernorshallenumerateandascertainthenumberofvotesforeachpersonsovotedandshallcertify theslatesofpresidentialelectorsreceivingthehighestnumberofvotes.”);accordAriz.Rev.Stat.§§16-645,16-647(requiringacertificateofelectionforcandidates,includingpresidentialelectors,“receivingthehighestnumberofvotescast”);Mich.Comp.Laws§§168.46; Wis. Stat. §§ 7.60(4)-(5); 25 Pa. St. § 3166. As the United StatesSupremeCourtrecentlyexplained:“Everyfouryears,millionsofAmericanscast a ballot for a presidential candidate. Their votes, though, actually gotowardselectingmembersoftheElectoralCollege,whomeachStateappointsbasedonthepopularreturns.Thosefew‘electors’thenchoosethePresident.”Chiafalov.Washington,140S.Ct.2316,2319(2020)(emphasisadded).

Thus,ineachstatewhereJoeBidenwonthepopularvote,hisslateofpresidentialelectors—andonlyhisslateofelectors—hasthelegalauthoritytomeetandsendacertificatetoCongress.Accordingly,onlyhiselectorshave

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the formal certificates of ascertainment from state executives required tocomplywithfederallawwhentheyvote.See3U.S.C.§6(requiringthatthestateexecutivefurnishcertificatesofascertainmenttoelectorswhohavebeenappointed“underandinpursuanceofthelawsofsuchState”);seealso3U.S.C.§ 9(requiringthattheelectors“shallannexto[theirvotes]oneofthelistsofelectorswhichshallhavebeenfurnishedtothembydirectionoftheexecutiveoftheState”).Moreover,faithlesselectorlawsinatleastsomestateswouldaffirmativelyprecludeevenavalidlyselectedelectorfromsupportinganyoneotherthanthecandidatewhowonthepopularvote.SeeChiafalo,140S.Ct.at2322n.2(identifyingfifteenstates,includingArizona,Michigan,andNevada,withfaithlesselectorprovisions).Statelawaffordsnoambiguity.Theproperslateofelectorsistheonethatreceivedthemostvotes,andanyotherslatehasnoauthoritytoeithermeetorsenda“certificate”ofvotestoCongress.28

Finally,itisclearthatCongresshasreceived306lawfulandproperlycertifiedelectoralvotesforJoeBiden.NeverinthehistoryofournationhasCongressrejectedaslateofelectorsforthecandidatewhowonthepopularvote in a state. Nothing in law or logicwould suggest it should start now,relyingonaseriesofunsubstantiatedandoutlandishclaimsthathavebeenrejected by every single state and federal court to consider them. For thatreason,amongmanyothers,theJointSessionshouldignoretheprocedurallyandlegallydeficientshamslatesandproceedtoconfirmtheelectionresults.

Historicalprecedentsupportstheconclusionthatshamslatesmustbediscarded.Forexample,in1873,thepresidingofficerdidnotpresentasetofreturnsfromArkansasbecausethey“didnotinanyrespectcomplywiththerequirementsofthelawonthesubject,”includingthattheywereonly“signedbythreeoutofthesixelectors,andtheystatedthattheycouldnotobtainthecertificateof thegovernor.”29On thatbasis, thepresidingofficernoted that“theChairopenedthemonthedistinctunderstandingthattheywereinformal,becausetheyweredirectedtohimasanyotherlettermightbe.”30Similarly,justafewyearslaterin1877,thepresidingofficerdeclinedtopresentasecondpacketofreturnsfromVermontonthestatedgroundthattheywerereceived

28 Indeed, thereportedslatesofshamTrump-Penceelectorsmayeachsuffer fromoneormoreproceduraldeficiencies,including:(1)theelectorsarenotthesameonespreviouslyselectedpursuanttostatelaw,see3U.S.C.§6;(2)theelectorsdidnotmeetintheplacerequiredbystatelaw,seeid.at§7;(3)theelectorsdidnotcastvotesonthecertificatesprovidedbythestateexecutive,seeid.at§9;or(4)the“certificates”werenotdisposedofinthemannerrequiredbylaw,seeid.at§11.29SeeH.R.MISC.DOC.NO.44-13,at309-91(quotedinSiegel,supra,at637).30Id.

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afterthedatespecifiedbylawforallpacketstobereceived.31In1889,asecondsetofcertificatespresentedbyOregonwasquicklydismissedonunanimousconsent, and the same occurred in 1961 when there were two additionalcertificates submitted fromHawaii.Notably, in that case,Hawaii submittedmultiplereturnscertifiedbydifferentgovernors—ActingGovernorJamesK.Kealoha and Governor William F. Quinn—who were each the legitimategovernorat the time theycertified theresults (thisoccurredbecauseofanunresolveddisputeovertheelectionoutcome).32Incontrast,the“certificates”submittedbypurportedTrumpelectorsinstateswheretheylostthepopularvotewerenevercertifiedbyanyexecutiveinthosestates.Theyarebogus.

IV. PRIOROBJECTIONS:TWOEXAMPLES

SincetheECAwasenacted,therehavebeenonlytwocircumstancesinwhichanobjectionrequiredtheHouseandSenatetowithdrawfordebate—onein1969andtheotherin2005.WewilldescribethosecaseshereasapointofreferencefortheproceduresthatCongresshashistoricallyadopted.

In1969,whenanobjectionwasraisedconcerninga faithlesselectorfromNorthCarolina,thehouseswithdrewtotheirchambersanddebatedthequestion. The Joint Session then reconvened and the presiding officerannounced the results as follows: “The two Houses retired to considerseparatelyanddecideuponthevoteoftheStateofNorthCarolina,towhichobjectionhasbeenfiled.”33Thetellerthenannouncedtheresultsofthevotesin the House and the Senate—both of which rejected the objection to theelectoralvotescastinNorthCarolina—andthenthepresidingofficernoted:“Under the statute in this casemade andprovided, the twoHouses havingrejectedtheobjectionthatwasdulyfiled,theoriginalcertificatesubmittedbytheStateofNorthCarolinawillbecountedasprovidedtherein.”34

In2005,therewasanobjectiontothevotesfromOhioonthegroundthat“theywerenot,underalloftheknowncircumstances,regularlygiven.”35Aswiththeobjectionin1969,theobjectiontotheelectoralvoteswasrejectedresoundinglyinboththeHouse(byavoteof267at31)andtheSenate(byavoteof74to1).AftertheSecretaryoftheSenateandtheClerkoftheHousereportedtheresultsofthevoteintheirrespectivehouses,thepresidingofficersaid:“Pursuanttothelaw,chapter1oftitle3,UnitedStatesCode,becausethe

31SeeSiegel,supra,at637.32107Cong.Rec.289-90(1961).SeealsoSiegel,supra,at631n.542.33115Cong.Rec.171(1969).34Id.35151Cong.Rec.H2,85-86.(2006).

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twoHouseshavenotsustainedtheobjection,theoriginalcertificatesubmittedbytheStateofOhiowillbecountedasprovidedtherein.”36

Thesehistoricalexamples,andtwoothers,arediscussedindetailintheAppendix.TheyshedlightonthecongressionalproceduresthatapplyundertheECAwhenanobjectionisproperlysubmittedtotheVicePresident.

V. THEPRESIDINGOFFICER’SROLEISMINISTERIAL

WewillconcludebybrieflyaddressingtherolethattheVicePresidentplaysattheJointSession,whereheservesaspresidingofficerbyvirtueofhisroleasPresidentoftheSenate.37(IftheVicePresidentisunableorunwillingto preside, the president pro tempore of the Senate presides instead, asoccurredin1965andthenagainin1969,amongotheroccasions.38)

Thepresidingofficer’srole,asdefinedbytheTwelfthAmendmentandtheECA,isministerial.TheTwelfthAmendmentstatesthat“ThePresidentoftheSenateshall,inthepresenceoftheSenateandHouseofRepresentatives,open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted.” U.S. CONST.amend.XII.Undertheplainmeaningofthattext,asconfirmedbylongstandinghistoricalpractice,itistheVicePresidentwho“open[s]allthecertificates”anditisCongressthatcountsthem.TheECAprovidesmoredetailandlaysoutfourmainfunctionsofthepresidingofficer:(1)preservingorderanddecorum;39(2) openingandhandingelectoralvotecertificatestothetellers;40(3)calling

36Id.atH84.37See3U.S.C.§15(“TheSenateandHouseofRepresentativesshallmeetintheHallof theHouseofRepresentatives . . . and thePresidentof theSenate shallbe theirpresidingofficer.”).38SeeDeschler’sPrecedentsoftheUnitedStatesHouseofRepresentatives,Chapter10,§2.5(hereinafter,“Deschler’sPrecedents”).Basedonourhistoricalresearch,thepresident pro tempore has also presided on several other occasions, including in1949,1925,1913,1905,and1901.39See3U.S.C.§18(“WhilethetwoHousesshallbeinmeetingasprovidedinthischapter, the President of the Senate shall have power to preserve order; and nodebateshallbeallowed,andnoquestionshallbeputbythepresidingofficerexcepttoeitherHouseonamotiontowithdraw.”).40 See3U.S.C. §15 (“Two tellers shall bepreviously appointedon thepart of theSenateandtwoonthepartoftheHouseofRepresentatives,towhomshallbehanded,as they are opened by the President of the Senate, all the certificates and paperspurportingtobecertificatesoftheelectoralvotes,whichcertificatesandpapersshallbeopened,presented,andacteduponinthealphabeticorderoftheStates....”).

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forobjections;41and(4)announcingtheresultsof thetallyandofvotesonobjections.42IfanobjectionisraisedandthehousesofCongresswithdrawtodiscussit,thepresidingofficerofeachhousecallsavoteonobjectionsafteralldebate.43

UnderlyingalltheserolesisabasicunderstandingthattheproceduralprovisionsoftheECAareintendedto“drainawayasmuchpoweraspossiblefrom the SenatePresident.”44 For example, before theECAwaspassed, theHouseremovedlanguagethatallowedthepresidingofficertoannounce“thenamesoftheperson,ifanyelected.”45AstheConferenceReportnoted:“[T]heeffectof[theamendment]istopreventthePresidentoftheSenatefromdoingmorethanannouncingthestateof thevoteasascertainedanddeliveredtohim by the tellers; and such announcement shall be deemed a sufficientdeclarationofthepersons,ifany,electedPresidentandVice-President.”46Thelegislativehistoryconfirmsthat“onegoaloftheECAwasto‘settle’that‘thepower to count the vote’ is held by Congress, organized as two separatehouses,and‘isnotinthePresidentoftheSenate.’”47Thatsaid,wenowturntosomeoftheVicePresident’sspecific—andlimited—duties:

1. PreserveOrder

Thepresidingofficer“shallhavepowertopreserveorder”duringtheJointSession.Thispowerisnotsubstantiveandisthestandardobligationofapresiding officer in a chamber of Congress. See Rules of the House of

41Seeid.(“Uponsuchreadingofanysuchcertificateorpaper,thePresidentoftheSenateshallcallforobjections,ifany.”).42Seeid.(“[T]heresultsofthe[listofvotes]shallbedeliveredtothePresidentoftheSenate,whoshall thereuponannounce thestateof thevote.”); id. (“Whenthe twoHouseshavevoted[onanyobjections],theyshallimmediatelyagainmeet,andthepresidingofficershallthenannouncethedecisionofthequestionssubmitted.”).43See3U.S.C.§17(“[B]utaftersuchdebateshallhavelastedtwohoursitshallbethedutyofthepresidingofficerofeachHousetoputthemainquestionwithoutfurtherdebate.”).44SeeSiegel,supra,at634-35(2004).45Seeid.at641-42(quoting18Cong.Rec.77(1886)(statementofRep.Oates)).46See18Cong.Rec.668(1886).Foramoredetailedaccount,seeSiegel,supra,at641-42.47 Siegel, supra, at 636 (quoting 18 CONG.REC. 30-31 (1886) (statement of Rep.Caldwell)); see also 17 CONG.REC. 865 (1886) (noting that the Senate Presidentpresides“onlybyreasonofsomeruleoragreementbetweenthetwoHouses.TheConstitutionissilentuponthatpoint.TheConstitutionspeaksofnoofficerwhoistopresideoverthejointmeeting.”)(statementofSen.Morgan).

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Representatives I.2, 116 Cong. (“The Speaker shall preserve order anddecorumand,incaseofdisturbanceordisorderlyconductinthegalleryorinthe lobby, may cause the same to be cleared.”); see Standing Rules of theSenateXIX.4,XIX.6,S.Doc.113-18(Jan.24,2013)(same).Accordingly, thisauthority is best understood as allowing the presiding officer to maintainorder and decorum in the Joint Session and remove any disturbances ordisruptions. For example, then-Vice President Biden used this authority toremoveprotestersfromthegalleryduringthe2017JointSession.48Presidingofficershavealsousedthisauthoritytorestrict“applauseormanifestationofapprovalordisapprovalduringanystage”oftheJointSession.49

2. FloorDebates

TheECAprohibitsdebateaswellastheofferingandconsiderationofalmost all questions except amotion towithdraw to consider objections.50This isaffirmedbyhistoricalpractice,aspresidingofficershaverepeatedlyshutdowndebatemasqueradingasanobjection.Atthe2017JointSession,thepresiding officer (then-Vice President Biden) rejected attempts frommembersoftheHousetodebateordiscusselectoralvotes,notingthat“debateisnotinorder”andthat“thereisnodebate.Section15and17oftitle3oftheUnitedStatesCoderequiresthatanyobjectionbepresentedinwriting,signedbybothaMemberoftheHouseofRepresentativesandaSenator.”51Similarly,at the 2001 Joint Session, the presiding officer, then-Vice President Gore,rejected attempts for a debate, noting that “the Chair is advised by theParliamentarianthat,undersection18oftitle3,UnitedStatesCode,nodebateisallowed inthe jointsession. If thegentlemanhasapointoforder,pleasepresentthepointoforder.”52TheprohibitionondebateisalsorecognizedintheHousePracticeGuide:“Nodebateisallowedinthejointsession.”53

3. PointsofOrderandProceduralMotions

Asforproceduralmotionsandpointsoforder,“itisnotentirelyclearthat the ECA’s framers intended to allow procedural motions, including

48163Cong.Rec.H185-8(2017).4949Cong.Rec.3042(1913).50See3U.S.C.§18(“[N]odebateshallbeallowedandnoquestionshallbeputbythepresidingofficerexcepttoeitherHouseonamotiontowithdraw.”).51163Cong.Rec.H186(2017).52147Cong.Rec.H32(2001).53HousePracticeGuide:AGuidetotheRules,PrecedentsandProceduresoftheHouse(115thCongress)(Mar.31,2017)(hereinafter,“HousePracticeGuide”)(citing3USC§ 18;Manual§220).

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appealsfromtheSenatePresident’sruling.”54ThereissometextualsupportforproceduralmotionsinaprovisionoftheECAstatingthat“whenthetwoHousesseparatetodecideuponanobjectionthatmayhavebeenmadetothecounting of any electoral vote or votes from any State, or other questionarising in thematter, each Senator and Representativemay speak to suchobjectionorquestionfiveminutes,andnotmorethanonce....”3U.S.C.§17(emphasisadded).Totheextentproceduralmotionsandpointsoforderarepermitted, it is likely they must proceed through the same process assubstantiveobjectionsundertheECA(i.e.,theymustbeinwritingandsignedbyamemberoftheHouseandSenate).

There is little historical precedent on the issue. In 2001, then-VicePresidentGoreruledthat, thoughproceduralmotionswerepermitted, theymust be submitted through the same process as substantive objections.“Readingsections15through18oftitle3,UnitedStatesCode,asacoherentwhole,theChairholdsthatnoproceduralquestionistoberecognizedbythepresidingofficerinthejointsessionunlesspresentedinwritingandsignedbybothaRepresentativeandaSenator.”55Heheldthesameastoapointoforder,notingthat“theChairisadvisedbytheParliamentarianthatsection17oftitle3,UnitedStatesCode,prescribesasingleprocedureforresolutionofeitheranobjectiontoacertificateorotherquestionsarisinginthematter.Thatincludesapointoforderthataquorumisnotpresent.”56

Thoughproceduralmotionsandpointsoforderarestandardpartsofparliamentaryprocedure,theECAwasenactedwiththebackdropofthe1876Joint Session,where itwas readily apparent that therewere not sufficientrulesprovidingforhowthetwohousesofCongresscouldactwhentheymetforaJointSession.57Accordingly,theECAprovidedamechanism,andindeedtheonlymechanism,fortheHouseandSenatetoactjointlytoresolveallofthe

54Siegel,supra,at647.55147Cong.Rec.H35(2001)(statementoftheVicePresident).56Id.57SeeDeschler’sPrecedents,Chapter10§2.6(“WherethetwoHousesmeettocounttheelectoralvote,ajointsessionisconvenedpursuanttoaconcurrentresolutionofthe twoHouseswhich incorporates by reference the applicable provisions of theUnited States Code; and the procedures set forth in those provisions are in effectconstituted as a joint rule of the two Houses for the occasion and govern theproceduresinthejointsession....”).

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substantive and procedural disputes.58 The House Practice Guide alsorecognizesthattheJointSessiondividestoconsiderproceduralmotions.59

4. UnanimousConsent

The presiding officer has some added authority if the Joint Sessionprovidesunanimousconsent.Forexample,thepresidingofficercan,andhasin almost every instance since the passing of the ECA, dispensedwith thereadingoftheformalportionsofthecertificateswithunanimousconsent.60

Unanimous consent can also be used to select a particular slate ofelectorsiftherearetwoormoreconflictingelectoralcertificatesfromastate.SeeDeschler’sPrecedentsChapter10,§3(“ThetwoHouses,meetinginjointsessiontocounttheelectoralvotes,maybyunanimousconsentdecidewhichoftwoconflictingelectoralcertificatesfromastateisvalid;andthetellersarethendirected tocount theelectoralvotes in thecertificatedeemedvalid.”).Thiswasthecasein1889,whenthepresidingofficerwaspresentedwitha

58 See Siegel, supra, at 649 (“To require the SenatePresident to allowproceduralmotions and appeals to his rulingswhen they are (1) timely, (2)meet the ECA’sformalrequirements,and(3)notdilatory,helpstoeffectuatetheECA’sbasictenetthat Congress, not the Senate President, counts the state’s electoral votes.”).ComparingtheECAtothe22dJointRule,whichgovernedtheprocedurefortheHouseandSenatebeforetheECA,furthersupportstheconclusionthatproceduralmotionsandpointsofordershouldbeconsideredthroughthesameprocedureprovidedforsubstantiveobjections.The22dJointRuleprovidedasmuch:“Andanyotherquestionpertinenttotheobjectforwhichthetwohousesareassembledmaybesubmittedanddeterminedinlikemanner.”S.J.Res.22,38thCong.(1865).Andin1865,pursuanttothis rule, the President of the Senate indicated that he would receive proceduralmotions“ifthehousesarewillingto‘separateinordertopassuponthequestion.’”Siegel, supra, at 648 n.657 (quoting SUBCOMM. ON COMPILATION OF PRECEDENTS,COUNTINGELECTORALVOTES,H.R.MISC.DOC.No.44-13,at226(1877)).59“Inadditiontothejointsessiondividingtoconsideranobjectiontothecountingofanyelectoralvote,thejointsessiondividestoconsideran‘otherquestionarisinginthematter.’3USC§§15-18;Manual§220.SuchaquestionalsomustbeinwritingandsignedbybothaMemberandaSenator.Manual§220;107-1,Jan.6,2001,p104.Examplesofan‘otherquestionarisinginthematter’include:(1)anobjectionforlackofaquorum;(2)amotionthateitherHousewithdrawfromthejointsession;and(3)anappealfromarulingbythepresidingofficer.Manual§220.Suchquestionsarenotdebatableinthejointsession.3USC§18.”HousePracticeGuide§3.60See,e.g.,103Cong.Rec.312(1993).(“Underwell-establishedprecedents,unlessamotionshallbemadeinanycase,thereadingoftheformalportionsofthecertificateswillbedispensedwith.”);id(“Ifthereisnoobjection,theChairwillomitinthefurtherprocedure the formal statement just made, and we will open the certificates inalphabeticalorder....”).SeealsoSiegel,supra,at649n.664(notingthatunanimousconsentwasalsousedin1913tocorrectaclericalerror).

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secondsetofreturnsfromOregonthathadbeensentasapractical jokebysomeoneclaimingtobeOregon’s“Governordejure.”61Thepresidingofficernoted:“ThePresidentoftheSenatehasreceivedtwocertificatesandtwootherpaperspurportingtobecertificatesfromtheStateofOregon.Heisrequiredbylawtodeliverthemall,anddeliversthemtothetellers,whowill,ifthereisnoobjection,readthosecertificateswhichareauthenticatedbythesignaturesof the electors certified by the governor ofOregon to have been duty [sic]appointedinthatState.”62Therewasnoobjection,andthevoteswerecounted.

Similarly, in 1961, the presiding officer was presented with threereturnsfromtheStateofHawaiiandacceptedonlyonebasedonunanimousconsent of the Joint Session.63 After the presiding officer handed the threereturnstothetellers,hesaid:“TheChairhasknowledge,andisconvincedthatheissupportedbythefacts,thatthecertificatefromtheHonorableWilliamF.Quinn,GovernoroftheStateofHawaii . . .properlyandlegallyportraysthefactswithrespecttotheelectorschosenbythepeopleofHawaiiattheelectionforPresidentandVicePresidentheldonNovember8,1960.”64Hewentontonotethat“inordernottodelaythefurthercountoftheelectorvotehere,theChair,withouttheintentofestablishingaprecedent,suggeststhattheelectorsnamedinthecertificateoftheGovernorofHawaiidatedJanuary4,1961,beconsideredasthelawfulelectorsfromtheStateofHawaii.”65TherebeingnoobjectionfromtheJointSession,thetellersaccordinglycountedtheelectorsinthecertificatenamedbythepresidingofficer.

61Siegel,supra,at638.6251Cong.Rec.1860(1889).63 On November 16, 1960, Hawaii’s lieutenant governor certified the results forRichard Nixon. The same day, Democratic officials announced a recount petition,whichRepublicanPartyofficialsandthelieutenantgovernoragreednottocontest.On December 13, 1960, the state court ordered a recount. On December 19, theappointed balloting day for themeeting of the electors, the recountwas ongoing.Nonetheless,twosetsofelectorsmetandcasttheirballots.ThegovernorpresentedtheNixonelectorswithdocumentscertifyingthatNixonwonHawaiiandthattheywere legally elected the state’s electors. When the Nixon electors finished, theKennedy electors—lacking any credentials showing JohnF.Kennedyhadwon thestate—casttheirvotesandsignedtheircertificates.OnDecember30,thestatecourtfoundthattheKennedyelectorsprevailedby115votes.OnJanuary4,thegovernorsent theAdministratorofGeneralServicesa copyof the courtdecreeand revisedcertificate,certifyingtheKennedyelectorsasHawaii’s legalelectors.OnJanuary6,whenCongressmet,thecertificateoftheNixonelectors,thecertificateofKennedyelectors,thegovernorofHawaii’srevisedcertificate,andthecourt’sjudgmentwerepresented.See107Cong.Rec.290(1961).Therewerethusthreetotalcertificates.6487Cong.Rec.290(1961).65Id.

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5. UnauthorizedConduct

Thepresidingofficerhasnoauthoritytowithholdavalidlycastslateofelectoral votes. The ECA expressly removes discretion from the presidingofficer,whomustopenandpresent“allthecertificatesandpaperspurportingtobecertificatesofelectoralvotes.”3U.S.C.§15(emphasisadded).66EachcertificatesentbytheelectorsinsupportofBidenfromstateswherehewonthepopularvotewassentpursuanttotheECA,andthepresidingofficerhasnodiscretionwhethertopresentthesecertificates.Hemustdoso.

Conversely, the presiding officer has no legal authority to presentpapers fromelectorswho lostastate’spopularvote.Asnotedabove, theseslates of electors are impermissible because they do not follow any of therequirementsoftheECAandthuscannoteven“purport[]”tobe“certificatesofelectoralvotes.”Ifthepresidingofficerpresentsanillegitimatecertificatefromelectorswholostthepopularvote,theJointSessioncanrejecttheslate,asoccurredin1889and1961.67

VI. CONCLUSION

TheTwelfthAmendmentandtheECAilluminatewhatliesaheadattheJoint Sessionon January6, 2021.Therewill likelybe anobjection, or evenmultiple ones, to specific slates. Passionate rhetoric may be heard, anddramaticgesturesmade.Congress’andthenation’stime—sovaluableinthefaceofapandemicandaneconomiccrisis—maybewasted.Proceedingsmaydragonintothenight(orendearly,theobjectors’pointhavingbeenmade).Buttheoutcomeis foreordained.Congresswillreflectthewillofthevotersand the choice of the Electoral College and confirm Joe Biden and KamalaHarrisasthenextPresidentandVicePresidentoftheUnitedStates.

66SeealsoHousePractice§3(“Wheremorethanonesetofcertificateshavebeenreceivedfromastate,andeachsetpurportstobethedulyappointedelectorsfromthestate,theVicePresidentpresentsthecertificates,withalltheattachedpapers,intheorderinwhichtheyhavebeenreceived.”).67SeeDeschler’sPrecedentsChapter10,§3.

APPENDIX:HISTORICALEXAMPLESOFOBJECTIONSUNDERTHEECA

The list ofmodern applications of the Electoral Count Act (ECA) inwhichthepresidentialelectiondidnotproceedasexpectedisshort.Hawaii’sdisputedresult inthe1960electionprovidesthemostrobustexample,andtheECA’s safe-harbordeadline famouslyplayeda role inbringingFlorida’srecounttoaclosein2000.Theotherhistoricalmomentsfromwhichonemightglean some insight into the meaning of the ECA draw from unsuccessfulobjectionstoelectoralvotesinCongressinthe1968and2004elections.

Wenote,however,thatincountingthevotesinthe1960election,nomembers of Congress objected to then-Vice President Richard M. Nixon’sacceptanceofthevotesofDemocraticelectorsfromHawaii,eventhoughtheRepublican electors had initially been certified as the state’s electors. It isdoubtful that all in Congress would abide the 1960 precedent today. Pastexampleswerealsonotoutcomedeterminativeoftheelection,with lessonthelineforallactorsinvolved.Nevertheless,theseexamplesprovidepossibleoperationsoftheECAintheelectoralprocess.

I. HAWAII,1960

Going into the presidential election between John F. Kennedy andNixonin1960,HawaiiwaswidelyperceivedtobeasolidstateforNixon.68Butlatepollssuggestedtheracewasatoss-up,andearlyreturnsshowedKennedythewinnerby92votes.69AftertheNovember8election,theofficialtabulationsheetswereaudited,andreportingerrorsledtoaNixonleadof141votesofapproximately 184,000 cast.70 On November 16, 1960, Hawaii’s lieutenantgovernorcertifiedtheresultsforNixon.71

Thesameday,Democraticofficialsplannedarecountpetition,whichRepublicanPartyofficialsandthelieutenantgovernoragreednottocontest.72Thepetition—filedagainsttheRepublicanelectors,thealternateRepublicanelectors,andthelieutenantgovernor—wasfiledonNovember22andalleged

68 Daniel W. Tuttle, Jr., The 1960 Election in Hawaii ,14 The Western PoliticalQuarterly331,332–33(1961).69Id.at333,337.70Id.at337.71Id.at337;NixonWinsIsles;RecountMoveSet,HonoluluAdvertiser,Nov.17,1960,at21.72NixonWinsIsles,supranote71.

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tallyingerrors,countingofinvalidatedvotes,andachargethat235morevoteswerecountedthanwereactuallycast.73

OnDecember13, 1960, a state court ordered a recount, despite thestate Attorney General’s argument that federal law required a decision sixdayspriortothemeetingoftheelectors.74OnDecember19,theappointeddayforthemeetingoftheelectors,therecountwasongoing.75Twosetsofelectorsmet and cast their ballots. Hawaii’s governor presented the RepublicanelectorswithdocumentscertifyingthatNixonwonHawaiiandthattheywerelegally elected the state’s electors.76 The electors voted and signed sixcertificates,whichwereplacedinenvelopestotransmitasrequiredbylaw.77WhentheRepublicanelectorsfinished,theDemocraticelectors—lackinganycredentialsshowingKennedyhadwonthestate—casttheirvotesandsignedtheircertificates.78

AtthetimetheDemocraticelectorsvoted,thestate-widerecountwasone-thirdcompleteandhadputKennedyaheadby83votes.79TheattorneyrepresentingtheDemocraticelectorsinthestatecourtcasewasdescribedassayingtheDemocraticelectorswerevotingforKennedyasalegalsafeguardincaseKennedyshouldemergethevictor.80

OnDecember30,thestatecourtfoundthatKennedyhadprevailedintheelectionby115votes.81OnJanuary4,thegovernorsenttheAdministratoroftheGeneralServicesAdministrationacopyofthecourtdecreeandarevisedcertificate,certifyingtheDemocraticelectorsasHawaii’slegalelectors.82Thegovernornotedthatthetimetoappealthecourt’srulingwouldnotexpireuntilJanuary 9 and that the state’s Attorney Generalwould not appeal and had

73 Democrats File Recount Suit; Cite Irregularities, Honolulu Advertiser, Nov. 23,1960,at1.74L.KinvinWroth,ElectionContestsandtheElectoralVote,65Dick.L.Rev.321,341(1961).75Id.76ElderStatesmenCastTwoSetsofElectorVotesforIsles;HonoluluStar-Bulletin,Dec.20,1960,at1.77Id.at3.78Id.79Id.80Id.81Wroth,supranote58,at341.82Id.

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advised the governor “that the possibility of an appeal in this case by anydefendantnotrepresentedbyhimisremote.”83

On January 6, when Congressmet, the certificate of the Republicanelectors, the certificate of Democratic electors, the governor’s revisedcertificate,and thecourt’s judgmentwerepresented.84Then-VicePresidentNixon,presidingasPresidentoftheSenate,announced,“Inordernottodelaythe furthercountof theelectoralvotehere, theChair,without the intentofestablishingaprecedent,suggeststhattheelectorsnamedinthecertificateofthe governor ofHawaii dated January4, 1961, be considered as the lawfulelectorsfromtheStateofHawaii.”85NoobjectionstocountingthevotesoftheDemocraticelectorsweremade,andthetellersthereforeproceededtocountHawaii’svotesforKennedy.86

In the 1960 election, Hawaii’s electoral votes did not decide theelection:includingHawaii’sthreevotes,Kennedyreceived303electoralvotestoNixon’s219.87ProfessorL.KinvinWrothlaterofferedtheopinionthat“itisplainthattherewasnoobligationundertheActtoacceptthestaterecount.”88

II. FLORIDA,2000

OnNovember8,2000,thedayafterthepresidentialelection,thefirstcomplete returns in Florida showed GeorgeW. Bush winning the state bymargin of 1,784 votes, which gave Bush 271 electoral votes and thepresidency.89Statelawprovidedforanautomaticstatewidemachinerecountbecause themarginwas one-half of one percent or less, and that recount,completedinallbutonecountyonNovember10,shrankBush’slead.90Then-Vice President Al Gore sought hand recounts in four counties, and FloridaofficialsindicatedtheywouldcertifystatewideresultsonNovember14,theday provided for by state law, even though hand recounts would not becomplete.OnNovember21,theFloridaSupremeCourtorderedthecounties

83107Cong.Rec.290(1961).84Id.at289–90.85Id.at290.86Id.87Id.at291.88 The Electoral College and Direct Election of the President and Vice President:HearingsBeforetheS.CommitteeontheJudiciary,95thCong.130(1977)(statementofProfessorL.KinvinWroth).89Bushv.Gore,531U.S.98,100–01(2000).90Id.at101.

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tocompletethehandrecountsbyNovember26andorderedthatvotetalliessubmittedpriortothedeadlinebeincludedinthestate’sofficialtotal.91

OnNovember26,2000, theFloridasecretaryofstateandthestate’selectionscanvassingcommissioncertifiedtheofficialreturns,declaringBushthewinner,eventhoughnotallcountieshadcompletedandsubmittedtheirhandrecounts.92GovernorJebBushthensignedandforwardedhisCertificateof Ascertainment that same night declaring his brother the winner. GorecontestedthecertificationinstatecourtunderFlorida’selectionlaws,andthestatecircuitcourtultimatelydeniedrelief.93Thesameday,theUnitedStatesSupreme Court vacated and remanded the Florida Supreme Court’s rulingextending the hand recount deadlines.94 Gore appealed the circuit court’sdecision,and,onDecember8,theFloridaSupremeCourtconcludedthatunderstatelaw,Gorewasentitledtoahandrecountof9,000votesinMiami-DadeCountyandthatvotetotalssubmittedaftertheNovember26deadlineshouldbe included in thestate’scertifiedresults.95Thenextday, theU.S.SupremeCourtstayedtherecountsandgrantedcertiorari.96Andfinally,onDecember12,2000, theSupremeCourtdeclined to invalidate thepreviously certifiedresultsandbroughttherecountstoanend.97AndonDecember19,2000,Bushgarnered271voteswhenelectorsmetandcasttheirballotsinthestates.98

The ECA—specifically the “safe harbor” provision of 3 U.S.C. § 5—played a role in bringing about an end to Florida’s recounts. In the U.S.SupremeCourt’sDecember4rulingvacatingtheextensionofthehandrecountdeadlines,theCourtnotedthattheFloridaSupremeCourthadcited3U.S.C.§§1–10 but had not specifically addressed § 5.99 The Court suggested that “alegislativewishtotakeadvantageofthe‘safeharbor’wouldcounselagainst

91Id.;Bushv.PalmBeachCty.CanvassingBd.,531U.S.70,75–76(2000).92 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 101; Count the Vote: the Overview; Bush is DeclaredWinnerinFlorida,butGoreVowstoContestResults,N.Y.Times,Nov.27,2000,atA1.93Bushv.Gore,531U.S.at101.94Bushv.PalmBeachCty.CanvassingBd.,531U.S.70(2000).95Bushv.Gore,531U.S.at101;seealsoGorev.Harris,772So.2d1243,1260–62(Fla.),rev’dsubnom.Bushv.Gore,531U.S.98(2000).96Bushv.Gore,531U.S.at100.97Id.at110–11.98The43rdPresident:TheElectoralCollege;TheElectorsVote,andtheSurprisesareFew,N.Y.Times,Dec.19,2000,atA31.99Bushv.PalmBeachCty.CanvassingBd.,531U.S.70,78(2000).

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anyconstructionoftheElectionCodethatCongressmightdeemtobeachangeinthelaw.”100

Onremand,amongotherissues,theFloridaSupremeCourtconcludedthatFloridastatutesgavetheFloridaDepartmentofStatediscretiontorejectamendedreturnsifa“failuretoignoretheamendedreturns”would“resultinFlorida voters not participating fully in the federal electoral process, asprovidedin3U.S.C.§5.”101WhenthecasereturnedtotheU.S.SupremeCourt,the Court declared that “[t]he Supreme Court of Florida has said that thelegislature intended the State’s electors to ‘participat[e] fully in the federalelectoralprocess,’asprovidedin3U.S.C.§5.”102Andbecausethesafeharbordeadlinehadarrived, in theCourt’sview, therewasnoway torespect thatlegislativeintenttohavecontestsandcontroversiesresolvedbythedeadlineexceptbyendingtherecount.TheCourtappearedtorelychieflyontheFloridaSupremeCourt’sstatement,ratherthananydirectlegislativestatementthatthestateprioritizedmeetingthesafeharbordeadlineaboveallelse.103

WhenCongressmettocountthevotes,RepresentativeAlceeHastings,aFloridaDemocrat,objectedtoFlorida’stwenty-fiveelectoralvotes,seekingto offer a formal challenge to their validity based on the “overwhelmingevidenceofofficialmisconduct,deliberatefraud,andanattempttosuppressvoter turnout.”104 House members offered seventeen other objections andpointsoforder,challengingthepresenceofaquorum,movingtowithdrawtheHouseofRepresentativestoholdaformaldebateontheobjections,andevenattemptingtoappealtheparliamentaryrulingsofthen-VicePresidentGoreonthepreviousmotions.105

Then-Vice President Gore, presiding as President of the Senate,concludedtheobjectionscouldnotbereceived:“Readingsections15through18oftitle3,UnitedStatesCode,asacoherentwhole,theChairholdsthatnoproceduralquestion is toberecognizedbythepresidingofficer intheJointSessionunlesspresentedinwritingandsignedbybothaRepresentativeand

100Id.101PalmBeachCty.CanvassingBd.v.Harris,772So.2d1273,1289(Fla.2000).102Bushv.Gore,531U.S.98,110(2000).103 See, e.g., Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1268 n.30 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J.,dissenting)(“ThereisnolegislativesuggestionthattheFloridaLegislaturedidnotwanttotakeadvantageofthissafeharborprovision.”),rev’dsubnom.Bushv.Gore,531U.S.98,(2000)104147Cong.Rec.104(2001).105Id.at104–06;seealsoChrisLand&DavidSchultz,OntheUnenforceabilityoftheElectoralCountAct,13RutgersJ.L.&Pub.Pol’y340,361–63(2016).

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aSenator.”106Becausenosenatorhadsignedanyobjections,Florida’svoteswereaccepted,andthecountcontinued.107

***

Hawaii in 1960 and Florida in 2000 are the chief examples of theoperation of the ECA when a state’s election results were in doubt. Bothexamples come with explicit limitations on the value of their present-dayapplication.InacceptingthevotesofHawaii’sDemocraticelectors,Nixonwentout of his way to express that he accepted the votes without “intent ofestablishingaprecedent.”108AndtheU.S.SupremeCourt,inhaltingFlorida’srecount in 2000, clarified that its “consideration is limited to the presentcircumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processesgenerallypresentsmanycomplexities.”109

The following two examples involve objections to electoral votes inCongress. Both objections were ultimately rejected, but these examplesnonethelessillustratethetypesofargumentsthatmembersofCongresshavemade that votes have not “been regularly given by electors whoseappointment has been lawfully certified.”110 Much like the examples fromHawaii and Florida, these examples have limitedprecedential value, as theobjectionswererejected.

III. NORTHCAROLINA,1968

In the 1968 election between Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, Nixoncarried the state of North Carolina. But one of North Carolina’s thirteenRepublican electors, Lloyd Bailey, publicly expressed his intent to vote forGeorgeWallace, rather thanNixon.111 North Carolina had no requirementsthatelectorsvotefortheticketthatcarriedthestateinthegeneralelection.112And North Carolina’s governor certified the thirteen Republican electors,includingBailey.113

106147Cong.Rec.105(2001).107Id.at106.108Id.at290.109Bushv.Gore,531U.S.98,109(2000).1103U.S.C.§15.111115Cong.Rec.10(1969).112Id.113Id.at207.

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Representative James O’Hara of Michigan and Senator Edmund S.MuskieofMaineannouncedtheirplantoobjecttothefaithlessvoteinadvanceof Congress’s count.114 Because of the ECA’s time limits on debates overobjections, the Senate discussed the expected objection prior to the jointmeetingwith theHouse.115 SenatorMuskieargued that thevotersofNorthCarolinaanticipatedthatifNixoncarriedthestate,allthirteenvoteswouldgotoNixonandthatthevoters’expectationsshouldbehonored.116SenatorSamErvinofNorthCarolina arguedagainst invalidating the vote, chiefly on thebasis that therewas no constitutional argument supporting denyingNorthCarolinaoneofitsthirteenelectoralvotes.117ButSenatorErvinalsoarguedthatwhere3U.S.C.§15speaksof“votesbeingregularlygivenbyanelector,”it“meanssimplythatthatvotemustbegivenorcastinthemannerprescribedbytheConstitution.”118

When the House and Senate met jointly, Representative O’Harapresented the objection,which 37 othermembers of theHouse and sevenmembers of the Senate, including Senator Muskie, joined.119 The objectionread:

We object to the votes from the State of North Carolina forGeorgeC.WallaceforPresidentandforCurtisE.LeMayforVicePresidentonthegroundthattheywerenotregularlygiveninthatthepluralityofvotesofthepeopleofNorthCarolinawerecastforRichardM.NixonforPresidentandforSpiroT.Agnewfor Vice President and the State thereby appointed thirteenelectorstovoteforRichardM.NixonforPresidentandforSpiroT.AgnewforVicePresidentandappointednoelectorstovotefor any other persons. Therefore, no electoral vote of NorthCarolina.shouldbecountedforGeorgeC.WallaceforPresidentorforCurtisE.LeMayforVicePresident.120

Both chambers separately met and ultimately voted to reject theobjection.TheSenatevoted58 to33 toreject theobjection,and theHouse

114Id.at206.115Id.at199–200.116Id.at197–209.117Id.at204–05.118Id.at207.119Id.at146.120Id.

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voted 226 to 170 to reject the objection, with over thirty members notvoting.121

IV. OHIO,2004

Inthe2004electionbetweenBushandJohnF.Kerry,voters inOhiofaced long linesat thepolls,malfunctioningvotermachines,poorly trainedpollworkerswhodirectedvoterstothewrongpollingplaces,andinconsistentpolicies about provisional ballots.122 Early vote totals showed Bushwith a136,000vote leadoverKerry,andKerryconcededtheelection.123The finalvotecountshowedamarginof118,775votes,andtheOhiosecretaryofstatecertified the results on December 6, the day before the December 7 safe-harbordeadline,despitedemandsforarecount.124

After the certification, Representative John Conyers and othermembersoftheHousewrotetoOhio’sgovernorandtheleadersofthestatelegislaturerequestingadelayofthemeetingofOhio’selectors.125Theletteralleged that bywaiting to declare the results,Ohio’s secretary of state had“engineeredaconflictwithstaterecountlaws”becausethestatelawdeadlinesrelatingtorecounts—whichrequiredthesecretaryofstatetocertifyresultsin the first instance before a recount—would extend the recount past theDecember13appointedday for themeetingofelectors.126The letterurgedOhio’sleaderstotreatthescheduledDecember13meetingoftheelectorsandsubmission of certificates of ascertainment as provisional and hold aconclusive meeting of electors and ascertainment after the recount.127Nonetheless,RepublicanelectorsvotedonDecember13,andthemeetingwasnottreatedasprovisional.

121Id.at170–71.122OhioRecountGivesaSmallerMargintoBush,N.Y.Times,Dec.29,2004,atA14.123AsQuestionsKeepComing,OhioCertifiesItsVoteCount,N.Y.Times,Dec.7,2004,atA18.124Id.125151Cong.Rec.202(2005).126 Letter to Bob Taft, Governor of Ohio, Larry Householder, Speaker of the OhioHouse,andDougWhite,PresidentoftheOhioSenate-UrgesProvisionalTreatmentofOhioElectorsPendingResultsofRecountandChallenges(Dec.10,2004),availableat https://votesmart.org/public-statement/87685/letter-to-bob-taft-Governor-of-ohio-larry-householder-speaker-of-the-ohio-house-and-doug-white-president-of-the-ohio-senate-urges-provisional-treatment-of-ohio-electors-pending-results-of-recount-and-challenges#.X3CPnGhKg2x127Id.

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WhenCongressconvenedtocountthevotes,RepresentativeStephanieTubbs Jones ofOhio and a SenatorBarbaraBoxer of California objected inwritingtotheOhioelectoralvotes.128ThechamberswithdrewfromtheJointSessiontoconsidertheobjection.

IntheHouse,RepresentativeTubbsJonesobjectedtothecountingofany of Ohio’s electoral votes, noting two pending lawsuits challenging thedenial of provisional ballots to voters alongwith the state’s other electionadministrationissues—longlines,pollingplaceswithoutworkingmachines,and voter roll purges.129 The Democratic staff of the House JudiciaryCommitteehadpreparedareportonOhio’selection,whichwasenteredintotherecord.130Thereportnotedmisallocationofelectionmachines,improperpurgingandregistrationerrors,voterintimidation,andotherirregularities.Inpreparingthereport,membersoftheJudiciaryCommitteesentquestionstoOhio’ssecretaryofstate,who—althoughheindicatedhewouldreply—neveranswered the questions.131 The report also summarized Ohio election lawprovisionsrelevanttothedispute.

Thereportalsodiscussed3U.S.C.etseq,particularly§5:“Congresshasspecifiedthatallcontroversiesregardingtheappointmentofelectorsshouldberesolvedsixdayspriortothemeetingofelections(onDecember7,2004forpurposesofthisyear’spresidentialelection)inorderforastate’selectorstobebindingonCongresswhenCongressmeetsonJanuary6,2005,todeclaretheresultsofthe2004election.”132Itnoted:

Historically, there appears to be three general grounds forobjecting to the counting of electoral votes. The law suggeststhatanobjectionmaybemadeonthegroundsthat(1)avotewasnot“regularlygiven”bythechallengedelector(s);(2)theelector(s)wasnot “lawfully certified”under state law;or (3)twoslatesofelectorshavebeenpresentedtoCongressfromthesame State. . . . Since the Electoral Count Act of 1887, noobjectionmeetingtherequirementsoftheActhasbeenmadeagainstanentireslateofstateelectors.133

128151Cong.Rec.198(2005).129Id.at199.130Id.at200–18.131Id.at201.132Id.at204.133Id.at204.

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The report concluded, “We believe there are ample grounds forchallenging the electors from Ohio as being unlawfully appointed.”134Specifically, the report noted “considerable doubt” that controversieswerelawfullyresolvedbythesafeharbordeadlinebecausethesecretaryofstatehad “intentionally delayed” certifying the electors until December 6,whichmade a recount before the safe-harbor deadline, or even theDecember 13meeting of the electors, impossible.135 Additionally, state election law hadbeenviolated(inseveralinstances)suchthattheelectioncouldnotbesaidtocomplywithOhiolawandthereforetheelectorswerenotlawfullycertifiedunderstatelawwithinthemeaningof3U.S.C.§5.136

Despitethereport’sconclusionthatthereweregroundstochallengetheelectors,thedebateintheHouseclearlysuggestedtheHousewouldrejecttheobjection.EvenDemocratswhothankedRepresentativeTubbsJonesforraising the objection talked about the debate as an opportunity to spurelectionreformtoprotecttherighttovote,morethanadebateaboutwhetherCongress should accept Ohio’s electoral votes.137 And some Republicanmembersnotonlyarguedagainsttheobjection,butsuggestedtheDemocratssupportingtheobjectionwereconspiracytheoristsandthattheHouseshouldnotbeengagedinthedebateatall.138Ultimately,theHousevoted267to31torejecttheobjection,with132representativesnotvoting.139

IntheSenate,asummaryofthereportoftheDemocraticstaffoftheHouseJudiciaryCommitteewasenteredintotherecord.140SeveralDemocraticsenatorsusedtheirallottedtimetoaddresstheirregularitiesinOhioandtocallforcongressionalactiontosupportimprovedelectionadministrationinthestates.Evenwhiledoingso,asintheHouse,manysenatorsindicatedtheywouldvotetorejecttheobjectionandbelievedtheoutcomeoftheelectioninOhiowasnot indoubt.141Ultimately, theSenatevoted74 to1 to reject theobjection,withSenatorBoxertheonlyonesupportingtheobjectiontoOhio’svotes.

134Id.at217.135Id.136Id.137See,e.g.,id.at220.138See,e.g.,id.at235.139Id.at241.140Id.at160.141Id.at157–73.