Guide to Further Reading and Bibliography

(Numbers refer to the books and articles listed in the bibli­ography.)

Good elementary accounts of the free will problem will be found in Cornman and Lehrer (6) (Chapter 3), Vivian (37), and Wisdom (39) (Chapter 8).

At a more sophisticated level, Ryle (31) (Chapter 3) is a famous attempt to show that the problem is generated by con­ceptual mistakes. Broad (63) is a statement of the issues from the viewpoint of the moral philosopher, unrivaled for clarity and thoroughness. Campbell (5) is a defense of libertarianism written by a philosopher who is thoroughly versed in contem­porary arguments. Taylor (36) is an elegantly written and in­geniously argued account of issues in the philosophy of mind relevant to the free will problem. Fatalism is lucidly and thor­oughly examined by Steven Cahn (4).

The bibliography gives a rather full (though not complete) survey of the work published on the free will problem during the past twenty years.

Books and Collections of Articles

(1) Ayer, A. J. Philosophical Essays (London and New York, 1954).

(2) Ayers, M. R. The Refutation of Determinism (Lon­don and New York, 1968).

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FREE WILL

(3) Berofsky, B., ed. Free Will and Determinism (New York, I966).

(4) Cahn, S. Fate, Logic and Time (New Haven and Lon­don, I957).

(5) Campbell, C. A. In Defence of Free Will (London and New York, I967).

(6) Cornman, J. and Lehrer, K. Philosophical Problems and Arguments (New York and London, I968), Chap. 5·

(7) Cranston, M. Freedom: A New Analysis (London, I954; New York, I958).

(8) Danto, A. Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge (Cam­bridge, I965; New York, I968), Chap. IX.

(9) Farrer, A. The Freedom of the Will (London and New York, 1958).

(Io) Franklin, R. L. Free Will and Determinism (London, 1968; New York, I969).

(I I) Hampshire, S. N. Thought and Action (London, 1959; New York, 196o).

(12) --- The Freedom of the Individual (London and New York, 1965).

(I3) Hart, H. L.A. Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford and New York, I968).

(14) Hook, S., ed. Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science (New York, I96I).

(15) Hudson, W. D. Modern Moral Philosophy (London and New York, I97o), Chap. 7·

(16) Kenny, A. Action, Emotion and Will (London and New York, I963).

(I7) Kneale, W. and M. The Developrnent of Logic (Ox­ford and New York, 1962), II 4·

(IS) Lehrer, K., ed. Freedom and Determinism (New York, 1966).

(19) Lucas, J. R. The Freedom of the Will (Oxford, 1970). (2o) Mates, R. Stoic Logic (Berkeley, 1961), Chap. 3· (21) Melden, A. I. Free Action (London and New York,

1961).

126

Guide to Further Reading and Bibliography

(22) Montefiore, A. An Introduction to Moral Philosophy (London and New York, 1958), Chap. 12.

(23) Moore, G. E. Ethics (Oxford and New York, 1947), Chap. 6.

(24) Morgenbesser, S. and Walsh, J. Free Will (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962).

(25) Munn, A. M. Free Will and Determinism (London, 196o; Toronto, 1961).

(26) Nowell-Smith, P. H. Ethics (Harmondsworth and Baltimore, 1954), Chap. 19 and 20.

(27) Ofstad, H. An Inquiry into the Freedom of Decision (London, Oslo, New York, 1961).

(28) Pears, D. F., ed. Freedom and the Will (London, 1964; New York, 1963).

(29) Popper, K. R. Of Clouds and Clocks, The A. H. Comp-o ton Memorial Lecture, (Washington University, 1965).

(3o) Rankin, K. W. Choice and Chance: A Libertarian Analysis (Oxford and New York, 1961).

(31) Ryle, G. The Concept of Mind (London and New York, 1949), Chap. 3·

(32) -- Dilemmas (Cambridge and New York, 1954), II. (33) Schlick, M. Problems of Ethics, trans. by D. Rynin

(New York, 1962), Chap. 2. (34) Stevenson, C. L. Ethics and Language (New Haven,

1944), Chap. 14. (35) Taylor, R. Metaphysics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,

1963), Chap. 4 and 5· (36) -- Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.,

1966). (37) Vivian, F. Human Freedom and Responsibility (Lon­

don and Mystic, Conn., 1964). (38) Wells, E. M. The Phenomenology of Acts of Choice

(British Psychological Society Monograph Supple­ment IV, 1924).

(39) Wisdom, J. Problems of Mind and Matter (Cambridge and New York, 1934), Chap. 8.

127

FREE WILL

Articles

Abbreviations for Journals A Analysis AJP Australasian Journal of Philosophy APQ American Philosophical Quarterly BJPS British Journal for the Philosophy of Science JP Journal of Philosophy M Mind P Philosophy PAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society PPR Philosophy and Phenomenological Research PQ Philosophical Quarterly PR Philosophical Review PBA Proceedings of the British Academy SPAS Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemen­

tary Volume.

(4o) Abelson, R. "Taylor's Fatal Fallacy,'' PR 72 (1963). (41) Acworth, R. "Smart on Free-will," M 72 (1963). (42) Albritton, R. "Present Truth and Future Contingency,"

PR 66 (1957). (43) Anscombe, G. E. M. "Aristotle and the Sea Battle,''

M 65 (1956). (44) Aune, B. "Fatalism and Professor Taylor," PR 71

(1962). (45) --- "Abilities, Modalities and Free Will," PPR 23

(1962-3). (46) --- "Free will, 'can' and ethics: a reply to Lehrer,"

A 30 (1969-70). (47) Austin, J. L. "A Plea for Excuses," in Austin, Philo­

sophical Papers (Oxford and New York, 1961). (48) -- "Ifs and Cans," in Austin, Philosophical Papers

(Oxford and New York, 1961). (49) ---and others. ''What sort of 'If' is the 'If' in 'I can

if I choose'?" A 12 (1951-2).

128

Guide to Further Reading and Bibliography

(5o) Ayer, A. J. "Fatalism," in The Concept of a Person (London and New York, 1963).

(51) Ayers, M. R. "Austin on 'Could' and 'Could Have,"' PQ I6 (1966).

(52) --"'Could' and 'Could Have': A Reply," PQ 18 (1968).

(53) Baier, K. "Could and Would," A, Supplement No. I

(January 1963). (54) Bar-Hillel, Y. "Et tu, Diodorus Cronus?" A 26

(1965-6). (55) Beardsley, E. L. "Determinism and Moral Perspec­

tives," PPR 21 (196o-1). (56) Bell, D. R. "Imperatives and the Will,, PAS 66

(1965-6). (57) Berlin, Sir I. "From Hope and Fear Set Free," PAS 64

(1963-4). (58) Bradley, R. D. "Must the Future be What it is going

to be?" M 68 (1959). (59) --- "'Ifs,' 'Cans' and Determinism," AJP 40 (1962). (6o) --- "Causality, Fatalism and Morality,'' M 72

(1963). (61) -- "Quixotic Reasoning,'' AJP 41 (1963). (62) Bretherton, D. "'Ought' implies 'Can Say','' PAS 63

(1962-3). (63) Broad, C. D. "Determinism, Indeterminism and Liber­

tarianism,'' Ethics and the History of Philosophy (London, 1952).

(64) Brown, C. D. "Fallacies in Taylor's 'Fatalism,"' JP 62 (1965).

(65) Cahn, S. "Fatalistic Arguments," JP 61 (1965). (66) -- "An Unanswered Paradox," A 26 (1965-6). (67) Campbell, C. A. "Moral Libertarianism: A Reply to

Mr. Franklin," PQ 12 (1962). (68) -- "Professor Smart on Freewill, Praise and Blame:

A Reply," M 72 (1963). (69) Canfield, J. V. "Determinism, Free Will and the Ace

Predictor," M 70 (1961).

129

PRl!B WU.L

(7o) --"The Compatibility of Free Will and Determin­ism," PR 7I (x962).

(71) -- "Free Will and Determinism: A Reply," PR 72 (I963).

(72) Chisholm, R. M. "He Could Have Done Otherwise," }P 64 (13) (I967).

(73) Collins, A. "Dating Abilities and Truths," A 26 (I965-6).

(74) Cooper, N. and Benson, J. "Oughts and Wants," SPAS 42 (1968).

(75) Cowan, J. L. "Deliberation and Determinism," APQ 6 (1969).

(76) Daveney, T. F. "Choosing," M 73 (1964). (77) -- "Intentions and Causes," A 27 (1966-;i). (78) Davidson, D. "Actions, Reasons and Causes," JP 6o

(23) (I963). (79) Dear, G. F. "Determinism in Classical Physics," B]PS

I I (196o-I). (So) Dore, C. "Is Free Will Compatible with Determin­

ism,'' PR 72 (I963). (8x) -- "On Being Able to Do Otherwise," PQ I6

(1966). (82) Duggan, T. and Gert, B. ''Voluntary Abilities," APQ 4

(1967). (83) Duncan-Jones, A. E. ''Freedom: An lliustrative Puz­

zle," PAS 39 (1938-9). (84) -- "Notional Choice," PAS 6x (x96o-1). (85) Ebersole, F. B. ''Free Choice and the Demands of

Morals," M 61 (1952). (86) Evans, C. "Timeless Truth," PR 71 (I962). (87) Ewin, R. E. "Actions, Brain Processes and Determin­

ism," M 77 (1968). (88) Ewing, A. C. "May Can-Statements Be Analyzed De­

terministically?" PAS 64 (1963-4). (89) Fitzgerald, P. "The Truth about To-morrow's Sea

Fight," JP 66 (11) (1969).

130

Guide to Further Reading and Bibliography

(90) Foot, P. and Montefiore, A. "Goodness and Choice," SPAS 35 (I96I).

(9 I) Franklin, R. L. "Dissolving the Problem of Free Will," AJP 39 (I96I).

(92) -- "Moral Libertarianism," PQ 12 (1962). (93) Gale, R. M. "Endorsing Predictions," PR 70 (1961). (94) Callie, W. B. "Free Will and Determinism Yet Again"

(Inaugural Lecture, Belfast, 1957). (95) Gallop, D. "On Being Determined," M 71 (1962). (96) -- "Ayers on 'Could' and 'Could Have,'" PQ 17

(1967). (97) Gauthier, D. P. "How Decisions Are Caused," JP 64

(5) (1967). (98) -- "How Decisions Are Caused (but Not Pre­

dicted),'' JP 65 (6) (1968). (99) Geach, P. T. "Ascriptivism," PR 69 (x96o).

(xoo) Ginet, C. "Can the Will Be Caused?" PR 71 (1962). (xox) Glasgow, W. D. "On Choosing," A 17 (1956-7). (102) -- "The Concept of Choosing," A 20 (1959-60). (103) Goldberg, B. "Can a Desire be a Cause?" A 25

(1964-5). (104) Goldman, A. I. "Actions, Predictions and Books of

Life," APQ 5 (1968). (1o5) Grant, C. K. "Certainty, Necessity and Aristotle's Sea

Battle," M 66 (1957). (xo6) Griinbaum, A. "Causality and the Science of Human

Behavior," Readings in the Philosophy of Science, H. Feigl and M. Brodbeck, eds. (New York, 1953).

(107) Gustafson, D. F. ''Voluntary and Involuntary," PPR 24 (1963-4).

(xo8) --"Assertions about the Future," PPR 26 (1965-6). (109) -- "Momentary Intentions," M 77 (1968). (I xo) Haksar, V. and Whiteley, C. H. "Responsibility,"

SPAS 40 (1966). (I I x) Hamlyn, D. W. and Smart, J. J. C. "Causality and

Human Behaviour," SPAS 38 (1964).

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FREE WILL

(I I2) Hampshire, S., MacLagan, W. G., and Hare, R. M. "The Freedom of the Will," SPAS 25 (I95I).

(113) Hancock, R. "Choosing as Doing," M 77 (I968). (II4) Hardie, W. F. R. "My Own Free Will," P 32 (I957). (115) Harre, R. "In Reply to Professor Stephan Komer on

Science and Moral Responsibility," M 76 (I967). (I I6) Hart, H. L. A. "The Ascription of Responsibility and

Rights," PAS (I948-9). (I I 7) Hartnack, J. "Free Will and Decision,'' M 62 (1953). (II8) Hartshorne, C. "Deliberation and the Excluded Mid­

dle,'' JP 6I (I964). (I I9) -- "The Meaning of 'Is Going to be,'" M 74

(I965). (I2o) Henderson, G. P. '"Ought' Implies 'Can,"' P 4I

(I966). (12I) Henson, R. G. "Responsibility for Character and Re-

sponsibility for Conduct,'' AJP 43 (I965). (I22) Herbst, P. "Freedom and Prediction," M 66 (I957). (I23) Hilton, J. "Indeterminate Determinism,'' M 73 (I964). (I 24) Hintikka, J. "The Once and Future Sea Fight,'' PR 73

(I964)· (I25) -- "Aristotle and the 'Master Argument' of Diodo­

rus," APQ I (I964). (I 26) Hobart, R. E. ''Free Will as Involving Determinism

and Inconceivable Without It," M 43 (I934). (I27) Honderich, T. and Park, J. A. "A Conspectus of De­

terminism,'' SPAS 44 (I97o). (128) Honore, A. M. "Can and Can't,'' M 73 (I964). (I29) Hospers, J. "Meaning and Free Will," PPR IO (I949-

50). (I3o) Houlgate, L. D. "Knowledge and Responsibility,'' APQ

5 (1968). (I3I) Huby, P. "The First Discovery of the Freewill Prob­

lem," P 42 (I967). (132) Hunter, J. F. M. "Aune and Others on Ifs and Cans,''

A 28 (I967-8).

132

Guide to Further Reading and Bibliography

(133) Ihrig, A. H. "Remarks on Logical Necessity and Future Contingencies," M 74 (1965).

(134) Kaufman, A. S. "Moral Responsibility and the Use of 'Could Have,'" PQ 12 (1962).

(135) Kenner, L. "Causality, Determinism and the Freedom of the Will," P 39 (1964).

(136) Komer, S. "Science and Moral Responsibility,'' M 73 (1964).

(137) Lacey, A. R. "Freewill and Responsibility," PAS 58 (1957-8).

(138) Ladd, J. "Free Will and Voluntary Action," PPR 12 (1951-2).

(139) Lande, A. "Determinism versus Continuity in Modem Science,'' M 67 (1958).

(140) Lehrer, K. "Ifs, Cans and Causes,'' A 20 (1959-60). (141) -- "Decisions and Causes," PR 72 (1963). (142) --"Cans without Ifs," A 29 (1968-g). (143) -- and Taylor, R. "Time, Truth and Modalities,"

M 74 (I965). (I44) Lewis, H. D. "Moral Freedom in Recent Ethics,'' PAS

47 (I946-7). (I45) Locke, D. "Ifs and Cans Revisited," P 37 (1962). (146) Lucas, J. R. and Sluga, H. "Freedom and Prediction,''

SPAS 4I (I967). (147) Lukasiewicz, J. "On Determinism,'' in Polish Logic,

192o--1939, S. McCall, ed. (Oxford, 1967). (I48) Lyon, A. "The Prediction Paradox," M 68 (I959). (I49) Mabbott, J. D. "Free Will and Punishment,'' Con·

temporary British Philosophy: Third Series, H. D. Lewis, ed. (London, I956; New York, 196I).

(I50) Macintyre, A. C. "Determinism," M 66 (I957). (I 5 I) Malcolm, N. "The Conceivability of Mechanism,'' PR

77 (I968). (152) Margenau, H. "Quantum Mechanics, Free Will and

Determinism," JP 64 (21) (1967).

I33

FREE WILL

(153) Matson, W. I. "On the Irrelevance of Free Will to Moral Responsibility and the Vacuity of the Latter," M 65 (1956).

(154) Mayo, B. "A Logical Limitation on Determinism," P 33 (1958).

(155) --- "The Open Future," M 71 (1962). (156) ---"Belief and Constraint," PAS 64 (1963-4). (157) -- "On the Lehrer-Taylor Analysis of 'Can' State-

ments," M 77 (1968). (158) McAdam, J. I. "Ch.oosing Flippantly or Non-Rational

Choice," A Supplement No. 3 (1965). (159) McKay, D. M. "On the Logical Indeterminacy of Free

Choice," M 69 (196o). (16o) --- "Freedom of Action in a Mechanistic Universe,"

Eddington Memorial Lecture (Cambridge, 1967). (161) Meiland, J. W. "Are There Unintentional Actions?"

PR 72 (1963). (162) Melden, A. I. "Willing," PR 69 (196o). (163) Montague, R. "Mr. Bradley on the Future," M 69

(196o). (164) Monte6.ore, A. "'Ought' and 'Can,'" PQ 8 (1958). (165) Nowell-Smith, P. H. "Determinists and Libertarians,''

M 63 (1954). (166) -- "Choosing, Deciding and Doing," A 18

(1957-8). (167) O'Connor, D. J. "Is There a Problem About Free

Will?" PAS 49 (1948-g). (168) --- "Determinism and Predictability," BJPS 7

(1956-7). (169) --"Possibility and Choice," SPAS 34 (196o). (170) Ofstad, H. "Frankena on Ought and Can," M 68

(1959). (171) --- "Recent Work on the Free-Will Problem," APQ

4 (1967). (172) Oldenquist, A. "Causes, Predictions and Decisions," A

24 (1963-4).

134

Guide to Further Reading and Bibliography

(173) Papanoutsos, E. P. "Freedom and Causality," P 34 (1959).

(174) Pears, D. "Predicting and Deciding," PBA 50 (1964). (175) Pike, N. "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,"

PR 74 (1965). (176) -- "Of God and Freedom: A Rejoinder," PR 75

(1966). (177) Pitcher, G. "Hart on Action and Responsibility," PQ

69 (196o). . (178) --"Necessitarianism," PQ II (I96I). (179) Popper, K. R. "Indeterminism in Quantum Physics

and in Classical Physics," BJPS I (I95I-2). (I8o) Prior, A. N. "Three Valued Logic and Future Contin­

gents," PQ 3 (I953). (18I) -- "Diodorus and Modal Logic," PQ 8 (1958). (I82) -- "Time and Determinism," in Past, Present and

Future (Oxford and New York, I967). (I83) Raab, F. V. "Free Will and the Ambiguity of 'Could,'"

PR 64 (1955). (184) Rankin, K. W. "Causal Modalities and Alternative Ac­

tion," PQ 7 (I957). (I85) -- "A Deterministic Windmill," AJP 4I (I963). (I86) --"More on the Deterministic Windmill," AJP 42

(I964). (187) Raphael, D. D. "Causation and Free Will," PQ 2

(I952). (I88) Rescher, N. "A Version of the 'Master Argument' of

Diodorus," JP 63 (I966). (I89) Richman, R. J. "Responsibility and the Causation of

Actions," APQ 6 (I969). (I9o) Russell, L. J. "Ought Implies Can," PAS 36 (I935-6). (19I) Ryan, A. "Freedom," P 40 (1965). (192) Saunders, J. T. "A Sea Fight To-morrow?" PR 67

(I96o). (I93) -- "Professor Taylor on Fatalism," A 23 (1962). (I94) -- "Fatalism and Linguistic Reform," A 23 (I962).

I35

FREE WILL

(195) "Fatalism and the Logic of 'Ability,'" A 23 (1963).

(196) --- "Of God and Freedom," PR 75 (1966). (197) -- "The Temptations of 'Powerlessness,'" APQ 5

(1968). (198) Scheer, R. K. "Predictions of Events," PQ 17 (1967). (199) Schlesinger, G. "Confirmability and Determinism," PQ

18 (1968). (zoo) Sharvy, R. "A Logical Error in Taylor's 'Fatalism,'" A

23 (1963). (201) -- "Tautology and Fatalism," JP 61 (1964). (zoz) Shaw, P. D. "Ought and Can," A 25 (1964-5). (203) Shute, C. "The Dilemma of Determinism Mter

Seventy-five Years," M 70 (1961). (2o4) Silber, J. "Human Action and the Language of Voli­

tions," PAS 64 (1963-4). (2o5) Skinner, R. C. "Freedom of Choice," M 72 (1963). (zo6) Smart, J. J. C. "Free-will, Praise and Blame," M 70

(1961). (207) Stocker, M. "Mayo and the Open Future," M 74

(1965). (zo8) Stoljar, S. "Ascriptive and Prescriptive Responsibility,"

M 68 (1959). (2o9) Stout, A. K. "Free Will and Responsibility," PAS 37

(1936-7). (210) Strang, C. "Aristotle and the Sea Battle," M 69 (196o). (211) Strawson, P. F. "Freedom and Resentment," DBA 48

(1962). (212) Stroup, T. "Austin on 'Ifs,'" M 77 (1968). (213) Taylor, R. "I Can," PR 69 (196o). (214) -- "Fatalism," PR 71 (1962). (215) -- "Ddiberation and Foreknowledge," APQ I

(1964). (216) Thalberg, I. "Foreknowledge and Decisions in Ad­

vance," A 24 (1963-4).

136

Guide to Further Reading and Bibliography

(217) University of California Associates. "The Freedom of the Will," Readings in Philosophical Analysis H. Feigl and W. Sellars, eds. (New York, 1949).

(218) Vesey, G. N. A. "Volition," P 36 (1961). (219) Walsh, W. H. "Moral Authority and Moral Choice,"

PAS 65 (1964-5). (220) Wheatley, J. "Hampshire on Human Freedom," PQ 12

(1962). (221) White, A. R. "What Might Have Been," APQ Mono­

graph No. 4 (1970). (222) Wick, W. "Truth's Debt to Freedom," M 73 (1964). (223) Williams, D. "The Sea Fight To-morrow,'' Structure,

Method and Meaning P. Henle, H. M. KaHan, and S. K. Langa, eds. (New York, 1951).

(224) Williams, G. "Freedom of Choice in a Predetermined Future," PPR 12 (1951-2).

(225) Wilson, J. "Freedom and Compulsion," M '67 (1958). (226) Yolton, J. W. "Agent Causality,'' APQ 3 (1966). (227) Zimmerman, M. "Is Free Will Incompatible with De-

terminism?" PPR 26 (1965-6).

137

Index

Ackrill, J. L., I 4 Actions, Ch. I I Agency, 87ff. Aquinas, St. Thomas, 22, 92,

94 Aristotle, I 3, 14, 86, I I 7 Ascriptive and descriptive

predicates, 3I, 32 Augustine, St., 9 Anne, B., 26 Austin, J. L., 27, I I4 Ayer, A. ]., 72, 79 Ayers, M. R., 30

Bivalence, principle of, I 5, II2

Boethius, 5, I I4 Boswell, J., I8 Bradley, F. W., 52 Bradley, R. D., n6 Broad, C. D., 24, 95, I09

Cahn, S., I I2, I25 Campbell, C. A., 75, 86, 87,

88, 89, I22 Campbell, Keith, 58 "Can," senses of, 26ff. Conditions, necessary and

sufficient, 27, 28, 76

"Condition X," 82, 83, 94, Io8, I22

Connections, conceptual, Io2ff.

Dear, G. F., 63 Design, argument from, 95

Eccles, Sir John, 58 Eddington, Sir Arthur, 57 Einstein, A., 55 Entropy, 90 Euler's theorem, n6, II7

Fatalism, Ch. 2, I2 Flew, A. G. N., 72

Geometry, I I8 Godel, K., 63

Haldane, J. B. S., 35ff., 48 Hart, H. L.A., 3I, IOI Hegel, G. W. F., 52 Heisenberg, W., 54 Hobbes, T., 72 Hudson, W. D., 25 Burne, D., 72, 95

Jeans, Sir James, 57

I39

FREE WILL

Johnson, Dr. Samuel, 17-I8 Johnson, W. E., 4I

Kant, I., 95

Laplace, P. S. de, 10, 65 Laws, prescriptive and de-

scriptive, 73 Laws of nature, 6, 55 Lucas, J. R., 63 Luffman, B. L., 55 Lukasiewicz, J., 5, I I I, I I8,

119

McCall, S., 5 Macintyre, A. C., 92 Melden, A. 1., I o I Mill, J. S., 72

Natural selection, theory of, 96

Nowell-Smith, P. H., 24, 72

"Ought" implies "can," 24ff.

Palmerston, Lord, 95 Paradox, 4 Peirce, C. S., 67 Pope, Alexander, 32 Popper, Sir Karl, 62, 63, 96 Predictability, 62ff. Putnam, H., I04

Radioactive material, 54

J40

Rationality, 92ff. Ross, Sir David, 24 Russell, Lord, I 2 3 Ryle, G., II2-I5, I25

Schlick, M., 62, 72 Schroedinger psi-function, 54 Self as agent, 85£f. Sidgwick, H., 24 Smart, J. J. C., 58 Spinoza, B., 18, 24, 52 Spontaneity, 93£f. Stebbing, L. S. S., 57 Suggestion, post-hypnotic, 2 1

Tautology, 69 Taylor, R., I25

Uncertainty, Principle of, 54, Ch. 7

Vivian, F., 125 Volitions, 84

Waismann, F., 114, 115 Wells, H. M., 84 Winch, P. G., IOI

Wisdom, J., I25 Wittgenstein, L., I 04

Yourgxau, W., 55

Zernelin, A. von, ?8