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LABOR LAW: H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan

LAST-MINUTE

NOTES ON THE 2012BAR EXAMINATION IN LABOR LAW BASED ON THE

SUPREME COURT-PRESCRIBED SYLLABUS

Prof. Joselito Guianan Chan

H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

[These 8-part Notes discuss all topics/sub-topics in the Supreme Court-prescribed Syllabus for Labor Law]

==================================================================

TOPICS UNDER THE SYLLABUS

H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTION

1. Labor Arbitera. Jurisdiction

b. Effect of self-executing order of reinstatement on backwagesc. Requirements to perfect appeal to NLRC

2. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)a. Jurisdictionb. Effect of NLRC reversal of Labor Arbiters order of reinstatementc. Requirements to perfect appeal to Court of Appeals

3. Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) Med Arbi tersa. Jurisdiction (Original and Appellate)

4. National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)a. Conciliation vs. Mediationb. Preventive Mediation

5. DOLE Regional Directorsa. Small money claims

6. DOLE Secretarya. Visitorial and Enforcement Powersb. Power to suspend effects of termination

7. Voluntary Arbitratorsa. Submission Agreementb. Rule 43, Rules of Court

8. Court of Appealsa. Rule 65, Rules of Court

9. Supreme Courta. Rule 45, Rules of Court

10. Prescription of Actionsa. Money claimsb. Illegal dismissalc. Unfair labor practice

d. Offenses penalized by the Labor Code and IRR issued pursuant thereto

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

===========================TOPIC UNDER THE SYLLABUS:1. Labor Arbiter

a. Jurisdiction

===========================

Relevant Provisions: Articles 217 and 128 [b], Labor CodeSection 10, R.A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022

1.PRELIMINARYCONSIDERATIONS.

a. Employmentrelationship,aprerequisiteforexerciseofjurisdiction.

han obles nternet ar eview : han obles rofessional eview, nc.

www.chanroblesbar.com : www.chanroblesbar.com.ph


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LABOR LAW: H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTIONProf. Joselito Guianan Chan

2LABOR LAW: H. PROCEDURE AND JURISDICTIONProf. Joselito Guianan Chan

The existence of employeremployee relationship between the partieslitigants, or a reasonable causal

connection to such relationship1 isaprerequisite for theexerciseofjurisdictionovera labordisputeby the Labor

Arbiters.

b.TheLaborArbitersandtheNLRCarenotexclusivelyvestedwithauthoritytodeterminetheexistenceof

employeremployeerelationship.

InRepublicofthePhilippinesv.AsiaproCooperative,[G.R.No.172101,November23,2007], involvingthe

issueofcoverageofownersmembersofrespondentCooperativeundertheSocialSecuritySystem(SSS),itwasheldthat

itisnotonlytheLaborArbiterortheNLRCwho/whichhastheexclusivejurisdictiontodeterminetheexistenceofthe

employeremployeerelationship.TheSocialSecurityCommission(SSC)hasalsothatpower.

Additionally, the MedArbiter may also exercise the power to determine existence of employeremployee

relationship.

c.IncasesofmoneyclaimsofOFWs,LaborArbitersmayexercisejurisdictionevenabsenttheemployment

relationship.

InSantiagov.CFSharpCrewManagement,Inc.,[G.R.No.162419,July10,2007],itwasheldthataseafarer

whohas

already

signed

aPOEA

approved

employment

contract

but

was

not

deployed

overseas

and,

therefore,

there

is

no employeremployee relationship, may file his monetary claims casewith the LaborArbiter. This is because the

jurisdictionofLaborArbitersisnotlimitedtoclaimsarisingfromemployeremployeerelationships. UnderSection10of

R.A.No.8042(MigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinosActof1995),asamendedbySection7ofR.A.No.10022(March

8,2010),theLaborArbitermayexercisetheclaimsofOFWsarisingoutofanemployeremployeerelationshiporby

virtueofany laworcontract involvingFilipinoworkersforoverseasdeployment, includingclaimsforactual,moral,

exemplaryandotherformsofdamage.

d.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionevenifthecaseisfiledbytheheirsoftheOFW.

ThiswastherulinginMedlineManagement,Inc.v.Roslinda,[G.R.No.168715,September15,2010].Asheirs,

thewifeandsonofJulianoRoslinda,thedeceasedOFW,havethepersonalitytofiletheclaimfordeathcompensation,

reimbursementofmedicalexpenses,damagesandattorney'sfeesbeforetheLaborArbiteroftheNLRC.

e.NatureofjurisdictionofLaborArbitersisoriginalandexclusive.

Thejurisdiction

conferred

by

Article

217

to

the

Labor

Arbiters

is

both

original

and

exclusive,

meaning,

no

other

officersortribunalscantakecognizanceof,orhearanddecide,anyofthecasesthereinenumerated.

f.ExceptionstotheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofLaborArbiters.

Thefollowingaretheexceptions:

1. WhentheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentorthePresidentexerciseshispowerunderArticle263[g]of

theLaborCodetoassumejurisdictionovernationalinterestcasesanddecidethemhimself;or

2. WhentheNLRCexercisesitspowerofcompulsoryarbitrationovernationalinterestcasesthatarecertified

to itbytheSecretaryofLaborandEmploymentpursuanttotheexercisebythe latterofhiscertification

powerunderthesameArticle263[g];or

3. WhenthepartiesagreetosubmitthecasetovoluntaryarbitrationbeforeaVoluntaryArbitratororPanelof

VoluntaryArbitratorswho,underArticles261and262oftheLaborCode,arealsopossessedoforiginaland

exclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidecasesmutuallysubmittedtothembythepartiesforarbitrationand

adjudication.

TheLaborArbitersdonothavejurisdictionoverthecasesmentionedabovewhicharetakencognizanceofby

saidotherlaborofficialsortribunalsunderspecificprovisionsoftheLaborCode.

g.Reasonablecausalconnectionruletheruleincaseofconflictofjurisdictionbetweenlaborcourtand

regularcourt.

Under this rule, if there isa reasonable causal connectionbetween the claim assertedand theemployer

employeerelations,thenthecaseiswithinthejurisdictionoflaborcourts.2

Intheabsenceofsuchnexus,itistheregularcourtsthathavejurisdiction.3

h.Labordisputes,notsubjecttobarangayconciliation.

Labor casesarenot subject to the conciliationproceedingsprescribedunderPresidentialDecreeNo.1508

requiringthesubmissionofdisputesbeforetheBarangayLupongTagapayapapriortotheirfilingwiththecourtorother

governmentoffices.

Requiring

conciliation

of

labor

disputes

before

the

barangay

courts

would

defeat

the

very

salutary

purposes of the law. Instead of simplifying labor proceedings designed at expeditious settlement or referral to the

propercourtsorofficestodecideitfinally,theconciliationoftheissuesbeforetheBarangayLupongTagapayapawould

onlyduplicatetheconciliationproceedingsandundulydelaythedispositionoflaborcases.4

i.LaborArbiterhasnoinjunctionpower;theNLRChas.

WhiletheNLRC isexpresslygrantedthepowerto issuean injunctionorarestrainingorder in labordisputes

underArticle218[e],thereisnoexpress,orevenimplied,grantofsimilarpowertoLaborArbitersintheLaborCode.

1Known as Reasonable Causal Connection Rule.2Dai-ichi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Villarama, Jr. G.R. No. 112940, Nov. 21, 1994, 238 SCRA 267, 271.3San Miguel Corporationv. Etcuban, G. R. No. 127639, Dec. 3, 1999.4Montoyav. Escayo, G.R. Nos. 82211-12, March 21, 1989, 171 SCRA442.




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j.Powertoconductocularinspection.

TheLaborArbitersortheirdulyauthorizedrepresentatives,havethepowertoconductocularinspections,at

anytimeduringworkinghours,onanyestablishment,building,shiporvessel,placeorpremises, includinganywork,

material,implement,

machinery,

appliance

or

any

object

therein,

and

ask

any

employee,

laborer,

or

any

person,

as

the

casemaybe,foranyinformationordataconcerninganymatterorquestionrelativetotheobjectoftheinvestigation.5

2.JURISDICTIONOFLABORARBITERS.

ThefollowingprovisionsoflawsgrantjurisdictiontotheLaborArbiters:

1. Article217oftheLaborCode;

2. Article128[b]oftheLaborCode;and

3. Section10ofR.A.No.8042(MigrantWorkersandOverseasFilipinosActof1995)asamendedin2010by

R.A.No.10022[March8,2010].

2.1.CASESUNDERARTICLE217,

ThefollowingarecasesfallingundertheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofLaborArbitersunderArticle217

oftheLaborCode:

1.Unfair

labor

practice

(ULP)

cases;

2. Terminationdisputes(Illegaldismissalcases);

3. MoneyclaimsinvolvinganamountexceedingP5,000.00;

4. Moneyclaimsraisedinillegaldismissalcases(regardlessofamount);

4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employeremployee

relations;

5. CasesarisingfromanyviolationofArticle264oftheLaborCode,includingquestionsinvolvingthelegalityof

strikesandlockouts;and

Exceptions:

1. ClaimsforEmployeesCompensation(EC),SocialSecurity(SS),PhilHealth6andmaternitybenefits.Reason:

JurisdictionoverEC,SSandmaternitybenefits is lodgedwiththeSocialSecurityCommission.Jurisdiction

overPhilHealthisvestedwiththePhilippineHealthInsuranceCorporation(PHIC).

2.Cases

involving

interpretation

or

implementation

of

CBA

and

interpretation

or

enforcement

of

company

personnel policies. Reason: Jurisdiction over these cases is vested with the Grievance Machinery and

VoluntaryArbitration. IferroneouslyfiledwiththeLaborArbiter,theyshallbedisposedofbytheLabor

Arbiterbyreferringthesametothegrievancemachineryandvoluntaryarbitrationasmaybeprovidedin

saidagreements.7

2.2.CASESUNDERARTICLE128[b],LABORCODE.

Article 128 [b] involves the exercise of the visitorial and enforcement powers by the DOLE Secretary. The

jurisdictionovercasesarisingfromtheinspectionofestablishmentsisvestedwiththeDOLERegionalDirector,exceptin

caseswheretheemployerconteststhefindingsofthe labor inspectors8andraises issuessupportedbydocumentary

proofswhichwerenotconsideredinthecourseofinspection.Thesecontestedcasesfallingunderthisexceptionclause

inparagraph[b]ofArticle128fallunderthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.

2.3.CASESOFOFWsUNDERARTICLESECTION10,R.A.NO.8042,ASAMENDEDBYR.A.NO.10022.

TheLaborArbiterhasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionovermonetaryclaimsofOFWs,towit:

1. Thosearisingoutofanemployeremployeerelationship;

2. Thosearisingbyvirtueofanylaw;

3. ThosearisingfromacontractinvolvingFilipinoworkersforoverseasdeployment;

4. Claimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages.

3.UNFAIRLABORPRACTICECASES.

a.AllULPsthatmaybecommittedbyboththeemployersandlabororganizations.

TheLaborArbiterhasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoverthecivilaspectofallULPsthatmaybecommitted

byeither theemployers9or the labororganizations.

10The criminalaspect thereof fallsunder thejurisdictionof the

regularcourt.

b.Unfairlaborpracticeacts.

UndertheLaborCode,thereareonlyfive(5)provisionsrelatedtounfairlaborpractices,towit:

1. Article247whichdescribes theconceptofunfair laborpracticesandprescribes theprocedure fortheir

prosecution;

2. Article248whichenumeratestheunfairlaborpracticesthatmaybecommittedbyemployers;

3. Article249whichenumeratestheunfairlaborpracticesthatmaybecommittedbylabororganizations;

5Article219 of the Labor Code.6Formerly known as medicare.7See paragraph [c] of Article 217, Labor Code.8labor employment andenforcement officer.9Under Article248, Labor Code.10Under Article 249, Labor Code.




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4. Article261whichconsidersviolationsoftheCBAasno longerunfair laborpracticesunlessthesameare

gross incharacterwhichmeansflagrantand/ormaliciousrefusaltocomplywiththeeconomicprovisions

thereof.

5.Article263[c]

which

refers

to

union

busting

involving

the

dismissal

from

employment

of

union

officers

duly

elected in accordance with the union constitution and bylaws, where the existence of the union is

threatenedthereby.

4.JURISDICTIONOVERTERMINATIONDISPUTES(ILLEGALDISMISSALCASES).

a.Laborofficialswhomaytakecognizanceofterminationdisputes.

Anexaminationof theLaborCodeshows that the followingofficialshave thepower to takecognizanceof

terminationdisputesintheexerciseoftheiroriginalandexclusivejurisdiction:

1. LaborArbitersunderparagraph[a](2)ofArticle217;

2. VoluntaryArbitratorsorpanelsofVoluntaryArbitratorsunderArticles261and262;

3. TheSecretaryofLaborandEmployment, in theexerciseofhisassumptionpower innational interest

cases. Under paragraph [g] of Article 263, he may take cognizance of termination disputes that are

includedorsubsumedinthecase/soverwhichhehasassumedjurisdiction.

4. TheNLRC,innationalinterestcasescertifiedtoitfor

compulsory

arbitration

by

the

Secretary

of

Labor

and

Employmentunder thesameArticle263 [g]. Suchcertifiedcasesmay includeorsubsume the issueof

terminationofemploymentthelegalityofwhichtheNLRCmayvalidlydecideupon.

b.Terminationcaseisnotagrievableissue.

InNavarroIIIv.Damasco,[G.R.No. 101875,July14,1995],theSupremeCourtheldthataterminationcaseis

notagrievableissuethatmustbesubmittedtothegrievancemachinery.

Inanothercase,SanMiguelCorporationv.NLRC,[G.R.No.108001,March15,1996,255SCRA133,140],it

wassimilarlyheldthatdismissalsdonotcallfortheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpoliciesandso

theymaynotbeconsideredgrievableorarbitrablebyvirtueofArticle217[c].

InManejav.NLRC,[G.R.No.124013,June5,1998,290SCRA603],itwasdeclaredthatterminationcasesfall

under theoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionof theLaborArbiters,notof theVoluntaryArbitrators.Thedismissalof

petitionerdoesnot fallwithin thephrasegrievancesarising fromthe interpretationor implementationofcollective

bargainingagreement

and

those

arising

from

the

interpretation

or

enforcement

of

company

personnel

policies,

the

jurisdictionofwhichpertainstothegrievancemachineryorthereafter,toavoluntaryarbitratororpanelofvoluntary

arbitrators.

InNegrosMetalCorp.v.Lamayo,[G.R.No.186557,August25,2010].Itwasheldthatterminationdisputes

shouldbebroughtbeforeaLaborArbiter,exceptwhentheparties,underArticle262,unmistakablyexpressthatthey

agreetosubmitthesametovoluntaryarbitration.

5.JURISDICTIONOVERMONEYCLAIMS.

a.Moneyclaimsunderpar.(a),[3]and[6]ofArticle217;classification.

MoneyclaimsfallingwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbitersarethosementionedin

paragraph[a],Nos.3and6ofArticle217. Theymaybeclassifiedasfollows:

1. Anymoneyclaim,regardlessofamount,accompaniedwithaclaimforreinstatement;or

2.Any

money

claim,

regardless

of

whether

accompanied

with

aclaim

for

reinstatement,

exceeding

the

amountoffivethousandpesos(P5,000.00)perclaimant.

ThemoneyclaiminNo.1abovepresupposesthatitproceedsfromaterminationcase,itbeingaccompanied

with a claim for reinstatement. Hence, it falls within thejurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter since it is principally a

terminationdispute.

ThemoneyclaiminNo.2abovedoesnotnecessarilyarisefromorinvolveaterminationcasebutbecausethe

amountexceedsP5,000.00,itfallswithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter. IftheamountdoesnotexceedP5,000.00,

itis,underArticle129,theDOLERegionalDirectororhisdulyauthorizedhearingofficerswhohavejurisdictiontotake

cognizancethereof.

b.Moneyclaimsmustariseoutofemployeremployeerelationship.

Asageneral rule,moneyclaimsofworkers thatarenotconnectedwithordonotariseoutofemployer

employee relationship fallwithin thejurisdictionof the regularcourts. Themoneyclaimsofworkers referred to in

paragraph3of

Article

217

of

the

Labor

Code

embrace

those

which

arise

out

of

or

in

connection

with

the

employer

employeerelationship,orsomeaspectorincidentofsuchrelationship.11

Clearly, thejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter isnot limitedtomoneyclaimsarisingoutofan illegaldismissal

case,butallmoneyclaimsarisingoutofemployeremployeerelationships.12

Sonzav.ABSCBNBroadcastingCorporation,[G.R.No.138051,June10,2004]

Sincepetitioner isnotanemployeebutan independentcontractor,hismonetaryclaimsfortherecoveryof

unpaidtalentfees,13thmonthpay,separationpay,serviceincentiveleave,signingbonus,travelallowance,andamounts

11San Miguel Corporationv. NLRC, 161 SCRA719.12Nation Broadcasting Corporation v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 116184, October 2, 1997, 280 SCRA65, 68-69].




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dueundertheEmployeeStockOptionPlanoftherespondentcompanydonotfallunderthejurisdictionoftheLabor

Arbiterbutcognizablebytheregularcourt.

Consultav.CA,[G.R.No.145443,March18,2005]

Theclaim

for

unpaid

commissions

filed

by

the

Managing

Associate

of

an

entity

engaged

in

health

care

business,

was declared beyond thejurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter because there was no employeremployee relationship

betweentheparties. Herremedyistofileanordinarycivilactionintheregularcourttolitigateherclaim.

Otherillustrativecaseswheremoneyclaimswereheldnottohavearisenfromtheemploymentrelationship

areasfollows:

1. Apersonalloanfromacompanypresidenttoanemployeeisnotwithintheambitofthejurisdictionofthe

LaborArbiter.13

2. Claimofemployeeforacashprizeunderaprogramofthecompanywasheldbeyondthejurisdictionofthe

LaborArbiter.14

Butinanothercase,theclaimbyanemployeeforahouseandlotprizeastopsalesmanwas

heldwithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.15

3. Unpaidsalaries,allowancesandperdiemofthePresidentofacompanyare included in intracorporate

dispute,hence,notcognizablebytheLaborArbiter.16

Butamoneyclaimofacorporateofficerwhois,at

thesame

time,

aregular employee

is

not

an

intra

corporate

dispute,

hence,

cognizable

by

the

Labor

Arbiter.17

4. Money claimsofan independentcontractor consistingofunpaid commissions and reimbursements fall

beyondthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.18

5. Anaction toenforce liabilityarising fromabreachof trust,aswellas to recoveranyamountallegedly

misappropriated,mustbebroughtbeforetheregularcourts.19

5.1.MONEYCLAIMSUNDERARTICLE128OFTHELABORCODE.

a.VisitorialandenforcementpowersofDOLESecretaryunderArticle128.

Article 128 enunciates the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary or any of his duly

authorizedrepresentatives.

b.RequisitesforthevalidexerciseofthevisitorialandenforcementpowersunderArticle128.

ForthevalidexerciseofthevisitorialandenforcementpowersprovidedunderArticle128[b],thefollowing

requisitesshouldconcur:

1. Theemployeremployeerelationshipshouldstillexist;

2. The findings in question were made in the course of inspection by the labor employment and

enforcementofficersorindustrialsafetyengineers;and

3. Theemployeeshavenot yet initiatedanyclaimor complaintwith theDOLERegionalDirectorunder

Article129,ortheLaborArbiter,underArticle217.

TheexistenceoftheemploymentrelationshipatthetimeoftheinitiationoftheactionunderArticle128[b]is

essential.Basedonthisrequisite,theSupremeCourt,inthe2006caseofEJRCraftsCorp.v.Hon.CA,[G.R.No.154101,

March10,2006],disagreedwiththecontentionofpetitionerthattheLaborArbiter,andnottheDOLERegionalDirector,

hasjurisdictionoverthiscase.Itheldthatconsideringthattherestillexistsanemployeremployeerelationshipbetween

petitionerand

private

respondents

and

that

the

case

involves

violations

of

the

labor

standard

provisions

of

the

Labor

Code,theDOLERegionalDirectorhasjurisdictiontohearanddecidetheinstantcaseinconformitywithArticle128[b]of

theLaborCode.

RizalSecurity&ProtectiveServices,Inc.v.Hon.Maraan,[G.R.No.124915,February18,2008]

TheSupremeCourtruledherethatwhatismaterialtoconsideristhatatthetimeofthefilingofthecomplaints

orclaimsforpaymentofmonetarybenefitswiththeDOLERegionalOffice,thecomplainantswerestillemployeesof

petitionercompany.Thus,theSupremeCourtsaidthatconsideringthat it isuncontrovertedthattherestillexistedan

employeremployeerelationshipbetweenpetitionerRizalSecurityandprivaterespondentsatthetimeoffilingofthe

complainton19May1995,andthatthecaseisoneinvolvingviolationsoflaborstandardprovisionsoftheLaborCode,it

istheDOLERegionalDirectorwhohasjurisdictionoverthecase.

c.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionifemploymentrelationshipnolongerexistsatthetimeoftheinitiationof

theactionunderArticle128.

Ifat

the

time

of

the

initiation

of

the

action

under

Article

128

[b],

the

employer

employee

relationship

had

alreadyceasedtoexist,itisnottheDOLERegionalDirectorbuttheLaborArbiterwhohasjurisdictionoverthesame,as

emphasizedinthecaseofBatongBuhayGoldMines,Inc.v.Sec.DelaSerna,[G.R.No.86963,August6,1999,370Phil.

872].

13Food Traders House, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120677, Dec. 21, 1998, 300 SCRA360; Seealso Pondoc v. NLRC, G.R. No. 116347, Oct. 3, 1996, 262 SCRA632.14San Miguel Corporationv. NLRC, 161 SCRA719.15Pepsi-Cola BottlingCompany v. Martinez, 112 SCRA578.16Cagayan de OroColiseum, Inc. v. Minister of Labor andEmployment, G.R. No. 71589, Dec. 17, 1990.17Gregorio Araneta University Foundation v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 75583, Nov. 8, 1988, 167SCRA79.18Sara v. Agarrado, G.R. No. L-73199, Oct. 26, 1988, 166 SCRA625.19Dacanay v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107277, Aug. 9, 1996, 260 SCRA486.




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d.LaborArbitershavenojurisdictioneveniftheamountofthemonetaryclaimexceedsP5,000.00.

AftertheamendmentofArticle128[b]oftheLaborCodebyR.A.No.7730,jurisprudenceaffirmedtherule

that the visitorial and enforcement powers of the DOLE Secretary under Article 128 are no longer bound by the

restrictiveeffect

of

Articles

129

and

217

insofar

as

the

amount

of

monetary

claims

is

concerned.

Allied InvestigationBureau, Inc.v.SecretaryofLaborandEmployment, [G.R.No.122006,November24,

1999,377Phil.80],

ItwasruledherethatwhileitistruethatunderArticles129and217oftheLaborCode,theLaborArbiterhas

jurisdiction tohearanddecidecaseswhere theaggregatemoneyclaimsofeachemployeeexceedsP5,000.00, said

provisionsoflawdonotcontemplatenorcoverthevisitorialandenforcementpowersoftheSecretaryofLabororhis

dulyauthorizedrepresentatives.

ExBataanVeteransSecurityAgency,Inc.v.TheSecretaryofLaborLaguesma,[G.R.No.152396,November

20,2007]

ItwasheldinthiscasethattheRegionalDirectorvalidlyassumedjurisdictionoverthemoneyclaimsofprivate

respondentseveniftheclaimsexceededP5,000becausesuchjurisdictionwasexercisedinaccordancewithArticle128

[b]oftheLaborCodeandthecasedoesnotfallundertheexceptionclause.20

e.LaborArbitersmaystillhavejurisdictionovercontestedcasesundertheexceptionclauseinArticle128

[b].

TheexceptionclauseinArticle128[b],asamendedbyR.A.No.7730,states:

xxx. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to theappropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, exceptin cases where the employer contests the findingsof the labor employment and enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which werenot considered in the course of inspection.

3elementstodivestDOLERegionalDirectorofjurisdictionandconferitwithLaborArbiter:

(1) thattheemployerconteststhefindingsofthelaborregulationsofficerandraisesissuesthereon;

(2) thatinordertoresolvesuchissues,thereisaneedtoexamineevidentiarymatters;and

(3) thatsuchmattersarenotverifiableinthenormalcourseofinspection.21

Resultantly,ifthe

said

elements

are

present

and,

therefore,

the

labor

standards

case

is

covered

by

said

exceptionclause, then theRegionalDirectorwillhave toendorse thecase to theappropriateLaborArbitersof the

ArbitrationBranchoftheNLRC.

5.2.MONEYCLAIMSCOGNIZABLEBYDOLEREGIONALDIRECTORSUNDERARTICLE129.

Under Article 129 of the Labor Code, DOLE Regional Directors or his duly authorized hearing officers, are

empowered,inasummaryproceeding,tohearanddecideclaimsforrecoveryofwagesandothermonetaryclaimsand

benefits,includinglegalinterest,providedthefollowingrequisitesconcur:

1. Theclaimmustarisefromemployeremployeerelationship;

2. Theclaimantdoesnotseekreinstatement;and

3. TheaggregatemoneyclaimofeachemployeedoesnotexceedP5,000.00.22

AbsentanyoftherequisitesmentionedabovewilldivesttheRegionalDirectorsoftheirauthoritytohearand

decidesaidmoneyclaims.Consequently,thejurisdictionthereoverisvestedupontheLaborArbiters.23

6.JURISDICTIONOVERCLAIMSFORDAMAGES.

a.LaborArbitershavejurisdictionoverclaimsfordamages.

Itisnowawellsettledrulethatclaimsfordamagesaswellasattorneysfeesinlaborcasesarecognizableby

theLaborArbiters, to theexclusionofallothercourts.Rulings to thecontraryaredeemedabandonedormodified

accordingly.24

No matter how designated, for as long as the action primarily involves an employeremployee

relationship,thelaborcourthasjurisdictionoveranydamageclaims.

b.ClaimsfordamagesofOFWs.

Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages that may be lodged by overseas Filipino

workersarecognizablebytheLaborArbiters.25

7.JURISDICTIONOVERLEGALITYOFSTRIKESANDLOCKOUTS.

a.Jurisdictionoverstrikesorlockoutsnotaffectingnationalinterest.

Ingeneral,theLaborArbiterhasthepowertodeterminequestionsinvolvingthelegalityorillegalityofastrike

orlockout,uponthefilingofapropercomplaintandafterdueproceedings.

Theemployer,incaseofastrike,ortheunion,incaseofalockout,mayfiletheproperpetitionwiththeLabor

Arbitertoseekadeclarationoftheillegalitythereof.26

20See also V.L. Enterprises v. Hon. CA, [G.R. No. 167512, March12, 2007].21Ex-Bataan Veterans Security Agency, Inc. v. TheSecretary of Labor Laguesma, [G.R. No. 152396, November 20, 2007]; See alsoSee alsoSection 1 [b], Rule III of the Rules on theDisposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices [September 16, 1987].22M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 89894, Jan. 3, 1997, 266 SCRA111, 128; Ubay Arrastre and StevedoringServices, Inc. v. Trajano, G.R. No. 106813, Nov. 25, 1993, 228SCRA189.23Paragraph [a] 6, Article 217, Labor Code; South Motorists Enterprises v. Tosoc, G.R. No. 87449, Jan. 23, 1990, 181SCRA386.24Primero v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. L-72644, December 14, 1987, 156SCRA435],25Section10, Republic Act No. 8042; Section58, Rules andRegulations Implementing theMigrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.26No. 26, Guidelines Governing Labor Relations.




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b.Jurisdictionoverstrikesorlockoutsaffectingnationalinterest.

Jurisdiction over strikes or lockouts in industries affecting the national interest is vested with the DOLE

SecretaryandnotwiththeLaborArbiter,underArticle263[g]oftheLaborCode.Thus,theDOLESecretarymayassume

jurisdictionthereover

and

decide

ithimself

or

certify

itto

the

NLRC

for

compulsory

arbitration.

c.Voluntaryarbitrationofstrikeorlockoutcasesmaybedoneatanystagethereof.

BeforeoratanystageofthecompulsoryarbitrationprocessinastrikeorlockoutcasebeforeaLaborArbiteror

theDOLESecretaryinassumedcasesortheNLRCincertifiedcases,thepartiesmaystillopttosubmittheirdisputeto

voluntaryarbitration.27

Iftheissueoflegalityorillegalityofastrikeorlockoutissubmittedbythepartiestovoluntary

arbitration, thejurisdictiontoresolvesaid issuebelongsexclusivelytotheVoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntary

Arbitrators.28

d.Jurisdictionoverprohibitedactivitiescommittedduringstrikesorlockouts.

CasesarisingfromanyviolationsofArticle264oftheLaborCoderegardingthecommissionofprohibitedacts

inthecourseofastrikeorlockoutfallwithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiter.29

e.Jurisdictionovercriminalcasesarisingfromstrikesorlockouts.

Jurisdictionover

criminal

cases

which

may

have

arisen

as

aconsequence

of

the

strike

or

lockout

falls

under

the

jurisdictionoftheregularcourts.

8.OTHERISSUESAFFECTINGTHEEXERCISEOFJURISDICTIONBYLABORARBITERS.

Jurisprudence enunciates a number of rulings on issues and controversies not expressly covered by any

provisionsoftheLaborCodebutwhichmayormaynotfallwithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiters.Someofthem

areasfollows:

1.Terminationofcorporateofficersandtheirmonetaryclaims;

2. Issuesinvolvingemployeesingovernmentownedand/orcontrolledcorporations;

3. Issuesinvolvinganalienparty;

4. Casesinvolvingentitiesimmunefromsuit;

5. Applicationofthedoctrineofforumnonconveniens;

6. Casesinvolvingpriestsandministers;

7.Effect

of

rehabilitation

receivership

on

jurisdiction

in

labor

cases;

8. CasesinvolvingoverseasFilipinoworkers;

9. Wagedistortioncases;

10.Enforcementoflaborstandardslaws;

11.Claimsofdomesticorhousehelpers;

12.Enforcementofcompromiseagreement;

13.Issuescognizablebygrievancemachineryorvoluntaryarbitration;

14.Issuesinvolvingcooperatives;

15.Issuesinvolvinglocalwaterutilitiesdistricts;

16.Quasidelictortortcases;

17.CriminalandcivilliabilitiesarisingfromviolationsofArticle241;

18.Claimsorcounterclaimsofemployersagainstemployees;

19.Constitutionality

of

CBA

provisions;

20.Taxdeductionsasmoneyclaim;

21.IssuancebyRTCofWritofHabeasDatainrelationtoalaborcase;

8.1.JURISDICTIONOVERTERMINATIONOFCORPORATEOFFICERS(INTRACORPORATEDISPUTES).

a.LaborArbitershavenojurisdictionoverterminationofacorporateofficerwhichisinthenatureofan

intracorporatedispute.

Itisasettledrulethatjurisdictionoverthesubjectmatterisconferredbylaw. Thedeterminationoftherights

ofadirectorandcorporateofficerdismissedfromhisemploymentaswellasthecorrespondingliabilityofacorporation,

ifany,isanintracorporatedisputesubjecttothejurisdictionoftheregularcourtsandnotofLaborArbiters.30

b.NewdoctrineisthatcorporateofficersreferonlytothosementionedintheCorporationCodeandthe

ByLaws; allotherofficersnotsomentionedaredeemedemployees.

MatlingIndustrialandCommercialCorp.v.Coros,[G.R.No.157802,October13,2010].

It isnow theprevailing rule,asenunciated in this2010caseofMatling, thatonly the following shouldbeconsideredcorporateofficers:

1. ThoseexpresslymentionedinSection25,specificallythethree(3)officerswhichacorporationmusthave,

namely:president,secretary,andtreasurer;and

2. ThoseexpresslymentionedandprovidedforintheByLaws.

Thus, thecreationofanofficepursuant toorunderaByLawenablingprovision isnotenough tomakea

positionacorporateoffice.Consequentlytheonlyofficersofacorporationwerethosegiventhatcharactereitherbythe

27Article263 [h], Labor Code.28No. 019, Primer onStrike, Picketingand Lockout.29Article217[5], Labor Code).30Okol v. Slimmers World International, G.R. No. 160146, Dec. 11, 2009.




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CorporationCodeorby theByLaws; the restof thecorporateofficers couldbe consideredonlyasemployeesor

subordinateofficials.31

Locsinv.NissanLeasePhils.,Inc.,[G.R.No.185567,October20,2010]

PetitionerLocsin

was

undeniably

Chairman

of

the

Board

and

Executive

Vice

President

and

Treasurer,

and

was

elected to these positionsby respondent companysBoard of Directors pursuant to its Bylaws.As such,he was a

corporateofficer,notanemployee,basedonthesubmittedfacts inthiscaseandonPresidentialDecree902A,and

Section25ofBatasPambansaBlg.69,ortheCorporationCode.EvenasExecutiveVicePresident/Treasurer,petitioner

Locsin already acted as a corporate officer because such position is provided for in respondent companys By

Laws.Consequently,itwasruledinthiscasethattheLaborArbiterhasnojurisdictionoverhisterminationcasesinceitis

inthenatureofanintracorporatedispute,anissuecognizablebytheRegionalTrialCourtunderSection5ofRepublic

ActNo.8799(SecuritiesRegulationCode).

c.RulingsinTabangandNacpil,nolongercontrolling.ThefollowingrulingshavebeenabandonedperMatling:1. PurificacionG.Tabangv.NLRC,[G.R.No.121143,January21,1997,266SCRA462,468],whereitwasruled

that(a)corporateofficersdismissalisalwaysacorporateact,oranintracorporatecontroversy,andthe

natureis

not

altered

by

the

reason

or

wisdom

with

which

the

Board

of

Directors

may

have

in

taking

such

action.Also,anintracorporatecontroversyisonewhicharisesbetweenastockholderandthecorporation.

Thereisnodistinction,qualification,noranyexemptionwhatsoever.Theprovisionisbroadandcoversall

kindsofcontroversiesbetweenstockholdersandcorporations.Inthiscase,thepetitionersdualpositions

at the timeofherdismissal, thatofMedicalDirectorandHospitalAdministratorofprivate respondent

PamanaGoldenCareMedicalCenterinCalamba,Laguna,areexpresslyprovidedundertheByLaws.

2. Nacpilv.IntercontinentalBroadcastingCorporation,[G.R.No.144767,March21,2002],wherepetitioner

arguedthatheisnotacorporateofficerofrespondentIBCbutanemployeethereofsincehehasnotbeen

electednorappointedasComptrollerandAssistantManagerbytheIBCsBoardofDirectors. Hepointed

outthathehasactuallybeenappointedassuchon January11,1995bythe IBCsGeneralManager. In

support of his argument, petitioner underscored the fact that the IBCs ByLaws does not include the

positionofcomptrollerinitsrosterofcorporateofficers.He,therefore,contendedthathisdismissalwasa

controversyfalling

within

the

jurisdiction

of

the

labor

courts.

The

High

Court,

however,

found

this

argument

of petitioner untenable. It declared that even assuming that he was in fact appointed by the General

Manager,suchappointmentwassubsequentlyapprovedbytheBoardofDirectorsofrespondentIBC.That

thepositionofComptroller isnotexpresslymentionedamong theofficersof IBC in itsByLaws isofno

momentbecausetheIBCsBoardofDirectorsisempoweredunderSection25oftheCorporationCodeand

underthecorporationsbylawstoappointsuchotherofficersas itmaydeemnecessary. Consequently,

sincepetitionersappointmentascomptrollerrequiredtheapprovalandformalactionofrespondentIBCs

Board of Directors to become valid, it is clear, therefore, that petitioner is a corporate officer whose

dismissalmaybethesubjectofacontroversycognizablebytheSECunderSection5[c]ofP.D.902A(now

bytheRegionalTrialCourtunderR.A.No.8799)whichincludesandcoverscontroversiesinvolvingboththe

electionandappointmentofcorporatedirectors,trustees,officers,andmanagers.Hadpetitionerbeenan

ordinaryemployee,suchboardactionwouldnothavebeenrequired.

Becausethe

soundness

of

the

dicta

enunciated

in

Nacpil

and

Tabang

therein

is

not

unassailable,

as

itis

too

sweepinganddoesnotaccordwithreason,justice,andfairplay,theSupremeCourtmadeadefinitiveholdinginthe

2010caseofMatlingIndustrialandCommercialCorp.v.Coros,[supra]thatNacpilandTabangshouldno longerbe

controlling.Thus,itruled:

ThepetitionersrelianceonTabang,supra,ismisplaced.ThestatementinTabang,tothe

effectthatofficesnotexpresslymentioned intheByLawsbutwerecreatedpursuanttoaByLaw

enabling provision were also considered corporate offices, was plainly obiter dictum due to the

positionsubjectofthecontroversybeingmentionedintheByLaws.Thus,theCourtheldthereinthat

thepositionwasacorporateoffice,and that thedeterminationof the rightsand liabilitiesarising

fromtheousterfromthepositionwasanintracorporatecontroversywithintheSECsjurisdiction.

InNacpilv.IntercontinentalBroadcastingCorporation,whichmaybethemoreappropriate

ruling,thepositionsubjectofthecontroversywasnotexpresslymentionedintheByLaws,butwas

createdpursuanttoaByLawenablingprovisionauthorizingtheBoardofDirectorstocreateother

officesthat

the

Board

of

Directors

might

see

fit

to

create.

The

Court

held

there

that

the

position

was

a

corporateoffice,relyingontheobiterdictuminTabang.

Consideringthattheobservationsearliermadehereinshowthatthesoundnessoftheirdicta is not unassailable, Tabang and Nacpil should no longer be controlling. [Underscoringsupplied].

d.Elementstodeterminewhetheradisputeisintracorporateornot.

In view of the declaration inMatling that the Tabang pronouncement is not controlling because it is too

sweepinganddoesnotaccordwithreason,justice,andfairplay,two (2)elementsshouldbeconsidered inorderto

determinewhetheradisputeconstitutesanintracorporatecontroversyornot,namely:

31Gurreav. Lezama, [G.R. No. L-10556, April 30, 1958, 103 Phil. 553].




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(a)Thestatusorrelationshipoftheparties;and

(b)Thenatureofthequestionthatisthesubjectoftheircontroversy.

e.Thestatusofanemployee(whorosefromtheranks)asdirectorandstockholderdoesnot

automaticallyconverthisdismissalintoanintracorporatedispute.

AccordingtoMatling,thecriteriafordistinguishingbetweencorporateofficerswhomaybeoustedfromoffice

atwill,ononehand,andordinarycorporateemployeeswhomayonlybeterminatedforjustcause,ontheotherhand,

donotdependonthenatureoftheservicesperformed,butonthemannerofcreationoftheoffice. Inthecaseof

respondent in Matling, he was supposedly at once an employee, a stockholder, and a Director of Matling.The

circumstances surrounding his appointment to office must be fully considered to determine whether the dismissal

constitutedanintracorporatecontroversyoralaborterminationdispute.Anotherconsiderationiswhetherhisstatusas

Director and stockholderhadany relationatall tohisappointment and subsequentdismissalasVicePresident for

FinanceandAdministration.

Obviously enough, the respondent in Matling was not appointed as Vice President for Finance and

Administration because of his being a stockholder or Director of Matling. He had started working for Matling on

September8,1966,andhadbeenemployedcontinuouslyfor33yearsuntilhisterminationonApril17,2000,firstasa

bookkeeper,and

his

climb

in

1987

to

his

last

position

as

Vice

President

for

Finance

and

Administration

had

been

gradual

but steady,as the following sequence indicates:1966Bookkeeper;1968SeniorAccountant;1969ChiefAccountant;

1972OfficeSupervisor;1973AssistantTreasurer;1978SpecialAssistantforFinance;1980AssistantComptroller;1983

FinanceandAdministrativeManager;1985sst.VicePresident forFinanceandAdministration;and1987 toApril17,

2000VicePresident forFinanceandAdministration.EventhoughhemighthavebecomeastockholderofMatling in

1992,hispromotiontothepositionofVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministrationin1987wasbyvirtueofthelength

of quality service he had rendered as an employee of Matling. His subsequent acquisition of the status of

Director/stockholderhadnorelationtohispromotion.Besides,hisstatusofDirector/stockholderwasunaffectedbyhis

dismissalfromemploymentasVicePresidentforFinanceandAdministration.

f. Acaseofanemployeewhorosefromtherankstobecomeacorporateofficeratthetimeofhisdismissal

stilltreatedasaregularemployee.

InPrudentialBank and TrustCompany v.Reyes, [G.R.No. 141093, February 20, 2001], it was held that

respondentAssistant

Vice

President

who

rose

from

the

ranks

was

aregular

employee

and

is

thus

entitled

to

security

of

tenure;thatis,herservicesmaybeterminatedonlyforajustorauthorizedcause.Itwasestablishedbyevidencethat

she startedheremploymentwith thebankwhen shewasappointedAccountingClerkon July14,1963.From that

position,sherosetobecomesupervisor.Thenin1982,shewasappointedAssistantVicePresidentwhichsheoccupied

untilherillegaldismissalonJuly19,1991.Petitionerbankscontentionthatshemerelyholdsanelectivepositionand

that,ineffect,sheisnotaregularemployeeisbeliedbythenatureofherworkandherlengthofservicetherewith.

g.AcorporateofficermayalsobeanemployeewhosedismissalmayvestjurisdictionontheLaborArbiter.

Acorporateofficermayalsobe,atthesametime,anemployee,asheldinRuralBankofCoron[Palawan],Inc.

v.Cortes,[G.R.No. 164888,December6,2006].While, indeed,respondentwastheCorporateSecretaryoftheRuralBankofCoron,shewasalso itsFinancialAssistantandthePersonnelOfficerofthetwootherpetitionercorporations.

ThecaseofMainlandConstructionCo.,Inc.v.Movilla,[320Phil,353(1995)],instructsthatacorporationcanengageits

corporateofficerstoperformservicesunderacircumstancewhichwouldmakethememployees. TheLaborArbiterhas

thusjurisdiction

over

respondents

complaint.

h.TransferofjurisdictionfromSECtoregularcourtsunderR.A.No.8799.

UnderSection5[5.2.]ofRepublicActNo.8799[SecuritiesRegulationCode],the jurisdictionoftheSecurities

andExchangeCommission(SEC)overallcasesenumeratedunderSection5ofPresidentialDecreeNo.902Ahasbeen

transferredtothecourtsofgeneraljurisdictionortheappropriateRegionalTrialCourt(RTC).TheSupremeCourt,inthe

exerciseofitsauthority,maydesignatetheRTCbranchesthatshallexercisejurisdictionoverthesecases.

i.Claimsforbenefitsanddamagesinintracorporatecasesarecognizablebytheregularcourts.

Anymonetaryclaimsbeingassertedbyacorporateofficerwhoisnotamereemployeesuchasunpaidsalaries,

commissions,separationpayandbackwages, includingclaimsforvacationandsick leaves,13thmonthpay,Christmas

bonus,medicalexpenses,carexpenses,andotherbenefits,arenotsimplelaborproblemsbutmattersthatcomewithin

the area of corporate affairs and management, and are, in fact, corporate controversies in contemplation of the

CorporationCodeand,therefore,thejurisdictionthereover is lodgedwiththeregularcourtsandnotwiththeLabor

Arbiter.32

8.2.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGEMPLOYEESOFGOVERNMENTOWNEDAND/ORCONTROLLED

CORPORATIONS.

a.Generalprinciples.

AccordingtoFelicianov.CommissiononAudit,[G.R.No.147402,January14,2004,419SCRA363],therearetwo(2)classesofcorporationsrecognizedunderthe1987Constitution. Thefirstreferstoprivatecorporationscreated

underagenerallaw;thesecondreferstogovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationscreatedbyspecialcharters.

32 Okol v. Slimmers World International, G.R. No. 160146, Dec. 11, 2009; Lozon v. NLRC, G.R. No. 107660, Jan. 02, 1995, 240SCRA1; Espino v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 109642-43, Jan. 5, 1995.




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It isnowwellentrenched that thehiringand firingofemployeesofgovernmentownedand/or controlled

corporationswithoutoriginalchartersarecoveredby theLaborCodewhilethosewithoriginalchartersarebasically

governedbytheCivilServiceLaw,rulesandregulations.33

b.Jurisdictionoverdismissalofemployeeforoffensescommittedwhileemployedbyagovernmentowned

corporationbutdiscoveredafteritwasprivatized.

The2010caseofLuzvimindaAngv.PhilippineNationalBank,[G.R.No.178762,June16,2010],presentsthe

uniqueissueofwhichagencyhasjurisdictionoverpetitioneremployeesillegaldismissalcasesinceshewasdismissed

basedonoffenseswhichshecommittedduringheremployment inrespondentPNBwhile itwasstillagovernment

ownedcorporationbutwhichwerediscoveredwhenshewasrehiredafterrespondentPNBwasprivatized.Atthetime

shecommittedtheoffenses,thejurisdictionthereoverwaswiththeCivilServiceCommission(CSC)sincerespondent

bankwasagovernmentownedcorporation,butatthetimetheoffenseswerediscovered,respondentbankhasalready

beenprivatizedand,therefore,thejurisdictionovertheissueoflegalityorillegalityofherdismissalbelongstotheLabor

ArbiterundertheLaborCode.

c.Specificcases.

CasinoLaborAssociationv.CA.[G.R.No.141020,June12,2008].Inresolving

the

issue

of

whether

or

not

the

NLRC has jurisdiction over the employeremployee relationship in Philippine Amusement & Gaming Corporation

(PAGCOR), Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) and Philippine Special Services Corporation (PSSC), the

Supreme Court made the definitive ruling that the respondent corporations were created by an original charter.

Consequently, they fallunder thejurisdictionof theCivilServiceCommissionandnot theDepartmentofLaborand

Employment.

Postigov.PhilippineTuberculosisSociety, Inc.,[G.R.No.155146, January24,2006].The respondentwas

incorporatedonMarch11,1960asanonprofit,benevolentandnonstockcorporationundertheCorporationCode.

Havingbeencreatedunderthegeneralcorporation law insteadofaspecialcharter, itwasheldthatrespondent isa

privateandnotagovernmentcorporation.Thisnotwithstandingthefactthat itsemployeesarecoveredbytheGSIS.

ExtantontherecordsistherespondentsadmissionthatalthoughitsemployeesarecompulsorymembersoftheGSIS,

saidemployeesarenotgovernedbytheCivilServiceLawbutbytheLaborCode.

DutyFreePhilippinesv.Mojica,[G.R.No.166365,September30,2005]PetitionerDFPwascreatedunder

ExecutiveOrderNo.46onSeptember4,1986primarilytoaugmenttheservice facilitiesfortouristsandtogenerate

foreignexchangeandrevenueforthegovernment.Inorderforthegovernmenttoexercisedirectandeffectivecontrol

andregulationoverthetaxanddutyfreeshops,theirestablishmentandoperationwerevested intheMinistry(now

Department)ofTourism(DOT),throughitsimplementingarm,thePhilippineTourismAuthority(PTA).Allthenetprofits

from themerchandisingoperationsof the shopsaccrued to theDOT.Accordingly, since DFP isunder theexclusive

authorityofthePTA, itfollowsthat itsofficialsandemployeesare likewisesubjecttotheCivilServiceLaw,rulesand

regulations.

Camporedondov.NLRC, [G.R.No.129049,August6,1999]. TheSupremeCourtruledthatthePhilippine

NationalRedCross(PNRC)isagovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwithitsowncharter.

BLISSDevelopmentCorporationEmployeesUnion(BDCEU) FDTUSentrongDemokratikongManggagawa

(SDM)v.Hon.PuraFerrerCalleja,[G.R.No.80887,September30,1994]. TheBliss

Development

Corporation

(BDC)

is

agovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporationwithoutanoriginalcharter.Hence,theunionsor labororganizations

therein existing are not covered by Executive Order No. 180 (Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to

Organize of Government Employees, Creating a Public Sector LaborManagement Council, and for Other Purposes)

which becameeffective on June 01,2007.They are not required to register under Section 7 of said law as a pre

conditionforfilingapetitionforcertificationelection.

BoyScoutsofthePhilippinesv.NLRC,[G.R.No.80767,April22,1991]. Complaintsforillegaldismissaland

unfairlaborpracticelodgedbyemployeesagainsttheiremployer,BoyScoutsofthePhilippines(BSP)whichwascreated

underCommonwealthActNo.111fortheeducational,civicandsocialdevelopmentoftheyouth,falloutsideofthe

jurisdictionof theLaborArbiter.BSP isbothagovernmentcontrolledcorporationwithanoriginalcharterandan

instrumentalityofthegovernment,despitethefactthat its fundsarederivedprincipally frommembershipduesand

propertyrentals.

TradeUnionsofthePhilippinesandAlliedServicesv.NationalHousingCorporation,[G.R.No.49677,May4,

1989, 173 SCRA 33]. Employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) which was organized in 1959 under

ExecutiveOrderNo.399,otherwiseknownastheUniformCharterofGovernmentCorporations(January1,1951),are

coveredbytheLaborCode,NHCbeingagovernmentownedand/orcontrolledcorporationwithoutanoriginalcharter.

Thereis,therefore,noimpedimenttotheholdingofacertificationelectionamongtheworkersofNHC.(SeealsoJucov.

NLRC,G.R.No.98107,Aug.18,1997,277SCRA528).

UniversityofLifeFoundationv.BureauofLaborRelations,[G.R.No.85050,April12,1989]. TheUniversityof

LifeFoundationisagovernmentownedandcontrolledcorporationwithoutanoriginalcharter,ithavingbeenorganized

33ZamboangaCity Water District v. Buat, G.R. No. 104389, May 27, 1994.




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under the Corporation Code. Thus, when the Bureau of Labor Relations assumedjurisdiction over the petition for

certification election filed by the union, it acted in accordance with applicable law and latestjurisprudence on the

matter.

Lumantav.NLRC,[G.R.No.82819,February8,1989]. Food

Terminal,

Inc.

(FTI)

is

agovernment

owned

and

controlledcorporationwithoutoriginalcharter,hence,itistheDepartmentofLaborandEmployment,andnottheCivil

ServiceCommission,whichhasjurisdictionoverthedisputearisingfromtheemploymentofthepetitionersandthat,

consequently,thetermsandconditionsofsuchemploymentaregovernedbytheLaborCodeandnotbytheCivilService

Law,rulesandregulations.

8.3.JURISDICTIONOVERDISPUTESINVOLVINGANALIENPARTY.

To illustraterulingcase lawonthissubject,thecaseofPakistan InternationalAirlinesCorporationv.Ople,

[G.R.No.61594,September28,1990],isinpoint.Inthiscase,twocontractsofemploymentwereexecutedinManila

betweenPakistanInternationalAirlinesCorporationandtwoFilipinoflightattendants. Paragraph10ofthecontracts

embodiesthestipulation,amongothers,thatthetermsthereofshallbeconstruedandgovernedbythelawsofPakistan

and only the courts of Karachi, Pakistan shall havejurisdiction to consider any matter arising out of or under the

agreement.Prior

to

the

expiration

of

the

contracts,

the

services

of

the

two

Filipino

flight

attendants

were

terminated.

Theyjointlyfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissal. Oneoftheissuesraisediswhichlawshouldapplyandwhichcourthas

jurisdictionoverthedispute.

The Supreme Court, in holding that the Philippine law should apply and that the Philippine court has

jurisdiction,declaredthatpetitionerPIAcannottakerefugeinparagraph10ofitsemploymentagreementwhich,firstly,

specifiesthelawofPakistanastheapplicablelawoftheagreementand,secondly,laysthevenueforsettlementofany

disputearisingoutofor inconnectionwiththeagreementonly[in]courtsofKarachi,Pakistan. The firstclauseof

paragraph10cannotbeinvokedtopreventtheapplicationofPhilippinelaborlawsandregulationstothesubjectmatter

ofthiscase,i.e.,theemployeremployeerelationshipbetweenpetitionerPIAandprivaterespondents. Therelationship

is much affected with public interest and that the otherwise applicable Philippine laws and regulations cannot be

rendered illusoryby thepartiesagreeingupon someother law togovern their relationship.Neithermaypetitioner

invokethesecondclauseofparagraph10,specifyingtheKarachicourtsasthesolevenueforthesettlementofdisputes

betweenthecontractingparties.Evenacursoryscrutinyoftherelevantcircumstancesofthiscasewillshowthemultiple

andsubstantive

contacts

between

law

and

Philippine

courts,

on

the

one

hand,

and

the

relationship

between

the

parties,

upontheother.Thecontractwasnotonlyexecuted inthePhilippines, itwasalsoperformedhere,at leastpartially.

PrivaterespondentsarePhilippinecitizensandresidents,whilepetitioner,althoughaforeigncorporation,islicensedto

dobusiness(andisactuallydoingbusinessinthePhilippines)andhence,isaresidentinthePhilippines.Lastly,private

respondentswerebasedinthePhilippinesinbetweentheirassignedflightstotheMiddleEastandEurope.Alltheabove

contracts point to the Philippine courts and administrative agencies as the proper forum for the resolution of the

contractualdisputesbetween theparties.Under these circumstances,paragraph10of theemployment agreement

cannotbegiveneffectsoastooustPhilippineagenciesandcourtsofthejurisdictionvesteduponthembyPhilippine

law.Finally,andinanyevent,thepetitionerPIAdidnotundertaketopleadandprovethecontentsofPakistanlawon

thematter.Itmust,therefore,bepresumedthattheapplicableprovisionsofthe lawofPakistanarethesameasthe

applicableprovisionsofPhilippinelaw.

8.4.JURISDICTIONOVERLABORCASESINVOLVINGENTITIESIMMUNEFROMSUIT.

a.Principleofimmunityfromsuitasappliedtolaborcases.

Immunity isnecessarytoassureunimpededperformanceofthefunctionsofinternationalorganizations.The

purpose istoshieldtheaffairsofinternationalorganizations, inaccordancewith internationalpractice,frompolitical

pressure or controlby thehost country to theprejudice ofmember States of the organization, and to ensure the

unhamperedperformanceoftheirfunctions.34

SoutheastAsianFisheriesDevelopmentCenterv.Acosta,[G.R.Nos.9746870,Sept.2,1993,226SCRA49].

Inthiscase,theSupremeCourt,inupholdingtheprincipleofimmunity,citedwithapprovaltheopinionofthe

thenMinisterof Justice, thus:Oneof thebasic immunitiesofan internationalorganization is immunity from local

jurisdiction,i.e.,thatitisimmunefromthe legalwritsandprocesses issuedbythetribunalsofthecountrywhereitis

found.Theobviousreason for this isthat thesubjectionofsuchanorganization to theauthorityof the localcourts

wouldaffordaconvenientmediumthruwhichthehostgovernmentmayinterfereinitsoperationsoreveninfluenceor

controlthe

policies

and

decisions

of

the

organization;

besides,

such

subjection

to

local

jurisdiction

would

impair

the

capacityofsuchbodytodischargeitsresponsibilitiesimpartiallyonbehalfofitsmemberstates.

DepartmentofForeignAffairsv.NLRC,[G.R.No.113191,September18,1996,262SCRA39,4344].

Thiscase involvesan illegaldismissalcasefiledagainsttheAsianDevelopmentBank(ADB), itwasruledthat

saidentityenjoysimmunityfromlegalprocessofeveryformand,therefore,thesuitagainstitcannotprosper. Andthis

immunity extends to itsofficers who alsoenjoy immunity in respectofall acts performed by them in theirofficial

capacity.TheCharterandtheHeadquartersAgreementgrantingtheseimmunitiesandprivilegestotheADBaretreaty

covenantsandcommitmentsvoluntarilyassumedbythePhilippinegovernmentwhichmustberespected.

34See Lasco, infra; International Catholic Migration Commissionv. Calleja, G.R. No. 85750, Sept. 28, 1990, 190 SCRA130.




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Lascov.UnitedNationsRevolvingFund forNaturalResourcesExploration [UNRFNRE], [G.R.Nos.109095

109107,February23,1995].

ThisinvolvesanillegaldismissalcasefiledagainsttherespondentwhichisaspecializedagencyoftheUnited

Nations,the

said

immunity

rule

was

asserted

and

reiterated

by

the

Supreme

Court.

In

dismissing

the

case,

the

High

CourtsaidthatbeingamemberoftheUnitedNationsandapartytotheConventiononthePrivilegesandImmunitiesof

theSpecializedAgenciesoftheUnitedNations,thePhilippinegovernmentadherestothedoctrineofimmunitygranted

totheUnitedNationsanditsspecializedagencies.Bothtreatieshavetheforceandeffectoflaw.

b.Exceptiontotherule.

InUnitedStatesv.Hon.Rodrigo,[G.R.No.79470,February26,1990,182SCRA644,660],whereitwasheldthatwhenthefunctionoftheforeignentityotherwiseimmunefromsuitpartakesofthenatureofaproprietaryactivity,

such as the restaurant services offered at John HayAir Station undertaken by the United States Government as a

commercialactivityforprofitandnotinitsgovernmentalcapacity,thecaseforillegaldismissalfiledbyaFilipinocook

workingthereiniswellwithinthejurisdictionofPhilippinecourts.Thereasonisthatbyenteringintotheemployment

contractwiththecookinthedischargeofitsproprietaryfunctions,itimpliedlydivesteditselfofitssovereignimmunity

fromsuit.

c.Estoppeldoesnotconferjurisdictionoveranimmuneentity.

Anentityimmunefromsuitcannotbeestoppedfromclaimingsuchdiplomaticimmunitysinceestoppeldoes

notoperatetoconferjurisdictiontoatribunalthathasnoneoveracauseofaction.35

8.5.DOCTRINEOFFORUMNONCONVENIENS.

a.Rationalebehindthedoctrine.

Under the international law principle offorum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume

jurisdictionoverthecaseifitchoosestodosoprovidedthefollowingrequisitesconcur:

(1) ThatthePhilippinecourtisonetowhichthepartiesmayconvenientlyresort;

(2) ThatthePhilippinecourtisinapositiontomakeanintelligentdecisionastothelawandthefacts;and

(3) ThatthePhilippinecourthasorislikelytohavepowertoenforceitsdecision.36

PacificConsultantsInternationalAsia,Inc.v.Schonfeld,[G.R.No.166920,February19,2007].

Petitionersinsisted

on

the

application

of

this

principle

since

the

respondent

is

aCanadian

citizen

and

was

a

repatriate.Inrejectingpetitionerscontention,theSupremeCourtcitedthefollowingreasonsthatdonotwarrantthe

applicationofthesaidprinciple:

1. TheLaborCodedoesnotincludeforumnonconveniensasagroundforthedismissalofthecomplaint.

2. Theproprietyofdismissingacasebasedonthisprinciplerequiresafactualdetermination;hence,itisproperly

consideredasadefense.

TheManilaHotelCorp.andManilaHotelInternationalLimitedv.NLRC,[G.R.No.120077,October13,2000].

Thisprinciplewasappliedinthiscase.PrivaterespondentMarceloSantoswasanoverseasworkeremployedas

aprinterinaprintingpressintheSultanateofOmanwhenhewasdirectlyhiredbythePalaceHotel,Beijing,Peoples

Republic ofChina towork in itsprint shop. Later,hewas terminateddue to retrenchmentoccasionedbybusiness

reversesbroughtaboutbythepoliticalupheavalinChina(referringtotheTiananmenSquareincident)whichseverely

affectedthehotelsoperations.Whenthecasewasfiledin1990,petitionerManilaHotelCorporation(MHC)wasstilla

governmentowned

and

controlled

corporation

duly

organized

and

existing

under

the

laws

of

the

Philippines;

while

petitionerManilaHotelInternationalCompany,Limited(MHICL)wasacorporationdulyorganizedandexistingunder

thelawsofHongKong.MHCisanincorporatorofMHICL,owning50%ofitscapitalstock.Byvirtueofamanagement

agreementwiththePalaceHotel(WangFuCompanyLimited),MHICLtrainedthepersonnelandstaffofthesaidhotel

inBeijing,China.

InholdingthattheNLRCwasaseriouslyinconvenientforum,theSupremeCourtnotedthatthemainaspects

ofthecasetranspiredintwoforeignjurisdictionsandthecaseinvolvespurelyforeignelements.Theonlylinkthatthe

Philippineshaswiththecaseisthattheprivaterespondentemployee(MarceloSantos)isaFilipinocitizen.ThePalace

Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Consequently, not all cases involving Filipino citizens can be tried here.

RespondentemployeewashireddirectlybytheBeijingPalaceHotel,aforeignemployer,throughcorrespondencesent

tohimwhilehewasworkingat theSultanateofOman.Hewashiredwithout the interventionof thePOEAorany

authorizedrecruitmentagencyofthegovernment.Hence,theNLRCisaninconvenientforumgiventhatalltheincidents

ofthe

case

from

the

time

of

recruitment,

to

employment

to

dismissal

occurred

outside

the

Philippines.

The

inconvenienceiscompoundedbythefactthattheproperdefendants,thePalaceHotelandMHICLarenotnationalsof

thePhilippines.NeitheraretheydoingbusinessinthePhilippines.Likewise,themainwitnesses,Mr.Shmidt(General

ManagerofthePalaceHotel)andMr.Henk(PalaceHotelsManager)arenonresidentsofthePhilippines.

Neithercanan intelligentdecisionbemadeas to the lawgoverning theemploymentcontractas suchwas

perfected in foreignsoil.Thiscalls to foretheapplicationof theprincipleof lex locicontractus (the lawoftheplace

wherethecontractwasmade).

ItmustbenotedthattheemploymentcontractwasnotperfectedinthePhilippines.

PrivaterespondentemployeesignifiedhisacceptancethereofbywritingaletterwhilehewasintheSultanateofOman.

This letterwassenttothePalaceHotel inthePeoplesRepublicofChina.NeithercantheNLRCdeterminethefacts

35Ebro III v. NLRC, G.R. No. 110187, Sept. 4, 1996, 261SCRA399.36Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. CA, [448Phil. 181, 196 (2003)] andCommunication Materials and Design, Inc. v. CA, [G.R. No. 102223, Aug. 22, 1996, 260 SCRA673, 695],




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surroundingtheallegedillegaldismissalasallactscomplainedoftookplaceinBeijing,PeoplesRepublicofChina.The

NLRCwasnotinapositiontodeterminewhethertheTiananmenSquareincidenttrulyadverselyaffectedoperationsof

thePalaceHotelastojustifyrespondentemployeesretrenchment.

Evenassuming

that

aproper

decision

could

be

reached

by

the

NLRC,

such

would

not

have

any

binding

effect

againsttheemployer,thePalaceHotel,whichisacorporationincorporatedunderthelawsofChinaandwasnoteven

served with summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired. This is not to say that Philippine courts and

agencieshavenopowertosolvecontroversiesinvolvingforeignemployers.Neithercould itbesaidthattheSupreme

Courtdoesnothavepoweroveranemploymentcontractexecuted inaforeigncountry. Iftherespondentemployee

wereanoverseascontractworker,aPhilippineforum,specificallythePOEA,nottheNLRC,wouldprotecthim.Heis

notanoverseascontractworkerafactwhichheadmitswithconviction.

PhilippineNationalBankv.Cabansag,[G.R.No.157010,June21,2005]

RespondentwashiredbytheSingaporebranchofpetitionerbankwhileshewasatouristinSingaporein1998.

PetitionerisaprivatebankingcorporationorganizedandexistingunderthelawsofthePhilippines,withprincipaloffices

atthePNBFinancialCenter,RoxasBoulevard,Manila.Atthattime,theBranchOfficehastwo(2)typesofemployees:(a)

expatriatesortheregularemployeeshiredinManilaandassignedabroadincludingSingapore;and(b)locally(directly)

hired.

Sheapplied

for

and

was

hired

as

Branch

Credit

Officer.

After

her

3month

probationary

period,

she

was

terminated.Subsequently,shefiledacomplaintbeforetheLaborArbiter. OnappealtotheSupremeCourt,oneofthe

issuespresentedwaswhetherornottheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionovertheinstantcontroversy. TheSupremeCourt,

inansweringthisissueintheaffirmative,ruledthattheLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionbecausetheissuehereinvolvesthe

terminationofanoverseasFilipinoworker(OFW).WhileshemayhavebeendirectlyhiredinSingaporebypetitioner,

however,respondentlikewiseappliedforandsecuredanOverseasEmploymentCertificatefromthePOEAthroughthe

Philippine Embassy in Singapore. TheCertificatedeclared herabonafide contract worker inSingapore. Thus,even

assumingarguendothatshewasconsideredatthestartofheremploymentasadirecthiregovernedbyandsubjectto

the laws,commonpracticesandcustomsprevailing inSingapore,shesubsequentlybecameacontractworkeroran

OFWwhowascoveredbyPhilippinelaborlawsandpoliciesuponcertificationbythePOEA.Atthetimeheremployment

wasillegallyterminated,shealreadypossessedthePOEAEmploymentCertificate.Moreover,petitioneradmitsthatitis

aPhilippinecorporationdoingbusinessthroughabranchofficeinSingapore.Significantly,respondentsemploymentby

itsSingaporebranchofficehadtobeapprovedbythepresidentofthebankwhoseprincipalofficeswereinManila. This

circumstancemilitates

against

petitioners

contention

that

respondent

was

locally

hired;

and

totally

governed

by

and

subjecttothe laws,commonpracticesandcustomsofSingapore,notofthePhilippines. Instead,withmorereason

doesthisfactreinforcethepresumptionthatrespondentfallsunderthelegaldefinitionofmigrantworker,inthiscase,

onedeployedinSingapore. Hence,petitionercannotescapetheapplicationofPhilippinelawsorthejurisdictionofthe

NLRCandtheLaborArbiter.

Simv.NLRC,[G.R.No. 157376,October2,2007]

Citing the said ruling in PNB v. Cabansag, the High Court noted a palpable error in the Labor Arbiters

dispositionof thecase,whichwasaffirmedbytheNLRC,withregardtothe issueonjurisdiction. Itheld that itwas

wrongfortheLaborArbitertodismissthecaseforlackofjurisdictionunderitsholdingthatlaborrelationssysteminthe

Philippineshasnoextraterritorialjurisdiction;thatitislimitedtotherelationshipbetweenlaborandcapitalwithinthe

Philippines;andthatsincecomplainantwashiredandassignedinaforeignland,althoughbyaPhilippinecorporation,

itfollowsthatthelawthatgovernstheirrelationshipisthelawoftheplacewheretheemploymentwasexecutedand

herplace

of

work

or

assignment.

ThepetitionerhereisCorazonSimwhowasinitiallyemployedbyEquitablePCIBank(respondent)in1990as

ItalianRemittanceMarketingConsultant to itsFrankfurtRepresentativeOffice. Eventually,shewaspromotedtothe

position of Manager until September 1999, when she received a letter from Remegio David the Senior Officer,

EuropeanHeadofPCIBank,andManagingDirectorofPCIB Europe informingherthatshewasbeingdismisseddueto

lossoftrustandconfidencebasedonallegedmismanagementandmisappropriationoffunds.AccordingtotheSupreme

Court,theLaborArbiterhasjurisdictionnotonlyonthebasisofArticle217oftheLaborCodebutunderSection10of

Republic ActNo. 8042, or the MigrantWorkersandOverseas FilipinosActof 1995, as well as Section 62 of the

OmnibusRulesandRegulationsImplementingR.A.No.8042. Undertheseprovisions,itisclearthatLaborArbitershave

originalandexclusivejurisdictionoverclaimsarisingfromemployeremployeerelations,includingterminationdisputes

involvingallworkers,amongwhomareoverseasFilipinoworkers. (Id.).

8.6. JURISDICTIONOVERLABORCASESINVOLVINGPRIESTSANDMINISTERS.

a.CasesoverwhichLaborArbitersandNLRChavejurisdiction.

Thefactthatacaseinvolvesaspartiestheretothechurchanditsreligiousministerdoesnotipsofactogivethe

caseareligioussignificance.Simplystated,whatisinvolvedinalaborcase,sayforillegaldismissal,istherelationshipof

thechurch,asanemployer,andtheminister,asanemployee apurelysecularmatternotrelatedtothepracticeof

faith,worshipordoctrinesofthechurch. Hence,LaborArbitersmayvalidlyexercisejurisdictionoversaidlaborcase.

Austria v. Hon.NLRC and Cebu City Central PhilippinesUnionMission Corporation of the SeventhDay

Adventist,[G.R.No.124382,August16,1999]

theministerwasnotexcommunicatedorexpelled fromthemembershipofthechurchbutwasterminated

fromemploymentbasedonthegroundscitedinArticle282oftheLaborCode. Indeed,thematterofterminatingan

employee which is purely secular in nature is different from the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the




14/53



religiouscongregation.Assuch,theState,throughtheLaborArbiterandtheNLRC,hastherighttotakecognizanceof

thecasetodeterminewhetherthechurch,asemployer,rightfullyexerciseditsmanagementprerogativetodismissthe

religiousministerasitsemployee.

b.Ecclesiasticalaffair,meaning.

Anecclesiasticalaffairinvolvestherelationshipbetweenthechurchanditsmembersandrelatestomattersof

faith, religiousdoctrines,worshipandgovernanceof thecongregation.Tobeconcrete,examplesof these socalled

ecclesiasticalaffairstowhichtheStatecannotmeddle,areproceedings forexcommunication,ordinationofreligious

ministers,administrationofsacramentsandotheractivitieswithattachedreligioussignificance.

8.7. EFFECTOFSUSPENSIONOFPAYMENTOFDEBTS(REHABILITATIONRECEIVERSHIP)ONJURISDICTIONINLABOR

PROCEEDINGS.

a.JurisdictionislodgedwithRTC.

ThejurisdictionoverpetitionforsuspensionofpaymentislodgedwiththeRegionalTrialCourt.37

AlthoughthejurisdictionoftheSECoverrehabilitationandsuspensionofpaymentscaseswastransferredto

theRegionalTrialCourtspursuantto

b.Receivershiporliquidationofbusiness,effectonjurisdiction.

Astayorderissuedconsequenttotheapprovalofarehabilitationreceivershipsimplysuspendsallactionsfor

claimsagainstacorporationundergoingrehabilitation; itdoesnotworktooustacourtof itsjurisdictionoveracase

properlyfiledbeforeit.ThependencyoftherehabilitationproceedingsdoesnotaffecttheCourtsjurisdictiontoresolve

thecase,butmerelysuspendstheexecutionofitsdecision.38

c. Thesuspensionembracesallclaimsandallphasesofthesuit,includingexecution.

Thesuspensionofallactionscovers:

1. allclaimsagainstthecorporationwhich isundergoingrehabilitationreceivership,whether fordamages

foundedonabreachofcontractofcarriage,laborcases,collectionsuitsoranyotherclaimsofapecuniary

nature. Noexceptioninfavoroflaborclaimsismentionedinthelaw.39

2. allphasesofthesuit,beitbeforethetrialcourtoranytribunalorbeforetheSupremeCourt.Noother

action may be taken, including the rendition ofjudgment during the state of suspension. It must be

stressedthat

what

are

automatically

stayed

or

suspended

are

the

proceedings

of

asuit

and

not

just

the

paymentofclaimsduringtheexecutionstageafterthecasehasbecomefinalandexecutory. Oncethe

processofrehabilitation,however,iscompleted,theCourtshouldproceedtocompletetheproceedings

onthesuspendedactions.40

3. executionofdecisions thatarealready finalandexecutorymaybestayed if thecorporationhasbeen

placedunderrehabilitationreceivership.41

d. Executionoffinaldecisionsduringtheperiodofrehabilitationandsuspension,nullandvoid.

TheproceedingsbeforetheLaborArbiterandtheorderandwritsubsequentlyissuedbytheNLRCduringthe

periodofrehabilitationreceivershipareallnullandvoid.42

e.Durationofautomaticstayhasnolimit.

Thesuspensionshalllastuptotheterminationoftherehabilitationproceedings.43

Rubberworld(Phils.)Inc.v.NLRC,[G.R.No.126773,April14,1999,365Phil.273]

Thesuspensionofallactionsforclaimsagainstpetitionerdoesnotexpireafterthree(3)months.Thelawdoes

notprovideforthedurationoftheautomaticstay. Hence,thesuspensiveeffectthereofhasnotimelimitandremainsin

forceaslongasreasonablynecessarytoaccomplishthepurposeoftheorder.44

f.RemedyistolodgethelaborclaimswiththeRehabilitationReceiver;exception.

Becauseofthesuspensionofproceedings,theremedyshouldbefortheemployeewhoclaimedtohavebeen

illegallydismissed,tolodgeherclaimbeforethedulyappointedreceiver.45

8.8.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESOFOVERSEASFILIPINOWORKERS(OFWs).

a.ConfermentofjurisdictionovermoneyclaimsofmigrantworkersunderR.A.No.8042,asamendedby

R.A.No.10022.

Section10ofRepublicActNo.8042,asamended,otherwiseknownastheMigrantWorkersandOverseas

FilipinosAct

of

1995

(approved

on

June

7,

1995),

conferred

original

and

exclusive

jurisdiction

upon

Labor

Arbiters,

to

hearanddecideallclaimsarising fromemployeremployeerelationshiporbyvirtueofany laworcontract involving

Filipinoworkersforoverseasdeployment,includingclaimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamages.

b. LaborArbitersmayexercisejurisdictionevenabsenttheemploymentrelationshipaswhentheOFWwas

notdeployedabroad.

37Section 5.2, R.A. No. 8799, [August 8, 2000]; Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. PhilippineAirlines Employees Association [PALEA], G.R. No. 142399, June 19, 2007, Footnote23.38De Castrov. Liberty BroadcastingNetwork, Inc., G.R. No. 165153, Aug25, 2010; Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 163156, Dec. 10, 2008, 573 SCRA434, 455.39Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Heirs of Zamora, G.R. No. 164267, Nov. 23, 2007.40Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 123238, July 11, 2005[Resolution].41Alemars Sibal & Sons, Inc. v. NLRC, [G. R. No. 114761, January 19, 2000].42Lingkod Manggagawasa Rubberworld, Adidas-Anglo v. Rubberworld [Phils.], Inc., [G.R. No. 153882, January 29, 2007] .43Section11, in relationto Section 27, Rule 4of the InterimRules of ProcedureonCorporate Rehabilitation.44See also BFHomes, Inc. v. CA, 190SCRA262, 269, Oct. 3, 1990; Tiangco v. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. [G.R. No. 168697, December 14, 2009].45Clarion PrintingHouse, Inc. v. NLRC, [G.R. No. 148372, June 27, 2005].




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ThecaseofSantiagov.CFSharpCrewManagement,Inc.,[G.R.No.162419,July10,2007],enunciatedthat

despite the absence of an employeremployee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the NLRC has

jurisdictionoverpetitionerscomplaint.Thepetitionerherewasnotdeployedoverseasaftersigningthecontract for

overseasemployment.

The

jurisdiction

of

Labor

Arbiters

is

not

limited

to

claims

arising

from

employer

employee

relationships. BasedonSection10ofR.A.No.8042,LaborArbitershavejurisdictionnotonlyovermoneyclaimsarising

outofanemployeremployee relationshipbutalsobyvirtueofany laworcontract involvingFilipinoworkers for

overseasdeploymentincludingclaimsforactual,moral,exemplaryandotherformsofdamagexxx.

Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the

employmentcontractdidnotcommencetobeeffectiveandnoemployeremployeerelationshipwascreatedbetween

the parties. However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the

commencement of theemployeremployee relationship.The perfectionofthe contract,which in this case coincided

withthedateofexecutionthereof,occurredwhenpetitionerandrespondentagreedontheobjectandthecause,as

well as the rest of the terms and conditions set forth therein.The commencement of the employeremployee

relationshipwouldhavetakenplacehadpetitionerbeenactuallydeployedfromthepointofhire.Thus,evenbeforethe

startofanyemployeremployeerelationship,contemporaneouswiththeperfectionoftheemploymentcontractwas

thebirthofcertainrightsandobligations,thebreachofwhichmaygiverisetoacauseofactionagainsttheerringparty.

Thus,ifthe

reverse

had

happened,

that

is,

the

seafarer

failed

or

refused

to

be

deployed

as

agreed

upon,

he

would

have

beenheldliablefordamages.

c.Monetaryornonmonetaryclaims;jurisdiction.

AllmonetaryclaimscasesthatmaybefiledbyanOFWfallsundertheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofthe

LaborArbiter.This includesclaims fordisabilityordeathbenefits.However,causesofactionwhichdonot refer to

monetaryclaimsunderSection10ofR.A.No.8042arerequiredtobedismissedorreferredbytheLaborArbiterstothe

appropriateagency.46

For example, violations of recruitment regulations certainly do not fall under the concept of monetary

claims. ThejurisdictionthereoverbelongstothePOEA.47

8.9.JURISDICTIONOVERWAGEDISTORTIONCASES.

a.Inorganizedestablishments.

Inestablishments

where

there

are

existing

CBAs

or

recognized

collective

bargaining

unions,

jurisdiction

is

lodgedwiththeVoluntaryArbitrator.48

b.Inunorganizedestablishments.

InestablishmentswheretherearenocertifiedcollectivebargainingunionsorexistingCBAs,theLaborArbiters

havejurisdictionisvestedwithLaborArbiters.49

c.Wagedistortiondisputesmadesubjectofnoticeofstrikeorlockout.

Sincewagedistortion isnotapropergroundtostageastrikeor lockout, itshouldbereferredtotheLabor

Arbiterforadjudication.50

8.10.JURISDICTIONOVERENFORCEMENTOFLABORSTANDARDSLAWS.

a.JurisdictionincasesunderArticle128oftheLaborCodeisvestedwithDOLERegionalDirectors.

Irrespectiveof

the

amount

of

the

violation

or

claim

unearthed

in

the

course

of

inspection,

whether

the

amount

thereofisbeloworaboveP5,000.00,theexercisebytheDOLESecretaryofhisvisitorialandenforcementpowerunder

Article 128 [b] is not lost or affected thereby. Hence, the DOLE Regional Directors, being the duly authorized

representativesoftheDOLESecretary,hasjurisdictionoverlaborstandardsviolations.

b.Noforumshoppingifemployees,duringthependencyofthecaseunderArticle128,aredismissedand

subsequentlyfiledanillegaldismissalcasewiththeLaborArbiter.

InConsolidatedBroadcastingSystem,Inc.v.Oberio,[G.R.No.168424,June8,2007],therespondentsatfirst

filedan inspectioncasebeforetheDOLERegionalDirector.Whilethecasewaspending,respondentsweredismissed

andconsequentlyfiledanillegaldismissalcasewiththeLaborArbiter. Itwasheldthatsuchfilingofthecomplaintfor

illegaldismissaldoesnotconstituteforumshopping.Incaseswherethecomplaintforviolationoflaborstandardlaws

precededtheterminationoftheemployeeandthefilingoftheillegaldismissalcase,itwouldnotbeinconsonancewith

justicetochargethedismissedemployeeswithengaginginforumshoppingwhentheremedyavailabletothematthe

timetheir

causes

of

action

arose

was

to

file

separate

cases

before

different

fora.

8.11.JURISDICTIONOVERCLAIMSOFDOMESTICORHOUSEHELPERS.

TheLaborArbiterretainsjurisdictionoverclaimsthatmaybefiledbydomesticorhousehelpersamountingto

morethanP5,000.00.,despitethedeletionofthephrasecasesinvolvinghouseholdservicesinparagraph4ofArticle

217effectedbyRepublicActNo.6715.

8.12.JURISDICTIONOVERENFORCEMENTOFCOMPROMISEAGREEMENTS.

46Section1, NLRCen banc ResolutionNo. 1-95, Series of 1995.47Philsa International Placement andServices Corporation v. Hon. Secretary of Labor and Employment, [G.R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001].48Article 124, Labor Code, as amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 6727; Section 7, Chapter II, Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6727; Section 1, Rule VII, Rules of Procedure on MinimumWage Fixing issued by the National Wages and Productivity Commission on 04 June

1990.49Id.50Section6 [c], Rule V, NCMBManual of Procedures for Conciliation and Preventive Mediation Cases.




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Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over the enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non

compliancebyanyofthepartiestheretopursuanttoArticle227oftheLaborCode.51

8.13. JURISDICTIONOVERCASESPROPERLYCOGNIZABLEBYTHEGRIEVANCEMACHINERYORVOLUNTARY

ARBITRATORS.

a. OriginalandexclusivejurisdictionofGrievanceMachineryorVoluntaryArbitrators.

AlthoughtheLaborArbitershaveoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecidetheenumeratedcasesin

Article217,oneshouldnotlosesightofthefactthatundertheamendatoryprovisionsofR.A.No.6715,thegrievance

machinery,underArticle260,hasoriginalandexclusivejurisdictiontoadjustandresolvethefollowinggrievances:

1. thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorimplementationoftheCBA;and

2. thosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.

If the same are not settled within seven (7) calendar days from the date of their submission, they shall

automaticallybereferredtoaVoluntaryArbitratororpanelofVoluntaryArbitratorswho,underArticle261,havethe

originalandexclusivejurisdictiontohearanddecideallsuchunresolvedgrievancesarisingfromthe interpretationor

implementationoftheCBAandthosearisingfromtheinterpretationorenforcementofcompanypersonnelpolicies.

Thisexplainsthe lastparagraphofArticle217whichprovidesthat(c)asesarisingfromthe interpretationor

implementationof

collective

bargaining

agreements

and

those

arising

from

the

interpretation

or

enforcement

of

companypersonnelpoliciesshallbedisposedofbytheLaborArbiterbyreferringthesametothegrievancemachinery

andvoluntaryarbitrationasmaybeprovided insaidagreements. Bysoproviding,Article217acknowledges inno

uncertaintermsthejurisdictionofthegrievancemachineryunderArticle260andthatoftheVoluntaryArbitratoror

panelofVoluntaryArbitratorsunderArticle261overtheseissues.

b.Failuretoobservegrievanceprocedure;effect.

InCentralPangasinanElectricCooperative,Inc.v.Macaraeg,[G.R.No.145800,January22,2003],theparties

voluntarilyagreetosubmittheissueofillegaldismissalforvoluntaryarbitrationwithoutpassingthroughthegrievance

machinery. However,beforetheSupremeCourt,thiswasraisedasanissue.TheSupremeCourtruled: Attheoutset,

weholdthatthefirstissueraisedinthepetitionpertainingtotheallegedviolationoftheCBAgrievanceprocedure is

mootandacademic. Thepartiesactiveparticipationinthevoluntaryarbitrationproceedings,andtheirfailuretoinsist

that the casebe remanded to thegrievancemachinery, showsa clear intentionon their part tohave the issueof

respondentsillegal

dismissal

directly

resolved

by

the

Voluntary

Arbitrator.

We,

therefore,

find

itunnecessary

to

rule

on

thematter in lightof theirpreference tobring the illegaldismissaldispute tovoluntaryarbitrationwithoutpassing

throughthegrievancemachinery.

8.14.JURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGCOOPERATIVES.

a.Membersofcooperativesarenotemployees.

Membersofacooperativesareitsowners.Issuesontheterminationoftheirmembershipwiththecooperative

donotfallwithinthejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiters.52

b. LaborArbitershavejurisdictionoverillegaldismissalcasesofemployeesofcooperatives.

Theruleisdifferentwithrespecttotheterminationofemploymentoftheemployeesofthecooperative.The

LaborArbitershavejurisdictionthereover.

PerpetualHelpCreditCooperative,Inc.v.Faburada,[G.R.No.121948,October8,2001]PetitionerinthiscasecontendsthattheLaborArbiterhasnojurisdictiontotakecognizanceofthecomplaintof

privaterespondents(whoarenotmembersbutemployeesofthecooperative)consideringthattheyfailedtosubmit

theirdisputetothegrievancemachinery.TheSupremeCourt,however,ruledthattheLaborArbiterhasjurisdiction.

Thereisnoevidencethatprivaterespondentsaremembersofpetitionercooperativeandeveniftheyare,thedisputeis

aboutpaymentofwages,overtimepay,restdayandterminationofemployment. UnderArticle217oftheLaborCode,

thesedisputesarewithintheoriginalandexclusivejurisdictionoftheLaborArbiters.

SanMiguelCorp.v.Semillano,[G.R.No. 164257,July5,2010]

Petitionerassertedthatthepresentcaseisoutsidethejurisdictionofthelabortribunalsbecauserespondent

Vicente Semillano is a member of the Alilgilan MultiPurpose Coop (AMPCO), not an employee of petitioner

SMC. PetitionerisofthepositionthattheinstantdisputeisintracooperativeinnaturefallingwithinthejurisdictionoftheArbitrationCommitteeoftheCooperativeDevelopmentAuthority.AMPCOwascontractedbypetitionertosupplyit

withworkers to perform

h procedure and jurisdiction

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