h388 presentations 12/05/06
DESCRIPTION
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 13. CJ Dreissen – free trade 14. Zachary Roberts –trade policy 15. Trung van Truong – remittances REGIME TYPE 16. Carlos Torres – gender 17. Scott Johnson – corruption 18. Benjamin Newton – corruption. MICRO-ECONOMY 19. Miles Hammond – micro-credit - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
H388 Presentations 12/05/06
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY
• 13. CJ Dreissen – free trade• 14. Zachary Roberts –trade policy• 15. Trung van Truong – remittances
REGIME TYPE
• 16. Carlos Torres – gender• 17. Scott Johnson – corruption• 18. Benjamin Newton – corruption
MICRO-ECONOMY• 19. Miles Hammond – micro-credit• 20. Susan Krissel – gender/health• 20. Margaret Knowles –
credit/health
MACRO-ECONOMY• 21. Alfonzo Salazar – Sanctions• 22. Bruno Valle – Debt relief • 23. Han Zhao – Struct Adustment
Chile: Trade and Equality 1990-2002
C.J. Driessen
Exports by Year
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
GoodsExported
Imports by Year
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
GoodsImported
Income Re-DistributionBy Region
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
-30.0% -20.0% -10.0% 0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0%
Top 5th vs.Bottom 5th
Middle Class Gains
Middle Class Loses
Rich gain at Poor's Expense
Poor gain at Rich's Expense
Income Distribution
$11.0
$11.5
$12.0
$12.5
$13.0
$13.5
$14.0
$14.5
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Top 5th/Bottom 5th
Gini Coefficient
44.0%
44.5%
45.0%
45.5%
46.0%
46.5%
47.0%
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Gini
Real GDP by Year
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
$40,000
$45,000
GDP at1996Prices
Destitute Percentage
-
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Destitute %
Poverty Percentage
-
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Poverty %
Inequalities in World Food Trade
Zachary Roberts
December 5
• Agricultural trade is much more important in developing countries vs. developed countries. In Ethiopia, agriculture is 47.5% of GDP, versus 0.5% of GDP in the United Kingdom. 80% of Ethiopia’s population works in agriculture vs. 1.5% in the United Kingdom.
• African producers can grow food more cheaply than in Europe and the U.S., so the West supports the agricultural industry with an average of $238 billion in subsidies between 2001-2003.
• This does not include countless tariffs and quotas on imports from developing countries, including Sub-Saharan Africa
• With a complete liberalization of food trade, there would be a $300 billion increase in food trade per year by 2015.
• Developing countries would account for 45% of this gain, which is highly disproportionate to their share of global GDP.
Example: Cattle Trade
• Europe’s tariffs on beef make it profitable only to export high-quality beef, so poor producers who cannot produce such quality beef are cut out of the trade. This also causes a lack of quality beef on the domestic market, which depresses domestic market prices, leading to lower income for cattle herdsmen.
• Also, foot and mouth disease standards for European exports cannot be met by the vast majority of African producers. The IMF estimates that African cattle herdsmen lose $1.3 billion for every European life saved by these measures.
African Liberalization
• The problem is not entirely Western. Up to half of the gain that would be realized in production and income from trade liberalization would result from a liberalization of trade by the African countries.
• Example: After Zambia lifted restrictions on maize exports to Europe, hybrid grain producers saw an increase in income from the new market access.
Migration, Remittances, and Poverty Alleviation in Egypt
Trung Van Truong
HIST 388 Hunger And Poverty in the Market Economy
December 5, 2006
Problem
• Relations between migration, remittances, and poverty alleviation
• Definitions• Situation around the world and Egypt• Why are people immigrating?• Where do remittances go?• Do they really help the economy and alleviate
poverty in Egypt and other places around the globe?
Findings
• Limited Data Set• Need to extend scope• Problematic; receiving countries are OECDs• IMF Records versus Stark and Adam’s findings• Some signs of poverty alleviation from
remittances• Development of infrastructures in the developing
countries
Data Set
Parity, Polity and Equality
Carlos Torres
December 5, 2006
History 388 - D. Ludden
Terms
• Parity - measure of the gap between HDI and GDI scores for a country.
• Polity - score given by the Polity IV Project.
• Equality - here, within society, measured by the Gini coefficient.
• Social Investment - government expenditures in public provision of goods such as education and health care.
Problem
• Many of the characteristics of gender parity are those commonly associated with liberal democracies. Is there a correlation between Democracy and parity, or are there other forces at work?
• WB says the former, but there are important errors in their historical analysis of institution building.
WB Report
• Stresses the importance of institutionalized structures to maintain equitable distribution of wealth and income.
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• But they get the distributive mechanism backwards
• American case study– Depend on the presence of “authorities” (112) that
didn’t exist in the colonies.– Pretend that a preexisting social/institutional
structure came from Europe with the settlers, but that isn’t exactly what happened.
– Brought a system of government for their internal community of settlers, but institutions were set up in response to distribution of resources in general.
– Even Mayflower Compact, universally recognized as the first institutionally directive document in the New World, mentions nothing more than “binding together” for the “general good of the colony”
• Curiously, the only time they seem to make this mistake is when they are talking directly about institutional formation (and implying a production mechanism of democratic political process).
• Otherwise, they recognize equity as the driving force in the creation and maintenance of institutionally equitable structures, such as property rights, habeas corpus, etc…– “threats of social disorder” (from a powerful public)
force democratic reform; “egalitarian distribution… eased the transition to Democracy” (114), among others
Evidence Polity v. Parity
R2 = 0.0655
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
-10 -5 0 5 10 15
Polity Score
HD
I -
GD
I
Gini v. Parity - World
R2 = 0.1924
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Gini Coefficient
HD
I -
GD
I
Stability v. Parity
R2 = 0.1646
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
Absolute value polity score
HD
I -
GD
I
Stability is introduced to control Stability is introduced to control for how the polity score is for how the polity score is determined, but is still a less determined, but is still a less accurate determinant than the accurate determinant than the Gini coefficient. Pattern holds Gini coefficient. Pattern holds true across population levels, true across population levels, GDP and HDI levels and regime GDP and HDI levels and regime typetype
Institutional Formation
Reality:
(Cash Input) (Outcome) (Results)
Health Economic Situation
Education >> - wealth >> Power >> Institutional Direction --|
Services - income |
^------------------------------Distribution--------------------------------------------- |
Cash can only influence cash inputs, everything else has to flow out of the system organically. The cash inputs are the base of the causation chain, and an imbalance anywhere else will not create a self-sustaining shift without the cash inputs balancing as well. Institutions take time to develop and the build up of equity is a fairly slow process (45) pointing to a cause that is difficult to influence on a broad scale and must be done in the long run, rather than an instantaneous mechanism like policy or polity change.
Point is, they’re looking at the evidences of institutional problems rather than the causes and advocate in a round about way for ‘hollow’ democratic reform while simultaneously stressing the importance of solid infrastructure in maintaining equitable institutions (equitable social structures in the community, rather than imposed by the government, are the ones that last).
- “Morally irrelevant” (19) categories like race, religion and gender are evidence of institutionalized inequalities, but not causative in themselves
- Income, too, is evidence of unequal opportunity, but not wholly causative in itself, either
- Concentration of reproductive wealth, and the power that comes from it from consequent distributions of investment in social capital (education, health care…), is the real source of distribution of power
- The only way to fix the distribution of wealth is to correct the social investment disparities (34, 45) - education, health, credit availability, labor opportunities, etc…
Problem with WB approach
• Advocates targeting institutions that create equitable distributions of wealth and opportunity even while it acknowledges that without the underlying infrastructure such efforts are doomed to failure.
• There is no particular pattern, only a series of correlations that are more or less accurate in different situations, because the peculiarities of each country’s history cause disparities in social investment in different ways.
Solutions• Realize that systems of inequality are
only correlated with certain demographic indicators and institutions, and that fixing inequalities, while targeting particular populations, involves correcting social investments, not artificially changing institutions without developing the infrastructure that supports those democratic institutions.
Measuring Measuring CorruptionCorruption
Scott JohnsonScott Johnson
• Corruption Perception Index (CPI)Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
• International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
• International Crime Victim Survey- International Crime Victim Survey-
Bribery (ICVS)Bribery (ICVS)
• Corruption Control Index (CC)Corruption Control Index (CC)
IndexesIndexes
8.1%8.1%
12%12%
15.3%15.3%
8%8%
7.7%7.7%
8.6%8.6%
World Average rGDP growth rate: 2.87%World Average rGDP growth rate: 2.87%
Global Corruption and on the Perpetuation of Domestic
Poverty
Benjamin Newton
Benjamin Newton
Introduction: Global Corruption
• Global corruption is the rule and not the exception
• In 2006, ¾ of Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) states scored below a “5”
• Dysfunctional states share characteristics
• Negative implications vary from state to state
• Poor states get “stuck” in poverty
Research Methodology
• Corruption measurements are a modern phenomenon
• Mixed Approach
• Qualitative and Quantitative uses
• Case sensitivity
Case Studies
• Corruption varies in different parts of the world
• Public vs. private sector corruption
• Some states do not have the luxury of dealing with corruption
• States who see the benefits in fighting corruption will do so
Why is this Important?
• Globalization is an inevitable force
• Corruption serves as an inhibitor to progress
• If the Global Development movement is serious, corruption will have to be effectively tackled
• Efforts to curb corruption will have to be case sensitive
Micro Finance and Family Dynamics in Bangladesh
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Miles Hammond
Important Facts About Bangladesh
• Population (2006): 147,365,352 (7th largest)• Densest pop. excluding small islands and city states• Almost 1/2 of the population lives below the poverty line• 10-15% of the population faces life-threatening nutritional risks• Per capita GDP: US $1870• Per capita income: US $440• Women hold 2% of parliamentary seats, make up 25% of professional and
technical workers, and 8% of management and administrationQuickTime™ and aTIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
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How Do Micro Finance Organizations Like Grameen Bank Help?
• Founded in 1974 by Muhammad Yunus• Gives small loans to rural women to farm
and start cottage industries• 6.61 million current borrowers, with over
50 million borrowers since inception• Empowerment groups• Sixteen decisions
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The Empowerment Index
• Resources
• Finance
• Transaction Management
• Mobility and Networks
• Activism
• Attitudes and husband’s behavior
• Family planning and parenting issue
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HDI Index suggests that Bangladesh is not doing particularly well…
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The Problems
- Reach insignificant portions of the poor population - Not financially viable - despite the hype- Target insignificant industries- Cycle of debt - burden falls on women- NGOs prop up existing social institutions- Ethical debate over ‘sixteen decisions’- Promote poor business practices- Distract funds and attention from more effective forms of aid
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Programs to improve maternal and child nutritional status
Susan Krissel
Examples of Interventions
• UNICEF– Fortification of food (ex. Iodization of salt)– Supplemental micronutrient formula with RDIs
for pregnant/lactating women– Education for the empowerment of women– Baby-Friendly Hospital Initiative– International Code of Marketing of Breast Milk
Substitutes
• Earthwatch– Educate women about nutrition and hygiene as
related to disease prevention– Involve and train community members/leaders– Make community self-sufficient
• Canada Prenatal Nutrition Program– Supplementation– Community gardens– Gift certificates to buy healthy food– Cooking demonstrations and shopping tours– Nutrition and Health Awareness Education– Budgeting workshops– Breastfeeding incentives
Conclusions
• Various types of organizations are taking action to improve maternal/child nutrition
• These organizations are mainly focused on improving malnutrition through nutrients, rather than targeting its causes
Improving Women’s Health through Micro-credit: Cases of
BRAC in Bangladesh
Margaret Knowles
December 5, 2006
• Two separate studies suggest that participation in the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee’s (BRAC) micro credit program has led to significant increases in maternal health knowledge and child survival rates
• Can these effects be attributed to the micro-credit program’s success or have other factors played a role?
• What components of the program are truly influencing health of these women and their children?
Study conducted by the Research and Evaluation Division of
the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC):Women's Knowledge of Prenatal Care among Credit
Forum Participants
48.3
7.6
1.7
64.9
13.2
5.3
62.6
15.911.2
6.5
17.7
63.7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Tetanus vaccines Vitaminsupplementation
Medical check up
Categories of Prenatal Health Measures
Pe
rcen
t Non participant
Participant <5 yrs
Participant ≥5 yrs
not eligible
Women's Knowledge of Postnatal care, BANGLADESH
38.9
11.9
56.1
80.4
45.8
60.2
43
78.8
55.6
43.5
79.8
57.3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
EPI doses DiseasesPrevented
Child Survival
Health topic
perc
en
t Non participant
Participant <5 yrs
Participant ≥5 yrs
not eligible
Joint project between BRAC and the International Centre for Diarroeal Disease Research, Bangladesh (ICDDR,B)
Predicted hazards of infant death during pre- and post intervention period by mothers participation in
development programme, Matlab, 1988–97.
Findings:
• Participation in BRAC micro-credit program has a positive impact on health knowledge, reducing and even preventing risks of child mortality
• Success cannot be attributed solely to the increase in income and economic participation among the woman participants.
• Micro-credit forums play a role as a form of media to reach women with health information
• Requirements of participation in the program insist that participants receive basic health services and participate in forums and educational activities in order to continually acquire loans and credit.
• BRAC uses a multifaceted approach to alleviate poverty and
empower the poor women of Bangladesh.
Economic SanctionsAgainst Iraq
Alfonso Salazar
UNSC Resolution
• On August 6, 1990 the United Nations Security Council implemented Resolution 6611) banned all imports from Iraq and Kuwait2) banned all exports except medical and food supplies3) froze Iraqi government funds held abroad
• Sanctions on Iraq held in one form or another until the Iraq War of 2003
Impact of Sanctions
• Immediate economic declineDecreases in GDP
HyperinflationCollapsed exchange ratesUnemployment
• Humanitarian StrugglesDecreases in Purchasing Power for Food
Growing overall Mortality ratesDeclining access to necessary resourcesIncreases in poverty rate
Sanction Affects on Trade
• Iraq dependent on oil export revenuesOil Rev US$ billion GDP US$ billion
1980 26.3 53.91984 9.4 35.11990 9.6 16.41992 0.5 11.9
• Civilian Imports1988 3.6 billion dollars1990 2.8 bill1992 0.6 bill
Up to 1990 domestic food production represented one third of total consumption for essential food items. Import dependent economy
Personal Income
• Collapse of Iraqi economy seen from per capita GDP measured in 1980 prices.
• 1980 $40831988 $1756 Per capita does not take into account
1990 $906 inequality among households
1991 $627
1994 $342• Food purchasing power of private income
declined to 5-7% of its August 1990 level.
Food Prices Aug. 90 Aug. 91 Percentage
increase
Wheat flour 0.05 2.42 4,431
Powdered milk 0.75 27.33 3,561
Sugar 0.20 4.42 2,108
Cooking oil 0.48 10.33 2,038
Rice 0.23 4.08 1,701
Tea 1.70 23.67 1,292
Food Basket for
Family of six 66.0 1,010.00 1,446• Prices continued to soar. In 1995, a kg of rice cost 1,184
ID. Unsustainable entitlement exchange
Total Deaths from Specified Health Conditions
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
70000
80000
90000
1989 1991 1993 1995
Children under 5
Population above 5
•Republic of Iraq, Baghdad: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000
Government Solutions
• In response to sanctions, Iraqi government instituted food rationing system covering wheat flour, rice, sugar, tea, cooking oil, and children’s powdered milk.
• The ration system provided 1,270 calories per day per person.
• Dietary intake in the late 1980s averaged 3120 calories per day.
• While the program somewhat prevented starvation, chronic hunger remained prevalent.
Do World Bank and IMF PRSP-based Economic Guidelines Hamstring Debt Cancellation and Poverty Deduction?
Bruno Valle
SAP = Structural Adjustment Programme
PRSP = Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
Malawi
Malawi External Debt Over Time
0.00
500,000,000.00
1,000,000,000.00
1,500,000,000.00
2,000,000,000.00
2,500,000,000.00
3,000,000,000.00
3,500,000,000.00
4,000,000,000.00
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
US
$
Series1
Malawi Life Expenctancy At Birth Over Time
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
1995 1997 2000 2002 2003 2004
Year
Yea
rs o
f L
ife
Series1
Zambia
Zambian External Debt Over Time
0.00
1,000,000,000.00
2,000,000,000.00
3,000,000,000.00
4,000,000,000.00
5,000,000,000.00
6,000,000,000.00
7,000,000,000.00
8,000,000,000.00
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Year
US
$
Series1
Zambian Life Expectancy at Birth Over Time
35.5
36
36.5
37
37.5
38
38.5
39
39.5
40
40.5
41
1995 1997 2000 2002 2003 2004
Year
Yea
rs o
f L
ife
Series1
Trade Liberalization and Developing Nations
Miracle Tonic or False Elixir?
Han Zhao
HIST388 Fall 2006
What is Trade Liberalization?
Trade Liberalization = Dual-Sided•Responsibilities of Developed Countries •Responsibilities of Developing Countries
What is it supposed to do? •Specialization => efficiency in markets and lower costs•Competition from abroad as stimulus
…should lead to… demand, growth, employment
BUT does it really do all that???
Some Analysis
GDP Growth vs. Consumption per Capita vs.
Trade Openness Trade Openness
Correlation: .09201 Correlation: -.2071
100
200
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
openness
100 200
growth rate
/ capita
-15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15
50
60
70
80
90
100
200
consumption
50 60 70 80 90
openness
100 200
What are its real effects?
“Review of the evidence of links between trade
liberalization and economic growth concluded there is no
clear causality” – Alan Winters
• Case Studies from SAPRIN
- Philippines, Ecuador, Bangladesh, Hungary, Mexico…
• Trends among countries: benefits to exclusive sectors, imports-exports imbalance, price shifts, loss of tariff revenues and losses to agriculture and manufacturing
• Most of case countries displayed LOSSES due to trade liberalization as poor bear the brunt of trade adjustment policies