halal analysis of automated election system failure as of 23 march 2010
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A Vote ofin Sma
RobertSecretarHalalang
rverzola
onfidencetmatic?
Verzolay-GeneralMarangal
gn.apc.org
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March 8: Smart
Last Mar
a full-page ad bcame out in seve
The ad wA Vote of Confidence
a
tic full-page ad
h 8, 2010
Smartmatic-TIMal national dailies.
as entitledfor the 2010 Elections
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Hardware / suppli
82,200 PCOS manu-factured, delivered
1,722 canvassing andconsolidation serversand printers delivered
1,722 powergenerators delivered
es / consumables
180,640 compactflash memory cardspurchased
82,200 batteries foreach PCOS delivered
338,750 rolls forprinting 30 copies ofER per pcnt delivered
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82,200 PCOS
Note the careful omissiChina, delivered in Mafull testing and accept
Omission creates false
In 2004, thorough testimachines took 3 montComm. Mehol Sadain,
ade, delivered
on: manufactured inila, but no mention ofnce by the Comelec
impression of readiness
g of 1,990 countings (source: Comeleca HALAL convenor)
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1,722 canvassingservers and pri
No mentionor Comelec
and consolidationnters delivered
f test resultsacceptance
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1,722 power gen
No mentionor Comelec
erators delivered
f test resultsacceptance
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180,640 compacards p
Each machine uses tw
82,200 PCOS machin
82,200 x 2 = 164,400 180,640164,400 = 16
There are only 75,471
Warning: potential capmemory cards in 21.5
ct flash memoryurchased
memory cards
s, including backups
emory cards needed,240 extra memory cards
precinct clusters
bility to substituteof PCOS machines
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Hardware / suppli
Unknown test results:
82,200 PCOS and batt
1,722 canvassing andprinters, generators
180,640 compact flash20% more than neces
PROBABILITY OF
es / consumables
ries
onsolidation servers,
memory cards; at leastary
UCCESS: 80%
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Software // voter e
Source codecustomization finished
Source code inescrow at BSP
System auditinternationally-recognizedcertification entityfinished
ertificationsucation Source code public
review processopened
Successful field testsand mock elections
Voter educationwebsites launched
Voter educn TV andradio infomercials
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Source code cust
Customization includverification and confirbuilt into the PCOS ma
This feature would havcandidates marked in tthen confirm through a
ballot was scanned ac It assures voters that t
accurately. This featur
mization finished
d disabling of voteration feature which ischine.
displayed the names ofhe ballot. Voters mustCAST button that their
urately.eir votes were scannedwas disabled.
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Source code in
Source code is Smartinstructions directed to
No mention of sourceSystest, for which Co
No mention of any certthe full Systest report,
Insiders cite series ofbetween Systest and
Release the full text of
escrow at BSP
atic's generalevery machine
ode certification byelec paid P72 million
ification document, or ofn its source code review
ritten exchangesomelec about the review
the Systest review NOW
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System audit brecognized ce
System anot only the
but all the fivessential to
Smartmatic claims finis
much less a full report,public. Full audit rep
internationally-tification entity
dit coverssource code
sub-systemsES success
ed. But no certification,
as been released to thert must be released.
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Sourcpublic review p
Process is hiand makes a revie
So far, no grou
to conduct
coderocess opened
hly restrictiveextremely difficult
p has managed
code review
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Successfuand moc
WHAT A LIE!
High ballot rejection ratshould not cause ballot
Transmission problems
Blackout on machine a
A contractor that will pad can lie about anythi
l field testselections
s (light shading of ovalsrejection)even in Metro Manila
curacy/error rates
t such a lie in a full-pageg
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Software // voter e
System audit and sourtext report or certificati
Source code public redone a code review
Successful field tests a
What a lie!
PROBABILITY OF
ertificationsucation
e code review: no fulln released
iew: no local group has
nd mock elections:
UCCESS: 70%
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Logistics / Supp
28 multinationalexperts at the PMT
327 qualified Filipinoorganic employees
Over 36,000 votingcenters surveyed forsignal, power, etc.
438 Comelec trainers
rt / Preparations
23,000 sqm centralwarehouse and configfacility operational
Contracts withlogistics providers,forwarders signed
Recruitment, trainingof 48,000 field techsstarted
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Over 36,000surveyed for si
Since there are 4only 75% hav
oting centersnal, power, etc.
,000 voting centersbeen covered
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904 test and confworking
Tests needed
Burn-in of machines, b
Full testing of batteries:
Testing for failures ratefailures (MTBF)
Testing for ballot rejecti
Testing for scan accuraless than 5 per 100,00
In 2004, testing 1,990
ig line employeeswo shifts
tteries, generators, etc.
will they last >12 hrs?
and mean time between
on rates
cy/error rates (should bemarks)achines took 3 months
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Contracts with loforwarde
Relative unknowns. H(Malaya, 15 March 201 Germalin Enterprises (
Agro Intl Forwarders (Pearnings)
ACF Logistics Worldwi
balance) Assuming a delivery te
delivery personnel nee
gistics providers,s signedve you heard of the ff?0)2.3M 2006 net income)
3.7M 2008 retained
e (P1.1M 2008 cash
m of 3, at least 200,000ed for 75,471 clusters
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Recruitmeof 48,000 fiel
48,000 field technician
nt, trainingtechs started
for 75,471 machines?
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438 Comel
For 226,000
ec trainers
EI members?
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Logistics / Supp
Over 36,000 voting cecoverage
438 Comelec trainers:
Logistics providers, for
Recruitment, training o
started
PROBABILITY OF
rt / Preparations
ters surveyed: 75%
60,000 BEIs to train
arders: unknowns
48,000 field techs: only
UCCESS: 80%
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TelecommuTrans
48,000 modemsdelivered
46,000 SIM cardssecured
5,500 BGAN mobilesat xmtrs purchased
680 VSAT mobile satxmtrs leased
ications andission
2 data centers forbackup of nationwideresults with
redundancy secured Contract with major
telcos to provide VPN
for transmitting resultssecured
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48,000 mod
For 75,471(63
How many of the
a signal i
ms delivered
machines?.6%)m can actually get
the field?
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46,000 SIM
FalseSmartmatic generatescertificates, verifies the
the m
This is like mergingfunctions of accoun
operator
ards secured
ecurity:asswords, issues digitalertificates, and operates
chines
n a single person theant, cashier, auditor,nd vendor!
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5,500 BGANpurc
48,000 + 5,
obile sat xmtrsased
00 = 53,500
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680 VSAT mobil
53,500 + 6(for 75,471 ma
sat xmtrs leased
80 = 54,180hines, or 71.8%)
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2 data centers forwith redund
Data centers in se
the Comelec refuses
This is equivalent toin a secret place
and Smar
backup of resultsncy secured
ret locations which
to reveal to the public
conducting a canvassonly the Comelecmatic know
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Contract with majVPN for transmitti
According to Smartmonly 70% of voting cen
r telcos to provideg results secured
tic's own field surveys,ers have reliable signals
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TelecommuTrans
46,000 SIM cards: for
48,000 modems; 5,50transmitters: for 75,741
Contract with major tel
2 data centers for bac
PROBABILITY OF
ications andission
8,000 modems?
BGAN; 680 mobile satmachines? (72%)os: 70% coverage
up: secret locations
UCCESS: 70%
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Ballot PrintingDelivered to CO
4 high-speed digitalprinters
1,500 metric tons ofballot paper
9,380 liters of ink
InfrastructureELEC and NPO
Over 10 million ballotswith security marks
(invisible ultravioletmark and uniquebarcode) printed
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Over 10 million bmarks (invisible ul
unique barc
Ballot printing begins a
C. LAPEA, K. J. TAN, GMANew02/08/2010 | 02:11 PM
The printing of ballots for the May
after technical considerations" hCommission on Elections (Comel
This was announced by Commissp.m. after printing was delayed by
llots with securitytraviolet mark andde) printed
ter a half-day delay
s.TV
2010 elections has finally begun
mpered the process, thec) said Monday.
ioner Gregorio Larrazabal at 1more than half a day.
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Confidential Mmemo on ballot
... The Comelec memorandum noted thafor the electronic balloting had been prinaccepted as good ballots, while the res
Granting that 7,878,480 are all good bal42,845,254 for a period of 54 days. Thisdaily production of 793,430,629, more oris impossible! the memorandum read.
Smartmatic-TIM has leased to the comm
printers, each capable of printing 200,00
Ladra said the printers daily output wascapacity, she said only 34.1 million ballothe Comelec starts to ship out the ballot
rch 1 Comelecprinting problemt as of March 1, some 7.9 million ballotsed. Of the number, 5.3 million weret have yet to be checked.
lots, we still have to print a total ofmeans, we should be able to have aless, per day from four printers, which
ission four Kodak VersaMark VL 4000
0 ballots.
only 650,000 or 162,500 each. At thiss would be printed by April 25, when. (PDI report, 10Mar2010)
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7.9 million bfrom Feb.
Dates DayRate
2/8 3/1 20 7
assuming the sa3/2 4/30 60 2
7.9 million + 21.3
If the remaining 10.8 milthe same rate, they will
llots printedto Mar. 1
Ballots
.9 million 394,000/day
me printing rate...1.3 million
illion = 39.2 million
lion ballots are printed ate finished on May 27
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1,600 print jo
Each municipality/city hEach ballot desi
1,600 print jois 20 print j
What if a printinDo candidates ve
are accurately positio
bs in 80 days
as its own ballot designn is one print job
bs in 80 daysbs per day
error is made?rify if their namesned? (Due diligence!)
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4 high-speed
Accordingthese special
are not availaKodak m
only when ord
igital printers
to insiders,Kodak printersle off-the-shelf.kes them
rs are received
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Over 10 million bmarks (invisible ul
unique barc
Ultraviolet scadisabled, accordin(UV mark is a
ARMM ballots minu
llots with securitytraviolet mark and
de) printed
nning capabilityto CJ Panganibanecurity feature)
s NPO security mark
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Over 10 million bmarks (invisible ul
unique barc
PROBABILITY OF
llots with securitytraviolet mark and
de) printed
UCCESS: 80%
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Expected probabas of March 8
Sub-project
Hardware and suSoftware and cerLogistics and suTelecomms andBallot printing
ilities of success,martmatic ad
PoS
pplies 80%ifications 70%port 80%ransmission 70%
80%
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Basicof Project
(and Reliabilit
To get the overall p
of a project with a seach one essential to
multiplyeach sub-project's p
.8 x .7 x .8
rincipleanagement
Engineering)robability of success
ries of sub-projects,verall project success,
togetherrobability of success:
x .7 x .8 = ?
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If each subprchances o
.99 x .99 x .
=
ject had 99%success...
9 x .99 x .99
95
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If each subprchances o
.95 x .95 x .
=
ject had 95%success...
5 x .95 x .95
77
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If each subprchances o
.9 x .9 x .
=
ject had 90%success...
9 x .9 x .9
59
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If each subprchances o
.87 x .87 x .
= .
ject had 87%success...
7 x .87 x .87
98
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If each subprchances o
.8 x .8 x .
=
ject had 80%success...
8 x .8 x .8
33
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Estimated AES chas of March 8 a
.8 x .7 x .
=
ances of success,by Smartmatic
8 x .7 x .8
25
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Will Smartmaticthe Filipin
The March 8 ad implieSmartmatic solid
in each of their five a
Smartmatic marked th
Will Smartmatic,
also speak for Filipi
ote on behalf ofpeople?
that voters have givenotes of confidence
tomation sub-projects.
se ovals, not the voters.
foreign company,
o voters on May 10?
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I. The COME
Make public test protocolsmachine, particularly theballot rejection rates, and
Allow pol parties to test so Not accept, deploy or pay
meet specifications sim
Distribute machines randoare sent to opposition baili
Embargo the 16,240 extra
EC should ...
and test results of everyean time between failures,can accurary rates
me machines themselvesfor machines which do notle due diligence
mly: what if bad machineswicks?
memory cards
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II. The COME
Reenable voter verificballot was scanned ac
Make public Systest con the system audit an
Provide stakeholder aon the same terms and
Make public the seriesComelec and its TechCommittee (TEC) and
EC should ...
tion and confirmation ifurately by the machine
rtification and full reportssource code review
cess to the source codeconditions as Systest
of exchanges betweenical Evaluationystest
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III. The COME
Make public the transavailability survey repo
Make public the list offorwarding firms contra
Make public the contra
Make public the latesttesting, ballot printing,timelines
LEC should ...
ission and powerrt of Smartmatic
ield offices of allcted by Smartmatic
ts with forwarding firms
ersion of its machineelivery and training
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IV. The COM
Make public detailed cwith weak or no signalfailures occur
Make public copy of co
Open to the public Co
Transfer digital securitSmartmatic to indepen
LEC should ...
ntinuity plan for areas, or where transmission
ntracts with telcos
elec data servers site
management froment third party (DOST?)
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V. The COME
Grant observer statusballot printing committ
Conduct random testinmachine readability an
Allow political parties tbatches themselves
LEC should ...
o political parties in thee
of ballots for quality,rejection rates
inspect and test ballot
T liti l
ti d
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To politicalthe public:
Location-specific prob
Regional variations in delquality/reliability of cou
batteries, servers, electsignals, ballots availabi
These variations can biasome candidate bailiwi
Ballot fraud in millions:ovals than writing nam
parties andeware of ...
lems, authentic or not:
ivery capabilities,ting machines, modems,
ricity, generators, telcoity, conduct of trainings, etc.
voter turnout in favor ofks over others
it is easier with shadings
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Reducing the
All proposals for ensuriAES must be heeded
Every precinct must be
prepared to count votemachine delay or failurballots and for a post-e
Full parallel count by agroups based on onemust be authorized an
risk of failure
ng transparency in the
authorized and
manually in cases of, valid but rejected
lection manual audit
consortium of citizens'f the 8 official ER copiesdone in public
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Options in ca
Orderly constitutional tensured, if no presidensenators are proclaime
Clarify the role of suchgovernment in settlingpossibly conducting ne
e of failure...
ansition must bet, vice-president ord
interim post-GMAlection disputes or even
w, credible elections
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Turbulent tim
Pray for
Prepare f
s are coming
the best
r the worst