halal analysis of automated election system failure as of 23 march 2010

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  • 8/9/2019 HALAL Analysis of Automated Election System Failure as of 23 March 2010

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    A Vote ofin Sma

    RobertSecretarHalalang

    rverzola

    onfidencetmatic?

    Verzolay-GeneralMarangal

    gn.apc.org

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    March 8: Smart

    Last Mar

    a full-page ad bcame out in seve

    The ad wA Vote of Confidence

    a

    tic full-page ad

    h 8, 2010

    Smartmatic-TIMal national dailies.

    as entitledfor the 2010 Elections

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    Hardware / suppli

    82,200 PCOS manu-factured, delivered

    1,722 canvassing andconsolidation serversand printers delivered

    1,722 powergenerators delivered

    es / consumables

    180,640 compactflash memory cardspurchased

    82,200 batteries foreach PCOS delivered

    338,750 rolls forprinting 30 copies ofER per pcnt delivered

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    82,200 PCOS

    Note the careful omissiChina, delivered in Mafull testing and accept

    Omission creates false

    In 2004, thorough testimachines took 3 montComm. Mehol Sadain,

    ade, delivered

    on: manufactured inila, but no mention ofnce by the Comelec

    impression of readiness

    g of 1,990 countings (source: Comeleca HALAL convenor)

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    1,722 canvassingservers and pri

    No mentionor Comelec

    and consolidationnters delivered

    f test resultsacceptance

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    1,722 power gen

    No mentionor Comelec

    erators delivered

    f test resultsacceptance

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    180,640 compacards p

    Each machine uses tw

    82,200 PCOS machin

    82,200 x 2 = 164,400 180,640164,400 = 16

    There are only 75,471

    Warning: potential capmemory cards in 21.5

    ct flash memoryurchased

    memory cards

    s, including backups

    emory cards needed,240 extra memory cards

    precinct clusters

    bility to substituteof PCOS machines

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    Hardware / suppli

    Unknown test results:

    82,200 PCOS and batt

    1,722 canvassing andprinters, generators

    180,640 compact flash20% more than neces

    PROBABILITY OF

    es / consumables

    ries

    onsolidation servers,

    memory cards; at leastary

    UCCESS: 80%

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    Software // voter e

    Source codecustomization finished

    Source code inescrow at BSP

    System auditinternationally-recognizedcertification entityfinished

    ertificationsucation Source code public

    review processopened

    Successful field testsand mock elections

    Voter educationwebsites launched

    Voter educn TV andradio infomercials

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    Source code cust

    Customization includverification and confirbuilt into the PCOS ma

    This feature would havcandidates marked in tthen confirm through a

    ballot was scanned ac It assures voters that t

    accurately. This featur

    mization finished

    d disabling of voteration feature which ischine.

    displayed the names ofhe ballot. Voters mustCAST button that their

    urately.eir votes were scannedwas disabled.

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    Source code in

    Source code is Smartinstructions directed to

    No mention of sourceSystest, for which Co

    No mention of any certthe full Systest report,

    Insiders cite series ofbetween Systest and

    Release the full text of

    escrow at BSP

    atic's generalevery machine

    ode certification byelec paid P72 million

    ification document, or ofn its source code review

    ritten exchangesomelec about the review

    the Systest review NOW

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    System audit brecognized ce

    System anot only the

    but all the fivessential to

    Smartmatic claims finis

    much less a full report,public. Full audit rep

    internationally-tification entity

    dit coverssource code

    sub-systemsES success

    ed. But no certification,

    as been released to thert must be released.

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    Sourcpublic review p

    Process is hiand makes a revie

    So far, no grou

    to conduct

    coderocess opened

    hly restrictiveextremely difficult

    p has managed

    code review

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    Successfuand moc

    WHAT A LIE!

    High ballot rejection ratshould not cause ballot

    Transmission problems

    Blackout on machine a

    A contractor that will pad can lie about anythi

    l field testselections

    s (light shading of ovalsrejection)even in Metro Manila

    curacy/error rates

    t such a lie in a full-pageg

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    Software // voter e

    System audit and sourtext report or certificati

    Source code public redone a code review

    Successful field tests a

    What a lie!

    PROBABILITY OF

    ertificationsucation

    e code review: no fulln released

    iew: no local group has

    nd mock elections:

    UCCESS: 70%

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    Logistics / Supp

    28 multinationalexperts at the PMT

    327 qualified Filipinoorganic employees

    Over 36,000 votingcenters surveyed forsignal, power, etc.

    438 Comelec trainers

    rt / Preparations

    23,000 sqm centralwarehouse and configfacility operational

    Contracts withlogistics providers,forwarders signed

    Recruitment, trainingof 48,000 field techsstarted

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    Over 36,000surveyed for si

    Since there are 4only 75% hav

    oting centersnal, power, etc.

    ,000 voting centersbeen covered

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    904 test and confworking

    Tests needed

    Burn-in of machines, b

    Full testing of batteries:

    Testing for failures ratefailures (MTBF)

    Testing for ballot rejecti

    Testing for scan accuraless than 5 per 100,00

    In 2004, testing 1,990

    ig line employeeswo shifts

    tteries, generators, etc.

    will they last >12 hrs?

    and mean time between

    on rates

    cy/error rates (should bemarks)achines took 3 months

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    Contracts with loforwarde

    Relative unknowns. H(Malaya, 15 March 201 Germalin Enterprises (

    Agro Intl Forwarders (Pearnings)

    ACF Logistics Worldwi

    balance) Assuming a delivery te

    delivery personnel nee

    gistics providers,s signedve you heard of the ff?0)2.3M 2006 net income)

    3.7M 2008 retained

    e (P1.1M 2008 cash

    m of 3, at least 200,000ed for 75,471 clusters

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    Recruitmeof 48,000 fiel

    48,000 field technician

    nt, trainingtechs started

    for 75,471 machines?

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    438 Comel

    For 226,000

    ec trainers

    EI members?

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    Logistics / Supp

    Over 36,000 voting cecoverage

    438 Comelec trainers:

    Logistics providers, for

    Recruitment, training o

    started

    PROBABILITY OF

    rt / Preparations

    ters surveyed: 75%

    60,000 BEIs to train

    arders: unknowns

    48,000 field techs: only

    UCCESS: 80%

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    TelecommuTrans

    48,000 modemsdelivered

    46,000 SIM cardssecured

    5,500 BGAN mobilesat xmtrs purchased

    680 VSAT mobile satxmtrs leased

    ications andission

    2 data centers forbackup of nationwideresults with

    redundancy secured Contract with major

    telcos to provide VPN

    for transmitting resultssecured

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    48,000 mod

    For 75,471(63

    How many of the

    a signal i

    ms delivered

    machines?.6%)m can actually get

    the field?

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    46,000 SIM

    FalseSmartmatic generatescertificates, verifies the

    the m

    This is like mergingfunctions of accoun

    operator

    ards secured

    ecurity:asswords, issues digitalertificates, and operates

    chines

    n a single person theant, cashier, auditor,nd vendor!

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    5,500 BGANpurc

    48,000 + 5,

    obile sat xmtrsased

    00 = 53,500

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    680 VSAT mobil

    53,500 + 6(for 75,471 ma

    sat xmtrs leased

    80 = 54,180hines, or 71.8%)

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    2 data centers forwith redund

    Data centers in se

    the Comelec refuses

    This is equivalent toin a secret place

    and Smar

    backup of resultsncy secured

    ret locations which

    to reveal to the public

    conducting a canvassonly the Comelecmatic know

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    Contract with majVPN for transmitti

    According to Smartmonly 70% of voting cen

    r telcos to provideg results secured

    tic's own field surveys,ers have reliable signals

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    TelecommuTrans

    46,000 SIM cards: for

    48,000 modems; 5,50transmitters: for 75,741

    Contract with major tel

    2 data centers for bac

    PROBABILITY OF

    ications andission

    8,000 modems?

    BGAN; 680 mobile satmachines? (72%)os: 70% coverage

    up: secret locations

    UCCESS: 70%

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    Ballot PrintingDelivered to CO

    4 high-speed digitalprinters

    1,500 metric tons ofballot paper

    9,380 liters of ink

    InfrastructureELEC and NPO

    Over 10 million ballotswith security marks

    (invisible ultravioletmark and uniquebarcode) printed

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    Over 10 million bmarks (invisible ul

    unique barc

    Ballot printing begins a

    C. LAPEA, K. J. TAN, GMANew02/08/2010 | 02:11 PM

    The printing of ballots for the May

    after technical considerations" hCommission on Elections (Comel

    This was announced by Commissp.m. after printing was delayed by

    llots with securitytraviolet mark andde) printed

    ter a half-day delay

    s.TV

    2010 elections has finally begun

    mpered the process, thec) said Monday.

    ioner Gregorio Larrazabal at 1more than half a day.

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    Confidential Mmemo on ballot

    ... The Comelec memorandum noted thafor the electronic balloting had been prinaccepted as good ballots, while the res

    Granting that 7,878,480 are all good bal42,845,254 for a period of 54 days. Thisdaily production of 793,430,629, more oris impossible! the memorandum read.

    Smartmatic-TIM has leased to the comm

    printers, each capable of printing 200,00

    Ladra said the printers daily output wascapacity, she said only 34.1 million ballothe Comelec starts to ship out the ballot

    rch 1 Comelecprinting problemt as of March 1, some 7.9 million ballotsed. Of the number, 5.3 million weret have yet to be checked.

    lots, we still have to print a total ofmeans, we should be able to have aless, per day from four printers, which

    ission four Kodak VersaMark VL 4000

    0 ballots.

    only 650,000 or 162,500 each. At thiss would be printed by April 25, when. (PDI report, 10Mar2010)

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    7.9 million bfrom Feb.

    Dates DayRate

    2/8 3/1 20 7

    assuming the sa3/2 4/30 60 2

    7.9 million + 21.3

    If the remaining 10.8 milthe same rate, they will

    llots printedto Mar. 1

    Ballots

    .9 million 394,000/day

    me printing rate...1.3 million

    illion = 39.2 million

    lion ballots are printed ate finished on May 27

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    1,600 print jo

    Each municipality/city hEach ballot desi

    1,600 print jois 20 print j

    What if a printinDo candidates ve

    are accurately positio

    bs in 80 days

    as its own ballot designn is one print job

    bs in 80 daysbs per day

    error is made?rify if their namesned? (Due diligence!)

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    4 high-speed

    Accordingthese special

    are not availaKodak m

    only when ord

    igital printers

    to insiders,Kodak printersle off-the-shelf.kes them

    rs are received

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    Over 10 million bmarks (invisible ul

    unique barc

    Ultraviolet scadisabled, accordin(UV mark is a

    ARMM ballots minu

    llots with securitytraviolet mark and

    de) printed

    nning capabilityto CJ Panganibanecurity feature)

    s NPO security mark

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    Over 10 million bmarks (invisible ul

    unique barc

    PROBABILITY OF

    llots with securitytraviolet mark and

    de) printed

    UCCESS: 80%

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    Expected probabas of March 8

    Sub-project

    Hardware and suSoftware and cerLogistics and suTelecomms andBallot printing

    ilities of success,martmatic ad

    PoS

    pplies 80%ifications 70%port 80%ransmission 70%

    80%

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    Basicof Project

    (and Reliabilit

    To get the overall p

    of a project with a seach one essential to

    multiplyeach sub-project's p

    .8 x .7 x .8

    rincipleanagement

    Engineering)robability of success

    ries of sub-projects,verall project success,

    togetherrobability of success:

    x .7 x .8 = ?

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    If each subprchances o

    .99 x .99 x .

    =

    ject had 99%success...

    9 x .99 x .99

    95

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    If each subprchances o

    .95 x .95 x .

    =

    ject had 95%success...

    5 x .95 x .95

    77

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    If each subprchances o

    .9 x .9 x .

    =

    ject had 90%success...

    9 x .9 x .9

    59

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    If each subprchances o

    .87 x .87 x .

    = .

    ject had 87%success...

    7 x .87 x .87

    98

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    If each subprchances o

    .8 x .8 x .

    =

    ject had 80%success...

    8 x .8 x .8

    33

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    Estimated AES chas of March 8 a

    .8 x .7 x .

    =

    ances of success,by Smartmatic

    8 x .7 x .8

    25

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    Will Smartmaticthe Filipin

    The March 8 ad implieSmartmatic solid

    in each of their five a

    Smartmatic marked th

    Will Smartmatic,

    also speak for Filipi

    ote on behalf ofpeople?

    that voters have givenotes of confidence

    tomation sub-projects.

    se ovals, not the voters.

    foreign company,

    o voters on May 10?

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    I. The COME

    Make public test protocolsmachine, particularly theballot rejection rates, and

    Allow pol parties to test so Not accept, deploy or pay

    meet specifications sim

    Distribute machines randoare sent to opposition baili

    Embargo the 16,240 extra

    EC should ...

    and test results of everyean time between failures,can accurary rates

    me machines themselvesfor machines which do notle due diligence

    mly: what if bad machineswicks?

    memory cards

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    II. The COME

    Reenable voter verificballot was scanned ac

    Make public Systest con the system audit an

    Provide stakeholder aon the same terms and

    Make public the seriesComelec and its TechCommittee (TEC) and

    EC should ...

    tion and confirmation ifurately by the machine

    rtification and full reportssource code review

    cess to the source codeconditions as Systest

    of exchanges betweenical Evaluationystest

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    III. The COME

    Make public the transavailability survey repo

    Make public the list offorwarding firms contra

    Make public the contra

    Make public the latesttesting, ballot printing,timelines

    LEC should ...

    ission and powerrt of Smartmatic

    ield offices of allcted by Smartmatic

    ts with forwarding firms

    ersion of its machineelivery and training

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    IV. The COM

    Make public detailed cwith weak or no signalfailures occur

    Make public copy of co

    Open to the public Co

    Transfer digital securitSmartmatic to indepen

    LEC should ...

    ntinuity plan for areas, or where transmission

    ntracts with telcos

    elec data servers site

    management froment third party (DOST?)

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    V. The COME

    Grant observer statusballot printing committ

    Conduct random testinmachine readability an

    Allow political parties tbatches themselves

    LEC should ...

    o political parties in thee

    of ballots for quality,rejection rates

    inspect and test ballot

    T liti l

    ti d

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    To politicalthe public:

    Location-specific prob

    Regional variations in delquality/reliability of cou

    batteries, servers, electsignals, ballots availabi

    These variations can biasome candidate bailiwi

    Ballot fraud in millions:ovals than writing nam

    parties andeware of ...

    lems, authentic or not:

    ivery capabilities,ting machines, modems,

    ricity, generators, telcoity, conduct of trainings, etc.

    voter turnout in favor ofks over others

    it is easier with shadings

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    Reducing the

    All proposals for ensuriAES must be heeded

    Every precinct must be

    prepared to count votemachine delay or failurballots and for a post-e

    Full parallel count by agroups based on onemust be authorized an

    risk of failure

    ng transparency in the

    authorized and

    manually in cases of, valid but rejected

    lection manual audit

    consortium of citizens'f the 8 official ER copiesdone in public

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    Options in ca

    Orderly constitutional tensured, if no presidensenators are proclaime

    Clarify the role of suchgovernment in settlingpossibly conducting ne

    e of failure...

    ansition must bet, vice-president ord

    interim post-GMAlection disputes or even

    w, credible elections

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    Turbulent tim

    Pray for

    Prepare f

    s are coming

    the best

    r the worst