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Handbook of Mul-level Finance Eh-sham Ahmad and Giorgio Brosio
(editors) World Bank Launch, May 4, 2015
CENTRO STUDI SUL FEDERALISMO
Why did we start this volume in 2010? • Only four years aKer the launch of the (successful) Handbook of Fiscal Federalism – Not meant to be an update—although there is an element of this in key areas, given the large volume of literature
– But to focus on what the new insights imply for policy • ODen pracEce and circumstance precede development in theory, but this new theory is useful – in addressing a range of issues, including climate change, natural disaster, and preven-ng conflict
• The focus of the volume is mainly on how the theory can be applied to burning policy quesEons of our Eme – although it starts with the updates to method in key areas since the last Handbook
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Some acknowledgements • Tribute to Ter-‐Minassian over the past 25 years
– When Ahmad came to IMF in March 1990, aKer comple-ng an assignment for “WDR 1990 Poverty;” prevailing FAD view was that intergovernmental issues were either poliEcal or structural, hence not relevant for the IMF
– But Ter-‐Minassian saw the importance of the issues for macroeconomic stability, and encouraged the work.
– In retrospect, both views were correct—it is both poliEcal and structural and that macroeconomics depends on both strands.
– The interacEons between macro policy, governance and insEtuEons are important and maMer to FAD and the IMF as well as the Bank—clearly reflected in her chapter in this volume.
• Also grateful to Vito Tanzi, who accepted and even encouraged debate on issues he did not necessarily agree with
• Within a week of joining FAD, Ahmad was on his way to China—and had the privilege to debate issues with Lou Jiwei and the MOF, leading to the design of the 1993 reforms (to which the Bank also contributed). – Policy prescrip-ons available from theory at the -me were inadequate; – Chinese 1994/4 reforms were carried out in advance of the theore-cal
developments over the past decade.
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The Volume: Analy-c Advances • Approaches and
Interpreta/ons – Lockwood (Poli-cal economy) – Breton (Posi-ve theory of
federalism and poli-cal decentraliza-on)
– Salmon (horizontal compe--on)
– Revelli (Geografiscal federalism)
– Congelton (Asymmetric federalism)
– Spahn (Contract Federalism)
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Key policy issues of relevance to countries and mul-lateral agencies
• Policies Instruments and Ins/tu/ons – Who does what? (Dafflon) – Governance and InsEtuEons
(Ahmad) – Revenue assignments
(Ambrosanio and Bordignon) – Tax CompeEEon (Wilson) – Below the salt: VAT (Bird) – Financing Urban Areas (Bahl and
Linn) – Local and Regional Taxes
(Mar-néz-‐Vazquez) – PoliEcal economy of Property
Taxes (Ahmad, Brosio, Pöschl) – Transfer Design (Boadway) – Macro Sustainability (Ter-‐
Minassian)
• Emerging Challenges – Capture and Clientelism (Bardhan
and Mookherjee) – Poverty reducEon (Birner and von
Braun) – Sharing Natural Resouces (Brosio) – Environment and Climate Change
(Dalmazzone) – Natural Disasters (Goodspeed) – Conflict prevenEon (Dower and
Weber) – Measurement issues (Blöchliger)
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Norma-ve approaches • NormaEve approaches, post WWII
– Largely prescrip-ve • Influenced by US experience
– Typically, instrument by instrument approach (educa-on in isola-on; or property taxes)
• Assignments, financing arrangements – Primary and secondary educa-on to municipal level, func-on of local
preferences – Central government addresses spill-‐overs through earmarked grants – However, neither may be warranted
• center may be able to provide educa-on in line with local preferences; and • may not be able to persuade local governments to internalize spillovers
• Many of the US precondiEons do not apply everywhere: sub-‐na-onal own-‐source revenues and hard budget constraints
• RecogniEon of externaliEes: centraliza-on of educa-on in Mexico, Chile…
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Focus on incen-ves and evolu-on of ins-tu-ons
• Increasing focus of literature since 2006: – Why and how policies are designed and implemented? – Importance of ins-tu-ons and incen-ves – Reviews of recent developments to literature and original contribu-ons
(Lockwood, Revelli, Breton, Salmon, Bardhan and Mookherjee) • YardsEck compeEEon to ensure effecEve outcomes • FacEons, “capture” or “clientelism” (Bardhan and Mookherjee—plus
work in Bank) • Echoes of old debates (e.g., Federalist papers) • Extensions to the reality of modern day emerging market countries • Modern day “chea-ng” or informality (analy-c and empirical work in Mexico, supported
by Bank, as background to 2013 reforms) • Asymmetric arrangements (Congleton) and contracts (Spahn) updates
from 2006 – Require more advanced PFM underpinnings—recogni-on and monitoring of
liabili-es and outcomes (Ahmad)
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Cri-cal alignment of incen-ves with ins-tu-ons
• What works? – Generally, combina-on of well-‐designed instruments relevant to context – Incen-ves mamer (firms, households, modelling interac-ons between
governments at different levels) • Both insEtuEons and policies may differ according to context
– New areas of research: informality and chea-ng with “vested interest” – “administra-ve progression” in cases where elec-ons may not provide
adequate “discipline” – Interac-ons within classes of instruments (tax on tax) and across instruments
(taxes and transfers, or taxes and social policy) cri-cal in virtually every context
– Increasing emphasis on the “number of -ers” in achieving accountability • Important implicaEons for InternaEonal Agencies
– Coordina-on across Divisions in FAD, or interac-ons across Bank “Global Prac-ces”
– Both in terms of assessments and relevant policy advice
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TAXES, TRANSFERS, INSTITUTIONS AND MACRO STABILITY
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Heavy focus on tax design • Ambrosanio and Bordignon: update of cri-cal paper from 2006
Handbook: – Importance of “own-‐source revenues” at every level for accountability – But incen-ves could be offset by poorly designed transfers
• Wilson: focusing on ver-cal tax compe--on – Role of the central government in addressing inefficiencies in horizontal tax
compe--on – Transfers become important, in ensuring efficiency as well as spa-al equity
• MarEnéz-‐Vazquez: typology of mul-level tax assignments, and administra-on constraints
• Ahmad: not necessary to replicate complex tax administra-ons at lower levels for accountability: seqng of rates is cri-cal – Proximity to taxpayers (cadaster or valua-on—land records) could encourage
“rent seeking”) – Bank work on electronic land records and cadaster at the na-onal or regional
level, possibly with satellite imaging, a very important contribu-on in increasing number of countries.
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Special tax issues: • Bird: Should countries split VAT bases?
– Co-‐occupancy can work, with difficulty (Canada) – Bemer not to complicate VAT – Problems with Bri-sh Commonwealth assignments: South Asia,
Canada, Australia • Clean solu-on in Australia, involving poli-cal economy compromise with
equaliza-on transfers • Significant reforms under discussion in India
• Ahmad, Brosio, Pöschl: Why do local property taxes perform badly in developing countries? – Very visible, and with weak ins-tu-ons and central transfers, so no
incen-ves to levy – Solu-on: based on J.S.Mill/Marshall—linkage between local benefits
(services) and financing; also addresses “capitaliza-on” of local investments
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Poli-cal economy of who does what?
• Dafflon provides a useful categoriza-on of responsibili-es – But both func-onal and economic categories are involved—cf. GFSM2001/2014, including full recogni-on of liabili-es (Ahmad)
• Important to focus on consistent informa-on together with clarity of spending – Pointless to devolve educa-on to lower -ers if they do not have own-‐sources of revenues or standardized repor-ng • Current wave of centralizing educa-on in La-n America aKer two decades of trying to copy the US model
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Transfer design and implementa-on
• Boadway: masterly review of issues and associated literature – important tradeoff between horizontal equity, and interpersonal welfare maximiza-on h
– How to handle migra-on and informality? – The role of minimum standards—whose? And how to finance them? SPPs or equaliza-on?
– Design of transfers and managing risks, hard budget constraints?
• Ahmad: Implementa-on issues – Ins-tu-onal arrangements (Grants Commissions or MOFs) – Linkages with PFM frameworks—monitoring of SPPs – Buildup of risks and liabili-es
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Governance and ins-tu-ons • Ahmad: Standardized informaEon is criEcal for both
– yards-ck compe--on, and – also administra-ve (“Confucian”) models (volume forthcoming) – Key element in “incen-ve” structures
• But fiscal organizaEonal structures may look and operate differently in various countries (building on North’s characteriza-on of ins-tu-ons) – On revenue side: integra-on of informa-on and administra-on rather
than segmented administra-ons may be needed with chea-ng (Mexico 2013)
– On spending side: disincen-ves to recognize liabili-es • PPPs—kicking the can down the road, including in EU? • Lack of TSA facilitates “bargains”, “clientelism” and “game play”
• IFIs have major role to play in helping design appropriate insEtuEons and governance frameworks
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Macro-‐sustainability • Responsibility for spending, own-‐taxes, transfers and informa-on genera-on/PFM come together – Interac-ons are cri-cal
• Ter-‐Minassian (see separate presenta-on): – Importance of fiscal rules at the sub-‐na-onal level – But also precondiEons for access to credit
• Especially own-‐source revenues and • Full informa-on on the build-‐up of liabili-es (PFM underpinnings)
• Cri-cal importance in mul-level (China, Indonesia) and Federal Countries (Mexico and UAE) – Also in Currency Unions (volume forthcoming on the Crisis in the EU and Mul-level Finance)
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“GEOGRAFISCAL” ISSUES, URBAN “HUBS” AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH
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“Geografiscal” issues • Revelli: Spa-al issues are increasingly to the fore in the literature. – Both ver-cal and horizontal compe--on and demonstra-on effects, complementari-es and spillovers.
– Provides a challenge for econometricians. • Exci/ng area for new research linked to sustainable development agenda: – Applica-ons to establishment of “sustainable new hubs”
– Empirical work on “convergence”, e.g., in China (volume forthcoming), UK and Chile (on-‐going project)
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Metropolitan and urban “hubs” • Bahl and Linn:
– Key issues in efficient management of large metropolitan areas – Mul-level ques-ons: organiza-onal arrangements, responsibili-es and
financing are cri-cal • But there are constraints in expansion of “mega ci-es”
– conges-on and pollu-on costs, and – middle income traps
• Links back to the “geografiscal” agenda above for sustainable “hubs” and genera-on of employment – No private investment unless cost differen-als are addressed and local
public services are provided efficiently – More than just physical investments
• More than building empty castles in the desert; or connec-vity from nowhere to anywhere
– Mul-level governance and ins-tu-ons are cri-cal—and all building blocks come together??
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POVERTY REDUCTION
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Capture, clientelism and sustained poverty reduc-on
• Bardhan and Mookherjee: add the cri-cal concept of “clientelism” to the idea of “capture” from the 2006 Handbook – May well be targeted perfectly to the poor—e.g., with condi-onal
cash transfers, – but this may be driven by “buying votes” rather than long-‐term
development needs • e.g., BISP
• Does decentraliza-on impact posi-vely on the provision of public services for the poor? – as highlighted in Junaid Ahmad, Devarajan, Khemani and Shah (2006
Handbook) based on WDR – by strengthening both the poor people’s ability to demand bemer
services? and – enhance incen-ves and the capacity of public agencies to provide such
services?
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Poverty reduc-on in mul-level context
• What cons-tutes sustainable poverty reduc-on? – Long term investments or transfers? – What happens to incen-ves to work?
• Birner and von Braun: survey the literature, including empirical evidence on – Role of local service delivery
• But evidence in CCTs is mixed: – Mexico moved to a basic benefit (minimum pension) and phased out Oportunidades in 2014.
• The policy context remains cri-cal—and the case for any measure has to be carefully evaluated in its ins-tu-onal/mul-level context
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CLIMATE CHANGE AND MANAGING NATURAL DISASTERS
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Mul-level issues with climate change
• Area for fruiuul research: – Spa-al aspects already discussed (sustainable “hubs) – Tax policy and transfers: for na-onal carbon tax (to prevent race to the bomom—Ahmad and Stern, 2011)
• Dalmazzone: examines case of local environmental challenges: – Externali-es and uniformity of standards and goals call for central, even suprana-onal guidelines
– But local ac-on on pollutants and conges-on will be cri-cal – Considerable incen-ves to cheat
• Balance needed between local, state, central and suprana-onal ac-ons
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Disaster preven-on and relief—in renewed focus with Nepal and Hai-
• Goodspeed: – focuses on consistent incen-ves at different levels for preven-on • Local building codes; health care and coordina-on facili-es, feeder roads and networks
• The role of co-‐insurance in affec-ng local and private incen-ves to undertake preven-ve measures
– Case for coordina-on with center • Early warning (hurricanes and tsunamis) • Dealing with catastrophic events • pooling of risks and • Reconstruc-on—and relief coordina-on
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THE STRUGGLE OVER NATURAL RESOURCES AND AVOIDING CONFLICT
Keeping countries together
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Revenue-‐Sharing and Transparency • People in resource rich regions oKen see more environmental
damage than benefits – Could lead to secession tendencies and conflict
• Brosio examines the case and typology of op-ons – Capture by corrupt central and local elites – SWFs a par-al solu-on –the en-re value chain has to be seen to be
fair (much more needed on PFM than before) • Appropriate management of sector, with properly assigned taxes
and shares – Poli-cal economy may result in asymmetric sharing, oKen linked to
compensa-on of damage – See e.g., Acheh in Indonesia – But equaliza-on transfers also important
• So confluence of taxes, revenue-‐sharing, transfers and governance criteria…feeds into the crisis prevenEon agenda
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Preven-ng or addressing ethnic or regional conflicts
• Dower and Weber: model conflicts due to ethnic differences; and the role of “transfers” in reducing incenEves to secede – effec-veness of transfers depends also on the ‘distance’ between the
centre and the regions – increases up to a certain level of ethnic diversity, but it decreases
thereaKer, • Implies that fiscal policies have limits in alleviaEng conflicts if used
in isolaEon. • Ahmad, Brosio et al 2007: Problems exacerbated if there is a
natural resource in the minority regions – Analysis basis for IMF-‐WB non-‐paper for Iraq in 2007 –unfortunately
ignored by both agencies, but which s-ll provides a key to the solu-on – Also a central element of Bank inputs to the Yemen NaEonal
Dialogue agreement • But UN-‐brokered Cons-tu-onal arrangements not locked in place quickly
enough • S-ll remains the basis for any poli-cal semlement in Yemen!
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Conclusions • A big lesson is the interacEon of instruments and policies
that are typically addressed in isolaEon by the IFIs • There is a significant research and policy agenda, where
collabora-on would be very desirable, both on method as well as specific country cases
• More case-‐specific works in progress: – Volume on the Crisis in Europe and Mul/level Finance (editors Ahmad, Bordignon and Brosio) in Press;
– China-‐specific volume under prepara-on; – Tax-‐social policy agenda under informality (focussing on LSE-‐IADB-‐JICA project on Mexico and Indonesia; with support from the World Bank for part of the work on Mexico) is nearing comple-on.
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