Hardtimes

Apregnantwomanstandsinheremptykitchen,ruralGwanda,October2011.“Nofood,nowork,nomoney.IfonlyIcouldgetcattletohelpmeplough.”

Matabeleland:urbandeindustrialization

‐andruralhunger

SOLIDARITYPEACETRUST

2November2011

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“Ifgovernmentimproves,ourlivesmay….”

“Failedrainsbroughtusproblemsanddonorsseemtohavedisappeared….”

“Thechildrengotoschoolwithouteatingandareturnedawayforfailingtopaylevies.Lifeissodifficultanddroughtmakesitimpossible….”

“Ihaveputmyhopeinmychildren,IdonotseehowIcansurviveinthefutureotherwise….”

“Ihopeforbetterthingsifsomefamilymembersfindwork….”

[VoicesofvillagersinterviewedinGwandarural,September2011]

“AsfarasIamconcerned,justgoandbuyyourownseedsanddon’twaitforsomethingtomaterializefromgovernmentbecauseitwillcometoolatetobeuseful–ifitcomesatall….”

[AREXofficial,28October2011]

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TTHHEE SSOOLLIIDDAARRIITTYY PPEEAACCEE TTRRUUSSTT

TheSolidarityPeaceTrustisanon‐governmentalorganisation,registeredinSouthAfrica.TheTrusteesoftheSolidarityPeaceTrustarechurchleadersofSouthernAfrica,whoareallcommittedtohumanrights,freedomanddemocracyintheirregion.TheobjectivesoftheTrustare:Toassistindividuals,organisations,churchesandaffiliatedorganisationsinsouthernAfrica,tobuildsolidarityinthepursuitofjustice,peaceandsocialequalityandequityinZimbabwe.ItshallbethespecialconcernoftheTrusttoassistvictimsofhumanrightsabusesintheireffortstocorrectandendtheirsituationofoppression.Contact: info@solidaritypeacetrust.org

www.solidaritypeacetrust.orgforallpreviousreports,videos,blogsandcommentpages

 

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ContentsRecommendations 6PartOne: 7A. Heatandhunger:OctoberinMatabeleland 7

1. DonorplansforFeedingofVulnerableGroups2011‐12 72. Rainfallpredictions–implicationsforplanting 93. Freeandsubsidizedinputsfor2011–2012growingseason: 9

Nottoolittle,buttoolate?4. Lackofcoordinationwithingovernment 12

B. Matabeleland:socio‐economiccontext2011 131. Thenationaleconomiccontext 132. OverviewofZimbabweeconomy:1980–2010 143. Bulawayoanddeindustrialization 154. DIMAF 19

PartTwo: 21A. TheGPAandthehumanrightssituation,October2011 21B. MatabelelandSouth:Findingsoffoodsecuritysurvey,October2011 22

1.Methodology 22 2.Octoberfollowup 22

3.Summaryoffindings 22 i. Demographics 22 ii. Foodsecurity 23 iii. Availablebutunaffordable 24 iv. Additionalfoodinformation 25 v. Watersecurity 26 vi. Livestock 28 vii. Bartertrading 30 viii. Harvests,2011and2012 31 ix. Generalintervieweeperceptionsofeconomicstatus 32

C. TheDiaspora–whoisoutthereandwhatdotheysendback? 33 1. YearofDiasporisation 34 2. HomevisitsbyfamilyintheDiaspora 34 3. Remittances 34

Photographs Coverphoto: Apregnantwomanstandsinheremptykitchen,ruralGwanda,

October2011.“Nofood,nowork,nomoney.IfonlyIcouldgetcattletohelpmeplough.”

Photos1/2: Gwandadistrict,27October2011:thisfamilypainstakingly 11gathersupmaizeseedsforplanting,thathaveleakedfromapassingtruckontotheroad.Willthesebetheironlytimely“freeinputs”for2011/12?

Photo3: Emptysilos,abandonedprocessingplant–“RedSeal”foodcompany 16inBulawayo,oneofmanyclosedbusinesses.

Photo4: Once,thesetraintracksbroughtrawmaterialstothisfactoryand 16carriedawayfinishedgoodsforexport.Bulawayoindustrialsite,October2011.

Photos5,6: Theonlyfunctioningboreholeinthetargetarea,with85%ofpeople 27

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reportinguptothreebrokenboreholesintheirvicinity.Nearly70%offamiliesreportedsourcingwaterfromariver‐bedand20%fromawell.

Backcover: Onethirdofhouseholdsweinterviewedexpecttoloselivestocktostarvationbeforetheendof2011:Gwandadistrict,October2011.

Graphs

Graph1:showingfoodinsecuritybasedonnumberofmealsandfoodstocks 24

Graph2:showingpercentageoffamiliesthathavefoodotherthanmaizemeal 26andvegetablesinthehomesteadondayofinterview

Graph3:showingasapercentagewhichfoodsintervieweesreportedhavingeaten, 26otherthanmaizemealandvegetablesinthelastweek.

Graph4:showingtotallivestockinallhouseholdsin2010(leftcolumn) 29and2011(rightcolumn)

Graph5:showingpercentageoffamiliesthatdoNOTownlivestock 29

Graph6:showingpercentageoffamiliesexpectingtoloselivestockbefore 30

endof2011

Graph7:showingpercentageoffamiliesusingbarterasasurvivalstrategy 30

Graph8:showinglastyear’sharvests 31

Graph9:showingpercentageofdiasporafamilieshavingdifferentnumbersof 33familyabroad

Graph10:showingwhenfamilymembersleftforthediaspora 34

Graph11:showingfrequencyofremittancesfromdiasporamembers 35

Abbreviations

AREX AgriculturalExtensionOfficeCFU CommercialFarmersUnionDIMAF DistressedandMarginalisedAreasFundESAP EconomicStructuralAdjustmentProgrammeFAO FoodandAgriculturalOrganisationFEWSNET FamineEarlyWarningSystemNetworkFVG FeedingofVulnerableGroupsGPA GlobalPoliticalAgreementMDC MovementforDemocraticChangeMDCT MovementforDemocraticChange,TsvangiraiMLF MthwakaziLiberationFrontNGO nongovernmentalorganisationNRZ NationalRailwaysofZimbabweSADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunitySPT SolidarityPeaceTrustUSAID UnitedStatesDevelopmentAgencyWFP WorldFoodProgrammeZIMVAC ZimbabweVulnerabilityAssessmentCommitteeZANUPF ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnion,PatrioticFrontZAPU ZimbabweAfricaPeople’sUnion

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Recommendations1. Thefirstrainshavealreadyfalleninmuchofthecountryandthereisthereforean

urgentneedforthealreadyplanneddistributionoffreeandsubsidizedinputstoreachthemostvulnerablefamiliesimmediately,bymidNovemberifpossible,toincreasethelikelihoodofthesehouseholdsharvestinganythingthisseason.

2. Identificationofthemostvulnerablehouseholdsisthereforeurgent.

3. Freeandsubsidizedinputsshouldbedistributedfirstinthoseareasthatare

knowntohavepoorrainfallandthatsufferedseriouscropfailurelastyear:plantinglateinsuchareaswillincreasetheriskofanothercropfailure,particularlyasaveragerainsarebeingpredictedinthefirstpartofthisseason,withpoorrainsin2012.

4. Humanitarianreliefisurgentlyneededandthedelayinrolloutoffeedingofvulnerablegroupsthatwenoteinsomedistrictsinthisreport,needstobeironedoutasfastaspossible,asmanyfamiliesarealreadycompromisingseverelyontheirdailyfoodintake.

5. ThegrindingpovertyofmanyruralZimbabweansneedstobeaprioritywithgovernmentandwiththeinternationalcommunity:thereisaneedtourgentlyaddressmattersofeconomicdevelopment,asfoodhandoutscannotbeapermanentsolution.

6. ItisthereforeimperativefortheSADCfacilitationtoproceedwithgreaterurgencyinordertofacilitateamoreconstructivedialoguewiththedonorcountriesovermoresubstantivedevelopmentassistance,evenduringthisinteregnumphaseoftheGPA.

7. CivilsocietyinZimbabweneedstoincludethesocialandeconomicrightsofallZimbabweansontheirlobbyingagendas,broadeningtheircurrentfocusfromhumanrightsandpoliticalrights.

8. TherecommendationsmadetoCabinettopromotetherecoveryofindustriesin

Bulawayo,needtoimplementedspeedilyinordertoregeneratesomeofthe20,000jobslostthereinthelasttwoyears.

9. TheGovernmentofSouthAfricashouldreconsideritspolicyofrenewed

deportationsofZimbabweans,whichispoisedtoexacerbatepovertyandhungerinmanypartsofZimbabwe.

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PARTONE

A. HeatandHunger:OctoberinMatabelelandAsweentertheclosingmonthsof2011,theresidentsofMatabelelandandBulawayoarefacingparticularchallengeswithinagreaterZimbabweancontextthatremainsverydifficultforalllow‐incomefamilies.WhilenationallyZimbabweismorefoodsecureattheendof2011thanithasbeenforseveralyears,partsofZimbabwesufferedseriouscropfailureearlierthisyearandmanyhouseholdsremaintooimpoverishedtopurchasemaizemealfromstores.HouseholdsscatteredthroughoutMatabelelandarealreadydealingwithseverehunger.BylateSeptember,oneintenfamiliesintworuralwardsofGwanda,MatabelelandSouth,reportedentiredayswithoutanymealsonceafortnightatleast,withalmosthalfofhouseholdsindicatingadaywithoutfoodinthelasttwomonths.1Only17%offamiliesreportedeatingthreemealsaday,meaningthat83%ofhouseholdswere,weeksbeforetheonsetoftheofficial“hungryseason”,alreadymakingfoodcompromisesdaily.Therandomlyselectedsamplegroupincludedfamilieswithlargenumbersofchildren,grandchildrenandorphans.AfollowupofsomeofthesefamiliesinlateOctobershowedaworseningsituation.Grazingiscritical,andpeoplearetravelingfurthertofindwater.ThishasbeenoneofthehottestOctobersonrecord.Severalfamiliesreportedthatbaboonswerekillingandeatingyounggoatsandchickens,asthehungernowaffectsalllivingcreaturesinthisarea.Severalfamilieshadnolivestockleftatall,notevenonechicken.Thishunger‐alreadysoextremeaheadoftherecognized“peakhungerseason”thatofficiallylastsfromOctobertoFebruary‐istakingplaceatatimewhenBulawayo,traditionallythesourceofemploymentandresourcesforMatabeleland,hasseenacataclysmiclossofjobsinindustryinthelasttwoyears.ThismeansthatpartofthegreatersupportsystemforruralMatabelelandishighlycompromised.DeportationsAsdeportationsfromSouthAfricagainmomentum,the17%ofruralfamiliesthatreceivemonthlyremittancesstandtolosethislittleextrameansofsupport.All47%offamilieswithmembersinthediasporawillhaveextramouthstofeedduringthehungriestmonthsoftheyear,asorwhenthedeporteesreturn.2DeporteestoZimbabwehavelittlelikelihoodoffindingformal,productiveemploymentandwillmerelyexacerbatetheplightofstrugglinghouseholds.

1. DonorplansforFeedingofVulnerableGroups(FVG)2011‐2012MatabelelandSouth,southernMidlands,MasvingoandpartsofManicalandhadtheleastsuccessfulharvestslastseason,andhavethehighestvulnerability.Donorshavepredictedthattheprevalenceoffoodinsecurehouseholdswillbelowerattheendof

1MostofMatabelelandSouthsufferedalmosttotalcropfailureinthelastgrowingseason–asdidextensivepartsofMidlands,MasvingoandpartsofManicaland.ThehungerwedocumentinthisreportisbeingexperiencedmorewidelyinZimbabwe.2SeePartTwoofthisreportformoredetailsontheGwandasurvey:wefoundthat47%offamilieshadupto3familymembersinSouthAfrica,butonly17%receivedremittancesof$25permonthormore.

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thisyearthanlastyear,withabout12%ofthetotalruralpopulation,oraroundonemillionpeoplebeingvulnerable,downfrom15%lastyear.3BySeptember,ourownfindingsinGwanda–whichintheZimbabweVulnerabilityAssessmentCommittee(ZIMVAC)report,asintheFamineEarlyWarningSystemNetwork(FEWSNET)report,isnotidentifiedasamongthemostneedydistricts‐indicatethat,insomewardsatleast,morethan20%offamiliesmaybeseriouslyfoodinsecure.Thereisenoughgraininthecountrythisyeartomeetconsumption,withbetween900,000and1,6milliontonnesestimatedtohavebeenharvested.4Maizeisalsocurrentlybeingfreelyimportedintothecountry,atalowerpricethanthatoflocallyproducedmaize,sotheassumptionisthatfamilieswillbeabletopurchasemaizewithintheirvicinity.Wenotedthatmaizemealwasindeedavailableeveninruralstores,andsoareseedsforplanting,butat$5to$7for10kgmaizemealand$23per10kgbagofseed,theyareunaffordabletoasignificantproportionoffamilies.Oneinfivefamilieshadnomaizemealatallinthehouseonthedaywevisited.Hungerisbeingcompoundedbytheslowroll‐outofdonorfoodforvulnerablefamilies.CAREwillnotberollingoutitsFeedingofVulnerableGroups(FVG)inGwandaforseveralweeksyet,astheyareonlybeginningtheirprocessofidentificationofbeneficiariesinNovember.TherehasbeennodonorfeedingorFoodForWorkforseveralmonthsinthisarea.Thismeansthatalready‐desperatefamilieswillonlybegintoreceivefoodnearlytwomonthsintothepeakhungerperiod–whensomeofthesefamilieshavebeenincrisissinceearlySeptember.Thishasimplications,particularlyforchildren,whosufferhighratesofstuntedgrowthinruralZimbabwe.CAREintendstoreach18%ofGwandaresidentswithFVGthisyear,or26,000people.Theyagreewithourassessmentthatrolloutisnothappeningfastenough,buttheyhaveotherlivelihood‐linkedprogrammestowrapupanddonothavethecapacitytomoveanyfasterontheprogramme.The18%targetwillreachagoodnumberofthosemostvulnerable,bearinginmindourfindingthat21%offamilieswerealready,twomonthsago,eatingonlyonemealaday,althoughitisclearthateveryoneinseriousneedmaynotbereached.Theidentificationofmostneedyfamiliesisanissuethatneedstobekeptpermanentlyinmindbydonors,whorelylargelyoncommunitiesandtheirleadershiptoputthefamiliesforward.Thisleavesthesystemopentoabusealongpoliticallines,orotherlinesbasedonlongstandingcommunitydisputeswheresomefamiliesmaybeostracized.However,donorsinZimbabwehaveyearsofexperienceincircumnavigatingthisandhaveshownthattheyreactquicklywhenthisisflagged.3FAOandWFP:“AgriculturalProduceandInputsMarkets:toassessthefunctionalityofruralmarketsforagriculturalinputsaswellasagriculturalproduce”:reportdisseminatedinSept2011.4TheFAO/WFPreporttalksofaharvestin2011of1,6million,butthisestimatewasmadeinApril:inOctober,theCFUrefersto900,000tonnesofmaize.

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2. Rainfallpredictions–implicationsforplanting

Analystsseemtodisagreeontheprospectsforrainthisseason.FEWSNETreferstothelikelihoodofscatteredrainsuntilDecember,withbetterrainsinthenewyear,5buttheZimbabweMeteorologicalOfficeandtheCommercialFarmersUnion(CFU)predictpreciselytheopposite–reasonablerainsfromnowuntiltheendoftheyear,followedbyadrystretchinthenewyear,whichhasbecometheregularpatterninthelastfewseasons.6Thedifferenceisimportant,asiftheCFUiscorrect,communalfarmers,particularlyinlowrainfallareassuchasMatabeleland,shouldbeplantingbynolaterthanmidNovemberiftheyaretoharvestanything.Large‐scalecommercialfarmersarepredictingalowerharvestthiscomingseason,owingtoproblemswithprocuringinputscausedbylatepaymentbytheGrainMarketingBoardforgraindeliveredearlierthisyear.Thismeansthatdebtsfromlastseasonarenotyetserviced,compromisingloansforthecomingseason.7TheCFUstressestheimportanceofcommercialfarmersalsoplantingbymidNovemberthisyear.AREXofficialsarecurrentlyrecommending“dryplanting”inMatabelelandtoincreasethechancesofharvesting,whichmeansplantingbeforethefirstrains‐ierightnow‐andtheyalsorecommendstaggeredplanting,withsomeseedplantedearlyandsomelater,sothatwhatevertherainfallpattern,somethingshouldbeharvested.8Butthisisallacademicforthosefamiliesthatcannotaffordinputsrightnow.ThefirstrainshavefalleninsomepartsofMatabelelandandareloomingelsewhere,andafewweeks’delayinplantingintheselowrainfallareascouldbethedifferencebetweenharvestingandnotharvestingbyApril.Basedonthecurrentstateofaffairs,forMatabelelandSouth’spoorestfamilies,2012maybepoisedonceagaintobeayearofgreathungerandcropfailure.9

3. Freeandsubsidizedinputsfor2011‐2012growingseason:Nottoolittle,buttoolate?

Thereislittleevidencethatsubsidizedseedandfertilizerinputsarebeingmadeavailabletimeouslyforthecurrentplantingseason,whichisalreadyuponus.10TheUSAID“PromotingRecoveryinZimbabwe”(PRIZE)programmewillbringsubsidizedseedtoruralstoresinGwanda,MasvingoandMberengwa‐butin

5FEWSNET:Zimbabwefoodsecurityupdate,September2011.6DChisvo,“Govt,financialsectorlacksfinancialresources”,intheDailyNews,23Oct2011.7TheheadoftheCFUpredictsadecreasefromthisyear’sharvestof900,000tonnesto781,000tonnesin2012.In2000,thecountryproduced2,000,000tonnesofmaize,sothenextharvestislikelytobe30%ofthispeakproduction.8TheChronicle:“DeliveryoffarminginputsinMatNorthbegins”:28October2011.9Seefurtheraheadforrainfallpatternpredictions,someofwhicharepredictinggoodearlyrainsandthenadryspell,whichiswhyearlyplantingissoessential.10InterviewswithORAP,WorldVision,Care,WFPon26October2011.ThereisapparentlysomeFoodForWorkinMatoboandBulilimadistricts.Otherprogrammesinskillstrainingarealsogoingon,butnothingthatisputtingfoodintohungryGwandahouseholdsnow.

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Gwanda,theyhaveyettoidentifyimplementingstores,whichmeansdistributionislikelytobeweeks’away.11InmidOctober,FinanceMinisterTendaiBitipresentedastatementonagriculturalinputsforthecurrentseason.Inthisheannouncedthatoutofabudgetof$248millionforagriculturein2011,inputsworth$75millionhadbeensecuredforA2(smallscale)andvulnerablefarmers.12

100,000vulnerablefarmersaretoreceiveafreeinputpackageofseeds:maize(10kg),sorghum(5kg)andmillet(5kg),aswellas2x50kgfertilizer,onthebasisofpresentingvouchersattheirlocalparastatalGrainMarketingBoard(GMB)outlet,showingthattheyhavebeenidentifiedasvulnerable.$8.1millionwillcoverthesefreeinputs.

250,000communalfarmerswillreceivethesamepackage,onasubsidizedbasis,inwhichtheypayareducedrate,alsoonpresentationatGMBofvouchersshowingthattheyhavebeenidentifiedasqualifying.$20.3millionwillcoverthesesubsidizedinputs.

Thepromiseoffreeorsubsidizedinputstobenefit350,000communalfarmersishighlycommendable,butthequestionremains,whenexactlytheseinputsaregoingtoreachfarmersontheground?InthelastdaysofOctober,AgriculturalExtension(AREX)officersinGwandahadonlythehaziestawarenessoftheseinputschemes.AttheendofOctober,theprocessesbywhichfamilieswillbeidentifiedforfreeorsubsidizedvoucherswasopaqueatthedistrictlevel,toallinvolved‐families,implementingNGOsandAREX.On28thOctober,analarminglybluntofficialintheBulawayoAREXofficesdismissedBiti’sstatementregardingfreeandsubsidizedseedas“politics”,sayingthathedidnotbelievewhathehadonlyreadaboutinthenewspapers,andhadyettoreceiveanykindofcircularaboutthescheme.13HereportedthatinSeptembertherewasanAREXmeetinginHarareatwhichaMinistryofAgricultureofficialhadtalkedofeachprovincereceiving$20,000towardsfreeinputsforvillagers,buttheBulawayoAREXofficialcommentedthatsincethen,“everythinghadgonequiet”,withnofurtherwordonthismatter.AREXstatedthattheyhavesofardonenothingabouttryingtoassesswhoonthegroundmightbeeligibleforfreeorsubsidizedinputs,astheyhadnoinstructionstodosoorhowtoproceed.Inanycase,thereisinadequatetransporttogetdowntovillageleveltodoassessmentsonavastscale.Withtheexperienceofmanyyears,theAREXofficial’sfinalwordonthesubjectoffreeinputswas:

“AsfarasIamconcerned,justgoandbuyyourownseedsanddon’twaitforsomethingtomaterializefromgovernmentbecauseitwillcometoolatetobeuseful–ifitcomesatall….”

11InterviewwithCARE,Gwanda,28October2011.CAREistheimplementingNGOforWFPinGwanda.12TendaiBiti:“Statementon2011‐2012agriculturalinputs.”15October2011.AswellasoutliningtheprocessofgettinginputstoA1andsmallcommercialfarmers,Bitistatestheneedforthelandresettlementprogrammetobefinalized,alongwithalandaudit,researchintoclimatechange,trainingoffarmers,andtheopeningoutofthegrainmarketfromthemonopolyoftheGMBtoamoresustainableprivatesectormarket,withtheGMBbecomingthebuyeroflastresortinthefuture13Interview,AREXoffices,Bulawayo,28October2011.

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Sadly,consideringthatgovernmentinputsforthelastgrowingseasononlyreachedthegroundinFebruarythisyear‐fourmonthstoolate‐thisadvicemayprovetobesound.

Photos1and2:Gwandadistrict,27October2011:thisfamilypainstakinglygathersupmaizeseedsforplanting,thathaveleakedfromapassingtruckontotheroad.Willthesebetheironlytimely“freeinputs”for2011/12?

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4. Lackofcoordinationwithingovernment

Therealitygapbetweenthedesiretoprovidefreegovernmentinputs,andtheabilitytodosotimeously,areindicativeofproblemsthatarebesettingthecurrentcoalitiongovernmentmoregenerally.TherehasbeenmuchcommentaryelsewhereontheconsequencesoftheGlobalPoliticalAgreement(GPA)thathasbroughtZANUPFandthetwoMDCsintoonecorral.14ButitisdeeplyregrettableifapoliticallackofcoordinationbetweenandwithinMinistriesbeginstocompoundthelife‐threateningsituationofdesperatefamiliesinruraldistricts.Thereisadirectlinkbetweendysfunctionalgovernmentministries‐wherebureaucratsandtheirMinistersmaybeatpoliticalandpolicyloggerheads‐andpovertyontheground.Forexample,statementsbytheMinisterofIndigenisationontheonehand,andthePrimeMinister,andtheMinistersofIndustryandFinanceontheother,haveprovedinconsistentinrecentyears,harminginvestmentinZimbabweandmakingapparentthelackofgoodwillandcoordinationamongvariouspartsofgovernment.15Itisordinaryjobseekerswhohavepaidtheprice.DiscussionswithCatholicReliefServicesinBulawayoon28OctoberhintedthatwhiletheWFPhavesufficientsuppliestorolloutforFVGalreadyonhand,“politics”ispreventingtheimmediateimplementation,oncemoresuggestingthatselfishpoliticalpointscoringmaybeliterallykeepingcitizenshungry.However,theGPAremainstheonlyframeworkinwhichZimbabweisabletomoveforwardatall.PressurethereforemustbemaintainedmorebroadlyforfullerimplementationofoutstandingissueswithintheGPA,inparticulartheroadmaptowardsafreeandfairelectioneitherlatein2012orin2013.Butinthecourseofthis,thehumanitarianneedsonthegroundmustnotbeforgotten.WhilepoliticalviolencehasbeenreducedsincetheimplementationoftheGPA,andwhilehungertooisreducedthisseason,politicscontinuesincomplexwaystoaffectthelivelihoodsofthenation’smostdesperatecitizens.ItisthereforeimperativefortheSADCfacilitationtoproceedwithgreaterurgencyinordertofacilitateamoreconstructivedialoguewiththedonorcountriesovermoresubstantivedevelopmentassistance,evenduringthisinteregnumphaseoftheGPA.

14SPT:TheHardRoadtoReform,April2011,and“Walkingathinline”,2010,forexample.15WhiletheprincipleofindigenizationisacceptedbyallthreepoliticalpartiesintheGPA,impracticaldeadlinesandextremelypunitivemeasuresfordefaulterswerefirsttoutedbyMinisterKasukuwere,wholaterbackeddown.However,uncertaintycontinuestodogtheissueofownershipinZimbabwe.

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B. Matabeleland:socio‐economiccontext2011BeforereturningtotheGwandasurveyanditsimplicationsinmoredepth,itisimportanttocontextualisethelevelsofruralpovertythatweobservedwithinthegreaterMatabelelandeconomicreality.ThecontinuedbattleforsurvivalinruralareasistakingplaceagainstabackdropoftheunprecedenteddeindustrializationofBulawayo,theonlycityinthewestofthecountry.Whereoncefamilymembersinurbanareascouldbereliedupontohelpthoseinruralareasduringdifficulttimes,urbanfamiliesarethemselvesdealingwithretrenchmentsandpoverty.16During2011,BulawayowasfoundbyaZIMVACsurveytobethesecondmostfoodinsecureareainthecountry.With16%ofhouseholdsbeingassessedasfoodinsecure,BulawayofamilieswerethreetimesmorelikelytobefacinghungerthanHararehouseholds,assessedat5%insecure.17ThisfindingpointstotheimpactofrapiddeindustrializationinBulawayoatthelevelofhouseholds.1. TheNationaleconomicrealitiesEventsinMatabelelandaretakingplaceinanationalsocio‐economiccontext,whichisbrieflysummarizedhere.AsZimbabweheadstowardstheendofthethirdyearoftheGlobalPoliticalAgreement(GPA),itisclearthatsomeareasoftheeconomyhavebenefitedmorethanothersfromtheresultingincreasedpoliticalstability.By2008,theZimbabweaneconomyhadbeenlargelyinformalisedanddrasticallyreduced,withalossofaround40%ofGDPbetween2000and2008:in2008alone,theeconomyshrankbynearly18%.18TheGDPlossessince2000werethemselvesafurtherdeclineinaneconomyfacingdifficultiessincetheearly1990s.Since2009,however,agriculture,inparticulartobacco,hasbeguntoregaincommercialviability,miningandcommunicationshaveexpanded,whilethetourismindustry,adverselyaffectedduringthepoliticalcrisis,hasbeguntorecover.Sufficientmaizewasgrownlocallyduringthelastseasontomoreorlessmeetthelocaldemand.Growthwasaround9%in2009,buthasconsiderablyslackenedsincethen,andwillprobablybearound5%in2011.Contributingtotheslowingofgrowth,hasbeenthegenerallackofconfidenceamonginternationalinvestorswithregardtosecurityofpropertyrights,astheimplementationofthepolicyofindigenizationcontinuestobeunclearandshifting.Zimbabweremainsahighlydifficultenvironmentinwhichtoconductbusiness,andwasrecentlyrankedasthetwelfthmostdifficultnationintheworldinwhichtooperatecommercially,at171outof183countries.19Zimbabwewasfurtherrankedat122outof183withregardtoprotectinginvestors’assets.Inagenerallygriminternationalcontextofworldrecession,theserankingsindicatethatgrowthislikelytocontinueonamuchslowerscalethanthecountrydesperatelyneeds,andmanufacturingwillcontinuetofacehugeobstacles.

16Therelationshipbetweenurbanandruraleconomieshasshiftedincomplexwaysinthelastdecade–seepreviousSPTpublicationsfortheimpactofMurambatsvinaandtheeconomiccollapseof2008.17FEWSNET,ibid.18CIA,TheWorldFactBook.19TauriaMangudhla:“Govtfrustratinginvestors”inTheDailyNews,23Oct2011.TherankingisfromthelatestWorldBankandInternationalFinanceCorporation’s“DoingBusiness2012report”.

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2. OverviewofZimbabweeconomy:1980–2010In1980,ZimbabwewasthemostindustrializednationinsubSaharanAfricaapartfromSouthAfrica,butbetween1991and1995,Zimbabwe’sindustrialproductionshrankby21%.20ESAPpoliciesdidnotresultinthegrowthgovernmentexpected:nordiditssuccessor,ZIMPREST.Additionally,duringthe1990s,Zimbabwemovedsteadilyfromproducinggoodswithahighleveloftechnicalinput,toproducingagreaterproportionofprimaryproductsthatwerelabour‐intensive.Food,beveragesandtobaccogrewtorepresentagreaterportionofGDPwhiletextileandchemicalindustrialoutputsdeclined.21Inthelate1990sandpost2000,therewereseveralsevereknockstotheZimbabweeconomy,includingthewarintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo,unbudgetedwarveteranpayouts,andthenwide‐spreadfarminvasionsinthewakeofthe2000elections.Commercialfarmingemployed400,000labourers,thevastmajorityofwhomlosttheirjobsasaresultoftheinvasions.Ascommercialagriculturalproductionshrunk,sodidtheentirenationaleconomy–industriesinZimbabwesourcemorethan60%oftheirinputsfromcommercialagriculturalproduction,andsell50%oftheirproductsbacktoagriculture.22AllthesefactorshaveresultedindramaticdeindustrializationofZimbabwe,particularlyBulawayo,andarespondinggrowthoftheinformalsector.However,in2005theinformalsectoritselfbecamethetargetofgovernmentaction,withtheinfamousOperationMurambatsvina(OM).Inthespaceoftwomonths,governmentforcesdestroyedinformalsettlementsandvendingmarketsnationwide.Thisdisplacedanestimated500,000people,withdirectandindirectknock‐oneffectsformillionsmore.Hundredsofthousandsoffamilieswereplungedintopoverty,andthedevastatingeffectsofOMonpeople’slivescontinuetodate.23NordidOMreversethegrowthoftheinformalsector:itsimplymadelifemoredifficultandtreacherousforthemillionsstrugglingtosurvivebyvendingandcrossbordertrading.Aspoliticaltensionsheightenedbetween2005andtheendof2008,governmentpoliciesfurtherexacerbatedtheviabilityofbusinesses,withunreasonableandpunitivepricecontrols,multipleexchangecontrollevelswhichdisadvantagedexporters,andprofligateprintingofmoney.Theresultinghyperinflationcombinedwithpricecontrols,resultedinemptyshelvesnationwide.HundredsofbusinessesfoldedduringtheyearsleadinguptotheGPA.Currently,otherwiseefficientlyrunandproductivecompaniesarestrugglingfinanciallyasaresultofthe“forcedborrowing”oftheircapitalbytheReserveBankofZimbabwe,whichin2008literallyseizedforeignexchangefrombusinessaccounts.OtherlosseswereaccruedinFebruary2009,duringtheprocessofUSdollarization,whichovernightleftcompanieswithemptyZimbabwedollarbankaccountsthathadbeenworthmillionsinrealcurrencyterms.NoneofthismoneyhasbeenrepaidbytheState.Companieswereforcedbyhyperinflationandgovernmentpolicyinthe2000stoaccruedebttostayafloat,whichtheynowfind20ZIMCODD:“DeindustrialisationofBulawayo:acontributiontothedebate”:August2011.21Ibidpage5.Itisnottheintentionofthisreporttofullyunpackthebroadercontextsoftheseshifts.22Ibid.23SPT:“Afracturednation:OperationMurambatsvina5yearson”:30July2010.

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close‐to‐impossibletoservice.AstheMinistryofFinanceappearsnottotrusttheReserveBankwithfunds,allgovernment‐to‐governmentfundsarecurrentlybeingchannelledviatheprivatebankstoindustryandcommerce.Theseprivatebanksarecharginginiquitousratestoaccesstheloanfacilities.Itcancostupto40%perannumtoborrowmoneyinZimbabwe,comparedto3%interestinmanyothercountriesaroundtheworld. In2011,andinspiteofthemodesteconomicgrowthsince2009,governmentremainsthebiggestformalemployerinthenation,withmostZimbabweansstillhavingtoseekincomefromtheinformalsector.Civilservantscontinuetoearnsalariesthatarebelowalivingwage24,andusemostofthistopayforrent,basicfoodandservices.Tragically,businessescontinuetocloseorrunatbelowcapacity.3. BulawayoanddeindustrializationBulawayohasbeenthemostseverelyaffectedcitywithregardtodeindustrialization.Sincetheearly1900s,BulawayohasbeentheindustrialhubofZimbabwe,beingstrategicallysituatedbetweenSouthAfrica,BotswanaandZambia.HometotheNationalRailwaysofZimbabwe,andclosetoHwangecoalsources,Bulawayohastraditionallyhousedmostofthelargetextileandclothingfactoriesaswellasfurniture,pharmaceutical,metal,electricalandheavyindustries.Atitsheight,Bulawayoindustriesalonecontributed25%totheGDP‐yetnationwide,industriesnowcontributearound15%tothedrasticallyreducedGDP.25AccordingtotheAssociationofBulawayoBusinesses(ABUZ)morethan20,000jobswerelostinBulawayobetweenFebruary2009andFebruary2011.26Atleast85firmsandindustrieshavecloseddownduringthattimespan,includingseveralofthecity’smajoremployers,whileseveralothershaverelocatedtoHarare,citingdifficultieswithsourcingagriculturalandotherinputsinBulawayo,aswellaslackofBulawayomarketsforfinishedgoods.Factoriesstandempty,andvacantshopfrontsarereplacingfunctioningbusinessesintheshoppingmallsandinBulawayocitycentre.Therecentinvasionsofsomeproperties,andthreatsofinvasionsmadetootherbusinesses,haveaddedtothesenseofeconomicinsecurityanddepressioninthecity.27Theknock‐oneffectofthesejoblossesforthewell‐beingofthecityasawholehasbeenprofound:thereisscarcelyafamilythathasnotfacedaredundancyinthelasttwoyears,withitsassociatedeconomichardship.Thelossofspendingpowerinthecityhasfurthernegativeconsequencesforsurvivingbusinesses.ItisnotsurprisingthatfamiliesinBulawayoarethreetimesmorelikelytobefoodinsecurethaninHarare.ThelossinrevenuetotheBulawayoCityCouncilcausedbybusinessclosures,whichhavereducedthepropertyrates’base,aswellasfailureofretrenchedfamiliestopayforservices,hasimpactednegativelyontherunningofthe24MostcivilservantsstillearnbelowUSD300permonth,whilethebasicincomeneededforafamilytosurviveisUSD400permonth.25BChitemba:‘Byorevolvingfundunderscrutiny”,ZimbabweIndependent,14‐20Oct2011.26Interview,Bulawayo,Sept2011.SeeAppendixOneforlistofcompanies.27TheStandard,“Policesaytheycan’tstopByopropertygrab”:28Augto3Sept2011;Newsday,“ZanuPFyouthsinvadewhite‐ownedbuildings”,19Sept2011,throughtoTheChronicle,“Policelaunchblitzonillegaloccupants”,13October2011.Countrywide,therehavebeenmixedmessagesastowhetherbusinessinvasionswillbetoleratedornot,andtherehavebeenwavesofinvasionsgoingbackto2000.

16

Photo3:Emptysilos,abandonedprocessingplant–“RedSeal”foodcompanyinBulawayo,oneofmanyclosedbusinesses. Photo4:Deadend:once,thesetraintracksbroughtrawmaterialstothisfactoryandcarriedawayfinishedgoodsforexport.Bulawayoindustrialsite,October2011.

city,historicallyoneofZimbabwe’sbetter‐runlocalauthorities.28Atatimewhenthenationasawholeisreflectinga5+%GDPgrowthrate,Bulawayoisclearlyshrinking.

28KMhotshwa:“Invasionsdestroyedindustry”,Newsday,21Oct2011.

17

PerceptionsofregionalmarginalizationTheunderdevelopmentofBulawayohasbecomeaburningpoliticalissueinthecity,withthegovernment’sfailuretorescuethecityfromaslowdeathbeingseenasadeliberateformofregionalneglect.Thisislinkedtopeople’smemoriesoftheGukurahundimassacresinMatabeleland,andtheperceivedfailuretodevelopthisregionduringthe1980s,wheninfrastructuraladvanceswerebeingmadeinotherpartsofthenation.29AlthoughthedramaticnumberofcompanyclosuresinBulawayoareundoubtedlybeingdrivenpredominantlybythesameeconomicforceswhicharegoverningthewholecountryasalreadyoutlinedinthispaper,itisalsoafactthatcentralgovernmentcouldhavedonemoreoverthedecadestoensureBulawayo’scontinuedgrowth.30Waterresourcesaretotallyinadequate,andthelongawaitedMatabelelandZambeziWaterProjectisonlyeverheardaboutintheweeksrunninguptoanyelection.ThelootingandmismanagementoftheNRZhashelpedtoundermineBulawayo,onceahubinthenationaltraintransportsystem.31ThefailuretodevelopandimprovetheroadlinksfromBeitbridgetoBulawayoandonwardtoZambia,andthedecisioninsteadtodevelopadoublehighwayfromBeitbridgeviaMasvingotoHarare,andfromthereontoZambiaandMozambique,isseenasonemorenailinthecoffinofBulawayoindustry.Moreover,thesearestrategicdecisionsthathavebeenmadeinthelasttwoyears,sincetheimplementationoftheGPA.PlansbySouthAfricaandZimbabwetoopennewborderpoststotheeastofBeitbridge,linkingMidlandsandMasvingoprovincestoLimpopoprovinceinSouthAfrica,32addfurthercredencetotheperceptionthatthereisadeliberatepolicytomarginalizeandby‐passMatabelelandintermsofitsimport‐exportpotential,aswellasordinaryhumantrafficintheyearsahead.Bulawayo’sisolationisfurtherexacerbatedbypoorairlinksinandoutofthecity.AirZimbabwehasinternationalroutesfromHararetoJohannesburg,Dubai,BeijingandLondon,andcurrently,doesnotflyinternationallyoutofBulawayoatall.OneSouthAfricanAirlinkflighttoJohannesburgperdayrepresentstheonlyinternationalairconnectiontoBulawayo,andthepriceofthisflightisamongthemostextortionateofany$/kmroutinginsouthernAfrica.33Itis$500cheaperperround‐ticket,toflyfromJohannesburgtoLivingstoneinZambia‐agreaterdistance‐thanitistoflyfromJohannesburgtoBulawayo.34ThishasramificationsforBulawayoindustry,bearinginmindthatthemostimportanttradingpartnerintheSADCregiongenerally,aswellasforZimbabwe,isundoubtedlySouthAfrica.

29TheStandard:“Zimbabwe’swideningethnicdivisions”,24‐30April2011.30ThedeclineofBulawayobeganasfarbackasthe1970s,andtheideaofpipingwaterfromtheZambeziwasfirstmootedinthe1920s.31Thecollapseoftherailwayshasofcourseaffectedtheinfrastructureandviabilityofindustrycountrywide,buthasalsoresultedinhundredsofretrenchmentsinBulawayo,whereitisheadquartered.32Mediareports,SouthAfrica,June2011,refertotheseplannednewborderpostsalthoughthetimelineisnotclear.AtthemomentalltraffictoandfromSAgoesthroughBeitbridge.33ReturnticketsJhb‐Bulawayo(a90minflight)averageUS$750:itcanbecheapertoflyJhb‐London.34Itcosts$240toflytoJhb‐Livingstonreturn,on1timeairlines.

18

During2011,unreliableornonexistentdomesticairscheduleshavemeantthatreachingHararefromBulawayohasbecomeamajorendeavourentailingsixhoursbyroadeachway,toattendasimplemeeting.35Poorand/orexpensivetransportnetworksalsomeanthatBulawayoisnowexcludedonmosttouristroutings,whereinyearspast,BulawayowaspartoftouristitinerariesthatincludedHwangeGameReserveandtheVictoriaFalls–nowaccessedmorecheaplyfromZambia.

2011Calendarshowingthe“RepublicofMthwakazi”,withZimbabweasaneighbouringstate.ThefringeMthwakaziLiberationFrontseparatistmovementisactivelargelyoutsideofZimbabwe,buttheirleadershipinthecountrycurrentlyfaceatreasontrialinBulawayo.

Undoubtedly,thereareothertownsaroundthecountrythatcouldclaimgovernmentneglectanddecay,butwhatisrelevantaretheperceptionsofBulawayoresidents,andhowthisislikelytoplayoutnationally.EthnictensionsareadailyrealityinBulawayonow,asthispredominantlyNdebele‐speakingregionperceivesitsneglectasbothdeliberateandethnicallydriven.ItispossiblynocoincidencethattheMthwakaziLiberationFront(MLF)oncemoreraiseditsvoiceinearly2011,callingforaseparatestateinthewestofthecountry.36WhilethemajorityofBulawayo

35AirZimbabwehasbeenincrisisallyear,withstrikesandplanebreakdowns,meaningessentiallythattherehasbeennoairservicetospeakofbetweenBulawayoandHararethisyear.36WhilethetreasontrialofGwisaiandothershasreceivedrecognitionnationallyandinternationallyin2011,thereisasecondtreasontrialcurrentlyunderwayinZimbabwe–thatofPaulSiwelaandtwoothersinBulawayo.Siwela,presidentoftheMLF,spenttwomonthsinjailwithoutbailearlierthisyear,afterallegedlydistributingMLFpamphlets.TheMLFisinfactmoreactiveinthediasporathaninBulawayocurrently–andburntaZimbabweflagatapublicgatheringinJohannesburgearlierthisyear.TheseparatistmovementinMatabelelandhasalonghistoryandisbynomeansanew

19

residentswouldbelikelytodismissthepossibilityofaseparatestateasimpracticalandundesirable,thisisnottodenythatthereremainsinthecity,astrongsenseofalienationfromthenationandaresentmentofthecentralityofpoliticalpowerinHarareunderthecurrentgovernancesystem.DuringtheCOPACoutreach,therewerestrongcallsfromthisregionfordevolutionofpoliticalpowerinanewconstitution,toallowpeopleagreatersenseofcontroloftheirowndestiniesandamoresignificantdecision‐makingcapacityinthenationalbodypolitic.MatabelelandispossiblythemosthighlycontestedregioninZimbabwepolitically,withfourveryactivepoliticalparties–MDC,MDC‐T,ZANUPFandZAPU.37AllofthethreepartiesthataresignatorytotheGPAhaveparliamentaryseatsinMatabelelandandwillseektoretainsupportinthisareaintheyearahead:theissueofBulawayo’sdeindustrializationhasbecomeastrategicpoliticalissueinthelastyear,withallthepoliticalpartiescompetingtosetupcommitteestoinvestigateandlobbyaroundtheissue.38Itistobehopedthatthiswillultimatelybepositiveforthecityasawhole,andthatinitiativeswillnotfallvictimtopoliticaljostlingandone‐upmanship.4. DIMAFInacknowledgementthatBulawayofacesuniquechallenges,ataskforceofsevenCabinetmembersunderthechairmanshipoftheMinisterofTradeandIndustry,wassetupatthebeginningof2011,andhasidentifiedvariouswaystostimulatearevivalofindustryinthecity.ADistressedandMarginalisedAreasFund(DIMAF)hasbeenestablished,and$40millionwasawardedtoBulawayoindustriesinOctober.Thisisintendedtoallowatleast17keyindustriestorecapitalize,replacingoutdatedequipmentsothattheycancompetitivelyre‐enterthemarketandcreateemployment.39BylateOctober,itwasagreedthatatransparentcommitteeshouldbeappointedwithrepresentativesfromtenestablishedbusinessnetworksinBulawayotoguidethedisbursementofthemoney:thefundisclearlygoingtobeoversubscribedandcontroversial.Inkeepingwiththewide‐spreadfearthatpeoplefromoutsidetheregionusuallybenefitaheadofthosefromBulawayo,keyofficialinthisprocess,RuthLabodefromBulawayoannounced:“Weareguardingthe$40millionjealouslybecauseweareawarethatthereareHararecompaniesandgreedybusinessmenwhoaretargetingthefund…”On27thWelshmanNcube,MinisterofIndustryandCommercereportedbacktoBulawayobusinesspeoplethatthefollowingrecommendationshadbeenmadetoCabinetandwerebeingpursued:40

phenomenon–theseparationofSouthSudanhasaddedsomeimpetustothemovement,butasmentioned,itremainsafringemovement.37Whileallofthesepartieswouldclaimtobenationalandnotregional,MDCwonparliamentaryseatsonlyinMatabeleland,andclearlyhasapredominantsupportbasethere,whileZAPUalsoarguablyhasapredominantlyMatabelelandsupportbase,theextentofwhichisnotclearasithasnotsofarcontestedforanelectedpost.However,allfourofthesepartiesarevisibleonthegroundinBulawayoandinruralMatabeleland.38AquickperusalofBulawayopapersincludingTheChronicleandtheNewsDay(SouthernEdition)sinceJune2011revealsatleast60articlesonthetopicofBulawayo’smarginalizationand/ordeindustrialization,orseveralsucharticleseveryweek.39BChitemba:‘Byorevolvingfundunderscrutiny”,ZimbabweIndependent,14‐20Oct2011.40ThissummaryiscourtesyofABUZ,whoattendedthemeeting.

20

1) Revisionsofthetariffstructureonrawmaterials‐Specificrecommendationsonexemptionshavebeenmadetobeincorporatedinthe2012Nationalbudget.

2) PorousBorderPostse.g.Beitbridge–Ithasbeenrecommendedthatthe

MinistryofFinanceembarksonaninternalre‐organizationofZIMRA.3) Procurementpolicies‐Thereshouldbede‐centralizationof

procurementproceduresfororganizationssuchasZESA,NRZandtheStateProcurementBoardinBulawayo.Procurementregulationsshouldalsobeamendedtofavourlocalcompaniessothattheyareempowered.

4) Distressedfirmsunderjudicialmanagement‐Itwasrecommendedthat

judicialmanagersshouldnotmanagemorethantwocompaniessothattheycanexertmoreeffortsinresuscitatingthesecompanies.

5) Labourregulations‐a)Retrenchment‐Theexerciseislengthyandthe

proceduresneedtoberevised.b)Wagesarbitration‐Thereisneedtorelateawardstoproductivity.

6) MinistryofInvestmentPromotion‐ThroughtheZimbabweInvestment

Authority,thereisneedtoclassifyBulawayoasaspecialzonesothatinvestorscanenjoythebenefitsthatarerelatedwithsuchstatus.

7) Set‐upofadistressedfundofUS40million‐Thetaskforcewillensure

thatthereistransparencyandfairnessinthedisbursementofthisfund.ThetaskforcewillreporttotheCabinetweeklyontheprogress.BusinessAssociationsinBulawayowillsecondonerepresentativetotheTaskforceforfurtherinteractions,asthemodalitiesofaccessingthesefundsareyettobefinalized.Itishopedthatthedisbursementwillbedoneoutsidethebankingsector.

8) Decentralisationofbanks‐TheMinistryofFinancehasbeentaskedto

workwithbankssothatavailablecreditlinesareallocatedregionallyandtheirmanagersempoweredtodisbursethefundstotheirclients.

Itremainstobeseenifthemeasuresbeingtakenwillservetoregeneratethecity,butthereisaneedforthemacroeconomiccontexttoimproveforanyothermeasurestohelp.Thismeansthebroaderissuesaroundindigenization,nationaltransportsystemsandgeneralaccesstoaffordablebankloansneedtobedealtwith,aswellasthecentrallyimportantissueoftherevivalofcommercialagriculture.

21

PARTTWO

A. TheGPAandthehumanrightssituation,October2011TheGPA,whilenotunproblematic,hasservedtostabilizeZimbabweinsignificantways,includingonthehumanitarianfront.41Accesstohealthandeducationhaveimproveddramaticallyinruralareassincewelastresearchedtheseaspectsin2009.InoursurveyinSeptember2011,allfamiliesreportedsatisfactoryaccesstoprimaryhealthcare,includingchildandmaternalservices.Thisisadirectconsequenceofamorestablepoliticalenvironment,whichhasallowedmedicalstaffinganddrugsuppliestoimprove,althoughbothstillhavecriticalshortfallsinspecialistareas.Everyprimaryschoolinthecountrynowhasafullsetoftextbooksforeverychildasaresultofinternationalsupport,andbooksforhighschoolchildrenwillsoonbeavailableinallschools.Manychildrencontinuetobeexcludedfromschoolingonthebasisoffailuretopayleviesimposedonpupilsonaschool‐by‐schoolbasis:althoughsuchexclusionisagainstMinistrypolicyatprimaryschoolsinparticular,itnonethelessremainsarealityformanychildren.42PoliticalviolencePoliticalviolenceisreducedfrompreviousyears,butitremainsaseriousandongoingprobleminHarare,particularlyinMbaresuburbwheretheChipanganogangs,alliedtoZANUPF,continuetoterrorisecitizensonadailybasis.Outof475casesofconfirmedpoliticalviolencecountrywidethisyear,documentedbetweenJanuaryandthefirstweekofOctober2011,over332ormorethan75%occurredinthegreaterHararearea.43OthertroublespotsincludeChimanimani,Mudzi,Mutare,Murehwa,andNyanga,allofwhichhavereportedbetween7and12victimsofpoliticalviolencesofarthisyear.InBulawayo,WomenofZimbabweArisehaveagainbeentargetedandbeaten,ashavesmallnumbersofpoliticalactivists,meaning24casesofpoliticalviolenceinBulawayothisyear.ItispleasingtoreportthattherehavebeennoreportedinstancesofpoliticalviolenceatallinMatabelelandSouthProvinceduring2011,andourresearcherswereabletoundertaketheiractivitieswithoutofficial–orunofficial–interference.

41ItisnottheintentionofthisreporttounpackthepoliticalnuancesoftheGPA,butrathertolookatthehumanitariancontext.SPTwillreleaseapoliticalupdatebeforetheendof2011.42Leviesaremeanttosupplementteachers’lowsalariesandrunningexpensesforschools,butmanyverypoorfamiliessimplycannotaffordthem.43“Harare”includesChitungwiza,Epworthandothersuburbsinthegreaterarea.Thisfigureof475casesisofthosewhohavesoughtaccesstomedicaltreatmentthroughtheNGOsector.

22

B. MatabelelandSouth:Findingsoffoodsecuritysurvey,

October2011

1. Methodology

Ruralwards13and14ofGwandaCentral,whichhavebeenshowntobeareasofparticularvulnerabilityandfoodshortagesinpreviousyears,wereselectedforasurvey.Sevenvillagesfromthesetwowardswereincludedinthesurveyonarandombasis.Fivehomesteadspervillagewererandomlychosenfromthesesevenvillages,onthebasisofapproximatelyeveryfourthhousehold,untilthetargetnumberhadbeenreached.44Thelivingstandardsof258peopleareincludedinthesefindings.Semistructuredinterviewswereconducted,eachlastingseveralhoursandincludingavisualinspectionofthehomestead,fieldsandlivestockofthoseinterviewed.Thisprocesswasbothquantitativeandqualitative,involvingbothspecificquestionsandmoregeneraldiscussionaboutthesocioeconomicexperiencesandconcernsofthehouseholders.Theaimwastoestablishtheavailabilityoffoodandwatertoeachhousehold,todetailcurrentfamilyeatingpatterns,andhowandwherefoodisbeingsourced.Alsorecordedwastheavailabilityofgrazingandwatertolivestock,andchangesinlivestockownershipsincethebeginningof2011.People’sgeneralevaluationoftheirsituationcomparativetotheirneighbours’andtheirexpectationsforthefuture,includingthecominggrowingseason,werealsonoted.

2. Octoberfollowup

Thesurveywasinitiallyconductedduringtheweekof19September2011.Afterthefirstroundofquestioning,thehouseholdsthatwereconsideredtobemostatrisk,wererevisitedamonthlaterandasecondevaluationwasconducted,toassessifthefood,waterandlivestocksituationhaddeterioratedaheadoftherains,andtoassesswhetherthehumanitarianresponsehadchanged.Thesituationonthegroundhadpredictablyworsenedinthecourseofthemonth,withwaterhavingdriedupinthenearestriver‐bedaccesspoints,andfamilieshavingtotravelfurthereachdaytogetwater.Grazinghadworsened‐althoughsofewfamilieshavemuchinthewayoflivestockthatthiswasnotafactorforeveryone.Andhungerhadincreased,withseveralofthefamiliesreferredtointhesecondinterviewasbeinglethargicandvisiblyweak,totheextentthattheywerelyingindoorsduringthedaytimeandnotcompletinghouseholdtasks.3. Summaryoffindings

i. Demographics74%ofhouseholdintervieweeswerewomen

44HomesteadsarenotorganizedinneatrowsinruralGwanda,sotheselectionprocesswasapproximatelyeveryfourthhomesteadwithingroupsofhomesteadsratherthanrows,whichresultedinfourextrahomesteadsbeingincluded.

23

40%ofthesewomenwerewidows,withafurther20%beingeithersingleordivorced.Thismeansthat60%ofwomeninterviewedwereheadinghouseholdsontheirown,withthebalancehavinghusbandseitherinthediasporaorworkingelsewhere.20%ofmeninterviewedwerewidowed,andafurther30%weresingle,withhalfbeingmarried.Theaverageageofthoseheadinghouseholdswas48years,withtheyoungestbeing17yearsold(female)andtheoldestbeing87yearsold(male).10%ofthoseinterviewedhadnoeducation,with45%each,havinghadprimaryschoolorhighschooleducation.56%ofhouseholdsindicatedthatsomebodyinthefamilyhadaregularsupplyofincome,eitherinZimbabweorintheDiaspora,butonly24%offamiliesindicatedthatthispersonsentmoneybacktotheruralareas.45Thehouseholdsinterviewedencompassedatotalof:

80adults 87children 68grandchildren 24orphans(excludingorphanedgrandchildren)

Thedailylivingexperiencesof258peoplearethereforereflectedinthissurvey.

ii. FoodsecurityThefoodsituationinthisareaatthelevelofhouseholdswasfoundtobeprecarious.Whilemealiemealandotherbasicfoodswerefoundtobeavailable‐ineveryinstanceatthelevelofthelocalstorewithineasywalkingdistance‐only17%offamilieswereeatingthreemealsadayduringthefirstsurveyvisitinmidSeptember.Aworrying21%wereeatingonemealaday,eithereverydayormostdays,andinsomeinstancesthiswasconsistingofplainmaizeporridgewithnoaccompaniments,notevencookingoiloranykindofvegetable.Twofamilieswereeatingonlyspinachwithnomaizemealtoaccompanythis.21%offamilieshadNOmaizemealwhatsoeverinthehomesteadonthedayofthesurvey,whileafurther26%hadlessthantwodays’maizemealonhand.21%ofintervieweesindicatedthattheyhadhadadaywithNOMEALSatallwithinthelastweek,withafurther26%indicatingthattheyhadhadadaywithnomealswithinthelastfewmonths.12%ofallfamiliesindicatedthatthey“often”haveadaywithouteating,atleasteveryweekortwo.

45Thereisadetailedanalysisofdiasporaremittancesfurtheraheadinthisreport.

24

Graph1:showingfoodinsecuritybasedonnumberofmealsandfoodstocks

Thisindicatesaworseleveloffoodsecuritythanthatpredictedinthe“AgriculturalProduceandInputsMarketsreport”,46releasedintheweekof17September2011.ThisdocumentisusedasastrategicplanningtoolbyallNGOsandothersconcernedaroundfoodproductionandsecurity.Inoursurvey47%,ornearlyhalfofthefamiliesinterviewed,hadeitherno,oralmostnostaplefoodinthehomestead,andanequalnumberhadexperiencedadaywithoutanyfoodwhatsoeverintherecentpast.Onthedayoftheinterview,severalfamiliesindicatedthattheyhadnoidea,bymidafternoon,ofwhattheywouldeatthatevening.20%offamiliesindicatedthattheyhadpreviouslybeeninvolvedinaCARE“Foodforwork”programmeintheirarea,andhalfofthese(10%)stillhadalittlebarleyfromthisprogramme–butitwasreportedlynotoperatingintheareabySeptember.Consideringthatthehouseholdsinterviewedincluded178children,thelackofregularmeals–andcommonreportsofdayswithoutfood‐isanextremelyalarmingfinding.

iii. Available–butunaffordableAsmaizemealwaspricedatlocalruralstoresatbetweenUSD5andUSD7per10kgbag,thefailureoffamiliestohaveasecuresupplyofmaizemealinthehouseisindicativeoftheextremepovertyofmostfamilies.ObserversnotedthattheGwandatownGMBdepotwas,inearlyOctober,filledtotheceilingwithbagsofun‐milledmaize,sellingatUSD16per50kgbag.Butthisisclearlybeyondtheeconomicreachofthevastmajorityoffamiliesweinterviewed–andasitisover30kmfromthe

46ZIMVACreport,circulated17September2011.

21

21

26

21

26

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

onemealperday

nomaizemealinhouse

lessthan2daysmaizem

daywithoutfoodthisweek

daywithoutfoodthismonth

25

surveyareatothetown,thecostsoftransportingmaizeprovidesadditionalcostconstraintsonfamilies.65%ofthosefamiliesthathadmaizemeal,indicatedthattheyhadsourceditthemselves,bybarterorbysalesoflivestockorhandiwork.Thebalanceindicatedthemaizewasadonation,eitherfromaneighbourorarelative–andinonly5%ofinstances,maizewasdonatedbyafamilymemberinthediaspora.

iv. AdditionalfoodinformationAdisturbing73%offamiliesindicatedthattheyhadnofoodinthehouse,apartfrommaizemealandvegetables–andasmentioned,21%didnothaveeventhis.Ofthosewhoreportedotherfooditems,thisconsistedmainlyofsalt,cookingoil,tealeaves,orsugar.Onepersonhadbread,andonehadbeans.Thevegetablesconsistedusuallyofthelocalspinach,oralternatively“sourmelons”,whichhaveverylittlenutritionalvalue,butservetomakethemaizemealyellow.Themajorityoffamilies,includingthosewithoutmaizemeal,didreporthavingeatensomevegetableitemwithinthelasttwodays,butthesewereoftenmelons,asalreadymentioned,ofquestionablenutritionalvalue.18%offamiliesreportedthattheywereeatingindigenousplants,includingmunyi,umkhomo,xakuxakuandmarulapips.52%offamiliesreportedhavinggoneamonthormore–anduptoayear–withouteatinganimalprotein,withathirdofthesefamiliessayingthattheyhadnothadmeatforsolongtheycouldnotevenrememberwhenlasttheyhadit.24%offamilieshadeatenmeatinthelastweek,andthisincludedmeatprovidedatalocalwedding,atalocalfuneral,andbyvisitingrelatives.Oneneighbourhadkilledagoatandseveralfamiliesreportedhavinghadsomeofthisgoat,whileanotherfamilyreportedthatachickenhaddiedmysteriouslyandthefamilyhadeatenit.Inotherwords,manyfamilieseatingmeatweredoingsoasaresultofacommunityeventratherthanthroughpersonalpurchases.48%offamiliesreportedthatapartfrommaizemealandvegetables,theyhadeatennootherfooditemsinthelastweek.Ofthefamiliesthathadeatensomethingelseinthelastsevendays:

30%hadeatenbread 12%hadeatenanegg 12%hadhadsomemilk,fromtheirowngoat/cow 1personhadcaughtafishinthedamandeatenit.

Itgoeswithoutsayingthatmealsinthesefamiliesshowedlittledailyvariation,orvariationfromonemealtoanother,consistingofmaizemealcookedasaporridgeinthemorning,possiblywithteaandveryoccasionallywithbread,andanothermealduringthedayofmaizemealcookedasastifferporridge(isitshwala)servedwithspinachorsourmelons.Thosefamilieseatingthreemeals,wouldhavetwoservingsofisitshwalainthecourseoftheday.Forthepoorestfamilies,aonce‐a‐dayservingofisitshwala,withorwithoutvegetables,wasbeingconsumed,withadayaweekatleastwithouteventhis.

26

Graph2:showingpercentageoffamiliesthathavefoodotherthanmaizemealandvegetablesinthehomesteadondayofinterview

Graph3:showingasapercentagewhichfoodsintervieweesreportedhavingeaten,otherthanmaizemealandvegetablesinthelastweek.

v. Watersecurity

68%offamiliesreportedthattheironlysourceofwaterwastodigitupfromariverbed,withonefamilysourcingwaterfromadam.

Aslivestockareusingthesamewatersources,thismakesthewaterpotentiallypolluted.

21%offamiliesweresourcingwaterfromawell,oftendugbythemselvesinariverbed.

Only9%offamiliesweresourcingwaterfromaborehole–theonlyreallysafewatersource.

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73

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

otherfoods nootherfoods

45

29

113

1217

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

nootherfoods

bread eggs fishfromdam

milk cooldrink

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Photos5and6:Theonlyfunctioningboreholeinthetargetarea,with85%ofpeoplereportinguptothreebrokenboreholesintheirvicinity.Nearly70%offamiliesreportedsourcingwaterfromariverbedand20%fromawell.

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Yet85%offamiliesreportedabrokenboreholeclosertotheirhomesteadthanthewatersourcetheyhadresortedtousing.Somereportedasmanyasthreebrokenboreholesintheirimmediatevicinities.Familiesreportedspendingfromlessthananhour,tomorethanfourhoursperday,collectingwater.Forsomefamilies,thesimpletaskofcollectingwatertakestheequivalentofhalfaworkingday.

vi. Livestock

68%offamiliesinterviewedhadNOcattleatall. 24%offamilieshadNOgoats. Overthecourseofthelastyear,goatstockshavebeendepletedbyaround

17%amongthesefamilies.Thiswasadecreasefrom184to153goatsownedintotal.

24%offamiliesdidnotownasinglechicken. Chickenstockshavebeendepletedbyanastonishing30%amongthese

familiessinceJanuary,from203to143chickens. 62%offamilieshadNOdonkeys. Donkeyshavedecreasedinnumbersby21%sinceJanuaryfrom52to41. 62%offamilieshadneitheradonkeynorcattle–whichissignificant,asthese

animalsarerelieduponforploughing. Onlythreefamilieshadsheep,andonefamilyhadamotherpigwithpiglets.

Cattleweretheonlylivestockwhosenumbershaveremainedfairlyconstant,butveryfewfamiliesownanycattleinthefirstplace,withlessthanathirdinthiscategory.Outof44cattleownedintotalamongthesefamilies,20wereownedbyoneindividual,withtheremainingfamiliesowningbetween2and4beastseach.Donkeysareveryusefulintheruralcontext,ploughingfields,pullingcartsandcarryingloads.Thefactthattherehasbeenaone‐in‐fivelossofdonkeysinoneyearisdisturbing,andthisisattributedpartlytodiseaseinthearea.Thescarcityofbothcattleanddonkeysinthesewardspointstoapoorlikelihoodoffieldsbeingploughedaheadoftherains,whichwasconfirmedbyalmosttwothirdsoffamilies,whostatedthattheyhadnomeansofploughingthisyear.Theshortageofyoungadultlabourinmostfamiliesaddstothisdilemma.Goatsandchickensareparticularlysignificantinruralfamilies,astheseareusedforbarter,forsalesandoccasionallytoeat.The30%lossofchickensandthealmost20%reductioningoatsinthelastninemonthspointstothepressureonfamilies,whohavehadtoresorttosellingofforeatingtheirlivestockinordertosurvive.Thefactthatoneinfourofthesefamiliesnownolongerownsasinglechickenisindicativeoftheirdesperateeconomicplight–itisalmostunimaginablethataruralfamilycanfailtohaveevenonechicken.

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Inathirdofcases,livestocklosseswereaccountedforbythefamilyeatingthem.Inafurtherthirdofcases,thelivestockwassaidtohavedied,eitherofdiseaseorofhunger.Inthefinalthird,livestockwassoldtobuyotherfoodorpayschoolfees.Whenaskediftheyexpectedfurtherlivestocklossesthisyear,33%indicatedtheyexpectedsomeoftheirlivestocktodieofstarvation,while12%expecteddeathsbydisease,asdonkeysandgoatshavebeendyinginthatarearecently.Afurther12%expectedtohavetobarterorsellgoatsorchickens,while6%expectedtoeatsomeoftheirstock.Onepersonexpectedtohavetoslaughteracowforanupcomingwedding.Onlyaroundonethirdoffamiliesanticipatetheywillhavenofurtherlivestocklossesthisyear.

Graph4:showingtotallivestockinallhouseholdsin2010(leftcolumn)and2011(rightcolumn)

Graph5:showingpercentageoffamiliesthatdoNOTownlivestock

48 52

184

23

203

44 41

153

22

143

0

50

100

150

200

250

cattle donkeys goats sheep chickens

68

24 24

62

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

nocattle nogoats nochickens nodonkeys

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Graph6:showingpercentageoffamiliesexpectingtoloselivestockbeforeendof2011

vii. Bartertrading18%offamiliesreportedhavingbarteredinthelastfewdaysorweeks,withafurther18%havingbarteredinthelastthreemonths.9%offamiliesreportedhavingbarteredatsomestageduring2011.Thismeansthatalmosthalfofthefamilies(45%)interviewedhaveusedbarteringasaformofexchangethisyear,withslightlymorethanhalfnothavingdoneso.

Graph7:showingpercentageoffamiliesusingbarterasasurvivalstrategy

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12

12

6

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

starvation

disease

barter

eatthem

18

18

9

36

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

barteredthisweek

barteredthismonth

barteredthisyear

willbarteragainthisyear

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Mostcommonly,labour,goats,chickens,clothes,orwovenmatswerebarteredformaize,cookingoilorsugar.36%offamilies–thesamenumberasthosewhohavebarteredintherecentpast–expecttobarteragainthisyearinordertosurvive.Someexpressedthattheywouldhavetobartereveryweek,askingtheirneighboursfortaskstodoinexchangeformaizeastheyhadnootherwayofsurviving.Twointervieweessaidtheywouldbarteriftheycould,buthadnothinglefttoexchangeandweretoooldtowork.

viii. Harvests,2011and2012Familieswereaskedtoreviewwhathadhappenedduringthelastharvest,andhowpreparedtheywereforplantinginthecomingseason.ThisisparticularlyimportantastheAgriculturalExtensionprogramme(AREX)inMatabelelandSouthhaspredictedagoodearlyrainyseason,withalongdryspellearlyin2012.ThismeansthatbythemiddleofOctober,seedandfertilizeroraplantoacquireit,shouldhavebeentohand.Thisisclearlynotthecase,withonlyonefamilyreportingthattheyalreadyhaveinputs,withthealltherestindicatingnoseedorfertilizerwhatsoeveratthisstage,andnoclearplanforacquiringthem.Thegovernmentroll‐outprogrammeannouncedinmid‐Octoberhasnotbeenheardofhere.Asalreadymentioned,aroundtwothirdsoffamiliesindicatethattheyhavenodraughtpowerandnocurrentplanforploughingeither.

Graph8:showinglastyear’sharvests

The2010‐11seasonwasdisastrousinthisarea,with41%offamiliesharvestingabsolutelynothing,andafurther40%havingalmosttotalcropfailure,harvestinglessthanonemonth’sgrainsupply–lessthan50kgofmaize.Only4familiesharvestedaround6monthssupplyofgrain,andbylateSeptember,nofamilyhadanyremainingharvesttohand.Thepredictionis,thatunlessinputshavealreadybeenacquiredbythetimethisreportisreleased,itwillbetoolatetoplantinthisregion,whichisnotoriouslydifficulttoharvestin,andtherewillonceagainbeaneartotalcropfailure.Infact,severalfamiliesindicatedthattheywillnotbeplantingthisyearinanyevent,asthey

41

40

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0 10 20 30 40 50

nothingatall

lessthan50kgmaize

uptosixmonthssupply

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havenocapacitytodoso,andhavehadsuchbadexperiencesofinvestinginfailedharvestsbefore.

ix. Generalintervieweeperceptionsoftheireconomicstatusandprospects

Intervieweeswereaskedtoranktheireconomicstatuscomparedtothatoftheirneighbours,andinterestingly:

30%rankedthemselvesasbeingtheequivalentoftheirneighbours 15%rankedthemselvesasbetteroff 52%rankedthemselvesaspoorerthanothers 3%didn’tknow

Thisseemsafairranking,asalmosthalfthoseinterviewedrankedothersasthesameorbetteroffthanthemselves.Whatisthereforedepressing,butrealistic,bearinginmindthefindingsofthissurvey,isthat:

35%rankedthemselvesaseconomicallydesperate 41%rankedthemselvesasverypoororpoor 21%rankedthemselvesasaverage 3%rankedasgood

Thegeneralperceptiontherefore,isthatpeopleseethemselvesasverypoor,andinthesameboatastheirverypoorneighbours.Interviewerswereaskedtorecordobservationsandcommentsmadebythosetheyinterviewed.Severalinterviewswererecordedagainstabackgroundofchildrencryingwithhunger,andintervieweeswereoftenreferredtoasbeingobsessedwithbeinghungry.Peoplewereconsideredtoberealisticallypessimisticabouttheirtotallackofprospectsforabetterlife.Commentsinclude:“Wewillbedesperateifnothingchanges.”

“Thingsaregettingworseeveryday,anditdoesnotrainhere.”

“Governmentneedstoimproveourlives,orwewillallbedead.”

“Itwillbehellifgovernmentdoesnotchangeitsattitudeandtakesourplightseriously.Ifthereisnorainitwillbeadisasterformeandthekids.”

“Failedrainsbroughtusproblemsanddonorsseemtohavedisappeared”.

“Nofood,nowork,nomoney.IfonlyIcouldgetcattletohelpmeplough.”

“Thechildrengotoschoolwithouteatingandareturnedawayforfailingtopaylevies.Lifeissodifficultanddroughtmakesitimpossible.”

Ontheslightlymoreoptimisticside,commentsincluded:“Ifgovernmentimproves,ourlivesmay.”

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“Governmentmustdoprogrammestoaddresspoverty,andlifecouldbebetter.Thereispoliticalabuseoffood,andalsoabuseofaccesstothegoatprogramme”.

“IfIcouldgettreatmentformyeyes,thingsmightimprove”(fromblindoldman).

“Ihaveputmyhopeinmychildren,IdonotseehowIcansurviveinthefutureotherwise”.

“Ihopeforbetterthingsifsomefamilymembersfindwork”.

“Godwilldecide….”

Generally,mostintervieweeswerereferredtoascalm;sad;depressed;realistic.Interviewersreferredtoseveralfamiliesasclearlybeingindesperatesituationswithnoobviouswayforward.

C. TheDiaspora–whoisoutthereand

whatdotheysendback?

47%offamiliesreportedatleastonefamilymemberinthediaspora,inallinstancesinSouthAfrica.

OftheseDiasporafamilies:

38%have1familymemberabroad 38%have2familymembersabroad Theremaining24%have3or4familymembersabroad.

Graph9:showingpercentageofdiasporafamilieshavingdifferentnumbersoffamilyabroad

Theaverageageofthoseabroadis31years.

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38

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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

morethantwo

twoindiaspora

oneindiaspora

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1. Yearofdiasporisation

15%leftbyorbefore2002 15%left2005‐2007 62%left2008‐2010 8%leftin2011

13%offamiliesreportedafamilymemberthathasdiedinthediaspora.

Graph10:showingwhenfamilymembersleftforthediaspora

2. Homevisitsbyfamilyinthediaspora

35%havebeenhomeinthelastthreemonths 9%havebeenhomeinthelastyear 21%havebeenhomelessoftenthanonceayear 35%haveneverreturnedhome

3. Remittances

44%ofthoseinthediasporaarereportedashavingneverremittedanymoneyorgoods.

17%remitmonthly,amountsvaryingfromR200(USD25)toR400(USD50) Thebalanceof39%offamilymembersabroadarereportedtohavesent

homeone‐offamountsinthelasttwelvemonths,mostlyatChristmas,rangingfromUSD25toUSD100.Thismoneyhasbeenusedprimarilytobuyfoodandpayschoolfees.

15

15

62

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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

before2002

2002to2007

2007to2010

thisyear

35

ThosereceivingUSD25ormoreamonthareclearlybenefitingimportantlyfromremittances‐bearinginmindthegrindingpovertyofthesefamiliesandthatsuchanamountisenoughtokeepabsolutestarvationatbay.Thosereceivingmoneymoreerratically,andusuallyofrathersmallvalue,cannotinanywayrelyondiasporafundsasameansofsurvival.Inshortitisonlythe17%offamiliesreceivingmonthlyremittancesthatcanbeconsideredtobebenefitingusefullyfromhavingfamilyabroad,withtheremaining83%benefitingonlyveryoccasionallyornotatall.Theusefulnessofsuchremittancesisrelativetoo,totheexcruciatingpovertyofthesefamilies:generallyinZimbabwethepovertydatumlineforafamilyoffourisconsideredtobemorethan$400permonth,sothe$25‐50beingremittedmonthlytoahandfuloffamiliesinthissurveyissimplyholdingdeathfromstarvationatbay,andisnotenoughtobuyclothes,payschoolfeesormeetmorethanbasicmaizemealexpenses.

Graph11:showingfrequencyofremittancesfromdiasporamembers

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monthly

onceortwiceayear

neverremitted

36

ANNEXURE 1: CLOSEDCOMPANIESinBULAWAYO:February2009toFebruary2011Clothing&Textiles MotorIndustry Construction1.TheLabelClothing2.AppealApparel3.LukeCrazyEnterprises4.JJPEnterprises5.CMTailors6.ChilternHatsEnterprises7.CreerPeakEnterprises8.GlobalClothing9.GoldenLambEnterprises10.HungweTailors11.InterfairEnterprises12.JacknorEnterprises13.JustJaxEnterprises14.JutheeEnterprises15.TopazUniforms16.TopazTrueValueEnterprises17.RusglenGarments18.SafetyAfrica19.CottonPrinters

1.CruiserWorld2.AutoRebuild3.BulawayoVehicleRebuild4.ForkliftAndAutoServices5.MotorCrafter(1Weekin,1WeekOut)6.SuperiorServiceStations7.PanelCraft8.KingshipMotors10.QualityTyres11.BelmontMotors12.Bike‐A‐Rama13.BulawayoTyreServices14.BulawayoServiceStation15.D’aguiarServices16.FisherMotors17.DegasPanelBeaters18.BlueStoneMotors19.CaringAutoShop20.BulawayoMotor21.RamMurucla22.MatabelelandTruckService23.Permakleen24.Powerfuel25.SimmsElectrical26.BradfieldServiceStation27.SkyokesServiceStation28.TruckTech29.VimshaCables30.WholesaleCentre31.WilsonMotors32.Wymar33.AutozoneMotorSpare34.E‐Stone35.AimdexTyres

1.TranicsConstruction2.TrueBuilders3.BrentwoodConstruction

36.BulawayoAutoClinic37.GrahamBishop38.MillridgeTyresService39.ReadyBuild40.SBMPneumatic41.SaltockMarketing42.AimdTyres

37

43.MordenAutoElectrical44.VerdolPanelBeaters45.BulawayoVehicleRebuild46.AVZeederberg47.BaobabFillingStation48.NationalTyreServices49.DougsAutoworks50.ZambeziFillingStation51.Amitex52.RaiseMotorCycles53.RadiatorAndTinning54.ExodusAfricaAutoServices55.Bambazonke56.AutoElectricalTax57.ExelPanelBeaters58.CabKing59.OzmotecMotors60.RotoDieselAndPump61.StalitePanelBeaters62.StylinePanelBeaters63.UnitedMotors

LISTOFCOMPANIESTHATRELOCATEDTOHARARE

1. HunyaniCorrugated2. HunyaniPrintoPack3. NatPakPvtLtd

ENTERPRISEDEVELOPMENTDEPARTMENT16April2011StateofmanufacturingsectorinByoasatApril2011

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Onethirdofhouseholdsweinterviewedexpecttoloselivestocktostarvationbeforetheendof2011:Gwandadistrict,October2011.