Municipal Administration in the Post-Industrial Great Lakes Region:

A Case Study of Detroit and Pittsburgh

By Emily Brooke Haskins

A thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science,Saint Mary’s College, Notre Dame, Indiana

in partial fulfillment for the degree of Bachelor of ArtsDecember 28, 2014

Professor Savage, Supervisor

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Abstract

The purpose of this research is to show the positive or negative effects of public policy on post-industrial Detroit and Pittsburgh. I believed that cities of the Great Lakes region had enough inherently in common that a blueprint for success could be applied universally, thus the goal of this research was to be applicable to municipalities across the Rust Belt and offer considerations for Detroit’s next step in revitalization. The research draws primarily upon books, scholarly articles, journalism articles, and interviews. Concluding findings are that Detroit and Pittsburgh have different histories and political dynamics; hence Detroit cannot follow the Pittsburgh model. However, Detroit can capitalize on its proximity to Canada and its status as a major airport hub city.

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction: A Tale of Two Shells………………………………………….4

II. Literature Review………………………………………………………....….5

III. Research Design and Methodology…………………………………………7

IV. Analysis……………………………………………………………...………..9

De-mystifying the Rust Belt…………………………………………………9

Chapter I: The City of Detroit………………………………….…………11

Global War Creates a World Class City………………………………….…14

Sowing the Seeds of Decline………………………..………………………15

1970s-1990s: Things Fall Apart…………………………………….………17

The 2000s: Things Get Worse…………….………...………………………19

Chapter II: The City of Pittsburgh……………………… ………………23

Renaissance I……………………………………………………..…………24

Renaissance II…………………………………….…………………………31

Renaissance III……………………………...………………………………38

V. Conclusion………………………………………….. ………………………43

Can Detroit Follow the Pittsburgh Model......................................................45

The Current Situation, and Next Steps………...……………………………49

VI. Appendix……………………………………………………………………52

Abbreviations……………………….………………………………………52

Interview Questions…………………...……………………………………52

VII. Bibliography………………………………………………………….……55

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I. Introduction: A Tale of Two Shells

Fifty years ago, Detroit was the 5th largest city in the United States, with nearly 2 million

residents.1 The Motor City boasted the nation’s highest per capita income, the highest rate of

home ownership of any black urban population, and an unemployment rate of 3.4%.2 In March

2013, Detroit was declared to be in a state of financial emergency by Michigan Governor Rick

Snyder. Five months later it became the largest U.S. municipality to every file for bankruptcy.3

Statistics reported by Kevyn Orr, the city’s emergency manager appointed by Snyder

immediately following the declaration of financial emergency, seem to reflect a war ravaged

developing nation: 40% of the city’s street lights do not work, and the police need up to 58

minutes to respond to a 911 call.4 Census data from 2010 reveal that four years ago city residents

numbered just over 700,000—over 60% shy of the population Detroit built up and out to

support.5 A community featuring some 78,000 abandoned structures and 66,000 abandoned

business lots has a hard time justifying “city” status. A more apt description would be “shell.”

Twenty-first century Detroit is a shell of its former glory; indeed, The Economist has described

this urban flight as a “demographic catastrophe unparalleled in the developed world.”6

1 Shikha Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan,” Reason 45 (2013): 38.http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/ehost/detail?sid=17d990a2-9929-4bbb-9671-1d7c2aa3f53c%40sessionmgr4003&vid=1&hid=4214&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=90618663.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Clarke, Kevin, “Can this City Be Saved?” America 209 (2013): 12-13.

http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.nd.edu/ehost/detail?sid=e1bafa08-c64c-4177-9a54-1afc5d11750a%40sessionmgr4003&vid=1&hid=4214&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=mth&AN=91677943.

5 Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan,” 40.6 Ibid.

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What Detroit is to the automobile industry, so Pittsburgh is to steel: once the backbone

and nerve center of its respective industry to the point of being metonymic, now having to

manage despite the breakthrough of global competition and much of what remains of American

steel production having moved outside of the city limits. It is a story slowly unfolding across the

Rust Belt, an area named specifically for the economic decline, population loss, and urban decay

in the postindustrial region of the Northeastern and East North Central states.

Nonetheless, Pittsburgh is not a shell. On the contrary, Pittsburgh has reinvented itself

into a modern renaissance city by building a technology and research sector right on top of the

ashes of the steel industry, rather than desperately trying to fan those moribund flames. Unlike

Detroit, Pittsburgh has avoided bankruptcy by cutting city pension packages and creating

initiatives for start-up companies to relocate to the Steel City. Straddling the Alleghenies,

Pittsburgh could quite literally be the ‘City on a Hill’ other Rust Belt cities aspire to become.

Policy-wise, what does it look like for a post-industrial city in the Great Lakes region to

emulate Pittsburgh, as opposed to Detroit? Economically, these two cities came of age

concurrently. They were almost completely dependent on one industry, and then the American

manufacturing sector of that industry collapsed. Politically, Pittsburgh made its exit through the

front door, and Detroit went out the back. This paper will examine what political factors have the

ability to ameliorate or worsen the fiscal consequences of the large-scale loss of industrial jobs

(or possibly keep those jobs from disappearing in the first place), and the universal applicability

of those factors. The desired result of this research is a blueprint for a successful municipal

administration in a post-industrial Great Lakes city, and an answer to the question, how should

Detroit invest what little resources it has to revitalize?

II. Literature Review

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I became engrossed in the story of Detroit during the summer of 2013, following the

bankruptcy in newspapers and reading a cover spread put out by TIME. I wanted to know how

one of the strongest, most prosperous cities in America could find itself filing for chapter 9. I

wanted to know what was going to happen to employees on the municipal payroll, and I wanted

to know if Detroit’s story arc was the future of America. So, apparently, did numerous others.

Pete Saunders, a Detroit native who now works as an urban planner and consultant out of

Chicago sums the public fascination with the Motor City:

“My hometown of Detroit has been studied obsessively for years by writers and researchers of all types to

gain insight into the Motor City’s decline. Indeed, it seems to have become a favorite pastime for

urbanists of all stripes. How could such an economic powerhouse, a uniquely American city, so utterly

collapse?”7

Literature and journalism chronicling Detroit’s rise and fall are abundant. The databases

for scholarly journals at Cushwa-Leighton Library, Saint Mary’s College, and Hesburgh Library,

University of Notre Dame, proved helpful with initial readings. The Brookings Institution’s U.S.

Metro Areas portal also led me to a host of articles.

The more I researched Detroit, the more I became overwhelmed by the city’s incredibly

complex and significant history of race, class, and discrimination. To give the subject the

attention it deserves would require several volumes, for which I recommend two: Whose

Detroit? Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City, by Heather Ann Thompson and

Detroit Divided, by Reynolds Farley, Sheldon Danziger, and Harry J. Holzer.

Finding a city to serve as a foil for Detroit was more difficult, as the Rust Belt is not

known to the rest of the country for its examples of modern success. However, once a professor

at Saint Mary’s suggested I take a look at Pittsburgh, I found that that the literature was there, if

7 Pete Saunders, “The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline,” Urbanophile, February 21, 2012, http://www.urbanophile.com/2012/02/21/the-reasons-behind-detroits-decline-by-pete-

saunders/.

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a bit obscured. Urban analyst Aaron Renn explains the difference in quantity of writing about

Detroit and Pittsburgh with the newspaper adage if it bleeds, it reads:8

“You can’t stop watching a train wreck. Detroit really is a true disaster; and it’s not as if Pittsburgh is

overtaking Manhattan or San Francisco. There are some things called “mezzo” facts: the weather changes

constantly, the speed of light never changes, but the reputation of a place changes very slowly over time.

Look at how we refer to Pittsburgh- we still call it “Steel City,” even though that era is long over.”

The University Library of American University, provided access to the past century of

politics in both cities and provided all of the books listed in the bibliography. Most helpful

among these are Gregory Crowley’s The Politics of Place: Contentious Urban Redevelopment in

Pittsburgh and Louise Jezierski’s “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City” in Regional

Politics: America in Post-City Age, edited by H.V. Savitch and Ronald K. Vogel.

III. Research Design and Methodology

My research attempts to answer the following question: how have political actions on the

municipal level impacted the financial well-being of Pittsburgh and Detroit, two cities sharing a

common Rust Belt heritage? To measure my independent variable, I studied metrics such as the

level of public-private partnership in each city, how city land was utilized, city hall-led economic

initiatives, and the level of cohesion between the city proper and surrounding municipalities in

the region. Similar factors have been analyzed in papers such as “Regional Restructuring and

Urban Regimes: A Comparison of the Pittsburgh and Detroit Metropolitan Areas” by Hyung Je

Jo and “Detroit’s Urban Regime: Composition and Consequence” by Leda McIntyre Hall and

Melvin F. Hall. In addition to consulting many secondary sources in looking for patterns in the

cities’ recent histories, I attempted to answer my research question by conducting original

research in the form of interviews. I began by examining a list of think tanks in the United States,

8 Aaron Renn (urban analyst), in discussion with the author, April 2014.

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and then zeroing in on the ones that dealt with regional politics and urban planning, especially

concerning the Rust Belt area. A cold call to the Allegheny Institute of Public Policy (AIPP), a

conservative leaning policy institute in Pittsburgh with an emphasis on free market principles

and local government, put me in contact with Mr. Eric Montarti. Mr. Montarti is an AIPP senior

policy analyst with a M.A. in public policy analysis and a B.A. in political science from

Pittsburgh’s Duquesne University. The most beneficial question in my interview arsenal was “do

you know anyone else I can talk to?” because the cold call to AIPP led to two more sources.

After our interview, Mr. Montarti referred me to the Allegheny Conference on

Community Development (ACCD), a nonprofit private sector consortium that has played a

crucial role in the Pittsburgh area for the past 70 years, where I was recommended to speak with

Mr. Brian Jensen, the Senior Vice President. Mr. Jensen was also Pittsburgh educated, receiving

his Ph.D. in history and policy from Carnegie Mellon University, as well as a B.A. in political

science from Ball State University in Indiana. Mr. Jensen was a uniquely qualified source to

address the connections between policy and economics, as he has also served as the executive

director for the Pennsylvania Economy League of Greater Pittsburgh since 1988. Mr. Jensen then

put me in touch with his colleague Mr. Eric Lupher at the Citizens Research Council of

Michigan (CRCM). Mr. Lupher serves as Research Director at the CRCM, a nonpartisan

organization that provides factual information on issues of state and local concern to Michigan

policymakers. Mr. Lupher is Michigan-educated, receiving a B.A. in international relations from

Michigan State University and an M.P.A. from Detroit’s Wayne State University.

An article in the online version of The Fiscal Times caught my attention for its analysis of

why Detroit cannot follow the Pittsburgh model for success, and I was particularly impressed by

the insight of one urban affairs analyst quoted, Mr. Aaron Renn. Internet searches of Renn lead

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me to his website, Urbanophile, which focuses on non-partisan, in-depth analyses of the

problems facing American cities. An email to Renn resulted in a telephone interview, after

which Renn directed me to Pete Saunders, whom he described as the “expert on Detroit,” and

Jim Russell, the “guru of all things Pittsburgh.”

Mr. Saunders, an urban planning consultant and blogger, truly is an expert on Detroit,

having grown up in the Motor City. He has over twenty years’ experience in urban planning and

economic development, in the public, private, and non-profit sectors. Mr. Saunders received a

B.A. in urban planning and consulting from Indiana University and a M.A. in urban planning

from the University of Illinois at Chicago. Mr. Russell is currently a blogger for Pacific Standard

Magazine and located in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, but is a native Pittsburgher

with an expertise in the “Pittsburgh Diaspora”: the out-migration of Steel City residents

following the collapse of the American steel industry. Mr. Russell co-founded the Pittsburgh

Expatriate Network, and organization that exists to connect and engage the Pittsburgh expatriate

community, and has also worked as a consultant for Global Cleveland, an organization dedicated

to bringing talent to the Rust Belt city of the group’s name. Mr. Russell holds a B.A. in

geography from the University of Vermont and a M.A. in geography from the University of

Colorado.

My final interview was an email correspondence with Dr. Stephanie Ryberg-Webster, of

Cleveland State University. Ryberg-Webster was quoted in Palesh Ghosh’s article “A Tale of

Three Cities: Detroit, Toronto, and Pittsburgh in a Post-Industrialized World,” which appeared in

the online version of the International Business Times. Ryberg-Webster is a professor of urban

affairs at Cleveland State University; not only is she an expert in cities, but she understands them

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in the Rust Belt context. She holds her M.A. and Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning from the

University of Pennsylvania.

All interviews were held in April 2014, and with the exception of Dr. Ryberg-Webster,

were all conducted over the telephone. A list of questions asked can be found in the appendix.

This paper will use “region” as an analytical unit designating a metropolitan area and its

suburbs. “Region” is synonymous with Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). According to the

U.S. Census Bureau, a MSA requires a core population of at least 50,000 and consists of the

counties containing the urban core “as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of

social and economic integration (as measured by commuting to work) with the urban core.”9 The

counties included in a city’s MSA vary from year to year; the table I have included below uses

Census Bureau information from February 2013.10

Urban Core City Counties Within MSA

Detroit, Michigan Lapeer, Livingston, Macomb, Oakland, St.

Clair, Wayne

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Fayette,

Washington, Westmoreland

IV. Analysis

De-mystifying the Rust Belt

The Great Lakes industrial corridor includes parts of New York, Pennsylvania, West

Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin, with notable cities including Buffalo,

9 “Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas Main,” U.S. Census Bureau, May 6, 2013, https://www.census.gov/population/metro/.

10 “Delineation Files-Feb. 2013,” U.S. Census Bureau, February 2013. http://www.census.gov/population/metro/data/def.html

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Pittsburgh, Youngstown, Cleveland, Gary, Detroit, Chicago, and Milwaukee. Tax revenues in the

area from Michiana (a region in northern Indiana and southwestern Michigan centered on the

city of South Bend, Indiana) to western upstate New York rely more heavily on manufacturing

than any other region in the U.S.

Factors of geography and history combined to predispose the region to become an

industrial powerhouse in the second half of the 19th century and first half of the 20th century. The

favorable geography is a proximity to the Great Lakes. All of the Great Lakes are naturally

connected to each other and to the Atlantic Ocean by the St. Lawrence River, but until the United

States developed a fascination with building canals in the early 19th century this water route to

the continent’s interior was not navigable due to impediments such as Niagara Falls and rapids.

For example, the 1820 census counted roughly 8,000 residents of Michigan, compared to

600,000 in nearby Ohio.11 After the Erie Canal was completed in 1826, and travel to the

Michigan territory was no longer limited to overland, Michigan’s population reached 31, 639.12

The success of canals brought an enthusiasm for paved roads and railroads. By 1848, a rail line

connecting Detroit to Lake Michigan was completed, and in 1855 the Chicago to New York line

was completed. It included: “rail travel from Chicago to Detroit; a ferry across the Detroit River;

a rail line across southern Ontario; a bridge into the U. S. near Buffalo; and finally a rail line

across New York State.”13 Michigan’s population alone doubled in the 1840s and again in the

1850s.14 The favorable geography of the Great Lakes region also includes the temperate and cool

climate that comes from being located near the water—a crucial factor for factory workers before

the advent of air conditioning.15

11 Reynolds Farley, Sheldon Danziger, and Harry J. Holzer, Detroit Divided, (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 2000): 16.

12 Ibid., 17.13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Eric Lupher (research director), in discussion with the author, 2014.

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The market for the region’s industrial goods grew as limitless as the potential for a better

life offered to prospective factory and mill workers. Great Lakes industrial cities became a

magnet for immigrants, as the blue-collar jobs did not require a formal education, or even a firm

grasp of English. For the factory and mill owners, this wretched refuse provided an inexpensive

labor resource. Each city and its surrounding metropolitan area grew through a particular

industry: “Detroit had cars, Pittsburgh had steel; Toledo had glass; and Cincinnati had

manufacturing.”16

The industrial corridor’s peak in relative economic importance to the country occured

during World War II, as assembly lines and forging fires lifted the nation out of economic

depression and to victory abroad. The fall came shortly after, with returning soldiers making use

of the G.I. Bill and relocating their families to the rapidly developing suburbs. The center of

American manufacturing shifted to the Southeast, and many of those jobs were outsourced to

developing nations to reflect lower labor costs. The liberalization of foreign trade policies acted

as a catalyst for the current era of internationalization. Technology was also a factor: the increase

of automation means a cheaper product for all, but at the expense of reducing labor needed in

factories. As each of the industries mentioned in the paragraph above declined, the city declined

with it. Why did Detroit alone fall to the depths of bankruptcy?

Chapter I: The City of Detroit

“Detroit turned out to be heaven, but it also turned out to be hell.” –Marvin Gaye17

16 David Francis, “Why Detroit Won’t Have a Pittsburgh Renaissance,” The Fiscal Times, July 24, 2013, http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/07/24/Why-Detroit-Wont-Have-a-Pittsburgh-

Renaissance.17 Charlie Leduff, Detroit: An American Autopsy (New York: Penguin Group, 2013).

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Both sides of the aisle have an opinion about what factors are to blame for Detroit’s

decline. To the left, racism and inequality are the culprits. Thomas Sugrue expounds this theory

in The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit:

“…highways and rising wages in union-dominated inner cities caused capital to flee to the Rust Belt after

World War II, much before the race riots of the 1960s. But blacks couldn’t follow because discrimination

prevented them from buying homes in the new neighborhoods, trapping them in dying urban areas without

jobs.”18

The roles of race and inequality will be addressed later, but this argument does not stand

on its own. Discrimination did not debilitate blacks prior to the 1950s, when they migrated from

the South and relatively thrived. Why would it debilitate them just as the civil rights movement

was finally making headway? Theoretically, white flight would have left opportunities wide

open for minority groups. In actuality, it was the flight of anyone who could afford to (e.g.,

middle class blacks). Other minority groups created thriving neighborhoods outside of the city

limits; for instance, Dearborn, Michigan, has the nation’s largest Arab population.19

The right’s theory, championed by Charles Murray, Thomas Sowell, and Lawrence

Mead, does not hold up well either: that “the progressive welfare state subsidized the breakdown

of inner city families.”20 It is not a rationale specific enough to the Rust Belt, let alone Detroit.

To understand the economic and political factors behind Detroit’s collapse, one must be

familiar with the history of the city. Detroit’s role as Motor City is attributed to more than just its

proximity to the Great Lakes and the good fortune of being the stomping ground of a young

Henry Ford and William C. Durant (of General Motors (GM) fame), for the city already had a

lock on being economic capital of the state by the end of the 19th century.21 Detroit, on an

18 Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan.”19 Jim Russell, in discussion with the author, April 2014. 20 Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan.” 21 Pete Saunders (urban planner and consultant), in discussion with the author, April 2014.

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isthmus between Lake St. Clair and Lake Erie in southeastern Michigan, is located midway

between the iron ore fields of northern Michigan and the coal reserves of Appalachia (both

crucial to automobile production), as well as being on one side of the busiest international border

crossing in North America.22 Detroit was founded as the ideal location for a trading post by

French explorer Antoine Cadillac in 1701: the soon to be city was a navigation point where

Midwestern and Appalachian suppliers, American and Canadian merchants, railroad barons, and

Great Lakes shippers could all converge.23 The city already had blast furnaces and brass

foundries; because by that time manufacturing was established as driving the regional economy.

Detroit had emerged as a national manufacturing center in response to the Union army’s demand

for armaments during the Civil War.24

This meteoric rise pre-dated effective public transportation, so Detroit grew as a walking

city: workers had to live close to their factory jobs, “so ethnic neighborhoods sprang up around

factories throughout the city.”25 Detroit’s mechanical orientation also pre-dates the automobile,

with engineers, designers, and laborers already drawn to the area for its metalworking, ship

building, and carriage building industries.26 A corner on the carriage making market was a boon

to Detroit landing the automobile industry: carriages and automobiles are similar in their bodies

and wheel designs, both utilized component production and contracting, assembly production,

and virtually the same market and dealer networks.27 In 1900, Detroit was the nation’s 15th

largest city. But by 1920, it was 4th, behind only New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia.28 Yet the

automobile industry alone did not create the modern Detroit.

22 Joe T. Darden, Richard Child Hill, June Thomas, and Richard Thomas, Detroit: Race and Uneven Development, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), 14.

23 Farley, Detroit Divided, 14. 24 Ibid., 20. 25 Ibid. 26 Saunders, in discussion with the author. 27 Darden, Detroit: Race and Uneven Development, 14.28 Farley, Detroit Divided, 21.

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Global War Creates a World Class City

The manufacturing demands of WWI contributed to growing Detroit “in a manner no one

could have foreseen.”29 Not only did this war require the chemicals, steel, and munitions that

Detroit had produced during the Civil War, but it demanded motor vehicles to get them to the

East Coast.30 In 1914, Detroit manufactured 25,000 trucks; in 1918, the last year of World War I,

that number soared to 227,000.31 The Motor City had arrived.

The war and the Immigration Act of 1924 severely curbed European immigration, but

there was still a growing demand for labor in Detroit’s automobile industry. Henry Ford led the

way in attracting blacks, southern whites, and Mexicans to work in his plants: Coleman Young,

Detroit’s first black mayor, “described the employment situation in his youth by recalling that

Ford sent buses to the city’s Black Bottom neighborhood every day to recruit factory hands.”32

Due to the booming auto industry, Detroit’s black population grew more rapidly than its

counterparts in any other northern city in the 1920s.33 By the 1930s Detroit had grown so that it

literally could not expand anymore—Michigan had “adopted restrictive annexation laws in 1926

limiting the physical expansion of the city,” ensuring that future growth with happen in adjacent,

but separate, municipalities (suburbs).34

If WWI gave birth to the modern Motor City, WWII catapulted it to an even greater

standing, temporarily switching out the automobile moniker for the sobriquet, “Arsenal of

Democracy.” “Thousands of trucks, jeeps, tanks, planes, and weapons built on Detroit’s

assembly lines helped bring the Allies to victory,” and in the post-war boom Detroit enjoyed a

29 Ibid., 22. 30 Ibid.31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 31.33 Ibid. 34 Ibid., 25.

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reputation as a city where blue-collar workers of any ethnic background could achieve the

American dream.35

Sowing the Seeds of Decline

A TIME article titled “Decline in Detroit” opened its expose with this paragraph:

“If ever a city stood as a symbol of the dynamic U.S. economy, it was Detroit. It was not pretty. It was, in

fact, a combination of the grey and the garish: its downtown area was a warren of dingy, twisting street; the

used-car lots along Livernois Avenue raised an aurora of neon. But Detroit cared less about how it looked

than about what it did—and it did plenty.”36

That article was from 1961.

The seeds of Detroit’s were sown in the decades before the American automobile

industry lost its competitive edge. In the 1950s and 1960s, the city was characterized by three

trends: increasing influence of the automobile industry, suburbanization and concentration of

wealth moving outside the city, and intensifying tension in race relations. Each of these played a

role in the fall.

For the first part of the decade following WWII, employment continued to surge.37 The

city expected sustained growth and prepared itself for a population of two million, so it came as a

shock when Detroit actually experienced an unemployment rate of 10% in the late 1950s, due to

the recession of 1957 and 1958 which put three auto-makers—Hudson, Kaiser-Fraser, and

Packard—out of business.38

At the same time, Detroit’s wealth began concentrating outside of the city limits.

Between 1947 and 1955 the Big Three built 25 new manufacturing plants in the metro area, and

not one was within the Detroit city limits.39 Even though the factories were technically moving

35 Ibid., 1.36 Saunders, “The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline.”37 Farley, Detroit Divided, 57. 38 Ibid. 39 Darded, Detroit and Uneven Development, 16.

16

outside of Detroit, public policy within the city was becoming increasingly automobile-

directed.40 For example, until the 1950s Detroit had an “elaborate” and popular streetcar

system.41 That system was converted into one of diesel buses after GM lobbied the city,

“stressing that diesel-fueled buses were an effective lower-cost alternative to

streetcars….Coincidentally, GM produced exactly the kind of buses that would easily facilitate

the transition.”42 GM, for all intents and purposes, was the government. “Detroit went “whole

hog” into industrialization,” says Saunders, “and let corporations rule the roost. The closest

comparison would be California’s Silicon Valley. Should the tech industry ever go the way of

the auto industry, it would devastate that area.”43

The theory of Harvard economist Ed Glaeser is that the Big Three “killed Detroit’s

culture of entrepreneurship with their decades-long supremacy” and rewarding of the “company

man mindset, rather than the start-up mindset.44 He continues that the federal government

reinforced this mindset with cash bailouts and corporatist interventions on behalf of auto giants:

“Had central planners allowed natural market forces to prevail…Chrysler and GM might well

have dissolved decades ago and been replaced with smaller, nimbler companies.”45

The tipping point for already tense race relations in the city came in the summer of 1967. Early

in the morning of July 23, Detroit police engaged in a routine raid on a party in the inner city

welcoming home a black soldier from Vietnam.46 The officers arrested 82 people and set off the

costliest riot in U.S. history47. By 8:30 am, Michigan governor George Romney felt it was

40 Saunders, “The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline.”41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Saunders, in discussion with the author. 44 Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan,” 40.45 Ibid. 46 Heather Ann Thompson, Whose Detroit? Politics, Labor, and Race in a Modern American City, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell

University Press, 2001): 46. 47 Ibid.

17

necessary to survey the ensuing violence and chaos via helicopter, after which he decided to call

out the National Guard.48 When the military finally wrestled the city under control five days

later, 43 people were dead, 347 were injured, 3,800 were arrested, 5,000 were homeless, over

1,000 buildings had been burned to the ground and 2,700 businesses had been ransacked.49 The

damage totaled $50 million.50 The 1967 riot accelerated white flight so much that within a

decade, Detroit’s population changed from 55% white to 34% white, leaving a considerable

difference in the property and income tax bases.

An attempt was made by the business community to address the tense race relations

following the 1967 riots from the perspective of Detroit’s economic interests.51 Organizations

such as New Detroit, Detroit Renaissance, and the Detroit Economic Development Corporation

(DEDC) appeared on the scene; however, due to a lack of overarching leadership no regional

coalition was formed.52 Ironically, this failure can be attributed to segregated interests. The

Detroit Renaissance and pre-existing Detroit Regional Chamber represent the white corporate

community while New Detroit and the DEDC “are seen as the structures for the articulation of

black elite preferences.”53

1970s-1980s: Things Fall Apart

The white flight left a consolidated electoral support base of black voters.54 Coleman

Young, Detroit’s first black mayor, exacerbated this emigration with a “racially charged rhetoric

48 Ibid. 49 Darden, Race and Uneven Development, 72. 50 Ibid. 51 Hyung Je Jo, “Regional Restructuring and Urban Regimes: A Comparison of the Pittsburgh and Detroit

Metropolitan Areas,” University of Michigan Transportation Institute, Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation (2002): 16.

http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/1511/96549.0001.001.pdf?sequence=2.52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan.”

18

that chased white residents and businessmen out of the city,” and by dividing the police

department along racial lines with separate layoff lists for white and black officers. 55 Young,

described as “politically invincible,” would serve five terms as mayor and Detroit would come to

resemble Chicago for the number of viable political parties in town (this is comparable to the

entrepreneurship argument: one political party, unopposed, does not have to be quick on its feet.

It is held to a high tolerance of corruption.).56 In the twenty years of Young’s administration,

there was little political cohesion in the region, attributed to the fact that “political autonomy

based on racial segregation in the central city did not force Mayor Young to cooperate with

suburban governments.”57

It is important to note here that city government power in Detroit is heavily concentrated

in the mayor’s office.58 This is due to a new city charter in 1973 that ended “ended much of the

fragmentation in mayoral agencies and consolidated control in the mayor’s office;” essentially,

giving the mayor the power to ignore “city council attempts at legislative oversight.”59

In the mid-1970s the Michigan House of Representatives witnessed an ambitious effort to

introduce regional governance legislation.60 The bills never passed, and the municipalities of the

Detroit region remained fragmented and isolated, without the legal capacity to coact.61

One group that did have the wide influence to push for regional restructuring did not.

Labor unions, specifically those of automobile workers, were long established in Detroit and

“had the organizational power to realize their interests.”62 However, they were only able to see

the short-term objectives of raising their wages and keeping their jobs as German and Japanese

55 Ibid. 56 Hyung, “Regional Restructuring and Urban Regimes,” 17.57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., 16. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid., 18.

19

imports were flooding U.S. markets, rather than realizing the potential economic stability

fostered by regional cooperation.63

It was not until 1994 that Detroit elected a new mayor. Dennis Archer’s “actively tried to

revitalize downtown Detroit,” through the entertainment projects strategy.64 Although the new

casinos, sports stadiums, and convention center were relatively successful, Archer did not

promote regional cooperation any more than the previous administration.65 The long-term value

of these projects can also be debated, in light of Detroit’s economic situation. Politicians have

been misreading their constituents: residents neither want nor need new stadia, casinos, and

athletic venues; they want good public services and to jobs.

The 2000s: Things Get Worse

It was during the administration of the succeeding mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick, that Detroit

took on new, unfavorable nicknames: “Arson Capital of America,” “Murder Capital of

America,” and “Most Dangerous City in America.”66 “Detroit got really bad just as America was

entering the era of the 24 hour news cycle,” said Lupher. “It has become really well-publicized in

the American consciousness.”67 For that, Kilpatrick’s name has become synonymous with

incompetence and corruption. On March 11, 2013 Kilpatrick was convicted on 24 charges,

including racketeering, extortion, bribery, mail fraud, wire fraud, and filing false tax returns; he

was already serving time for perjury.68 The excesses of the Kilpatrick administration allowed the

media to unfairly paint Detroit as a city that had a higher than average tolerance for corruption

among one-party cities. A look at New Orleans, Miami, Providence, and any number of cities in

63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid.66 Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan,” 39. 67 Lupher, in discussion with the author. 68 Tresa Baldas, “The Charges Former Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick is Facing,” Detroit Free Press, February 16, 2013,

http://www.freep.com/article/20120902/NEWS01/309020130/The-charges-former-Detroit-Mayor -Kwame-Kilpatrick-facing.

20

New Jersey provide relevance, not to ignore the Windy City: “Detroit certainly hasn’t cornered

the market on political corruption, as long as Chicago exists.”69 Before Kilpatrick, there were

actually very few instances of corruption in Detroit. Young was accused of bad racial politics

more than actual corruption.70 Far more prevalent than corruption is the incompetence: “elected

officials are not very good at what they were elected to do, and the workers they hired were not

trained to do what they needed to do.”71

Ironically, Detroit amended its city charter in 1918 to allow for a city council elected

entirely at-large instead of from districts in response to the national Progressive Movement

pushing for local government reform.72 The greatest legacy of this policy was that it

unknowingly precipitated white flight. The votes of remaining white enclaves did not carry much

weight in an increasingly black city; a common refrain of those leaving for the suburbs was, “if

only I had had political representation, I would have stayed.”73 The charter was amended in 2013

to allow for council members from seven districts and two at-large spots, because the

neighborhoods where people live are in absolute degradation, and the people wanted

representation.74 Today, government is the city’s largest employer, and that is more than enough

rope for City Hall to hang itself.75 In early 2013 Detroit launched Operation Compliance, the goal

of which was to shut down or force compliance from 20 illegal businesses operating without

proper permits each week.76 It was a questionable use of funds for the city only weeks away from

bankruptcy, and hardly conducive to an entrepreneurial renaissance. “In some state capitals, it

works, but it is neither financially safe nor sustainable for a city like Detroit to have an economy

69 Saunders, “The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline.”70 Lupher, in discussion with the author. 71 Ibid. 72 Saunders, “The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline.”73 Saunders, in discussion with the author. 74 Saunders, “The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline.”75 Dalmia, “Detroit, Michigan.”76 Ibid.

21

driven by bureaucracy,” says Russell. “The public sector is not dynamic. You need a healthy

private sector, to import wealth in.”77

After Kilpatrick, the trajectory towards bankruptcy has been both dizzyingly fast and

painfully slow. “Unionized rapacity,” government corruption, bad race relations, and

deindustrialization were all contributing factors to the city being declared “insolvent.”78 Local

sentiment towards the bankruptcy is mixed. Some see it as a refreshingly honest take on the

situation and an opportunity to start fresh, while others resent the state’s involvement as a

takeover. It has undoubtedly further eroded the confidence of Americans outside of Michigan in

the Motor City.79 One resident interviewed by journalist Kevin Clarke for America takes the

optimistic outlook: “If it will allow things to become arranged where, economically speaking, the

city can begin and start anew as far as their finances, it could be good. Detroiters are fighters, I

know that from experience. I deeply believe that Detroit will bounce back from (the

bankruptcy).”80

Post-bankruptcy, Detroit has gotten some breaks. Dan Gilbert, CEO of Quicken Loans,

moved his firm’s headquarters from suburban Farmington Hills to downtown Detroit in 2007.81

That means more than 7,000 employees are commuting into downtown Monday-Friday.82 After

Gilbert purchased more than 15 buildings and two parking garages in the downtown area,

Quicken Loans is the third-largest landowner in Detroit, after the city and GM.83

77 Russell, in discussion with the author. 78 Clarke, “Can This City Be Saved?,” 13. 79 Dr. Stepahnie Ryberg-Webster, in discussion with the author, 2014. 80 Kevin Clarke, “Can This City Be Saved?,” 13. 81 Bruce Katz and Jennifer Bradley, “A Growth Strategy for Post-Bankruptcy Detroit,” Brookings Institution (2013).

http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/07/19-detroit-bankruptcy-katz-bradley.82 Ibid. 83 Ibid.

22

Concurrently, suburban Detroit is doing fine to the point of thriving. The greater

metropolitan area has a population of 4.3 million and a GDP of nearly $200 million.84 The region

has an economic base, but it has become divorced from its urban core.85 For that to change the

attitudes of the wealthy and the suburbanites have to change; they have to want the urban core

again.86

Chapter II: The City of Pittsburgh

Pittsburgh may be considered a Rust Belt city despite being over 100 miles from the

nearest of the Great Lakes, but Pennsylvania is a stand-alone hybrid. Although sharing a western

border with Ohio, no geographer ever considers the Commonwealth a part of the Midwest. Nor

does it get grouped in with the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic region, despite bordering Delaware,

Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. Pennsylvania is a “demographic bridge.”87 It should

come as no surprise that Pittsburgh is breaking the Rust Belt mold—it never fit too comfortably

within it to begin with.

Pittsburgh began as Ft. Pitt in 1758 to oversee the new “western” frontier.88 Its strategic

location as the source of the Ohio at the confluence of the Monongahela and Allegheny Rivers

provided control and access to riverways, land, and trade downriver. With the advent of the

railroad the strategic location lost its strategic-ness, “except in the case of steel distribution.”89

Like Detroit, the industrial character of the “Iron City” was set by the Civil War. Area towns

84 Palesh Ghosh, “A Tale of Three Cities: Detroit, Toronto, and Pittsburgh in a Post-Industrialized World,” International Business Times, October 9, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/tale-three-cities-

detroit-toronto- pittsburgh-post-industrialized-world-1417742. 85 Russell, in discussion with the author. 86 Ibid. 87 William H. Frey and Ruy Teixeira, “The Political Geography of Pennsylvania: Not Another Rust Belt State,”

Brookings Institution (2008), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2008/04/political- demographics-frey-teixeira.

88 Louise Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” in H.V. Savitch and Ronald K. vogel, eds., Regional Politics: America in a Post-City Age (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Productions, 1996): 162.

89 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 162.

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grew due to the presence of natural resources such as oil, natural gas, and coal; later on it was the

production of iron, glass, textiles, steel, and machinery production that spurred Pittsburgh’s

expansion and rise.90

Renaissance I

In the period between the end of WWI and the end of WWII, Pittsburgh was the modern

Detroit.

It was the era of muckraking journalism, and the Steel City was the “favorite target” of

many headlines: “Is Pittsburgh Civilized?” (Harper’s, 1930) and “Pittsburgh: What a City

Shouldn’t Be” (Forum, 1938) are just a few examples.91 H. L. Mencken wrote of “unbroken and

agonizing ugliness…sheer revolting monstrousness of every house in sight.”92 At the end of

World War II, as Detroit was hailed as the “Arsenal of Democracy,” the Wall Street Journal

rated Pittsburgh a “class D” city.93 The air was polluted, there was sewage in the water, rats ran

in the streets, and city blocks displayed poorly built and ill-maintained homes. The rivers that

gave Pittsburgh its beneficial location were threatening to flood every spring, property values

dropped an average of $10 million every year, and 40% of existing office space sat empty. 94

Several of the city’s largest corporations—Alcoa (aluminum), Westinghouse (electric), and US

Steel, to name a few—“had purchased real estate in New York with intentions of moving east.”95

“Pittsburgh in the 1940s was not a place you wanted to be,” says Brian Jensen, Senior

Vice President of the ACCD. “The quality of life was low-grade; the streetlights literally came

on at 10 o’clock morning because there was so much smog and air pollution.”96 These conditions

90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid. 93 Dan Fitzpatrick, “The Story of Urban Renewal,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 21, 2000, http://old.post-

gazette.com/businessnews/20000521eastliberty1.asp.94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Brian Jensen (Senior Vice President, ACCD), in discussion with the author, April 2014.

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set a “foundation for cooperative action within the private sector.”97 Voluntary associations were

springing up across the city to address a collective concern for the direction the city was taking,

the most elite of which “proved to be the crucible of regional physical, environmental, and social

planning.”98 Such groups supplied corporate commitment, consolidated the network of

organizations, and prioritized the redevelopment agenda.99 The Pennsylvania Economy League

(PEL) and the Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association (PRPA) were born of this movement

and continue to serve as the primary research arms for both downtown and regional concerns.100

However, these efforts were not enough to bring about effective legislation. The private sector

was form without substance; it “could not implement plans without the legal authority provided

by the public sector, and this power was relatively weak.”101

In 1939, a community group was organized to bring famed New York Parks

Commissioner Robert Moses to the city to make recommendations.102 He suggested “the city

build a new park at the Point, build several new highways and clear the Lower Hill District, a

neighborhood of blacks and immigrants plagued by overcrowding, faulty sanitation, and

absentee landlords.”103 It does not happen: “a succession of Republican governors in Harrisburg

denied the city’s Democratic mayors any funds.”104

A New Dealer named Wallace Richards, desperate to reverse the tide of urban decline in

his hometown, reached out to staunch Republican R.K. Mellon, executive of a vast banking

empire with connections to nearly every large company in western Pennsylvania, and leader of

97 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 164. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid.102 Fitzpatrick, “The Story of Urban Renewal.”103 Ibid. 104 Ibid.

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one of the world’s richest families.105 The unlikely pair became friends and partners in their

mission to save Pittsburgh. Discussing the future of the city midway through WWII in

Washington, D.C., where Mellon was stationed, Mellon said “We’ve either got to do something

about that place or give it back to the Indians.”106

Mellon became president of the PRPA in 1941, a “vehicle by which top business leaders

sought to facilitate action on the improvement of downtown.”107 To consolidate effectiveness in

setting the redevelopment agenda, Mellon backed the creation of the ACCD with considerable

effort and money in 1943.108 There was a now a clear division of power: “the PRPA drew up the

plans, the Economy League did research and organized funding, and the ACCD worked with

public authorities.” 109The ACCD would unexpectedly gain power in 1945 when David

Lawrence, a populist, won the mayoral election.110 The ACCD had wanted the Republican

opponent to win; Lawrence “railed against the city’s elite,” of which the ACCD board was

comprised.111

ACCD attorney Arthur Van Buskirk suggested that Mellon meet with Lawrence and

bring a gift to break the ice. Mellon walked into Lawrence’s office and offered 13.5 acres of his

land for use as a park.112 The private-public partnership was born. David Fitzpatrick stated in the

first part of a five-part series on Pittsburgh’s urban renewal, “in Lawrence, Mellon found a

politician willing to back the Allegheny Conference’s ideas and play the role of thug…In

Mellon, Lawrence found someone willing to poke the business community with a sharp stick.

105 Ibid.106 Ibid.107 Gregory Crowley, The Politics of Place: Contentious Urban Redevelopment in Pittsburgh, (Pittsburgh: University

of Pittsburgh Press, 2005): 46.108 Ibid. 109 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 165.110 Fitzpatrick, “The Story of Urban Renewal.”111 Ibid.112 Ibid.

26

When coal companies resisted new smoke controls, Mellon leaned on Consolidated Coal, the

city’s largest coal company. Mellon could do that because he was Consolidated’s largest

stockholder. When the Pennsylvania Railroad balked at the new regulations, Mellon dialed up

the railroad’s president. Mellon could do that because he was a director at the company.”113 The

28 directors of Mellon Financial held 239 seats on the boards of 185 different companies in the

region; this extensive network of social capital lead Lawrence to remark that Mellon was “a sort

of bell cow in Pittsburgh; as he moved, others moved with him.”114

Later in 1945, Mellon and his deputies Richards and Van Buskirk lobbied the state to

approve the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA), a “powerful tool that allowed Pittsburgh to

seize private properties through eminent domain.”115 Before the URA, the municipal government

had neither the technical staff nor the funds to develop redevelopment plans.116

The nonpartisan, cooperative effort of the PRPA, PEL, ACCD, Allegheny County, and

the City of Pittsburgh developed “The Pittsburgh Package,” a group of bundled proposals put

through the Pennsylvania legislature in 1946.117 The goal of these collective proposals was “to

create a more attractive physical environment to keep corporate headquarters from leaving.”118

Van Buskirk, as vice chairman of the URA (Lawrence was chairman), used his position as

finance chairman of the Allegheny County Republican Committee to push the Pittsburgh

favorable legislation in Harrisburg.119 The governor was persuaded to pass eight of the ten bills in

the so-called Pittsburgh Package, including county smoke control legislation that overrode

railroad exemptions (Pittsburgh would be the first major city to have environmental

113 Ibid. 114 Ibid.115 Ibid. 116 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 165.117 Ibid., 166.118 Ibid.119 Fitzpatrick, “The Story of Urban Renewal.”

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regulations),120 countywide refuse disposal, expansion of county planning commission control

over suburban subdivision plans, the creation of a Pittsburgh parking authority, a county transit

and traffic study commission, a Department of Parks and Recreation, expedition of the Penn-

Lincoln Parkway, and a broadening of the Pittsburgh tax code to include sources other than real

estate.121 Another piece of legislation was passed in 1947, allowing insurance companies to

invest in redevelopment areas.122

Van Buskirk’s efforts also persuaded the state to purchase land and provide funds for

Point State Park and convinced Equitable Life Insurance (a New York based insurer) to buy land

adjacent to the park, pay annual fees to the URA, and put up the stainless steel office buildings

that would later be known as the Gateway Center.123

The Point State Park and Gateway Center plan was a long shot. Mellon and Van Buskirk

had to persuade companies to commit to space not yet built, with rent higher than downtown, and

on land prone to flooding. The gamble paid off; in 1956 Life referred to the Point and Gateway

Center as “Mellon’s Miracle.”124

Other “Pittsburgh Package” initiatives did not work out so well. Expedition of the Penn-

Lincoln Parkway was meant to “alleviate congestion and make (the city) more attractive.”125 The

opposite occurred: residents left for the suburbs in droves, a move they could afford thanks to the

G.I. Bill, “which gave WWII veterans access to long-term mortgages backed by the Veterans

Administration.”126 Despite public and private officials spending more than $5 billion in the

120 Jensen, in discussion with the author.121 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 166.122 Ibid.123 Fitzpatrick, “The Story of Urban Renewal.”124 Ibid. 125 Ibid.126 Ibid.

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second half of the 20th century to repair Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods, the city’s population was on

a continuous decline, never again to surpass its mid-century count of 676,806.127

Like other post-industrial cities of the region, Pittsburgh suffered from this exodus to the

suburbs. The federal government gave the city money to clear the “slums” that developed in the

void left behind by the fleeing middle class and agreed to cover two-thirds of any loss.128

Eminent domain laws stipulate that land seized is seized with an alternative purpose in mind, and

the first redevelopment plan for a razed neighborhood was to be a civic auditorium with a

retractable roof.129 The Lower Hill District, an area very popular with minorities, was first

considered but later dismissed because the area’s density presented a “rehousing problem.”130

Lawrence and city administrators decided on Highland Park, a middle and upper class area

mostly owned by Richard King, uncle to Richard King Mellon.131 Despite petitions and public

hearings against the project, Lawrence refused to budge until King’s lawyer threated the city

with an injunction.132 Opposition from local residents aside, Lawrence smelled defeat: “taking

land from a Mellon relative in a wealthy neighborhood may have posed a serious legal threat to

Lawrence’s larger urban redevelopment plans.”133

In the end, Lawrence chose to clear the Lower Hill District.134 Politically, it was the right

move as the lively but overcrowded neighborhood could not assemble cohesive opposition.135

Official reasons cited for the demolition included that 681 of the 901 homes were “substandard,”

and the crowding encouraged the spread of disease.136 The URA took the neighborhood in 1956,

127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid.

29

removing 1,300 buildings, 413 businesses, and 8,000 people.137 To say the relocation did not go

well would be an understatement; no reparations were made and “homeowners had no contact

with the city until the acquisition had been made.”138 Families forced to leave the integrated Hill

moved mainly to neighborhoods that reflected their own race, creating a segregation problem

where there was not one before, so that “by 1960 Pittsburgh was one of the most segregated big

cities in America.”139

Despite the formation of groups who wanted the city to abandon its demolition plans in

favor of anti-poverty programs,140 local architects attacking the European Modernism on which

the redevelopment was based, and preservationists taking on restoration projects and

campaigning against the demolition of historic buildings, the URA pressed on with

redevelopment by means of demolition.141 After the Lower Hill District was cleared, the URA

took on East Liberty, another Pittsburgh neighborhood. 1,200 homes were razed, the size of the

shopping district was reduced by 1 million square feet, and the middle of the neighborhood was

closed to automobiles. The neighborhood lost hundreds of small businesses and 4,500 people in

four decades. Not even the mayor’s boyhood streets escaped the larger redevelopment vision.

Lawrence was there to tear down “The Point” on May 18, 1950.142 133 buildings and 2 bridges in

the Point came down, leaving 59 acres empty.143 Over the next two decades the area would be

filled with stainless steel office towers, a hotel, an underground parking garage, a luxury

apartment building, a new state park, and a centerpiece fountain.144 What was formerly known as

the Point was now the “Golden Triangle.” Pittsburgh, it would appear, was on its way back:

137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid.

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“(in reference to Golden Triangle project) Of the $118 million in costs, only $600,000 came from public

coffers. By 1967, 22,000 people worked in the area, compared with 4,000 before 1950. The project,

which spurred a mid-century transformation known as the “Renaissance,” elevated Lawrence

from a political boss into a big-city mayor and governor, landed multibillionaire banker Richard King Mellon on

the cover of TIME and thrust Pittsburgh into the national spotlight for the first time since the age of

Andrew Carnegie, George Westinghouse, and Henry Clay Frick.”145

As mayor, Lawrence used his clout in county politics to influence the state legislature,

but as governor, he provided Pittsburgh with ties to state-level political power.146 During his four

year term, Pittsburgh benefitted from roadside improvements and bridge construction, a $100

million flood control project, $300 million for further construction of the Pittsburgh airport, and

a statehouse-backed pressure on public authorities to coordinate development and financing.147

In “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” Doctor of Sociology Louise Jezierski

places the first Pittsburgh Renaissance between 1943 and 1970.148 However, all of the Pittsburgh

experts interviewed were in consensus that the two most instrumental decades were the 1940s

and 50s. Jensen said, “Renaissance I fundamentally changed the way Pittsburgh operates.

Without the groundwork it laid, both in improving basic quality of life and in creating long

lasting public-private partnerships, the successes of Renaissances II and III would not have been

possible.”149 The decisions made were a tough sell in the short term, but they saved the city for

the century to come.150

Although Renaissance I mostly focused on downtown development, there was also a

post-war investment of more than $1 billion into the steel valleys, even though America’s steel

145 Ibid.146 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 166. 147 Ibid.148 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 159. 149 Jensen, in discussion with the author. 150 Russell, in discussion with the author.

31

industry was already losing some of its edge.151 Labor unions, churches, and neighborhood

groups were still supportive of a strategy to keep “Old Pittsburgh” by “mobilizing against

economic disinvestments in the manufacturing sector.152 “Although the public-private partnership

Renaissance I did succeed in preserving Pittsburgh as a corporate headquarters city, it failed to

stop either the gradual decline of steel and other manufacturing or the continued loss of jobs;”

hence, the stage was set for Renaissance II.153

Renaissance II

The era of the second Pittsburgh Renaissance is identified as one and the same with the

mayoral administration of Richard Caliguiri, from 1977 to 1988. Caliguiri, a Democrat, was

president of the city council when Mayor Peter Flaherty was appointed Deputy Attorney General

for the Carter administration in 1977.154 Before leaving office, Flaherty delivered on his election

promises to sever close ties with the ACCD and existing political machine, “promoting

neighborhood as opposed to downtown development, while dismantling the machine through

major cuts in personnel, thus depleting its patronage reserves.”155 Caliguiri did in fact become the

second mayor to “defeat the machine,” but it was not through the attacking style of his

predecessor.156 Rather, Caliguiri treated the political and growth machines with indifference, and

so community development corporations (CDCs) entered into the tradition of public-private

partnership.157

Taking over as interim mayor, Caliguiri inherited a foundation of established formal ties

to neighborhoods to build on. On his first day in office, Caliguiri re-normalized relations with the

151 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 167. 152 Hyung, “Regional Restructuring and Urban Regimes,” 12.153 Ibid. 154 Barbara Ferman, Challenging the Growth Machine: Neighborhood Politics in Pittsburgh and Chicago, (Lawrence,

KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996): 39. 155 Ferman, Challenging the Growth Machine, 39. 156 Ibid. 157 Hyung, “Regional Restructuring and Urban Regimes,” 13.

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ACCD by phoning their office and declaring his intention to focus on partnerships.158 At first

Caliguiri insisted he would not be seeking re-election and thus opted out of the Democratic

primary in the spring of 1978.159 After changing his mind later in the year, Caliguiri sought re-

election in the general election as an independent on the slogan, “It’s another Renaissance.”160

The Pittsburgh-for-Caliguiri ticket edged out the party-endorsed candidate, Thomas Foerster, by

approximately 5,300 votes (out of a rough total of 147,000). 161 With re-election a renewed

commitment to economic development and to economic-political partnerships was set in motion

and the administration boldly decided to call this plan Renaissance II.162

In addition to the close partnership with the ACCD that he initially sought, Caliguiri set

up contacts with neighborhood groups and philanthropic foundations.163 “Caliguiri strengthened

the formal linkages between city government and neighborhood organizations and increased the

flow of resources to those organizations;” this system would be referred to as the “politics of

group mobilization.”164Described by Jezierski as “a dual-state structure of consisting of an

electoral sphere and a quasi-state sphere typical of partnerships,” the emphasis on neighborhood

politics “allows the state to avoid the constraints of the electoral system.”165

The new decade brought with it some challenges demanding a response. Firstly, the

American economy was deindustrializing. Japan’s economic star was rising, and low-cost

manufacturing states in east and southeast Asia were quick studies.166 In 1963, Japan, South

Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and China held a

158 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 171.159 Ferman, Challenging the Growth Machine, 39. 160 Ibid., 94. 161 Ibid. 162 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 171. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid.165 Ibid.166 Crowley, The Politics of Place, 91.

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combined share of 5.9% of world manufacturing output; by 1994 these same countries held

29.2%, and in the same period of time the U.S.’ share fell from 40% to 26.9%.167 Mirroring these

statistics was manufacturing sector employment numbers for the two regions. The steel industry

was not exempt from the transition to Asia, as American steel producers utilized new automation

technology where they could and outsourced production where they could not.168 U.S. Steel,

based in Pittsburgh, began investing in developing countries that exported steel in the early

1970s, and “announced in 1979 that it would permanently close twelve steel plants, half of which

were in Pittsburgh, resulting in the loss of 14,000 jobs in southwestern Pennsylvania.”169

Meanwhile the other last name in Steel City, Mellon, acquired controlling interests in

LTV Corporation, a large conglomerate. LTV “bought out J&L Steel, closed its Pittsburgh

plants, and entered a partnership with Sumitomo Steel Company of Japan.”170 The total cost of

deindustrialization to Pittsburgh was the loss of over 100,000 manufacturing jobs between 1979

and 1987.171 The service sector experienced sharp growth in compensation, but the opportunities

were inferior to previous ones in the unionized mills. At the time, the average annual income in

the region for a laborer in manufacturing was $36,989, compared to $24,442 for a service worker

of equal educational background. Despite more jobs created in the twenty year period between

1970 and 1990 than lost (approximately 170,000 and 100,000, respectively), the postindustrial

transition was one of economic hardship for Pennsylvanians. Secondly, not only was the

manufacturing base eroding, but federal aid to cities was being cut. Pittsburgh’s allocated

Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) money went from $26 million in 1980 to $17

million in 1986.172

167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid.172 Ibid., 101.

34

Together, these factors were a catalyst for the administration’s conscious effort to

diversify the local economy and step up as the region’s capital. In 1986 Caliguiri publicly

observed that “the steel industry is down. It might come back, and I hope it will, but in the

meantime we must attempt to revitalize our economy…The future, as I see it, is in high

Technology, it is in our educational and health institutions, in our research and development.”173

The rebalancing towards technology and services to diversify the region planted the seeds of

Renaissance III; taking what could be saved from the manufacturing base—the research and

development arm—and running with it.174

By the early 1980s, the “New Pittsburgh” strategy endorsed by corporations, civic

leaders, and non-profits such as the hospitals and universities was unchallenged, due to the

“competitive edge of the region’s steel industry being totally destroyed.”175 With the rapid

collapse of the steel industry, conflicts within business organizations were irrelevant and

demands from labor unions received little attention.176 The moniker “Steel City” was the only

remnant of “Old Pittsburgh.”

To better understand what “New Pittsburgh” meant for the regional economy, the ACCD

organized an Economic Development Committee (ECD) in 1981.177 The ECD’s final report, “A

Strategy for Growth: An Economic Development Program for the Pittsburgh,” was issued in

1984 and outlined their proposed economic development strategy for the region in five vital

points:178

173 Ibid.174 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 172.175 Hyung, “Regional Restructuring and Urban Regimes,” 13. 176 Ibid. 177 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 172.178 Ibid.

35

1. “The forces that caused Pittsburgh’s decline are irreversible, and the area will never return to

primary metals and durable goods manufacturing. Nor will Pittsburgh be allowed to be so vulnerable

to a single type of industry in the future. The economy must diversify to enjoy continued stability.”

2. “A development strategy should pursue a mix of business in different industries, both product- and

service-oriented industries, and a mixture of mature and new activities.”

3. “The strategy should be long term and avoid quick fixes. There is no way to solve the massive

unemployment problem within a year or two, but a long-term solution of developing employment

sources is less likely to have severe cycles of unemployment in the future.”

4. “The strategy should be oriented to the private sector and market driven, and it should encourage

private investment. A strong and supportive public sector is important, however, to provide

transportation improvements, training and retraining, tax policy, and a supportive climate for

investment.”

5. “The strategy should call for coordinated action rather than central planning.”179 (all emphasis

mine)

Like the ambitious proposals of Renaissance I, implementing the ECD’s proposals

required state funding and “increased authority capabilities.”180Along with city council officials,

the ACCD prepared a bundled package of proposals called “Strategy 21” for presentation to the

state legislature.181 Spending requests included $97 million for improvements at Pittsburgh

Airport, $57.5 million for three Pittsburgh redevelopment projects (Three Rivers Stadium, Strip

Districts, and Herr’s Island), $49 million for 11 redevelopment projects in the Monongahela

Valley, $150 for highway improvements, and $71 million for advanced technology research at

city universities.182 Even outlined for officials in Harrisburg to see exactly where the money was

going and why the immoderate amount was necessary, Strategy 21 invoked controversy.

Remarks Jezierski,

“The Partnership professed that its goals were designed in the public’s interest, yet all the budget

requests were for large capital improvements that did not directly address the needs of

179 Ibid.180 Ibid., 173.181 Ibid.182 Ibid.

36

neighborhoods or labor. The partnership saw small business development as the key to structural

unemployment.”183

The ACCD assessed the area’s resources and “decided that pursuing high tech was a

viable economic strategy.”184 According to the Regional Industrial Development Corporation of

Southwestern Pennsylvania (RIDC), the Pittsburgh MSA already had “more than 25,000 resident

scientists, engineers, and technicians; 170 research laboratories, a combined corporate budget of

more than $1.5 billion spent annually on research and development.”185 The same year that the

ECD’s report came out, southwestern Pennsylvania employed more than 40,000 in over 400 high

tech firms.186 This base of technologically knowledgeable workers was owed to the city’s

manufacturing legacy—in addition to locating their headquarters in Pittsburgh, firms such as US

Steel, Alcoa, PPG, and Westinghouse also kept their centers of research and development

there.187 These firms understood that to survive they could not be stuck in the past and focused on

developing “new products such as optics…., robotics, and industrial automated controls.”188

Rather than aggressively recruit high tech firms from outside the region to relocate to Pittsburgh,

or “chip chasing,” the strategy pursued was to build a local “farm system, drawing on inherent

regional strengths in software and automation.”189

An organizational infrastructure was quickly set up: the High Technology Council (HTC)

was set up in 1983, with board members from the RIDC, local universities, and small and large

corporations.190 By 1985 the HTC boasted 300 organizational members, representing 131 high-

tech companies, 136 professional service companies, and 24 civic, academic, and entrepreneurial

183 Ibid. 184 Ibid. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid., 174.188 Ibid. 189 Ibid. 190 Ibid.

37

organizations.191 The same year that the HTC was set up, the local universities created their own

group, the Western Pennsylvania Advanced Technology Center (WPATC), to focus on the

development of robotics, biological and biomedical technology, high-tech materials, and coal

processing.”192 This information may seem repetitive, but it is included to emphasize the

dedication and cooperation of public and private Pittsburgh to heed the advice of the EDCs

report. University research is key to new industry development, so linkages with those

universities are absolutely essential.193 The Enterprise Corporation of Pittsburgh (ECP) aids in

fostering these linkages between the universities and larger corporations, and manages the pool

resources for venture capital.194 With the infrastructure firmly in place, Renaissance III was

poised to take Pittsburgh through the 1990s and into the next century.

Interestingly, near the end of Caliguiri’s administration, Pittsburgh voters passed a

referendum to establish district elections for the city council, instead of electing all members at-

large.195 Despite Caliguiri’s emphasis on neighborhoods and cooperative partnerships, or

perhaps because of it, citizens decided they would be better served as constituents in separate

districts rather than the city as a whole. This separated the mayor’s office from the city council,

and created the potential for even greater divisions among the branches of Pittsburgh

government.196

After Caliguiri died in office in 1988, city council president Sophie Mastoff took over as

mayor.197 Her administration continued the “strong relationship between neighborhoods and City

191 Ibid. 192 Ibid.193 Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 Crowley, The Politics of Place, 104.196 Ibid., 111. 197 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 171.

38

Hall,” but the late 1980s the economic initiatives organized earlier in the decade had matured to

sustain economic development without close political oversight.198

Renaissance III

Renaissance III almost did not get off the ground, as the organizational infrastructure set

up at the end of Caliguiri’s administration stalled in the early 1990s. Pittsburgh and Allegheny

County continued to suffer net population losses through the 1990s, especially of college-

educated young adults (the phenomenon known as “brain drain”).199 In 1992, the Pittsburgh

metropolitan area had the slowest employment growth in the U.S.200 In that same year, the

ACCD published another report, pinning the new decade’s malaise on the unfamiliar lack of

regional cohesion: “Key stakeholders from business, labor, government, education, civic

organizations and foundations in Southwestern Pennsylvania do not have a widely shared vision

of what the region’s economy can be.”201 The report went on to reference the “sheer

proliferation” of public-private cooperation since the era of Renaissance I.202 In 1993 there were

over 200 active organizations in the region (compared to the fewer than 25 during Renaissance

I), but the exceptional coordination was not there; instead the organizations were plagued with

“factionalism, fragmentation, and overlapping agendas which divert attention from solving real

problems.”203

Naturally, the solution to this discontent was to create more organizations, with more

clearly defined initiatives. Two of the most important groups created during the 1990s were the

Pittsburgh Downtown Partnership (PDP) and the Pittsburgh Urban Magnet Project (PUMP).204

198 Ibid. 199 Crowley, The Politics of Place, 104. 200 Ibid., 105. 201 Ibid. 202 Ibid. 203 Ibid.204 Ibid.

39

PDP was created by the ACCD in 1994 with the mission to foster a “clean, safe, accessible, and

vibrant downtown.”205 The group works with other agencies to help market downtown as the

business and cultural center of the region, with a special focus on the Golden Triangle (aka “The

Point” of Renaissance I focus).206 PDP created a business improvement district in 1997 to pay

for cleaning, marketing, and other services for businesses in the Golden Triangle.207 PUMP was

formed in 1995 by a University of Pittsburgh graduate student “in order to advocate issues

affecting “young and young-thinking people” in Pittsburgh.”208 The rationale was, if 20-39 year

olds are the future of Pittsburgh, why not treat them like it? PUMP made the region more

attractive to young professionals by involving them in the political and civic scene.209 The City of

Pittsburgh gives credit to PUMP for helping to build its younger image by advocating for its

members to sit on the city’s organizational boards.210

The broader importance of the aforementioned groups is that because they are

“autonomous from local growth coalitions, but [have] stakes in local redevelopment issues,”

Pittsburgh “began to create a more pluralistic system of redevelopment politics” when State

Senator Tom Murphy was elected mayor of Pittsburgh.211

Murphy “responded to the region’s continued economic decline with an aggressive urban

growth agenda that emphasized investing in the preservation and strengthening of downtown and

reusing older industrial sites for business retention, expansion, and relocation opportunities.”212

205 Ibid. 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid., 106.210 Ibid. 211 Ibid., 108.212 Ibid.

40

The goal was to increase shopping, dining, entertainment in the downtown area, which was

declining because of growth in the suburbs.213

To finance his agenda, Murphy established the Pittsburgh Development Fund (PDF) and

the Strategic Investment Fund (SIF).214 PDF started with a budgetary commitment from the city

of $7 million annually, with banks and foundations agreeing to match the contribution, “resulting

in $120 million for low-interest, flexible financing of redevelopment projects.”215 SIF started

with “$40 million of private contributions from thirty regional corporations, foundations, and

individuals.”216 It provided financial incentives (flexible loan terms and deferred interest) for

private developers to partner with the city on large-scale redevelopment projects.217

PDF and SIF financed several projects, including the 1.5 million square foot David L.

Lawrence Convention Center (named after the Mayor who ushered in Renaissance I) and Penn

Avenue Place, a $56 million renovation of turn of the 19th century dry goods department store

into a 560,000 square foot office and retail complex (the Pittsburgh Historical Landmarks

Foundation (PHLF) designated the building a historic landmark and it was carefully adapted to

be a high energy office and retail space.).218

Not all PDF/SIF projects were successful. A Lazarus department store, financed by

“absorbing $48 million in public subsidies,” folded in 2004, after only 5 years in operation.219 All

of these large redevelopment deals were highly scrutinized by the public. It was a pluralistic

political environment, and most, if not all, of these projects made use of eminent domain and had

incredible price tags attached.220 This is another way in which the think tanks and autonomous

213 Ibid. 214 Ibid., 109. 215 Ibid. 216 Ibid. 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. 219 Ibid. 220 Ibid.

41

groups were important; they had the capacity to come in and “mobilize credible challenges to

corporatist-style redevelopment projects.”221

Eminent domain, which was not a tool of Renaissance II, was crucial to the strategy of

Renaissance III. The difference between Pittsburgh’s use of eminent domain during Renaissance

I and the 1990s was that “as the economy diversified, no longer could a single individual such as

R.K. Mellon speak for the entire business community.”222

In October of 1999, Mayor Tom Murphy presented his “bold new plan to remake

Pittsburgh’s distressed retail district.”223 The plan was called “Market Place at Fifth and Forbes”

and proposed a $480 million redevelopment of the downtown area, calling for the demolishment

of 62 properties and replacing 125 local businesses with upscale retailers and restaurants.224

Critics immediately compared the mayor’s Market Place agenda to the demolition and rebuilding

projects of Renaissance I. Officials from Murphy’s administration for two years had “kept the

community out of the planning process by not inviting participation and by keeping a tight grip

on information that opponents would have needed to adequately respond to the plan.”225 Pages

112 to139 of Crowley’s The Politics of Place chronicle the process by which various

neighborhoods groups, CDCs, and previously mentioned organizations, inspired by the

cooperation shown in Renaissance I, joined together to ultimately defeat the mayor’s plan, and

presented an alternative of their own.

Another incredibly important facet of the third Renaissance was the purposeful

investment in the already strong research university community. The Murphy administration and

URA worked together to get federal and state funding for the Carnegie Mellon University-NASA

221 Ibid., 110.222 Ibid., 111. 223 Ibid., 1.224 Ibid.225 Ibid., 127.

42

Robotics Engineering Consortium Initiative with the purpose of exploiting the commercial

potential of robotics technologies.226 Today, Carnegie Mellon is leading the world in robotics

research, and people from outside the Pittsburgh region seek treatment at the University of

Pittsburgh medical system.227 Unlike industry, universities are incredibly invested in their

physical capital.228 They are not going to leave their location like a company could. Current

Mayor of Pittsburgh Bill Peduto had this to say about the “Eds & Meds” impact on his city: “The

[steel] mills never left. They just moved up the hills, and [now] they’re called [University of

Pittsburgh Medical Center], and Carnegie Mellon and the University of Pittsburgh.”229

V. Conclusion

Across the U.S., cities are very weak. The federal system divides power between the

federal government and the states, leaving cities as urban administrative divisions of their states.

Except for CDBGs, federal funding very rarely goes to cities; rather, it goes to the states to

allocate as they wish. Thus, the federal government has very little influence and control over

cities directly. It would be neither politically likely nor appropriate for the federal government to

intervene on behalf of city’s economic affairs. And in swing states, the government can be

competitive to the point of ineffectiveness: a Republican mayor is not going to give money to a

Democratic municipal administration, and vice versa. But in the case of Detroit, giving more

power directly to the cities is a bad idea—and Lansing agrees.230 “It is like the parable of the

talents in the Bible,” says Renn. “Until you prove you can be trusted with the little things, you

226 Brian Jacobs, Strategy and Partnership in Cities and Regions: Economic Development and Urban Regeneration in Pittsburgh, Birmingham, and Rotterdam, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000): 95.

227 Renn, in discussion with the author. 228 Eric Montarti (policy analyst), in discussion with the author, 2014.229 Ghosh, “A Tale of Three Cities.”230 Lupher, in discussion with the author.

43

are not going to be trusted with the big things. Giving more power to an economic region is a

different story.”231

Regional cooperation, a dominant theme in Pittsburgh’s history of the past hundred years,

has been conspicuously absent in Detroit. The blame for this failure does not rest squarely on the

mayor’s office or the business community, but is rather shared:

“The failure of Detroit’s regime to form a regional coalition cannot be reduced to the failure of an effective

mayor-center coalition to emerge but reflects inadequacies on both sides of the public-private fence and in

fence-building.”232

Detroit has also been plagued by “relatively weak participation in community-based

organizations,” further protecting the mayoralty from contending with popular discontent.233

Another crucial difference between Pittsburgh and Detroit is the linked factors of freeway

expansion and suburbanization. The two cities have had different experiences with highways.

Pittsburgh is among the largest of U.S. cities lacking a beltway (a highway encircling a city, as

opposed to going through it). “Getting around Pittsburgh is painful to travelers because going

through downtown is unavoidable. The benefit to Pittsburgh is that it is very easy to get

downtown; everything converges there in the Golden Triangle.”234

Detroit, in comparison, has more freeway miles per land area than most U.S. cities

because “the auto –dominated economy wanted a landscape that supported its values.”235 These

highways serve little purpose except to help suburbanites further avoid the city. The physical

location that was crucial to Detroit’s initial prosperity is a hindrance now: Michigan is a

peninsula; cross-country traffic does not pass through Detroit the way it does in cities such as

231 Renn, in discussion with the author.232 Hyung, “Regional Restructuring and Urban Regimes,” 17. 233 Ibid., 18. 234 Renn, in discussion with the author. 235 Saunders, “The Reasons Behind Detroit’s Decline.”

44

Indianapolis, or to a lesser extent, Pittsburgh.236 As for suburbanization, Pittsburgh’s lack of a

beltway combined with its significantly hilly topography to limit “the direction and scale of

outward expansion,” relative to Detroit.237 Detroit would lose over a million residents to the

suburbs, while Pittsburgh lost around 300,000. Pittsburgh’s population decline was significant,

but in this case, not comparable. Unlike Detroit, the region surrounding Pittsburgh never stopped

being absolutely dependent on its urban core.238

Can Detroit Follow the Pittsburgh Model?

A critical analysis of Pittsburgh’s political and economic policy in the 20th century shows

that its success cannot be easily (or quickly) replicated; unfortunately, there “is no silver bullet

for solving chronic Rust Belt problems.”239 Jezierski identifies three reasons why the Steel City’s

turnaround is not reproduced across the Great Lakes region:

“First, the particular and compelling leadership of the Mellon interests was crucial in organizing the private

sector. Second, the corporate resources available in Pittsburgh are shared by only a few metropolitan areas.

Third, local government had to extend decision making authority to private sector groups that could

underwrite the planning process.”240

However, if Detroit is to intentionally emulate the Pittsburgh model, there are five

specific obstacles to overcome.

First, it must be noted that Detroit cannot utilize the powers of eminent domain like

Pittsburgh did in Renaissance I, simply because it cannot financially afford to. Even though

blighted, abandoned structures are magnets for arson, crime, and injury, each building would

236 Renn, in discussion with the author.237 Dr. Stephanie Ryberg-Webster (professor of urban affairs), in discussion with the author, 2014.238 Russell, in discussion with the author. 239 Francis, “Why Detroit Won’t Have a Pittsburgh Renaissance.”240 Jezierski, “Pittsburgh: Partnerships in a Regional City,” 178.

45

cost an average of $20-25 thousand to raze.241 That is a luxury Detroit does not at the present

have. There is also a lack of political will; with so many structures, where do you even begin?242

Second, concerning the “Eds and Meds” component: like Pittsburgh, Detroit does have a

downtown research university. Wayne State University (WSU) is the third largest university in

Michigan, offering more than 370 programs through 13 colleges (including a medical school and

college of engineering) to almost 29,000 students.243 Yet there are a crucial differences for

Detroit: WSU is a public university, whereas Carnegie Mellon University and Duquesne

University are private and the University of Pittsburgh is only state-related (a designation

specific to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; four of its universities receive non-preferred

financial appropriations from the state in exchange for offering tuition discounts to in-state

students, while the university legally remains a separate and private entity). And for native

Michigan students interested in medicine and engineering, not only is world-renowned

University of Michigan (UM) only 45 minutes away from Detroit in Ann Arbor, but the state’s

land grant university, Michigan State (MSU) is an hour away in the capital.244 WSU will never be

able to compete with UM and MSU, not that WSU’s second or third tier status among research

universities negates its status as an asset to Detroit:

“It is clearly important to a city/region to have the presence of major educational institutions from an

innovation and economic development perspective. Universities such as Wayne State fill an

important role in serving the population of their cities, many of whom are lower-income residents, first-time

college students and perhaps unable to attend or afford prestigious institutions such as Carnegie Mellon.

Therefore, It is worth investing in Wayne State - not because it might compete fully with UM or

because it will save Detroit, but rather because it fills an important role in serving Detroit's population.”245

241 Saunders, in discussion with the author. 242 Lupher, in discussion with the author. 243 Katz, “A Growth Strategy for Post-Bankruptcy Detroit.”244 Saunders, in discussion with the author. 245 Ryberg-Webster, in discussion with the author.

46

On that note, Pittsburgh is so much smaller than Detroit, in both square miles and

population, that despite being a major U.S. city and regional capital with a diversified economy,

it is able to be dominated by the research university cluster.246

Third, Pittsburgh’s philanthropic legacy is nearly unparalleled. For generations,

Pittsburghers have grown up with a cadre of wealthy, influential people who have cared about

the community, as evident in the fact that “nearly every cultural institution has the Carnegie of

Mellon name on it.”247 Henry Ford was generous with his estate, but the Ford Foundation is

headquartered in New York City with a global mission to advance human welfare. Carnegie,

Mellon, and H.J. Heinz (Pittsburgh business magnate of the 57 varieties fame) had a different

focus. Mellon, described as shy and reluctant, stayed in Pittsburgh and spent his adult life

participating in public-private partnerships for the benefit of the city because his father “revered

Pittsburgh.”248 Heinz had a devout Christian faith that compelled him to philanthropy and civic

engagement—not only was Heinz chairman of the committee in charge of devising ways to

protect Pittsburgh from floods, but he left an endowment that is among the largest in the United

States, with a specific southwestern Pennsylvania outlook in its mission statement.249 As for the

steel tycoon himself,

“Carnegie instilled a civic soul in every Pittsburgher. He left for the city a legacy with a great emphasis on

educating the youth, which itself is a hallmark of Carnegie’s Scottish heritage and the Scottish golden age

of enlightenment. This tradition has really given the altruistic foundations in Pittsburgh the

capacity to pick the city up on their back when the need arose.”250

246 Renn, in discussion with the author. 247

248 Fitzpatrick, “The Story of Urban Renewal.”249 Jensen, in discussion with the author.250 Russell, in discussion with the author.

47

Fourth, even if Detroit does take steps to grow and diversify the local economy, they will

be late coming to that strategy. Pittsburgh, by contrast, not only responded to the region’s

economic problems with public-private

cooperation, but they did so early, with gaze set

on the long-term. The ECDs report declaring that

the economy had to diversify if the city was to

prosper, that decisions had to be made with the

long-term consequences in mind, and that private

invest had to be courted, was published 30 years

ago, and taken to heart then. Renaissance III

would diversify Pittsburgh in the 1990s during Mayor Murphy’s administration, with policies

and economic initiatives out of City Hall intentionally shifting the economic base to education,

tourism, health care, medicine, finance, and robotics. The change didn’t happen overnight;

Pittsburgh would not be considered a technology and research hub until the 2000s.

Finally, although the focus of the research intended to be purely economic and political,

with demographic differences as sharply contrasted as those in Detroit and Pittsburgh, the

addressing the question of the influence race has on a city is inevitable. Of the 100 largest

metropolitan areas of the United States, Pittsburgh comes second only to Scranton in

northeastern Pennsylvania when ranking the percentage of the white population, an incredible

87%.251 To put that in perspective, Pittsburgh is whiter than Amish Lancaster County,

Pennsylvania; whiter than the center of the world’s Mormon population, Salt Lake City; whiter

251 William H. Frey, “The New Metro Minority Map: Regional Shifts in Hispanics, Asians, and Blacks from Census 2010,” Brookings Institution (2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2011/8/31%20census

%20race%20frey/0831censusr acefrey.

48

than agrarian centers such as Des Moines, Iowa; and whiter than isolated regions like Boise,

Idaho. Urban analyst Aaron Renn puts it bluntly: “Cities that are all white are just going to look

better statistically because white people have the best statistics. That’s why Pittsburgh, Portland,

and Seattle look so good.”252 There are historical and geographical factors for Pittsburgh’s lack of

diversity. Pittsburgh was settled largely by Scottish and Irish immigrants, which culturally are

clannish.253 Pittsburghers are very proud that the city has developed its own insular dialect,

famous for saying “yinz” where people from the American South would say “y’all.”254 It can be

very hard for an outsider to move into a parochial, tightly networked community like that.255 The

previously mentioned effect of highways also affected migration: after WWII Detroit was easily

accessible, whereas Pittsburgh lacked a transportation network to get southern blacks into the

city.256

Detroit, by contrast, was 82% black as of the 2010 census.257 Both cities have the short-

term advantage that comes from being homogenous: it is easier done in an unvarying

environment because you do not have to reconcile competing views. However, it is not advisable

to actively eschew diversity.258

The Current Situation and Next Steps

With filing bankruptcy, Detroit can tell its citizens, “We know where rock bottom is: this

is it. This is the worst. Know at least that the financial state is out in the open.”259 Now that

Detroit is greatly relieved of its debt, the main priorities are finding a way to bring in new

252 Francis, “Why Detroit Won’t Have a Pittsburgh Renaissance.”253 Russell, in discussion with the author. 254 Renn, in discussion with the author. 255 Russell, in discussion with the author. 256 Jensen, in discussion with the author. 257 “State and County QuickFacts: Detroit (city), Michigan,” United States Census Bureau (2014),

http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/26/2622000.html.258 Renn, in discussion with the author. 259 Ibid.

49

revenue, becoming more effective at levying taxes, and getting substantially better at providing

services.260

It seems like a catch-22. Detroit has a hard time selling itself to future potential residents

and businesses for its rate of violent crime, poor education, sub-standard housing and services,

and degraded infrastructure, but these factors are hard to change without tax-paying residents

providing a tax base to fund city services and without jobs putting money into the local

economy. Which side has to give first? Some academics reason that “more people will move to

an expensive, high-tax city like New York, than a cheap, high-tax one like Detroit because of the

massive differential in services.”261 Others hold a more positive line— that Downtown and

Midtown are a stark contrast to the neighborhoods, and young people are attracted to the low

overhead cost and attractive start-over mentality.262 Lupher spoke for the Woodward Avenue

corridor: “People know that the police and fire departments have a presence in the area, so they

also see opportunity. Detroit will grow from there, just not as fast as before.”263 Another reason

for hope in Detroit is Michigan’s recent enactment of “schools of choice.”264 Previously couples

did not want to raise their families in Detroit for the poor school system, but now that there are

charter school options it is possible they will reconsider. “It’s hard to see it for the bleak

statistics, but it is there,” Saunders continues. “For a while, there will be two Detroits.”265

The seeds of Detroit’s renewal are there: even after losing 1.1 million people since 1950,

Detroit still maintains a population density on par with Portland and Minneapolis, and more than

Atlanta, Dallas, or Houston.266 The city now needs to find multiple new economic footholds.

260 Lupher, in discussion with the author. 261 Dalmia, “No Utopia for Detroit,” 10. 262 Saunders, in discussion with the author. 263 Lupher, in discussion with the author. 264 Ibid.265 Saunders, in discussion with the author. 266 Ibid.

50

Although Detroit has an out of the way location compared to the rest of the United States, it still

remains the apex of US-Canadian commercial traffic, which has only increased since the passage

of NAFTA.267 It is extremely unlikely that geographic advantage will ever ebb, so it should be

capitalized on, such as building a new bridge to span the Detroit River. Detroit can also look to

capitalize on the fact that the area airport is a major hub with many non-stop flights to Asia, a

holdover legacy from the auto industry.268 There is also a push to reclaim the city’s music

heritage; to make an R&B equivalent to Nashville.269

Until the city finds a way to bring in new revenue, what little resources it has must be

invested wisely. If the remaining amount allocated for infrastructure is spent equally across the

city, if it will make little to no impact.270 Instead, local officials will have to spend it on

concentrated areas, which requires the hard task of telling residents on lonely blocks that they are

no longer going to invest in that area.271 The municipal finance system currently in place in

Michigan does not work very well, with the income from casino and gaming tax long ago having

surpassed its property tax counterpart.272 Hopefully Saunders in right when he boldly claims,

“Detroit is going to have a prominence by nature of its place in American history. It’s a big city.

Big cities don’t go away.”273

As for Pittsburgh, Mayor Peduto has gone on the record as saying “there will not be a

Renaissance IV.”274 Regardless, the city has retained the lessons of its three seasons of

redevelopment. Pittsburgh maintains an economy that is diversified and non-complacent, as well

267 Ibid. 268 Renn, in discussion with the author. 269 Saunders, in discussion with the author. 270 Ryberg-Webster, in discussion with the author. 271 Ibid. 272 Lupher, in discussion with the author.273 Saunders, in discussion with the author.274 Montarti, in discussion with the author.

51

as a workforce that is educated and nimble.275 For example, five years ago people were not

familiar with the terms horizontal drilling, fracking, or shale gas; “low and behold, there’s a lot

of money in that in southwest Pennsylvania. An entire new industry is growing out of that.”276

God forbid the technological industry is ever eclipsed, it will be interesting to see how Pittsburgh

reinvents itself once again.

VI. Appendix

Abbreviations

ACCD Allegheny Conference on Community Development

AIPP Allegheny Institute of Public Policy

CDBG Community Development Block Grant

CDC community development corporation

CRCM Citizens Research Council of Michigan

DEDC Detroit Economic Development Corporation

GM General Motors

HTC High Technology Council

MSA Metropolitan Statistical Area

MSU Michigan State University

PEL Pennsylvania Economy League

PDF Pittsburgh Development Fund

PDP Pittsburgh Downtown Project

PHLF Pittsburgh Historical Landmarks Foundation

PRPG Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association

PUMP Pittsburgh Urban Magnet Partnership

RIDC Regional Industrial Corporation of Southwestern Pennsylvania

SIF Strategic Investment Fund

UM University of Michigan

URA Urban Redevelopment Authority

275 Jensen, in discussion with the author. 276 Ibid.

52

WPATC Western Pennsylvania Advanced Technology Center

WSU Wayne State University

Interview Questions

(for Detroit experts)

1. Do you think Detroit reflects America; that it is symbolic and representative of the US

industrial revolution, dominance, and decline? Or is it a city set apart, too unique to be

our national vanguard?

2. Why Detroit in the first place? Was it simply because Henry Ford was from the area, and

that was an era when it was common for people to spend their whole lives in one place?

3. What does civil society in Detroit look like?

4. What is the average turnout at City Hall meetings?

5. Can you discuss the effects that Detroit’s cheap housing market will have on the city?

Will that be a factor in attracting people to the area?

6. Is the vast size of Detroit a liability, an example of municipal resources being spread too

thin?

7. How does a city raise revenue without a steady, reliable tax base?

8. Is Detroit’s physical location within the United States a liability? Michigan is a

peninsula; you do not go through Detroit by driving cross-country. For traffic (and

revenue) to go through Detroit, the Motor City must be the destination.

9. What factors lead to Detroit switching in 2013 to a city council elected by districts, as

opposed to the old entirely at-large system?

10. Does Detroit have an inherently higher tolerance for corruption than other American

cities, or is it simply a byproduct of being a one-party town?

11. Do you foresee the Republican Party ever holding sway in Detroit?

12. Why has Detroit not used powers of eminent domain to raze blighted, abandoned

structures?

13. Do you personally view the city’s bankruptcy as something positive (a chance to start

over) or negative (akin to an inappropriate state takeover)?

14. Did the federal bailout of the auto industry just reinforce a mindset of corporate

irresponsibility?

53

15. It seems like a catch-22: Detroit has a hard time selling itself to future potential residents

and businesses for its rate of violent crime, poor education, sub-standard housing, and

degraded infrastructure, but these factors are hard to change unless jobs are putting

money into the local economy. Which side has to give first?

16. After declaring bankruptcy, what steps does Detroit take to get its financial house in

order?

(for Pittsburgh experts)

1. What factors led to Pittsburgh’s initial success as an industrial city?

2. Why do you think there is less literature and journalism covering Pittsburgh’s success, as

opposed to Detroit’s collapse?

3. My research thus far seems to point towards Pittsburgh’s use of eminent domain being

instrumental in its success—first with the Urban Redevelopment Authority in the late

1940s and 50s, with the team of Mellon, Lawrence, and Van Kirk; and then again with

Mayor Murphy’s administration. Eminent domain is obviously controversial. Would say

its potential outweighs the concerns? What is the grace period given to an act of eminent

domain, before history judges the land seized as a success or a failure?

4. Which Renaissance do you think did the greatest good, and why?

5. Do Pittsburghers have a high or low tolerance for corruption?

6. Can you speak to Pittsburgh’s philanthropic legacy and the impact altruistic foundations

have had on the city?

7. Do you think Pittsburgh is vulnerable to another collapse of industry, or is the regional

economy soundly diversified now?

(for both)

1. Can you speculate on the effect of having research universities like Pitt and Carnegie-

Mellon, something Detroit lacks? Is it worth the time, effort, and money to invest in

Detroit’s Wayne State University, with the University of Michigan being only 45 minutes

away?

54

2. Some would argue that suburban sprawl helped to fuel Detroit’s decline, but Pittsburgh

did not avoid the highway system either (to the contrary, it welcomed it). What explains

the discrepancy?

3. Is there something to be said for not being a BIG big city? Detroit’s population is around

700,000; Pittsburgh’s hovers around 300,000. Are there advantages to having a smaller

population and land area, yet still being thought of as a major center of commerce?

4. 2010 census data revealed that Detroit is 92% black, while Pittsburgh is 87% white. How

would address the temptation of some to say that this is just a banner example of white

affluence and black poverty?

5. Both the political left and right point to some broader sociological force as a factor in the

breakdown of the Rust Belt: the liberals point to racism and inequality, while the

conservatives blame the progressive welfare state. I am looking for purely economic or

political factors, but do you believe these concerns need to be addressed?

6. Is it financially safe for government to be a city’s largest employer? Is an economy based

on bureaucracy sustainable?

7. In respect to suburbs, Detroit and Pittsburgh are again opposites. The area surrounding

Detroit is affluent and thriving, while industrial suburbs surrounding Pittsburgh never

bounced back from the recession. How can Detroit build on the economic base of its

surrounding area, and how can Pittsburgh’s suburbs gain momentum off the city’s

prosperity?

8. What do you feel the ideal breakdown of federal, state, and local responsibility is, in

regards to a city’s economic affairs?

VII. Bibliography

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