healt hazard identification_final

FINAL REPORT

for

HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY

FPSO BROTOJOYO

FACILITIES

REV DATE DESCRIPTION PREP’D CHK’D APP’D

TABLE CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND 21.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES 21.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 2

2 HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGY

2.1 OVERVIEW 52.2 HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE 52.3 FACILITY SYSTEM REVIEWED 62.4 HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION GUIDEWORDS 72.4 RISK ASSESSMENT 8

3 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

3.1 LOCATION 123.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION – PROCESS AREA 123.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION – UTILITIES AREA 16

4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 RESULTS OF HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY 19

5 CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION WORKSHEETS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Joint Operating Body (JOB) Pertamina - PetrochinaSalawati is currently undertakingTelukBerau A (TBA) and TelukBerau C (TBC) Field Development, which is located in theSeram Sea East Indonesia. It will provide Petrochina with the FPSO to process, store andoffload crude oil.

The study shows that consequences to people mainly result in major injuries and/orfatalities due to health issues. These hazards are those identified as health hazards, whichresults consequence to personnel.

Since the Brotojoyo FPSO has sufficient mitigation measures in place to address thesignificant hazards identified for health issues occurrence of high severity consequences,based on the estimated probabilities, is very unlikely.

FPSO BROTOJOYO HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION REPORT JANUARY 2015

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND

Joint Operating Body Pertamina - PetrochinaSalawati (Petrochina) is currentlyundertaking the development of TelukBerau-A (TBA) and TelukBerau-C (TBC) fields,which are located in Seram Sea, East Indonesia. The facilities to be installed under thisdevelopment will comprise of the following major components:

• Two fixed wellhead platforms (TBA in Phase 1 and TBC in Phase 2);

• One Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessel i.e. a refurbished60,000 tonne DWT vessel which will be spread moored. The FPSO will be namedBrotojoyo FPSO; and

• One inter-field multiphase sub sea hose.

During production, a flexible high-pressure marine hose into the process facilities onthe Brotojoyo FPSO for treatment transports the well fluids produced from thewellhead platform separately. Oil exporting is performed via offloading operation toa shuttle tanker moored in tandem during the offloading operation. The FPSO willbecome the control center of the overall oil field and provides the Living Quarters(LQ) for the operators. Detailed design is now being carried out for the FPSO. Insupport of this design work, a Health Hazard Identification study is required to beperformed.

The Health Hazard Identification is to be a desktop study and covers hazards from theprocess plant, the shipboard system, as well as the off-loading operation includingnew installation of lift gas compressors and fuel gas system. The findings of this studywill be presented and it will be submitted for review.

1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the Health Hazard Identification study were to:

• Identify potential hazards and reasonably foreseeable accident events within theoverall design life of the facilities related to human health;

• Assign a risk category to each hazard and rank them in accordance with the risk;

• Identify whether mitigation or preventive measures exist and providerecommendation for mitigation measures requirement; and

• Provide initial qualitative guidance on areas where attention may be required tocontrol risks to personnel.

1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The scope of Health Hazard Identification review is limited to the potential hazards ofFPSO Brotojoyo facilities related to the additional equipment and design changeduring Lift Gas Compression additional project. Plant process hazards was examined


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to identify possible consequences which contributes to Health, Safety, andEnvironmental issues and operating problems.

The Health Hazard Identification study includes reviewing previous general HazardIdentification (HAZID) in 2008(BRO-FMS-MNP-20-006) and new additional facilitysuch as lift gas compression system and fuel gas system. All recommendations duringprevious HAZID have been re-visited in this Health Hazard Identificationreview(especially for health issues) by referring the previous Hazard Identification document(BRO-FMS-MNP-20-006).


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2 HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION METHODOLOGY

2.1 OVERVIEW

Health Hazard Identification is an early or the first stage of a risk assessment to defineall the potential hazards from any part of the facility or its operations, which can harmpersonnel, the environment, the asset or the reputation of the company.

The Health Hazard Identification workshop took the form of a structured discussionbased upon a series of hazard guidewords. For each identified hazard, the discussionwas structured so as to consider the following:

Health Hazard description, including cause (potential with which the hazardcould rise), consequence/effect (the possible hazardous incident scenarios whichcould occur) and from what equipment the hazard could occur (if applicable);

Preventive measures, including any existing aspects of the design that prevent,detect, control or mitigate against the hazard; and

Recommendations, further measures that should be considered to reduce thelevels of risk associated with the identified hazard.

A qualitative risk ranking is then made to determine the possible frequency ofoccurrence of these accident events and the severity of their results. The high-riskevents arising from the hydrocarbons handled in the facilities, leading to firesorexplosions and events, which are mainly related to working practices, known asnon- hydrocarbon hazards, are identified so that they can be subjected to detailedevaluation in the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study.

A brief discussion is provided in this report for the major hazards identified, with thefocus on the potential problems, rather than possible solutions. This report is seen asan introduction to the hazard analysis work and it restricts the discussion to arelatively limited level of detail.

2.2 HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION TECHNIQUE

Preliminary Hazards Assessment (PHA) was originally developed to provide astructured approach to the analysis of safety hazards throughout the life cycle of aninstallation. The environmental and health risk assessment processes fulfill acomparable function with respect to environmental and health hazards at all stages ofthe life cycle. These assessments are based on the same concept. The process isapplicable to all business processes in the life cycle of an operation from inception toabandonment. The tools and techniques available are applied in a logical and rigorousway, setting acceptance criteria and screening against them as the process proceeds.The arrangements identified as necessary to manage assessed threats and potentialconsequences and effects are then incorporated in the design phase or for existingoperations it is necessary to verify that what is in place is suitable and sufficient. If not,then remedial action is taken and all necessary procedures are incorporated into theHSE Management System.


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A. Step 1: Identify Hazards and Potential Effects

Systematically identify the hazards, the threats and potential hazardous events andeffects that may affect, or arise from, a company's operation throughout the totallife cycle of the operation.

B. Step 2: Evaluate Risk

Systematically evaluate (assess) the risks from the identified hazardsagainstaccepted screening criteria, taking into account the likelihood of occurrenceand the severity of any consequences to employees, assets, the environment andthe public. This includes the risks associated with deviation from limits set forenvironmental and occupational health hazards.

C. Step 3: Record Hazards and Effects

Record all those hazards and effects identified as significant in relation to thescreening criteria in relevant documents.

D. Step 4: Compare with Objectives and Performance Criteria

Compare the evaluated risks against the detailed HSE objectives and targets for theproject or installation. For all cases these targets must be maintained and beconsistent with the Company Policy, and Strategic Objectives. Performancestandards at all levels must meet the criteria set in the HSE Case, which in turnmust comply with the Company's HSE Management System.

E. Step 5: Establish Risk Reduction Measures

Select, evaluate and implement appropriate measures to reduce or eliminate risks.Risk reduction measures include those to prevent or control incidence (i.e.reducing the probability of occurrence) and to mitigate effects (i.e. reducing theconsequences). Mitigation measures include steps to prevent escalation ofdeveloping abnormal situations and to lessen adverse effects on Health, Safety andthe Environment. Risk reduction measures also include recovery preparednessmeasures that address emergency procedures as well as restoration andcompensation procedures to recover. Revisit Step 3 to record fully theactivity/task requirements.

2.3 FACILITY SYSTEM REVIEWED

For this report, Hazards are identified for various systems of the Brotojoyo FPSO. Thevarious systems of the FPSO are as follows:

Process and Operation systems

The process and operations systems were divided into the following to enable detailedreview of their hazards:


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1. Incoming Piping Line

2. HC Process Module

3. Flare System

4. Compression System (Additional HC Process Module)

The hazards from these systems are identified for the operation phase of the facility’slife cycle.

Ship Systems

The ship systems were divided into the following to enable detailed review of theirhazards:

1. Oil Storage and Offloading

2. Accommodation

3. Machinery and Systems

4. Mooring

The hazards from these systems are identified for the production phase of the facility’slife cycle.

2.4 HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION GUIDEWORDS

The primary objective of this study is to identify potential hazards and possibleaccidents using a generic hazard list. As for a proper Health Hazard Identificationstudy, the Health Hazard Identification uses a checklist approach with predefinedhazards (also known as guidewords). The guidewords used in this study aresummarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Process Variables and Guidewords for Health Hazard Identification

Guide Word Code

1 Toxic / Asphyxiating Gas Release

2 Toxic Liquid

3 Toxic Solid

4 Dropped Objects

5 Noise

6 Heat

7 Cold


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Guide Word Code

8 Electricity

9 Ultramagnetic Radiation

10 Ionizing Radiation

11 Biological Hazards

12 Ergonomic Hazards

13 Psychological Hazards

2.4 RISK ASSESSMENT

The likelihood and effects of the hazards to people, environment, asset and reputationhas been assessed based on the risk-screening matrix presented in Table 2. A semi-quantitative approach, assigning numbers and letters to consequences and likelihoodbased on their severity and frequency, is used. This approach separates the hazards inthe primary two dimensions of likelihood and consequence, with a third dimension ofimpact i.e. what is affected (people, environment, asset and reputation) assessed forincreased resolution of the assessment. The objective of this approach is to separate thehazards allowing for further specific analysis and focused action.

Table 2. Risk Matrix


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Guide Word Code

8 Electricity






2.4 RISK ASSESSMENT




8

Guide Word Code

8 Electricity






2.4 RISK ASSESSMENT




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2.4.1 Likelihood/ Probability Assessment

The assessment of likelihood of occurrence of an event is independent of its effects orconsequences. The likelihood/probability categories stipulated for use by the PHAmethodology are presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Likelihood/Probability Categories used in PHA Analysis

ProbabilityCategory

Definition

A Has not happened in the oil and gas industry

B Has happened in the oil and gas industry in the last 10years

C Has happened in our company in the last 10 years

D Happened once in the last 12 months in our company

E Happens several time per year at this location

2.4.2 Consequence Assessment

The consequence categories specified by the PHA methodology are based on thespecific impacts of a hazard especially for people due to health issues.

The hierarchy of impacts is as presented above. The following subsections present theassessment consequence categories stipulated by the PHA methodology, by impact.

The consequences of the hazard to people consider the severity of injury or thenumber of fatalities resulting should an incident occur. Table 4 presents the definitionof consequences to people.

Table 4. Definition of Consequences to People

ProbabilityCategory

Potential Impact Definition

1 Sight Injury Not detrimental to individuals employability or tothe performance of present work

2 Minor Injury Detrimental to the performance of present work,such as curtailment of activities, or some days ofabsence to recover, up to a maximum of one week

3 Major Injury Leading to permanent partial disability or unfitnessto work or detrimental to performance of work overan extended period, such as long term absence

4 Single Fatality Single fatality or victim with permanent totaldisability or unfitness to work. Also includes the


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ProbabilityCategory

Potential Impact Definition

possibility of multiple fatalities (maximum of 3) inclose succession due to the incident e.g. explosion

5 Multiple Fatality May include four fatalities in close succession dueto the incident, or multiple fatalities (four or more)each at different points and/or with differentactivities


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3 FACILITY DESCRIPTION

3.1 LOCATION

Teluk Berau-A (TBA) and Teluk Berau-C (TBC) fields are located in Seram Sea, EastIndonesia and ismanaged by Thome Offshore Management (TOM) from Singapore.

The facility is located approximately 01o 33’35” south and longitude 130o 31’11” eastat a heading of 270.10.

Management and engineering support is provided from Thome offices in Singapore. Asupporting office is located in Sorong.

3.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION – PROCESS AREA

Topside Separation Process, Flare system and Produced Water processing facility ispresented in the formof simplified block diagram below.

Figure 1. Process Flow Diagram

A. Separation

The separation system separates the well fluid in to oil, gas and water. Productionseparated gas is sent to HP Flare Knockout Drum. Oil is stabilized to meet storagespecification. Produced water is sent to produce water treatment to remove oil fromproduced water to the acceptable level.

Separation train is designed for the following conditions:

• Total Fluid Flow rate : 20,000 BFPD


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• Total Oil Flow rate : 15,000 BOPD

• Produced water flow rate : 18,000 BWPD

•Water Cut : 0-90%

Separation is carried out in three stages. In order to produce stabilized crudeoilspecification as per Exhibit-M Attachment 5 to ITB, viz., RVP of max. 10 psi andwater in Oil content of max. 0.5 % by volume, a three stage separation systemconsisting of First Stage Separator V-100, Second Stage Separator V-200 andElectrostatic Coalescer V-300 has been adopted.

Gas separation from the liquids is achieved in the First stage Separator V-100. Thisseparator design allows up to 2250 BWPD water to be carried over to the Second StageSeparator V-200.

The produced water from Electrostatic Coalescer is returned to the First StageSeparator by means of one of two 100% capacity Produced Water Pumps. Theproduced water from the pumps is also used for sand jetting the First stage Separatorin future.

The First stage Separator (V-100) is designed to operate at a pressure of 215 psia andtemperature 72°F (22°C).

Heating of the fluid at the inter-stage between First stage Separator V-100 and SecondStage Separator V- 200 is provided to flash off the volatile components in Second stageseparator V-200. This is required to reduce the RVP of crude to storage.

The Second Stage Separator is designed to operate at 45 psia and 77°F (25°C).Separator pressure is controlled by a pressure control valve. After the low pressureflashing in V-200, the crude is sent to the Coalescer V-300. Final waterremoval isachieved in the Electrostatic Coalescer V-300.

To operate effectively the Electrostatic Coalescer requires at least 2% BS&W in thefeed. It is expected that the required separation will be achieved. To guarantee the0.5% BS&W it is necessary to have some 2% water in the feed. In the event the FirstStage separation is too effective this can be achieved by raising the water level in theseparator thereby giving greater carry-over.

The Coalescer is of Bielectric design. This design has three electrodes effectivelydoubling the charged field. The Coalescer will operate to specification with up to 15%water in the oil.

The separators are designed based on analysis of fluid dynamics inside the separatorwhen under the influence of Ship’s movement due to environmental condition.

Gas from the Second Stage Separator is flared in a low pressure flare system. The Firststage Separator and Second Stage Separators are provided with pressure controlsystem to vent excess gas to HP and LP flare system respectively.

B. Produced Water Treatment

Produced water treatment system consists of one Hydrocyclone (HC-100) and


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Degasser Drum (V-400). The Hydrocyclone contains centrifugal devices that areenclosed in pressure vessel. After the centrifugal separation produced water is flashedin Produced Water Degassing Drum (V-400) operating at near atmospheric pressure torelease any dissolved gas. Treated produced water is discharged overboard throughlevel control. Off-spec water can be diverted to slops tank manually. Diverting theproduced water to overboard or slop tank is decided based on the results of analyzerAT-400.

C. Condensate Stabilization System

In order to produce stabilized crude oil meeting export specification to ITB, viz., RVPof max. 10 psia and water in Oil content of max. 0.5 % by volume, Crude from theElectrostatic Coalescer is sent to Condensate Stabilization system. CondensateStabilization System consists of Stabilizer column C-100 and Condensate StabilizerReboiler E-200.

The stabilization process reduces vapour pressure, thereby making the crude safe forshipment in tankers. Vapour pressure is exerted by light hydrocarbons, such asmethane, ethane, propane, and butane, changing from liquid to gas as the pressure onthe crude is lowered. If a sufficient amount of these light hydrocarbons is removed, thevapour pressure becomes satisfactory for shipment at approximately atmosphericpressure.

Crude from Electrostatic Coalescer V-300 is fed into the Condensate Stabilizer columnC-100. Condensate Stabilizer column C-100 is a packed column where crude from theElectrostatic Coalescer flows downward to the Reboiler while gas from the Reboilerflows upward stripping the light hydrocarbonfrom the Crude. Condensate StabilizerColumn C-100 is packed with 7.94 m3 random packing over a height of 3600 mm.Condensate Stabilizer Column C-100 is designed to achieve stabilized Crude RVP ofMax.10 psi. It operates at 45 psia and 76°C (168°F).

The resultant condensate from bottom of Condensate Stabilizer Column C-100 is sentto the Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler E-200. Pressure inside the column is maintainedby PT-110 which controls the PV-110. Gas from the Stabilizer column is sent to the LPFlare system under pressure control.

Rated duty of this Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler E-200 is 3652 kW and it is a BKU(Kettle) type Reboiler. Hot oil (Therminol 55) comes from Hot oil supply header isused as heating medium in Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler tube side.

The generated vapour is sent below the bottom tray of the Condensate Stabilizercolumn V-200. Crude is stabilized to meet storage specification Hot oil enters undertemperature control to tube side of Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler E-200.

LICA-211 maintains level inside the shell side of the Condensate Stabilizer Reboiler bycontrolling LV-104 on the outlet of Crude/Crude Exchanger E-100. The Reboiler isprovided with a HH and LL level trip function. The LL level closes the outlet SDV-300while the HH level closes the Condensate stabilizer column inlet/ First stage Separatoroutlet SDV-101.


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D.HP/LP Flare System

There are two flare headers collecting relief loads and vent loads from variousequipment.

HP flare is designed to handle 30 MMSCFD continuous relief and 75 MMSCFDEmergency relief at higher radiation levels. Capacity of HP Flare is 75 MMSCFD.

LP flare is designed to flare the flashed gas from the Second stage separator,Condensate stabilizer Column and Degassing Drum. LP flare capacity is 13 MMSCFD.

Note:During blow down/depressurization of subsea lines Thome will ensure thathydrates are not formed due to pressure reduction.

Separate knockout drums have been provided for LP and HP flare headers. In additiongas outlet from the Degassing Drum and Stabilizer column will also be routed to theLP flare knockout drum. Two LP Knockout drums 1 & 2 have been provided forhandle large quantity of LP gas. Liquid with lower vapor pressure than the operatingpressure of the HP flare Knockout drum will be routed to LP Flare knockout drumthrough the level control system.

Drains from the separation Process module will also be routed to the LP FlareKnockout Drum 1.

Excess heavy liquids from both the LP Flare Knockout Drums have been routed toSlops tank. 2 x 100% pneumatic type LP Flare Knockout Drum Pumps have providedfor boosting the LP Flare Knockout Drum drains to Slops Tank. The LP Flare KnockoutDrum Pump design capacity is 21.7 gpm (5m3/hr).

Two separate flare Stacks are provided for HP and LP Flare system. High-energydirect ignition system has been chosen for flare ignition. The ignition system will thenmonitor the flame using the same electrodes using flame ionization technique.

Flare headers are continuously purged with gas from the production separator. Priorto start up flare headers will be purged with Nitrogen. Provisions have been made forNitrogen purging.

Flare height is calculated on the basis of radiation on the operating deck limited to 501BTU/hr. ft2 (1.58 kW/m2).Thiswillenablemaintenanceworktobecarriedoutonthecompressorswithoilproductionatthe maximum rate. Coincidental wind velocity forthe maximum flow condition has been considered at 11.8 m/s.

Dispersion levels will be limited to 15 % LEL at Air intake or exhaust area and 25 %LEL at the deck level.

Flare gas flow rates and volume are continuously metered and recorded. Purge gasfrom First stage separator gas outlet is provided for continuous purging of both LPand HP Flare headers. Nitrogen is provided as start-up purge gas.

E.Hot Oil System

The hot oil system is used as a heating medium for Condensate stabilizer Reboiler. Oil(Therminol 55) from the expansion vessel is pumped to the Heater where it is heated


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by hot flue gas from burner. The burner uses the fuel gas from the First stage separatoroutlet at required pressure using pressure control and air from external blowerassembly. The hot oil obtained in this process is sent to the Reboiler for heating the un-stabilized crude.

F. Closed Drain

All process equipment with hydrocarbon liquid inventory under normal operatingconditions are provided with closed drains to enable draining of liquid duringmaintenance of these equipment. All hydrocarbon level instruments will also drain into the closed drain header. A systematic collection system is provided to collect closeddrains from different equipment. The collectors are connected to a central closed drainheader that will route all collected fluid to the LP Flare knockout drum.

G. Hazardous Open Drains

Drains from process pancakes shall be collected and routed to the slops tank throughliquid seal. Each pancake is provided with coaming plates to contain the maximumliquid inventory on the pancake. Each pancake is also provided with drain channels tocollect, hold and route the liquid to Hazardous open drain header.

H. Chemical Injection

Chemical injection is envisaged to aid production of oil, gas and water and to controlcorrosion. Corrosion properties and settling characteristics of are not available. Hencebased on the best available information and experience the chemical injection system isdesigned. Provisions are available for addition of any chemicals that may be foundnecessary during production.

Chemical injection will be from dosing tanks. Chemicals from tote tanks will betransferred to dosing tanks using portable pneumatic chemical transfer pumps.

I. Lift Gas Compression and Fuel Gas System

Lift gas compression and fuel gas system is new system and installed separately fromthe main project FPSO Brotojoyo. Details information for lift gas compression and fuelgas system is not available. Refer to the reviewed PID, the gas outlet from V-100 willbe utilized as fuel gas and to gas lift injection system. The liquid outlet of the systemwill be drained to the open drain and closed drain.

3.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION – UTILITIES AREA

The FPSO systems consist of the cargo and ballast system, cargo offloading system,cargo tank control system and inert gas system. These systems extend across the vesseland in conjunction with the hydrocarbon process facilities are supported by utilitiessystems located within the Engine Room. Figure 2 shows utility diagram of FPSOBrotojoyo.

Open deck areas are classified in accordance with the Area Classification. The EngineRoom is designated a non-hazardous area and contains the following main equipmentitems.


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Figure 2. Utility Flow Diagram


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4 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 RESULTS OF HEALTH HAZARD IDENTIFICATION STUDY

The two main elements i.e. Process and Ship Systems of the Brotojoyo FPSO facilitywere systematically reviewed using the detailed PHA Health Hazard Identificationchecklists. The completed sheets are included in Appendix A. Every hazard that wasidentified was assessed with a corresponding frequency and consequence estimatedfor each initiating event. The risk-screening matrix was then used to rank the risk as'Low', 'Med/Marginal' or 'High'. The following are list of recommendation related tohealth issues in facility.

Table 4. Recommendation from Health Hazard Identification

Rec. No Recommendation

1 Perform noise mapping and create noise map to warn personnelregarding to noise hazard

Noise can be potential hazard as new installation of compressor in facility. High noiseof compressor can lessen capacity to hear for human. Noise mapping is required todefined adequate procedure of personal protection when entering facility area,especially compressor system including its engine room. Noise mapping shall beattach and publish in certain area so that every personnel can be informed regardingto area health status.


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5 CONCLUSION

Health Hazard Identification is an early or the first stage of a risk assessment to defineall the potential hazards from any part of the facility or its operations, which can harmpersonnel, the environment, the asset or the reputation of the company.

In total, 2 recommendations raised during the review. Those are related to healthissues especially noise related to new installation of compressor. The study shows thatconsequences to people mainly result in major injuries and/or fatalities.

Since the Brotojoyo FPSO has sufficient mitigation measures in place to address thesignificant hazards identified for Process and Ship Systems, the occurrence of highseverity consequences, based on the estimated probabilities, is very unlikely.


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Appendix A

Health Hazard Identification Review Worksheets


Brotojoyo FPSO ProjectHazard Identification Worksheet Health Risk AssessmentFunctional Group FACILITY AREA

Hazard ID Hazard Cause Effect Preventive Measures

Risk Matrix

Rec. No ReccommendationsHealth Risk1,1 Toxic / Asphyxiating

Gas ReleaseCloud of hydrocarbonvapour released

Risk of asphyxiation ifpersonnel are trapped ingas cloud and cannotescape quickly

Gas detection system inprocess area. Single soliddeck, well ventilated. Airintake points for TR arelocated aft, which is awayfrom process area. Sufficientpocket gas detectors havebeen provided onboard forthe person working aroundincoming pipe line andprocess area.

SIG

1,2 Toxic / AsphyxiatingGas Release

Toxic gas release (H2S)contained in gas withinits IDLH (ImmediatelyDangerous to Life orHealth)

Immediate Fatality due totoxic (i.e. H2S)

Gas detection system inprocess area. Single soliddeck, well ventilated. Useadequate respiratoryprotection while working.

SIG

1,3 Toxic / AsphyxiatingGas Release

Excessive N2 whileperforming purgingactivity

Risk of asphyxiation ifpersonnel lead to fatality

Gas detection system whileperform purging. Useadequate respiratoryprotection while working.

SIG

2,1 Toxic Liquid Spill of chemicals andother toxic liquidmaterials in facility area

Personnel injury. Use adequate personnelprotection while handlingtoxic liquid.

LOW

2,2 Toxic Liquid Oil based sludges Personnel injury. Use adequate personnelprotection while handlingtoxic liquid.

LOW


3,1 Toxic Solid No issues applicable forthis scenario

4,1 Dropped Objects Object dropped fromdeck crane damagesprocess module andcauses leak

Potential injury andfatality to personnel.

Control of lifting operationswhere work permit and safejob analysis were in place.Consider restriction oncrane operational were bein place in material handlingphilosophy.

MED

5,1 Noise High Noise in lift gascompression system

Potential to hearingdissability

Wear proper ear protectionwhile working and aware toworking period in high noisearea.

MED 1 Perform noise mappingand create noise map towarn personnelregarding to noise hazard

6,1 Heat Heat exposed to humanfrom high temperaturecontainment surface.


Attach proper insulation athigh temperaturecontainment, attachwarning sign at the area,wear proper PPE whileworking.

MED

6,2 Heat Heat exposed fromengine and turbineexhaust system.


Heat shall be exhaust to safelocation where personnelrarely to be there.

MED

7,1 Cold No issues applicable forthis scenario

8,1 Electricity High voltage exposed tohuman

Potential Fatality topersonnel.

Attach sign/ warning at highvoltage area. Wear properPPE for high voltage use.

SIG

8,2 Electricity Lightning discharge Potential Fatality topersonnel.

Attach lightning strike, applyprocedure to avoid anyactivities regarding toligthning hazards.

LOW

9,1 UltramagneticRadiation

No issues applicable forthis scenario


10,1 Ionizing Radiation No issues applicable forthis scenario

11,1 Biological Hazard Contaminated foodand/or improperlycleaned foods, hands,etc.

Potential sick topersonnel.

Cleaned foods, hands, cloth,etc properly.

LOW

11,2 Biological Hazard Influenza due towheather changes

Potential sick topersonnel.

Cleaned foods, hands, cloth,etc properly.

LOW

12,1 Ergonomic Hazard Inappropriateequipment handling

Potential injury topersonnel

Adequate workingprocedure.

MED

12,2 Ergonomic Hazard Insufficient light whileworking

potential to lessenseyesight.

Adequate light on workingarea.

LOW

13,1 Psychological Hazard Fatigue Potential sick and injury topersonnel.

Time management whileworking.

LOW

healt hazard identification_final

Documents

health hazards

human health

namedbrotojoyo fpso

offloading fpso vessel

desktop study

thesignificant hazards

potential hazards

development of telukberau