hearing officer determination - washington, d.c
TRANSCRIPT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OFFICE OF THE STATE SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION Office of Dispute Resolution
1050 First Street, N.E., Third Floor
Washington, D.C. 20002
)
Student,1 ) Case No.: 2018-0229
through Parents, )
Petitioners, ) Date Issued: 2/10/19
)
v. ) Hearing Officer: Keith L. Seat, Esq.
)
District of Columbia Public Schools ) Hearing Dates: 1/28/19 & 1/31/19
(“DCPS”), ) ODR Hearing Room: 423
Respondent. )
)
HEARING OFFICER DETERMINATION
Background
Petitioners, Student’s Parents, pursued a due process complaint alleging that Student
had been denied a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) in violation of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEA”) because Student had not been
provided an appropriate Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) and placement on a
timely basis. DCPS defended its proposed IEP and placement.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred pursuant to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et
seq.; the implementing regulations for IDEA, 34 C.F.R. Part 300; and Title V, Chapter E-30,
of the District of Columbia Municipal Regulations (“D.C.M.R.”).
Procedural History
Following the filing of the due process complaint on 9/5/18, the case was assigned to
the undersigned on 9/6/18. Respondent filed a response on 9/17/18, which did not challenge
jurisdiction. An amended due process complaint was filed on 11/13/18 pursuant to the
Order of the undersigned. An amended response to the amended complaint was filed on
1/10/19. A resolution meeting took place on 9/25/18, but the parties neither settled the case
1 Personally identifiable information is provided in Appendix A, including terms initially set
forth in italics.
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nor terminated the 30-day resolution period; the resolution period following the amended
complaint ended on 12/13/18. A final decision in this matter must be reached no later than
45 days following the end of the resolution period, as extended by a 14-day continuance,
which requires a Hearing Officer Determination (“HOD”) by 2/10/19.
The due process hearing took place on 1/28/19 and 1/31/19 and was closed to the
public. Petitioners were represented by Petitioners’ counsel. DCPS was represented by
Respondent’s counsel. One or both Parents participated in the entire hearing.
Petitioners’ Disclosures, submitted on 1/18/19, contained documents P1 through
P41, all of which were admitted into evidence without objection. Respondent’s Disclosures,
submitted on 1/18/19, contained documents R1 through R20, and R21 and R22 were added
during the due process hearing, all of which were admitted into evidence without objection.
Petitioners’ counsel presented three witnesses in Petitioners’ case-in-chief (see
Appendix A):
1. Neuropsychologist (qualified without objection as an expert in
Neuropsychology)
2. Director of Education at Nonpublic School (qualified without objection as an
expert in Special Education Programming and Instruction)
3. Parent
Respondent’s counsel presented three witnesses in Respondent’s case (see Appendix
A):
1. School Psychologist at Public School
2. Principal of Public School
3. Resolution Specialist
The issues to be determined in this Hearing Officer Determination are:
Issue 1: Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by failing to propose an appropriate
IEP and/or placement for 2018/19.2 Respondent has the burden of persuasion on this issue,
if Petitioners establish a prima facie case.
Issue 2: Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by failing to have an updated IEP
in place for the start of 2018/19. Petitioners have the burden of persuasion on this issue.
2 All dates in the format “2018/19” refer to school years.
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Issue 3: Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by delaying completion of updated
evaluations of Student. Petitioners have the burden of persuasion on this issue.
Issue 4: Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by delaying sending a copy of the
finalized IEP from the 9/25/18 IEP meeting and failing to send any other documentation
following the meeting. Petitioners have the burden of persuasion on this issue.
Issue 5: Whether Nonpublic School is a proper placement for Student. Petitioners
have the burden of persuasion on this issue.
The relief requested by Petitioners is:
DCPS shall place and fund Student for the 2018/19 school year at Nonpublic
School and reimburse Parents for tuition and related services already paid.
Findings of Fact
After considering all the evidence, as well as the arguments of both counsel, the
Findings of Fact3 are as follows:
1. Student is a resident of the District of Columbia; Parent is one of Student’s Parents
and one of the Petitioners in this case.4 Student is Age, Gender and in Grade.5 Student
began at Nonpublic School at the beginning of 2018/19, after attending Public School for
one year in 2017/18; Student attended PCS prior to Public School.6 Student was found
eligible for special education services in December 2015 with a disability classification of
Other Health Impairment (“OHI”) due to Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(“ADHD”).7
2. Evaluations. After Parents were unable to get prompt assessment from Public
School of Student’s reading deficits, Neuropsychologist conducted a neuropsychological
evaluation of Student at Parents’ request on 1/22/18 and 2/7/18, with a report prepared on
2/28/18.8 The neuropsychological evaluation diagnosed ADHD, Combined Presentation;
3 Footnotes in these Findings of Fact refer to the sworn testimony of the witness indicated or
to an exhibit admitted into evidence. To the extent that the Hearing Officer has declined to
base a finding of fact on a witness’s testimony that goes to the heart of the issue(s) under
consideration, or has chosen to base a finding of fact on the testimony of one witness when
another witness gave contradictory testimony on the same issue, the Hearing Officer has
taken such action based on the Hearing Officer’s determinations of the credibility and/or
lack of credibility of the witness(es) involved. 4 Parent; P1. 5 Parent; R2-1. 6 Parent; Neuropsychologist. 7 R2-1,2; P3 (2016 draft); R16 (10/20/17 IEP). 8 Parent; Neuropsychologist; P7-1.
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Developmental Coordination Disorder with Dysgraphia; Specific Learning Disability with
Impairment in Reading (Dyslexia); and Unspecified Anxiety Disorder.9 In a report dated
4/5/18, School Psychologist reviewed the neuropsychological evaluation and reported her
psychological evaluation of Student.10 In the psychological evaluation, School Psychologist
concluded that various factors suggested a Specific Learning Disability (Dyslexia), along
with ongoing classification as OHI due to significant executive functioning weaknesses.11
School Psychologist also conducted a psychological reevaluation dated 5/29/18 to test
Student’s writing skills at Parents’ request.12
3. Student has solidly average cognitive abilities, across both verbal and nonverbal
skills.13 Student’s premature birth (between 33 and 34 weeks) and family history of
dyslexia have significantly impacted aspects of self-regulation, behavioral control,
emotional regulation, and foundational literacy skills.14
4. Reading and Written Expression. Student has had persistent struggles with reading
and writing.15 Student has difficulty with decoding, comprehension, and fluency; Student
struggled and did not truly begin reading until 2016/17.16 Testing with the Feifer
Assessment of Reading (“FAR”) suggested struggles with multiple aspects of reading and
the presence of Mixed Dyslexia, a more severe type of reading disability.17 The FAR results
were generally consistent with the neuropsychological evaluation.18
5. The Woodcock-Johnson IV Tests of Achievement (“WJ-IV”) found Student’s
overall reading skills to be in the Low Average range.19 Student’s reading skills were a
standard deviation below expectations and had Borderline performance on word attack and
oral reading; reading comprehension skills were at the 9th percentile and single word reading
skills were at the 12th percentile.20 Student’s reading comprehension went from 385 to 485
to 624 as assessed by Reading Inventory (“RI”) at the beginning, middle and end of year in
2017/18, which moved Student from Far Below grade level to merely Below grade level.21
9 R2-4,9. 10 R2-1. 11 R2-10,11; R3-3. 12 R3-1. 13 P7-15,16; R2-3. 14 P7-15,16. 15 P7-15; R2-6 (ANET – reading and writing – remained far below grade level; Reading
Inventory’s reading proficiency measures of Student show a two-grade deficit). 16 R2-2,9 (Parent also noted that Student did not read at all until 2016/17). 17 R2-9. 18 Neuropsychologist. 19 R2-3. 20 P7-15. 21 R17-3,4; Principal.
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Parent testified that Public School told her that they read the questions to Student on the
reading test; DCPS witnesses were unsure whether that occurred as an accommodation.22
6. As Student ages, Student is losing the opportunity to get to average levels of reading
fluency, and needs more than 15 hours/week of specialized instruction; Student can’t
progress with reading in large classes.23 Neuropsychologist observed the special education
class at Public School on 12/4/18, but the special education teacher was absent so the six or
seven special education children were included in the general education classroom for a
class of 28.24 Neuropsychologist testified that Student would not benefit from a general
education classroom, and would struggle in general education specials (art, music, gym),
given Student’s weaknesses.25
7. Student’s special education teacher at Public School, who retired at the end of
2017/18 and did not testify, reported to the evaluator that Student arrived at Public School in
2017/18 as a “nonreader” because Student’s previous school had read to Student to avoid
emotional outbursts from Student, but once the Public School special education teacher
“strongly encouraged” Student to read and removed the option of reading assignments to
Student, that Student “has been able to read and comprehend grade level text without
difficulty.”26 The special education teacher further asserted that Student had “inherently
strong reading skills” and that any weaknesses should be attributed to skills not being taught
by PCS or Student not being required to practice the skills.27 Parent disagreed that PCS had
not been teaching Student skills.28 The undersigned is not persuaded of the truth of the
special education teacher’s assertions that Student merely needed her strong encouragement
to begin reading at grade level without difficulty, as that is contradicted by the scores on
testing instruments. In the view of the undersigned, these statements harm the credibility of
the special education teacher’s other statements, such as asserting that Student had grown
from writing one sentence upon arriving at Public School in 2017/18 to writing multiple
paragraphs by Springtime.29
8. While Student’s written expression was in the Average range on the WJ-IV, that
assessment was not representative of what is required in the classroom; at Parent’s request
further assessment was done with subtests of the Wechsler Individual Achievement Test –
Third Edition (“WIAT-III”), which found both Spelling and Sentence Composition in the
Below Average range.30 School Psychologist reported in her evaluation that it was difficult
22 Parent; Principal. 23 Neuropsychologist. 24 Neuropsychologist; P30-1. As of 12/16/18, the special education teacher who would have
taught Student at Public School had resigned and the school was seeking a replacement.
P31-1. 25 Neuropsychologist. 26 R2-5. 27 Id. 28 R4-1. 29 R2-5. 30 R3-1,2.
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to determine if Student’s issues included Dysgraphia as well as Dyslexia, but that Student
clearly met the criteria for Specific Learning Disability and would benefit from specialized
instruction in both reading and writing.31 A paragraph of Student’s handwriting, which is
very nearly illegible, is included in the record with other work samples.32 The team at the
IEP meeting on 6/13/18 agreed that Student was not where Student should be going into a
higher level in 2018/19.33
9. Behavior. Student was described as easily frustrated and at times acting out
behaviorally.34 Student’s special education teacher at Public School reported that Student’s
difficulties modulating emotions truly impeded learning and that Student had several
outbursts per week which were not related to academic frustration.35 An FBA was
conducted on 6/15/18 due to Student’s history of disruptive and oppositional behaviors in
various school settings, with verbal and physical aggression towards peers and staff.36
Student was noted to most likely remain in the academic environment when feeling
confident and the academic task was manageable.37 On 8/21/18 a DCPS evaluation
summary report concluded that “technically” Student qualified for an Emotional
Disturbance classification, but the examiner believed that was premature at that time and
Student should simply receive a BIP.38 A BIP-Level II was developed on 8/24/18 at Public
School.39
10. Student has not needed a behavior plan at Nonpublic School.40 Neuropsychologist
credibly testified that it was Student being frustrated that caused negative behaviors to
increase.41 Student does not need behavior supports at Nonpublic School, as behavior is not
an issue when Student is with other appropriate peers.42
11. Timing of Assessments/IEP Meetings. Parent texted the Public School social worker
on 10/24/17 to ask if Public School could test Student for dyslexia; the social worker
responded that she would have School Psychologist contact Parent; the social worker set up
a meeting in a day or two.43 School Psychologist testified that she remembered meeting
Parent in December 2017 and it was possible Parent raised the issue sooner; School
Psychologist recalled responding affirmatively in December to a question about whether she
31 R3-3. 32 P41-10. 33 R4-4. 34 P7-15. 35 R2-5. 36 P14-1. 37 P14-2. 38 P19-5. 39 P24. 40 P40-7 (Student has not warranted an individual intervention plan; Nonpublic School has
positive behavior intervention and support initiatives and activities). 41 Neuropsychologist. 42 Id. 43 P21-1.
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was qualified to test Student for dyslexia, but School Psychologist did not regard that
inquiry as a request for testing by Parent.44 Parent later wrote that she had approached
School Psychologist, special education teacher and social worker in December 2017 for
testing and was told that Student “simply wants to act that way.”45
12. On 1/22/18, Parent emailed Student’s special education teacher to follow up on a
conversation earlier in January about having Student tested for dyslexia; Parent then talked
to School Psychologist and understood that the testing would result in a report in early
March 2018.46 School Psychologist stated that Parent’s request was in January 2018 for an
evaluation based on “longstanding concerns” about Student’s reading and spelling,
especially her belief that Student’s skills were several grade levels below expectation and
concern about dyslexia; the team agreed to test Student’s reading skills.47 Parent signed the
consent to evaluate form on 1/29/18.48 School Psychologist stated that her testing of
Student’s reading was completed in February 2018.49
13. On 3/22/18, the Public School social worker texted Parent that School Psychologist
had confirmed plans to provide the evaluation report to Parent in March; Parent responded
that she didn’t know if there was a need anymore, as Parents had Student independently
tested and just reviewed the report and sent it to Principal.50 On 3/30/18, School
Psychologist emailed Parent asking for a copy of the evaluation that Parents had done;
School Psychologist received the report on 4/2/18 and noted that Neuropsychologist’s
evaluation was very comprehensive and that School Psychologist’s data corroborated
Neuropsychologist’s findings.51 At the due process hearing, School Psychologist testified
that she “absolutely” agreed with Neuropsychologist.52
14. At a 6/13/18 IEP meeting, Parents requested that the team meet before school started
for 2018/19 to revise Student’s IEP, so they could decide if the IEP was appropriate and
whether to keep Student at Public School.53 Parent continued to seek to meet, but Public
School delayed, e.g. by Principal declining to even discuss the timeline for an IEP meeting
with the summer team until after receiving a re-formatted IEP from OSSE.54 Scheduling
slipped to 7/27/18 with apologies from DCPS, but even then efforts went back and forth
44 School Psychologist; P21-1. 45 P21-9. 46 P21-3. 47 R2-1. 48 R1-1. 49 R3-1. 50 P21-2,4. 51 P21-5. 52 School Psychologist. 53 R4-5. 54 P21-7,8.
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with no meeting until 8/24/18, after school began on 8/20/18, which was not substantive due
to Public School’s failure to properly provide documents in advance of the meeting.55
15. Draft IEPs. Principal emailed a draft IEP to Parent and counsel on 6/20/18 which
contained a listed “meeting date” of 8/13/18.56 That 8/13/18 IEP contained only 10
hours/week of specialized instruction outside general education; Resolution Specialist
testified that it was intended to provide the same 15 hours/week as the prior IEP in 2017/18;
the 8/13/18 IEP also contained 120 minutes/month of Behavioral Support Services (“BSS”)
inside general education and 120 minutes/day of BSS outside general education, although
two hours a day was a mistake that was finally modified to 120 minutes/month by the final
9/25/18 IEP; the 8/13/18 IEP contained no area of concern for written expression.57
16. The 8/13/18 IEP contained an identical lengthy passage about reading pasted into
page R5-5 (the math section), R5-11 (the reading section), and R5-14 (the socio-emotional
behavior section) which overflowed the available space on each page; the passage was
word-for-word from School Psychologist’s review of Neuropsychologist’s
neuropsychological evaluation at R2-9.58 Parent immediately sought a corrected draft IEP,
which she requested multiple times, but the error was never fully corrected and remained
once (improved from three times) even in the finalized 9/25/18 IEP, where it remained in
the wrong area of concern.59
17. Parents received another draft IEP the night before the 8/24/18 IEP meeting –
apparently at 10:20 p.m. – and so were not prepared to go forward with the meeting at 9:30
a.m.60 The 8/24/18 IEP contained a written expression area of concern, and contained the
overly long passage about reading pasted in once after the socio-emotional behavioral area
of concern.61 The 8/24/18 IEP did increase to 15 the hours/week of specialized instruction
outside general education, but continued to include 120 minutes/day of BSS outside general
education.62
18. Principal testified that “to her knowledge” the final 9/25/18 IEP for Student was the
same as had been provided on 6/20/18, although she acknowledged on cross-examination
that written language was supposed to be included and was not.63 The substantive IEP
meeting was finally held on 9/25/18 but DCPS would not increase above 15 the number of
55 Parent; R11; R12-1 (proposing 8/24/18 and promising an updated IEP prior to the
meeting); R13-1 (confirming 8/24/18 and promising draft IEP, FBA/BIP and final eligibility
documents prior to the meeting); Administrative Notice (DCPS school calendars). 56 R5-1. 57 R5-13,16,17. 58 R5-5,11,14. 59 P27-10. 60 P21-8; R13-1. 61 P22-6,9. 62 P22-11. 63 Principal.
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hours of specialized instruction.64 After the 9/25/18 IEP meeting, Parents’ counsel had to
ask to receive a copy of the final IEP on 10/31/18, 11/2/18 and 11/5/19; the final IEP was
provided to Parents for the first time on 11/9/18.65
19. Suitability of Nonpublic School. Student will continue to require special education
services, with a science-based reading program that is multi-sensory, systematic, and
phonics-based.66 Student requires a low student-teacher ratio throughout the day and
numerous accommodations.67 The reading programs being used at Public School were not
sufficient for Student’s level of disability and Student did not make appropriate progress at
Public School in 2017/18.68 Student was reported to be progressing on most IEP goals at
Public School in 2017/18, but did not meet any of them.69
20. Neuropsychologist’s expert opinion was that Student’s challenges will in fact
increase over time, so that Student is unlikely to be able to return to general education.70
Parents gave written notice to DCPS that they were unilaterally placing Student at
Nonpublic School on 8/6/18, which DCPS acknowledged was 10 business days prior to the
beginning of 2018/19.71
21. Nonpublic School is a very small nonpublic full day school that is certified by
OSSE.72 Nonpublic School serves students who are average or above average cognitively,
with classes of eight or fewer students, except for reading where classes are no larger than
four students.73 Nonpublic School is not for children with significant behavior issues, so
with Student’s FBA/BIP at Public School, Nonpublic School required a two-day visit by
Student to determine whether behavior issues were a result of academic needs not being
met; Student did very well on the visit.74 Student has had no emotional outbursts at
Nonpublic School.75
22. Nonpublic School provides small, structured classes all day, which is the appropriate
education for Student and is Student’s least restrictive environment (“LRE”).76 Nonpublic
64 Parent; P27-12. 65 P26-1,2; P27-1; Parent. 66 P7-16. 67 P7-16,17. 68 Neuropsychologist (comprehension measurement has the least predictive validity
compared to fluency and decoding); R17-3. 69 P11; Resolution Specialist (not aware of Student meeting any goals at Public School). 70 Neuropsychologist. 71 P15-1; P17-1. 72 Director of Education. 73 Id. 74 Id. 75 Id. 76 Neuropsychologist; Director of Education; P32; P33.
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School is not overly restrictive for Student; Student is flourishing and learning.77 Student is
getting top grades at Nonpublic School, with term final grades of “As” and “A+s.”78
Student has friends at Nonpublic School and feels that other kids there are like Student.79
DCPS emphasized in testimony that it was willing to reimburse out of pocket tuition and
transportation costs for 2018/19 at Nonpublic School to date, and fund the remainder of the
year.80
Conclusions of Law
Based on the Findings of Fact above, the arguments of counsel, as well as this
Hearing Officer’s own legal research, the Conclusions of Law are as follows:
The overall purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that “all children with disabilities have
available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education,
employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). See Boose v. Dist. of
Columbia, 786 F.3d 1054, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (the IDEA “aims to ensure that every child
has a meaningful opportunity to benefit from public education”).
“The IEP is ‘the centerpiece of the statute’s education delivery system for disabled
children.’” Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988,
994, 197 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2017), quoting Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S. Ct. 592, 98
L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). “The IEP is the means by which special education and related services
are ‘tailored to the unique needs’ of a particular child.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 994,
quoting Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 181, 102
S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982).
Once a child who may need special education services is identified and found
eligible, Respondent must devise an IEP, mapping out specific educational goals and
requirements in light of the child’s disabilities and matching the child with a school capable
of fulfilling those needs. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d), 1401(a)(14); Endrew F.,
137 S. Ct. at 994; Sch. Comm. of Town of Burlington, Mass. v. Dep’t of Educ. of Mass., 471
U.S. 359, 369, 105 S. Ct. 1996, 2002, 85 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1985); Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935
F.2d 303, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Dist. of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 892 n.5 (D.C. Cir.
2010).
The IEP must be “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress
appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001. The Act’s
FAPE requirement is satisfied “by providing personalized instruction with sufficient support
services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” Smith v. Dist. of
77 Director of Education; Parent (Student connects readily with typically developing kids in
the neighborhood). 78 P37. 79 Neuropsychologist; Director of Education. 80 Resolution Specialist.
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Columbia, 846 F. Supp. 2d 197, 202 (D.D.C. 2012), citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. The
IDEA imposes no additional requirement that the services so provided be sufficient to
maximize each child’s potential. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198. In its decision, the Supreme
Court made very clear that the standard is well above de minimis, however, stating that
“[w]hen all is said and done, a student offered an educational program providing ‘merely
more than de minimis’ progress from year to year can hardly be said to have been offered an
education at all.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001.
In addition, the LEA must ensure that to the maximum extent appropriate, children
with disabilities are educated with children who are nondisabled, and special classes,
separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular
educational environment occurs only if the nature or severity of the disability is such that
education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be
achieved satisfactorily. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114; Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1000 (children with
disabilities should receive education in the regular classroom to the extent possible);
Montuori ex rel. A.M. v. Dist. of Columbia, 2018 WL 4623572, at *3 (D.D.C. 9/26/18).
A Hearing Officer’s determination of whether a child received a FAPE must be
based on substantive grounds. In matters alleging a procedural violation, a Hearing Officer
may find that a child did not receive a FAPE only if the procedural inadequacies (i) impeded
the child’s right to a FAPE; (ii) significantly impeded the parent’s opportunity to participate
in the decision-making process regarding the provision of a FAPE to the parent’s child; or
(iii) caused a deprivation of educational benefit. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a). In other words, an
IDEA claim is viable only if those procedural violations affected the child’s substantive
rights. Brown v. Dist. of Columbia, 179 F. Supp. 3d 15, 25-26 (D.D.C. 2016), quoting N.S.
ex rel. Stein v. Dist. of Columbia, 709 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2010).
Petitioners carry the burden of production and persuasion, except on issues of the
appropriateness of an IEP or placement on which Respondent has the burden of persuasion,
if Petitioners establish a prima facie case. D.C. Code Ann. § 38-2571.03(6); Z.B. v. Dist. of
Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (party seeking relief bears the burden of
proof); Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 62, 126 S. Ct. 528, 537, 163 L. Ed.
2d 387 (2005). “Based solely upon evidence presented at the hearing, an impartial hearing
officer shall determine whether . . . sufficient evidence [was presented] to meet the burden
of proof that the action and/or inaction or proposed placement is inadequate or adequate to
provide the student with a FAPE.” 5-E D.C.M.R. § 3030.3.
Issue 1: Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by failing to propose an
appropriate IEP and/or placement for 2018/19. (Respondent has the burden of persuasion
on this issue, if Petitioners establish a prima facie case.)
Petitioners established a prima facie case on this issue based on testimony and the
neuropsychological evaluation, shifting the burden of persuasion to DCPS, which failed to
prove that the IEP and placement proposed for Student were appropriate.
The applicable legal standard for analyzing the appropriateness of the IEP at issue
was articulated by Chief Justice Roberts for a unanimous Supreme Court as whether it was
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“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s
circumstances.” Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001. As the Court of Appeals emphasized in
Z.B. v. Dist. of Columbia, 888 F.3d 515, 517 (D.C. Cir. 2018), Endrew F. “raised the bar on
what counts as an adequate education under the IDEA” in that case, requiring more than
“merely some” educational benefit. See also Damarcus S. v. Dist. of Columbia, 190 F.
Supp. 3d 35, 51 (D.D.C. 2016) (IEP must be “reasonably calculated to produce meaningful
educational benefit”).
The measure and adequacy of the IEP are determined as of the time it was offered to
Student, rather than with the benefit of hindsight. See Z.B., 888 F.3d at 524; S.S. ex rel.
Shank v. Howard Rd. Acad., 585 F. Supp. 2d 56, 66 (D.D.C. 2008). Moreover, the analysis
is not about achieving a perfect IEP, but one reasonably calculated to enable Student to
make appropriate progress. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001; Z.B., 888 F.3d at 519 (IDEA
“stops short of requiring public schools to provide the best possible education”). See also
Hill v. Dist. of Columbia, 2016 WL 4506972, at *21 (D.D.C. 2016), quoting Leggett v. Dist.
of Columbia, 793 F.3d 59, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2015). As for placement, the IDEA requires
“school districts to offer placement in a school and in programming that can fulfill the
requirements set forth in the student’s IEP.” Middleton v. Dist. of Columbia, 312 F. Supp.
3d 113, 143 (D.D.C. 2018), citing O.O. ex rel. Pabo v. Dist. of Columbia, 573 F. Supp. 2d
41, 53 (D.D.C. 2008). See also Johnson v. Dist. of Columbia, 962 F. Supp. 2d 263, 267
(D.D.C. 2013) (DCPS “must place the student in a setting that is capable of fulfilling the
student’s IEP”). The appropriateness of Student’s IEP and placement is analyzed by
considering the specific concerns raised by Petitioners, which are considered below in
turn.81 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(a); Honig, 484 U.S. at 311.
The heart of this dispute is whether Student needed a full-time IEP in a day school or
could make sufficient progress with only 15 hours/week of specialized instruction at Public
School. Student has had persistent struggles with reading and writing, with difficulties in
decoding, comprehension, and fluency. Student did not truly begin reading until 2016/17,
far later than expected with Student’s solidly average cognitive abilities.
DCPS claimed that Student’s reading comprehension went from 385 to 485 to 624 as
assessed by Reading Inventory at the beginning, middle and end of year in 2017/18, which
was progress in moving Student from Far Below grade level to merely Below grade level.
But Parent testified that Public School had told her that they read the questions to Student on
the reading test and DCPS witnesses were unsure if that occurred as an accommodation.
Taken as true, this entirely undercuts DCPS’s argument that Student made good progress in
2017/18 with the 15 hours/week of specialized instruction in place.
Neuropsychologist credibly testified that as Student ages, Student is losing the
opportunity to achieve average levels of reading fluency, and needs much more than 15
81 A Hearing Officer must also determine whether “the State complied with the procedures”
set forth in the IDEA. A.M. v. Dist. of Columbia, 933 F. Supp. 2d 193, 204 (D.D.C. 2013),
quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07. Here, specific procedural violations are discussed in
Issues 2, 3 and 4, below.
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13
hours/week of specialized instruction. Student can’t progress with reading in large classes
and would not benefit from a general education classroom. Neuropsychologist persuasively
explained that Student would even struggle in general education specials – such as art,
music, gym – given Student’s weaknesses. Student requires a low student-teacher ratio
throughout the day, numerous accommodations, and better reading programs than were
being used at Public School given Student’s level of disability. Student did not make
appropriate progress at Public School in 2017/18 so needed a significant increase in the
level of service.
School Psychologist conducted a writing evaluation at Parents’ request and reported
that it was difficult to determine if Student’s issues included Dysgraphia as well as
Dyslexia, but that Student clearly met the criteria for Specific Learning Disability and would
benefit from specialized instruction in both reading and writing. The team at the IEP
meeting on 6/13/18 agreed that Student was not where Student should be going into a higher
level in 2018/19, but the DCPS IEP maintained Student’s specialized instruction at the same
level as previously.
The need to provide full-time specialized instruction is confirmed by Student’s
behavior at Public School compared to Nonpublic School. Student’s special education
teacher at Public School reported that Student’s difficulties modulating emotions truly
impeded learning. Student was reported as having several outbursts per week which were
not related to academic frustration. An FBA was conducted on 6/15/18 due to Student’s
history of disruptive and oppositional behaviors in school settings, which included verbal
and physical aggression towards peers and staff. In fact, a DCPS evaluation summary report
on 8/21/18 concluded that “technically” Student qualified for an Emotional Disturbance
classification, but the examiner felt that was premature at that time and suggested a BIP
instead.
By contrast, Student has not needed a behavior plan at Nonpublic School at all.
Nonpublic School is not for children with significant behavior issues, so with Student’s
behavior at Public School, Nonpublic School required a two-day visit by Student to
determine whether behavior issues were a result of academic needs not being met. Student
did very well on the visit and with an appropriate IEP and placement, Student has had no
emotional outbursts at Nonpublic School in the months there. Neuropsychologist credibly
testified that it was Student being frustrated that caused negative behaviors at Public School.
Student does not need behavior supports at Nonpublic School, as behavior is not an issue
when Student is with other appropriate peers.
This Hearing Officer concludes that 15 hours/week of specialized instruction in the
DCPS IEP was not sufficient for Student’s needs. Neither the 9/5/18 DCPS IEP nor any
earlier draft IEP was reasonably calculated to enable Student to make appropriate progress
in Student’s circumstances in 2018/19, based on the need for greatly increased or full-time
specialized instruction hours. This is a substantive violation and a denial of FAPE, leading
to the remedy discussed below. As for placement, there was a material failure in the ability
of Public School to provide the services required by the greatly increased or full-time IEP
that Student needed. Maintaining Student at Public School would not have afford Student
the opportunity to make appropriate progress in Student’s particular circumstances. See
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14
N.W. v. Dist. of Columbia, 253 F. Supp. 3d 5, 17 (D.D.C. 2017), quoting James v. Dist. of
Columbia, 194 F. Supp. 3d 131, 139 (D.D.C. 2016). This placement failure is also a
substantive violation and a denial of FAPE, with the remedy discussed below.
Issue 2: Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by failing to have an updated IEP
in place for the start of 2018/19. (Petitioners have the burden of persuasion on this issue.)
Petitioners demonstrated a violation of the IDEA, but showed no denial of FAPE
here. The IDEA is clear that DCPS must have “an IEP in place for each student with a
disability ‘[a]t the beginning of each school year.’” Leggett v. Dist. of Columbia, 793 F.3d
59, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2015), citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.322(a),
300.323(a). Here, as recounted in detail above, DCPS did not have a finalized IEP in place
for Student until 9/25/18, well after the beginning of the school year on 8/20/18.
DCPS argued that an IEP might have been finalized right at the beginning of the
school year if only Parents had been willing to participate in the 8/24/18 IEP meeting
without taking time to review the documents for the meeting. As an initial matter, that is
incorrect because school began on 8/20/18 for Public School, as it did for other DCPS
schools on the traditional calendar. Moreover, D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(3) requires that
DCPS provide parents a copy of the documents to be discussed at IEP meetings at least five
business days prior to the meeting. Here, the documents were just transmitted to Petitioners
the night before the meeting, apparently not until at 10:20 p.m., in advance of the meeting at
9:30 the next morning. DCPS cannot blame the need for a later meeting on Parents.
However, not having an updated IEP in place at the beginning of the school year is
not the end of the inquiry. Procedural violations are a denial of FAPE only if the violation
impeded Student’s right to a FAPE, significantly impeded Parents’ opportunity to
participate in the decision-making process, or caused a deprivation of educational benefit.
See 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2). Here, Petitioners’ counsel did not assert any of these
grounds, and none are apparent, for Student had been enrolled in Nonpublic School in
advance of the school year, so the lack of an IEP at the beginning of DCPS’s school year
made no practical difference to Student. Accordingly, this Hearing Officer concludes there
was no denial of FAPE from this procedural violation.
Issue 3: Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by delaying completion of updated
evaluations of Student. (Petitioners have the burden of persuasion on this issue.)
Petitioners have not proved a denial of FAPE from any delay in completing
evaluations of Student. While there are many facts and details asserted by the parties on this
issue, the big picture is that ultimately the IEP team at Public School concluded that no
more services were needed for Student as a result of the evaluations, so any delay made no
difference to the outcome. Further, Parents unilaterally placed Student at Nonpublic School,
so there was no impact on Student from the lack of services at Public School, and the
evaluations were completed by the time Nonpublic School needed them for programing.
Finally, the neuropsychological evaluation was no doubt most helpful to Parents in
determining their course, and that independent evaluation was completed at Parents’
direction in February.
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Wading into the details, the timing requirements for DCPS evaluations become
unclear. The undersigned is unaware of a 45-day deadline for evaluations imposed by law,
as DCPS suggested, or of a 60-day deadline as Petitioners suggested, for D.C. Code ¶ 38-
2561.02(a)(2) only applies to initial evaluations and only shifted to 60 days from 120 days
as of 7/1/18. The IDEA does not set a timeframe within which a public agency must
conduct an evaluation that is not an initial evaluation upon receiving a request from a child’s
parent, although it is clearly less than the 120 days that the District of Columbia provided
for an initial evaluation prior to 7/1/18. See Smith v. Dist. of Columbia, 2010 WL 4861757,
at *3 (D.D.C. 2010) (120-day period for initial evaluations does not apply to reevaluations),
quoting Herbin ex rel. Herbin v. Dist. of Columbia, 362 F. Supp. 2d 254, 259 (D.D.C.
2005). Lacking statutory guidance, Herbin concluded that “[r]eevaluations should be
conducted in a ‘reasonable period of time,’ or ‘without undue delay,’ as determined in each
individual case.” Id. (quoting Office of Special Education Programs Policy Letter in
Response to Inquiry from Jerry Saperstone, 21 IDELR 1127, 1129 (1995)). Thus, with the
newly shortened timeframe for initial evaluations, it seems that subsequent evaluations
certainly should take no longer than 60 days, and maybe less depending on the
circumstances.
Here, the date of request could arguably be late October 2017 or December 2017, but
clearly no later than Parent’s signing of the consent to evaluate on 1/29/18. Sixty days from
then would be 3/30/18, and Parent was promised on 3/22/18 that the report would be
completed in March. School Psychologist’s report was not provided in March and the delay
was caused by the neuropsychological evaluation, which School Psychologist
understandably wanted to incorporate into her analysis. While there are no exceptions to
evaluation timelines for such circumstances, the undersigned does note that the
neuropsychological evaluation had been completed for a full month before it was provided
to Public School and School Psychologist, so the undersigned concludes that there was not
even a procedural violation here. In any case, this Hearing Officer concludes that there was
no denial of FAPE as there was no practical impact, as discussed in the initial paragraph of
this section. Specifically, DCPS’s failure to complete the evaluation in 60 days or other
reasonable timeframe did not impede Student’s right to a FAPE, significantly impede
Parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, or cause a deprivation of
educational benefit. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2).
Issue 4: Whether DCPS denied Student a FAPE by delaying sending a copy of the
finalized IEP from the 9/25/18 IEP meeting and failing to send any other documentation
following the meeting. (Petitioners have the burden of persuasion on this issue.)
Petitioners demonstrated that after the final 9/25/18 IEP meeting, Parents’ counsel
had to ask repeatedly for a copy of the final IEP and it was not provided to Parents until
11/9/18, more than six weeks after the meeting. D.C. Code § 38-2571.03(4)(A) requires
that within five business days after a meeting where an amended IEP has been agreed upon,
DCPS must provide a copy of the revised IEP to the parents, although if more time were
needed to complete the IEP DCPS could provide a draft and the final IEP no later than 15
business days after the meeting, which was also violated here.
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However, this is a mere procedural violation, for as Petitioners’ counsel
acknowledged in Petitioners’ closing argument, it made no actual difference to Parents,
since Student had by that time already been attending Nonpublic School for an extended
period. DCPS’s failure to provide the revised IEP to Parents did not impede Student’s right
to a FAPE, significantly impede Parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision-making
process, or cause a deprivation of educational benefit. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.513(a)(2).
Therefore, in the view of the undersigned there is no denial of FAPE for this procedural
violation.
Issue 5: Whether Nonpublic School is a proper placement for Student. (Petitioners
have the burden of persuasion on this issue.)
Petitioners met their burden on this final issue. Nonpublic School provides small,
structured classes which are the appropriate education for Student and are Student’s LRE.
Nonpublic School is not overly restrictive and Student is flourishing with other children
there who are like Student, receiving high grades, and making friends. Importantly,
Student’s behavior issues have significantly moderated, with no emotional outbursts at
Nonpublic School compared to several per week at Public School, the apparent result of
meeting Student’s academic needs at Nonpublic School. The undersigned concludes that
Nonpublic School is a proper and appropriate placement for Student.
Remedy
As the remedy for the denials of FAPE concerning Student’s IEP and placement,
Petitioners seek reimbursement of their payments to Nonpublic School for 2018/19 to date,
and for DCPS to place and fund Student for the remainder of the school year. Judge Colleen
Kollar-Kotelly recently confirmed that “if there is no public school which is suitable, the
school district ‘must pay the cost of sending the child to an appropriate private school.’”
Montuori ex rel. A.M. v. Dist. of Columbia, 2018 WL 4623572, at *3 (D.D.C. 9/26/18),
quoting Reid ex rel. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2005). See also
Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935 F.2d 303, 304-305 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (if a public school program
were available to enable student to receive educational benefits, DCPS would not need to
consider nonpublic placement).
Under the IDEA, however, parents who unilaterally place their disabled child in a
private school, without obtaining the consent of local school officials, “do so at their own
financial risk.” Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15, 114 S. Ct. 361,
126 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1993), quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374. The Court of Appeals
explained in Leggett v. Dist. of Columbia, 793 F.3d 59, 66-67 (D.C. Cir. 2015), that,
As interpreted by the Supreme Court, IDEA requires school districts to reimburse
parents for their private-school expenses if (1) school officials failed to offer the
child a free appropriate public education in a public or private school; (2) the
private-school placement chosen by the parents was otherwise “proper under the
Act”; and (3) the equities weigh in favor of reimbursement – that is, the parents did
not otherwise act “unreasonabl[y].”
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Here, the first prong of Leggett is met due to the denials of FAPE by DCPS failing to
provide Student an appropriate IEP and placement, as discussed in Issue 1, above.
The second prong of Leggett focuses on whether Nonpublic School is proper for
Student. Petitioners readily demonstrated that Nonpublic School is proper and appropriate
for Student and DCPS did not seriously dispute the case. The legal standard for proper
placement is the same for school districts and for parents. Leggett, 793 F.3d at 70. Under
Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001, the question is now whether Parents’ unilateral private
placement was reasonably calculated to enable Student to make appropriate progress given
Student’s circumstances. Cf. Leggett, 793 F.3d at 71, quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102
S. Ct. 3034. See also Wirta v. Dist. of Columbia, 859 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1994); N.G. v.
Dist. of Columbia, 556 F. Supp. 2d 11, 37 (D.D.C. 2008). Petitioners’ witnesses
convincingly testified that Student was being appropriately educated at Nonpublic School,
which is a good place for Student to learn and making progress appropriate for Student’s
circumstances. The second prong of Leggett is satisfied.
The final prong of Leggett is to consider whether the equities weigh in favor of
reimbursement or whether Petitioners acted unreasonably. Here, Parents interacted
reasonably with DCPS and provided all documentation requested during the evaluation and
IEP processes. There was no serious assertion by DCPS that the third prong is not satisfied.
Accordingly, this Hearing Officer concludes that Parents should be reimbursed for
Student’s tuition and related services at Nonpublic School for 2018/19 and funded there for
the remainder of the school year. This meets the Court’s guidance that the essence of equity
jurisdiction is “to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular
case.” Lopez-Young v. Dist. of Columbia, 211 F. Supp. 3d 42, 55 (D.D.C. 2016), quoting
Reid, 401 F.3d at 523-24.
ORDER
Petitioners have prevailed on the central issues in this case, as set forth above.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that:
Upon receipt of documentation of payment by Petitioners, DCPS shall within 30
days (a) reimburse Petitioners for tuition and related services paid to date for Student
at Nonpublic School for the 2018/19 school year, and (b) fund tuition and related
services for Student at Nonpublic School for the remainder of the 2018/19 school
year.
Any and all other claims and requests for relief are dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated in Caption /s/ Keith Seat Keith L. Seat, Esq.
Hearing Officer
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Case No. 2018-0229
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NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
This is the final administrative decision in this matter. Any party aggrieved by this
Hearing Officer Determination may bring a civil action in any state court of competent
jurisdiction or in a District Court of the United States without regard to the amount in
controversy within ninety (90) days from the date of the Hearing Officer Determination in
accordance with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).
Copies to:
Counsel of Record (Appendix A, by email)
OSSE-SPED ([email protected])
ODR ([email protected])