April 1969

Koeln/GermanyS. PLACE AND OAT! OF ACIN21 May. 69

S. EVALUATION. SOURCE B "4"1"4""--3-"IlL APPROVING AUTHORIT

G. DATE OF INFORMATION.

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Translation of BfVMonthly Report No 4 -Results of CE in April1969, 10 pages.

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umanT,C7Results of Counterespionage S. "1"/"E"Mi69506 August 69

in Anril 1969 (U)ie. No, or PAGED 1

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.a. Attached is a translation of BfV Monthly Report NO 44

Results of Counterespionage in April 1969.

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5 Cologne, 16 Mei-1SFEDERAL OFFICE FOR THE PROTECTIONOP THE CONSTITUTIONIV A 1 — 104-A-03001 —V0 VSJfertr

Monthly Report No 4

Results of Counterespionage in April 1969

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Distribution:see separate list

This report or information contained therein may not bepassed on to other agenoies or .persons without the approval .of the BfV, .

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* A. General Survey

In April 1969, the WV recorded a total of 53 personawho had been approached fur the purponc of completingintelligence maignmante directed against the FederalRepublic.

Assigning Services:

.48 persona were approached by Soviet Zonal intelligynoe aervioeo3 persons were approached by Soviet intelligence services1 person was approached by a Czech intelligence serviceI person- was approaohed by a Hungarian intelligenoe service

Above contacts were established in the following Years:

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B. Legal Resident Agencies of Soviet Intelligence Servioee in the federal Republic,

The Soviet intelligence services are maintaining operationalbases at all official Soviet agencies in the Federal RepublicThere are the following Soviet agencies in the FRG:

o Embassy of the USSR,Rolandseck, Koblenzer Straeee 28

o Trade /neaten of the USSR,Cologne, Amhener Stratum 240-44

o SOWFBAOHT (Ship Freightage State Office),Hamburg 63, Wellingebuetteler Landetrasse 267

o SOVAG (Bleak Sea and Baltic) Sea Transportation InsuranceCompany),Hamburg 22, Sohwanenwik 37.

•Press Agencies:

o TASS -.Bonn, Heuseallee 2-10, Preasehaue I

o PBAWDA - Bona -Venueberg, Kiefernweg 20,• branch office: Frankfurt/Main

o TBUD -Bad Godeeberg, Austraase 12(trade union paper)

o EKONOMITSCHS8KAJA (=ETA (financial paper),-Bonn, Robert •Kooh-Straese 16

o RADIO MOSCOW -Bad Godeeberg, Brunhildetraane U.

The Soviet Military Mieeiono (ffMM) in the FederalRepublic also are intelligence bases. They had beenset up ta'accordanoe with agreements between thevictorious powers of World War II in the former

o US occupation zone in Frankfurt/Main,o British zone in Buende,o French zone in Baden/baden.

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The Soviet agencies in the Federal Republic employabout 210 persona, among them 50 SMM members.This figure does not include dependants and thoseSoviet nationals who come to work at a Soviet agencyfor a short period ("acceptance engineers").

Between 50 and 60 percent of the personnel of officialSoviet agencies belong to legal resident agencies ofThe Soviet intelligence services KGB and GRU (two thirdsare KGB members, one third GRU members). The intelligenceofficers occupy permanent established poets that arereserved for KGB and GRU members but given out as regularduty jobs by the individual agencies.

Such procedures and the diplomatic status offer excellentcover and protection. Any counterintelligence activityagainst the resident agencies is further handicapped-because the persona to be observed have been trained in

I ; many years of thorough 'intelligence studies'. The diplomaticasencies the intelligence officers' strongholds in theYA4 — offer an ideal operational basis. The WM members holda special status and enjoy the privileges laid down in articleII of the Germany Treaty. Accredited to the commanders—in—chiefof the armed forces stationed in Germany they hold a quasiexterritorial statue. They may move about freely in areas

• of the former occupation zones. However, the armed forcesstationed in Germany have set up reetrieted areas (militaryinstallations) in regions that they are reeponsible for, Whichmay be entered by members of the military missions only on

• special conditions.

Only the Soviet Hmbasey personnel and the manager of theSoviet Trade Mission as well as his three deputies holdan exterritorial status. Yet, those privileged persons arenot the only ones who are engaged in intelligence activity.There are numerous examples that members of Soviet agencies

ra,m_r!e4. . tts who are eub cot Vo German jurisdiction handle agents in the- Federal lic.NA ember of the Soviet Trade Mission whose

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been active as handling agent. In 1962,was sentenced to fo ,.yeare imprisonment at hard labor byFedera igh Oourt \The former00VAG chief in Hamburg,

:y also handled an agent. Warned by the Soviet agentE1FIz w4 able to evade arrest.) •

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The KGB members in the Federal Republic conduct jointactions, no matter where they are stationed and to whichagency they belong.

Soviet Trade LliseionASMNy had handled a German went.This became evident ip eaeof SOHPAGIN, member of the

He had been supported (protection of meetings, clearingdead letter drops, eto) by the following /yowl.

TASS °correspondent JAKOWIEWwin ilanntsnw norreaponden the trade mission members iSO Albert M. 'I'REZOW le-and the Boyle Bra easy mem crilat, Lt!In1; y11 o 01)1p,8 ' '

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ran se ■ of Babasey and had acted as chiefs of thepolitical seotion.

The personnel of the KGB resident agency is composed of officceof the let Main Directorate. Their tasks include;

o collecting information on internal and foreign politicalevents and on scientific and technioal projects;

o penetrating western intelligence services (Counterespionage)

o supporting illegal resident agents (RUNGS, eto)1,

o disinformation

o vetting and penetrating emigrants' groups;

o protecting the Soviet agenoies in the FRG.

It is the GRU agents' chief tank to vet military andmilitary-technical installations. In many canes, however,their activity overlaps with that of KGB agents; they, too,handle sources having access to military material.

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The members of the Soviet military missions are GdUmembers for the most part. They are not eubject tosystematic observation by German authorities but comeunder the responsibility of the oounterespionage organsof the western allies. Main targets of the SMMO vettingaotivity are military installations in the FRG as wellas troop movements of the Federal Armed Force° and itswestern allies. In times of political tension (CSSR crisis,eto) they will intensify their vetting activity considerably.

The KGB agents are responsible for security matter's.They may interfer in GIRT cases which they believe tobe recognized or endangered. . .

The members of legal resident agencies of the KGB andGRU have undergone an excellent training. Some of themhave an outstanding eoiontifio and teohnioal knowledge.The methods of legal resident agencies regarding therecruitment of agents have been pointed out repeatedlyin other connections. Generally, the Soviet agents wil/establish first contacts to persons of interest to theIntelligence service at social events or at businesstalks. It is remarkable, however, that years may go byfrom the establishment of relations to the recruitmentand that no official pledge for cooperation will bedemanded. Frequently, first talks concerning the recruitmentwill take place in the Soviet Union. For this purpose, theperson to be reoruited will be invited to "business talks"in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet intelligence members display great activity inthe vetting of prominent personages of public life.Apparently, "overt" vetting actions are concerned.The partner in a conversation unconsoiously serves asvetting target.

This method is all the more effective as the danger of -premature discovery is very small and the establishmentof all kinds of contacts with West Germans a 'normal event'.

There ie a group of Soviet nationals who work at theSoviet Trade Mission in Cologne for a period of three.years at the most. Their.activity is worth.mentioningbecause there is reason to suspect that those persons("acceptance engineers" acoording to the visa entry)are official members of the Soviet Trade Mission in Cologne.

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Thus, the Soviet Trade Mission probably increases itanumber of personnel which is restricted to 60 persona.According to their statements at border control offices,those persona want to test machines etc at West Germanindustrial firms; part of them live at apartments rentedby the Soviet Trade Mission. Generally, they do not appearat the mentioned firma at all or work there only for ashort time.

According to experience, the "acceptance engineers"complete as many intelligence assignments as the offioialTrade Mission personnel. They work under almost idealconditions; In their capaoity as unofficial members ofthe Soviet Trade Mission they are authorized to move aboutfreely in the FRG beoause they are not liable to notification.For this reason, it is extremely diffioult to control theactivity of those "acceptance engineers"; if at all, this oanbe done only at a great expense of observation personnel.

Some llacceptanoe engineers" are stationed at the Soviet .Trade Mission in Cologne, some stay in other West Germancities. At present, a total of about 230 "acceptance .engineers" are aetive in the Federal Republic.

C. Deserter of the Soviet Intelligence Service

On 11 April 1969, the KGB member Rupert SIGL came toWest Berlin.

Since the latter part of 1953, SIGL had been active for theEast Berlin KGB office. It had been his chief task to approachand recruit agents on behalf of the Soviet intelligenceService; besides, SIGL also handled agents himself.

His vetting activity wan directed againet NATO countries .first of all against the United States. SIGL made severaltrips to the Federal Republic and to other western countries.He had the following cover names; •

Kurt HAGERPeter KlEINHeinz BEMDr. Gerhard REMELT.

In 1961, SIGL beoame naturalized in the "GDR".

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SIGL was born in Austria on 12 April 1925. He said thathe had boon recruited by the Soviet intelligence servicein Austria in 1947. Ho had worked there in the Sovietoccupation sone until 1952. On 12 December 1952, SIGLparticipated in a predatory attack in Lower Austria,allegedly on behalf of the Soviet intelligence service.After the attack, he fled to the Soviet-occupied part of

_ Auetria from where he wan taken to Moscow by air.OAT ItSS.(-4..t j041"PIA 11.--..-** Si:11_14 (

The KGB deserter HikolaluKOKHLOP/made statemélfte regarding.SIGI in 1958. He pointed out that'SIGL had been workingfor the Soviet intelligence nervice.since 195/ and thathe had been given the cover name "PILIP". Asked about the•predatory attack, KOKHLOV stated that SIGL had acted wilfullyand for lucre. Prom talks with a KGB colonel KOKHLDV ba, •

learned that SIGL had told his handling office that hehad intended furn eh.pro of hie A..lifin.*int. as .a terrorist. ' C:

In 1953, KOKHIOV had been ordered to handle SIGL. After2=3haying studied photostat copies of the court recordson the trial against SIGL he had refused this task becausehe had considered SIGI an unreliable agent.In Dascow, SIGL was given another handling agent.

SIGL received a thorough intelligence training. Accordingto his statements, he was taken over as a full-time KGBcoworker in 1953.

Based on SIGLI e statements, four persons were arrested inthe P deral Republic, one person in Belgium. They are:

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Pnecnnr (deep workings) HACKEMBES.G knew details aboutFederal Armed Per conatructien prEq7PITIT-(rupl ti.ennp inntnliptiona etc).

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..*" ,/' o POUF., Horst Hans Wilhelmborn in Berlin on 12 Mar 1932,residing Berlin 20, Spekteweg 50,waiter and mechanic.

When visiting his aunt in Erlau/toviet Zone in(15.150FORM was recruited by the Soviet intelligence service.From July 1966 to February 1967, POHLE has been employedas driver by the US Consulate-General in Frankfurt/Mate.His handling officer had ordered him to furnish reportson employees of the Consulate-General. When POHIEquitted working there he was dropped by the KGB. PaHIE&enid maintaining intern-gonna contaote:�

/ L ::3MANDAN', Lisette, nee MAHLISR,

born in Berlin in about 1930,residing Hanau, Fahratrasse 79Ceylonese citizenship, oommeroial agentin paintings.

Frau MIRCHANDANI, who used to wo4 for the Soviet Zonaltelevision program committee, wadCrecruited by the JfSin 1953 and handed nvor to the gpa in 1960/61.In 1962, Frau MIRMANDANI (she was single at that time)was asked by the KGB to marry the Ceylonese businessmanMIRMANDANI; the KGB wanted this marriage because it

• would enable her to move to the West "legally".In the long run, Frau MIRCHANDANI was to be introducedinto diplomatic oirolee for the purpose EZ13EMI

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pernonn of intere:!dtahos1.1:11gaINgnot.; 19.,.!‘L o2le

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OIL , Guenter FriearionKlbert,• born in Berlin on 7 Feb 1932,-

residing Berlin 41, Zimmermannetrasse 25,electrician. .

In 1959i SCHULZ moved from East Berlin to West Berlinfor financial reasons. His wife remained in East Berlin.During a visit in East Berlin, SCHULZ was ouestioned abouthis contacts with "flight helpers". He wadvtold to collnctinformation on nightclubs and restaurante .fragnontoa byAmerioana. He was to establish contact with those Americans,vet their apartments and_fucuieb—intarmetioa--aonmenangthair_acauaintannes_and_friencla. Finally, SCHULZ was towrite down the licence numbers of vehicles entering thebarracks area at Finokenallee. He reported to SIGL at Mooitineiin Bast Berlim, He admitted working for the intelligenoe

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O y.**StCONOranz,born in Berlin on 21 Oct 1916,last reeidence: Drewe, Rivelles/Belgium.

V. WEGENDONK was e!Cmember of the European Common MarketScoretariate (liaison office to other European institutions)until October 1968. Since then he has been habilitatingat Saarbruecken University.

v. WESENLONK had been reoruited by the Soviet inte/ligenoeservice while a POW in Russia. After his return to theFederal Republic he attended several meelfs with hisSoviet handling officer IIVIUGH" in Vienna

v. WESENDONK was told to finish his law studies at first.In the following time he maintained oontaot with severalSoviet handling offioers. Since his employment at theCommon Market Seoretariate in 1958, WISENDOM has beeninforming his handling office on

o the situation within the Oommon.Market,

o the consequences of Common Market . politios to'Communist countries,

o the efforts for assooiation of oountries of the 'ThirdWorld'.

Meanwhile, the warrants of arrest issued against HACKEMBERG,POHIE and SCHULZ have been put out of force.Frau MIRCHAMANI is still under arrest. v. WESENDORK came tothe Federal Republic soon after his arrest in Belgium.In the FRG no warrant of arrest was issued against him.

The inveetigations will be continued.

D.Deserter; of the Czech Intel ence Servine lA4111

On 18 April 1969, Metodej Ra -Gain or tte 'Czech intelligence service, reported to the police in Frankfurt/Main. He had come to the FRG on behalf of the Czeoh Ministryof Foreign Trade, Since 1958, SOCHOR had been a member ofthe Czech counterintelligenoe eervioe. He belonged tothe 2nd Administration (SPHAVA) of the StB, Aussig. At first,

was to inetruot and ciuee. on Czech ntiona1nto: or returning from the Federal Republic. Later on, he .was to obeerve members of the British Etbnesy in Prague.In March 1968, SOOHGR was detailed to work at the Ministryof Foreign Trade. His AtB memberehip Was kept secret./

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The MV had a16ady recezveo anzormaxion on MALI°intelligence activity.

-HIAISIOKA and KYRALwere taken into investigative oust00.

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LA:) ,GEE4A11/111 Vicetchalia, from 1961, with iaterriffWrM1X, among others,represents the Czech foreign trade organization MOTOKOV in theFRG. URAL was an official member ef.thie organization.

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to his move to the West,flee assigmmente directed •ices. HIAISIOKA saidad been his firet handlingrest was ieRued against

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