heirs of teodoro guaring vs. ca, g.r no. 108395, 07 mar 1997

8/22/2019 Heirs of Teodoro Guaring vs. CA, G.R No. 108395, 07 Mar 1997

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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997.]

HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING,

JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINERABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES

CUEVAS, respondents.

Rene A.V. Saguisag, for petitioner.

Escudero Marasigan Sison and E. H. Villarealfor Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines.

SYLLABUS

1.CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; DOES NOT CARRY WITH ITEXTINCTION OF CIVIL LIABILITY BASED ON QUASI- DELICT. Acquittal of theaccused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with itthe extinction of the civil liability based on quasi-delict. Thus. in Tayag, v.

Alcantara, it was held: the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c),Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, S2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability

founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas thecivil liability forthe same act considered as a quasi-delictonly and not as a crime is notextinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal actcharged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. It is noteworthy that the accident in that casealso involved a Philippine Rabbit Bus and that, as in this case, the acquittal of thebus driver was based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case fordamages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based onquasi-delict.

3.ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL EXTINGUISHES LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES ONLY WHENIT INCLUDES A DECLARATION THAT THE FACTS FROM WHICH THE CIVILMIGHT ARISE DID NOT EXISTS. Even if damages are sought on the basis ofcrime and not quasi-delict the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery ofdamages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guiltybut only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held: The judgment of acquittal


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distinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes adeclaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, thecivil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based onreasonable doubt. (PNB vs. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance ofevidence is required in civil cases, where the court expressly declares that theliability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v.

Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as for instance, in the felonies ofestafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who therebyincur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civilliability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which theaccused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093;See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

4.REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT, NOT A TRIER OF FACTS; CASE REMANDED

TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR.

In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in thecriminal case reads: WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubts asto his guilt, the accused is hereby acquitted of the offense of recklessimprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged inthe Information, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. It was thuserror for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case andinstead base its decision on the findings of the trial court in the criminal case.The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case.What it did was simply to cite findings contained in the decision of the criminal

court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable doubtconcerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate court regarded as acategorical finding that the driver was not negligent and, on that basis declaredin this case that "the proximate cause of the accident was the act of deceasedGuaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion that an actionfor quasi-delict is separate and distinct from the criminal action was thus setaside. This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case.This is important because the criminal court appears to have based its decision,acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what itperceived to be relative capacity for observation of the prosecution and defense

witnesses. Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civilcase, this case should be remanded to it so that it may render another decisionin accordance with the law and evidence. The issues raised by petitioners areessentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the functionof the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. Theycannot be decided in this Court. Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appealsis reversed and this case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instruction to


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render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and theevidence presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, Jp:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing thedecision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20, which orderedrespondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, topay various amounts in damages to petitioners, the heirs of the late TeodoroGuaring, Jr.

This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happenedon November 7, 1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico,Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven byTeodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit BusNo. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by EligioEnriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80 to 90kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, withPlate No. CVD-584. On the other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on theopposite lane, bound for Manila.

Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action fordamages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Theirevidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring's car bypassing on the right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the rightrear portion of Guaring's Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the Lancer toswerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the ToyotaCressida car coming from the opposite direction.

With Teodoro Guaring Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, wasBonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez

was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at theback were his daughter Katherine (who was directly behind him), his wifeLilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.

Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving theLancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while injuredwere Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.


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Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending toshow that the accident was due to the negligence of the deceased Guaring.They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead ofhim on the highway and that in doing so he encroached on the south-boundlane and collided with the oncoming Cressida of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez.Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the Lancer wasthrown back to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.

On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment findingPhilippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, andholding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive portionof its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and againstthe defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former, jointly and severally, the sum

of:

1.P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased TeodoroGuaring, Jr.;

2.P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

3.P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

4.Costs of suit.

From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.appealed, contending:

1.The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of thecollision was Guaring's negligence in attempting to overtake the car infront of him.

2.The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligencein the supervision of its employees.

3.The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favorof plaintiffs-appellees representing Guaring's loss of earning capacity.

4.The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

5.The lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.


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On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting asidethe decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil action for damagesand dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine Rabbit BusLines, Inc. and Cuevas on the strength of a decision rendered by the RegionalTrial Court at San Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the busdriver Angeles Cuevas of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to propertyand double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners'action was the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter's acquittal in thecriminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that

[1]EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASEAGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY IN THE FIRST CASE AND TO HOLDOTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE. PROCESS.

[2]THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUTFACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT RESOLVE SQUARELY THE ASSIGNEDERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.

[3]ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHERON REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO BAR TO THE PROSECUTIONFOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.

The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished theliability of private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver,

Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolvingprivate respondents from liability, the Court of Appeals reasoned:1

Since the appellee's civil action is predicated upon the negligence of theaccused which does not exist as found by the trial court in the saidcriminal case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused inthe criminal case carries with it the extinction of the civil responsibilityarising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil action

might arise, that is, the negligence of the accused, did not exist.

The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligentand the proximate cause of the accident was the act of deceasedGuaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him likewise exoneratesPRB from any civil liability.
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Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have basedits ruling on Rule 111, 2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

(b)Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of thecivil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final

judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereasthe present action was instituted pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, whichprovides:

Art. 2176.Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, therebeing fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Suchfault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relationbetween the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the

provisions of this Chapter.cda

It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that heis not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based onquasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v.Alcantara,2it was held:

. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually chargedalso criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would beentitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, theextinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [nowRule 111, 2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the sameact considered as a quasi-delict onlyand not as a crime is notextinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminalact charged has not happened or has not been committed by theaccused. . .

It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit

bus and that, as in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was based onreasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred sincethe cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.

Again, in Gula v. Dianalait was held:3
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Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpaaquilianaand not culpa criminal, thus precluding the application of theexception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule 111, 2(b)], and the factthat it can be inferred from the criminal case that defendant-accused,Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of

evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrinein Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will not find application. In thatcase, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the cause ofaction was based on culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suitfor damages barred.

Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, theacquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittalwas based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt.Thus, it has been held:4

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused fordamages only when it includes a declaration that the facts from whichthe civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is notextinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonabledoubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidenceis required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that theliability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzmanv. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in thefelonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certainrelatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised

Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is notbased upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castrov. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, RemedialLaw Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in thecriminal case reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt,the accused is hereby acquitted, of the offense of reckless imprudence

resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in theInformation. without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5

It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in thiscase and instead base its decision on the findings of the trial court in the criminalcase. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this case had
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been instituted independently of the criminal case and that petitioners hereintook no part in the criminal prosecution. In fact this action was filed below beforethe prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action. The attention of theCourt of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which wasdecided on September 7, 1990, only when the decision of the trial court in thiscase was already pending review before it (the Court of Appeals).

The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in thecriminal case. What it did was simply to cite findings contained in the decisionof the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered wasreasonable doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate courtregarded as a categorical finding that the driver was not negligent and, on thatbasis, declared in this case that "the proximate cause of the accident was theact of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The

notion that an action for quasi delict is separate and distinct from the criminalaction was thus set aside.

This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case.This is important because the criminal court appears to have based its decision,acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what itperceived to be the relative capacity for observation of the prosecution anddefense witnesses.6The prosecution did not call Bonifacio Clemente to testifydespite the fact that shortly after the accident he gave a statement to thepolice, pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver.Indeed, the civil case involved a different set of witnesses. Petitioners

presented Eligio Enriquez, who was driving the Cressida, and BonifacioClemente, who was a passenger in Guaring's car. Thus, both had full view ofthe accident.

It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action whenthe fact is that they did not take part therein. That the witnesses presented onbehalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecutionshould have brought home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness ofconsidering the decision in the criminal case conclusive of the civil case.

Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil

case, this case should be remanded to it so that it may render another decisionin accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by petitionersare essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is thefunction of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its exclusive appellate

jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and thiscase is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals with instruction to render judgment
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with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented inCivil Case No. 88-43860.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Punoand Torres, Jr., JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, p. 60.

2.98 SCRA 723, 728 (1980) (emphasis added).

3.132 SCRA 245, 248-249 (1984).

4.Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (1984).

5.RTC decision, p. 31; Rollo, p. 46 (emphasis added).

6.This is apparent from the following excerpt from the decision in the criminal casewhich the Court of Appeals quoted:

While Edgardo Sobrevilla was seated in the conductor's seat in the front portion of thePhilippine Rabbit Bus, Mrs. Lilian Enriquez was at the back seat of the Cressidacar. As between them, it is in accord with ordinary human experience thatEdgardo Sobrevilla was in a better position to see the actual occur[r]ence ofthe incident.

Confirmatory to the testimony of Edgardo Sobrevilla are the sketches (Exhs. "A" and"A-1") drawn by Pat. Danilo Gonzales the investigating Policeman, which revealno fallen debris on the North bound lane. Fallen debris could have surelyoccur[r]ed in the North-bound lane if there was a violent contact between theMitsubishi Lancer car and the Philippine Rabbit bus in the North bound lanebefore the Lancer car left its lane to encroach on the South bound lane. Thesketches (Exh. "A" and "A-I") reveal very clearly that fallen debris are on theconcrete pavement and asphalt shoulder of the South-bound lane, clearlyindicative that the collision between the Lancer and the Cressida occur[r]ed inthe lane of the latter.

heirs of teodoro guaring vs. ca, g.r no. 108395, 07 mar 1997

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