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AIR 1-iBILITY7. To meet superior numbers we require super-Lor- lIiOb':"'lity 50 tha tVie can concentrate quickly and ach Leve i l local super-Icr-Lty , 1I1Obilityi5 more than jus t speed of movenent , I t Ls speed of response .i.n a11the f ive f'unct.Loris of Land combat-manoeuvre f i r e , conmunt.cat.i ons , reconnaissance and supply. Air mobili ty can b::: usea an a.l.L 1":1."8 .:t:H.;"l.:LOfJ::i.None of our l ikely enemies, or countries requir ing a peace-keep ingoperation) has a s i.gn.if'Lcant id r mobile capabil i ty . Our possessionof one wouLd thereforc ' ive us R f'avourab.l,e mob i litY d:Lffen.ntial andredress our infer ior st rength.8. Air mobili ty i s the next major r-evcLut.onar-y CYCle :l.rl 1."r:.d foc'cedevelopment. I t provides an extra dimension te aIl five funct.Lons 0:land combat, Helicopters arc the be sf mer-na of obtaining th is a1:('mobili ty.9. Helicopters ceri be Hctroc1uced .,s (, tew machines to suppor-t alarge number of urri.t s , or as a la.r.,'.': rn.r'er o machines ta fe,-" urut,s ,or variat ions in between., ; , \ ~ ' ) r r ; :nfficien"" 2 '; \ 'craft are providecl 50tha t ful ly ? ir mobile operc.c.lons arp hab1tu.!il 1aree s a v i n ; 3 ~ ' inground ve hi.c Los can 1) 8 rmde , 'Uhere a 'c raf t ! L ~ ' e sujp.l.Led on Iv tempor a r i J . ~ r 1 . n d occas i.one.Lly, s a ' [ i n i ~ S 1"j,thin c ombat l 'nits ."l'e not siLIfic r 1 t ,10 0 Air raob i Le operat.Lons are comp'Lement.ery t e an d corret:.tLbLe Hithpure a i r operations. They are an extension of the O ' o l ~ n ( ; ' br t.t.Le an dnot an in trusion into the a i r one, Of'f'ensi.ve a i r opera.ti:ms sta;'t : : . ~ . : , the forward edge of our dep.Loyment, a i r rnobi.Ls cpe rat. jons e ssent Ls.Llyend there .VULNERABILITYi l . Hel:i..:opters are vulnerable to var-Loue t3;pes of f i re but sc' E , ~ ~ ~ : O a re all o the r combat veh ic l e s . He::"icoptera can be is ed il:" c ( ) m b " ~ t i nsueh a way as to exploi t t.he i. r capabi.Li.tLes ui thout incurr ing unnccertable casua.Lt.es , Helicopter opere' t ions t.ake place primari ly in the ,iJ:spaee over' our own ground dep.Loyment, and 50 dra:.... protect ion from Lt ,When they are required to penetrnt,e an enemy deployment they do sa theway 8round forces do, in small numbers using s tea l th and spee, or ~ a colwnn with f i re support and f'Lank protect ion.12. In the face of a well-knit and powerful an t i - a i r c raf t cief'ence,helicopters would have ta l imi t thei r operations when in proximity tathe enemy , For th is reason , helicopters ar-e r-al.atLvel.y Less usefuli:, a K'U llilr t.h.,u i l l a coi.I Li.ct. of Lee sei- Lnt.ens i.t.y ,13. The best 1-vay of ensuring survivabi l i ty i s to avoid areas ofhigh weapon densi ty . Properly employed, helieopter5 expose the1!'Cll'llvesonly or i.ef'Ly te. AA f'Lr-e , The helicopter Ls 3 rUbfed machi.ne ~ n ( ~ is not,.'! L?rticulr-r ly good t r rget for even hand-held anti-l ' lrcr.! ' f t missilesof the H ~ d ~ . \ T e type . l '.05t he Lic opter-s when h i t Le nd s:';>'y i.:, rrien:Ll.yt.err-i torv ; r-ec ov er-v r-st.es Are h.i.gh , Loss ra tes in lJ i"t Nrm en d eLsewher s,tore low.
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l ~ ) . .'.( rv i.Ience ; " : 'd Le found of the d ' ~ v e l r ) p m e J l t of a C h i L ~ ) , ~ ' : l : : ~ i \ r ~ ,';rJ,j~ o r t : : : . L J , -nti-helicapter weapon , Nor Ls tlt::r'e any weapon in 1 p v e : L o : : , ~ ; '.:;Le, capabl.e of cle st.royi.ng 0111' he1icopters fl:rin(J" over- our own t.er-r-Lv.Y:.:y ou; or r2.nge of c o n . J e ! l V ~ ' l l enemy \ l c ~ > o n f 3 , ~ ' ~ U Z : ; T l O I J Of AIlL VEllICLES. "._._.__ . _ - - - - _ . ~ - ' - " = ; ; ; . . ; ; . ; ; : ~ ' -l ~ ) . l ' .. '8 our gro1.md forces 2 o n ~ ' l r mob.i.Lc c,.a.bilit;( , a. familyur four t ~ 1 . J 8 S of he Li.copt.ers 15 r-equ.ired :

d , An ar-meil he Li copt.er (Id:l),1'( . The Hu.::;hes OH-6 fi118 t.l.e WH r o.Le , It Ls r pm", desi,:n ofl ight helicopter end wil l be il"' the US .invent.or-y p'st 1980.18. The Bell lIB-lD f'Ll.Ls the lJl'T role .. I t Ls a we.Ll, proven .s.Lcraf t but i5 not obsolescent; tJ:Jere i5 no suJ.ti1.ble replacement in sightun t i l weil af t e r 1975. 'l'he t J H ~ l D wil l Le in t he US Lnvent.ory \"!ll j)".st1980.19. ?or the C:::LX'gO .:d.lcr:dt t.hr-ee options r, re open 1 ~ , 0 obt.a.iri mor-e ! (of our present CH-113s.. or the greatl;-,r Lmproved CH-/: 7; ; Chinook a tapp roxdmat.e.ly the same co s t , or the CH'-5JA -vfhid1 has evon be t te r ::..iftand i s more eas i.Ly stowed aboa r-d sh'i.p , Furt her' study '.r ~ t.e chrri.caLanalysis are required.20. Ta rneet tlle armed he LLcopter- ro Le -' t.l.e 3el1 A H - l ' ~ Huey Cobr-a .i.cava i Lab.l,e nO,J end it Ls suit : 'b le . I t Ls il. version of the UE-JD a n l ~ e.oi s real1y not ,,1, whoLl.y new a i r cr-af't tjT'e. 121 D. f'ev :r2;"l.'S the Lc ckhec.tAH-56A . AAFSS (.dvanced aer-LaI fli'0 support syst em}, wil J ' Y ::.vlilab:1 ':land it of'f'er-s a very [;reatl;)T ancr-eased capab i.Li.t.y , The j ~ h F S S , l.owever-,exceeds the l 'ole and s ta r t s to encr-oo.ch on t.hat of the CF-5. That,


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tii'l. .., _ . , . . , . , . . - - , ~ , ...... . --___l . - ~ " ' " 23.. HeLi copt.er-s with small wines and al ternate means oi' th rus tgi.vang b E . < : , ( . ~ . _ flying ef'f'Lci.ency ar-e in d.eveloprrlent.. A lo" t. .l


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: . ir n ~ u . i . . .... :.",)' ... ~ t J . ( ' . ) 5 ( ; H t s .... r [ l j o ~ ' 1 ; L c e :L'i i.he 'iiorld ~ i h e r e "I n ~ , ~ _ ( : h t h , v ~ to fi -:htt;;:.t l l e l i c o . p t ~ r s ' : : ~ . : m o t operv te .

' . . Ibl icopters C..: l 0 ') i . s s : : j l i l " t ~ , . . i . . J i t b o u t l ' L ~ o r r-e-o r. ; ; , i ~ : . t ' : " l ) . : 01 ' ~ . justr'le;,t '00 our force nt.ructure,

~ id r u:/oile oper' 'l.,:.:.Jl1S , . : : ' ~ ; compement.ary .t.,) li ' vj'e'" V.o.i:sand (. 0 110';:' er.cro-.cn O}, ;',h(' J . ' 0 1 ~ of f i.;d- .'ii, f i rhter ortr ' nsport a i r c r ; ~ . f t .

r~ H e l i c , i ) t ~ I - S c..n be e l i l i ~ l o ~ r ( l d so as Le use their ' [ " j l 'U , ]ca.pabilitil;Ju, .ri.th out, i.,:;c1,;.rriJ12' 1. l !kCC3;: t . :1 . :e c c ~ ' . :", l l 3 S .Nu ....,:'eon is in 3 L ~ h t ',:hich d. iJ l t cll...j(C t :s .

~ ~ i rcl(-lllir'3 f Jur ; L ~ J . ~ ~ O l ) ~ ' 3 ~ ' " ~ ~ : t ~ ) e 5 "' iv\": ! ~ / ~ _ J . ' ".. i i C ' an ~ ~ l l ' r " , ~ ) l I i ~ t j c a l J a . J i J . j : ~ ~ ~ - l i , . : : ~ t J U ~ ~ ' , : . L ~ . ~ , \ J . t - : " _ ~ I : ~ i ( ~ l J . . c \ . " .. _ ~ L.u t i ] i t . ~ r t ~ c t i c i ~ . l ' ~ r ; ' , , ~ . ; Q J ...t, "" C ' , ; ~ } . e l i c o . ) ~ t J r , ':erpo:l'>j;e::'.co,lt.el'o 1 1 ' . C J . ~ 1 ; 0 G ' r:>. . v ; . : J t . ~ c . l , ) > \-[111(,;:1 ...-1~ e r ' r l ; i c o i.u t.he U..; l4l/(,il i , i la .L ; t ~ (,,'~ \ . . ; .

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9 37. The study group was not required. to anaJ,yze the helicopter programme as proposed by )i)bile CODlll.8nd. However, 1t considera that tromthe point of view of nUllbers of helicopter. and aethod of employment,the proposa! appears sound and well-balanced; the organization was note t u d i e d ~ The nuabers proposed woUld. g in Cana.da a reasonable a irmobility capability bu t %let so extensive that we wcu1d b. coJ'lllittedexclusively to air mobile operations. There are a tew areas in whichfurther studyand starf review i8 suggested particu1arly the requir..ment fOI' a weapons helioopt:.er, the choice of a cargo helicopter, theprovision of aerial oommand poste, and the selection of raIes for theCL-84.

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MILITARI ENVIRONMENTS AND TAC TICAL CONCEPTS

SCOPE1 . This chapter outlines briefly the present and future political andmilitary envirorunents, and discusses broad tactica1 concepts mainly interms of the roles and employment of air mobility. The purpose of sucha review is to determine whether or not a need exists now for air vehiclesin our ground force and, if so, i f this need extends into the future.

PART l - WORLD POLITICAL AND MILITARI ENVmONMENTS2. The world's political state determines the militar,y situations weface now and in the future. Our military capacity determines theresponse we can make as a nation. The more our military capacity canbe adapted to the situations which arise, the more effective will be ourforeign policy.3. The present state of the world is characterized by the gap betweenrich and poor nations, instabili ty in developing nations, and the threatof proliferation of nuclear weapons. Stuqy of the future indicates thatthese trends will not only continue but will be expanded, Technologywill widen not narrow the gap between rich and poor; over-population indeveloping countries will increase instabili ty. Major advances intransportation and communications will compress the world and emphasizedifferences; we shall become increasingly sensitive to events a ~ h e r e . 4. The major cause of tension will be over-population. The greatestincreases will take place in the countries least able to cope with theproblem - ABia, Arrica, Latin America. In the next 30 years the population o these countries Yill increase by a rough average o f 175%.(Rets 1 and 2). By 1980 the population of A.sia.al.a.ne 'Will equal the1960 population of the entire globe. The dominant feature of population growth is increased urbanization. Again this trend is sharperin the under-developed countries where in the next 30 years the population of cities is expected to double.. This will inevitably aggravateeconomic, social and political tensions and make revolutionary activityeasier. Over-population coupled with polit ical immaturity, insufficientadministrative and technical talent, religious and ethnie rivalry, andthe widening social gap between rnling and lower classes will breedpolitical instability and revolutionary movement. Leadership emergingfrom unrest will be aggressive and will more often than not be militar,y.5. The strength and position of the two super-powers will remainmuch the same in relative terma, However, the growth of other powercentres such as Western. Europe, China.and J.apan, and the furtherdevelopment of regional groupings, will continue to modify the presentbi-polar aligrunento International relations will be more flexible

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and greater oo-operation can be expeoted.. l9 a oonsequence of this t theUnited Nations should increase in prestiget and i ts apparatus for economicand social assistance he strengthened..6. Nuclear proliferation w ill continue to be a cause of tension.. Despiteinternational efforts to control or halt the spread of nuclear veapons,individual national interests appear stronger.. As ma.ny as six or seven ll2A::European countries coul.d possess a nuclear eapability within the next tenyears.. This alone would not necessarily alter the balance of internationalpower, but the threat of escalation of conflicts will require that themeans to achieve a rapid solution are at hando7.. While nuclear proliferation w ill increase world tension, i t willnot necessarily make nuele ar war more likely. It is to every nation 1 sadvantage to achieve i ts national objectives without recourse to nuclearweapons.. Indeed, two disagreeing countries, each with a nuclear capability,might he more sensitive te world pressures and amenable to arbitrationthan i f they were only conventionally arroed ..8. Alliances, agreements? and other means of promoting security throughcollective action will continue, but with lessened importance:

a. NATO will continue to provide defence for Europe but willhe modified by the easing of the Soviet Union's expansionistdrive, and the emergence of Western Europe as an economic unit.Although the alliance will continue to depend on the USstrategie nuclear deterrent 9 US influence will be less and areduction in US forces can be expected ..

b. CENTO will have been reduced to ineffeetiveness through thedivergent national interests of i ts members ..c.. The failure of SEATO to deal with indirect aggression 1 coupled~ t the aggressiveness of C h i n a ~ will force this alliance tabe reconstituted or abandonad ..d, Traditional ties and alliances within the Commonwealth will hereoriented as a consequence of declining British strength ..e.. The OAS of'f'er-s hope of economie and social development butbasic rivalries and varying national objectives will render

i t less effective in dealing with revolutionary upheavals.As these smaller alliances veaken, countries will be dravn to the UnitedNations despite i ts present faults and weaknesses.9. A1l the problems touched on here are capable of resolution giventhe will and the Ume. I t is clear hovever, that problems will ge tmuch vorse before corrective action becomes sufficiently effective toarrest and reverse trendso For at least the next 10 yea:rs and perhaps20, we must face an unsettled international political situation ..


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MILlTAR ENVIRONMENT10. No form of conflict can eLmi.nat.ed; no place on earth canbe considered remote t C o n f l i c ~ can range between an alI-out nuclearstruggle for survf.vaL through to shows of force and peacekeepng; Thel ikelihood of conf'Li.cb hovever i! is t.ovar.x the lower end of th is sca.Le ,Ll., Potential rnil i tary env.ronmerrte have increased in number anddiff iculty.. Europe is no longer t envtz-onment., i t:. 18 nov only one ofmany, and not necessarily th e most, important t Canada. The nuclearthreat is evel' present, but the nuc1ear baU1efield 16 th e least l ikelymilitary environment t The more Lfke.ly military envi.ronment. is an undevelopedcountry composed of extremely dii'f:l,:,ult t .orrain J broken only by areas ofhigh population dens i ty connect.ed with each ot.her by indifferentcommuni,cat io ns t12. No country 9 hovever- poor or b a ' : k w a r d , ~ need suffer from a lack ofarms or equipment. They will lack cnIy t.he technical capabil i ty to usethe weapons which wil l be a'FaiJ.0b1r:;!. 'I'he supe r-epower-s! arras sales :exclusive of mutual ai.d, are mc reas lng , (In the past f if teen years ,US sales have increased by a f'ac t.or- of s ix and greater increases arapredicted for th e future.) The governments of Britain) Frmlce, Sweden,Switzerland and others ar'6 also working with the i r industries to securea share of the arma mar-ket., The Middle East counbr-te s are oi1 r ich andarms hungry o Lack of funds hoveve r i8 no Impeddment., Even backwardcountries quickly learn the t r ick of playing off th e supe r-cpove ra andforcing one of them to rnake a pr-e-emptdve sa le .13. The ostensible purpcse cf the se arms sales i s ta develop mili taryclient states whieh wil l bu iLd up l ) o l i t i ( ' : a l ~ m i l . l t a r y at.rong-hol dsfavourab1e ta one or ot.her- bloc The effe::t . hovever J Ls Lo pl.acesophisticated arms in the hands of p.Litic-8:ily .immatur e nations whLchhave a surplus of rnanpover-, We sh3.11 U18r,'Jfor6 ia


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b. Limited WarS o Limited vars of the lerea-type should becomemore likely as the Soviet Union and China build up theirallies, and also as they develop an expeditionar,y capabilityof their own. Wars of this type will more likely oeeur in theMiddle East and Asia. The European theatre is not likel..v t.obe involved. These warB will normally be conventional innature, though China could involve us in a nuclear l:l.mited waJ'in ABia. Terrain will normally offer useful employment tomotorized and mechanized forces as weIl as unrnounted infantry.D e p l o ~ n e n t s will be r e l a t i v e ~ wide and not completely c o h e s i v e ~ The enerny will possess a good ground-to-air capability butlimi ted air-to-air strength. The enemy wil l also have asuperiority in numbers, but not necessarily in equipment.

c, Peace Enforcing. Low intensity conflicts such as c.ounterinsurgency or peace enforcing o p e r a t i o n s ~ are the most likelyform of ac t rvt.ty, These will occur most frequently in under-developed areas and the most l ike ly theatres are Arrica southof the Sahara, South-East Asia, and Latin An:cri("''J.. Lack of a.road network will seriously inhibit ground mecharriaed I'o.rceeand the air will provide the main means of mobili.ty. In theforward areas , the enemyl s capability for anti-air will helimited to low altitudes and to the area immediately overtheir unft.s , The enemy could pOGsib:'y depLoy veapons of theREDEYE type but cos t , and training and maintenance complexitywill limit the seo Deploymcnts will be 100se a.nd enemy forcesdifficult to locate an: der; ne. li. "front line" as such Lsunlikely to e x i s t ~ d , Peacekeepi..!lii'. Peacekeeping operations will r-are.Iy t ake pl.acein developed count.res , The more normal envi.ronment wil.1 bl"! thatdescribed for peace enforcing. Both sides will have rougn.Iysimilar weapons and strength, or a c e a s e ~ f i r e waula not he in

e f f e c t ~

15. In a nuclear war or a l ~ n i t e d war we will be operating as part ofan allied force drawn from well-developed Western countries; to play ourful l role our contribution must he w e l l ~ q u i p p e d modern forces. In peaceenforcing and peacekeeping tasks \l e m be part of a force drawn. from tbedeveloping countries who will look ta us ta supply the modern technlcalequipment and skills eCONCLUSION16. From this consideration of the present and future world envirorxmentsi t caa he ccnckuded s

a. That world tensions resultipg trom the super-power S t l ~ g g l ~ will tend to lessen; those resulting from the rich/poor gapwill increase.- 1

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b. Major disarmament will not occur , Such anus controL m ~ 3 a ~ " , ; : ' f ' ~ 3 that are adopted will stem fro:n mutual, s01f-.nterest ano i":"J,lnot seriously change the balance of military strength.Developing nations wil l have access ta adequate 3 u p ~ t i e 5 ofarms and equipment.c , The forms and Levs.Is of conflict will he as vared as thflcauses and locales, but lover level cont Li.cbs are n.oz-e l : ~ k ' 8 l y . These will take place mainly in uner-developed ~ o u n t , ! " i e s ; our part icirat ion will be intervention:i.st 'in n a ~ U T ' e , In a l l

forms of conflict ve shal l be numer-Lca.Ll.y iHt'mJ'lr.d, Urban areas will have increased effect en n,il: .. C t u , ~ y .pera ;: ' I lS .The civi l ian population in combat zones 'h .n great..,t e ; ~ ( ! ~ i : d . 1 ~ a , . o military density. Our force:'! must therefo,r'e pose ess the meansfor discriminant applicat ic . of force.e , Population growth and outs ide ir: '.litary ass i st.er.cs .


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c. ~ o n t i n u o ~ O p e ~ t i o n s . The development of militar,y scotoscopespassive night vision devices using image intensifier tubes)will enable ground forces to operate by night 'Wi. th almost afull daylight capability. These devices will have a more profoundeffect on our tactical concepts than any other single equipmentdevelopmento1d. Inte]J.igence. Sorne end items ot development can be eXpeotedfrom the current efforts to find new sensora , These, and newmethods of processing intelligence information, will g r e a t ~ increase our intelligence capabilityoe. Fire Po;r. There are no new fire power developments in proape cbwhich will have a major influence on tacticaJ. coneepte , Hm'lever,improvements to existing weapons will contribute to change. Thedevelopments which will be of greatest importance are anti

mechanized weapons, aerial fire support weapons, rocket-boostedarti l lery ammunition, flechette warheads, and the means ofachieving terminal guidance.f . Qommunications. Improvements in communications equipment andprocedures, plus such new aids as automatic position indicators,aerial command posts, etc, will enable commandera to exercisemore real-time control and make possible new concepts of commandorganization and techniques.

18. The tactical concepts we adopt must accommodate these technologicaladvances and also recognize Canadafs ernerging role as an expeditionaryinterventionist. This will require us to produce forces capable of fightingagainst a nurnerically stronger enerny in a hostile terrain at a greatdistance from Canada.MOBILITY19 . Classically the answer ta fighting superior forces is the possessionof euperior rnobility. History is replete with examples of highly mobileforces viotoriously engaging impossible odds, Mobility enables men and firepower to be concentrated at points of decision, where they can achieve alocal superiority and so a local victory. Hobility also enables the forceto withdraw quickly to ccncentate at another point. A. succession oflocal victories bringe general suocess. We must, however, passess asubstantial tactical mobility difterential over that of the e n e ~ . EqualDr slightly better tactical mobility i s not sufficient.20. I t is not sufficient r n e r e ~ to he able to move quickly however.AlI the related functions of ground combat must be speeded up, Werequire the oapability of executing aU the ground functions of moving,shooting, connnunicating, reconnoitering and supplying, quickly, at will,at any time, and in or out of the presence of the enemy. We need to beable to pick up ground units and their fire power from the vicinity ofwhere they are fighting, and move them to where they can fight immediatelythey are placed back on the ground, We also need the means of cornmanding

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CIAftll IIID I JllPLOnGft OF .An MOBILm

800P11. !hie chapter considere the concept of air mobillty and shows l teimpac' on the five fUnctions of land combat. Its employment in the miliiaryenvironmenh ouUined in the previous cha:pter i s discuseed. Oerta.in o'herquestions auch al vulnerabilHy, cos s, and strategic movement a.re a l lO considereL

2. !l'he palt 50 years have seen the proe,res!live mechanizaUon of landforces. The characierisUos of wheeled and trAcked vehicles have now beenexplolted and, while lome product improvement is ~ o s s i b 1 e , no start l ing breakthroughs can be expected in ound mobi l ity The next major revo1utionarycycle in land force development.wi11 be in air vehicles. This cycle i s novfirm1y estab1ilhed, and i ts val1dity has been proven in Malaya, Xorea, Suez.Algeria and 'Par't1cular1y ln Vlet Nam. Countr.ie3 wliich have had to engsge in o p ~ r ~ t i o n s within the l ~ s t ten y e ~ r 8 h ~ v . aIl recognized the need for air mobili ty in the i r ground f'ore es ,3. The helicopter gives ground forces the capabi1iiy of using the ai r wiihout basic change to ~ principlo8 and procedures of ground combat. A. helicapter-borne force flghts vith the same aims and tactics as a vehicle-borneforoe. A combat unlt requires 1it t le re-adjultment to becoming air mobile.!he hellcopter can plck up the unU wherever it 18 and drop I t where i l 18n e e d . e d ~ ready to flght. ArU11ery can be f1rlng one mlnute. be airborne th e : . : l e J ~ t " and be f"i r ing &gain 8hor . minu.es a:.f1;er 1;Quchdown. The he l icop te r fit. 1n\0the arnl1 .true'ure; U doel not require 8. new etructure buU t around i t . Grounc.iunite can usefully 8IIlp10y a few, or ~ he1icopterl for iemporary a.ir mobil i ty ,or entire unite can be permanen\ly a ir mecbanized.4. He1icoptiere proTide an erlra dimension to flYery funcUon of the grouv,.battle -reconnaissance, movement, fire, communications, and logistics. Theirintroduction wl11 ~ an equlvalent. i f no t grea'er, impact on ground forceef:f'ectivenelB ,han the replacement of the horle by the aotor veh1cle. No' ihat helicopters will complete1y replace vehic1... Air aobl1l'y lB now added to the other forms of ero\lDd force mobll1ty - tracks, whee1s, and feet. !heseother forma, as a coneequenee, will need to be re-ecaled and a new balancereached.ORGA1UWIOWJJi ASPIO!S5. Unite ean be e1ven a iempore.ry air mobll1iJ br ihe aUachmen\ of helicoptere. or 'h87 cau be coaplete1T air mechanized b.r replacing 'he i r groundvehlc1e. with air vehlele.; there are alao variatlons in between these 'woorganiza'ional concepts.

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the fring of the 8Il8lllJ' area, but OM)'" fa i t fizeli-winc aireraf t can 8earch outdi,stant information. SW1ar1y. cargo helicopt ers cannot replace transportaircraf t in th e moving of large bulk tonnages; their task is detailed distr ibution t.o foNard uni.t.a,9. Air mobile operations use the a i r , but there a.ny simllarity vithpure a ir operations ceases. Air offensive operations begin at the edge of theen8ll1 deploymenti a ir mobile operations essentially end there. Ground aviation.can in fact make a ful l contribution without ever leaving i ts own dr space.Air mobile operations are an extendon of the ground bat t le , not an intrueion t nt othe a ir b",ttle. The tvo operations are different in t1Pe, sim, .cale , e q u i p ~ ment and pi lo t sltil le. !he)'" are entirely colementary and in no vay competit ive.VUIBERA'BILI'l'Y .ID StIIlVIT.AJILI!T100 Vulnerabili ty 18 discu8sed in de ta i l in Chapter V. The followingpar88raphs discullS the problem. briefly.,11. The he1icopter ls vulnerable, but so to o is a heavy tank or a jeeponce i t i l in range of enemy weapons. Jlquipment and men survive in batt leby carefully co-ordinating the activi ty of a11 combat arma. Infantry alone,or tanks &lone, or art i l1ery alone are vir tual ly defenceless. !ogetherbovever, they produce a tact ical cohesion with each 8upplying 1ts strength tocover the otheran weaknesseB. Hel1copters can be integrated into this combatstructure so that they add strength and in turn receive protection. Helicopters do not increase the armyU s general vulnerability; in fact i f properlyused, the,r reduce i t .12. Helicopters can be uBed in form of land combat in such a w asto exploit their unique capablli t ies without incurring unaeceptable casualtiee,In ' i e t Ham, helicopters bave been faced with a steadily rising enemy c a p a . b i l i t ~ b o ~ h in numberB and cal ibre o f weapons, 7 e caBua1ty r a t e . a re cons iBtent1ydroppingo As the tbreat increased and ehanged , new tacticlI were introduced.such aB U8ing different fl ight alt i tudes and eoneealed approaches, employingcovering t i re from other helicopters, a ir force ai reraf t . ar tUlery , etc . , andby illproving tactica1 procedures while in the presence of the enemy. I f facedvlth a different e n in a different environment, tact ics and techniqueswould again be modifiedo Ground aviation 18 very flexible - i t can do a. greatman7 different jobs. and i t ean do each in a great ManY different ways.13. In considering the survivability of helicopters i t muet be remembered,ae mentioned ear1ier 0 that they operate pril lari17 in the a ir space immediatelyover our ground deployment. When they do penetrate into actively host i leterr i toT7. they do so in the same Ya1 ground for cee do - either as a smallpatrol uling ste81th and speed, or as a column vith ful l f i re 8upport andnanl t protect ion. Helico'Dtere Beek protect ion froll enemy veons in the aamevay ~ q other vehicle does, by ~ v o i d i n g exposure o

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= 20

14 . ~ h development of tact tes and flying teChniques to reduce the helicopter Ds exposure is in faet on1)" just beginning. Large area lJIlok. " c r e e n s ~ for example, do no t a:ppear to have been exploited. A f i a t esoke cloud overthe landing zone would blind the enemy but not yrevent helicopters framapproaehing and lWlding; the helicopter rotors clear a sufficient aree topermit the pi lot to select his point of landing. N a p - o f - t h e ~ e a r t h flyingallo requires more development. So too dose the use of instruments and simplenavigation nids to permit flying in marginal weather. The time is not far offwhen grount.. fog or rain will f'avour a.ir mobile operations. Work also 1srequired on ground hand.1ing de'V'ices which will permit helicopters ta be movedback into woods and camouflaged. TheBe a s ~ e c t s are discussed further inChapter V.15. Even when the helicopter dose come under fire i ts chances for survivalare good; Extensive S3cientific testing in the U.S. , which was conf1rmed byViet Nam exper1ence, indieates tha.t the helico-pter is not only a poor targetbut 18 &leo 8. remarkably rugged b i t of e q t t : 5 . ~ . , m e n t . Very few are sbot down tnthe classic sense. Most helico-pters when hit: can land safeIy, and recoveryrates are therefore high. These aspects a l o l ~ with the resul ts of testing andexperience are discussed in deta.il in Chapter V.TASKS OF GROUND AVIA!IO!16. AlI grouni operations can be divided into f i ~ e functional tasks, asfollowsg

a. Oommand, control, and communication.b Q Reconnaissanc.e.c. Mano euvrEll d . Fi.:re power .e. Logistics o lncluding medical evacuation.

17. Air vehicles can be used effecti.vely in al1 five of the above tasks,The f'ollowing iB a brie! summary of how air vehfcl.es would be used, .A. ful lanalysis a p ~ e a r s in Chapter VI.aQ Command. Oontrol and Communications - Air vehielesare required as aerial command posts at batta11oD. andbrigade level . These are mandatory for air mobileonerations and are desirable for all other operations.They wald be particularly useful in p e a c e ~ e n f o r c 1 n g or

p e a c 8 ~ k e e p i n g s i tuat ion.. Air vehicles are nee4ed ~ l a o for command and staff transportat ion. They can &180 beuaed for the establishment of radio relay station!, 10'10.peake%' and l eaf le t dissemination" and / l I aerial deSIil'ttct.riderso AlI these taBks can be done by Light ObseTVl'ltionHelicopters (LOB) except for aerial command pOlis whichrequire a UTTH aircraft (UH=lD)Q


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b. lleconnaiss&B,c.! Air vehieles can be employedeffective1y in nearly al1 the tasks of reconnaissanceuni ta route reconna.issance" protect ive ecreens,ground sear ch, oo:avoy escort s aeize and. ho'Ld, f'Lankp r o t e c t 1 o n ~ coup da main cper'at i.one , etc The hell,copter is so suiiable for reconnaissance operations thatU " S ~ reconnaissance units were the f i rs t ones to becomea i r mechan.aed, Their a ir c:avl"..1:ry unts have made P.tremendcus contribution 'to the f ighting Ln Viet Namwhere they now have eight uni ts o f company s ize and t'Woof bat t a l i.on size" with a t'1.:ther s ix more bat.talionum ts schedul.ed f:Jr activation. Aerial reconnaissanceunite require the LOR an d the UTTH vith a high proportionof armed he'l .copt.er s , He'lLcoot er-s can be uaed on S01nesurveillance t asks out tb.ey do not !,Tovide a 'l'articula!"l;}"good pla'c.orm for the c a r r 1 , l { ; ~ cf cameras and senscr-s ,no!' can they f ly wit.h saf ety at altl tude.s emanded b; i d ~ ~ ~ i s u r v e i l l a n ~ e ' tasks. For r ne s 3 'Lasks e fixed wtng a i : x ' ( ~ r a f t , vith the ~ a : p a . b n i t y to nenet.:l'.,!:;,t,'3 i s needld,

c , M a n o e u 1 f ~ Manoeuv'l'e is great ly fa c il it a td by a irmobility. ~ h speed and f lexibili ty of the helicopterpermits large number-s of men and equtpment to be movedin successt've l i f t s a very sho:l'\; Ume. This in t.urnpe:rmits uni ts te conduct cp er-ati.cns in a '{1"!",n:."J" much widel'ar ea, or conversely smalLer uni ts to do the same tasksas larger ground molJ:lle urri t s , Even a proport ionatelysma11 l i f t ~ such as one company i i f t p ~ brigade, canbe yery effect ive" Dep endf.ng on d i s t , ~ n c e b : L ~ . v ( ' . b ' e d , th is amount of l i f t . could moye a "briga.de in a r e l a t i v ~ l y short Ume.. This and osher asY)ect.s of u:rovi,ding' a irmobilUy are d 1 s c u s s ~ . in detai l in Ohapt er VIo

do J'ire Power Air vehicles can cont.r but e ta th e t'i1'8power task in three ways g(1) As armed helicopters.(2) To give art i l lery a temporary a ir mobi l i ty(3 ) As aerial arti l lel 'Y (described la ter) ,Armed helicopters axe required to prov1de en routeescort and landing ~ o n e suppressive f i re , as weIl as1ntimate aerial f i re support to the a ir landed troopsoArmed helicopters are Meo an indbpenlilable par t of thea . r ia l reconnaissance unit 9 s combined arma team; thesemust have f i good anti-mechanized capabilityo Whethe.rone type of ai reraf t and one uni t can do bo th ~ ~ c o r t Mld.recorma:ltiSanC6 task$ is examLned in Cr...a;pter VI.. Laz 'gecargo hel Lcopt er-s are required no give a.rtiller 'y ai1'mobility. Artille:ry guns , creys, and ammunitioll cari. oe

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quickly moTed b7 a ir and deployed in areas unreachable byany other means of transport. Whether these hel1copterssbould be p o o l e d ~ or be permanently attached to theartillerYg ie discuesed in Chapter VIc Aerial ar t i l leryw h i ~ h cau provide direct air-to-ground fire and indirectground-to-ground fire le belng examined in th e U05. This1s a contentious employment of h e l i c o p t e ~ a n d at the momentdoes not appear too rewarding A full examination appear-ain Cha:pter VI.

e . Logistics - Ground forces require extensive strategie,tact ical , and combat air l i f t for the logistlc function.Desirably, 0-130s and :Buffalo ahould oper-ate as far forwardas possible. Detailed distribution of supp'l i es to unitsand the evacuation of casual ties however, can best be doneby helicopters. Logistic h e l i c o ~ ) t e r l i f t may augment groundtransportation for the deli.very of urgently needed items,or i t may in certain circumstancee be th e only forro of transport available. The provision of an adequate air l i f t eanaffect large savings in pipe-line and local stock levels.A minimum number of helicol'ters are needed exclusivelyfor air medical evacuation. AlI helico"9ters however canbe used when requiredo Helicopter evacuation permitsextensive changes to be made in the f ield medical organizationo The vehicle r e p ~ i r o r g ~ n i z ~ t i o n is ~ l s o ~ f f e c t e d . Thase ~ s p e c t s ~ r covered in C h ~ p t e r VI.

lS. Aircraft committed to one function can contribute to another. Logistichelicopters can make art l1lery air mobile and also l i f t t r o o ~ s ; troop helicoptersin turn can ass1st in logist ic and reconnaissance tasks. This i n t e r ~ a c t i o n is evidence of the helicopterOs flexlbil i ty.

lWIGI OF UBI19. Helicopters can be used in all theatres and all military env1ronmentr,,In the followlng paragraphs the abovefive functionaltasks are consideredwithin the four typ1cal military environments described in Chapter 11 0 Thiswill serve to show the scope of use of air vehicleso20. European Theatre - The outstanding success of air mobile operationsin Viet lam, and the reduction in conceptuaJ.. thinldng devoted ta nuclear war.has perhaps created the feeling that air mobile operations have no place in aNA!O var and that helicopters have a l imited and somewhat dubious role in ahigh sophisticated warD Our examination indicates that this is not the case.21. The UcS. air mobile concept, described in Annex :B, was in factdesigned and tested for a luropean var. (The fact i t was f i ret used in acounter-insurgency operation attests to i ts flexibil i ty of employment.) I twas conceiTed as a combat formation which could concentrate and maye quickly10 as to exploit our nuclear weapons or escape those of the enemy. I t 'lasto he augmented by an air cavalrybrigade (yet to he formed) which would belargely an anti-mechanized force operating on the nanks of th e enemy' stank columns. The Germans have started to l'iek: up this idea and are now 1.n

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COIJ'IDM'IAL- 23 - ~ i ' I . ; - l ~ .. ,1"'"""1 l - C.'4 r " ' ~ 1 ! l ' 7 ' ~ ~ : 1: ,,' "' !' fI ! l . \ " . 11 'E ' p.'t : , ; . ~ ili...! .' ? f ~ I ' : ' - J 11 i " ~ " " ~ t . .....;"\, - ;J--., ,U \ j, '; \ ~ : . . / . !J . ~ ~ ! . j '. .L ....., .... ...._. - - ~ _ = - . : ~ P , , , ;>,.J:::,::", ..1:'... .-4 .s:

the process of acquiring large numbers of hellcopters (UB-U both for troopcarrying and for anaecl hellcopter tasles. A report on German thinking an dprocurement pIani for aohievinc a ir mobili ty in aluropean var, la at.Annex Co U "X. plans are also disoussed in this annex,22 . Our increaling abUity to dominate our own a ir space , and the factthat a ir mobile operations can be effective vithout leaTing our a ir Ipf\.ce,makes helicopter operations in EUrope practicable. !echniques of emnloymentwill undoubtedly have to be modifiecl and tasks such as reconnaissance endaerial f i re support, vhich bring ground aviation to the fringes of the enemylsdeployment, vU l be increasingly dangerous. The main roles for a ir vahleleswill be the rapid re-deployment of fire power. part icularly anti-tank wea:pons,and the movement of reserves. Logistic resupply and the evacuation oi maIScasualties will be a big role . 'l'here will be scope for fully a ir mobLl eoperations part icularly in covering our withdrawsl over an obstacle and inoperations &gainlt enemy fianks. J'lank reconna.:1.ssance and protection, andrear area securi ty are other tasks.23. Limited Var - Helicopter operations are of even great . r use in al imited war situation wbere the mobility differential between ours'lves andthe enemy v i l l be greater . Air vehicles will be able to operate more freelyin the forward areas and at higher alt i tudes. A certain amount of penetrationcan be done. Armed aerial reconnaissance vi l l be more feasible. The mainroles for helicopters will be in the rapid movernent of reserves and f i re power,part icularly to coyer gaps in ou r deployment or to deal vith sudden threats .Logistic reBupply and medlcal evacuation will be important roles. There willal.so be scope for fully a ir mobile operations part icularly ln surprise spoil:1ngoperations.24. Peace-Enforcing - In a peace=enforcing or counter-insurgeney oper-ation 9 helicopters cau be ful ly employedc.. In these operations, our groundforces have very restr icted vehicle mobilityo The ground mobility differer.tiAlis normally in favour of the l ightly equpped enemy who can use his knovledgeof' the t e r r a in and h is na t ive sk i l l s to move qu ick ly . Under these circ'U.mstancesi t le estimated that we must have a superiori ty of 10 to l in order to besuccessful. ln f a c t ~ the strength rat io will more l ikely be the reverse.Helicoptere adjust tbi l numerical disadvantage by providing the increasedmobility that permits successful operations even against a more numerouB enemy.There vU l be maJll' tasks for a ir vehicles. Indeed 9 in some cases a l l combRttasks might have to be done from the ai r . 25. Peace-Keeping _ Peace-keeping operations require an extensivesurveillance capabilit)" combined with the means of quickl)" assembling command.fll"s,and observer team.s - and on occasion a fighting force. Vi thout a ir vehiclee.f t is necessary to deplo)" a large proportion of our strength in patrol l ingand surveillance taSks and to main tain larger local reBerves. more economicaluse of rnanpower coul4 be obtained by aucsenting ground surveillance by slowflying, lov level aerial reconnaissance, and a ir lifte4- patrols . Air mobilit7vould also permit reS8nei to be centralized, again eaving numbers.. :Becausepeac&-keep:l.ng forces are granted freedom of rnovem8nt. they Carl operate overboth sides. freedam of movement has often been interfered vith by applytngrestr ict ions to our ground movemant. Air mobility vould eliminate th is

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''''UWlIDII-I l iT. r---_"----------,,__\I.IIo8 ~ . . . . s ~ " - " - - " . ~ " " " _ ' ' ' - - ' ' ' ' __ ._.-....,_) ; ff"'r4"--'1 ,f .;-,; .. r ~ ' " T ""'"-"Il ,......__' ~ ' ~ ~ ~ .. V tn -.( . t' Vf e2', ,: ". ,1; , . '. ,., ;'. J ,1 f , ' -" ' lAt -! ., '" "" ' ! .' ., j '" ., elL.... . . . . . ._._ e. J ' ..: . . ~ . L lt /L.JA..

26. Home Ja,e - Hellcopterl can al.a be uleMly .-ploTea. ;1th1n ~ _ . _ - - -home base. All t1Pe. of helicopters would be useful in lupport of the civi lpower in catastrophle, 8uch aa flood, forelt fires, etc. , and alla in riotcontrol. In a ll thele tasks the rapi4 concentration of men and equipment levital . Helicopter borne force. can also play a large part in the reductionof enemy lodgements in th e Borth. A i r - d r o p ~ e d fuel caches will permit helicoptera to extend their range so as to cope with the long distances involved.STRATEGIC MOBILITY27. Ideally, the ground foree's air vahicles should be capable of strategieself-deployment, thus relieving ships or aircraft from the job of transportingthem. Helicopters do not, however, have th e capability for very long-rangeovarseas ferrying; air refueling techniques are being developed but this doesnot really offer a practical solution at the present time. Only one V!CiLa i r c r a f t ~ the CL-84, offers the possibi l i ty of world-wide self-deployment, a n this capability might in certain circumstances make i t cost effective. Thiscase 1s discussed further in the ne.xt c h a ~ t e r . 28. Larger helicopters of the CH-47 or OH-113 type cannot be l i f ted in mor.ttransport aircraft . They do have a certain ferry capabili ty but for very longover-sea journiee they would have to be carried by ships. The smaller ones(OB-6 and UR-ID) can be l i f ted in transport airerait , and therefore Dose nomore serioue problems in a strategie deployment than does any other vahicle.29. Ship-based air mobile forces offer m a advantages in the conduct ofboth short and sustained operations, particularly those of a peace-enforcingor peaee-keepin nature. This capability i8 now largely unique to the U.S.Marines but ia being expanded in the U.S. Army. An army helicopter repairship (float1ng aircrait maintenance faci l i ty) is now under construction anda second planned. These in conjunction with stores ships, and tankers willgive the U.S. Army the capability for extended onerations from a sea-bornebase. Thi. concept could be adapted to our forces, and in conjunction withstrategic air 11ft would ensure we had the mobility to deploy and sustainourselves anywhere in the world oOOST mECTlVENlSS30. Helicoptere, l ike other forme of new equipment, are costly to buy.They are however , becoming increasingly cheaper to operate and maintain. Inrela,tion to other forms of mobllity, helicopters are in Many sitU8.tions cos teffective. Helicoptere, unlike sorne other types of aircraft , do not have ahigh obsolescence rate. The B-13 for example has been in the U.S. inventoryfor 20 years and is expected to be in service for another three. The UH-Iseries will not have a replacement in the U.S. unti l 1975 and is expected tobe in service there unt11 weIl on into the 1980B. This is discussed furtherin the next chapter.31. !he cost :figure. for air ....Meles are within the economic capabiHtyof any nation wh1Ch now maintainl ground mecbanized units and taetical airforce aircraft . 'o r exemple, fully a ir mobile divisions are only s11ghtly moreexpeniive than other t1PeSD !he following U.S. figures show the relat ive cast

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of proeuring and mainta1n1Dc four t1PeS of div1s10n. for f1Te year.:

Relative COlt - fAir mobUe division 100Armoured divi. ion 93XeChanised d1vil10n 921nfantry div1lion S7

COllCLlJSIOBS32. a. Air mob11ity offers a quantum jump in tact ical effectivenewithout bas1cally chang1ng round force unit8 or tact ics .Helicoptere make a contribution to al1 ground force functions.

\ l . Be11copt er l can be introduced into the ground force in avar le ty of vays, thu8 offering a epectrum of tactiC8l options.e , Bellcopter operations are compatible vith other a ir opera

t ionl .

d. Properly used, helicopters have a h1gh chance of surviva1 ina11 types of operationl.eo Helicopters CM be usefully emp10yed in a l l theatres and inal1 types of operations both combat and non-combat.

33. In the nen ohapter, the rance of a ir vehicles which are ava11ab1enov, or are in deve1opment, i8 considered. A luggeated lelection for theCanadien Jorce. 18 made.

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SJUO!IOB 07 AIR TUleLle

SCOPI1 . This chspter considere the types of a ir vehicle. vhich can be employedin the five ground force tasks, the aircraft that are av&ilable nov, and thedevelopments which are in progresl or proposed . A suggested ,e l .cUon of typesie offered.

2. To give the ground forces an a ir mobile capability in a ll the fivefunctions of land combat, a family of four types of helicopter8 1s requiredas follows:

a. A l ight ob.ervation h.l icopter (LOI) for reconnaissance,command and etaff transportation, l iaison, etc.b. A utl l i ty tact ical transport (U1'T) for the moveJnentof combat troops, reconnaissance, provision of aerialcommand posts, medical evacuation, etc.c , A. cargo helicopter (OH) for logist ic resupply, movement of art i l lery, certain troop movement, etc. There

may be a requirement for a heavy l i f t helicopter (skycrane). !h i l i s discussed la ter .d; An armed helicopter (AR) for aerial escort, aerial f i re

support, armed reconnaissance, etc.LIGH'I O:ssmvA!fIOB DLlooPHa (LOB)3. The U.S. conducted a competition for the deYelopment of a LOH. Threecandidate8 vere t ted and the OB-6A, a ful l description of which ap-pears atAnnex , vas selecte4. A CIRQ technical evaluation team revieved these testsand the aircraft , and confirmed the U .S. selection. This helicopter is of anadvanced design and meeta M lT the LOR role. I t 11 Just nov start ing intoproduction and 18 ezpected to b . in the U. S. inventory unt i l a t least 1980.

UTILI!Y T.AC'1'ICAL TBABSPOBT (UT!)4. !he tJft role i. be1ng met ln the U.S., and in pract ical ly everyother army, by the Bell Ul-l seriel of &ircraft. !his helicopter has beenaround for 80 7ears but the original UH-lA is a very different ai reraf t fromthe current t1It-lD. !he UI-lD 1s b;y no Mean. an obsolescent ai reraf t , nor haei t yet reachecl the end of i te development cycle. !he O!'BQ teehnical evaluation.team recOmJ1ended th i t ai rcraf t as suitable to ID8et our requi r .ents .

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A description of th e present ai rcrai t and Blso the growth potentiel i t has forthe future i s a t Annex 1 .5. The U.S. expect that they w11l s ta r t introducing a replacement ai r craft for this role sometime after 1975. The present UR-l ser ies will be in their inventory weIl beyond 1980. The development of a replacement ai rerai t , and the controversy which surrounds this projeet , i s described la ter in thischapter.6. The OL-84 might be considered for the UTT role but i t bas certainposit ive tac t ical di sadvantages , al well a l baing much more costly an4 complex.The 0L-84 and it. roles are discussad l a te r in this chapter.O.A!lOO HlLIOD1lS (011)70 Mobile Oommand' s proposed structure celle for an additional. uUlIberof cargo helicopterB. In making a sel.ect.Lon, there are a number of choie :

a. Oanada is at present using the eB-1l3 t ransport . Thisi s a good ai reraf t , though expendve for i ts Bize. A v 8 : ~ l ! l o n l , also currently in use in the tT.S. Marine Oorps.Bowever, i t cannot meet a probable Mobile Oommandrequirement for making ar t i l l e ry a ir mobile s ince itcannot carry a gun, ammunition, and crew in a single11ft .b. The U.S. Army uses the same type of aircraf t but ina larger version, the 0B-47A. The OH-47A 18 s ignif i c.ntly superior in performance and capability to our01-113s, for an inerease in cost of approximately$400,000. Moreover, it s t i l l has a long developJllentahead of i t , while the OH-113 i8 at the end of i tscycle.. The 0H.-4TB is about to come into service and i t

r apre .en te a major advance over the OB-113. The OH-47Ci l expeeted to be in service within a couple of yearsprovidiDg a fur ther increase in capability ..c, The U.S. Marines also use the Sikorlk;y CB-53A.. This

ai rerai t bas sl ight ly bet ter l i f t tban the OH-47, andhas the added advantage of being stowable in the hangardeck of BMOS J30NA'V'E.NTU:U.AlI the above aireraf t are described and compared a t .lnnex J .3. A. requirement May exist , though i t is no t in Mobile Oommand's structure, for one or two heavy l i f t helicopters such as the Sikorsky OR-54 Sk;y-orana.These helicopters oan l i f t extremely heavy 8lung-loads and would be useful inship to shore unloa.d.ing opera.tions, the emplacing of bridging, and the l i f t ingof equipmant over obstacles. Their principal use in Viet Nant ls the recoveryof downed ai rerai t ; the)" are the only aireraf t that can recover a OH-47 or00-115. !he OB-548 are a1so used for the movement of special pods containingsurgical faci l i t ies , communication centres, etc. Whether or not such an air cra i t is required by the Canadian Forces must be the subject of further s t u ~ .

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CONFIDENTIAL- , - - ' ' " ~ ..-- ... _ - ~ - - - , - ~ - _ ...-_._.__.._-_ ... _ - ~ ~ -! - , ~ y,,,,':r . f ~ " ~ ~ ; r - /. { ~ ~ r " " 1 l - \ l " " ' J >TT--l Ti~ t ) r \ l ii:,;c./ l ~ ! i \ ~ ; ; . - : \ \ : : ~ ~ ~ _kl-4 I t : ~ / jL----------

helicopters, and with the .&H-IG, but they f l . l tbat th . gr...te r capabi11Uof the .lH-56J. woald allow 1t to talte over a large 1ee of ~ h J.1r J'ore. elo support role. Th. 8ystems analyaiets are net so concemed oVlr th . rol &Bdmissions aspects, but they feel more etudy 18 required ta d.termine the,b . l tapproach to the JJJ8S problem. (!hie dieagrlement i8 dileussed fur tb. r inthis chapter under a consideration of the CL-S4.) !l'he future of the WU i ltherefore uncertain at thi8 Ume. but the .AH-1G iB in no doubt eUher 11.8 toprocurement or employment.LIMITA!IOIS OF HEtlCOHDS15. Helicopterl are slow flying vehicles, expensive in fuel, relativelydiff icul t to fly, and diff icul t to maintain. These are the coate ve must payfor the eS8ential VmL eapability. An these .isadvanta,;e. are bl1C reducedhowever. !e t te r speeds are being obtained by better engines, new rotor syatems,and better airframe desien, which in turn produce improvemente in fuel economyand operating rances. Improved rotora and control 8YliJtem. make th e machine.ea.sier to f ly. Maintenance requirements are dropplng.16. Improved avionics are making night and bad westher operationsfeadble . the n1ght capabllity in particular iB being developed. In Viet lamhelieoptera are operatinc when all other airerait are grounded. l igh windeh1&h t .-peratures, and h alt i tude. adverse17 affect a ll VfOL aireraft ,but morl powerful engines are p e r m i t t i ~ helicopters to operate with inereasedeffiei.ney under thes. conditions. However, the helicopter as i t nov stands i&la proven and well-developed machine quit . ready to take i te place in modernarmy.

17 a Variou. t)'pee of hovercraft vere eDllined. Theae are highly speeiallzed veh1c1el and a re only ef fec t ive in cer ta in 8e100tod environments. !he)"are not airera i t ; they are in fact fast boat. . They have some 1\1litarypotentiel in c .r ta in . i tuat ions, but th87 are no substitute for helicopters ina more en.rel application.

19. For' the future, a requirement exists to give vertical l i f t aircraftgreater speed and l i f t capability. J'uture develop.enta teke two courses basedon two different approachea to the problea. !hese two approaches may in timeconverge and a single type avolve to meet a ll taak:sj it w111 be the mid-19801lhowever beiore thie i. l tk.1y. A more l ikely outeo.e is a mix of two types.!he two approach to the problEID are:a. 'fo develop the he11copter to get gre.ter l i f t 9speed. range andb. !o give a vert ical l i f t capabllity to fised ving aircraftby developlng a V/ftOL (vertical/short take-off Md landing)

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development, far less to production. The UoS., moreover. has fa11ed toidentify a military mission in vhich current V/STOL aireraft could be expectedto out-perform ether available aiI'crai't type s. Search and rescue however,is emerging as a valid role. The U,S. is now at th e close of phase, andefforts for the next year or two will be davoted to examining promising a!'eas.The most promising V/S'roL development in the U"S. is the XCL.142A whi,ch is alarge tU t-w1ng turbo prop transport. This airerait however 'hl not neaI'lyr e a ~ for production and i t 1s d o u b t f u ~ that the U.S. vil l proceed with i t .aven though the USD have declared a r equ.Ir-ement , Canadair s OL-84 appear ato be further along in development than any other tU t w1.ng aireraft in thevorid. I t is discussed below. :Bell Relicopter bas aU" S. ArrTXy cont.racn fora design study on a t i l t propeller aircraft, as another c ~ l d i d a t e to r e ~ l a c e the U H ~ l D uti l i ty tactical transport. but this machine le not aven on thedrawlng board. A more complete review of V/STOL development iB at Annex l i ..23. I t can be seen that there is no :r8placement for the UR-ID in sightor even :Ln the planning staee. The UoS" fe':\'ithey need more information onthe state of the art bafere they can dedds; on. the design concept to follow.Moreove!" 9 they have r eached no decision on what size the replacement aircraft should be. At present, there is controversy over whether i t shouldbe a squad (section) carrier fo r 12 men; or a platoou carrier for 40 add,or w h e t h e ~ a mix is required. The relat ive vulnerability of a few largetransports to a larger number of small anes has s t i l l to be satisfactorilyresolved howevero24. This controversy cver the size of vehic1e required may 118.v8 relevanceto us i f we ever decids to pr-oject the air mo"t.>i1Hy concept beyond thecurrently proposed scala. In the future. we might want to increase our cargofleet for use as traop carriers, rather than buying more t m ~ , l D s . For thepresent programme, however , the proportions se em weIl balanced, We will needthe currently proposed number of UR=lDs regardIess of the course we might.adopt in the future. In order to guide futre planning however. i t iesuggested that an operational TaSSerCI t analysis on the question of the 'trH,.lDversus a. car'go hellcopter ln the troop ' c ransprt role SMuId. be l.ni.t:l.ated.c ~ g 4 25Q The CL-84 is a well advanced t i l t ~ w i n g development which combinesa TTOL capability with the relatively high speeds of a. fb:ed-wing aircraf' t .These two characteristics iTOL and high speed - a r e ~ as explained earl ier ,mutually antagonistic. Either hl relative1y 6al!lY te obta.in but putting themtogether in one machine iB a complex problem. The result is a compromise.The high dise loading of the OL-S4 affects i t s vert ical l i f t efficiency.while i ts large propel1ers limit i ts forvard speed in level f l ight . Compromisesare normally expensive and complicated g the C L ~ g 4 Ls no exception.26. Where both speed and a vertical l i f t capabil1ty are needed. h o w e v e r ~ we must be prepared to p the priee. In roles demanding bath these characterisUei the 01-84 could be cost effective. Where ~ n 1 y one 01 the othereharaeteristic is needed other aircrafi types are bath mere effective andchsaper , A consideration of soma r o.es fo1lOW'sg

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aG For the u'i11ty tactical transport role t h ~ l i f teffic1ency ls mantatory but hgh speed 1 . uniaportant.For a journe.r of )0 to 40 miles. the dlifer .ncabetween 100 kr10tS and 250 knots ie not tacticallydgn1fican'tQ The OL..!4 in this role ia theref'o:re n,otcost effective.

b. In certain portions of the reconnaissance task, suchas 15 now done by the Mohawk aircraft in the U.S. force$,h1h spelld ie mandatory and VTOL woul.d be very dedra.ble,The OI,...g4 would be lui table if the systems coul.d bedesi&ned into the aircraft .CG .A. cooci case coula. be .ade for b a v i ~ both VTOL and highspeed ta do the JAFSS rolsa T h i ~ 18 discussed in

deta i l latered. Search and re.cue requires spe ed , ,range and a hove:r:'ingcapa.bilityo The OL-g4 i s 1d8a111' su:it ed ,

27 . In lecting roles for the C L - S 4 ~ i t .hould not be considered _ f a s ~ hel icophr , but a fast fixed-wlng ai rerai t which can land verUce.llyo Forthe rele. 1I.01'2l&11y carried eut by hellcopters, the Oy,..,s4 is no t cost effectivepound for pouncl or dollar for dollere Moreov.r t in. a tactica.l r-o l e , wOl'kiD&vith Cround forcel n 1t bas cany undesirable characterist ics. I t cannot landwith U s talt..off veicht; thiB Mean. tbat if the t r ip 18 short n say underapproxtaate17 50 a i l , i t cannat 'Oum orf fuel an d sa i t must carr.r leS8" O ~ y 1 . 0 a d 8 I t carmot aake a sata ft'OL landillg on one eJJ.f;ine. neithtlll' ca n it&ut0rotate '0 the groun4, a. a helieopter does, in case of complete poweTfai lure. Ii woulcl al lO appea:r to be more vulnerable ta groun(i f1:re th;;m acomparable heUcop-tere The losa of a ta n rotor whU. hovering, for axampl e ,voule! r u l t in .. complete 1088 of t.he a i reraf t . I t he.s a h1 d.ownwashe f ~ e c ~ anA t h l . woul4 l i a i t l t s usefu1nees in operating close tQ troops cvercertain '1Pel of cround.. A de'Cl'iption of th e ,..,S4 and some furtherii.cus.ion on 1 tl operational efflciency appears at Annex Re21 . All 'he above aumes tbat strategie sOV'eJnent i l not a factor.I f n as ha. been '1lUeiltedn the OL-84 i e l f ~ d e p l o y a ' b l e anywhe:c6 in the world,th i . coula. a e 1t COlt effective even aB a tactical troop cazr-Ler , I t coulabe IU"cued 1ihat vi th CL-S4. w. could. reduce our strategie transport requirementand ihe 11011.7 sttTe4 applie4 acainl t the cost of OI,...S4.. ' h i s require!!! anoperational anal7ds beyond th . terme of r . terence of this stwiT group.Calual siud1 however, indicate. 'hat while a ca could probably be made fora tew cz,...,g4s to give a ir Ilobili ty to an advance par'y in an operation, i twould be diffleul1i to justify replacing ut i l i ty tactical h e l i c o p t ~ r s withC L - S ~ .290 Of a l l the 1'01. . considered for the O ~ g 4 the most prom1s:1ng.,. andpa.renU;y leas ' eons1dered, ia as an ad:nnce4 a.e:dal f i re suppc)rt $ystem.!he 0];,...84 vas entere4 in the .uJ8S cOllpeUtion but was eliminated. in thef i rs t round, not ecause of i t s unsu1tability! but p e r r ~ s b e C ~ l s e of i i seta t . of developaent a t the Ume, and al .a the fact that th e U"5, Arm,. made

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the selec'tion and ' t ra4iUonally favoured. a hel lcophr lIoluUon. - 'he CL-!4would carry le88 load ' t he the Lockheec1 .AJi-56,A bu't i t wou14 baT. fa r ,relAterspeed and would be able to pli n e t r a ~ . further and take OTer a large 'Part ofthe close support ra le . I t could operate in the cloae-in a ir b a t ~ l e (mediumrange r e c o n n a i s B ~ c e and certain close a ir support taske> and a l lO perform1Ia.tl1' of the roles of th . anucl helicopter. h therefore prOTides an excellentinterface betveen the purely a ir batUe an d the ground baUle. !he OL-84could not hk e o'Ver the role of the CF-5, nor would 1t be cost effecti've inthe Al-1G armed helicopter role . I t la complementary to bath, noi competing,but i te acquisition would possibly modify the numbers of both types neededta meet our requirements.30. Whether ve have a raIe for such an ai rcraf t l'emains ta be determinedby a car.ful cast analysie and an operational research study. Bowever,such a role appears ta be developing in the U0 S. and development of the OL-84along these l ines might make a usefui contribution.31. The Ct-s4 and ~ h propOled helicopter programme are in factcomplementary; both are needed but in difi'er1ng roles. The de'relopment ofthe OL-!4 .hould n o impede or inhibit our acquisit ion of the helicoptersproposed belowo32. In lhori , the OL-!4 is a remarkable piace of ,quipment and coula. haveIL place in the a ir aobUity struciure. It la an expensive aircraf t howeTer rboth in in i t ia l and recurring cOli, and i te roles must be careful1y eelectedso a . ta ge co. t effect ive. In i t l present form i i iB not ready for production.Ii require . further technical development, and more study is required todeteraiue 'the lIost suitable ro le . for H . In par t icu lar , study ahould hegiven to i t s suitabi1ity as an aerial weapons a i r c r a f t ~ and a attempt madeta interest the USD in it. This denlopment. tellting and. service avaluatioIl.in the ro le . selected wUl take a m1n1mum of two years T and for seme versionsas much as four or :five.

SUGGIIfJlD BlLIeTIO!33. ! f i e r a careful consideration of the tasks of a ir vehicl es, and ofaTailabl . a i reraf t aD4 their sui tabi l i ty an d effective 1ife . the followingaircraf t are .uggee'ed for procurement:

aD 1011 the Hughes OH-6 Cayuleb. U!t the Je11 UIl-ID Iroquoisc. Ci the :Boeing 01-471 Ohinook or SlkorslQ' OH-530 SeaStal110nd. .&JI "he 1&11 .AH-1G luey Oobra

34. All ' he .e a i re ra ! ' v i l l be in the U.S o inveniory a \ leas t unt!l 1980ancl. l>ossiblv v . l l bqond th i s . Su.pply of epares or replacement aircra.:f"t ahouldtherefore be no problem. Ve caa a l lO benefU from any improvement programmesthey 1 I I p l e m e n ~ 0

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1. DGlA/Tl52 D J.epor't on Technical Evaluation of FairchUd B11ler 1100,Hughes OB-6AD Je l l J e langer, August 61.2. D e v e l o p m . e n ~ of the O....6A for Maximum Performance and Iff iciency,Ml'. larned, 1'P - Jngineering. Hughes Tool Company t June 65.3. !M55-l520-21O-10, Operator 's Manual rmy Model OH-ID le l icopter ,

DOJ. 1965.4. CH-47B l e l i c o p ~ e r Cbaracterlstics and Istimated Performance J ) ~ , \ a , !oeing T e r ~ o l Division, 31.0ct 66.

f inal lleport, Joint United States 1GR Mohawk Surveillance System.5 Demonstration, 15 July - 15 Oct 63. OONFIDENTIJL.6. '!ecbnical Information I.eport U .1 .2.2 .AMC, Developlieni of MohawkSurveillance S y . ~ U 1 , Mar 65, oonIDINTIAL.

0'-1 Mohawk Ooncept of OperaUon. Grummsn J.ircra,1't.OT-l Mohawk ( '1) :Product Improved Manned .A.erial SurveillanceS 7 8 ~ " (u) OonIDmUL.l e l l .ellcop'ter ! r ief ing .G-IG Bu.y Oobra, March 22, 1967.

10. '!M55-1520-210-10, O p e r a ~ o r o s Manual lJB...1D Belicoyt el'.lle lo i Cycle I l o t o r / W i ~ 9 Hughes Tool, TH-7:B.12 .. l)evelopIIen" of ihe Relicopter D Lockheed - Oal1forn1a, M 66.

vancing 11&4. Ooncept. Sikorsky A i r c r a f ~ o Stratford, C o n n e c t i c u ~ , Apr 66.14. DGIA/D53, Beport on !echn1cal ~ v a l u a . U o of Bell TJB-1D, Gd 66.

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CHAPTER VVULNERABILITY AND SUH.VIVABIUTY

SCO?E10 Thl s chapt.er' consi.ders the sur-vi.vab.i.Li.t.y of hel icopters in t ermsof the l e tha l i ty of a n t i ~ a i r c r a f t weapons and the vu'Lner-ab.i.Lty ofhel icoptere . Various means o f Irnpr-ovi.ng ~ n f f v i " l T a J J i L i t y ar-e d i scu ssed ,2 0 This chapter 1s i t se l f a summar-y of a more complete study whi ch i sattached a t Annex LGENERAL3. The sur-vi,vabi l i ty of any equi pTlI{;r:': en the bat t lef ie ld i 'o. a functionof:

a. Ruggedness and arrnour-ed pr ot ect i on,b 0 Exposure t i meJ andCo The h it probabi l i ty of enemy weapons,

Equipment survives by being rugged or protected or by l imit ing the timeit i8 a t a r g e t ~ or by neutral iz ing the e n e m y ~ s weapons. Helicopters caf!use a'Ll, three of these means of sur-vf.va'l , The machine i s essent ia l lyrugged and v i t a l component s cari be armoured , exposur-e t:,me ca n be reducedby carefu l employment, and f i re suppressjon can be used to neu.ralizeenemy weapons. Of these t.hr-ee expoeur-e t.i rne i s the most, cr-Lt i cal.,Survivabi l i ty dr-ops sharply ''fi th each se cc nd a ta rge t 15 expo sed ta aweapon af te r being Ldent i.I'Led , There i s se.Idom a need , however , ta r:Lskhe Lt.c op t er-e i n f l i gh t s ove,':' th e e n e n v ~ and whe r-e t .hi.e i s ne c e s so.r-y,suppressive f i re sU;Jport::an be pr-ovl.ded "4. HeLi.copt.er-e, therefore 3 cari be employed in such a way as te usethei r fu l l poten t ia l with::mt Lncur r i.ng unaccept.ab l e casua.Lt.Le s . Acarefu l study of future weapan developments an d of the s ta te of the a r tshows tha t there i s no weapon Ln deve Loprnent , or concept be.ing cons der-ed,which would nake hel icopter operations impracticaJ..,5. The sur-vi.vabi.Li,ty of hel icopters i s considered under t.hr eehead.i.ng s

a . The vulnerabil i ty c f hel icopters ta var i ou s ant i -a i rcraf t(AA) weapons.The l ikel ihood of hel icopters being wit.hir. range of AA we&pons.The ef fec t of suppr-ese.ive f ixe en Ait weapons,

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60 The basis for the statements made and conclusions drawn is a widerange of studies in various countries, a long series of tests conductedby the US Combat Development Experimentation C e n t e r ~ and operationalexperience from Viet Nam wh1ch confirms generally the results of tnos'!scientif ic simulations. Detailed references and s tat is t ical analysescan be found in Annex 1.HEUCOPTER VULNERABIUTY7. The prabability of a helicopter being shot dawn i f fired on dependson the characteristics of the AA weapon and th e vulnerabili ty of the a i r ~ > craft . These two aspects are now considered.8. Helicopters do not penetrate the enemy deployment so the only AAweapons they will encounter are those in the hands of forward troops.Heavy AA arti l lery and guided missiles are excluded from study. Ant1.=helicopter weapons may be divided into rive categories:

a. R i f l e s ~ machine guns, etc; which are primarily a n t i ~ personnel weapons but can be employed against helicopters.b. Conventional light anti=aircraft weapons found in th eforward areaS 3c. Missiles found in the forward area.d. Manned interceptors.e. Possible future weapons.

9. Rifles and machine guna, which are the normal weapons of Lnf'antry ,are l i g h t ~ cheap easily concealed and are readily available., Theyr ep resen t the main t h r ea t ta he l icop te r s because they are a Lway s presen twhere the enenw is . Approximately 90% of the hUa on helicopters inViet Nam were from such weapons. These weapons have a short effectiverange however, approximately 200 n e t r e s ~ and their ki l l probability i5low - up to .04 (four chances in one hundred). This low ki l l probabilityis due ta the relative ineffectiveness of small arms f ire againsthelieopters; this aspect i s discussed la ter . Heavier machine guns ofthe Russian 14,5mrn type have a greater effeetiveness and range, howeverat approximately 500 metres the ki l l probability ia the same as aboven10. Multiple barrelled heavy machine guns designed for the AA role,are more effective (up to .34 against slow flying aireraft) but. eventhese have relatively short r a n g e s ~ weIl under 1000 metres. Theseweapons are not man-portable and they require special training Theywill be less n u m e r o u s ~ exeept when we are opposed by a highly mechanizedenemy0 Larger l ight anti=aircraft weapons such as the Russian 37rmngun, are considerably more effective. I f helic:opters flew into a w ~ l l ~ coordinated defence composed of these AA weapons they would ineurunacceptable losses unless f ire suppression was successfully employed.


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I l . Man-portable low altitude missiles, such as REDEYE, have a lowki l l probability against helicopters (Less than .1). These are infra-red(IR) heat seeking missiles and require to "lock on" before being launched oI f simple IR shielding were added to the helicopter i t would furtherdegrade missile performance. Future d e v e l o p n ~ n t s of REDEYE, however,could be more effective but these are mere concepts at present. The presentmissiles are very expensive, over $5,000 each, and they require a technicallogistic backup. For these reasons they are unlikely to be used ext.ensivelyby an unsophisticated enemy.12. I f the e n e ~ ' s manned interceptors can dominate our air space,helicopter operations would be very hazardous, but 50 too would any groundoperations. The helicopter's mobility and i t s abil i ty to disperse quicklywould probably give i t a better chance of survival than trucks or tanks.Helicopters operating on the nap of th e earth would be a difficult targetfor a manned interceptor particularly i f there were trees or buildings inthe area.13. Helicopters have been found to be very rugged and durable. They havefew vi tal parts and these can be readily armoured against small arms ,Helicopters are capable of absorbing a number of such hits and s t i l l beingable to f ly. Of the helicopters hit in South Viet Nam only about 7% areforced down; the res t continue with their mission or land safely in friendlyterri tory.14. Accidents have actually claimed more helicopters in Viet Nam thanenemy f i re . The terrain is particularly difficult and the heat andalt i tude rob the helicopter of i t s l i f t ing power. The nature of theoperation requires that ni.Lots fly to the extreme limits of their ski l land the aircraf t ' s capability. Training is constantly being modified tomeet these demands. However, the helicopter is 50 useful and versati lethat ground commanders will always stretch i t s capability to the limit"FUTURE DEVELOPMENT15. No evidence could be found of the development of any cheap, p o r t a b ~ anti-helicopter weapon which m i i ~ h t be used by an unsophisticated e n e ~ y , Similarly, no development is in sight,nor would the present state of theart support i t , for a weapon capable of destroying helicopters over f r i e r ~ l y terri tory and out of range of convent i.ona.L enemy weapons ,AVOIDANCE OF ENEMY WEAPONS16. As has been mentioned many times earl ier , helicopter operations arenormally conducted within our protected air space, or over routes on whichsuppressive fire is obtainable. Helicopters are not a penetrating air craft . Their main defence against e n e ~ weapons is to avoid thern, in thesante way an ; combat, vehicle does ,

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17. Night and bad weather favour helicopter survivability. Operationsunder these conditions are a practical reall ty now, and equipmeJlt development is making them even e a s i e r ~ US operations in Viet Nam and Britishoperations in Aden and Malaya indicate the need ror i r ~ r u m e n t t r a 1 n i n g ~ Germany 9 which experiences so much margi.nal weather, aIso st.r-eeees this"AlI these countries realize the necessity of flying in bad weather andthey train their pilots accordf.ng.ly, The British have virtual13 no VFRl.i.mits, German regulations are mile via1bility.


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SCOPE1. This chapter discusses the way helicopters operate in the five functionsof land combat; the employment of helicopters in peacekeeping is alsoconsidered.GENERAL2. In fighting against an enemy superior in strength, we must be ableto move faster than he can so as to establish si tuations in w11ich WB have alocal superiority. I t is not enough, however, just to be able to move ourcombat and f i re support e'Leraerrbs quickly. We must have detailed informationon the enemy so we can establish vhe re and. when i t Ls oost to engage h im,We must also have command, control and communication faci l i t ies w11ich willpermit commandera to process this information, t ranslate i t into a plan andorders, and then be able to direct the fast mov1g forces in their execut.Lonof the plan. Behind this there must be a logist ic syc t.em capab.Ie of caintaining these mobile forces over wide distances. Helicopters give the forcethe mobility i t s combat units require, provide the meanS of gatheringinformation, ensure commander-s th e abi l i ty to control, tLrJ.d support the whoLelogist ically.3. The fact that helicopters can be used in aD the five func td.ons ofland combat - reconnaissance, manoeuvre, f i re , command and control, andlogist ics - at tests ta their ut i l i ty and f lexibi l i ty .RECONNAISSAnCE4. The nore a commander- knovs about bhe enemy the better 1.118 chances ofsuc cess. ~ ~ s t failures and militar3r disasters could have beon avoided hadproper intelligence been avai.Lahlc , The side w11ich can secure inE'orr:w.tion,while denying information to the onemy by rapid Boves or careful concealment,has a decisive advantage.. This si tuat ion i s desirable when "le are superiorin strength; i t is absolutely vi ta l when we are 1nf"erior.50 The type of information required varies a t each level of command ,Higher commands need intelligence in depth, forwa.rd units are concernedprimarily with what :18 immediately in front of them. Reconnaissance indepth depends principall:y on long range photograph1a reconnaissance.Forvard reconnaissance ia provided by a variety of means, principallyreconnaissance unite wich are trained and equipped ta aearch vide ar-eas inarder to locate the e n e ~ . Other methods include ground patrols, stat icobservation posts, and personal reconnaissance b,y oommandera. All thesemeane have l imitations. Reconnaissance units are largely vehicle-bound,ground patrols are slO'W' moving and are also h i g h ~ vulnerable, sta t icobservers are res t r ic ted in the area they can COV'er and commander' sreconnaissance is very time consuming, particularly' if vide areas have tobe covered.

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60 Helicopters overcome many of these disadvantages ... Reconnaissanceunits can be made halicopter-borne and execute a I l their tasks regardlessof terrain obstacles. Ground patrols can be moved quiclcly to where neededand extracted when thei r task is done , Observera can be l i f ted high enoughto exploit the i r ful l oapabilityo Commanders can be moved quickly and alsobe eiven an elevated platform from which te observe.7. Reconnaissance Unitf!o Reconnaissance 1lllits are responsible forfinding and fixing the enenu. They have subsidiary roles vhich exploitthei r mobile y l ight-f ighting oapabillty such as raids, flan!:: proteetioIl,rear area secuz-Lty, seize and ho.Ld , search and destroy, etc, T r a d i t i o n a l ~ - 5 these l'ales were carried out by oavalry, f i r s t by horse and l a ter by '-lheeledor tracked vehicles.. In fact however, mechanization resulted in Lensmobility because vehiclee were res t r ic ted by obstacles. forming a ~ cavalry units using helicopters, complete mobility can be achfeved, Aerhlreconnaissance units can ecout 'Widely to find the enemy; land assau.lt.parties to investigate on foot, and supply f i re support from armed h e l i c o p t e r s ~ 8. While aer ia l reconnaissance uzd.ts can take part in a l l the normalreconnaissance tasks, they will not replace ground reconnaissance, nor Hill they encroach on th e armed reconnaissance taslcs carried out by f ighter aircraf t . Used in conjunction "li th these other forms of reconnaissancothey f i l l a gap and greatly Lncr'eaae our tac t ica l capability . This Lsparticularly true in guerillll. operations where wide areas mus t be patrolled,and \olhere a ground element i s needed ta f ix the enemy. Air cavalry units have been widely used in Viet Nam, Dnd the US are increasing thei r nwnber.9" These units can al.so act in an anti-mechanized l 'ole 0 Equipped ".-li th anti-ta'1k guided missiles they can be very effecthre agaf.nst enemy t anks,Recent tes ts in the UK and Germany, as weIl as ones conduc ted by the USCombat Developments Oommand , credit the arr d helicopter tr.ith a gre::ttercapability than was previously cncededb10& Aerial reconnaissance units use l ight observation helicopters forscout.Lng, ut i l i ty tac t ica l helicopters for assault l i f t , and armed heJJcopters for fire support. They are completely a ir mechanized and 50 havever,y few ground vehicles oMANOEUVRE11. AlI military operations are baaed on i:11:'e and manoeuvre. Both areneeded but the side which can move quickly and at wil l ia normally dec i.s.lve ,Mobility reduces the effectiveness of enemy f i re and pemits us to concentrate where and when needed.. Terrain and man-made obstacles l imit ourmobi.L ty , Air mobility enables us ta overcome these problems. I t Ls notenough to be able to move in the a i r , loTe must be able ta tal,e off andland v i r t u a 1 ~ anywhere - o the he1icopter gives this capability. 12 0 The he1icopter 'a spead relat ive to ground vehic1e movement enablesa few helicopters ta move a great number of rJen and vehicles. Asdescribed in Chapter IIIjl a one-ninth l i f t gives al.L US divisions arespectable a ir mobile capabllity, \olhile a one-third l i f t enables one oftheir divisionsjI the l s t Cavalry Division (Airmobile), to rely almost, entirely on a ir movement,


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13, HOV8!Jent of combat units Ls done principal ly by u t i l i ty t.ran spor-thel icopters . Helicopter companies composed of UTTs and escort weaponshelicopters mov,\to where a unit is , l i f t it, and drop i t where it canf ight immediateljr on ar-rLva.L, These helicopters can then move moreper-sonnel. or they can be used on resupply basks , This operation is veI"Jsimple to pl.an and execute ..14. Air mobility voul.d be used ta move combat untts quickly to reinforcea diff icul t s i tua t ion, or to establ ish a blocking posi t ion, or to createa surprise threa t . In most of these operations penetration of the enemydeployment is not required. HO\-18ver, if th e si tuation were favourable, i ti s quite possible to penetrate and establ ish posit ions deep in th e enemyarea, By select ing routes over svamp or mountains where the enemy couldnot deploy ant i -a i rcraf t ,reapons, penetration could be done with re la t ivesafety ..

15. Fire is the compand.on of ~ ; 1 0 V e T l e n t " Air mobility is of sma.Ll, use i fun t s caillot have fire-p01.,er available af te r Landi.ng, At A..'1nex J is adetai led study of the f i re power aspect with part icular emphasLs on the l'oleof the hel icopter . The follmring sumuar-Lses th e essen t ia l points of thiss'tudy,16. Infant'ry in an a ir mobile operation can carry the i r personal andt ~ 1 e i r man-por-tab.Le l igh t crev "Teapons ,vith them in t he tacticaJ. t ransporthel icopters. They require more support however, to be successful in act ion.Fire can be provided by close a ir support a i rcraf t ; these are very effect ivebut they Lack the capabi1ity of providing ccnt.Lnuoue , responsive andintimate support, all-\-leather and round-the-clock. Arti l lory and :leaV-j1,lapons must be depl.oyed to ~ ' r o v i d e th is .1'1" Helicopters can contribute to the f i re l 'ole in three ' 1 . . J ' a ~ ' - s :

a. As armed helicoptersb. giving a r t i 1 1 e ~ J a t e ~ p o r a r y a ir mobilityc. As aer ia l ar t i l lery to provide direct air-to-ground r i re andindirec t ground-to-ground f i r e .

18& Armed Helicopters o As discussed ear l ie r , armed hel icopters areneeded in aer ia l reconnaissance uni ts to provide mnedate f i re support.The sarne type of helicopter also is needed to support an a ir mobileoperation, both while en route and during and af te r Landng,19. While en route, armed helicopters f ly escort and apply suppressivef i re on any enemy ueapons wich at tack the aer ia l convoy, This f i re ismaintained while the convoy passes, or diverts around , and th e escortsthen rejoin the convoYe The threa t of this ins tant re ta l ia t ion oftendiscourages enerny ground troops from f i r ing as has been shown in VietNam, Armed helicopters ean al.so f ly over routes used by t.rucks, Theil'presence discourages ambushes , but i f a COrN0Y does get into dif f iaul tythey can come ta i t s support quicklyo In Viet Nam a number of roads,previously unusable, have been opened and kept open by such tac t ics

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20. As an aerial convoy ax,:coaches i ts landing area tlte armed heLi.coptereapply fire on likely 8";:IJW pc)sitions. Under cover of this suppressive firethe troop helicoptersLmd and depart. If enemy fire does occur, the armedhelicopters reduce their general suppressive fire and engage these pointtargets. They remain in the area providing this type of support unti l theinfantr.;! are vrell established and have their support weapons deployed ..21& During any ground action these helicopters can be called on ta giveaerial fire support. In this role t.hoy compl.emerrt close air support fighteraircraft. Fighter aircraft carry large loads and are very effective againstlarge or area targets. For small selective targets particularly ones closein, the armed helicopter is particularly s u i t e d ~ I t can fly slowly taensure good target identification. Unlike the fighter aircraft which onlyfire forward, the helicopterls rotating turret permits the target to becontinuously engaged while the helicopter manoeuvres. Helicopters can flylow to the ground and do not need altitude for their attack, as fightersdo; they can continue to operate , therefore, in pOOl' weather.220 Only one type of armed helicopter is needed for the aerial recon naissance unit and for the escort and aerial support l'ole. ~ w n u n i t i o n loads might be varied, however, depending on the job to be done. Aroedhelicopters should appear in two places in the organization, in the aerialreconnaissance units and as part of uti l i ty t r & ~ s p o r t companies. I t isnot practicable ta require the recoIlllaissance units to do bath their normall'ole, and supply aTIned helicopters to support air mobile operations.2.3. Air Hobile Arti l leu. Cargo helicopters can l i f t art i l lerJ , orheavy weapons, plus amreun.td on and crews and drop t:1cm vher-e neededready to fire in a matter of minutes. These smae helicopters can aS81reresupply of ammunition.24.. V/eapons can be emplaced in areas otherwise unaccessi.bl,e ta artiller,{ In Viet Nam, arti l lery was put on the tops of almost unsca.Lab.le mountainsthus using the difficult terrain to provide protection. The capubility formoving a r t i l l e r y by a i r has enabled opera t ions i n Vie t Nam t a succeed where,in the past , unsupported infantry has failed.25. I t has been suggested that helicopters should be made a permanentpart of sorne arti l lery units so they could have a guaranteed l i f t andthus use air mobility exclusively. The helicopter used to provide thismobility is the normal cargo helicopter and i t requires no preparationfor this task. US Army experience indicates that i t is more economicalta keep the helicoptere in a separate unit and supply them to arti l lerywhen neededo Less than 50% of the cargo helicopter 's time in Viet Namis spent on purely a r t i l l e ~ duties ..26" .Anti-tank weapons could be air l i f ted quickly to form a blockingposition to stop armoured breakthroughs. These could be supplementedby missile firing helicopters.

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27. Aerial Artillery. The concept of true a e r i ~ l artiller,y is beinepursued in the US but in no other country.. The US see a need for helicopterscarrying art i l lery-type veapons 1"h1c11 can deliver f i re from th e a i r orfrom the ground. They feel this capability is needed for the support ofa ir mobile operations \ihich take place beyond the range of ground deployedartillery.. At present, they have one aerial z-ocket ar t i l l e ry unit l1ith thel s t Cavalry Division in Viet Nam. I t uses Uli-1B helicopters firing 4.5"rockets.. I t bas been used extensively to support aerial reconnaissanceuni ts whose operations are mainly carried out beyond the range of ar t i l lery .28. The 4 .. 5" rockets are not a particularLy sui table weapon ho\rever, asthey can only he f i rad in th e air-to-ground l 'ole. The US requirement callsfor a weapon system which can also be detached and f ired from the ground,with the helicopter used in re-supply.. Some developmcnt ls being d O l ~ butthere is no major proj Bot 3ret approved..29. This is a conbentdoun cnplo3'7nont or helicopters and, a t t.he momenta t least , i t does nO'G look particul?r ly r evardng, I t is reconnended i tbe kept ~ ~ d e r study, however.30. Direct:i,o,n of Fire o Helicopters con be uaed effectively to directand correct th e f i re of ei ther ground ar t i l lery or close a ir s u p p o r t ~ The observation and adjusting of art i l1ery fire from the rdr goes bacle inM.story to the use of bal.Loons in the Franco-Prussian War. In World War I Iand Korea liCht ai reraf t were used, Fixed vring ai rcraf t hoveve r are tied.to a Landng str ip an d cannot l ive and operate r ight Hith the art i l lery.AIso, a fixed 1f.ing aircraf t does not present the best observation view.A helicopter cau operate right from th e gun position Md i t s hoveringc

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