herodotus's account of the battle of salamis
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Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
Author(s): Benj. Ide WheelerSource: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, Vol. 33 (1902),pp. 127-138Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/282591.
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8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
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Vol.
xxxiii.]
Herodotus's
Account of
Battle
of
Salamis.
I27
VIII. - Herodotus's
Account
of the Battle
of Salamis.
BY PRESIDENT
BENJ. IDE
WHEELER,
UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA.
OUR chief
sources of
knowledlge
oncerning
the battle
of
Salamis are
Aeschylus,
Persians, 345
ff.,
nd Herodotus
VIII,
70-95. Of only secondaryvalue-possibly, as some have
thought,
f
no
independent
value-are
Diodorus
(Ephorus)
VIII,
17, 2-19, 2,
and
Plutarch
in the
Thcmistocles.1
The
vulgate
account,
basing
upon
Herodotus,
and
placing
the
battle
inside the
straits,
was first
eriously
alled
in
question
by
Loeschke, Ja/rb.
f:
P/il.
1877,
pp.
25
ff.
Finding
Aes-
chylus
and
Herodotus
in
discord,
he
prefers
to follow
the
former,who
was
an
eye-witness,
nd
prepares
an
account of
the battle
which
he
believes to be
supported
by
the
state-
ments of
Aeschyius
and in
harmony
with
those of
Diodorus.
He
makes no
attempt
o
lharmonize
he
statements f
Herod-
otus,except
to
suggest
a
correction
f
the
text
at
the
point
of
most
serious
discrepancy. The
battle
he
believes
to
have
occurred
outside the
narrowsmade
by
the
point of
Cynosura
and the
opposite headland
of
Attica.
His
main
points are
thefollowing:
(i)
It
is not
credible hat the Persian
ships
the
night
before
the
battle
could
have entered the
straits
000
metres
distant
from he
Greeks
without
being
observed
by them.
(2)
Psyttaleia was
evidently
xpected
by Xerxes to
be
in
the
midst
of
the
impendingbattle,
E'V
yadp
&)
rpdp
Tr)q
Pav-
AaXt,qai,
/ ,?EXXovO-s?
6'aEa-Oat
E''O
'E70
vI?
os
(Herod.VIII,
76);
hence the disembarkation ftroops here. If thebattlewere
fought
inside the sound,
it
would
be too far
away to
be
sought
as
a refuge
by
the
Greeks
cf. Aesch.
450 ff.).
(3)
Aeschylus confirms iodorus when he
indicates
Pers.
366-68) that
one detachment
of
ships
was sent
around the
southof
Salamis
to
block the
northwest
assage,
and
the
rest
l
Cf.
Perrin, B., Plutarch's Themis/ocles
zn.] Ar4is/ides;
note
pp.
206
ff.
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I28
Benj.
Ide Wheeler. [I902
in three ranks were
set to guard the strait t Psyttaleia.
If
the Greeks
were surrounded by a movement of Persian
ships inside the straits,there were no need of this outside
manoeuvre.
(4)
The Persians
are
represented
by Aeschylus as having
heard
the
Greeks,theirpaean,
the trumpetblast, the stroke
of
the
oars,
before they saw them.
This
can only be
ex-
plained on supposition
hat Cynosura ntervened. The
Per-
sians
in
question
were therefore
t
the southwest
passage
betweenPsyttaleiaand Cynosura. The Greeks became visi-
ble
as
they
bent around the
point
of
Psyttaleia. Hence the
rightwing was seen
first.
(5)
The
Ezv
-revw'(Aesch.
4I3)
refers
o the narrows etween
Cynosura
and Attica. The
turning
point of the battle was
the
confusion
nto
which the Persians
fellwhen forcing heir
way
into this strait.
(6) The statement f Hlerod.VIII, 85 that the Phoenicians
occupied
in
the Persian line the
wing
towardEleusis and the
west, and the Ion ans that toward
the east and Peiraieus
is from Loeschke's point
of view
unintelligible.
It
yields
meaning
for
him, however,
f
only
EaXap4zvos,
e
substituted
for
EXEuo-'YoW,
so that
the Phoenicians
be
assigned
the
wing
toward Salamis
and the west.
Loeschke, therefore, rrangesboth lines across the straits
from hore
to
shore,
from ast
to
west.
A
somewhat
different
olution s
attempted y
W.
W.
Good-
win
in Vol.
I,
Papers
Amer.
Schloo, pp. 239
ff.
Starting
with an
acceptance
of Loeschke's
criticism
of
the vulgate
theory,
he
joins
with
him in
thinking
t incredible that the
Persians
should
have taken
up
their
position,
on
the night
before
the
battle,
within
he
straits.
He
does
not,
however,
follow Loeschke in amending the text of Herodotus, but
rather
seeks
to harmonize Herodotus's account
with
the
others
by
a different
nterpretation
f
the
vexed
passage
Herod.
VIII, 85.
He
seeks, namely,
o locate
the
struggle
within
he
straits,
ut makes the Persians
enter
n
the
morn-
ing,
and ascribes
their defeat
to the
fact
that
they
were
attacked
before
they
had formedtheir
ine,
and
before
they
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8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
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Vol. xxxiii.]
Herodotus's
Account of
Battle
of
Salamis.
129
had recovered
from
the
confusion
incident to
passing
the
narrows.
His mainpoints, dditionalto those ofLoeschke, are:
(i)
A.eschylus beyond
doubt
represents
the
Persians
as
enterin1ghe straits fter aybreak. So
Diodorusand
Plutarch.
(2)
Their
line
(called by Aeschylus
pE'/,ua)
ell into
some
confusion
n
entering he
narrows;
and
they
never
ucceeded
in
regaining
their
orderof
battle,being immedliately
met by
the Greeks
as
they passed
the
long
point
of
Salamis.
(3) SThere is nothing inconsistentwith this view of the
battle
except
the common
nterpretation
f
two
passages
of
Herodotus :
the
first
of
these, VIII,
76,
which
represents
the Persians as bringing
up
their
west
wing to
Salamis
KCVKXOv,uLevoturing the
nighit
before tfe battle, he explains as
referring
o the
sending of
ships
around the south of
the
island to close the northwest
assage (cf. Diod. XI, I 7; Plut.,
Themnist.
2);
and the second passage, VIII, 85, he explains
by applying
the
points
of
the
compass
to
the order
of
the
Persian line as
it
entered
the straits, .e.
it
entered
end on
with
the
right
wing
leading,
so that
the
right
wing
thus lay
to
the west or
northwest.
The
Greeks are
made
to take a
position
at
first
cross
the
sound,
between Magoula
and the
Perama
(corresponding
o Diodorus's
statement), i.e.
south
to north,and then, by advancing their right wing first, o
assume
a
position
southeast
to
northwest
ufficient o
bring
them
near to the desired
ine,
.e.
with
their
eft
wing slightly
west
of
north.
Professor Goodwin's
statement gives a clear, consistent
story
of
the
battle,
and has
the merit of
establishing
an
apparentlycomplete reconciliationbetween the
accounts
of
Herodotus and
Aeschylus.
It
is, however,
ather n
attempt
at reconcilingwith the Aeschylean account two conflict-
ing passages
in
Herodotus
than any attempt
at
reconciling
the two
accounts taken as a
whole.
To
Aeschylus,
as
an
eye-witness,
must be
given
undoubtedly
the
preference
in
case
of
ultimate conflict.
We submit,however,
hat
the
account of
Herodotus must
be interpreted s
a whole.
It
can
scarcely
be
doubted
that
Herodotus,
who
certainly
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130
Bcnj.
Ide Wleeler. [I902
visited
the scene of
the battle within thirty-five
ears
after
its occurrence,
must have
had
when he wrote a
self-
consistent plan of the battle in nmind, hetherthat plan
was rightor
wrong.
We believe
that a reviewof
Herodotus's
account as
a
whole
will show
that the two passacges
cited
above are not
the only
ones which
appear to be
inconsistent
with the plan suggested
by Professor
Goodwin; we believe
that
t
will
also
appear that he
misunderstands
eschylus.
The essential
featuresof
Herodotus's
account may be
dis-
cussed in the chronological rderas he gives them.
(i)
In the forenoon
fthedaybefore
the battle
the Persian
ships
were beached
at
Phaleron, and
the leaders
were in
council. So
soon
as it
was decided
to give battle,the
ships
were
pushed
off and headed
for
Salamis,
'rVb
v
laXapva
(? 70),
just as the land
troops
were at
niohtfallbeaded
c'rb
i7V
HfEXO7rOlVJJ7cTvO.
Contrast7rpoS
Tr7V
YaXaaitva,
?
75.
In
the open sea off Peiraieus the ships were sorted out and
arranged
KaT'
?'o-vXtyv.
s
nightwas,
however, pproaching,
it
was found
necessary
to
postpone
battleuntil
the next
day.
At
night
the
Persian
army
broke
camp
and started
long
the
shore toward
the
Peloponnesus.
Hence
it was
in
the
midst
of
his
army, lready
on its
slow
march,
hatXerxes had
his
seat the next
morning
v
T7ro\
QV
pe
(Lo
apzrt'ov
aXa/.t,Voq
(?
90).
The wholeAttic shorewas Persian.
(2)
The Greeks,especially
the
Peloponnesians,
eeing
how
completely
hey
would
be
isolated
in case of a naval
defeat,
were
in
great
perturbation,
nd
the
withdrawal
f
the
Pelo-
ponnesian
contingent,
r
perhaps
even
of the whole
fleet,
o
the
Isthmus
was all but determined
pon.
Themistocles sent
Sikinnos
to
warnXerxes
of
the
proposed
movement.
Xerxes
believed.
The
story
was
probable
nough,
for t seemed
surely
thewise course forthe Greeks to pursue. Why should they
at
great
risk
of
complete
solation
of the
army tay
to defend
a
country lready
ost
?
Xerxes
acted
promptly.
His
purpose
was
to
prevent
he withdrawal f
the
Greek
fleet.
First,
lhe
immediately
disembarked
7roXXo)t0v
-cv
llpp-e'av
upon
the
island
of
Psyttaleia,
hus
securing
with
troops
this
slhore,
s he
had
already
the Attic
shore.
This
marks the
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Vol. xxxiii.] Herodotus's Accountof
Ba/tle
of Salamis. I3I
proposed line of his battle.
Ancient naval
battles
were
by
preference, s Duncker (Gesch.
d.
Altert.)
has
shown,
fought
from shore to shore, i.e. fromfriendly hores respectively,
and
not with the
wings
reposing,
he one
upon
a
friendly,
he
otheruponan unfriendly,hore.
The Greeks
were
at Salamis
and held the
island,
and
if,
as seems a
priori natural, the
Persians were proposing
n
general
to
make the
Attic
shore
theirbackground,Psyttaleiawould be
at
the end of their
eft
and,
as
lying
n
the face of the
strait,
ould well be viewed
as
CE 77oppo
TI'
vavuaX7,9q
/LeXXovT7)9
eOco-Oat
?
76), and as
affording
fine
vantage point
fromwhich to succor friends
or hew down foes
according
as
the
refugees
from
ither ide
might eek it.
The
second part of
Xerxes's movement
ook
place
at night
and concerned
the
fleet.
It consisted
of
two
distinct ma-
noeuvres
(
-ie
Be
Firstly,
z'vq2yov ezy ro&' -pr'Epuv
idKpaq
cvKov/LEvO1
w7rpoq
r
\v
aXaFitva; secondly, '4yov &e
ot
a,uO\
\v
Ke'ovre
c
r
Kvvo'o-ovpav TeTay/LJevot,aTer%ov
Te
/1%pI MouvVX611
adzrza
ToZ 7Vop9f,loP
'fl?
VXVCr.
Concerning
the
first
of these
manoeuvres,
wo
difficulties
face the
interpreter: a) Which
is
the
west wing? (b) Was
the movement one around
the
south
of
the island
or
inside
the sound ?
Professor
Goodwin's interpretationmakes Herodotus use
west
wing
in
? 85
of
the rig-ht ing and in ? 76 of the left
wing,and this in a connected account of the samc battle.
Regarding
the wings
as
named
by
their
tenporary
position,
he
naturally s forced by the specification hat the other or
eastern
wing
was
at,a,u
T7L
Ke'o0
TE
Kxa
T
7P
Kvvo'o-ovpav o
locate
the
west
wing
out
along
the
shore of the
sland,though
no possible ratio for eading the fleet over there can be dis-
covered.
Dr.
Lolling
(Meerenge zvon alamis, Aufsdtze
an
Curtizus
ewidinet) attempts
o
solve
the
diifficultyy reading
Leros for
Keos. This is impossible,not only forgrammatical
reasons
viz.
the use of
-re
ca\,
nd the necessity
of making e
balance
LeLP, hile
8e
introduces a parentheticalclause),
but
forthe
plain reason that if the Persian ships were already at
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132
Benj.
Ide Wheeler.
[I902
Leros, the
Greeks were already
surrounded, nd there was
no need of
doing anything further cf. Hauvette, Herod.,
p.
4I2).
The
whole
difficultyinds a ready
solution when we take
into account
that we are dealing here
with a continuous,
consistent, nd
well-considered ccount in
which the Persian
fleet
s always spoken of in terms of the
Attic shore against
which it was
located on the day before the battle, before
which it was drawn up on the day of the
battle,and which
was regarded as its permanent point of departure. Pre-
cisely the same thing
s done in ? 85, where,
f I may antici-
pate somewhat, t will be shown that the
wings are again
named in terms of
the trend of the Attic
shore. The 7pos
&'7repDscdpa9s throughout he rig/twing.
The
movement
escribed by Herodotus
as
KvKXoVF,EJVot
rpo
T\)v
2aXa/uva
is
by some understood as within the sound
towarda positionby the Perama, by others as a circumnavi-
gation
of the
island. No one gives a propervalue
to
KVKXOV-
,/evot.
If, now,
this movement consisted in
sending- part
of the righlit
ing
around the island,
KVKXOv,)ueVoL
s the per-
fectly
natural
description
f
the
movementwhich
sends this
detachment of the
right
wing- round
behind
the left wing.
It
seems
to
me
probable
that
such
a detachment
was
sent
aroundthe island,and forthefollowinigeasons
(a) Aesch.
Pers. v.
368,
aXXa9
8\ Ac6KXa v-ooV
A1tavroq
7rwpt
rTdat)
seems
to
refer o
such
a
movement;
if
not,
it
refers
o something therwiseunmentioned
n
our
sources.
(b)
DiodoruLs
I, 17 says:
He
sent out the naval force of
the
Egyptians
with
orders
to close
the straitbetween
Salamis
and the
land of Megara. The same is
impliedby
Plutarch.
Two
hundcred
s
just
the number
of
ships
assigned
by
HerodotLuso the Egyptians. For this see Goodwin,p. 248.
The
Egyptians
would
naturally
elong
in the
right
wing
with
the
Phoenicians.
(c)
The
enemy's ships,
which
Herodotus
reports
Aristeides
as
having
seen in
his
passage
from
Aegina,
may well
have
belonged
to this
detachment.
See
Goodwin,
p.
251.
(d)
The
objections which have
been raised
on the
score
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8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
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Vol.
xxxiii.]
Herodotus's
Accountof
Batle
of
Salamis.
I33
of the distance and the
darkness
of the
night
are not
of
weight.
The
weather,
s usual in
September,
was
probably
calm; thetriremeswere moved byoars and were
swift; the
distance
was not
such as to
require
over
fouror five
hours;
i.e.
the
triremeswould
reach the straitsbefore
daybreak.
(e) The movement
was
an
exact
parallel
to that of
sending
two
hundred
hips
around Euboea
with
the
design
of
shutting
up
the
Greeks
in
the
Euripus.
(f)
The flight f
the
Corinthian
Adeimantus through
the
sound to thewestmaybe a base libel,but the very ntroduc-
tion
of
the
story
hows
that
Herodotus did not
think of
a
Persian
fleet s
postedoff
t. George. The
second
manoeuvre
of the
fleetconsisted in
bringing
he left wing-
ver to
enter
and
occupy
the
strait.
In
consonance
with his
general
way
of viewing
the
plan
of
battle,
Herodotus
here
also
expresses
this
occu'pation n
terms
of
the
Attic
coast,-
occupied
clear
down to Munychia all the strait with the ships. The
temptation o
justify n
oracle
cited later
undoubtedly ided
in
dictating
the
choice
of
word.
If
these
ships
had been
already
ying
off
the
straits,
s
is shown
by
a',u4l
Tr7)v
6ov TE
ecat
TrRv
vvo'oovpav,
something,
ew
must have
happened,-
something
radicallynew. The
theory
f
Professor
Goodwin
really eaves
nothing
to be
done. That
Herodotus
believed
the ships occupied the straitsinside and were posted along
the
shore
facing
the
bay of
Ambelaki,
we
think
certainly
proven
by
what
follows.
If
he did
not
think
hey
did some-
thing
of
this
sort,
why
should
he
specifically
dd,
They did
this in
silence,
that
those on
the
other
side
might
not
know
of
it ?
(?
76).
It
is,
indeed,
only
bywhat
I
must
thinka
misinterpretation
f
Aeschylus
(Pers.
382) that
Professor
Goodwin
refuses to think
that
the
Persians
began
entering
the straits
before
daylight.
Aeschylus
says (1.
38X):
they
sail
off
ach to
his
appointed
station, nd
(11.
382-3) all
the
night
keep
sailing
throughi
ntil 11.
384-5),
whenthe
night
s
passed,
no
place
is
left
for
the
Greeks to
sail
out.
The
antithesis f
&tdw7Xoov
ca9io-raoav
nd 'cX7rXovv
tcac9to-raro
is too
apparent;
the
word-play
tcaOt(o-aro)points
t
out; note
also
7rXe'ov-t
ad7rXoov
e'c7rXovv.
Professor
Goodwin's
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8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
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I34
Beej.
Ide Wheeler.
[1902
interpretation
f 1.382
is given
on
p. 246, the Persian
ships
are
kept rowingabout
all night.
Aside fromthe
common
meaningof the anguage and the implication f theantithesis,
therearises
the
consideration:
howwere they
ailing
to their
appointed
stationsby
rowingabout
all night ?
The inter-
pretation
f
this passage
is not, however,
f
prime mportance
to us,-to
Professor
Goodwin and
his theory
t is
of fatal
importance.
Loeschke and
Goodwin
lay
great stress upon
the
impossibility
f effecting
uch a
movement
n the face
of
theenemywithout ttractingrheir ttention. Goodwin n the
first lace
is
surely
mistaken
n assertinc,
hat t was
a moonlit
night. The
statementof Aesch.
v.
365 is
against this,and
Busolt, Gr. Gesc.2
(II,
702,
note
2),
shows that
at the time
of
the
battle
the moonmust
have been
well
advanced in its
last
quarter
nd probably
id not rise
before
bout two
o'clock.
The
Greeks were deep
back
in
the bay
of
Ambelaki some
fourmiles fromthe opposite Attic coast. That there was
doubtless
danger
of
attracting
he attention
f
the
Greeksis
shown
by
the fact
that
the
Persians
moved
in
silence,
but
that
it
was
possible
to
do
it
under cover
of
the darkness must
be
undoubted.
That the south
passage,
i.e.
that between
Cynosura
nd
Psyttaleia,
was not
entirely
locked
s
suggested
by
the arrival
of the
Aeginetan
trireme
he next
morning.
Herodotus's account turns now in ? 78 to the Greeks.
They
were
busy
in
discussion.
They
did
not
know
yet
that
the barbarians
were surrounding
hem with
their
ships,
but
supposed
them
to
be in
the same
positions
as
they
saw
them
by daylight.
According
o Professor
Goodwin's
theory,
they
would
be,
except
for the
ships
sent around
the island.
Then
follows
the arrival of
Aristeides,l
from whom as
an
eye-witness
Themistocles
first earns that
the Persians
have moved as he desired.
Not until
Aristeides's
report
s confirmed y
the
Tenian
deserters
do
the
Greek
leaders
really
believe
they
are sur-
rounded.
Once
convinced,
hey
directlyprepare
for battle.
1
Aristeides
may
have
anded
on
the south horeof
Cynosura,
hence
five
r
ten minutes'walk
over
the
ridge
would have taken
him
to
the Greek
camp,
or
he
may
have
rounded
he
point.
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8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
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Vol.
xxxiii.]
Herodotus's
Account
of
Battle
of
Salzamis.
I35
The
dawn
is
breaking,. The men are assembled to hear
some
words
of
exhortation.
They
hurry
to
their
places
on
the
ships. The triremewiththe blessingof theAeacidae arrives.
They push off.
Hardly
are
they
off
when
the barbarians
are
upon
them.
At
first
he
Greeks
recoil,
and some
were
just
beaching
their boats
again,
but
Ameinias on
the left
pushes
ahead, joins
fight,
nd
the rest
follow.
The
fight
begins
off
the mouth of the
bay
of
Ambelaki.
Mr.
Goodwin's
plan
makes
it
begin
at the
other
side or
the
middle
of
the
sound,
beforethe Persians have reached theirposition and formed
their
line.
The
Greeks,
according
to
his
plan,
would
have
been
obliged
to
back water
at at least
i
miles before
beach-
ing.
In
? 89 Herodotus
says
Greeks
whose
ships
were
lost
swam
ashore. If the
Greek line had
been
across
the
sound,
this
were
unlikely.
Near
those of the
leftwing
would
have
been a
hostile
shore.
Most
of
the others
could
have
reached
shore
only
by swimming y and aroundmanyfriendlyhips.
Passing
to
the
details
of
the
battle,
H-erodotus,
85,
makes
the
statement:
Opposite the
Athenians had
been
arranged
the
Phoenicians,
for
they
held
the
wing
toward
Eleusis and
the
west;
opposite
the
Spartans
the
Ionians;
they had
the
wing
toward
the
east
and
Peiraieus.
As we
have
already
seen, this
statement
has
given
rise to
abundant
controversy,
but yet it is just the statementthat it was mostnaturalfor
Herodotus
in
accordance
with
his
entire
conception of
the
plan
of
battle
to
make.
He
viewed
the
Persian
ine
as
arrayed
before the
Attic
coast.
This coast
opposite the
mouth of
the
bay
of
Ambelaki
lies
exactly
east
and
west.
Herodotus
had
not
studied
out
the
battle
on a
map, but
on
the
spot.
It
was
of
slight
matter
that
the
map
shows
Eleusis
to
be
to
the
northwest.
The
plain
fact
is
that the
shore
runs
east
and west, and the west end of the sound opens toward
Eleusis,
the
east
end
toward
Peiraieus.
A
fleet
arrayed
along
this
shore
has
therefore
ts
right
wing
toward
the
west
and
Eleusis, its
left
toward
the
east
and
Peiraieus.
The
story
of
the
battle,
aside
from
the
personal
incidents,
is
brief.
The
Greeks
preserved
heir
order,
but
the
Persians,
as
they
crowded
down
to fall
upon
the
Greeks
in
their
nar-
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8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
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I36
Beny.
Ide
Whecler.
[1902
rower
position, nterfered ith ach other,
aking ne another's
oars,
and making
themselvesan easy prey.
The position of
the Greeks forced the Persians into narrowerquarters,cz'
crTsC,
so
Aeschylus
puts
it. The resultcould not have been
different,s Herodotus
says. The ancient
naval battle was
a
ramming match. A
fully equipped triremecarried only
eighteenfightingmen to
I70
oarsmen. The
great considera-
tion
was speed, and theability o drive the ioo
feet ong barge
against
the enemy's ship and disable it.
Once the Persians
were crowded upon each other, he battle was settled. This
was
the reason why the Greeks kept the
shelter of their
narrow
bay.
It
is
inconceivable that they should, as Mr.
Goodwin
would
have
them,
leave the shelter
of
a
friendly
shore, nd
lean
their
eft
wing upon
a
hostile
shore.
The confusion f the
Persians was increased
by the ambi-
tion of those in
the rear lines
(Aesch. says
they
were
drawn
up threedeep) to make a good showingunder the eye of the
king
wlho at on the
shore behind them.
The
Phoenicians
were
driven
back by the Athenians
e
7'v
rypv
lutarch ays),
and Herodotus tells
of
their
coming
up
to
rnake
a certain
complaint
o the
king.
The flight
ecame
general.
All
the
ships
pushed
for
the north
passage.
Here
the
Aeginetans,
who had
moved
forward
from their
position
on
the
right
Greekwingr t the tip of Cynosura,were waitingfortlhem,
and
taking
them
in
the
flank made havoc
of the
fug-itives,
earning
themselves
he
chief
glory
of the
day.
This is
Herodotus's
perfectlyntelligible
nd
self-consistent
account.
From it
it
seems to us
clear
that he thought f the
Persians as
already
drawn
up
at
daybreak
along
the Attic
shore
and
closing the north
passage of
the
strait,
o as to
extend from
Psyttaleia
on the
Attic
shore
opposite
it
to
a
pointwestwardtherefromppositethe northern ape bound-
ing
Ambelaki
bay.
This
makes
a
line
of
21
miles,
or
if
extended
to the
Perama,
of
4 miles.
The Persian
fleet,
fter
the
withdrawalof
the 200
Egyptian ships,
could
not have
exceeded
6oo
ships. Aeschylus says these
were drawn
up
three
deep.
This
allows,
on
the basis
of a
21-mile
extent
of
line,
65
feet
waterwayfor each ship,
considerably
more
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8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
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8/10/2019 Herodotus's Account of the Battle of Salamis
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138
Bcnj.
Ide
Wlieeler.
[1902
paean was not
the song of men
who meditated
flight,but
rather of men
hastening in inspired
courage
to the
battle.
Then the blare of the trumpetset all the air afire, and
straightway ame
the dash
and
the swish of
the
oar
as it
smote the brine to the
boatswain's call.
And with
a
rush
they were
all
beforetheir
eyes.
This fits Herodotus's
account.
The
Greeks tarried
in
council
till
day
was
dawning. Then came late the
decision
to
fight.
The sailors were addressed
just
as the
sun
was
rising. With an enthusiasm heyare off o theirboats. The
trumpetgives
the
signal
for
launching.
Suddenly they
are
off, nd way down
in
the recesses
of the
bay
four
miles
away,
where
just
before all
had been
quiet
in
the
gray
of
twilight,
the Persians ee
the
water overed
with
he
advancing
riremes.
(b)
The
expression
p'evi4a
s
believed
by
Goodwin
to
refer
to the
columnar
order of the Persians
in
passing
the
straits.
The cause of their confusionwhich resulted n theirdefeat
was, according o
his
view,
that
n
passing
the straits
ev
Trev5)
they
were
obliged
to
narrow
his
column.
They
were
then
attacked
before
they
recovered
from
their
confusion.
This
is not what
Aeschylus says.
He
says
the
reverse.
For
the
first
he stream
of the
Persian
host held on its
way,
but
when the mass
of the
ships
had
been
crowded
together
nto
close quarters, heywere no help to each other,but rather
hindrance
and
destruction, tc.,
and
then the
Greeks
smote
them
hip
and
thigh.
This
crowding
ezv
7evjOi
omes
at
the
end,
not
at
the
beginning. Compressed
nto
a narrower
ed,
what
had
been
a
steady
stream
now
becomes
a
confusion
f
waters.
It
is the
same thing
which
Herodotus
describes. As
they
came down
upon
the
Greeks
in
their
narrower
osition
off he mouth
f
the
bay, they
crowded
ogether,
ouched
oars,
and weredisabled.
Herodotus's
account
is not
only
self-consistent;
t
is in
entire
consistency
with
the
other
ccounts.