hewlett packard enterprise msr1000 series, msr2000 series, … · 2016-03-04 · hewlett packard...

Hewlett Packard Enterprise

MSR1000 Series, MSR2000 Series, MSR3000

Series and MSR4000 Series Routers

Security Target

Version 1.0

March 4, 2016

Prepared for:

Hewlett Packard Enterprise

11445 Compaq Center Drive West

Houston, Texas 77070

Prepared by:

Leidos Inc (formerly Science Applications International Corporation)

Common Criteria Testing Laboratory

6841 Benjamin Franklin Drive, Columbia, Maryland 21046

Security Target Version 1.0, 2/16/2016

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1. SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 4

1.1 SECURITY TARGET, TOE AND CC IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................ 4 1.2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ................................................................................................................................. 5 1.3 CONVENTIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 6

1.3.1 Terminology .......................................................................................................................................... 7

1.3.2 Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................... 7

2. TOE DESCRIPTION .......................................................................................................................................... 8

2.1 TOE OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................................. 9 2.1.1 MSR1000 Series Routers ....................................................................................................................... 9

2.1.2 MSR2000 Series Routers ..................................................................................................................... 10



2.2 TOE ARCHITECTURE .................................................................................................................................... 14 2.2.1 Multitenant device context ................................................................................................................... 15

2.2.2 Physical Boundaries ............................................................................................................................. 15

2.2.3 Logical Boundaries .............................................................................................................................. 16

2.3 TOE DOCUMENTATION ................................................................................................................................ 17

3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .......................................................................................................... 18

4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES .............................................................................................................................. 19

4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ................................................................... 19

5. IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .................................................................................................................. 20

5.1 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................................... 20 5.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................. 21

5.2.1 Security audit (FAU) ........................................................................................................................... 21

5.2.2 Cryptographic support (FCS) ............................................................................................................... 23

5.2.3 User data protection (FDP) .................................................................................................................. 25

5.2.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)................................................................................................ 26

5.2.5 Security management (FMT) ............................................................................................................... 26

5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT) ................................................................................................................ 27

5.2.7 TOE access (FTA) ............................................................................................................................... 27

5.2.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP) ................................................................................................................ 28

5.3 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................... 29

6. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .............................................................................................................. 29

6.1 SECURITY AUDIT .......................................................................................................................................... 29 6.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT ........................................................................................................................... 30 6.3 USER DATA PROTECTION .............................................................................................................................. 38 6.4 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION ....................................................................................................... 39 6.5 SECURITY MANAGEMENT ............................................................................................................................. 39 6.6 PROTECTION OF THE TSF ............................................................................................................................. 40 6.7 TOE ACCESS ................................................................................................................................................. 41 6.8 TRUSTED PATH/CHANNELS ........................................................................................................................... 42

7. PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIMS ............................................................................................................... 43

8. RATIONALE ..................................................................................................................................................... 44


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8.1 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE ................................................................................................ 44

APPENDIX A: DOCUMENTATION FOR HEWLETT PACKARD ENTERPRISE MSR1000, MSR2000,

MSR3000, AND MSR4000 ROUTERS .................................................................................................................... 45

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 TOE Series and Devices ................................................................................................................................. 5 Table 2 CPU’s and Number of Fixed Ports by Device............................................................................................ 16 Table 3 TOE Security Functional Components ...................................................................................................... 21 Table 4 Auditable Events .......................................................................................................................................... 23 Table 5 Assurance Components ............................................................................................................................... 29 Table 6 Cryptographic Functions ............................................................................................................................ 30 Table 7 NIST SP800-56B Conformance .................................................................................................................. 32 Table 8 Key/CSP Zeroization Summary ................................................................................................................. 36 Table 9 SFR Protection Profile Sources .................................................................................................................. 43 Table 10 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping ....................................................................................... 45


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1. Security Target Introduction

This section identifies the Security Target (ST) and Target of Evaluation (TOE) identification, ST conventions, ST

conformance claims, and the ST organization. The TOE is Hewlett Packard Enterprise MSR 1000, 2000, 3000, and

4000 Series Routers with Comware V7.1.059, Release 0305 provided by Hewlett Packard Enterprise. Each of the

Series Router products is a stand-alone Gigabit Ethernet router appliance designed to implement a wide range of

network layers 2 and 3 switching, service and routing operations.

The focus of the evaluation is on the TOE functionality supporting the claims in the Protection Profile for Network

Devices (NDPP). The only capabilities covered by the evaluation are those specified in the aforementioned

Protection Profile, all other capabilities are not covered in the evaluation. The security functionality specified in

[NDPP], includes protection of communications with remote administrators and trusted IT entities, identification

and authentication of administrators, auditing of security-relevant events, ability to verify the source and integrity of

updates to the TOE, and specifies NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms.

The Security Target contains the following additional sections:

TOE Description (Section 2)

Security Problem Definition (Section 3)

Security Objectives (Section 4)

IT Security Requirements (Section 5)

TOE Summary Specification (Section 6)

Protection Profile Claims (Section 7)

Rationale (Section 8).

1.1 Security Target, TOE and CC Identification

ST Title – Hewlett Packard Enterprise MSR Routers 1k-4k Security Target

ST Version – Version 1.0

ST Date –February 16, 2016

TOE Identification – Hewlett Packard Enterprise MSR 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 Series Routers with Comware

V7.1.059, Release 0305 with a High Encryption License1.

On November 1, 2015, Hewlett-Packard became two separate companies: Hewlett Packard Enterprise and HP Inc.

The network products are part of the new Hewlett Packard Enterprise. The former HP network switches and routers

are undergoing product rebranding. The rebranding is not complete in the documentation and on the websites. The

TOE maybe referred to with the suffix “HP”, “HP FlexFabric”, “HPE” or “HPE FlexFabric”. For the purpose of this

evaluation, these name variations are used interchangeably and refer to the same product.

Product Series Specific Devices

HP MSR1000 HP MSR1002-4 AC Router ((JG875A)

HP MSR1003-8S AC Router (JH060A)

HP MSR2000 HP MSR2003 AC Router (JG411A)

HP MSR2004-24 AC Router (JG734A)

HP MSR2004-48 Router (JG735A)

1 HPE ships the MSR router series with a High Encryption License. The FIPS mode cannot be enabled if a High

Encryption license has not been installed.


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Product Series Specific Devices

HP MSR3000 HP MSR3012 AC Router (JG409A)

HP MSR3012 DC Router (JG410A)

HP MSR3024 AC Router ((JG406A)

HP MSR3024 DC Router (JG407A)

HP MSR3024 PoE Router (JG408A)

HP MSR3044 Router (JG405A)

HP MSR3064 Router (JG404A)

HP MSR4000 HP MSR 4060 Router Chassis with HP

MSR4000 MPU-100 Main Processing Unit

(JG403A)

HP MSR 4080 Router Chassis with HP

MSR4000 MPU-100 Main Processing Unit

(JG402A)

Note: Each MSR4000 product series must

also have one of the following Service

Processing Units2:

HP MSR4000 SPU-100 Service

Processing Unit (JG413A);


Processing Unit (JG414A); or


Processing Unit (JG670A).

Table 1 TOE Series and Devices

TOE Developer – Hewlett Packard Enterprise

Evaluation Sponsor – Hewlett Packard Enterprise

CC Identification – Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 3,

July 2009

1.2 Conformance Claims

This TOE is conformant to the following CC specifications:

This ST is conformant to:

Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.1, 8 June 2012 (NDPP) as amended by Errata

#3 dated 3 November 2013, and including the following optional SFRs: FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1;

FCS_SSH_EXT.1; and FIA_PSK_EXT.1. The following NIAP Technical Decisions apply to this

PP and have been accounted for in the ST development and the conduct of the evaluation:

TD0004: FCS_TLS_EXT Man-in-the-Middle Test - This Technical Decision removes

the FCS_TLS_EXT man-in-the-middle tests for the NDPP (FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1, Test 2),

pending development of new TLS requirements and assurance activities and

identification of suitable test tools.

TD0005: FPT_ITT Test 3 Resolution - This Technical Decision removes the need to

perform Test 3 associated with FPT_ITT.1 in NDPP, consistent with the test

requirements for FTP_ITC.1 and FTP_TRP.1.

2 See MSR4000 Series Routers in section 2.1.4 for a description of the Service Processing Units.


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TD0011: FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 Clarification - The SFR requires that the SSH transport

implementation use specific encryption algorithms. The TD clarifies that the

restrictions must be implemented by the TOE and cannot be reliant upon configuration

of the SSH client.

TD0012: FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 - Algorithms not identified in FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 must

not be allowed; other cipher suites (such as 3DES-CBC) must be disabled in evaluated

configurations. The Assurance Activities associated with this requirement must verify

that connection attempts with algorithms not listed in FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 are denied.

The NDPP was updated via errata to reflect this decision.

TD0017: NDPP Audit Shutdown - This Technical Decision allows for the use of a

startup audit record to indicate audit shutdown in the event of an uncontrolled shutdown.

TD0026: FPT_TUD_EXT.1 - This Technical Decision allows for the administrator

following TOE guidance to reject an illegitimate update detected by the TOE, in addition

to the TOE rejecting the update automatically (during testing).

TD0032: FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 – The SFR was rewritten to conditionally require

password-based authentication.

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,

Version 3.1, Revision 33, July 2009.

Part 2 Extended

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,

Version 3.1 Revision 34, July 2009.

Part 3 Conformant

1.3 Conventions

The following conventions have been applied in this document:

Security Functional Requirements – Part 2 of the CC defines the approved set of operations that may be

applied to functional requirements: iteration, assignment, selection, and refinement.

o Iteration: allows a component to be used more than once with varying operations. In the ST,

iteration is indicated by a number in parentheses placed at the end of the component. For example

FDP_ACC.1 (1) and FDP_ACC.1 (2) indicate that the ST includes two iterations of the

FDP_ACC.1 requirement, (1) and (2).

o Assignment: allows the specification of an identified parameter. Assignments are indicated using

bold and are surrounded by brackets (for example, [assignment]). Note that an assignment within

a selection would be identified in italics and with embedded bold brackets (for example,

[[selected-assignment]]).

o Selection: allows the specification of one or more elements from a list. Selections are indicated

using bold italics and are surrounded by brackets (for example, [selection]).

o Refinement: allows the addition of details. Refinements are indicated using bold, for additions,

and strike-through, for deletions (for example, “… all objects …” or “… some big things …”).

Note that ‘cases’ that are not applicable in a given SFR have simply been removed without any

explicit identification.

3 NDPP claims conformance to CC Part 2 Revision 3. CC Part 2 Revision 3 and Revision 4 are the same for the

requirements included in this ST, 4 NDPP claims conformance to CC Part 3 Revision 3. CC Part 3 Revision 3 and Revision 4 are the same for the

requirements included in this ST,


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The NDPP uses an additional convention – the ‘case’ – which defines parts of an SFR that apply only when

corresponding selections are made or some other identified conditions exist. Only the applicable cases are

identified in this ST and they are identified using bold text.

Other sections of the ST – Other sections of the ST use bolding to highlight text of special interest, such as

captions.

1.3.1 Terminology

FlexBranch A solution provided by HP that integrates network connectivity and

applications.

FlexNetwork A network architecture developed by Hewlett-Packard to provide

networking services and a consistent network architecture for the data

center, campus and branch offices. It was developed to support

technologies such as virtualization and cloud computing.

1.3.2 Acronyms

AAA Authentication, Authorization and Accounting

ACL Access Control List

AES Advanced Encryption Standard

AUT Authentication

CBC Cipher-Block Chaining

CC Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation

CEM Common Evaluation Methodology for Information Technology Security

CM Configuration Management

CLI Command Line Interface

CPU Central Processing Unit

DH Diffie-Hellman

EVI Ethernet Virtualization Interconnection

FDP User Data Protection CC Class

FIA Identification and Authentication CC Class

FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard

FMT Security Management CC Class

FSP Functional Specification

GR Graceful Restart

HMAC Hashed Message Authentication Code

IP Internet Protocol

IPC Inter-process communication

IPv4 Internet Protocol version 4

IPv6 Internet Protocol version 6

IPsec Internet Protocol Security

ISSU

IT

In Service Software Upgrades

Information Technology

LACP Link Aggregation Control Protocol

LAN Local Area Network

MDC Multitenant device context

MOF

MPLS

MTD

Management of Functions

Multiprotocol Label Switching

Management of TSF Data

Mpps Millions of packets per second

NDPP Protection Profile for Network Devices

OAA

OSP

Open Application Architecture

Organization Security Policy

OSPF Open Shortest Path First

POS Prime order subgroup


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PP Protection Profile

PCI Peripheral Component Interconnect (personal computer bus)

QoS Quality of Service

RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial In User Service

RPC Remote procedure call

RSA Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (algorithm for public-key cryptography)

SA Security Association

SAR Security Assurance Requirement

SFP Security Function Policy

SFR Security Functional Requirement

SHA Secure Hash Algorithm

SIC Smart Interface Card

SM Security Management

SMR Security Management Roles

SOF Strength of Function

SSH Secure Shell

ST Security Target

TACACS+ Terminal Access Controller Access Control System Plus

TCP Transmission Control Protocol

TOE Target of Evaluation

TRILL Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links

TSC TSF Scope of Control

TSF TOE Security Functions

TSP TOE Security Policy

UAU User Authentication

UDP User Data Protection

USB Universal Serial Bus

VLAN Virtual Local Area Network

VPN Virtual Private Network

WAN Wide Area Network

2. TOE Description

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Hewlett Packard Enterprise MSR 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 Series Routers

with Comware V7.1.059, Release 0305. The MSR 1000 Series router in the evaluated configuration comprises the

following specific devices:

HP MSR1002-4 AC router ((JG875A),

HP MSR1003-8S AC Router (JH060A).

The MSR 2000 Series router in the evaluated configuration comprises the following specific devices:

HP MSR 2003 AC Router (JG411A),

HP MSR 2004-24 AC Router (JG734A),

HP MSR 2004-48 Router (JG735A).

The MSR 3000 Series in the evaluated configuration comprises the following specific devices:

HP MSR3012 AC Router (JG409A),

HP MSR3012 DC Router (JG410A),

HP MSR3024 AC Router ((JG406A),

HP MSR3024 DC Router (JG407A),


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HP MSR3024 PoE Router (JG408A),

HP MSR3044 Router (JG405A), and

HP MSR3064 Router (JG404A).

The MSR 4000 Series in the evaluated configuration comprises the following specific devices:

HP MSR 4060 Router Chassis with HP MSR4000 MPU-100 Main Processing Unit (JG403A); and the

HP MSR 4080 Router Chassis with HP MSR4000 MPU-100 Main Processing Unit (JG402A).

Note: Each MSR4000 product series must also have one of the following Service Processing Units: HP MSR4000

SPU-100 Service Processing Unit (JG413A); HP MSR4000 SPU-200 Service Processing Unit (JG414A); or HP

MSR4000 SPU-300 Service Processing Unit (JG670A).

Each series of routers comprising the TOE consists of a set of distinct devices (as identified in Section 1.1), which

vary primarily according to power delivery, performance, and port density.

The MSR 1000, 2000, 3000, and 4000 routers have a fixed number of ports and each support plug-in modules,

which provide additional functionality (for example, various numbers and types of network connection ports). All of

the available plug-in modules are included and can optionally be used in the evaluated configuration (see below) as

they do not affect any of the claimed security functionality.

2.1 TOE Overview

The various routers comprising the TOE are all Gigabit Ethernet router appliances that consist of hardware and

software components. While the physical form factor of each of the four series of MSR routers is substantially

different, the underlying hardware shares a similar architecture. The software uses a common code base of a

modular nature with only the modules applicable for the specific hardware installed.

The following product descriptions identify the evaluated hardware and software included in the TOE. The scope of

the evaluation is the security functions specified in the NDPP. The additional product features that have been

described are not within the scope of evaluation but are provided to identify the product type and intended use.

Please see the details in the text below.

2.1.1 MSR1000 Series Routers

The Hewlett Packard Enterprise MSR1000 series routers are a multiservice routers designed for small sized branch

offices or departmental end points. HP MSR1000 series routers feature interface and module options for Local Area

Network (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN) communications, along with security and convergence capabilities

through embedded and integrated encryption and voice processing. The evaluation covered Internet Protocol

Security (IPsec) capabilities specified in the NDPP.

The HP MSR1002-4 AC router provides three Smart Interface Card (SIC) interface module slots and up to eight

Gigabit Ethernet LAN ports which can be re-configured as WAN Routing ports. The router provides High-density

Ethernet access with WAN Fast Ethernet/Gigabit Ethernet, LAN 4- and 9-port Fast Ethernet; and mobility access

with 2 SIC (or 1 DSCI slot) module slots. The router also provides 1 RJ-45 autosensing 10/100/1000 WAN port, 1

SFP fixed Gigabit Ethernet SFP port, 4 RJ-45 autosensing 10/100/1000 LAN ports, and 1 Serial port.

The MSR1003-8S AC router provides 3 SIC or 1 SIC and 1 DSIC module slots, 2 RJ-45 autosensing 10/100/1000

WAN ports, and 8 RJ-45 autosensing 10/100/1000 LAN ports, supporting up to 500Kpps forwarding and 170Mbps

of IPsec encryption throughput.

The routers support IPv6 with full Layer 2 and Layer 3 features. The router uses USB memory disk to download

and upload configuration and operating system image files; and supports an external USB 3G/4G modem for a

3G/4G WAN uplink. The models included in the TOE are the HP MSR1002-4 AC router (JG875A); and the HP

MSR1003-8S AC Router (JH060A).

The following module(s) are supported by this series and can optionally be used since they do not affect any of the

claimed security functions but rather serve to extend available network connectivity:

HP A-MSR 4-port 10/100Base-T Switch SIC Module JD573B


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HP A-MSR 9-port 10/100Base-T Switch DSIC Module JD574B

HP A-MSR 1-port 10/100Base-T SIC Module JD545B

HP A-MSR 1-port 100Base-X SIC Module JF280A

HP A-MSR 2-port FXO SIC Module JD558A


HP A-MSR 2-port FXS SIC Module JD560A


HP A-MSR 4-port FXS/1-port FXO DSIC Mod JD189A

HP A-MSR 2-port ISDN-S/T Voice SIC Module JF821A

HP A-MSR 2-port FXS/1-port FXO SIC Module JD632A

HP A-MSR 1-port E1/Fractional E1 (75ohm) SIC Module JD634B

HP A-MSR 1-port T1/Fractional T1 SIC Module JD538A

HP A-MSR 2-port E1/Fractional E1 (75ohm) SIC Module JF842A

HP A-MSR 1-port Enhanced Sync/Async Serial SIC Module JD557A

HP A-MSR 1-port ISDN-S/T SIC Module JD571A

HP A-MSR 8-port Async Serial SIC Module JF281A

HP 802.11b/g/n Wireless AP SIC Module JF819A

HP MSR 802.11b/g/n Wless AP SIC Mod (NA) JG211A

HP A-MSR 16-port Async Serial SIC Module JG186A

HP A-MSR HSPA/WCDMA SIC Module JG187A

HP A-MSR 1-port ADSL over POTS SIC Mod JD537A

HP MSR 1-p ADSL over ISDN BRI U SIC Mod JG056B

HP A-MSR 1-p 8-wire G.SHDSL DSIC Module JG191A

HP MSR 1p E1/CE1/PRI SIC Mod JG604

HP MSR 4G LTE SIC Mod for Verizon JG742A

HP MSR 4G LTE SIC Mod for ATT JG743A

HP MSR 4G LTE SIC Mod for Global JG744A

HP A-MSR 4-port 10/100Base-T PoE Switch SIC Module JD620A

HP A-MSR 9-port 10/100Base-T PoE Switch DSIC Module JD621A

HP MSR 2p Enh Sync/Async Srl SIC Mod JG736A


HP MSR 1p GbE Combo SIC Mod JG738A

HP MSR 4p Gig-T Switch SIC Mod JG739A

HP MSR 4p Gig-T PoE Switch SIC Mod JG740A


The HP MSR2000 series router is a component of the Hewlett Packard Enterprise FlexBranch solution, which is a

part of the comprehensive Hewlett Packard Enterprise FlexNetwork architecture. These router appliances feature a

modular design that delivers application services for small- to medium-sized branch offices. This provides the

benefit of reduced complexity, and simplified configuration, deployment, and management. HP MSR2000 series

routers feature an interface and module options for reliable, scalable LAN and WAN communications, along with

security and convergence capabilities through embedded and integrated encryption and voice processing. The

evaluation covered IPsec capabilities specified in the NDPP. The HP MSR2000 supports up to 400 Mb/s of IPsec

VPN encrypted throughput.

The routers provides 3-4 interface module slots and 15 high-density Fast Ethernet ports, WAN Gigabit Ethernet and

LAN 4-port and 9-port Fast Ethernet; and mobility access with 3G SIC module and 3G/4G USB modems; as well

as provides IPv6 support with full Layer 2 and Layer 3 features. The routers use USB memory disk to download

and upload configuration and operating system image files; and supports an external USB 3G/4G modem for a

3G/4G WAN uplink. The series includes:

HP MSR2003 AC Router JG411A

HP MSR2004-24 AC Router JG734A

HP MSR2004-48 Router JG735A


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The following modules, extending the physically available ports, are supported by this series and can optionally be

used since they do not affect any of the claimed security functions but rather serve to extend available network

connectivity:









HP A-MSR 4-port FXS/1-port FXO DSIC Mod JG189A

HP A-MSR 1-port E1 Voice SIC Module JF821A













HP MSR 1p E1/CE1/PRI SIC Mod JG604A


HP MSR 4G LTE SIC Mod for ATT JG743A








The HP MSR3000 series routers are components of the HP FlexBranch solution, which is a part of the

comprehensive HP FlexNetwork architecture. These router appliances feature a modular design that delivers

application services for medium to large-sized branch offices. This provides the benefit of reduced complexity, and

simplified configuration, deployment, and management. The MSR3000 routers use the latest multicore central

processing units (CPUs), offer Gigabit switching, provide an enhanced Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI)

bus, and provides a full-featured, resilient routing platform, including IPv6 and Multiprotocol Label Switching

(MPLS), with up to 5 million packets per second (Mpps) forwarding capacity and 3.3 Gb/s of IPsec VPN encrypted

throughput. The evaluation covered IPsec capabilities specified in the NDPP. The MSR3000 router series provide up

to three on-board Gigabit Ethernet ports. They support Layer 2 switching, select Layer 3 services, and static Layer 3

routing, as well as provide dual IP stack to transition from IPv4 to IPv6. The series include:

HP MSR 3012 AC Router JG409A

HP MSR 3012 DC Router JG410A

HP MSR 3024 AC Router JG406A

HP MSR 3024 DC Router JG407A

HP MSR 3024 PoE Router JG408A

HP MSR 3044 Router JG405A


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HP MSR 3064 Router JG404A

The following modules, extending the physically available ports, are supported by this series and can optionally be

used since they do not affect any of the claimed security functions but rather serve to extend available network

connectivity:









HP A-MSR 4-port FXS/1-port FXO DSIC Mod JG189A

HP A-MSR 1-port E1 Voice SIC Module JD575A

HP A-MSR 1-port T1 Voice SIC Module JD576A

HP A-MSR 2-port ISDN-S/T Voice SIC Module JF821A













HP MSR 1p E1/CE1/PRI SIC Mod JG604A




HP A-MSR 4-port 10/100Base-T PoE Switch SIC Module JD620A

HP A-MSR 9-port 10/100Base-T PoE Switch DSIC Module JD621A







The HP MSR 4000 series routers are components of the HP FlexBranch solution, which is a part of the

comprehensive HP FlexNetwork architecture. These router appliances feature a modular design that delivers

application services for extra-large branch offices, headquarters, and campuses. This provides the benefit of reduced

complexity, and simplified configuration, deployment, and management. The MSR 4000 series leverages separated

data and control planes, dual main processing units (MPUs), and support for up to four power supplies, which

provides outstanding performance and reliability.

The MSR4000 routers provide a full-featured, resilient routing platform with the latest multicore CPUs, offer 10

Gigabit switching, provide an enhanced PCI bus, and ship with the latest version of HP Comware software to help

ensure high performance with concurrent services. The MSR4000 series provides a full-featured, resilient routing

platform, including IPv6 and MPLS, with up to 20 Mpps forwarding capacity and 8 Gb/s of IPsec VPN encrypted

throughput. The evaluation included IPsec capabilities as specified in the NDPP . The series include:


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HP MSR 4060 Router Chassis with HP MSR4000 MPU-100 Main Processing Unit (JG403A)

HP MSR 4080 Router Chassis with HP MSR4000 MPU-100 Main Processing Unit (JG402A)

Note: Each model series must also have one of the following Service Processing Units: HP MSR4000 SPU-100

Service Processing Unit (JG413A); HP MSR4000 SPU-200 Service Processing Unit (JG414A); or HP MSR4000

SPU-300 Service Processing Unit (JG670A).

Most of the available modules, including the fabric modules, serve to extend the number of physical ports available

and the throughput performance to the base appliance. However, the Main Processing Unit and the Service

Processing Units serve to add additional processing power to the base appliance. A service processing unit performs

data forwarding, encryption or decryption, and analyzing or filtering of data packets. A main processing unit

performs route calculation, forward table maintenance, and configures and monitors the SPU. MPUs and SPUs

execute the same multiprocessor-capable operating system in conjunction with the instance operating on the

processor(s) found in the base appliance.

The following modules are supported by this series and can optionally be used since they do not affect any of the

claimed security functions but rather serve to extend available network connectivity:

HP MSR G2 128-channel Voice Processing Module

HP A-MSR 1-port E1 Voice MIM Module JD565B

HP A-MSR 2-port E1 Voice MIM Module JD567B

HP A-MSR 1-port T1 Voice MIM Module JD566B

HP MSR 1-port E3 / CE3 / FE3 HMIM Module

HP A-MSR 2-port T1 Voice MIM Module JD568B

HP A-MSR 16-port FXS MIM Module JF822A

HP A-MSR 16-port Enhanced Async Serial MIM Module JF841A

Note 13 0.5U HMIM Adapter Modules can adapt following MIM Modules:

HP A-MSR 8-port Enhanced Async Serial MIM Module JF840A

HP A-MSR 1-port T3/CT3/FT3 MIM Module JD628A

HP A-MSR 1-port E3/CE3/FE3 MIM Module JD630A

HP A-MSR 1-port OC-3c/STM-1c POS MIM Module JG193A

HP A-MSR 2-port Enhanced Sync/Async Serial MIM Module JD540A



HP A-MSR 4-port FXS MIM Module JD553A

HP A-MSR 4-port FXO MIM Module JD542A

HP A-MSR 4-port E&M MIM Module JD539A

HP A-MSR 2-port E1/CE1/PRI MIM Module JD544B

HP A-MSR 4-port E1/CE1/PRI MIM Module JD550B

HP A-MSR 8-port E1/CE1/PRI (75ohm) MIM Module JD563A

HP A-MSR 4-port E1/Fractional E1 MIM Module JF257B

HP A-MSR 8-port E1/Fractional E1 (75ohm) MIM Module JF255A

HP A-MSR 2-port T1/CT1/PRI MIM Module

HP A-MSR 4-port T1/Fractional T1 MIM Module JF254B

HP A-MSR 8-port T1/CT1/PRI MIM Module JC160A

HP A-MSR 8-port T1/Fractional T1 MIM Module JC159A

HP A-MSR 2-port 10/100Base-T MIM Module JD613A

HP A-MSR 4-port 10/100Base-T MIM Module JD551A

HP A-MSR 2-port Gig-T MIM Module JD548A

HP A-MSR 2-port FXO MIM Module JD543A

HP A-MSR 4-port ISDN-S/T Voice MIM Module JF837A

HP MSR G2 128-channel Voice Processing Module


14

2.2 TOE Architecture

The various routers comprising the TOE share a common software code base, called Comware. Comware is special

purpose appliance system software that implements a wide array of networking technology, including: IPv4/IPv6

dual-stacks, a data link layer, layer 2 and 3 routing, Ethernet switching, Virtual Local Area Network (VLANs),

Quality of Service (QoS), etc. The evaluated version of Comware is V7.1.059, Release 0305. It should be noted that

Comware runs on a variety of underlying architectures including VxWorks, Linux, pSOS and Windows; however,

the only underlying architecture found in the evaluated configuration is Linux. The TOE supports both IPv4 and

IPv6 networks; however, IPv6 was not tested as part of this evaluation.

Comware V7.1.059, Release 0305 implements full modularization and multi-process applications, as well as

provides the following benefits:

Full modularization—Brings improvements in system availability, virtualization, multi-core multi-CPU

applications, distributed computing, and dynamic loading and upgrading.

Openness—Comware V7.1 is a generic, open system based on Linux.

Improved operations—Comware V7.1 improves some detailed operations. For example, it uses

preemptive scheduling to improve real-time performance.

Comware V7.1 optimizes the following functions:

Virtualization—Supports N:1 virtualization.

ISSU—Supports ISSU for line cards.

Auxiliary CPU and OAA—Improve scalability for devices.

In addition, Comware V7.1 supports IETF industry standard TRILL (Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links).

TRILL provides support for VLANs and is a link state routing protocol running over layer 2 that enables loop free

large Layer 2 networks with multi-path support. TRILL and the optimization functions are not security relevant and

not covered by the evaluation but can be included in the evaluated configuration as they do not affect any of the

claimed security functions.

Comware V7.1 comprises four planes: management plane, control plane, data plane, and infrastructure plane:

Figure 1 Comware V7.1 Architecture

Infrastructure plane – The infrastructure plane provides basic Linux services and Comware support

functions. Basic Linux services comprise basic Linux functions, C language library functions, data

structure operations, and standard algorithms. Comware support functions provide software and service

infrastructures for Comware processes, including all basic functions.


15

Data plane – The data plane provides data forwarding for local packets and received IPv4 and IPv6 packets

at different layers.

Control plane – The control plane comprises all routing, signaling, and control protocols, such as MPLS,

OSPF, and security control protocols. It generates forwarding tables for the data plane.

Management plane – The management plane provides a management interface for operators to configure,

monitor, and manage Comware V7.1. The management interface comprises a CLI accessed using Secure

Shell (SSH).

The Comware V7.1 software is further decomposed into subsystems designed to implement applicable functions.

For example, there are subsystems dedicated to the security management interface. There are also subsystems

dedicated to the IPv4 and IPv6 network stacks as well as the applicable network protocols and forwarding, routing,

etc.

From a security perspective, the TOE implements NIST-validated cryptographic algorithms that support the IPsec

and SSH protocols as well as digital signature services that support the secure update capabilities of the TOE.

Otherwise, the TOE implements a wide range of network switching protocols and functions.

The various TOE devices include the same security functions. The salient differences between the devices are the

available ports and port adapters primarily representing differences in numbers, types, and speeds of available

network connections.

2.2.1 Multitenant device context

Multitenant device context (MDC) is a 1:N virtualization technology. It virtualizes the data plane, control plane, and

management plane of a physical device to create multiple logical devices called MDCs. MDCs use the same kernel,

but their data is separated. Each MDC has its own interfaces and CPU resources. Rebooting an MDC does not affect

the configuration or service of any other MDC.

Note that since this technology is not covered in the NDPP, the Multitenant device context virtualization technology

was not subject to evaluation.

2.2.2 Physical Boundaries

A TOE device in MSR1000 Series, MSR2000 Series, MSR3000 Series, or MSR4000 Series is a physical network

rack-mountable appliance with a fixed number of Ethernet ports as shown in Table 2. Each series also supports

modules that serve to offer a wide range of network ports varying in number, form factor (copper or fiber), and

performance (1 – 10 Gb). The applicable modules for each series are identified in Section 2.1.

Product Series Specific Devices CPU Ports

HP MSR1000 HP MSR1002-4 AC Router Freescale P1016 10

HP MSR1003-8S AC Router Freescale P1016 10

HP MSR2000 HP MSR2003 AC Router Freescale P1021 2

HP MSR2004-24 AC Router Freescale P1021 2

HP MSR2004-48 Router Freescale P1021 2

HP MSR3000 HP MSR3012 AC Router Cavium CN6130 4

HP MSR3012 DC Router Cavium CN6130 4

HP MSR3024 AC Router Cavium CN6130 4

HP MSR3024 DC Router Cavium CN6130 4

HP MSR3024 PoE Router Cavium CN6130 4

HP MSR3044 Router Cavium CN6130 5

HP MSR3064 Router Cavium CN6635 5


16

HP MSR4000 HP MSR 4060 Router Chassis Cavium CN6218 4

HP MSR 4080 Router Chassis Cavium CN6218 4

HP MSR4000 Service Processing Units SPU-100 Cavium6740,1Ghz,MIPS -

SPU-200 Cavium6760,1Ghz,MIPS -

SPU-300 Cavium6880,1.2Ghz,MIPS -

Table 2 CPU’s and Number of Fixed Ports by Device

The TOE can be configured to rely on and use a number of other components in its operational environment.

Syslog server – to receive audit records when the TOE is configured to deliver them to an external log

server.

RADIUS and TACACS+ servers – The TOE can be configured to use external authentication servers.

Management Workstation – The TOE supports CLI access and as such an administrator would need a

SSHv2 client to use the administrative interface.

2.2.3 Logical Boundaries

This section summarizes the security functions provided by the TOE:

Security audit

Cryptographic support

User data protection

Identification and authentication

Security management

Protection of the TSF

TOE access

Trusted path/channels

2.2.3.1 Security audit

The TOE is able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events including the events specified in NDPP

. The TOE can be configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator or alternately to

send the logs to a designated external log server.

2.2.3.2 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms that provide key management, random bit generation,

encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level

cryptographic protocols, including IPsec and SSHv2. Note that in the evaluated configuration, the TOE must be

configured in FIPS mode, which ensures the TOE uses only FIPS-approved and NIST-recommended cryptographic

algorithms..

2.2.3.3 User data protection

The TOE performs network switching and routing functions, passing network traffic among its various physical and

logical network connections. While implementing applicable network protocols associated with network traffic

forwarding, the TOE employs mechanisms to ensure that it does not inadvertently reuse data found in network

traffic.

2.2.3.4 Identification and authentication

The TOE requires administrators to be successfully identified and authenticated before they can access any security

management functions available in the TOE. The TOE offers both a locally connected console and a network

accessible interface (SSHv2) for interactive administrator sessions.


17

The TOE supports on device definition of administrators with usernames and passwords. Additionally, the TOE can

be configured to utilize the services of trusted RADIUS and TACACS+ servers in the operational environment to

support, for example, centralized user administration. The TOE supports the use of text-based pre-shared keys for

IKE peer authentication.

2.2.3.5 Security management

The TOE provides Command Line (CLI) commands to access a range of security management functions. Security

management commands are limited to administrators and are available only after they have provided acceptable

identification and authentication data to the TOE.

2.2.3.6 Protection of the TSF

The TOE implements a number of features to ensure the reliability and integrity of its security features.

It protects data such as stored passwords and cryptographic keys so that they are not accessible even by an

administrator. It also provides its own timing mechanism to ensure that reliable time information is available (for

example, for log accountability).

The TOE uses cryptographic means to protect communication with remote administrators. When the TOE is

configured to use the services of a Syslog server or authentication servers in the operational environment, the

communication between the TOE and the operational environment component is protected using encryption.

The TOE includes functions to perform self-tests so that it might detect when it is failing. It also includes

mechanisms to ensure updates to the TOE will not introduce malicious or other unexpected changes in the TOE.

2.2.3.7 TOE access

The TOE can be configured to display an informative banner that will appear prior to authentication when accessing

the TOE via the console or SSH interfaces. The TOE subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity

timeout value which, when exceeded, will terminate the inactive session.

2.2.3.8 Trusted path/channels

The TOE protects interactive communication with administrators using SSHv2 for CLI access. Using SSHv2, both

integrity and disclosure protection are ensured.

The TOE protects communication with network peers, such as audit and authentication servers, using IPsec

connections to prevent unintended disclosure or modification of logs.

2.3 TOE Documentation

There are numerous documents that provide information and guidance for the deployment of the TOE. In particular,

there are four Common Criteria specific guides that reference the security-related guidance material for all products

evaluated:

“Preparative Procedures for CC NDPP Evaluated Hewlett Packard Enterprise MSR1000, MSR2000,

MSR3000 and MSR4000 router series based on Comware V7.1”, Version V1.01, dated 2/16/2016

“Command Reference for CC Supplement”, Revision 1.05, dated 1/22/2016

“Configuration Guide for CC Supplement”, Revision 1.6, dated 1/22/2016

“Comware V7 Platform System Log Messages”, Revision 1.00, dated 4/21/2014.

The links in Appendix A for each series can be used to find the full set of documentation for each of the evaluated

router series. Note that only the documents listed above were examined during the course of the evaluation, and are

the approved documents for configuring and using the TOE in its evaluated configuration.


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3. Security Problem Definition

This security target includes by reference the Security Problem Definition (composed of organizational policies,

threat statements, and assumption) from NDPP. There are no additional assumptions.

In general, the NDPP presents a Security Problem Definition appropriate for network devices, such as routers, and

as such is applicable to the Hewlett Packard Enterprise TOE.


19

4. Security Objectives

Like the Security Problem Definition, this security target includes by reference the Security Objectives from the

NDPP. The NDPP security objectives for the operational environment are reproduced below, since these objectives

characterize technical and procedural measures each consumer must implement in their operational environment.

In general, the NDPP presents Security Objectives appropriate for network infrastructure devices, such as routers,

and as such are applicable to the Hewlett Packard Enterprise TOE.

4.1 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

OE.NO_GENERAL_PURPOSE There are no general-purpose computing capabilities (e.g.,

compilers or user applications) available on the TOE, other

than those services necessary for the operation, administration

and support of the TOE.

OE.PHYSICAL Physical security, commensurate with the value of the TOE

and the data it contains, is provided by the environment.

OE.TRUSTED_ADMIN TOE Administrators are trusted to follow and apply all

administrator guidance in a trusted manner.


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5. IT Security Requirements

This section defines the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)

that serve to represent the security functional claims for the TOE and to scope the evaluation effort.

The SFRs have all been drawn from NDPP as amended by Errata #3. As a result, refinements and operations already

performed in the protection profile (PP) are not identified (for example, highlighted) here. Rather the requirements

have been copied from the PP and any residual operations have been completed herein. Of particular note, NDPP

makes a number of refinements and completed some of the SFR operations defined in the CC and the reader should

consult that PP to identify those changes if necessary.

The SARs are the set of SARs specified in NDPP.

5.1 Extended Requirements

All of the extended requirements in this ST have been drawn from the NDPP. The NDPP defines the following

extended SFRs. Since this ST does not redefine the extended SFRs, the reader should consulted NDPP for more

information in regard to those CC extensions.

FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Trail Storage

FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Zeroization

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Explicit: IPSEC

FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

FCS_SSH_EXT.1: Explicit: SSH

FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management

FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition

FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism

FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication

FPT_APW_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords

FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update

FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking


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5.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements

The following table identifies the SFRs that are satisfied by the Hewlett Packard Enterprise MSR Routers.

Requirement Class Requirement Component

FAU: Security audit

FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation

FAU_GEN.2: User identity association

FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Trail Storage

FCS: Cryptographic support

FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys)

FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Zeroization

FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption)

FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature)

FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing)

FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Explicit: IPSEC

FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

FCS_SSH_EXT.1: Explicit: SSH

FDP: User data protection FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection

FIA: Identification and

authentication

FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management

FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition

FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback

FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism

FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication

FMT: Security management

FMT_MTD.1: Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data)

FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions

FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles

FPT: Protection of the TSF

FPT_APW_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords

FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all

symmetric keys)

FPT_STM.1: Reliable Time Stamps

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing

FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update

FTA: TOE access

FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination

FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination

FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking

FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners

FTP: Trusted path/channels

FTP_ITC.1: Trusted Channel

FTP_TRP.1: Trusted Path

Table 3 TOE Security Functional Components

5.2.1 Security audit (FAU)

5.2.1.1 Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1)

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;

b) All auditable events for the not specified level of audit; and

c) All administrative actions;

d) Specifically defined auditable events listed in Table 4.

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome

(success or failure) of the event; and


22

b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the

functional components included in the PP/ST, information specified in column

three of Table 4.

Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents FAU_GEN.1 None.

FAU_GEN.2 None.

FAU_STG_EXT.1 None.

FCS_CKM.1 None.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 None.

FCS_COP.1(1) None.

FCS_COP.1(2) None.

FCS_COP.1(3) None.

FCS_COP.1(4) None. FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 Failure to establish an IPsec SA.

Reason for failure.

Establishment/Termination of an IPsec SA.

Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP address) for both successes and failures.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 None. FCS_SSH_EXT.1 Failure to establish an SSH session.

Establishment/Termination of an SSH session.

Reason for failure

Establishment/Termination of an SSH session.

Non-TOE endpoint of connection (IP address) for both successes and failures.

FDP_RIP.2 None.

FIA_PMG_EXT.1 None.

FIA_PSK_EXT.1 None.

FIA_UAU_EXT.2 All use of the authentication mechanism. Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).

FIA_UIA_EXT.1 All use of the authentication and authentication mechanism.

Provided user identity, origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).

FIA_UAU.7 None.

FMT_MTD.1 None.

FMT_SMF.1 None.

FMT_SMR.2 None.

FPT_APW_EXT.1 None.

FPT_SKP_EXT.1 None. FPT_STM.1 Changes to the time. The old and new values for the time.

Origin of the attempt (e.g., IP address).

FPT_TUD_EXT.1 Initiation of update. No additional information.

FPT_TST_EXT.1 None.

FTA_SSL_EXT.1 Any attempts at unlocking of an interactive session.

No additional information.

FTA_SSL.3 The termination of a remote session by the session locking mechanism.


FTA_SSL.4 The termination of an interactive session.


FTA_TAB.1 None.


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Requirement Auditable Events Additional Audit Record Contents FTP_ITC.1 Initiation of the trusted channel.

Termination of the trusted channel. Failure of the trusted channel functions.

Identification of the initiator and target of failed trusted channels establishment attempt.

FTP_TRP.1 Initiation of the trusted channel. Termination of the trusted channel. Failures of the trusted path functions.

Identification of the claimed user identity.

Table 4 Auditable Events

5.2.1.2 User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)

FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to

associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

5.2.1.3 External Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG_EXT.1)

FAU_STG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to [transmit the generated audit data to an external IT entity]

using a trusted channel implementing the [IPsec] protocol.

5.2.2 Cryptographic support (FCS)

5.2.2.1 Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) (FCS_CKM.1)

FCS_CKM.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys used for key

establishment in accordance with [

o NIST Special Publication 800-56A, “Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key

Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography” for elliptic

curve-based key establishment schemes and implementing “NIST curves” P-256,

P-384 and [P-521] (as defined in FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital Signature Standard”)

o NIST Special Publication 800-56B, 'Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key

Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography' for RSA-based

key establishment schemes]

and specified cryptographic key sizes equivalent to, or greater than, a symmetric key

strength of 112 bits.

5.2.2.2 Cryptographic Key Zeroization (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)

FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1 The TSF shall zeroize all plaintext secret and private cryptographic keys and CSPs when

no longer required.

5.2.2.3 Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption) (FCS_COP.1(1))

FCS_COP.1(1).1 Refinement: The TSF shall perform encryption and decryption in accordance with a

specified cryptographic algorithm AES operating in [CBC, GCM, [CTR]] and

cryptographic key sizes 128-bits and 256-bits that meets the following:

FIPS PUB 197, 'Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)'

[NIST SP 800-38A, NIST SP 800-38D].

5.2.2.4 Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature) (FCS_COP.1(2))

FCS_COP.1(2).1 Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic signature services in accordance with

a [

(2) RSA Digital Signature Algorithm (rDSA) with a key size (modulus) of 2048

bits or greater or


24

(3) Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with a key size of 256

bits or greater]

that meets the following:

[Case: RSA Digital Signature Algorithm

FIPS PUB 186-2 or FIPS PUB 186-3, 'Digital Signature Standard'.

Case: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

FIPS PUB 186-3, 'Digital Signature Standard'.

The TSF shall implement “NIST curves” P-256, P-384 and [P-521] (as

defined in FIPS PUB 186-3, “Digital Signature Standard”).]

5.2.2.5 Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing) (FCS_COP.1(3))

FCS_COP.1(3).1 Refinement: The TSF shall perform cryptographic hashing services in accordance with a

specified cryptographic algorithm [SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512] and message

digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512] bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 180-3, 'Secure

Hash Standard.'

5.2.2.6 Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication)

(FCS_COP.1(4))

FCS_COP.1(4).1 Refinement: The TSF shall perform keyed-hash message authentication in accordance

with a specified cryptographic algorithm HMAC-[SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-

512], key size [160, 256, 384, 512 bits], and message digest sizes [160, 256, 384, 512]

bits that meet the following: FIPS Pub 198-1, 'The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication

Code', and FIPS Pub 180-3, 'Secure Hash Standard.'

5.2.2.7 Explicit: IPSEC (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1)

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the IPsec architecture as specified in RFC 4301.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall implement [tunnel mode, transport mode].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall have a nominal, final entry in the SPD that matches anything that is

otherwise unmatched, and discards it.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall implement the IPsec protocol ESP as defined by RFC 4303 using [the

cryptographic algorithms

AES-CBC-128 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash

Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC,

AES-CBC-256 (as specified by RFC 3602) together with a Secure Hash

Algorithm (SHA)-based HMAC,

AES-GCM-128 as specified in RFC 4106,

AES-GCM-256 as specified in RFC 4106,

].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall implement the protocol: [IKEv1 as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409,

RFC 4109, [no other RFCs for extended sequence numbers], and [RFC 4868 for hash

functions]; IKEv2 as defined in RFCs 5996 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal

as specified in section 2.23), 4307, and [RFC 4868 for hash functions]].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure the encrypted payload in the [IKEv1, IKEv2] protocol uses the

cryptographic algorithms AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 as specified in RFC 6379 and

[no other algorithm].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that IKEv1 Phase 1 exchanges use only main mode.

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.8 The TSF shall ensure that [IKEv2 SA lifetimes can be established based on [number of

packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the time values can be limited to: 24


25

hours for Phase 15 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2

6 SAs]; IKEv1 SA lifetimes can be

established based on [number of packets/number of bytes; length of time, where the

time values can be limited to: 24 hours for Phase 1 SAs and 8 hours for Phase 2 SAs]].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.9 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols implement DH Groups 14 (2048-bit MODP),

and [24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit Random ECP) (IKEv2 only),

and 20 (384-bit Random ECP (IKEv2 only))].

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.10 The TSF shall ensure that all IKE protocols perform Peer Authentication using the [RSA,

ECDSA (IKEv2 only)] algorithm and Pre-shared Keys.

5.2.2.8 Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation)

(FCS_RBG_EXT.1)

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall perform all random bit generation (RBG) services in accordance with

[NIST Special Publication 800-90 using [CTR_DRBG (AES)]] seeded by an entropy

source that accumulated entropy from [a software-based noise source].

FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2 The deterministic RBG shall be seeded with a minimum of [256 bits] of entropy at least

equal to the greatest security strength of the keys and hashes that it will generate.

5.2.2.9 Explicit: SSH (FCS_SSH_EXT.1)

FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall implement the SSH protocol that complies with RFCs 4251, 4252, 4253,

4254, and [5656].

FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH protocol implementation supports the following

authentication methods as described in RFC 4252: public key-based, [password-based]7.

FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall ensure that, as described in RFC 4253, packets greater than [256K] bytes

in an SSH transport connection are dropped.

FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses the following

encryption algorithms: AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256, [AEAD_AES_128_GCM,

AEAD_AES_256_GCM].

FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5 The TSF shall ensure that the SSH transport implementation uses [SSH_RSA, ecdsa-

sha2-nistp256] and [ecdsa-sha2-nistp384] as its public key algorithm(s).

FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6 The TSF shall ensure that data integrity algorithms used in SSH transport connection is

[hmac-sha1, hmac-sha1-96, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512].

FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7 The TSF shall ensure that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 and [ecdh-sha2-nistp256, ecdh-

sha2-nistp384] are the only allowed key exchange methods used for the SSH protocol.

5.2.3 User data protection (FDP)

5.2.3.1 Full Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2)

FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made

unavailable upon the [allocation of the resource to] all objects.

5 That is, IKE_SA_INIT and IKE_AUTH exchanges in IKEv2.

6 That is, CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange in IKEv2.

7 Marked as a selection per NIAP Technical Decision TD0032 (https://www.niap-

ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_td.cfm?td_id=34)

https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_td.cfm?td_id=34

https://www.niap-ccevs.org/Documents_and_Guidance/view_td.cfm?td_id=34


26

5.2.4 Identification and authentication (FIA)

5.2.4.1 Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)

FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide the following password management capabilities for

administrative passwords:

1. Passwords shall be able to be composed of any combination of upper and lower

case letters, numbers, and the following special characters: [“!”, “@”, “#”, “$”,

“%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(”, “)”, [“'”, “+”, “,”, “-”, “.”, “/”, “:”, “;”, “<”, “=”,

“>”, “[”, “\”, “]”, “_”, “`”, “{”, “}”, and “~”]];

2. Minimum password length shall settable by the Security Administrator, and

support passwords of 15 characters or greater;

5.2.4.2 Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition (FIA_PSK_EXT.1)

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall be able to use pre-shared keys for IPsec.

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to accept text-based pre-shared keys that:

are 22 characters and [[lengths from 15 to 128 characters]];

composed of any combination of upper and lower case letters, numbers, and

special characters (that include: “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“, and

“)”).

FIA_PSK_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall condition the text-based pre-shared keys by using [[the bit representation

of the ASCII coding of the entered characters as the key]] and be able to [use no other

pre-shared keys].

5.2.4.3 Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7)

FIA_UAU.7.1 The TSF shall provide only obscured feedback to the administrative user while the

authentication is in progress at the local console.

5.2.4.4 Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism (FIA_UAU_EXT.2)

FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1 The TSF shall provide a local password-based authentication mechanism, [[and access to

external RADIUS and TACACS+]] to perform administrative user authentication.

5.2.4.5 User Identification and Authentication (FIA_UIA_EXT.1)

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall allow the following actions prior to requiring the non-TOE entity to

initiate the identification and authentication process:

Display the warning banner in accordance with FTA_TAB.1;

[[network routing services]].

FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall require each administrative user to be successfully identified and

authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that

administrative user.

5.2.5 Security management (FMT)

5.2.5.1 Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data) (FMT_MTD.1)

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to manage the TSF data to the Security Administrators.

5.2.5.2 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:


27

Ability to administer the TOE locally and remotely;

Ability to update the TOE, and to verify the updates using the [digital signature]

capability prior to installing those updates; [

Ability to configure the cryptographic functionality].

5.2.5.3 Restrictions on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2)

FMT_SMR.2.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles:

Authorized Administrator.

FMT_SMR.2.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

FMT_SMR.2.3 The TSF shall ensure that the conditions

Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE locally;

Authorized Administrator role shall be able to administer the TOE remotely;

are satisfied.

5.2.6 Protection of the TSF (FPT)

5.2.6.1 Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords (FPT_APW_EXT.1)

FPT_APW_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall store passwords in non-plaintext form.

FPT_APW_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall prevent the reading of plaintext passwords.

5.2.6.2 Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys)

(FPT_SKP_EXT.1)

FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall prevent reading of all pre-shared keys, symmetric key, and private keys.

5.2.6.3 Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1)

FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.

5.2.6.4 TSF Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1)

FPT_TST_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up (on power on) to demonstrate

the correct operation of the TSF.

5.2.6.5 Extended: Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to query the current version of

the TOE firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2 The TSF shall provide security administrators the ability to initiate updates to TOE

firmware/software.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3 The TSF shall provide a means to verify firmware/software updates to the TOE using a

[digital signature mechanism] prior to installing those updates.

5.2.7 TOE access (FTA)

5.2.7.1 TSF-initiated Termination (FTA_SSL.3)

FTA_SSL.3.1 Refinement: The TSF shall terminate a remote interactive session after a Security

Administrator-configurable time interval of session inactivity.


28

5.2.7.2 User-initiated Termination (FTA_SSL.4)

FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow Administrator-initiated termination of the Administrator’s own

interactive session.

5.2.7.3 TSF-initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)

FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1 The TSF shall, for local interactive sessions, [terminate the session] after a Security

Administrator-specified time period of inactivity.

5.2.7.4 Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1)

FTA_TAB.1.1 Refinement: Before establishing an administrative user session the TSF shall display a

Security Administrator-specified advisory notice and consent warning message regarding

use of the TOE.

5.2.8 Trusted path/channels (FTP)

5.2.8.1 Trusted Channel (FTP_ITC.1)

FTP_ITC.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall use [IPsec] to provide a trusted communication channel

between itself and authorized IT entities supporting the following capabilities: audit

server, [authentication server] that is logically distinct from other communication

channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the

channel data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data.

FTP_ITC.1.2 The TSF shall permit the TSF, or the authorized IT entities to initiate communication via

the trusted channel.

FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [transmitting audit

records to an audit server and external authentication functions].

5.2.8.2 Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1)

FTP_TRP.1.1 Refinement: The TSF shall use [SSH] to provide a trusted communication path between

itself and remote administrators that is logically distinct from other communication paths

and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the communicated

data from disclosure and detection of modification of the communicated data.

FTP_TRP.1.2 Refinement: The TSF shall permit remote administrators to initiate communication via

the trusted path.

FTP_TRP.1.3 The TSF shall require the use of the trusted path for initial administrator authentication

and all remote administrative actions.


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5.3 TOE Security Assurance Requirements

The security assurance requirements for the TOE are included by reference to the NDPP.

Requirement Class Requirement Component

ADV: Development ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification

AGD: Guidance documents

AGD_OPE.1: Operational user guidance

AGD_PRE.1: Preparative procedures

ALC: Life-cycle support

ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE

ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage

ATE: Tests ATE_IND.1 Independent testing - conformance

AVA: Vulnerability assessment AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey

Table 5 Assurance Components

Consequently, the assurance activities specified in NDPP apply to the TOE evaluation.

6. TOE Summary Specification

This chapter describes the security functions:

Security audit

Cryptographic support

User data protection

Identification and authentication

Security management

Protection of the TSF

TOE access

Trusted path/channels

6.1 Security audit

The TOE is designed to be able to generate log records for a wide range of security relevant and other events as they

occur. The events that can cause an audit record to be logged include starting and stopping the audit function, any

use of an administrator command via the CLI, as well as all of the events identified in Table 4 (which corresponds to

the audit events specified in NDPP). Note that the only protocol (that is, SSH, IPsec) failures auditable by the TOE

are authentication failures for user-level connections (including both human user and peer connections).

The logged audit records identify the date and time; the nature or type of the triggering event; an indication of

whether the event succeeded, failed or had some other outcome; and the identity of the agent responsible for the

event (that is, user name for administrator and IP address for network host). The logged audit records also include

event-specific content that includes at least all of the content required in Table 4.

The TOE includes an internal log implementation that can be used to store and review audit records locally. The

maximum storage space reserved for the local log file can be configured to a range between 1 and 10MB. When the

local log storage is full, the TOE will overwrite the oldest records with new records. Only the network-admin user

can access to local audit trail. Alternately, the TOE can be configured to send generated audit records to an external

Syslog server using IPsec.

Note that audit records are not buffered for transmission to the syslog server. If the connection to the syslog server

goes down, generated audit records are not queued and will not be transmitted to the syslog server when the

connection is re-established. However, audit records will still be delivered to any other configured audit

destinations, such as the log buffer and local log file. Therefore, the administrator is advised to ensure additional

audit destinations are configured so that generated audit records will still be available for review in the event of loss

of connectivity to the syslog server. In addition, multiple log servers can be configured to provide redundancy.

The Security audit function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:


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FAU_GEN.1: The TOE can generate audit records for events include starting and stopping the audit

function, administrator commands, and all other events identified in Table 4. Furthermore, each audit

record identifies the date/time, event type, outcome of the event, responsible subject/user, as well as the

additional event-specific content indicated in Table 4.

FAU_GEN.2: The TOE identifies the responsible user for each event based on the specific administrator or

network entity (identified by IP address) that caused the event.

FAU_STG_EXT.1: The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external Syslog server and

can be configured to use IPsec for communication with the Syslog server.

6.2 Cryptographic support

The TOE includes NIST-validated cryptographic algorithms providing supporting cryptographic functions. The

following functions have been certified in accordance with the identified standards.

Functions Standards Certificates

Asymmetric key generation

ECC key pair generation(NIST

curves P-256, P-384 and P-521)

NIST Special Publication 800-56A #834

RSA key generation (key size 2048

bits)

NIST Special Publication 800-56B #1969

Encryption/Decryption

AES CBC, CTR, and GCM (128,

256 bits)

FIPS PUB 197

NIST SP 800-38A

NIST SP 800-38D

Firmware: #3855

Kernel: #3854

HW Accelerators: #3850

Cryptographic signature services

RSA Digital Signature Algorithm

(rDSA) (modulus 2048)

ECDSA (NIST curves P-256, P-384

and P-521)

FIPS PUB 186-2

FIPS PUB 186-3

Firmware:

#1969 (RSA),

#834(ECDSA)

Cryptographic hashing

SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and

SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 256, 384

and 512 bits)

FIPS Pub 180-3 Firmware: #3177

Kernel: #3176

HW Accelerators: ##3172

Keyed-hash message authentication

HMAC-SHA-1 (block size 512 bits,

key size 160 bits and digest size 160

bits)

HMAC-SHA-256 (block size 512

bits, key Size 256 bits and digest

size 256 bits)



size 384 bits)



size 512 bits)

FIPS Pub 198-1

FIPS Pub 180-3

Firmware: #2503

Kernel: #2502

HW Accelerators: #2498

Random bit generation

CTR_DRBG (AES) with one

independent software-based noise

source of 256 of non-determinism

NIST Special Publication 800-90 Firmware: #1094

Table 6 Cryptographic Functions


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The TOE implements a random number generator for RSA key establishment schemes, finite field-based key

establishment schemes, and for elliptic curve-based key establishment (conformant to NIST SP 800-56B and to

NIST SP 800-56A). The following table demonstrates that the TSF complies with SP 800-56B. The table identifies

the sections in 800-56B that are implemented by the TSF. While the TOE generally fulfills all of the NIST SP 800-

56B requirements without extensions, the following table specifically identifies the “should”, “should not”, and

“shall not” conditions from the publication along with an indication of whether the TOE conforms to those

conditions with deviations rationalized. Key establishment is among the identified sections.

NIST SP800-56B

Section Reference

“should”, “should not”, or

“shall not”

Implemented

accordingly? Rationale for deviation

5.6 should yes

5.8 shall not no RSA-OAEP is not supported. The

device supports RSA-PKCS1

Padding

5.9 shall not (first occurrence) yes

5.9 shall not (second occurrence) yes

6.1 should not yes

6.1 should (first occurrence) yes

6.1 should (second occurrence) yes

6.1 should (third occurrence) yes

6.1 should (fourth occurrence) yes

6.1 shall not (first occurrence) yes

6.1 shall not (second occurrence) yes

6.2.3 should yes

6.5.1 should yes

6.5.2 should yes

6.5.2.1 should yes

6.6 shall not yes

7.1.2 should yes

7.2.1.3 should yes

7.2.1.3 should not yes

7.2.2.3 should (first occurrence) no RSA-OAEP is not supported. The


Padding

7.2.2.3 should (second occurrence) no RSA-OAEP is not supported. The


Padding

7.2.2.3 should (third occurrence) no RSA-OAEP is not supported. The


Padding

7.2.2.3 should (fourth occurrence) no RSA-OAEP is not supported. The


Padding

7.2.2.3 should not no RSA-OAEP is not supported. The


Padding

7.2.2.3 shall not no RSA-OAEP is not supported. The


Padding

7.2.3.3 should (first occurrence) no RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported


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NIST SP800-56B

Section Reference

“should”, “should not”, or

“shall not”

Implemented

accordingly? Rationale for deviation

7.2.3.3 should (second occurrence) no RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported

7.2.3.3 should (third occurrence) no RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported

7.2.3.3 should (fourth occurrence) no RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported

7.2.3.3 should (fifth occurrence) no RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported

7.2.3.3 should not no RSA-KEM-KWS is not supported

8 should yes

8.3.2 should not yes

Table 7 NIST SP800-56B Conformance

The TOE uses a software-based deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) that complies with NIST SP 800-90,

using CTR_DRBG (AES). The entropy source is a 256-bit value derived from the Comware entropy pool. The

design architecture of the Comware entropy source is the same as the architecture of the Linux kernel entropy pool.

The noise sources for the Comware entropy pool include interrupt, process scheduling, and memory allocation

The TOE is designed to zeroize secret and private cryptographic keys and critical security parameters (CSPs) when

they are no longer required by the TOE. Table 8 identifies the applicable secret and private keys and CSPs and

summarizes, how and when they are deleted. Note that only some of the keys and CSPs are applicable to the

evaluation. Also note that where identified zeroization occurs as follows: 1) when deleted from FLASH, the

previous value is overwritten once with zeroes; 2) when added or changed in FLASH, any old value is overwritten

completely with the new value; and, 3) the zeroization of values in RAM is achieved by overwriting once with

zeroes.

# Key/

CSP Name Generation/ Algorithm

Key Size Description Storage Zeroization

Public key management

CSP1-1 RSA private key CTR_DRBG (AES)/RSA

2048 bits

Identity certificates for the security appliance itself and also used in IPsec and SSH negotiations.

FLASH (cipher text / AES-CTR 256)

Using CLI command “public-key local destroy rsa …” to zeroize.

CSP1-2 ECDSA private key

CTR_DRBG(AES)/ECDSA

NIST P256, P384, P521

Identity certificates for the security appliance itself and also used in IPsec, SSH and SSL.

FLASH (cipher text /AES-CTR 256)

Using CLI command “public-key local destroy ecdsa …” to zeroize.

CSP1-3 RSA Public keys RSA

RSA:1024 ~ 2048 bits Note: 192 –bit keys are not used in the evaluated configuration

Public keys of peers to validate the digital signature

FLASH(plain text)

Peer public keys exist in a FLASH start-up configuration file. Using CLI commands “undo public-key peer “ and “save” to zeroize the public keys.

CSP1-4 ECDSA Public keys

ECDSA NIST P256, P384, P521

Public keys of peers to validate the digital signature

FLASH (plain text)

Peer public keys exist in a FLASH start-up configuration file. Using CLI commands “undo public-key peer “ and “save” to


33

# Key/



zeroize the public keys.

IPsec

CSP2-1 IPsec authentication keys

Generated using IKE protocol (CTR_DRBG (AES)+HMAC-SHA1/HMAC-SHA256/SHA384/SHA512+DH). Algorithms: HMAC-SHA1-96 HMAC-SHA-256-128 HMAC-SHA-384-192 HMAC-SHA-512-256

AES-GMAC

160 bits 256 bits 384 bits 512 bits AES-GMAC: 128, 256 bits Note: GMAC is not used in any of the evaluated mechanisms

Used for authenticating the IPsec traffic

RAM (plain text)

Zeroized upon deleting the IPsec session.

CSP2-2 IPsec encryption keys

Generated using IKE protocol (CTR_DRBG (AES)+HMAC-SHA1/HMAC-SHA256/SHA384/SHA512+DH). Algorithms: AES-CBC, AES-GCM

128 bits 192 bits 256 bits Note: 192 –bit keys are not used in the evaluated configuration

Used for encrypting the IPsec traffic

RAM (plain text)

Zeroized upon deleting the IPsec session.

CSP2-3 IPsec authentication keys

HMAC-SHA1-96 HMAC-SHA-256-128 HMAC-SHA-384-192 HMAC-SHA-512-256

160 bits 256 bits 384 bits 512 bits

Manually configured key used for authenticating the IPsec traffic.

FLASH (cipher text / AES-CTR 256) and RAM (plain text)

Keys will be zeroized using CLI commands “undo sa hex-key authentication …” and “ save”,

CSP2-4 IPsec encryption keys

AES

128 bits 192 bits 256 bits Note: 192 –bit keys are not used in the evaluated configuration

Manually configured key used for encrypting the IPsec traffic.

FLASH (cipher text / AES-CTR 256) and RAM (plain text)

Keys will be zeroized using CLI commands “undo sa hex-key encryption …” and “ save”,

IKEv1

CSP3-1 IKE pre-shared keys

Shared Secret 15 ~ 128 bytes

Entered by the Crypto-Officer in plain text form and used for authentication during IKE

FLASH (cipher text/ AES-CTR 256) and RAM (plain)

Keys will be zeroized using CLI commands “undo pre-shared-key …” and “ save”,

CSP3-2 IKE RSA Authentication private Key

RSA

RSA: 2048 bits

private key used for IKE protocol during the handshake

RAM(plain text)

Automatically zeroized upon handshake finishing


34

# Key/



CSP3-3 IKE Diffie-Hellman Key Pairs

CTR_DRBG (AES) / DH

2048 bits Key agreement for IKE RAM (plain text)


CSP3-4 IKE Integrity key

Generated using IKE (CTR_DRBG (AES)+HMAC-SHA1/HMAC-SHA256/SHA384/SHA512+DH). Algorithms: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256 HMAC-SHA384, HMAC-SHA512

160 bits 256 bits

Used for integrity test of IKE negotiations

RAM (plain text)

Zeroized upon deleting the IKE session.

CSP3-5 IKE Encryption Key

Generated using IKE (CTR_DRBG (AES)+HMAC-SHA1/HMAC-SHA256/SHA384/SHA512+DH). Algorithms: AES

128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits Note: 192 –bit keys are not used in the evaluated configuration

Used for encrypting IKE negotiations

RAM (plain text)


IKEv2

CSP4-1 IKE pre-shared keys


Entered by the Crypto-Officer in plain text form and used for authentication during IKE

FLASH(cipher text/ AES-CTR 256) and RAM (plain)

Keys will be zeroized using CLI commands “undo pre-shared-key …” and “ save”,

CSP4-2 IKE RSA Authentication private Key

RSA ECDSA

RSA:2048 bits ECDSA:P-256, P-384, P-521

private key used for IKE protocol during the handshake

RAM(plain text)


CSP4-3 IKE Diffie-Hellman Key Pairs

CTR_DRBG (AES) / DH,ECDH

DH:2048 bits ECDH:P-256, P-384

Key agreement for IKE RAM (plain text)


CSP4-4 IKE Integrity key

Generated using IKE (CTR_DRBG (AES)+DH/ECDH + HMAC-SHA1/HMAC-SHA256/HMAC-SHA384). Algorithms: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA256-128 HMAC-SHA384-192

160 bits 256 bits 384 bits

Used for integrity test of IKE negotiations

RAM (plain text)



35

# Key/



CSP4-5 IKE Encryption Key

Generated using IKE (CTR_DRBG (AES)+DH/ECDH + HMAC-SHA1/HMAC-SHA256/HMAC-SHA384). Algorithms: AES

128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits Note: 192 –bit keys are not used in the evaluated configuration

Used for encrypting IKE negotiations

RAM (plain text)


SSH

CSP5-1 SSH Private key

RSA ECDSA

RSA:2048 bits ECDSA: P-256, P-384

private key used for SSH protocol during handshake

RAM(plain text)

Automatically zeroized upon finishing handshake.

CSP5-2 SSH Diffie-Hellman Key Pairs

CTR_DRBG (AES) / DH/ECDH

DH: 2048 bits ECDH: P-256, P-384

Key agreement for SSH sessions.

RAM (plain text)

Automatically zeroized upon finishing handshake.

CSP5-3 SSH Session encryption key

Generated using the SSH protocol(CTR_DRBG(AES)+SHA1+DH) Algorithms: AES-CBC, AES-GCM

128 bits, 256 bits

Key used for encrypting

SSH session. RAM (plain text)

Automatically zeroized when SSH session terminated.

CSP5-4 SSH Session authentication key

Generated using the SSH protocol(CTR_DRBG(AES)+SHA1+DH) Algorithms: HMAC-SHA1, HMAC-SHA1-96, hmac-sha256, hmac-sha512 AES-GCM

SHA1: 160 bits AES-GCM: 128 bits, 256 bits

Key used for

authenticating SSH

session.

RAM (plain text)

Automatically zeroized when SSH session terminated.

AAA

CSP6-1 User Passwords Secret 15 ~ 63 bytes

Critical security parameters used to authenticate the administrator login.

FLASH (hashed text/SHA-512) and RAM (plain)

Use CLI command “password” to set new password, or use CLI command “undo local-user …” to zeroize the password and delete user account.

CSP6-2 Super password Secret 15 ~ 63 bytes

Critical security parameters used to authenticate privilege promoting.

FLASH (hashed text/SHA-512) and RAM (plain)

Use CLI command “undo super password” to zeroize the super password.


36

# Key/



CSP6-3 RADIUS shared secret keys


Used for authenticating the RADIUS server to the security appliance and vice versa. Entered by the Security administrator in plain text form and stored in cipher text form.


Keys will be zeroized using following commands: “undo primary authentication”, ““undo primary accounting”, “undo secondary authentication”, ““undo secondary accounting”.

CSP6-4 TACACS+ shared secret keys

Shared Secret 15~255 bytes

Used for authenticating the TACACS+ server to the security appliance and vice versa. Entered by the Security administrator in plain text form and stored in cipher text form.


Keys will be zeroized using following commands: “undo primary authentication”, ““undo primary accounting”, ““undo primary authorization”, “undo secondary authentication”, ““undo secondary accounting”, ““undo secondary authorization”.

Random Bits Generation

CSP7-1 DRBG seed

Entropy /

SP 800‐90

CTR_DRBG

256 bits

Input to the DRBG that determines the internal state of the DRBG

RAM (plaintext)

Automatically zeroized when DRBG initialized

CSP7-2 DRBG V SP 800‐90

CTR_DRBG 128 bits

Generated by entropy source via the CTR_DRBG derivation function

RAM (plaintext)

Resetting or rebooting the security appliance

CSP7-3 DRBG Key SP 800‐90

CTR_DRBG 256 bits

Generated by entropy source via the CTR_DRBG derivation function

RAM (plaintext)

Resetting or rebooting the security appliance

Table 8 Key/CSP Zeroization Summary

These supporting cryptographic functions are included to support the IPsec, IKE, and SSHv2 (RFCs 4251, 4252,

4253, 4254, and 5656) secure communication protocols. The TOE implements SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and

SHA-512 (digest sizes 160, 256, 384 and 512 bits) in accordance with FIPS Pub 180-3 for cryptographic hashing.


37

The TOE supports SSHv2 with AES (CBC, GCM) 128 or 256 bit ciphers, in conjunction with HMAC-SHA-1,

HMAC-SHA-1-96, hmac-sha2-256, or hmac-sha2-512. The TOE supports public key algorithms RSA, ecdsa-sha2-

nistp256, and ecdsa-sha2-nistp384. It supports diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, ecdh-sha2-nistp256 and with ecdh-

sha2-nistp384 key exchange methods. While DES and 3DES (CBC), HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-MD5-96, as well as

diffie-hellman-group-1 and diffie-hellman-exchange are all implemented, they are disabled while the TOE is

operating in CC/FIPS mode.

SSHv2 connections are rekeyed prior to reaching 228

packets. The authentication timeout period is 90 seconds

allowing clients to retry only 3 times. Both public-key and password based authentication can be configured.

Packets are limited to 256K bytes. Note that the TOE manages a packet counter for each SSH session so that it can

initiate a new key exchange when the 228

packet limit is reached. Whenever the timeout period or authentication

retry limit is reached, the TOE closes the applicable TCP connection and releases the SSH session resources. As

SSH packets are being received, the TOE uses a buffer to build all packet information. Once complete, the packet is

checked to ensure it can be appropriately decrypted. However, if it is not complete when the buffer becomes full

(256K bytes) the packet will be dropped.

The TOE includes an implementation of IPsec in accordance with RFC 4301. The TOE’s implementation of IPsec

supports both tunnel and transport modes. Furthermore, ESP mode “confidentiality only” is disabled by default. The

TOE implements the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) IPsec protocol, as defined by RFC 4303, supporting

AES-CBC-128, AES-CBC-256 (both specified by RFC 3602) with HMAC-SHA1 and HMAC-SHA-256; and AES-

GCM-128, and AES-GCM-256 (both specified by 4106). The TOE implements both versions 1 and 2 of Internet

Key Exchange (IKEv1, IKEv2).

IKEv1 is implemented as defined in RFCs 2407, 2408, 2409, and 4109, and 4868 and supports use of AES-CBC-

128 and AES-CBC-256 to encrypt IKEv1 payloads. Note that the TOE supports both main and aggressive modes,

though aggressive mode is disabled in CC/FIPS mode. Furthermore, “confidentiality only” ESP mode is disabled by

default. HMAC SHA-1 (key size 160), HMAC SHA-256 (key size 256 bits), HMAC SHA-384 (key size 384 bits)

and HMAC-512 (key size 512 bits) are used in support of the IPsec protocol ESP (FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1.4). IKE

authentication keys are generated using the HMAC algorithms. The keys are used for authenticating IKE

negotiations and IPsec traffic authentications and subsequent traffic encryption. HMAC SHA for IPsec key

authentication and encryption can be generated by using IKE commands.

The TOE’s implementation of IKEv2 conforms with RFCs 5996 (with mandatory support for NAT traversal as

specified in section 2.23), 4307, and 4868 for hash functions. IKEv2 supports the same algorithms as for IKEv1

described above. Table 8 sections IPsec and IKEv2 identify HMAC support for key generation, authentication, and

integrity. The TOE supports the 128-bit and 256-bit AES for both IKE_SA and CHILD_SAs.

The TOE provides mechanisms to implement an IPsec Security Policy Database (SPD) and to process packets to

satisfy the behavior of DISCARD, BYPASS and PROTECT packet processing as described in RFC 4301. This is

achieved through the administrator configuring appropriately specified access control lists (ACLs). The

administrator first establishes an IPsec Policy containing a Security ACL to match traffic to be encrypted

(PROTECTed) and applies it to the outbound interface. The Security ACL contains one or more rules, which are

ordered based on a numeric index from lowest to highest. The TOE compares packets in turn against each rule in the

Security ACL to determine if the packet matches the rule. Packets can be matched based on protocol (for example,

TCP, UDP), source IP address and destination IP address. As soon as a match is found, the packet is handled based

on the action specified in the rule—either permit, which equates to PROTECT, or deny, which equates to BYPASS.

Traffic matching a deny rule or not matching any rule in the Security ACL is passed on to the next stage of

processing. Note that multiple IPsec Policies can be assigned to an interface as a policy group. In this case, each

policy in the group has its own priority number that is unique within the policy group. Each policy is considered in

turn, starting at the lowest number policy (which has highest priority) and proceeding in turn with increasing policy

numbers until a match is found or until all policies have been examined. To cater for packets that match a deny rule

or do not match any of the IPsec Policies, the administrator needs to configure further ACLs and bind them to the

outbound interface using the packet-filter command. These ACLs specify permit/deny rules to implement

BYPASS/DISCARD behavior. As with the Security ACL, the TOE compares packets against rules in the packet

filtering ACL based on protocol, source IP address and destination IP address. The rules in the packet filtering ACL

can be ordered in the same fashion as in a Security ACL. In the packet filtering ACL, a permit rule equates to

BYPASS, and a deny rule equates to DISCARD. By default, the packet filter permits packets that do not match any

ACL rule to permit. In the evaluated configuration, an administrator changes this action to deny.


38

IKEv1 and IKEv2 SA lifetime and volume limits can be configured by an authorized administrator. IKEv1 SA

lifetimes can be limited to 24 hours (any value between 60 and 604,800 seconds) for phase 1 and 8 hours any value

from 180 to 604,800 seconds) for phase 2 and also to as little as 2.5 MB (any value between 2,560 and

4,294,967,295 KB) of traffic for phase 2. IKEv2_SA lifetime can be limited to 24 hours (any value between 120 and

86,400 seconds). CHILD_SA lifetimes can be limited to 8 hours (any value from 180 to 604,800 seconds). Volume

can be limited to as little as 2.5 MB (any value between 2,560 and 4,294,967,295 KB).

The IKEv1 protocols implemented by the TOE include DH Groups 2 (1024-bit MODP), 5 (1536-bit MODP), 14

(2048-bit MODP), and 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS) and use RSA (aka rDSA) peer authentication.

However, when the TOE is operating in FIPS mode, only DH Groups 14 and 24 are supported. In the IKEv1 phase

1 and phase 2 exchanges, the TOE and peer will agree on the best DH group both can support. When the TOE

initiates IKE negotiation, the DH group is sent in order according to the peer’s configuration. When the TOE

receives an IKE proposal, it will select the first match and the negotiation will fail if there is no match. During

IKEv1 phase 1 authentication is based on a verifiable signature as described in RFC2409. The IKEv2 protocol

implemented by the TOE includes DH 14 (2048-bit MODP), 24 (2048-bit MODP with 256-bit POS), 19 (256-bit

Random ECP), and 20 (384-bit Random ECP) using RSA and ECDSA peer authentication. In the IKE_SA_INIT

and CREATE_CHILD_SA exchanges, the TOE and peer will agree on the best DH group both can support. When

the TOE initiates IKE negotiation, the DH group is sent in order according to the peer’s configuration. When the

TOE receives an IKE proposal, it will select the first match and the negotiation will fail if there is no match.

The TOE can be configured to use pre-shared keys with a given peer. When a pre-shared key is configured, IKE

peer authentication will be performed using the configured pre-shared key, provided that the peer also has the pre-

shared key. Text-based pre-shared keys used for IKE can be constructed of essentially any alphabetic character

(upper and lower case), numerals, and special characters (for example, “!”, “@”, “#”, “$”, “%”, “^”, “&”, “*”, “(“,

and “)”) and can be anywhere from 15 to 128 characters in length (including, for example, 22 characters). In this

case, the TOE uses the bit representation of the underlying ASCII characters of the text-based pre-shared key as the

key for IKE peer authentication. The TOE requires suitable keys to be entered by an authorized administrator.

The Cryptographic support function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FCS_CKM.1: See table above.

FCS_CKM_EXT.4: See table above.

FCS_COP.1(1): See table above.




FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: The TOE supports IPsec cryptographic network communication protection.

FCS_RBG_EXT.1: See table above.

FCS_SSH_EXT.1: The TOE supports SSHv2 interactive command-line secure administrator sessions as

indicated above.

FIA_PSK_EXT.1: The TOE supports pre-shared keys for IPsec peer authentication.

6.3 User data protection

The TOE is designed to ensure its own internal integrity as well as to protect user data from potential, unintended

reuse by clearing resources (for example, memory) as they are allocated to create objects used in the implementation

of the TOE operations. Note that volatile memory is the primary resource involved in normal TOE execution while

its persistent storage is based on non-volatile flash memory.

When a network packet is sent, the buffer used by the packet is recalled and managed by the buffer pool. After that,

if a new packet acquires a buffer from the buffer pool, the new packet data will be used to overwrite any previous

data in the buffer. If an allocated buffer exceeds the size of the packet, the additional space will be overwritten

(padded) with zeros.


39

The User data protection function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FDP_RIP.2: The TOE always overwrites resources when allocated for use in objects.

6.4 Identification and authentication

The TOE is designed to require users to be identified and authenticated before they can access any of the TOE

functions. Note that the normal routing of network traffic is not considered accessing TOE functions in this regard.

In the evaluated configuration, users can connect to the TOE CLI via a local console or remotely using SSHv2. For

each session, the user is required to log in prior to successfully establishing a session through which TOE functions

can be exercised. CLI and SSHv2 both support password authentication as described below. SSHv2 also supports

public key authentication methods as identified in section 6.2 above. Note that the only capabilities allowed prior to

users authenticating are the display of the warning banner before authentication, and network routing services.

In order to log in using password authentication, the user must provide an identity along with authentication data

corresponding to the provided identity. Users can be defined locally within the TOE with a user identity, password,

and user role. Alternately, users can be defined within an external RADIUS or TACACS+ server configured to be

used by the TOE, each of which also defines the user’s role in the TOE. Locally defined users are authenticated

directly by the TOE, while remotely defined users are authenticated by the external server and the result is enforced

by the TOE. In either case, any resulting session is dependent upon successful authentication and established

sessions are associated with the privilege level/role (see section 6.5) assigned to the user.

When logging in the TOE will not echo passwords so that passwords are not inadvertently displayed to the user and

any other users that might be able to view the login display.

Note also that should a console user have their session terminated (for example, due to inactivity), they are required

to successfully authenticate, by reentering their identity and authentication data, in order to establish a new session.

Passwords can be composed of upper and lower case letters, numbers and special characters, including blank space

and ~`!@#$%^&*()_+-={}|[]\:”;’<>,./. Also, new passwords have to satisfy a configurable minimum password

length. The administrator can specify a minimum password length of 15 to 32 characters.

For IPsec, the TOE supports peer authentication with RSA, ECDSA, and pre-shared keys. The TOE can use either

bit-based or text-based pre-shared keys.

The Identification and authentication function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FIA_PMG_EXT.1: The TOE implements a set of password composition constraints as described above.

FIA_UAU.7: The TOE does not echo passwords as they are entered.

FIA_UAU_EXT.2: The TOE can be configured to utilize external RADIUS and TACACS+ authentication

servers.

FIA_UIA_EXT.1: The TOE only displays the warning banner and allows for network routing services prior

to a user being identified and authenticated.

6.5 Security management

The TOE controls user access to commands and resources based on user role. Users are given permission to access a

set of commands and resources based on their user role.

The TOE includes pre-defined user roles, of which only the user roles network-admin and level-15 admin roles, are

considered instances of the ‘Security Administrator’ as defined in the NDPP. These Security Administrator roles are

capable of managing the security functions of the TOE since they allow for security relevant configuration

management capabilities. These capabilities include changing the user permission settings including user-role,

authentication-mode, protocol, and setting the authentication password in user interface view.

The other roles represent logical subsets of those security management roles, but do not offer any security relevant

configuration management capabilities. The other roles are limited to the ability to change a user’s own password,

non-security relevant functions and review of information.


40

The TOE offers a CLI providing a range of security management functions for use by an authorized administrator.

Among these functions are those necessary to manage all aspects of the cryptographic functions of the TOE, those

necessary to enable or disable the network services offered by the TOE, and the functions necessary to review the

TOE versions, update the TOE components, and also to verify the validity of those updates.

The Security management function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FMT_MTD.1: The TOE restricts the access to manage TSF data that can affect the security functions of the

TOE to Security Administrators.

FMT_SMF.1: The TOE includes the functions necessary to enable/disable available network services, to

manage the cryptomodule and associated functions, and to manage and verify updates of the TOE software

and firmware.

FMT_SMR.2: The TOE includes pre-define roles network-admin and level-15 admin that correspond to the

required ‘Security Administrator’.

6.6 Protection of the TSF

The TOE is an appliance and as such is designed to work independent of other components to a large extent. Secure

communication with third-party peers is addressed in section 6.8.

While the administrative interface is function rich, the TOE is designed specifically to provide access only to

locally-stored, hashed (and not plain text) passwords. In the evaluated configuration (that is, with FIPS mode

enabled), the TOE protects user passwords by saving a SHA-512 hash of the password. Also, while cryptographic

keys can be entered, the TOE does not disclose any keys stored in the TOE. See Table 8 Key/CSP Zeroization

Summary for more information about stored keys and passwords. Note that while some keys and passwords occur in

plain text in RAM, that is only while they are in use and are not accessible by any user from RAM.

The TOE is a hardware appliance that includes a hardware-based real-time clock (except for MSR 1000 Series) ).

The real-time clock is a battery-powered clock that is included in a microchip in a computer motherboard. When a

device starts up, the device gets the time from the real-time clock and synchronizes it to the CPU. When the device

is powered off, the real-time clock still keeps track of the current time. Since the MSR 1000 Series does not have a

real-time clock, the TOE maintains time by adding CPU ticks to the default time of the system. The TOE’s

embedded OS manages the clock and exposes administrator clock-related functions. The clock is used for audit

record time stamps, measuring session activity for termination, and for cryptographic operations based on time/date.

The TOE includes a number of built in diagnostic tests that are run during start-up to determine whether the TOE is

operating properly. An administrator can configure the TOE to reboot or to stop, with errors displayed, when an

error is encountered. The built-in self tests include basic read-write memory (that is, each memory location is written

with a non-zero value and read to ensure it is stored as expected), flash read, software checksum tests, and device

detection tests.

The TOE is designed to support upgrades to the boot ROM program and system boot file as well as to support

software hotfixes. In MSR4000, the upgrade process upgrades both service processing units and main processing

units. There is not a separate upgrade for service processing units. The TOE provides interfaces so that an

administrator can query the current boot ROM program or system boot file versions as well as to identify any

installed patches. The Basic BootROM and extended BootROM menus provide access to the BootROM program.

Basic BootROM can be accessed by pressing CTRL+D while the device is booting. Note that this can only be

performed while accessing the network device through the Serial Console. Extended BootROM menu can be

accessed by pressing CTRL+B while the device is booting. Both the boot ROM program and system boot file can be

upgraded via the Boot ROM menu or the command line interface, but a reboot is required in each case. Hotfixes,

which can affect only the system boot file, can be installed via the command line interface and do not require a

reboot to become effective.

The TOE includes a validity checking function that can be enabled when upgrading the boot ROM program, while

system boot files and software patches are always validated prior to installation. In each case, the upgrade version

will be checked to ensure it is appropriate and the upgrade file will be verified using an embedded (Hewlett Packard

Enterprise authorized) digital signature verified against a configured pair of hard-coded keys embedded in the TOE.

If the version is incorrect or the signature cannot be verified, the upgrade will not proceed to protect the integrity of


41

the TOE. More specifically, each update includes a header and data. The header includes a SHA-256 secure hash of

the data that is signed (using rDSA/RSA 2048) by Hewlett Packard Enterprise. In order to verify the data, the TOE

generates its own SHA-256 secure hash of the update data, compares it with the signed hash in the update header to

ensure they match, and verifies the hash signature using its configured public key.

The Protection of the TSF function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FPT_APW_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any user a plain text

password. Note that passwords are stored in hashed form within the TOE FLASH.

FPT_SKP_EXT.1: The TOE does not offer any functions that will disclose to any users a stored

cryptographic key.

FPT_STM.1: The TOE includes its own hardware clock (except for MSR 1000 Series, which uses CPU

ticks to maintain time).

FPT_TST_EXT.1: The TOE includes a number of power-on diagnostics that will serve to ensure the TOE

is functioning properly. The tests include ensure memory and flash can be accessed as expected, to ensure

that software checksums are correct, and also to test the presence and function of plugged devices.

FPT_TUD_EXT.1: The TOE provides functions to query and upgrade the versions of the boot ROM

program and system boot file (including installing hotfixes). Digital signatures are used to ensure the

integrity of each upgrade prior to performing the upgrade; this checking is optional for the boot ROM

program since special circumstances might require those checks to be disabled.

6.7 TOE access

The TOE can be configured to display an informative banner that will appear prior to authentication when accessing

the TOE via the console or SSH interfaces. The TOE subsequently will enforce an administrator-defined inactivity

timeout value after which the inactive session will be terminated. The banner will be displayed when accessing the

TOE via the console or SSH interfaces.

The TOE can be configured by an administrator to set an interactive session timeout value (any integer value in

minutes and also optionally in seconds, with 0 disabling the timeout) – the default timeout is 10 minutes. A remote

session that is inactive (that is, no commands issuing from the remote client) for the defined timeout value will be

terminated. A local session that is similarly inactive for the defined timeout period will be terminated. The user will

be required to re-enter their user id and their password so they can establish a new session once a session is

terminated. If the user id and password match those of the user that was locked, the session is reconnected with the

console and normal input/output can again occur for that user.

An authorized administrator can set an inactivity time limit for IPsec SA. Time limits can be set globally or per

IPsec policy (ipsec sa idle-time and sa idle-time, respectively.

The TOE access function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FTA_SSL.3: The TOE terminates remote sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-configured

period of time.

FTA_SSL.4: The TOE provides the function to logout (or terminate) both local and remote user sessions as

directed by the user.

FTA_SSL_EXT.1: The TOE terminates local sessions that have been inactive for an administrator-

configured period of time.

FTA_TAB.1: The TOE can be configured to display administrator-defined advisory banner before

establishing an administrative user session.


42

6.8 Trusted path/channels

The TOE can be configured to export audit records to an external Syslog server. The TOE uses IPsec to protect

communications between itself and components in the operational environment including Syslog and authentication

servers (RADIUS and TACACS+).

To support secure remote administration, the TOE includes an implementation of SSHv2. An administrator with an

appropriate SSHv2-capable client can establish secure remote connections with the TOE. The TOE supports both

public key-based and password-based client authentication for the SSH trusted path. To successfully establish an

interactive administrative session, the administrator must be able to provide acceptable user credentials (for

example, user id and password), after which they will be able to issue commands within their assigned

authorizations.

All of the secure protocols are supported by NIST-validated cryptographic mechanisms included in the TOE

implementation.

The Trusted path/channels function is designed to satisfy the following security functional requirements:

FTP_ITC.1: The TOE can be configured to ensure that any authentication operations and exported audit

records are sent only to the configured servers via IPsec communications channels so they are not subject to

inappropriate disclosure or modification.

FTP_TRP.1: The TOE provides SSH to support secure remote administration.. Administrators can initiate a

remote session that is secured (from disclosure and modification) using NIST-validated cryptographic

operations, and all remote security management functions require the use of this secure channel.


43

7. Protection Profile Claims

This ST is conformant to the Protection Profile for Network Devices, Version 1.1, 8 June 2012 (NDPP), with the

optional SSH, IPsec and pre-shared key requirements as amended by Errata #3.

The TOE includes Ethernet router devices. As such, the TOE is a network device making the NDPP claim valid and

applicable.

As explained in section 3, Security Problem Definition, the Security Problem Definition of the NDPP has been

included by reference into this ST.

As explained in section 4, Security Objectives, the Security Objectives of the NDPP have been included by

reference into this ST.

The following table identifies all the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) in this ST. Each SFR is reproduced

from the NDPP and operations completed as appropriate.

Requirement Class Requirement Component Source

FAU: Security audit FAU_GEN.1: Audit Data Generation NDPP

FAU_GEN.2: User identity association NDPP

FAU_STG_EXT.1: External Audit Trail Storage NDPP

FCS: Cryptographic

support

FCS_CKM.1: Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) NDPP

FCS_CKM_EXT.4: Cryptographic Key Zeroization NDPP

FCS_COP.1(1): Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption) NDPP

FCS_COP.1(2): Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature) NDPP

FCS_COP.1(3): Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing) NDPP

FCS_COP.1(4): Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message

authentication)

NDPP

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1: Explicit: IPSEC NDPP

FCS_RBG_EXT.1: Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit

Generation)

NDPP

FCS_SSH_EXT.1: Explicit: SSH NDPP

FDP: User data

protection

FDP_RIP.2: Full Residual Information Protection NDPP

FIA: Identification

and authentication

FIA_PMG_EXT.1: Password Management NDPP

FIA_PSK_EXT.1: Extended: Pre-Shared Key Composition NDPP

FIA_UAU.7: Protected Authentication Feedback NDPP

FIA_UAU_EXT.2: Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism NDPP

FIA_UIA_EXT.1: User Identification and Authentication NDPP

FMT: Security

management

FMT_MTD.1: Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data) NDPP

FMT_SMF.1: Specification of Management Functions NDPP

FMT_SMR.2: Restrictions on Security Roles NDPP

FPT: Protection of

the TSF

FPT_APW_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords NDPP

FPT_SKP_EXT.1: Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all

symmetric keys)

NDPP

FPT_STM.1: Reliable Time Stamps NDPP

FPT_TST_EXT.1: TSF Testing NDPP

FPT_TUD_EXT.1: Extended: Trusted Update NDPP

FTA: TOE access FTA_SSL.3: TSF-initiated Termination NDPP

FTA_SSL.4: User-initiated Termination NDPP

FTA_SSL_EXT.1: TSF-initiated Session Locking NDPP

FTA_TAB.1: Default TOE Access Banners NDPP

FTP: Trusted

path/channels

FTP_ITC.1: Trusted Channel NDPP

FTP_TRP.1: Trusted Path NDPP

Table 9 SFR Protection Profile Sources


44

8. Rationale

This security target includes by reference the NDPP Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and Security

Assurance Requirements. The security target makes no additions to the NDPP assumptions. NDPP security

functional requirements have been reproduced with the protection profile operations completed. Operations on the

security requirements follow NDPP application notes and assurance activities. Consequently, NDPP rationale

applies but is incomplete. The TOE Summary Specification rationale below serves to complete the rationale

required for the security target.

8.1 TOE Summary Specification Rationale

Each subsection in Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, describes a security function of the TOE. Each

description is followed with rationale that indicates which requirements are satisfied by aspects of the corresponding

security function. The set of security functions work together to satisfy all of the security functions and assurance

requirements. Furthermore, all of the security functions are necessary in order for the TSF to provide the required

security functionality.

This Section in conjunction with Section 6, the TOE Summary Specification, provides evidence that the security

functions are suitable to meet the TOE security requirements. The collection of security functions work together to

provide all of the security requirements. The security functions described in the TOE summary specification are all

necessary for the required security functionality in the TSF. Table 10 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping

demonstrates the relationship between security requirements and security functions.


45

Sec

uri

ty a

ud

it

Cry

pto

gra

ph

ic s

up

po

rt

Use

r d

ata

pro

tecti

on

Iden

tifi

cati

on

an

d

au

then

tica

tio

n

Sec

uri

ty m

an

ag

emen

t

Pro

tecti

on

of

the

TS

F

TO

E a

cces

s

Tru

sted

pa

th/c

ha

nn

els

FAU_GEN.1 X

FAU_GEN.2 X

FAU_STG_EXT.1 X

FCS_CKM.1 X

FCS_CKM_EXT.4 X

FCS_COP.1(1) X

FCS_COP.1(2) X

FCS_COP.1(3) X

FCS_COP.1(4) X

FCS_IPSEC_EXT.1 X

FCS_RBG_EXT.1 X

FCS_SSH_EXT.1 X

FDP_RIP.2 X

FIA_PMG_EXT.1 X

FIA_PSK_EXT.1 X

FIA_UAU.7 X

FIA_UAU_EXT.2 X

FIA_UIA_EXT.1 X

FMT_MTD.1 X

FMT_SMF.1 X

FMT_SMR.2 X

FPT_APW_EXT.1 X

FPT_SKP_EXT.1 X

FPT_STM.1 X

FPT_TST_EXT.1 X

FPT_TUD_EXT.1 X

FTA_SSL.3 X

FTA_SSL.4 X

FTA_SSL_EXT.1 X

FTA_TAB.1 X

FTP_ITC.1 X

FTP_TRP.1 X

Table 10 Security Functions vs. Requirements Mapping

Appendix A: Documentation for Hewlett Packard Enterprise MSR1000,

MSR2000, MSR3000, and MSR4000 Routers

The following documents for the MSR Router series can be found under the General Reference section of the Router

Series documentation page for each model on the Hewlett Packard Enterprise Web site. The links are provided

below.

HP MSR Router Series Security Command Reference (V7), 2015

HP MSR Router Series Fundamentals Command Reference (V7), 2015

HP MSR Router Series Network Management and Monitoring Command Reference (V7), 2015


46

HP MSR Router Series ACL and QoS Command Reference (V7), 2015

HP MSR Router Series Layer 3 - IP Services Command Reference (V7), 2015

The following documents for the MSR Router series can be found under the Setup and Install section of the Router

Series documentation page on the Hewlett Packard Enterprise Web site. The links are provided below.

HP MSR Router Series Security Configuration Guide (V7), 2015

HP MSR Router Series Fundamentals Configuration Guide (V7), 2015

HP MSR Router Series Network Management and Monitoring Configuration Guide (V7), 2015

HP MSR Router Series ACL and QoS Configuration Guide (V7), 2015

HP MSR Router Series Layer 3 - IP Services Configuration Guide (V7), 2015

MSR1000

http://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/psi/home/?sp4ts.oid=6796027&ac.admitted=1453386164725.1

25225703.1938120508#manuals

MSR2000


25225703.1851288163#manuals

MSR3000


25225703.1851288163#manuals

MSR4000


25225703.1938120508#manuals

http://h20566.www2.hpe.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/psi/home/?sp4ts.oid=6796027&ac.admitted=1453386164725.125225703.1938120508#manuals






