hgsv11n1 - 60-78

Failure of Plans for an SS ExterminationCamp in Mogilev, Belorussia

Christian Gerlach

Zentrum fur Antisemitismusforschung, Technical University of Berlin

Translated with Deborah Cohen and Helmut Gerlach

By autumn 1941 in most of the German-occupied USSR the last phase ofthe Holocaust had begun, with the exception of some ghettos in the Balticsand former Eastern Poland. Elsewhere the extermination would be almosttotal within three or four months. Only in a few places some Jews, to-gether with political prisoners and hunger refugees, were concentrated inwork camps; one of these was in the city of Mogilev, in Eastern Belorussia.When most of the Jews there and in the rest of Eastern Belorussia alreadyhad been murdered, the SS considered combining the concentration campwith a gassing and cremation facility—not to kill the remaining local Jewsbut those of Western and Central Europe. Because the railway networkwas overstrained, transportation was planned in part for the rivers Bug,Pripet, and Dnieper. The project failed because these waterways, whosefacilities had been heavily damaged, were overburdened and under fre-quent threat from the growing partisan movement. The plan was aban-doned in 1942, and the killing centers erected only in Poland.

Between August 1941 and June 1942, the development that led to the destniction ofthe European Jews entered an intermediate stage, before the industrialized murderof Polish and Western European Jews accelerated in the death camps of Belzec,Treblinka, and Auschwitz.1 Although the decision-making process still is not clear,many facts are. In the occupied parts of the Soviet Union, the German policy of massmurder of Jews was transformed in September and October 1941 into a policy ofcomplete extermination; in Lithuania the change had already occurred in August.2

During the same period the German Army began murdering the Serbian Jews; theSS finished that job some months later. Mass murders in the Chelmno death campnear Lodz began in December 1941, in Sobibor in March 1942, and in Belzec in May1942.3 Hitler gave his permission to deport the German Jews east in the middle ofSeptember 1941.

It is not clear if the German leadership actually intended to resettle the Jews as

60 Holocaust and Genocide Studies, VI1 Nl, Spring 1997, pp. 60-78

it had before4 or whether the phrase "sending the Jews to the East" had now become acode for murdering them. In fact, some Jews deported in the Soviet Union (all whocame to Kaunas, one entire transport to Riga) were murdered in 1941, whereas theothers—brought to Riga, Minsk, Lodz, and to the Lublin district—survived for sev-eral months, a few until 1943 and 1944.5 At the Wannsee Conference on January 20,1942, Heydrich indicated that forced labor was only a temporary placement for someEuropean Jews; all were to be murdered in the end.6 The early history of the deathcamps therefore can provide clues about the origins of the plan to murder not "only"the Soviet, but also other European Jews, as well as about the locations and methodsof extermination.

During recent years surprising new revelations have emerged about activitiesof the SS in the Belorussian city of Mogilev. Jean-Claude Pressac has shown that inmid-November 1941 the Topf Company of Erfurt received a commission to constructa huge crematorium at Mogilev; the order came from Amt II of the SS Main Officefor Budget and Building. On December 30,1941, an oven with four cremation cham-bers was delivered and assembled. Three more ovens were available by August 1942to be delivered to Mogilev and were then "diverted" to Auschwitz. The SS BuildingAdministration of "Russia Center" already had paid most of the money for all of theseovens.7 Gotz Aly argued that the SS intended to ship some of the European Jewsdown the Pripet River and up the Dnieper to Mogilev and murder them there.8

Jean-Claude Pressac argued that the crematorium in Mogilev was to removethe bodies of those German soldiers and Soviet POWs who had died of typhoid fever,but the epidemic in the rear area of Army Group Center, where Mogilev was located,was not as serious as Pressac maintained, as far as the German army was concerned.Out of 300-400,000 soldiers in December 1941, 252 soldiers and officers fell sickwith typhoid fever, 150 more in January, 161 in February, and 27 in the first half ofMarch 1942, most of them guards of POW camps. During the same period, therewere 4,907, 4,270, 3,776, and 648 cases amongst Soviet POWs, and roughly as manyamong Soviet civilians from that area.9 The immense mortality of POWs in the Sovietterritories under German occupation in the winter of 1941/42 was mainly caused byhunger and cold, only in relatively few cases by typhoid fever.10 Einsatzgruppe A re-ported from the Belorussian city of Minsk that the situation concerning typhoid feverwas "not to be considered as alarming."11 The SS told companies producing gas vansthat the vans were meant for victims of typhoid fever, but it would have been illogicalto transport the corpses of the people who had died of this disease from a dozen largecamps to one central point in the rear area of Army Group Center.12 The death rateamong Soviets in POW camp Dulag 185 in Mogilev in December 1941 was noticablylower than in other camps: 50 per day.13 But the estimated capacity of the cremato-rium the SS had ordered was more than 3,000 corpses a day.14 Moreover, the com-mander of the POW camp, Major Wittmer, had a very bad relationship with the SS:for them he was an unlikely partner.15

Failure of Plans for an SS Extermination Camp in Mogilev, Belorussia 61

IIAn epidemic of typhoid fever was not the reason for constructing a crematorium inMogilev. Rather, the crematorium was connected with the relatively unknown SS la-bor and extermination camp in that city. One hint of this project emerged on October10 at a conference in Prague on "Jewish questions" in the Protectorate of Bohemiaand Moravia. During the meeting Heydrich stated that the heads of Einsatzgruppen

B and C, "SS-Brigadefuhrer Nebe and Rasch[,] could take Jews into the camps for

communist prisoners in the operational area. According to [a] statement from SS-Sturmbannfiihrer Eichmann this is already in process (eingeleitet)."16

For a long time no one believed that that camp existed, so Heydrich's remarkhas seemed to make little sense. Historians have ignored his comment or interpretedit as camouflage for the "destruction in the East."17 But such a camp in fact existed,not under the control of Einsatzgruppe B (headquartered in Smolensk) but theHigher SS and Police Leader (HSSPF) "Russia Center," Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, who had his headquarters in Mogilev. This camp had been set up shortlybefore Heydrich's meeting. The commander of the rear area of Army Group Center,General von Schenckendorff, informed his troops that, "Since 29 September a laborcamp for suspicious vagabond civilians (men, women, teenagers) has been set up bythe Higher SS and Police Leader in Mogilev. If arrested civilians are not brought tothe next POW camp, they must be taken to the labor camp. Similar camps areplanned in Vitebsk and later in Smolensk."18 In the course of their "preventive" anti-partisan fight the Germans intended to persecute the numerous "wanderers" and"strangers" (Ortsfremde), most of them hungry or homeless refugees from the townsand cities or former soldiers of the Red Army in hiding, all regarded as security risksand as "not useful."19

A second reason for the founding of the camp had to do with the killing of theJews in the city of Mogilev and in the whole region. Following instructions from theleader of Einsatzkommando 8, Dr. Bradfisch, on September 25 the Belorussian cityadministration commanded the Jewish population to move into a new ghetto at theDubrovenka Bridge within five days. This move was intended to control the Jewsmore effectively and to prepare for their execution; obviously not all the Jews hadfollowed the order to settle in the first ghetto, because, among other reasons, it wastoo small.20 From then on executions of Jews in Mogilev went on almost every day.The new ghetto was emptied in two stages: according to orders of Bach-Zelewski onOctober 2 and 3, 2,273 people were killed, and 3,726 on October 19.21 The action of2 and 3 October was the start of the destruction of all the major ghettos in the reararea of Army Group Center, the last stage of the "Final Solution" in this region. Itbegan on the same day as Operation "Typhoon," the Army Group Center's offensiveagainst Moscow. In the city of Mogilev fewer than 1,000 Jews survived the 19th ofOctober.22 They were forced to resettle in the new labor camp inside the Dimitrovfactory.a On October 5 the local authorities of the Economic Staff East prohibitedthe employment of Jews, with the exception of labor gangs in Mogilev and its sur-

62 Holocaust and Genocide Studies

roundings, obviously in cooperation with the SS.24 The SS was trying to gain controlover the Jewish workers in the city who had survived selection. Jews represented asignificant number of the camp's prisoners until its dissolution.

Let us examine the interregional plans for destruction of the Jews, which wereobviously connected with the Mogilev camp. In 1946, Bach-Zelewski gave evidencethat in 1943 "a commission" from Hamburg had appeared in Mogilev with the orderof the SS to build there "a gas plant" in which people were to be murdered. By itself,this evidence, which had already been mentioned by Gerald Reitlinger and repro-duced in the weekly "Aufbau,"25 seemed confusing and not worth serious consider-ation. But taken together with the construction of the crematorium and the openingof the camp in Mogilev, as well as Heydrich's remark, it makes more sense. Accordingto Bach-Zelewski, the gas chamber was to have been built within a well-preservedfactory under his command where there was a repair shop for arms.26 This factorywas evidently identical with the "Dimitrov" plant, where the labor camp was located.27

Of course, two elements of this evidence are not credible: the date of the event men-tioned by Bach-Zelewski was designed to prove how late he found out about massgassings of people;28 and the assertion that his insistence on an order from Himmlerhimself had held up the project and caused it to fail, was intended to confirm his ownimage as an SS leader who had prevented the worst.29

Another detail in Bach-Zelewski's account seems questionable at first glance,namely that the "commission" had come from Hamburg. But other sources supportthat information. Between October 23 and 25, 1941, Heinrich Himmler came toMogilev. On October 23 the "inspection of strongpoints, and labor camps, and SSplants" in the city was on the agenda:30 Himmler visited the new camp for forcedlaborers,31 where 279 Jewish people were shot on the same day.32 Bach-Zelewski'sdiary mentions that "eight other gentlemen" accompanied Himmler, among them theHSSPF Nordsee, SS-Gruppenfiihrer Rudolf Querner, who resided in Hamburg.33 Itis not evident from Himmler's daily calendar and the other sources why Querneraccompanied him during the entire journey. The conflict between Querner and thehead of the police in Hamburg, Kehrl, about which Querner had to report to Himm-ler in Mogilev on October 25, doesn't seem a sufficient reason.34 But suppose thatQuerner prepared the visit of the "commission" from Hamburg, which wanted tobuild a gas chamber, or, suppose Bach was referring to Querner's visit itself. Some-thing happened around this time, because the crematorium was ordered in mid-November. It remains a matter for investigation why a commission from Hamburg ofall places should have been employed to arrange to build the gas chamber.35 In hisletter of October 31, 1941, to the Gauleiter of Hamburg, Karl Kaufmann, Quernersaid he would prefer to give an oral report about his "very interesting" trip to Smo-lensk and Mogilev. He also informed Kaufmann that the next transport of Jews to theEast had been postponed for eight days because of a "lack of material." The trainlater brought 1,000 Jews from Hamburg to Minsk, where they arrived on November10, 1941.36


The fact that Himmler, Bach-Zelewskd, and the commander of the Police Regi-ment "Mitte," Max Montua, talked during Himmler's visit between October 23 and25, 1941, at Mogilev about "solutions" to the "Jewish problem" other than shootingthem—he meant here mass murder by gas—is confirmed by statement from Bach-Zelewski's former adjutant G., who was also present. Montua had complained be-cause the continuing massacres of Jews endangered the morale of the police unitswhich took part in them. G. said that Himmler promised the others that those "othersolutions" would come soon.37

The general context suggests that Himmler's journey to Mogilev and Smolenskhad something to do with plans for deportations of Jews. On October 23 he wantedto meet the Generalkommissar for so-called "White Ruthenia," Wilhelm Kube, andpossibly intended to officially inform him of the planned transports to Minsk.38 Atabout the same time civil administration officials in Riga and Berlin were officiallyinformed.39 It is not known if a meeting between Himmler and Kube took place, butin any case the Reichsfiihrer met the SS and Police Leader of White Ruthenia, CarlZenner, in Mogilev.40 Zenner may have given him a report on the massacre of Borissovcarried out two days before by a unit of Security Police and SD from Minsk underthe command of Zenner, who was not in charge of the city. The local Belorussianpolice had also taken part. In Borissov there were rumors among the civil population"that the houses of the Jews which have become empty now shall be prepared forJews from Germany, who shall also be liquidated like the Jews from Borissovearlier!"41

Immediately after his journey (during which he also met the Commander ofArmy Group Center, Generalfeldmarschall von Bock) Himmler reported to Hitler inthe presence of Heydrich on the evening of October 25. We can only infer the contentof the report from Hitler's remarks that evening:

In the Reichstag I predicted to the Jews that they would disappear from Europe, if thewar would not be prevented (nicht vermieden bleibt). This race of criminals is guilty ofthe two million dead of the World War, and for other hundreds of thousands now. No-body should say to me: we can not send them into the mud! . . . It is good that the factthat we exterminate Jewry inspires horror in other nations.42

This was far from Hitler's only remark of that sort in those months. But the referenceto the "mud" ("Morast"), usually interpreted as a metaphor, is striking.^Swamps werealmost a synonym for Belorussia to German leaders then. That term may indicate thatHimmler had informed his Fiihrer about plans to deport Jews to Minsk and Mogilev.

Ill

Mogilev is linked to another aspect of German extermination policy. In September

1941 a notorious killing experiment with exhaust gasses took place there under the

command of the head of Einsatzgruppe B, Arthur Nebe. Contrary to the (Western)


scholarly literature, not one but two gassing experiments were carried out at thattime—one in Mogilev and one in Minsk, often confused.43 On 15 August 1941Himmler had visited the psychiatric asylum of Novinki, four miles north of Minsk,on a collective farm which had been assigned to the SS. Himmler gave Nebe theorder to kill the patients, but with a "more humane" method than shooting.44 General-kommissar Kube repeatedly confirmed this decision.45 On September 18, 1941, 200patients from Novinki were murdered in the little bath house with van exhaust gas.Some inmates of Novinki also fell victim to the notorious killing attempt by explosives,carried out under guidance of Nebe and chemist Dr. Albert Widmann of the Krimi-naltechnisches Institut (KTI), which was under the command of Nebe as chief of theReich Criminal Investigation Department.46 In the psychiatric asylum in Mogilevthere was another experimental killing with exhaust gas from vans, led again by Dr.Widmann. The commander of Einsatzkommando 8, Dr. Otto Bradfisch, had been thefirst to call for a "solution" to the "problems" that the patients of this institutioncaused.47 That was presumably a short time before September 17, 1941, when a con-clusive discussion between Nebe and Bach-Zelewski took place in Smolensk.48

Scholars have linked these experiments in killing solely to the development ofgassing vans. It has even been alleged that Himmler gave the order to develop anduse this new technique of killing and that Nebe and Widmann s attempts were themost important step on that way.49 Indeed, Widmann brought drawings of gassingvans to Mogilev in September 1941.^ But this theory does not pay sufficient attentionto the "contribution" of the Kanzlei des Fuhrers, to which the KTI reported.51 A sec-tion of the Kanzlei des Fuhrers experienced in the use of gas chambers in the "eutha-nasia" program played the main part in the development of gas vans in October 1941at the latest, and furnished most of the personnel for the "Aktion Reinhard," themurder of the Jews in the General Government beginning in spring 1942.52 More-over, there are clues that the KTI had developed the idea of killings by motor exhaustgas earlier, possibly before 22 June 1941.53 That Himmler s visit to Minsk was not thestarting-point is indicated by the fact that in Liepaja, Latvia in the beginning of Au-gust, 1941 there were already rumors that Jewish women "shall later be removed bygassing."54 The Mogilev experiment took place in improvised stationary gas cham-bers. Perhaps it was more a test for the permanent installations built later in theextermination camps of Aktion Reinhard than for the gas vans. A connection betweenthis experiment and the plans for deportations to Mogilev can therefore be supposed.

IV

Gotz Aly has argued that the German authorities pursued at times a project to deporta portion of European Jewry by ship to the "reception camps in the East"55 becausethe occupied Soviet territories' railways were overburdened.56 Aly also suggested thatthe Jews were to be brought to Mogilev on the rivers Pripet and Dnieper; he couldnot prove it, but reached the conclusion deductively. Richard Breitman has also con-


sidered the possibility that Himmler sent for Eichmann during a visit to Kiev onOctober 2 and 3, 1941, to talk to him about shipping Jews to the German-occupiedpart of the Soviet Union.57 Kiev is situated on the river Dnieper as is Mogilev. In fact,there is another hint of this plan.

On August 16, 1941, SS-Standartenfiihrer Fritz Allihn was hired by the ReichMinistry of Transportation as the manager of an extensive ship construction program.As head of the "Staff for the construction of wooden ships," later under the commandof the Generalkommissar of Volhynia and Podolia, he was commissioned to build alarge number of "makeshift" ("behelfsmaBige") inland wooden ships with a short lifespan for "the Dnieper-Bug system," the only waterway between the Reich andUkraine. This construction program was supposed to complete an extension of theriver Bug, a project that had been already started under the control of the GeneralInspector of Water and Energy, Albert Speer. Allihn's main plant for the project wasthe "state shipyard" in Pinsk, a factory with nearly 1,000 employees.58

Allihn, who had been commander of the SS Artillery Substitution Regimentfrom Berlin, was not an exemplary SS leader. He had been expelled from the Waffen-SS on 31 March 1941 for disciplinary reasons. On 29 January 1942 he was also dis-charged from the SS without honors.59 Because of his difficulties, it seems unlikelythat he was inserted by the SS into this key position for transport and perhaps for thetransportation of Jews. But after Allihn had unsuccessfully sent petitions for his re-engagement to high authorities for months—among them were Bormann, Goring,and the High Command of the Wehrmacht (OKW)—the Reichskommissar for theStrengthening of Germandom (RKF) suddenly suggested him for the "mission in theEast" and his new position in August 1941. In his career Allihn had not had anyobvious contact with the RKF before.60 If they had not simply been trying to accom-modate Allihn somewhere, what interest could they have had in the Bug-Pripet-Dnieper project?

Allihn was only the second employee of Dr. Bodo Ebhardt, who had just begunto establish the "East Section" of the Reich Ministry of Transport, and the most ener-getic, so that Ebhardt later spoke of his availability as a "fortunate chance."61 It seemsto be particularly important that Allihn, who had been appointed one month before,received an official letter of appointment from the Reich Ministry of Transport,signed by Under-secretary Kleinmann, on September 10, 1941.62 This was remark-able, not only because this ministry was not in charge of the territory—the Reichs-kommissariat Ukraine was63—but because one day after, on September 11, 1941,the Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle (VoMi) began looking for ethnic Germans in theircamps who had come from the Soviet Union and were "inland boatsmen with exactknowledge of the Russian streams and canals."64 The connection between these twoevents is proven by the expression "canals." The only important Soviet canal con-quered by the Germans was the Dnieper-Bug between Kobryn and Pinsk in Belorus-


sia.65 In fact, the order of the VoMi was based on a conference on September 11 atthe Reich Ministry of Transportation, in which Ebhardt, Allihn and representativesof the RKF took part (the RKF was closely connected with the VoMi). Another par-ticipant was SS-Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr. Erwin Weinmann. He was head of theAmtsgruppe IV D of the Reich Security Main Office (the Gestapo's occupied territor-ies' branch) and probably less interested in the official topic of the conference—tofind ethnic Germans as technical and managerial personnel, and to find workers toconstruct and sail ships in the Soviet Union. This was far away from Weinmann'sduties. His presence at the meeting can be seen as an indication of interest in thepossibility of shipping the Jews to the East.66 Various sources emphazised how im-portant and urgent Allihn's mission was.67

The Armament Inspection of Ukraine along with the head of transportation inthe High Command of the Army (OKH) and the Feldwasserstrafienabteilung 2 triedto bring the shipyards, especially in Pinsk, under their own control. Allihn soon hadto submit to Army commissions.68 Part of the military supplies and of the mightyfreight transports between Germany and Ukraine would use the Bug-Dnieper water-way. The RKF might have had special interest in projects to settle ethnic Germansin the Ukraine.69 Another purpose was the shipping of materials and equipment toconstruct SS and police strongpoints, for example the one in Mogilev, where up to9,000 SS and policemen were later based.70 The head of the economic department ofthe HSSPF Russia Center as commissioner for the "police strongpoints" also had tosecure, extend and utilize "important economic objects" like "river shipyards."71 Butthis goal in no way contradicts the purpose of erecting a large labor and exterminationcamp in Mogilev.72

The "great" projects did not succeed, the economic aims failed, as did plans fordeportations of Jews by ship, if they had ever existed. There was no slack in the Ger-man war economy—so there was not only a shortage of railway engines and cars butalso ships.73 In the summer of 1942, Fritz Allihn was relieved of his position by theReichskommissar of Ukraine, after his methods alienated other authorities. TheHSSPF Ukraine, Priitzmann, also opposed him.74 By that time the partisans wereable to paralyze the Bug-Dnieper almost completely anyway. By the end of March1942 its extension was officially considered unimportant to the war effort, and theproject was shelved.75 The Dnieper-Bug Canal remained silted up. Only a few shipsever passed this waterway on a trial basis under German rule, and even that waspossible only during floods.76 Shipping on the Dnieper from the South was decisivelyhindered because the Soviets had blown up the huge dam near Dniepropetrovsk.Ship transports from the Black Sea to Kiev or beyond uninterrupted at Dnieprope-trovsk could not begin before April 15, 1943.77 The SS and police leadership contin-ued efforts to buy or build "SS-freighters" and "police combat boats" in the area ofthe Black Sea during 1942, but the results proved significant only for troop supplies


and economic interests of the SS.78 At midday of November 1, 1942, Himmler per-sonally visited the dam of "Dnieprostroi."79 Only Allihns construction programproved relatively successful.80

V

Any plans to transport Jews to the East by water never even came close to realization.In the autumn of 1941 time was too short, then the rivers froze over, and before theythawed out in 1942, transportation and economic authorities had already abandonedthe projects to extend the Dnieper-Bug Canal. The SS apparently did not give up theidea of an extensive extermination camp in Mogilev until 1942, when the crematoriaintended for Mogilev were delivered to Auschwitz.81 Transportation of Jews acrossthe Black Sea and upstream to Kiev or Mogilev was practically impossible beforeApril 1943, but by then the German retreat from the Ukraine was already under way.

It seems that a gas chamber in Mogilev never existed,82 probably because thedeportation plans failed. Instead, three gas vans were at times located in the city, asin February 1942. This is proven by a newly found report of the Einsatzgruppe B.83

Deportations of Jews by railway failed because the army prohibited them, whereastransports to Minsk had to be stopped about November 20, 1941, because of thegrave supply crisis of Army Group Center—immediately after the SS had orderedthe crematory for Mogilev.84 The SS and police could not act without the cooperationof other authorities, but for those officials the war effort had priority. Despite twotestimonies to the contrary, no train with German or Polish Jews ever seems to havearrived in Mogilev.85 Whether the SS could have carried out major construction inthis half-destroyed city remains unknown. But considering the construction of theWaffen-SS and police Supply Command in nearby Bobruisk, it should not have beenimpossible. In 1942 at least two transports with about 1,500 Jewish workers fromWarsaw arrived in Bobruisk (only 91 were alive one year later).86

Mogilev's labor camp, intended for service as an extermination center, was dis-solved in September 1943 upon the partial withdrawal of Army Group Center. Ac-cording to eyewitnesses, the number of prisoners may have remained as high as 4,000or fallen to 1,000. At the beginning of September there had been 500, 276 of themJews, according to Soviet partisans.87 The camp was under the direct supervision ofthe Local SS and Police Leader K. and guarded by police units from Waldenburg,Darmstadt, and Berlin. Prisoners lived in terrible conditions in this overcrowdedcamp; according to eyewitnesses, several transports must have arrived. Otherwise itwould have soon become empty. Every Thursday inmates were taken away in a vanto be murdered, and sometimes people were simply shot in a corner of the camp.88

Some transports of unknown origin arrived, and repeatedly mass executions and gas-sings took place. At once up to 4,000 people were said to be killed.89 Perhaps trans-ports of Jews arrived from Gomel, Briansk, and Orel.90 For example, on 26 May 1942,400 Jewish workers from Slonim in the Generalkommissariat of White Ruthenia


(Western Belorussia) were sent to Mogilev; only two or four came back.91 It is hardto say how many inmates of the Mogilev labor camp were murdered, because the SSburned the corpses in the autumn of 1943. Most had been killed at the nearby villagesof Novopashkovo (since 1941) and Polykovitshi (since 1942). The total number ofcivilians murdered there has been estimated at 25-30,000 by a German policemanand by Soviet local authorities, but this figure might be too high. It is certain thatabout 7,500 victims were Jews and 1,200 mentally ill people from the city of Mogi-lev.92 No sources identify the other victims. In the autumn of 1943 the surviving pris-oners of the Mogilev camp were brought to Lublin, the machinery going to Minsk.93

Although there can be doubts about some details, it is at least probable that theSS intended in autumn 1941 to send part of European Jewry to Mogilev to kill themthere. Mogilev was one option; others were Lodz, Riga, and Minsk, precisely as men-tioned during the conference in Prague on 10 October. Another option was the Lub-lin district of the General Governement, where the building site of Belzec was chosenin October 1941.M Other possibilities were Vitebsk and Smolensk, where labor campsof the same sort as in Mogilev were projected. Future research will show whethersimilar institutions also existed in Ukraine, as Heydrich asserted in Prague.

The case of Mogilev proves that a net of transit and extermination camps wasplanned for eastern Europe, and that it was intended to be more widespread thanscholars have assumed. The SS's intentions were more concrete than has been recog-nized—but nevertheless unrealistic. The failure in Mogilev resulted from the RedArmy's resistance and difficulties with transportation—problems the SS couldn'tsolve. These restraints made realization of the project not only "impractical" from thepoint of view of the organizers of genocide but impossible.

AcknowledgmentsThis article derives from a study of German occupation policy in Belorussia financedin part by the Hamburger Institut fur Sozialforschung. I also want to thank prosecut-ing attorney Tonnies (Ludwigsburg) and Mrs. GroBmann (Institut fur Zeitgeschichtein Munich).

Notes1. See Dieter Pohl, NS-Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien: Die Organisierung eines staatlichenMassenverbrechens (Ph.D. diss., Miinchen, 1994), pp. 201-203.

2. Cf. Peter Longerich, "Vom Massenmord zur "Endlosung": Die ErschieBungen von jiid-ischen Zivilisten in den ersten Monaten des Ostfeldzuges im Kontext des nationalsozialis-tischen Judenmords," Zwei Wege nach Moskau, ed. Bernd Wegner (Miinchen and Zurich:Piper, 1991), pp. 251-74; Philippe Burrin, Hitler und die Juden: Die Entscheidung fur denVolkermord (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1993), pp. 111-28. According to other scholars, thechange came during August 1941: Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer Kriegsge-fangener im "Fall Barbarossa" (Heidelberg and Karlsruhe: C.F. Miiller Juristischer Verlag,1981), pp. 74-93; with some inaccurate conclusions Ralf Ogorreck, Die Einsatzgruppen und


die "Genesis der Endlosung" (Berlin: Metropol, 1996). See also Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicher-heitspolizei unddes SD 1938-1942 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981).

3. Ino Arndt and Wolfgang Scheffler, "Organisierter Massenmord an Juden in nationalsozialist-ischen Vernichtungslagern," Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 24 (1976), pp. 112-35; Yitz-hak Arad, Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death Camps (Bloomington:Indiana University Press, 1987).

4. See Gotz Aly, "Endlosung": Volkerverschiebung und der Mord an den europdischen Juden(Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1995); and Burrin, pp. 70-105.

5. Cf. Adalbert Riickerl, Nationabozialistische Vernichtungslager im Spiegel deutscher Straf-prozesse (Munchen: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1977), pp. 146-47; Wilhelm, in Krausnickand Wilhelm, pp. 583-96; Wolfgang Scheffler, "Die Wannsee-Konferenz und ihre historischeBedeutung," Erinnern fur die Zukunft: Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz 20. Januar 1942-20.Januar 1992: Ansprachen und Vortrage zur Erbffnung der Gedenkstdtte (Berlin: EditionHentrich, 1993), pp. 17-34; H.G.Adler, Der verwaltete Mensch: Studien zur Deportation derJuden aus Deutschland (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1974).

6. "Unter entsprechender Leitung sollen nun im Zuge der Endlosung die Juden in geeigneterWeise im Osten zum Arbeitseinsatz kommen . . . , wobei zweifellos ein Grofiteil durch natiir-liche Verminderung ausfallen wird. Der allfdllig verbleibende Restbestand wird, da es sichzweifellos um den widerstandsfdhigsten Teil handelt, entsprechend behandelt werden mu's-sen. . . . " Protocol of the Wannsee Conference (no date), Akten zur deutschen auswdrtigenPolitik, Serie E, vol. 1 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1969), p. 271.

7. See Jean-Claude Pressac, Die Krematorien von Auschwitz (2. impr., Munchen and Zurich:Piper, 1995), pp. 38-41, 64-65, 75, and 120.

8. Aly, pp. 339-47.

9. Those were precisely 1,596, 2,070, 7,351, and 2,965. See Chief Medical-Sanitary Officer ofthe Commander of Rear Area of (Army Group) Center, Bericht iiber Fleckfieber, 21 March1942, Militarisches Zwischenarchiv Potsdam (MZAP) WF-03/7366, pp. 987-88. The micro-filmed records of MZAP are now in the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv Freiburg (BA MA).

10. See Situation reports of the Commander of Rear Area Center (Quartermaster) on Novem-ber, December 9, 1941, MZAP WF-03/7314, p.426; and on December, January 7,1942, MZAPWF-03/7366, p. 979. Documents of the POW camp Stalag 352 (Minsk), captured by the RedArmy, show that 6,829 out of 9,425 determinable cases of death were directly caused by hunger,only 665 by typhoid fever. Medical opinion about destruction of Soviet POWs in Stalag 352 inJuly 1944 in: Prestupleniia nemetsko-fashistskikh okkupantov v Belorussii, ed. S.I. Beluga etal. (Minsk, 1965), p. 199. In the Reichskommissariat of Ukraine in February 1942, fourteenpercent of all dead POWs died of typhoid fever. German Army Commander of Ukraine, ReportNo.7 (March 1942), 21 April 1942, BA MA RW 41/1.

11. Chief of Security Policy and SD, Ereignismeldung UdSSR No. 152, 7 January 1942, MZAPSF-01/28935, pp. 3508-10.

12. See Aly, p. .344.

13. See POW District J Commander, Inspection Report, 22 November 1941, MZAP WF-03/


7353, pp. 749-54: During the last four weeks 1,500 of 30,000 POWs had died in the Mogilevcamp.

14. Cf. Pressac, pp. 34 and 40.

15. See the complaints of Einsatzkommando 8 to HSSPF Russia Center, 3 November 1941in: Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion, ed. Reinhard Riirup (Berlin: Argon, 1991), pp. 131-32;Himmler's investigation on Wittmer, BA NS 19/3678, p. 3. But Wittmer had personal contactwith Daluege and his wife since their meeting in Bialystok in early July 1941, when a platoonof Police Batallion 322 guarded his POW camp. Wittmer to Daluege, 14 April 1943, BA R 19/360; Pol. Rgt. Mitte, la, to Pol. Btl. 322, 7 July 1941; Tatigkeitsbericht iiber den Einsatz der 3./Pol. Btl. 322 of 20 July 1941, both BAP F 56754.

16. Notizen aus der Besprechung am 10.10.41 iiber die Losung von Judenfragen, EichmannTrial, Document No.1193 (emphazised in original).

17. See for example Gotz Aly and Susanne Heim, Vordenkerder Vernichtung (Hamburg: Hoff-mann und Campe, 1991), pp. 458-59, and Aly, p. 356.

18. Commander of Rear Area Center, Department VH/War Administration, AdministrationOrders No. 8 (sic), 10 October 1941, Central State Archives Minsk 570-1-1, p. 137 (back). SeeWar Diary of Security Division 286, Supply Officer, entry for 3 October 1941: "A labor campfor suspicious civilians is being equipped in Mogilev." BA MA RH 26-286/10.

19. On this topic, which cannot be treated here, see Commander Rear Area Center, Dep.VII/War Administration, Administration Orders No. 7 (sic), 29 September 1941, BAP F 40540, p.774, and Sicherungsdivision 221, Besondere Anordnungen fur die Versorgung, Versorgung-struppen, Feldkommandanturen, Orts-Kdtren., Dulags with letter of 19 September 1941,MZAP (BArchP)F 57076, pp. 612-13.

20. See City Administration of Mogilev, Order No. 51, 25 September 1941; interrog. I.S.F.(then mayor), 2 August 1945 (extracted translation); interrog. of Jewish survivor L.M.N. of 8April 1970; interrog. A.W.K., 6 April 1970, all in: Der Bundesbeauftragte fur die Unterlagendes Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR (BStU) ZUV 9, vol. 11, pp. 23-25, 33-36,125, and 143.

21. See Ereignismeldungen Nos. 108, 124, 125, and 133 of 9, 24, and 25 October and 14November 1941, MZAP SF-01/28933, pp. 2858, 2861, 3040, and 3049, and SF-01/28934, pp.3186-89; 9./Pol. Rgt. Mitte, Report on 1 to 15 October 1941, Bundesarchiv-ZwischenarchivDahlwitz-Hoppegarten, P 812; list "ErschieBungen" of Police Bataillon 322, BA D-H P 813;and Andrej Angrick et al., "'Da hatte man schon ein Tagebuch fiihren miissen.' Das Polizeiba-taillon 322 und die Judenmorde im Bereich der Heeresgruppe Mitte wahrend des Sommersund Herbstes 1941," Die Normalitat des Verbrechens: Festschrift fur Wolfgang Scheffler, ed.Helge Grabitz et al. (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1994), pp. 346-50.

22. Ereignismeldung No.125, 26 October 1941, MZAP SF-01/28933, p. 3049; "fast judenfrei"according to No. 133, 14 November, MZAP SF-01/28934, p. 3190.

23. See interrog. of L.M.N., 8 April 1970; K.P.B. (then chief of district administration), 26 July1944; O.M., 6 June 1945; and P.I.K., 28 January 1963 (extracted translation), BStU ZUV 9, vol.11, pp. 102, 126ff., 152, and 156.

24. See War Diary of Security Division 286, Supply Officer, 5 October 1941, BA MA RH 26-


286/10; see also Wirtschaftsinspektion Mitte, Situation Reports Nos. 8 to 10, 6 and 22 Novem-ber and 22 December 1941, MZAP (BArchP) F 42862, pp. 966, 1003, and 1034.

25. See Gerald Reitlinger, The "Final Solution" (2. impr, London, 1953), p. 222, and "Lebeneines SS-Generals," Aufbau (New York), 6 September 1946.

26. Interrog. of Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 23 March 1946 (in English), Zentrale Stelleder Landesjustizverwaltungen (ZStL) 202 AR-Z 52/59, doc. vol. 5, pp. 36-37 ("this was only asmall commission that came with some letter of authorization"). Since Bach addressed themas "gentlemen," they might have been civilians.

27. The second factory, which SS and police had confiscated in Mogilev, the so-called Fordplant, does not fit Bach-Zelewski's description because it stood a little outside of the city, wasseverely damaged, and had no arms repair shop. See Supply Command of the Waffen-SS andPolice, Russia Center, 10 April 1942, BAP F 3341, pp. 781-82, and CStA Minsk 378-1-222.

28. By 1943, for hundreds of kilometers around Mogilev almost no Jews remained alive, andnobody in the SS could seriously believe in deportations of people so far east any more. Noother group who should be gassed is imaginable. Bach-Zelewski avoided answering a questionto that point (ibid., p. 37).

29. See ibid, and Aufbau, 6 September 1946. It is not clear if the article is based on anotherinterrogation of Bach-Zelewski or reproduces the known interrogation inaccurately.

30. Programm fur die Reise des Reichsfuhrers-SS vom 23.10. bis 25.10.1941 in Das Gebietdes Hoheren SS- und Polizeifuhrers RuBland-Mitte, Bundesarchiv (BA) NS 19/1792, p. 60.This is the actual agenda, which departed from earlier plans (ibid., pp. 63-66). See also "Krieg-stagebuch Kpmmandostab Reichsfiihrer-SS, 23 October 1941," Unsere Ehre heifit Treue(Wien: Europaverlag, 1984), p. 59, and Bach's diary (copy), 27 October 1941, BA R 20/45b,pp. 15-16.

31. See letter of R.S., 25 March 1959, and his interrog., dated 5 August 1958 (actually 1959),ZStL 202 AR-Z 52/59, vol. 4, pp. 453 and 640 (back); interrog. F.H., 8 October 1959, vol. 6,pp. 1154 (back)-1155.

32. See Ereignismeldung No.133, 14 November 1941, MZAP SF-01/28934, p. 3189.

33. Bach-Zelewski's diary, 27 October 1941 ("8 andere Herren"), BA R 20/45b, p. 15. Also,Himmler's "Reiseprogramm" for 23 to 25 October, BA NS 19/1792, p. 61 (Querner's name hadonly recently been added, but was already included in a proposal of Himmler's personal staff,21 October, p. 66: Querner and "8 weitere Herren"); Himmler's Terminkalender, 25 October1941, Osobyi arkhiv, Moscow, 1372-5-23, p. 389 (the leaves for October 23 and 24 are miss-ing there).

34. See ibid., 25 October 1941, p. 389. In the evening Himmler talked to Kehrl about the casefor half an hour. On October 22 he had a phone conversation with Chef der OrdnungspolizeiKurt Daluege about Kehrl's behavior ("Benehmen") (BA NS 19/1438).

35. The Tesch & Stabenow Company, which owned the utilization rights for Zyklon B, wasbased in Hamburg. But there is no hint of any relation to an extermination camp in Mogilev,nor grounds for corresponding conclusions.


36. See Querner to Kaufmann, 31 October 1941, MZAP SF-01728941, pp. 766-67. Thanks toAndrej Angrick for directing me to this document.

37. See interrog. of H.G. on 26 May 1962, ZStL 202 AR-Z 152/59, vol. 2, p. 1029. Thanks toAndrej Angrick for this reference. Angrick et al. have misinterpreted this statement in so faras they located Himmler's trip to Mogilev on 2 and 3 October, the time of the first phase of theliquidation of the ghetto. But the G. to whom they referred made no connection between thismass execution and Himmler's visit. Ibid., p. 379, n. 120. It is certain that Himmler was inKiev on 2 and 3 October (Reiseprogramm fur 2.-5.10.1941, BA NS 19/1792, pp. 70-71). Thediscussion which G. described can only have taken place at the end of October 1941 becauseit was in Mogilev and Himmler was there only two more times, 9 March and 6 August 1942(Himmler's Terminkalender, 9 March and 6 August 1942, Osobyi arkhiv, Moscow, 1372-5-23,pp. 149 and 286). By then Montua was not present, and in March Bach-Zelewski wasn't either.

38. Wire from Grothmann to Bach-Zelewski, 21 October 1941, BA NS 19/1792, p. 66 (back).

39. See Raul Hilberg, Die Vernichtung der europaischen Juden (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer,1990), pp. 368-69; interrog. Georg Leibbrandt, 17 October 1961, Staatsanwaltschaft (StA)Hannover 2 Js 499/61, vol. 2, p. 74; Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (Dr.Wetzel) to the Reichskommissar fur das Ostland, Lohse, 25 October 1941 (draft), Nurem-berg Doc. NO 365.

40. Diary of Bach-Zelewski, 27 October 1941, BA R 20/45b, p. 15.

41. Oberwachtmeister Soennecken's report, 24 October 1941, cited by Wilhelm in Wilhelmand Krausnick, p. 578. See also, pp. 576-80. Zenner himself did not take part in the Borisovmassacre.

42. Adolf Hitler, Monologe im Fuhrerhauptquartier: Die Aufzeichnungen Heinrich Heims, ed.Werner Jochmann (Miinchen: Wilhelm Heyne, 1982), p. 106.

43. See Matthias Beer, "Die Entwicklung der Gaswagen beim Mord an den Juden," Vierteljahr-esheftefur Zeitgeschichte 35 (1987), pp. 407-409; "Euthanasie" im NS-Staat, ed. Ernst Klee(Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1986), pp. 112-15; Aly, pp. 342-43; Wilhelm, pp. 543-52;Angelika Ebbinghaus and Gerd Preissler, "Die Ermordung psychisch kranker Menschen in derSowjetunion," Ebbinghaus et al., Aussonderung und Tod (Berlin; Rotbuch, 1985), pp. 83-90.See interrog. Bruno Franz Mit[t]mann, 15 December 1945, ZStL II 202 AR-Z 179/67, vol. 2,pp. 171-72. This policeman resided in Novinki near Minsk and is mistaken for the chemist Dr.Widmann by Ebbinghaus and Preissler. Widmann was not present during the gassing experi-ment at Novinki.

44. Interrog. Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, 27 October 1947, Case 8, English minutes, p.458, BAP F 47144; statements of Bach-Zelewski, Aufbau, 23 August 1946; interrog. Otto Brad-fisch, 23 June 1958, StA Munich I 22 Ks 1/61, vol. 1, p. 184.

45. "Generalkommissar Kube and Reichsleiter [sic] Himmler have visited the institution andhave promised its evacuation in the near future." Stabsarzt Dr. Ellinghaus, Visitation Report,16 September 1941, CStA Minsk 370-l-141a, p. 139; "I inform you that GeneralkommissarKube agrees to the total liquidation of the mentally sick persons in the . . . kolkhoz Novinki."SSPF White Ruthenia to Generalkommissar White Ruthenia (von Rumohr), 27 October 1941,ibid, p. 129.


46. See evidence of Akimova, head of the hospital in 1941, Ebbinghaus and Preissler, pp.88-91; interrog. E.K.K., 24 July 1944; and M.K.W., 19 December 1945 (former worker resp.nurse in Novinki), ZStL 202 AR-Z 184/67, vol. 1, pp. 148-49, and doc. vol. 1, pp. 1-2 (summa-rizing translations); summary of evidence given by Kolonitskaja and Naumenko in: Das inMinsk gesammelte Beweismaterial, Nuremberg Doc. USSR 38. About the attempt to killpeople with explosives see the literature in n. 43. With reference to the date Akimova's informa-tion can likely be trusted because her statements are correct in those points which can bechecked. Probably she had notes or other records during her interrogations.

47. Himmler never entered this hospital (Beer, p. 408, and Aly, p. 343, are wrong). About thisepisode see literature in n. 43; interrog. Otto Bradfisch, 23 June 1958, StA Munich 22 Ks 1/61,vol. 1, p. 185; Notice on number patients in Mogilev Psychiatric Asylum 3 September 1941(910 patients, before murder), same of 2 November 1941 (217 patients), BStU ZUV 9, vol. 4,pp. 214 and 216; interrog. A.N.S. (head of the hospital), 20 July 1944, 4 November and 24December 1948, ibid., pp. 219-34 and 299-306 (all German translations). According to S.,from 8 p.m. to 9 a.m. about 500 people were gassed.

48. See interrog. Albert Widmann, 11 January 1961 (copy), ZStL 439 AR-Z 18a/60, p. 84, anddiary of Bach-Zelewski, 17 September 1941 (copy), BA R 20/45b, p.14. Widmann said Bachcould not come to the final meeting because he had been wounded during an air attack. Bachwrote in his diary that he nearly became a victim of a Soviet air attack two times on September17 when he flew to Smolensk. According to his "sanitized" diary he visited Nebe and Smolenskonly for a sightseeing tour and lunch, which is hard to believe. Evidently Widmann wantedto protect Bach, whose trial as HSSPF Russia Center was still going on when Widmann wasinterrogated. Indeed, Beer (p. 408, n. 37) failed to note that—or that Bach-Zelewski met withNebe on 17 September 1941.

49. Seen. 43.

50. Interrog. K.K. (former member of Einsatzkommando 8), 31 May 1945, BStU ZUV 9, vol.19, pp. 224—25 (translated back from Russian to German).

51. Interrog. of E.F., former secretary in the KTI, 3 September 1959, ZStL 439 AR-Z 18a/60,vol. 1, pp. 68-69; further interrog. of I.L., former secretary in the Kanzlei des Fiihrers, 15 May1961, ibid., vol. 2, p. 428 ("I admit that with regard to the numerous telephone calls and thebusy correspondence between the Kanzlei des Fiihrers and the Reich Criminal InvestigationOffice a close contact existed").

52. See Wetzel to Lohse, 25 October 1941 (draft), NO 365; Nationalsozialistische Massentot-ungen (lurch Giftgas, ed. Eugen Kogon et al. (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1986).

53. Interrog. Albert Widmann, 27 and 28 January 1959 and 11 and 15 January 1960 (copies),ibid., pp. 33, 36, 79-80, and 88.

54. Tour report of Major von Payr of 11 August 1941. Quoted from Aly, p. 333. For generalcontext of the visit to Minsk see Volker RieB, Die Anfdnge der Vernichtung "lebensunwerten"Lebens in den Reichsgauen Danzig-Westpreufien und Wartheland 1939/40 (Frankfurt/Main:Peter Lang Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1995), particularly pp. 273-81; andJochen von Lang, Der Adjutant. Karl Wolff: Der Mann zwischen Hitler und Himmler(Munchen and Berlin: Herbig, 1985), pp. 170-73.


55. The officer for Jewish affairs in the Foreign Ministry, Franz Rademacher, in a note of 25October 1941. Quoted from Aly, p. 341; see also, pp. 340-47.

56. See fundamental study by Klaus A. Friedrich Schiiler, Logistik im Rufilandfeldzug: DieRolle der Eisenbahn bei Planting, Vorbereitung und Durchfiihrung des deutschen Angriffs aufdie Sowjetunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang,1987).

57. However, Breitman reports his considerations on Riga and Minsk. Shipping people toMinsk, which is located on the small river Svislotch, was almost impossible. See Richard Breit-man, The Architect of Genocide: Himmler and the "Final Solution" (London: Grafton, 1991),pp. 214—15. Besides there are considerable doubts about Eichmann's statement that he actuallycame to Himmler in the beginning of October, 1941, when Himmler was in Kiev. Eichmannsaid Himmler s "Feldkommandostelle" was there, a newly renovated building—impossible twoweeks after Kiev's conquest. More importantly, Himmler requested, according to Eichmann,a final report on Jewish emigration from Germany which Himmler had prohibited on the occa-sion of Eichmann's visit (interrog. Adolf Eichmann, 1 June 1960 and 17 July 1961, The Trial ofAdolf Eichmann [Jerusalem, 1995], vol. 7 [part 6, p. 26] and vol. 5, p. 1705). But Himmler toldHeydrich by phone to close "emigration of Jews" as late as 18 October (BA NS 19/1438), andonly on 23 October 1941 did Muller announce that Himmler had prohibited Jewish emigration(Helmut Krausnick, "Judenverfolgung,' Anatomie des SS-Staates, vol. 2 [4. Impr., Miinchen:Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1984], p. 307). The meeting between Himmler and Eichmann tookplace after 1 November 1941 when Eichmann ordered a statistical survey of Jewish emigrationfrom the "Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland"; (Scheffler, p. 24). Officially, Eich-mann's statistics about Jewish emigration ended with 31 October 1941 (record of the Wannseeconference, Akten zur deutschen auswdrtigen Politik, Serie E: 1941-1945, vol. I [Gottingen,1969], p. 269).

In his interview with Wim Sassen, Eichmann stated that this report to Himmler tookplace "near Minsk or Kiev." "The Reichsfuhrer wanted an . . . almost general report,. . . anentire survey of the work of the Security Police toward solution of the Jewish question, [so] Ireported the whole case to him here." BA All.Proz.6/95, pp. 20-21. For this I thank PeterWitte. Possibly Eichmann confused this visit with a journey with Muller to Himmler at Hege-wald, Ukraine, on 11 August 1942 (Himmler's Terminkalender, Osobyi arkhiv Moscow 1372-5-23, p.146). Further research is needed to clarify this.

58. See Reich Ministry of Transport (RVM), Certificate of Employment, 28 October 1942,Berlin Document Center (BDC), personal record Fritz Allihn; RVM, Eastern Branch, InlandShipping Department B Ost I 48/41, Binnenschiffahrt im groBen Feld des Dnjepr-Bug-Systems, 10 September 1941 (two documents, one for the public, one for Allihn), BA MA RW19/2186 (quotation). See also War Diary of Armaments Inspectorate of Ukraine, 16 October1941, BA MA RW 30/91, pp. 4-5; speech of Reichsminister Todt of 30 October 1941 in theMinistry for the Eastern Occupied Territories, Rolf-Dieter Muller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und diedeutsche Siedlungspolitik (Frankfurt/Main: S. Fischer, 1991), pp. 164ff.

59. See BDC, personal record Fritz Allihn. He was charged with bad supervision of his unit(which trashed an SS guest house), participation in the opening of a brothel in Auxerre, France,and a speeding offense.

60. "Only in August 1941 did I receive a letter from the Reichsfuhrer-SS as Reichskommissarfor the Strengthening of Germandom in the Occupied Eastern Territories [sic], that I was


chosen to be used in the East. I was thereupon appointed by the Reich Ministry of TransportB Ost through Herm Ministerialrat Dr. Ebhardt." Allihn to RVM, 26 June 1942, BDC, per-sonal record Fritz Allihn.

61. "Personal B Ost," BA R 6/425, p. 51; and Lage- und Arbeitsbericht iiber die Gruppe BOst, 6 March 1942, ibid., p. 85.

62. RVM, Eastern Branch, Inland Shipping Dep. B Ost I 48/41 (see n. 58).

63. The Pripet River is situated in Belorussia but was given to the ReichskommissariatUkraine; the Reich Ministry of Occupied Eastern Territories was in ultimate control.

64. Quotation from Aly, p. 340.

65. In 1942 the Germans briefly held the Volga-Don Canal near Stalingrad, but never madeuse of it. The document might be linked to the Baltic-White Sea Canal, also considered inplans for deportation of Jews (Aly, p. 274), but the Germans never reached it. The same holdsfor the Moscow waterways system.

66. Two other participants belonged to the Reich Security Main Office. Reich Minstry ofTransport, B Ost I/II, Aufzeichnung iiber die Sitzung am 11.September 1941, 15 September1941, BA R 6/425, pp. 9-12. For information about Weinmann I am grateful to Michael Wildt.

67. See Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories (RMO), II lc, Notice of 21 No-vember 1941; RMOIII B Ostl/III, Minutes of the conference of 10 December 1941, 6 January1942; and Lage- und Arbeitsbericht iiber die Gruppe III B Ost, 6 March 1942, BA R 6/425,pp. 48, 63 (back), and 85 (back)-86.

68. See Economic Staff East, Main Department Fu/M/T.u.V, Holzschiffbau in Pinsk, 27 Janu-ary 1942; Economic Staff East, III B Ost, to OKW/War Economy and Armaments Office, 10January 1942 and other correspondence, all BA MA RW 19/2186.

69. See Brandt to Greifelt, 4 December 1941, BA R 49/981: "The Reichsfiihrer-SS has heardthat the plans of Reichsminister Todt for canals, streets, and railways in the East are almostready. The Reichsfiihrer-SS is very interested in these plans, which are very important for thesettlement of the ethnic Germans in the East."

70. On this see Willy Dahlgriin, Erfahrungsbericht iiber den Einsatz der Verwaltungspolizeiin RuBland-Mitte und WeiBruthenien, 16 June 1943, BA R 19/137, p. 125.

71. HSSPF Russia Center, Beurteilung fiir Konrad Breuer, 8 October 1943 (on duty since 1August 1941), BDC, personal record Konrad Breuer.

72. See Der Reichsfuhrer-SS, SS-Befehl, 15 January 1942, BA D-H ZM 885, A. 10. Accordingto this the SS and police supplies' base in Russia Center was to be "best in Mogilev," includingaccommodations for 3,000, hospitals for 2,000, and a clothing depository for 20,000 men. Butit was erected in Bobruisk.

73. See file BA R 6/425.

74. See RVM, Dep. B Ost KSW, 24 July 1942, BA MA RW 19/2186; RVM, Certificate ofEmployment, 28 October 1942, BDC, personal record Fritz Allihn.

75. War Diary of Economic Staff East, 27 March 1942, MZAP (BArchP) F 43385, p. 123.


76. See "Transports of the Enemy at the Soviet-German Front" in Compendium of the Ger-man Wehrtnacht, ed. Main Administration of the Secret Service of the Red Army, 1943, trans-lated by OKH/Foreign Armies East, BA MA H 12/34; Curt Poirier, Head of the Inland ShipTransport Branch of the Reich Transport Section Kiev, Bericht iiber die Binnenschiffahrt inder Ukraine 1943 (without date), BAP 46.04, No. 9, pp. 238-97, esp. 275-92.

77. See ibid., p. 277 (back); RMO, III B Ost, Minutes of conference of 10 December 1941, 6January 1942; and RMO, III B Ost, Notice for Deputy Minister Meyer, 4 May 1942, BA R 6/425, pp. 66 (back) and 95 (back). Aly (p. 345, n. 45) is wrong here; his source ("Final Reportof the Economic Staff East" in Die deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik in den besetzten sowjetischenGebieten 1941-1943, ed. Rolf-Dieter Miiller [Boppard: Harald Boldt, 1991], p. 233) says noth-ing at all about ship traffic at the ruined dam.

78. See Himmler's contacts with Pohl, Daluege, Wolff, and Police Brigade General Gerloff:records of Himmler's telephone calls, 3, 5, 7, and 10 February and 21 April 1942, BA NS 19/1439; Terminkalender Grothmann, 7, 16, and 22 April, 5 May, and 11 and 12 September 1942,BA NS 19/3959.1 want to thank Peter Witte for this reference.

79. Himmler's daily calendar, 1 November 1942, Osobyi arkhiv Moscow 1372-5-23, p. 57.

80. See Report of Poirier, BAP 46.04, pp. 276-77, and RVM, Certificate of Employment, 28October 1942 ("on the whole he performed his assignments"), BDC, personal record FritzMlihn.

81. Pressac, pp. 64—65.

82. There is no indication of their existence in the cases StA Miinchen I 22 Ks 1/61, BStUZUV 9 (both concerning Einsatzkommando 8), ZStL 202 AR-Z 52/59 (against Bach-Zelewski),and StA Nurnberg-Furth 12 Js 300/67 (against Bach-Zelewski's staff).

83. Tatigkeits- und Lagebericht der Einsatzgruppe B fur die Zeit vom 16. bis 28. Februar, 1March 1942, BStU ZUV 9, vol. 31, p. 159; also in Osobyi arkhiv Moscow 500-1-770, p. 8.According to this the Einsatzgruppe received two big "gas vans" ("Gaswagen," the originalexpression) on 23 February 1942; they already had two little ones.

84. Prohibition by the Commander of the Rear Area, Army Group Center v. Schenckendorffon 12 November 1941 according to Hannes Heer, "Killing Fields: Die Wehrmacht und derHolocaust," Mittelweg 36 3 (1994), p. 25; prohibition by Commander of Army Group Center v.Bock on 12 November 1941, according to Klaus Reinhardt, Die Wende vor Moskau (Stuttgart:Deutsch Verlags-Anstalt, 1972) p. 189. See also Hans Safrian, Die Eichmann-Manner (Wienand Zurich: Europaverlag, 1993), p. 150.

85. See letter of R.S., 25 March 1959, and his interrog., 5 August 1958 [i.e., 1959], ZStL 202AR-Z 52/59, vol. 4, pp. 435 and 641(back)^2 with a detailed description of a supposed execu-tion of 300 German Jews in October 1941. See further Report of M. Nicaise, Belgian ConsulGeneral in Stockholm, based on an eyewitnesses account of August 1944, U.S. National Ar-chives, Record Group 226, Plain Number File, Document 102832 (NND 750140). Thanks toRichard Breitman for drawing my attention to this document. There are other hints at thearrival of German Jews in Borisov and Bobruisk, but no proof.

86. See the trial StA Hamburg 147 Js 22/70 and several reports to that issue, BAP F 3341,pp. 781-806.


87. "Secret report of Grischin Partisan Brigade," 7 September 1943, Soviet Partisans in WorldWar II, ed. John Armstrong (Madison, 1964), p. 735. See interrog. H.K., 6 August 1959, ZStL202 AR-Z 52/59, vol. 4, p. 637; interrog. H.W., K.J., and A.P., 5, 4, and 7 November 1959, vol.5, pp. 804, 821 (back), and 832 (back); interrog. F.H., 8 October 1959, vol. 6, pp. 1154-55.

88. See interrog. H.W., K.J. and A.P. (as in n. 87), letter and interrog. R.S. (as in n. 85).

89. See ibid.; letter and interrog. H.K., 30 May and 6 August 1959, ibid., vol. 4, pp. 634 and637; interrog. G.M.M., 20 November and judgement against him of 20 December 1949, ZStL202 AR-Z 184/67, doc. vol. 2, pp. 474-75 and 479-81; StA Nurnberg-Furth 12 Js 300/67, finalreport, vol. 4, pp. 1893-95 and 1903-1908.

90. According to Report of Belgian Consul General in Stockholm, August 1944 (as in n. 85).

91. See StA Hamburg 147 Js 29/67, in particular reports of S.S., J.H., and N.K. (all withoutdate), special vol. J, pp. 12 and 71-72, and special vol. Kl, pp. 46-48; Affidavit K.E., 3 October1947, special vol. A, p. 28; his interrog., 2 November 1961, vol. 12, p. 2203; interrog. H.V., 31January 1962, vol. 13, p. 2425 (both survivors of the Mogilev transport); and letter of the Ger-man witness E.F. based on a diary entry for 26 May 1942, vol. 15, pp. 2992-93; see also En-zyklopadie des Holocaust (Berlin: Argon, 1993), p. 1321.

92. Conclusion of the Commission of Investigation of the City of Mogilev, 8 October 1944(German translation), ZStL UdSSR, vol. 425, pp. 277-306. Partly published in: "Gott mit uns":Der deutsche Vernichtungskrieg im Osten, ed. Ernst Klee and Willy DreBen (Frankfurt/Main:S. Fischer, 1989), pp. 189-95. See also Report of Belgian Consul General in Stockholm, August1944 (as in n. 85).

93. See HSSPF Russia Center and White Ruthenia, Verlegung von Dienststellen, 8 Septem-ber 1943, MZAP SF-01/31688, p. 77; statements of Bach-Zelewski, Aufbau, 6 September 1946;War Diary Wirtschaftskommando Mogilev, 21-30 September 1943, BA MA RW 31/850.

94. See Dieter Pohl, Von der "Judenpolitik" zum Judenmord: Der Distrikt Lublin des General-gouvernements (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1993), pp. 104-106.
