HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN -SOVIET WAR

By O. PRINCIPINI

The Genllo71·S0-vjct tUt'lr is being lough.t on Sitch It tre1tlendous seate01 ?/len and miles that it will lor a wng time be impossible to obtain a.clear lJieture of the actual course of events. Yet 80me general outlinesare discernible. It is al?'eady obvious that the battle between Germanyand the USSR differs from th~ previous campaigns of the prcsent war.Here a'/'e the views of a competent obsertler on the Ii-rst twelve weeks 01hostilitics.-K.M.

The Russo-German conflict, in the"first twelve weeks of war, has had twoessential phases-the "battle of thefrontier" and the "battle of the StalinLine": battles of giants, the struggleof colossa" armies, along frontiers andin war-zones practically unlimited.

While it is still too early thoroughlyto examine the various phases of thefighting, certain conclusions are alreadyclearly enough revealed. However, anobjective military or political observer,before reaching definite conclusions,must proceed cautiously. limiting him­self to a rational examination of the'first fundamental aspects of the tre­mendous struggle and deducting fromthem the basic elements for a logicaland well-based judgment.

Out of the fog of military secrecy thefirst lights and shadows of the newwar have begun to appear.

Russia, upon entering this war, couldrely on two sources of strength: thetremendous distances, and the hugereserves of man-power and materials;we shall later see how these have beenutilized by the Red High Command.

Initiative and surprise-two fun­damental elements of success in war­seem t.o have disappeared immediately,and perhaps forever, from the handsof the Red Headquarters. Three otherelements, however, seem still uncertainto the distant observer: the moralc!)hesion of the Red troops; the leader­ship of the Red Command; and the

actual p;ovision of adequate, timelyand effiCIent material aid to the SovietUnion by Britain and America.

NO BLITZKRIEG IN RUSSIA?

During the first week of the warthere was real fear in London andWashington, perhaps more than inMoscow, of seeing Russia "blitzed" ina few weeks, as had been the case firstin Pola.nd. then France, and most re­cently in Yugoslavia and Greece. Andas Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev aretoday still in Russian hands, the Anglo­American press speaks of a victoriousRussian resistance.

The truth may very soon turn out tobe quite different. It seems that in theRussian campaign the German Com­mand has again taken the enemy bysurprise, not only in the choice of timebut also in the choice of tacticalmethods. It should be rememberedthat the real military purpose of a waris the defeat of the enemy forces, notthe occupation of enemy territories.Victory is very often manifested, it istrue, by the occupation of enemy ter­ritories, but not unless the occupationof the strategic territorial objectivespresupposes the destruction of the de­fending forces by depriving the enemyof the very sources of his war-powerand by striking directly at the heartand will of enemy resistance. All thisis only true if, after the objectiveshave been reached, there are no more

HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR 25

enemy forces left capable of annullingthe success already obtained.

From reports known to us up to now-reports that are necessarily frag­mentary and incomplete - we areprompted to conclude that the GermanCommand is applying in Russia a newtactical method which is perhaps mostappropriate to the particular situationon the Russian front. There has beenno spectacular drive, none of thoseaudacious, impressive, arrow-likethrusts, as that on Lemberg in 1939 tocut any possible junction of Polandwith Rumania, or as in France in 1940the thrust on Amiens, Abbeville, andDunkirk, or that on Athens throughSalonika and Larissa. In the Russiancampaign, the day-to-day situation ofthe opposing fronts has on Borne daysshown wide and deep indentations to­ward the east; but generally the frontshave kept, and are continuing to keep,an almost unbroken line.

Perhaps the German Command, tak­ing into consideration the vastness ofthe Red provinces and the great nume­rical strength of the Soviet armies,preferred to thrust directly into sepa·rate enemy armies instead of at greatterritorial objectives. In other words,"blitzkrieg" localized against the de­fending forces, as at Bialystok andMinsk, at Vitebsk and Smolensk, as re­cently between the lower Bug and lowt;rDniepr and as in many other locali­ties all along the wide Russian front.

STALIN LOSES ADVANTAGE OFSPACE

Another of the main conclusions ithas been possible to draw immediatelyafter the "battle of the frontier" isthat Stalin has been compelled to giveup his advantage of space. EnormousRussian land and aerial forces havebeen compelled to fight and have beendefeated, all along the frontier, sincethe first day of the campaign withoutbeing able to withdraw to the mainRussian defense line.

The "hattIe of the frontier" has fullyconfirmed what the German High Com­mand suspected, namely, that Russiawas for a long time secretly preparingfor war, massing her forces to strikeat Germany while the latter was en­gaged on other fronts. The tenaciousresistance met by the German troopssince the first day of this campaignhas been possible only because therewere already Russian troops and mate­rial at the Russo-German frontier prac­tically ready to start the offensivethemselves.

Perha.ps history will later recordthat it is just this which has been thefatal self-condemnation of Soviet Rus­~a. The timely move of the GermanArmy compelled the Soviet Commandto employ a great quantity of its forceswhen the Red Army was not yet com­pletely ready to fight. And moreover,to fight not only at a time but also ina territory and in a manner less favor­able to the Soviet forces.

In a defensive struggle such as theone now imposed on the Soviet forces,the Russian High Command had prob­ably intended to exploit to the maxi­mum the vastness and depth of theendless Soviet territory: in other words,to give up space in order to gain time;to gain time in order to prepare a fightunder the most favorable conditions,namely, where, when, and in which­ever way the grouping of her ownforces and the general situationmakes It advisable to fight, thatis, to maintain the bulk of her ownforces at a great distance from theenemy with a view to keeping fully herown freedom of action and of maneu­ver; to withdraw as far as possiblefrom the starting-bases of the Germanforces in order to compel the GermanCommand to lose time by searching forthe enemy, to build new advance-basesfor its land and air forces, and to re­open long ways of communication orto bring into use new ones.

We all know today that exactly theopposite happened. The Red HighCommand had deployed towards the

26 THE XXth CENTURY

west all the bulk, and perhaps the bestpart. of its mammoth war-machine: itsheadquarters, its mechanized units, itsimposing land troops, its airfields, itsdeposits of supplies. These Russianforces, arrayed for an attack, were nowsuddenly forced to fight a defensivebattle in a mo t critical situation. Sinceit was impo..sible to take up in timepositions further back-as would havebeen advisable in a defensive battle-­the Russian Command had to acceptopen battle from the first day of thewar, under conditions of great dis­advantage to its own forces. Indeedthe German Army was able, from thebeginning of the campaign, to developto the full its unfa.iling ability for theoffensive, operating at short distancesfrom its own starting-bases.

For the Russian High Command thesurprise was complete. Not until afterthe first week of war was it reorganiz­ed and the front divided into thethree known sectors: northern, central,and southern (Voroshilov, Timoshenko,Budenny).

THE STALIN LINEThe Stalin Line has already given

its name to the second phas'e of thewar. The fate of the great fortifiedlines in this war has been unfortunate.Mannerheim, Maginot, and Metaxaswere really ill-advised to give theirnames to the principal defensive or­ganizations of Finland, France, andGreece. Will the name of Stalin beany more fortunate? The results sofar achieved by the Germans justifyus in seriously doubting this.

We do not as yet precisely knoweither the actual course or the con­structive details of the "Stalin Line."It would seem likely that such a linehas for its main object the defense ofMoscow, Leningrad, and Kharkov; forit more immediate object the defenseof the line of great advance centres:Reval-Smolensk-Kiev-Odessa. A sum­mary glance at the map of Russia issufficient to mnke clear that this lineis undoubtedly powerful, due perhaps

more to its natural advantages than itsdefensive preparations. Of great valueare the supporting wings at the twoopposite ends of the line, facing re­spectively the Baltic and the BlackSeas.

In the north, the system seems tohave consisted of an advanced line ofdefense along the lower river Dvina, aline which is completed in the rear byan excellent defense in depth, linked upwith the Lake Peipus region and sup­ported at a convenient distance by thenaval base of Kronstadt and the greatsUpply base of Leningrad.

In the south. on the Black Sea front,there was another multiple system ofdefense lines. First, an advanced line offortifications along the lower Dniestr,well supported by the central supplybase of Odessa and by the naval base ofNiko}ayev. The main defense line wasperhaps constructed along the lowerriver Bug. Still further to the east isa defense line curving back onto thelower Dniepr, whose course at thispoint turns in again towards the east,which is not very favorable for theeconomical defense of that territory.

In the centre, the Stalin Line wasprobably based on the rivers Dvina andDniepr. Toward its centre the coursesof these two rivers (flowing in oppositedirections) do not meet but turn off atan abrupt right.angle to the east,forming in that sector a wide corridor,long known as the "CQrridor of Smo­lensk." The cities of Vitebsk andSmolensk are both within this corridor.This is precisely the most dangerouspoint of the whole front, for throughhere passes the shortest route to Mos­cow, that is to the heart of the wholeRussian defense system. SmCllenskreally deserves the name of the WesternGate of Moscow. Napoleon used thisroute for his advance on Moscow. Inthis ~ar. Smolensk has already givenits name to what is perhaps so farthe bloodiest battle of the war. BothVitebsk and Smolensk are entirely inthe hands of German troops.

HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR 2'1

THE BATTLE OF THE STALINLINE

This battle appears so far to be thedecisive battle of the whole Russiancampaign. War communiques confirmwith daily increasing clarity that theRussian High Command has decided tothrow into the Stalin Line the greaterpart of its fighting forces. The battleis still in full swing, but the outlines~re visible.

For many weeks the German HighCommand has been hammering at theStalin Line at various points, alternat­ing its blows between the centre andthe north and the centre and thesouth; with feints to the right and realblows to the left; with feints towardsthe Baltic and a terrific blow towardsthe Black Sea. The Soviet Commandhas tried to parry these blows as bestit could, and to stop up with all pos­sible haste the most threatening gapsin the system, thereby undoubtedlyusing up tremendous quantities of itsland and air forces.

In the south, large Axis forces havegot around the Dniestr and Bug fromabove, so 'that these two rivers havequickly lost all defensive value. Theconquest of Nikolayev has effectively-sealed the fate of Odessa, if not thepotential fate of the whole rich coastalregion facing the Black Sea. In thecentre, large German forces have cross­ed the Dniepr, and turning to thesouth. already menace the rear of thewhole defense system hinging on thegreat population centre of Kiev. Inthe northern sector, Leningrad isgripped in a vice, from the south andfrom the north. The fall of Leningradwould entail that of Kronstadt, where­by the Soviet forces lose their lastremaining communications with theBaltic.

THE SOVIET UNION NEEDS MOREARMS

At the beginnin~of the war the worldwas stunned by information published,about the Soviet Army: officers, air-

planes, tanks, in tens upon tens ofthousands, soldiers in tens of millions;and other practically inexhaustible warresources in general. Truly impressivefigures, even in comparison with thecolossal war machines of the most mo­dern and most powerful countries inthe world.

Today, after over two months of war,Stalin has apparently sent out desper­ate S.O.S. messages to his friends inLondon and Washington. We do notknow yet whether he has asked for aidin the form of man-power; but he hascertainly made urgent requests for helpin the form of war machinery andmunitions, and perhaps of fo?d; andit seems he even needs gasolme andother fuels and lubricants.

Supposing that all these things wereavailable. how are they going to reachRussia? There is the painful ques­tion of ships already sunk in hugenumbers on all the Seven Seas. Thisproblem of transport was of mostpressing urgency even before the Ger­man-Soviet war created new demands.

THE SOVIET COMMAND AND THERUSSIAN SOLDIER

The capacity for leadership of theRussian High Command cannot yet bedefinitely judged, but it can already besubjected to severe criticism. The RedArmy has long been called a "giantwith a head of clay:' Years of "Redpurges" have wrought havoc in theArmy, particularly in the upper com­mand, causing a grave crisis in quantityand quality, which has most certainlyhad an unfavorable influence on theconduct of the war. Up till now theRussian High Command has had tosubmit almost entirely to the initiativeof the enemy.

Commanders and general staffs arenot to be found in a hurry. To preparegood military leaders, just as to pre­pare good scientists, years of intensive,patient, and conscientious work arenecessary; above all today, when tech­nical science pervades and often pre-

28 THE XXth CENTURY

dominates in nearly all fields of waractivity. The use of large modernarmies, provided with complex and de­licate instruments of war, requires inthe commanders a capacity for organi­zation which can only be acquired afterlong and assiduous experience of com­mand.

Anti-Soviet propaganda, especiallythat of England and America, hasalways represented Russia as a herdof cattle, held together by the whipof the herdsman Stalin with the aid ofhis faithful horde of vicious watchdogs,the OGPU. With or without a whip,the fact remains that the Red soldiershave certainly put up a good fight thesefirst two months of war. The GermanCommand has not failed to point thisout. The younger generation in Rus­sia, having grown up in the atmo­sphere of the Soviet regime, has learnedto obey, to march and to die.

THE RED ARMY AND THE LES­SONS OF PREVIOUS CAMPAIGNS

Russia entered the war nearly twoyears after the outbreak of the presentEuropean war. By now the Red Armyhas had the benefit of utilizing to itsown advantage the lessons learned byothers through experience. In thiswar, absolute supremacy in land war­fare has until now been held con­tinuously by the airplane and the tank.The binomial term of attack, "planesand tanks," has suddenly altogetherousted the old binomial term of defense,"trenches and machine-guns," whichlargely predominated in aU sectors ofthe last World War.

Up till the beginning of the presentwar, the Red Army seemed to beamong the best equipped in the world,especially in the fields of aviation andmechanized forces; at least in quantityif not in quality. It was therefore ina position to carry out a rapid adapta­tion to new methods of land warfare,based precisely on the intelligent use ofairplanes and tanks.

In conBidering the Soviet perfor­mances so far one must recognize that"planes and tanks" are primarily usedfor offensive and counter-offensive.Russia, forced suddenly to fight on thedefensive, has not been able to makemuch use of her gIl'eat numeric'a!strength in airplanes and tanks; more­over many were quickly destroyed bythe German forces. . The overratedSoviet parachute troops never put ina serious appearance.

The Red Army does not seem tohave succeeded in contriving an "armorof defense" capable of halting effective­ly the attacking might of moderntechnical and aerial forces. But it haslearned from the French defeat to fightin a very deep front and always tokeep sufficient reserves to deal withenemy forces that have succeeded inbreaking through.

REPERCUSSIONS

In the general fielg of the Europeanconflict, the beginning of the Russo­German campaign had tremendous re­percussions; it was immediately hailedby the Anglo-American press. Londonheaved a sigh of relief. The specterof a German invasion vanished onceagain. At Suez and at Gibraltaranxiety diminished. Traditional Britishpolicy could really boast of a genuinesuccess. At last a new ally had joinedthe British Forces. Stalin was prepar­ing to fight to the last RusBian. Inthe heart of every EnglishQlan waskindled the hope of seeing Germanyhopelessly bogged in the Pripetmarshes, crushed in the embrace of theRussian giant.

But apparently Stalin was morerealistic, directly attacking the vitalpart of the problem: the active andeffective co-operation of England andAmerica. He would not be satisfiedwith empty guarantees like those givento Poland and others. He wanted notfine words but deeds: airplanes, can­nons, munitions; not bombardments byReuter but genuine and effective-

HIGH LIGHTS OF THE GERMAN-SOVIET WAR 29

•

bombardments against the commonenemy; fewer hymns of praise in honorof the Soviet soldiers but effective co­operation of British soldiers.

This new problem soon became amajor anxiety for London as well asWashington. Were they to makeBritish troops march on the heels ofthe Axis? This was without doubt themost propitious moment to date, withthe greater part of the Axis troopsengaged on the eastern front.

But where were they to marchBritish troops to? The European con­tinent? The High Command in Londonis still nursing the wounds received byBritish forces in Norway, at D~nkirk,

and in the Balkans. Moreover, to dis-

embark on the Continent would meanships, thousands of ships.

Perhaps the possibility could beexamined of another enterprise wherethe going was easy, such as the offen­sive in Cyrenaica against Italian troopswho were without mechanized equip­ment; or the offensive in East Africaagainst Italian forces who had beenisolated from their own country for ayear; or the most recent campaignsagainst Iraq and the French in Syria?

We know now that the answer wasIran. This occupation of a neutralcountry brings British soldiers to thePersian oilfields and to the gates ofthose of Baku. How much the Russianswill benefit by it, remains to be seen.