high yield and bank loan outlook - april 2013

INVESTMENT PROFESSIONALS

B. SCOTT MINERD

Chief Investment Officer

ANTHONY D. MINELLA, CFA

Co-Head of Corporate Credit

MICHAEL P. DAMASO

Co-Head of Corporate Credit

JEFFREY B. ABRAMS

Senior Managing Director, Portfolio Manager

KEVIN H. GUNDERSEN, CFA

Senior Managing Director, Portfolio Manager

KELECHI C. OGBUNAMIRI

Senior Associate, Investment Research

APRIL 2013

High Yield and Bank Loan Outlook

First quarter 2013 returns of 2.9 and 2.4 percent in the high yield bond and bank loan market, respectively, represent the weakest performance to begin a year since 2008. Extended valuations and historically low yields have begun to elicit warnings of a bubble in the high yield market. While leveraged credit is far from the bargain it was four years ago, discussions of a bubble are premature at this point. Although we have entered the advanced stages of the rally, historical precedent and the continuation of accommodative monetary policy suggest that spreads, particularly those of lower-rated credits, may tighten materially from current levels.

With monetary policy mitigating credit risk in the near term, investor focus has shifted to interest rate risk. During the past quarter, rate-sensitive BB bonds underperformed floating-rate single B bank loans by over 100 basis points, a trend we expect to continue. Given the limited supply of net new bank loans, the robust demand from collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and loan funds should continue to provide a strong technical bid. In the bond market, we remain focused on identifying select opportunities in upper middle-market tranches, where there is a greater ability to drive outcomes.

REPORT HIGHLIGHTS:

• The typical credit cycle, following a recession, lasts approximately 60 months with spreads not beginning to widen until the 80th month. Discussions of a bubble may be early, considering that the current credit rally will just be entering its 46th month post-recession in April 2013.

• Concerns of a sudden shift in monetary policy derailing the credit rally appear largely unfounded. The Federal Reserve has given no indication of plans to begin normalizing accommodation or tightening until 2015, at the earliest. Additionally, historical precedent shows that, in four out of the last five credit rallies, spreads continued to tighten even after the Fed began raising rates.

• Retail demand for bank loans remains robust as investors seek to minimize interest rate risk. Dating back to last year, loan funds have registered 31 consecutive weeks of positive inflows through March 2013. Year-to-date inflows of approximately $13 billion have already exceeded the total for full year 2012.

• The resurgence of the CLO market has contributed to the rise in loan issuance during the first quarter of 2013. Bank loan issuance totaled $150 billion in the first three months of this year, a level not reached until August last year. 64 percent of this year’s issuance has been used for refinancings, resulting in lower spreads and all-in yields.

INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR COMMENTARY IG • HY • ABS • CMBS • RMBS

HIGH YIELD AND BANK LOAN OUTLOOK | Q2 2013

CREDIT SUISSE HIGH YIELD INDEX RETURNS CREDIT SUISSE LEVERAGED LOAN INDEX RETURNS

SOURCE: CREDIT SUISSE. DATA AS OF 03/31/2013.

■ Q1 2012 ■ Q1 2013 ■ Q1 2012 ■ Q1 2013

SOURCE: CREDIT SUISSE. EXCLUDES SPLIT B HIGH YIELD BONDS AND BANK LOANS. *DISCOUNT MARGIN TO MATURITY ASSUMES THREE-YEAR AVERAGE LIFE.

Leveraged Credit Scorecard AS OF MONTH END

HIGH YIELD BONDS

Dec-12 Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13Spread Yield Spread Yield Spread Yield Spread Yield

Credit Suisse High Yield Index 554 6.25% 519 5.99% 521 5.95% 508 5.80%

Split BBB 302 4.16% 269 3.92% 274 3.90% 269 3.80%

BB 376 4.58% 348 4.48% 358 4.48% 361 4.50%

Split BB 442 5.03% 432 5.04% 428 4.94% 429 4.95%

B 566 6.27% 536 6.04% 536 5.96% 516 5.75%

CCC / Split CCC 958 10.21% 885 9.56% 880 9.44% 844 9.09%

BANK LOANS

Dec-12 Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13DMM* Price DMM* Price DMM* Price DMM* Price

Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index 555 96.60 531 97.50 522 97.65 499 98.14

Split BBB 296 100.30 290 100.54 286 100.34 279 100.57

BB 385 100.22 370 100.63 372 100.40 354 100.68

Split BB 486 100.26 479 100.68 459 100.44 444 100.86

B 584 98.58 536 99.75 527 99.54 514 99.98

CCC / Split CCC 1,359 79.39 1,288 80.85 1,256 81.72 1,213 82.97

2%

0%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

Index Split BBB BB B

Split BB

CCC / Split CCC

2.9%

2.1%

3.2%

5.0% 5.3%

10.4%

1.0% 1.7%

3.5% 3.5% 3.8%

5.5%

2%

0%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

Index Split BBB BB B

Split BB

CCC / Split CCC

2.4%

1.2%

2.1% 2.8%

1.3%

2.4%

5.0%

8.9%

5.0%

3.5% 3.4%

1.5%


Macroeconomic OverviewSTRENGTH OF HOUSING AND EMPLOYMENT SHIFTS FOCUS FROM FUNDAMENTALS TO POLICY

Macroeconomic Factors: Housing and Employment Providing Strong Tailwinds

The U.S. expansion is unlikely to be derailed given the strength of housing and employment.

The recovery in employment tends to be understated due to the sheer magnitude of the

drawdown at the height of the financial crisis and continued softness in the public sector.

In the private sector, the U.S. economy is currently adding an average of 175,000 jobs per

month since March 2010, a rate that is over 20 percent higher than that of the prior expansion.

Turning to housing, January and February 2013 marked the best two-month period of new

home sales since 2008. Given the low levels of existing home inventory, housing starts should

continue to rise, providing a boon to construction employment. Additionally, with home values

reaching their highest levels since 2007, this should drive increased consumption. Housing

tends to be the largest asset on the balance sheets of American households and unlike rising

stock portfolios, home appreciation is generally viewed as a more permanent source of wealth.

Monetary Backdrop: Normalization vs. Tightening

As the economy powers along, economic risk has been replaced by growing event and

policy risk. Recent rumblings regarding the inevitable normalization of monetary policy have

created concern that a sudden policy shift could derail the credit rally. The market is failing

to distinguish between normalization and tightening. Tightening refers to the Fed raising

interest rates with the intended purpose of restricting economic activity to prevent overheating.

Removing accommodation, or normalization, is not the same as tightening. While this is a very

important distinction, the bottom line remains that we are still a long ways away from either.

More importantly, Fed tightening has historically been viewed as a positive for the broader

economy since it signals the anticipation of sustained growth. Following the previous five

periods of extended monetary accommodation, credit spreads continued to tighten after

the first Fed rate hike on four occasions.

“During periods of strong fundamental valuation like we witnessed in 2008 and 2009, the margin of safety in investing is high. If you purchased a portfolio of high yield assets and one or two securities within it performed badly, the strong return on the others would protect you from taking a loss. Today, the margin of safety is slowly being eroded as good value is being replaced with overvaluation. We have not reached the point where it is time to head for the exits, but it cannot hurt to figure out where they are.”

– Scott Minerd, Chief Investment Officer

25%

15%

5%

-15%

-5%

20%

10%

0%

-10%

Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11 Dec-11 Mar-12 Jun-12 Sep-12 Dec-12 Mar-13

-1%

1%

5% 6%

-2%

3% 2% 3%

7%

17%15%

3% 4% 3%

8%

-3%

19%

9%9%

-14%

-4%

14%14%15%

19%

U.S. CONSTRUCTION JOB GAINS AS A SHARE OF TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR JOB GROWTH

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, GUGGENHEIM INVESTMENTS. DATA AS OF 03/31/2013.

The rebound in the housing market has led to strong job growth in the U.S. construction sector. Over the past four months, nearly one out of every five new private sector jobs created has been in the construction sector.


Investment Implications: Following the 2004 Script

Piecing together current market sentiment with the macroeconomic and monetary backdrop,

present conditions appear very similar to those of 2004. Back in 2004, the economy was

entering its third year of expansion following the recession of 2001. At the time, skeptics

questioned the ‘jobless recovery’, but as market confidence grew, risk assets continued their

ascent with high yield bonds and equities rising 17 and 28 percent, respectively, over the

subsequent three-year period. As we would later find out, this period would also prove to be

the formative years of asset bubbles, most notably in housing. While we believe the market will

follow a similar script over the next three years, the credit market is not currently exhibiting the

traditional characteristics of a bubble.

It is important to make a clear distinction between an overvalued market and an asset bubble.

While overvalued markets have lost much of the fundamental cheapness that provided a

cushion against market noise and pullbacks, they can remain overvalued for an extended

period of time. These periods are generally referred to as bull markets. An asset bubble,

on the other hand, represents a market reaching unjustifiably high valuations that have never

been seen before. Given that bond spreads are still 200 basis points wide of all-time tights

and we are likely to remain in a period of low defaults for the next several years, we are not

in a bubble yet but the chances of one forming increases the longer the Fed maintains its

accommodative policies. Amid stretched valuations and lower margins of safety, investors

need to be alert to a sudden reversal of fortunes in the market. In the following sections,

we describe how investors can position their leveraged credit portfolios in an effort to

safeguard against future risks.

Cred

it Su

isse

U.S

. Hig

h Yi

eld

Bond

Spr

eads

(Nor

mal

ized

Spr

ead

= 10

0 a

t the

Firs

t Fed

Rat

e H

ike)

Months Following the First Fed Rate Hike

130

110

90

70

120

100

80

600 2 4 6 8 10 12

Credit Spreads Continuedto Tighten for 9 Months

on Average

Maximum Range

Average Since 1986

Minimum Range

U.S. HIGH YIELD BOND SPREAD PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING FED TIGHTENING

SOURCE: CREDIT SUISSE, BLOOMBERG, GUGGENHEIM INVESTMENTS. DATA AS OF 03/31/2013. THE RANGE IS

GENERATED BY CALCULATING THE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM VALUES FOR ALL FIVE PREVIOUS CYCLES.

Since 1986, of the five instances when the Fed began raising rates following an extended period of monetary accommodation, bond spreads continued to tighten on four occasions. Tightening of monetary policy does not necessarily lead to an immediate widening in credit spreads.


Q1 2013 Leveraged Credit Recap: Key InsightsRATE RISK BECOMING A LOOMING CONCERN FOR INVESTORS

• Last year, the strong performance of the new issue market was one of the primary drivers

of the sector’s success. In a trend that began during the latter half of 2012, aggressive new

issue bond pricing has begun to minimize investor upside. During the first quarter, high yield

bonds returned 2.9 percent, the lowest first quarter return since the end of the financial crisis.

• The trend of favorable new issue deal terms for issuers has been prevalent on the loan side

as well, but to a lesser extent. In select instances, investors have been able to push back

against increasingly aggressive deal structures and pricings. During the quarter, 22 deals

were pulled, representing $16 billion in proposed proceeds. For the quarter, bank loans

returned 2.4 percent, driven by strong institutional and retail demand.

• Reinvestment risk has become a serious concern for bank loan investors due to the wave of

refinancings. During the quarter, the sector saw $95 billion of refinancings, which on average,

lowered spreads by 90 basis points. The dearth of net new supply has compelled many

investors to participate in these transactions, resulting in lower spreads and weaker

call protection.

• With monetary policy largely neutralizing credit risk, interest rate risk has taken precedence.

Over the past three months, floating-rate single B bank loans outperformed BB bonds

by over 100 basis points. Additionally, we saw the long beta trade come back into favor

as CCC bonds outperformed BB bonds by 375 basis points during the quarter.

• We continue to see superior relative value in lower-rated, upper middle-market financings

($300 - $750 million). Leveraging our private debt platform, our deep relationships with

these issuers have provided greater opportunities to offer guidance on deal structure

and pricing levels.

2,000 bps

1,600 bps

1,200 bps

800 bps

400 bps

0 bps

50

60

70

80

90

100201320122011201020092008

AVERAGE: 751 bps

AVERAGE: 88.22

CREDIT SUISSE LEVERAGED LOAN INDEX HISTORICAL SNAPSHOT

SOURCE: CREDIT SUISSE. DATA AS OF 03/31/2013. *NOTE: PRICE IS INVERTED ON SECONDARY Y-AXIS.

■ DMM (LHS) ■ Price (RHS)

DMM (LHS) PRICE* (RHS)HIGH 1,842 98.14LOW 466 61.79LAST 499 98.14

Institutional and retail demand for bank loans has driven the Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index to its highest price since inception. Although bank loans offer greater protection and strong relative value compared to the high yield bond market, their high prices, coupled with weak call protection, limit the potential for meaning ful price appreciation from current levels.


Increasing Attractiveness of Bank LoansDEMAND OUTSTRIPPING SUPPLY CREATES STRONG TECHNICAL DYNAMIC

The increased protection of bank loans, in the form of floating-rate coupons, secured status,

seniority in the capital structure and maintenance covenants, has traditionally come at

a considerable yield discount to high yield bonds. In recent years, this yield discount has

narrowed with the Credit Suisse Leveraged Loan Index currently yielding just 45 basis points

less than the Credit Suisse High Yield Index, compared to the historical average of 160 basis

points. The burgeoning relative value of bank loans has attracted strong retail flows into

the sector, presumably at the expense of high yield bonds. During the first quarter, the loan

market enjoyed inflows of $13 billion, compared to inflows into bond funds of approximately

$1 billion. Retail investors, however, represent less than 25 percent of the high yield bond and

bank loan market and tend to be less ‘sticky’ than institutional capital. The more noteworthy

development has been the reemergence of the CLO market. CLOs, which represent 60 percent

of the buying base, are projected to finish 2013 with full-year issuance of $70 billion, eclipsing

last year’s total of $55 billion.

200 bps

100 bps

0 bps

-200 bps

-400 bps

-600 bps

-100 bps

-300 bps

-500 bps

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012

PRE-2008 RECESSION AVERAGE: -160 bps

Last: -45 bps

HISTORICAL YIELD DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN CREDIT SUISSE LEVERAGED LOAN AND HIGH YIELD INDEX

SOURCE: CREDIT SUISSE. DATA AS OF 03/31/2013.

Given the small yield discount of bank loans to high yield bonds, the bank loan market has been the recipient of strong inflows from both institutional and retail investors. As interest rate risk remains at the forefront of investor concerns, we would expect bank loans to outperform relative to higher duration BB corporate bonds.

Corporations have capitalized on the strong risk appetite to issue $150 billion in bank loans

during the first quarter. Due to the high level of refinancing activity, this has resulted in limited

incremental net new supply and has been easily absorbed by the market. 64 percent of total

issuance went towards refinancing activity, compared to 14 percent for leveraged buyouts

(LBOs). Based on attractive equity valuations and cheap debt financing, we do anticipate LBO

activity picking up over the course of the year, however, to this point, it has yet to materially add

new supply to the bank loan market. Of the $51 billion in LBO volume during the first quarter,

a single transaction, H.J. Heinz, represented over half of the total. The dearth in diversity

and volume of new leveraged loans has forced many investors to accept lower spreads in

refinancing transactions.


CHANGE IN OUTSTANDING LOANS AND INFLOW

SOURCE: S&P CAPITAL IQ LCD, LIPPER, EPFR. DATA AS OF 03/31/2013.

Strong CLO issuance and inflows into loan funds have created robust demand for bank loans at a time of stagnant supply. While this is generally a positive technical for the sector, it has also given rise to a wave of refinancings that has removed spread from the sector.

■ Change in Outstandings ■ CLO Issuance/Prime-fund Inflows

$20Bn

$15 Bn

$10 Bn

$0 Bn

$5 Bn

-$10 Bn

-$5 Bn

Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12 Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12 Jan-13 Feb-13 Mar-13

The massive imbalance between demand and supply underscores our constructive view

on the bank loan market. Factoring in loan redemptions and prepayments, the total size

of the U.S. leveraged loan market has increased by less than two percent since the end

of 2012. However, this positive technical is tempered by lower forward return forecasts.

Refinancings are removing an average of 90 basis points of spread on each deal,

while lenders are increasingly being forced to accept call protection of just six months

compared to the standard 12 months.

Optimal Portfolio Positioning TRANSITIONING FROM OFFENSE TO DEFENSE

As the Fed continues to engineer an environment of ample liquidity, resulting in low defaults,

it remains an optimal time to take prudent credit risk. While we believe the leveraged credit

sector has more room to the upside, there is one important caveat. Extended valuations have

made high yield bonds more susceptible to increased volatility. The slightest geopolitical

provocation may give rise to a correction as investors seek to consolidate gains in the high yield

market. After realizing annualized returns of 11 percent over the past five years, nearly double

that of the equity markets, we sit in a markedly different place in the credit cycle today than we

did in 2008 when assets were so fundamentally cheap that investors operated with

a much wider margin of safety.

Due to their premium prices and stretched valuations, it is unlikely that high yield bonds will

continue to provide equity-like returns, in the near term. Recent market behavior has begun to

reflect this sentiment as investors have begun transitioning from offense to defense through


increased allocations to bank loans. Lower rated, upper middle-market bank loans offer

comparable yields to BB bonds but provide a much greater degree of comfort, in the event of

rising rates and deteriorating credit quality. For investors seeking to participate in the credit

rally while remaining protected on the downside, bank loans are the investment vehicles best

positioned to provide this flexibility.

■ S&P 500 ■ Credit Suisse HY Index

16%

12%

14%

10%

8%

4%

6%

0%

2%

YTD 1 Year 3 Year 5 Year 10 Year

10.6%

2.9%

14.0%

12.4% 12.7%

10.9% 10.8%

8.5%

9.8%

5.8%

COMPARATIVE TOTAL RETURNS: STOCKS VS. HIGH YIELD BONDS

SOURCE: BLOOMBERG, CREDIT SUISSE. TRAILING RETURNS AS OF 03/31/2013.

Investors allocated to the high yield bond market over the past decade have realized returns exceeding those of equity investors. Based on current valuations, it is unlikely for bond investors to continue realizing equity-like returns, in the near term. Given where we are in the credit cycle, we would advise a more tactical and defensive shift towards bank loans.

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high yield and bank loan outlook - april 2013

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