hijacking havens the challenges of …...2015/09/04 · david a. jones, cpp, cfi vp – global...

David A. Jones, CPP, CFI

VP – Global Security Lead – Supply Chain

HIJACKING HAVENS – The Challenges of

Transporting Goods in Mexico and Brazil

September 9, 2015

DHL | Page ISCPO Cargo Security Summit September 8,2015

2

Hijacking Risk Levels

National Statistics – Brazil

National Statistics – Mexico

Common Hijacking M.O.s

Best Practice Countermeasures

Agenda


3

Security spending by major carriers in Latin America represents

an astonishing 20% of their total operating costs!

Brazil and Mexico Have The Highest Incidents of Cargo

Theft in The World

Sources – Coordinating Office of Insured Risks (OCRA) & Frieghtwatch Intl

Risk Level

Low

Elevated

Moderated

High

Severe

Mexico 2015: 136 hijackings per day or 16,400 YTD. Increased 93% vs. 2014

Nearly 60% of reported incidents occur in Sao Paulo State


4

Brazil – Risk by State

Source: FreightWatch International – Global Threat Assessment 2013

Sao Paulo State and Rio De

Janeiro at highest risk –

represents 84% of all Brazilian

hi-jacking’s

Risk Level

Low

Elevated

Moderated

High

Severe

Brazil had 17,500 reported hijackings in 2014, including armed attacks

on cargo terminals at Guarulhos and Viracopos International airports.

2015 Hi-Jackings

• Country ……….. 10%

• Sao Paulo State..18%

• Rio State………...50%


5

Mexico – Risk by State 2015 YTD

Mexico State & Puebla represent highest risk areas. Hundreds of gangs

are known to specialize in cargo crime.

Puebla

Jalisco

Distrito Federal

Estado de México

Chihuahua

Guanajuato

Veracruz

Hidalgo Risk Level

Low

Elevated

Moderated

High

Severe


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Agenda


7

Brazil – Robbery Risk Scenario

Vehicle 99% Warehouse 1%

1st

2nd

3rd

Most Stolen Commodities

Evento Prejuízo

49% 38%

51% 62%

Urban

Highway

$ Loss Incidents


8

64%51%

32%44%

4% 5%

Evento Prejuízo

Agregado

Frota

Autônomo

00:00h

06:00h

12:00h

18:00h

16%

35%

19%

30%

Day Time/ Week

Driver type “MODUS OPERANDI”

Road

Urban

52% 48%

40% 37%

8% 15%

Evento Prejuízo

Agregado

Frota

Autônomo

00:00h

06:00h

12:00h

18:00h

46%

16%

20%

18%

48,5%

51,5%

68,3%

31,7%

Movement

Stopped

52%

48%

32%

68%

Aggregate

Fleet

Independent

Fleet

Aggregate

Fleet

Independent

Fleet

# Events $ Value

# Events $ Value

Movement

Stopped

Brazil Robbery Risk Scenario


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Agenda


10

Mexico – Hijacking Risk

Vehicle 99% Warehouse 1%

1st

2nd

3rd

Source: FreightWatch & DHL

Type of Incident Q2 2014 vs Q22015


31% 26%

12%

3%

7% 5% 4% 3%

2% 2% 1% 2% 2%

Building &Industrial

Food & Drinks Miscellaneous Alcohol Auto & Parts Clothing & Shoes Electronics Pharmaceuticals Cash-In-Transit Tobaco Personal Care Fuel Chemicals

Total Loads 229,151

Total Loads Stolen 85

% Theft Ratio 0.03%

% Recovered 37.65%

% Real Theft Ratio 0.02%

2014 DHL Incident - Loads Ratio

Type of Incident 2014 Q2 vs 2015 Q2

445%

98%

76%

55% 36%

20% 100%

Hijacking Theft fromTrailer

Theft ofTrailer

WarehouseBurglary

Rail Theft Theft ofContainer

Fake Police

2014 2015


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Mexico – Hijacking Risk

Source: FreightWatch & DHL


31% 26%

12%

3%

7%

5% 4%

3%

2% 2%

1% 2% 2%

Building & Industrial Food & Drinks Miscellaneous Alcohol Auto & Parts Clothing & Shoes Electronics Pharmaceuticals Cash-In-Transit Tobaco Personal Care Fuel Chemicals


12

Mexico – Hijacking Risk – 2015 YTD

Event – Loss/Week Event Loss

10% 10%

17%

21%

29%

8% 6%

M T W T F S S

Event – Loss/Hour

6%

4%

19%

18%

10%

12% 01:00 HRS.

02:00 HRS.

03:00 HRS.

04:00 HRS.

05:00 HRS.

06:00 HRS.

Event - Modus Operandi

67%

4%

14% 15%

ROAD BLOCKED TRAFFIC LIGHTS GAS STATION OTHERS

Event – Type

97%

3%

Hijacking

Truck Theft

Source: FreightWatch


13

90% of transportation in Mexico is comprised of small, family businesses

called “Truck Men.” On average, trucks are between 10 and 20 years old

Mexican Transport Structure

10%

90%

Transport Fleet Operations Truck Men


14

Mexico Transportation Breakout

11%

34% 54%

Railway

Sea

Land

Air

Railway

Sea

Air

Land

1%

The highest percentage of product is transported by land. And most of

what is carried by sea remains focused on export.


15

Thefts by product type

Mexico Thefts by Commodity


Pharma-

ceuticals

Clothing/

Shoes

1% 2%

1%

Consumer

Care

2%

Tabacco Cash-in-

transit (CIT)

2%

Home/

Garden

7%

2%

Alcohol Unknown Miscellaneous Electronics

9%

Food/

Drinks

14%

Chemicals

3%

7%

3%

27%

Building/

Industrial

Auto/

Parts

20%


16


Hijacking by location 2015 YTD

Mexico – Where Did Thefts Occur

69%

11%

16%

2% 4%

In-Transit Facility Interior Roadside Gas Station Facility Lot


17






Agenda


18

Hijacking on the Road – Typical Process for Cargo

Robbery

Original truck New truck

Warehouse “Safe place”

Highway attack

Move cargo to

“safe place”

Wait few days to see

if police and recovery

teams show up on scene

Deliver cargo to

end receiver


19

Hijacking on the Road – Attack Strategy

Hijacker Car

Transfer Truck

Escort Car


20

Hijacking on the Road – Attack Strategy


21

Hijacking in the Street – Typical Process for Cargo

Robbery

Delivering cargo Armed Bandit

Small Bodega Flees scene

Street attack

Takes van or a

few packages

Bad guy delivers

to small shop

or trades for narcotics


22

Hijacking in the Street – Attack Strategy

Driver and helper are surrounded while moving or parking on the street


23

Hijacking in the Street – Attack Strategy

Driver or helper are surrounded during a delivery on the street


24

Real World Examples


25

Real World Examples


26

Real World Examples


27

Real World Examples


28

Equipment Found with Cargo Thieves


29

High Power Jammers


30






Agenda


31

Inbound Quality Control

Insure use of proper inbound quality control audits,

as some losses may not be your

responsibility………….


32

Central Monitoring – Tracking Cells 365 24/7

Drivers not allowed to

use shortcuts or low

density side roads

Drivers must travel on

main highways or toll

roads, whenever

possible. If he must

leave route, he must first

notify tracking cell

If hauling international

shipments, the driver

cannot make stops

before 300 kms and 100

kms for local shipments

The operator must follow

the route that tracking

cell sets


33

Geofencing with Central Monitoring


34

Geofencing with Central Monitoring


35

Automated Tracking Device System

A N B

The tracking operator is the weak link

in the chain because defensive

actions depend on his alertness.

If the operator fails to follow the

standard protocol, protection

procedures fail.

An automatic program takes action as

soon as any alert is received,

regardless of operator actions.


36

Tracking Devices

Tracking Cell – When a vehicle must be tracked, the tracking cell

should be a reputable and vetted company. Professional tracking

operators can make a huge difference, and performance should be

monitored regularly.

Minimum Tracking Cell Infrastructure

Internet connection in large band

Dedicated computer

UPS (Unit Power Supplier)

Software compatible with tracking technology

Insure that all Tracking Device Accessories are clearly defined in

the Formal Security Agreement (FSA) with carrier.


37

Tracking Equipment

Used by DHL


38

Geo Route and Geofence Creation

Origin and final destination with client is recorded before route initiation, and is being

tracking by Protekto and continuous communication with driver and security.


39

Padlocks Placing


40

Along the route, we can detect the exact location of gas stations and schedules / timings of

allowed stops or when truck was parked in public places

Tracking and Monitoring.


41

Detailed reports of the truck progress are received, also if arrival to destination with client

and confirmation from geofence.

Tracking and Monitoring.


42

Escort Practices

GPS

1 2

X1, X2: Escort positioning must guarantee the widest cone of observance

x2 x1


43

Success Story

While delivering cargo for a high-end fashion retailer, a truck

was approached by two armed bandits at a red traffic light. He

immediately pressed the panic button to reach the central

monitoring center.

Monitoring center personnel activated the reaction protocol

disengaging the engine of the truck and requesting police

support.

The would-be thieves left the truck and fled leaving the cargo,

with a value of USD 81K intact, but taking the keys!

The quick reaction of the operator and central monitoring

station personnel, prevented the hi-jack attempt and the

merchandise was delivered safely, albeit un-conventionally, to

the customer.


44

Success Story

Truck loaded onto tow flatbed Truck arriving at Destination

Off-load of the product Final Delivery


45

Due Diligence – Limiting Liability and Establishing

Protocols in the Formal Security Agreement (FSA)

Maximum Value

Define security protocols and include

them in the contract

The FSA should define the maximum

value the client will allow in one

shipment

Shipments over the value agreed

should only be shipped after formal

communication from client or

insurance owner

Escort Protection

FSA should also specify the minimum

escort value that triggers escort use

The radius where escorts are to be

used (distance from origin)

Door to door escorts are not usual

due to the cost. The efficiency is

questionable

FSA and Operational Protocol

Escort Protocol


46

Due Diligence – Security Agreement with Carrier

Carrier Contract Agreement

Clear definition of insurance

responsibility during cargo

transportation (hijacking, truck

theft and accident). Formal and

part of commercial contract

Any new carrier should be

contracted only after a formal

security agreement is signed

Subrogation

Formal Security Agreement

(FSA) with carriers

Formal Security Agreement


47

Due Diligence – Driver Background Checks

Driver and Helper

There are many companies that

can conduct these kind of

checks, but country privacy laws

often limit how deep the search

can go.

Base criteria

Criminal

Financial

Driving record


48

Due Diligence – Security Carrier Hub Audit


49

When You Fail to Audit Carrier Location…………


50

Due Diligence – Training Associates & Transportation

Partners

We work with over 1,000 transportation

companies and thousands of drivers in Latin

America. Ensuring that these teams

understand and follow our transportation

procedures and protocols, is essential to the

success of our security program.

“Trust, but verify”!

Ronald Reagan


51

Truck Protection Capabilities

Disengage sensor

Extra devices

• truck stairs protection

• windows sensor web

• sunglass

• 2° tracking device in the cabin

Extra devices

• Armored capsule

• 3° tracking device

with

prompt answer

• On-board computer

• GPS

• Satelital or GPRS

communication

• Cell or radio

communication

• Panic button

• Sound and light alerts

• Left- and right-door

sensors

• Damage sensor

• Motor sensor

• Speed sensor

• Fuel block

• Trailer back door

sensor

• Trailer back door lock


52

Best Practices – Harden the Target

Additional and optional equipment

added in the truck or trailer to

improve security

Cargo portable tracker

Cabin windows mesh

Truck stair protection

Disposable portable trackers –

Uses GPRS and RF and is

placed inside the product box

‒ Expensive but efficient


53

Best Practices – Harden the Target

Armored Trailer & Vans

Protects the trailer using steel

mesh and steel plates (2 mm);

coffer door with electronic lock

with random access.

Cheaper than an armored

cabin

Short payback if it is possible

to change the escort

protection

Efficient in short distance in

use second tracking device.


54

Portable Tracking Devices Hidden Inside Product


55

Ongoing Challenges We Face

Poor reporting standards by victim companies

Government involvement to aggressively address issue

Improving infrastructures - roads, highways, bridges

Police corruption on local level

Criminal infiltration of shipping companies and tracking centers

Finding solutions to defeat “Jamming” technology

Brazil – Upcoming Olympics (2016)

Lack of law enforcement personnel with cargo crime specialization

training


56

Questions??

Thank You!

hijacking havens the challenges of …...2015/09/04 · david a. jones, cpp, cfi vp – global...

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