history of modern philosophy- final exam

7/31/2019 History of Modern Philosophy- Final Exam

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David Krajewski

Philosophy 321- Final Exam

1A. For Descartes, the mind’s principle (essential) attribute is thought and the body’s principle

(essential) attribute is extension. In other words, what it is to be a mind is to be a thinking thing and

what it is to be a body is to be a thing extended in space. Elisabeth will claim that a mind cannot

causally interact with a body and vice-versa. If so, then that is not a desirable consequence for Descartes

since he claims that mind and body are united and causally interact with each other. Consider

mechanical (body to body) causation. Suppose I’m at a pool table and I hit a cue ball. The cue ball (A)

collides with the 8 ball (B). (A) and (B) are things that are extended in space. The physical particles of

the two things collide together and the physical force of (A) is sufficient to cause (B) to move.

Causation between two bodies appears unproblematic. Consider what would have to happen for a mind

to causally interact with a body. The mind (as a thinking thing) would have to be able to cause my body

to move (an extended thing). In the pool case, one extended thing caused another extended thing to

move. But my mind is principally a thinking thing and is not extended in space. How then am I

(through my mind’s volition) able to raise my arm? Elisabeth in her The Hague letter, writes “..it seems

that how a thing moves depends solely on (i) how much it is pushed, (ii) the manner in which it is

pushed and (iii) the surface-texture and the shape of the thing that pushes it. The first two require

contact between the two things, and the third requires that the causally active thing be extended. Your

notion of the [mind] entirely excludes extension, and it appears that an immaterial thing cannot possibly

touch anything else”.

If my mind isn’t extended, it appears problematic to claim that it can cause movement in my arm

(an extended thing). To use Elisabeth’s language, my mind “cannot possibly touch” my arm. It seems

implausible for an immaterial thing (my mind) to be able to touch a material thing (my body). In the

pool case, the 8 ball required contact from the cue ball in order to move. It’d seem that in order for my

arm to be raised, it too would require contact to move. But my mind is immaterial and so there’s no way



for it to be extended in space and mechanically bring it about that my arm moves. From this, it might be

more generally concluded that non-extended things cannot cause movement in extended things and vice-

versa. If that’s so, the idea of Cartesian mind-body union would have to be abandoned, since Descartes

claims that mind and body causally interact.

B. The doctrine of “primitive notions” is intended to “save” mind-body union. Descartes claims

that there are three primitive notions. By distinguishing between the three notions, mind-body union

will be better understood and avoid Elisabeth’s criticism. The three primitive notions are thought,

extension and mind-body union. Thought, being the principle attribute of mind, applies to mind-mind

interactions. I can inquire into the nature of thought through my understanding. For instance, if I was

only a thinking thing and not united with a body, I introspect and understand that I would not be able to

interact with something extended in bodily space. If I were only an immaterial thing, then I’d only be

able to interact with other immaterial things. Extension, being the principle attribute of body, applies to

body-body interactions. I inquire into the nature of body through my understanding as well as

imagination. I understand that a cue ball can only interact with things extended in space for it would not

make sense for a cue ball (which is extended) to be able to interact with an immaterial thing. It seems

impossible. Secondly, I imagine certain images and shapes that bodies might take.

Lastly is the notion of mind-body union. Descartes claims that mind-body union is the only

notion that applies to mind-body interactions. According to Descartes, I come to know the nature of

mind- body union through sensation. When I raise my hand up, I in some sense “feel” the connection or

“union” between my mind and my body. If I were just a thinking thing, I wouldn’t be able to raise my

hand since my hand is extended. If I were just a body, I wouldn’t be able to will anything (for only

minds and not bodies can will things). But these observations don’t prove mind-body union. Before the

notion’s explanatory theory is given, already Descartes can prove that there’s a flaw in Elisabeth’s

criticism. Elisabeth is conflating mind-body causal interactions with that of body-body causal



interactions. She’s attempting to criticize mind-body causal interactions through the scope of the

primitive notion of extension. In other words, she expects causal relations between mind and body to

work in the same way as causal relations between two bodies. But, for Descartes, this is not how causal

interactions between mind and body work. He proposes that they work in a much different way.

Consider the scholastic notion of “heaviness”. Heaviness, for the scholastics, is a “real quality”

of a heavy object. When a heavy object is forced to the ground, the real quality of heaviness is doing the

work. I may not be able to literally see the “heaviness” that the heavy object possesses. However, the

scholastics held that the “heaviness” is an incorporeal quality that is united to the heavy object and yet

the incorporeal quality could still exist without being united to the object (akin to a Cartesian mind being

able to exist without being united to a body). Descartes claims that we don’t think that the real quality

of heaviness is actually making contact with the object. In other words, the causal interaction between

heaviness and the object is not like a body-body interaction. There are no extended things touching each

other. Likewise, when I will my hand to be raised, I don’t think that my mind is coming into contact

with my hand to cause movement. It’s not like a body-body interaction. Instead, mind-body causal

interaction is akin to “heaviness”-heavy object causal interaction. Through this scholastic analogy, we

see how an immaterial thing (mind) can be in causal relations with a material thing (body). And just as

we consider “heaviness” and the heavy object to be united, we also consider mind and body to be united

in a similar way.

C. Suppose God willed there to be a universe (since he is all-powerful, a universe was created). After

he willed it, he walked away from his creation. Would the universe continue to exist or would it be

annihilated? I believe the common intuition here is that the universe would continue to exist. Assuming

that God gave physical objects active causal powers, it’d seem that the universe would continue to exist

even if God were not sustaining it. Malebranche attempts to defeat this intuition with his “continuous

recreation” argument.



Suppose that since God created the universe and all of the finite beings in it, that everyth ing’s

existence in the universe is dependent on God. In other words, the existence of a rock is contingent on

the fact that God willed there to be a rock. If God hadn’t willed there to be a rock, there’d be no rock.

Now suppose that God were to walk away from his creation. Malebranche doesn’t believe that the rock

would continue to exist since it’s “essentially dependent” on God for its existence. If the rock is to

continue to exist, then God must continually will it (or “continually create it”) to exist. If he doesn’t

“continually create it” then the rock will pop out of existence. Just because God willed it to exist at an

earlier time, it doesn’t follow from that that it can exist without God’s help. Suppose I object and say

that a rock can exist without God willing it to be so. I am insistent that as a human being, I can craft a

man-made rock. It’d seem that this man-made rock is in existence as a result of me producing it.

However, since I’m a finite being, my existence is also “essentially dependent” on God’s will. In order

for me to make the rock in the first place, God had to continually will me to exist. If he did not, I

wouldn’t have been able to make the rock. The rock wasn’t created independently of God’s will. It

contingently existed just as I did because of God’s will. The objection fails.

Garber claims that if Descartes is committed to holding the continuous recreation argument, he

cannot introduce his primitive notions doctrine in order to respond to Elisabeth. Garber notes that

Descartes, in his Principles, explains God’s role in body to body causal interaction. Descartes believes

that God is always changing the places of bodies from moment to moment, and this is what allows there

to be motion in the world. It appears that, according to Descartes, bodies cannot move at all unless God

puts them in motion. God must continually preserve bodies and just creating them (and walking away)

wouldn’t be sufficient for their motion. When body (A) is moving towards (B), it might have sufficient

formal reality to move (B), but it requires God to put (A) into motion in the first place so that it can

move (B). According to Garber, in order to completely understand body to body interaction (it is not



just explained by mechanical science now, we have introduced God), we must understand this new kind

of divine causation where God moves bodies around to cause motion.

But, a new primitive notion has to be introduced. The primitive notion of extension alone does

not fully explain body to body interactions. Mechanical science alone is not sufficient to explain them;

we also need divine causation. Descartes compared the notion of divine causation to how when “I am

conscious I can move my own body by my own thought”. In other words, Descartes seems to think that

understanding the notion of mind-body union is the key to understanding the notion of divine causation.

However, Garber states that Descartes cannot claim this while at the same time saying to Elisabeth that

she has confused the primitive notions. Descartes claims to Elisabeth that the notions of extension and

mind-body union are intelligible, independently of each other. Clearly these notions are not intelligible

independently of each other. In order to understand the notion of extension, I must understand the

notion of mind-body union (since understanding mind-body union is the key to understanding divine

causation). It’s an inconsistent move for Descartes to make.

Descartes might deny that this is much of a problem for his response to Elisabeth. He might say

that what’s more important in his response to Elisabeth, is his claim that Elisabeth believes mind-body

union to be akin to extension. Even if the notions of mind-body union and extension are not

independently intelligible, because of this new notion of divine causation, he can still provide a view to

Elisabeth that explains to her how she’s mistaken. Although the notion of extension ultimately is

explained by the notion of mind-body union, Descartes can still allude to mechanical science to partially

explain extension. He cannot allude to mechanical science at all to explain mind-body union. They

remain fundamentally different.

D. Malebranche claims that an event is a “true cause” only if there is a necessary connection between

the event and its effect. Consider my mind causing an effect in my body. I notice that when my mind

wills to raise my hand, my hand goes up. But it doesn’t always have to be the case that my hand goes up



when my mind wills it to, since I’m a fallible being. It’s logically (and actually) possible that at some

point when my mind wills my hand to go up, it doesn’t go up. My body might be physically exhausted,

and so my hand doesn’t want to cooperate with my mind’s volition. Therefore there appears to be no

necessary connection between my mind willing my hand to go up and my hand going up. Consider a

being of infinite power (God) that wills my hand to go up. It’d seem that whenever he wills my hand to

go up, my hand has to go up. Whatever a being of infinite power wills, it has to happen. I can’t

conceive of an infinitely powerful being that wills something to happen and then it doesn’t happen.

There does appear to be a necessary connection between God willing my hand to go up and my hand

going up. My mind’s volition is not a “true cause” of my hand going up since there appears to be no

necessary connection. Likewise, in any situation where a thing with finite power wills something, there

is no necessary connection between its willing and its effect. Therefore, since there’s only a necessary

connection between what an infinitely powerful being wills and its effect, then an infinitely powerful

being (God) is the only true cause of events.

But, in most cases that my mind wills my hand to go up, my hand goes up. Even if there is no

necessary connection between my willing it and its effect, I do seem to be playing a causal role and God

does not appear to be doing all of the work. However, according to Malebranche, God is doing all the

work. For Malebranche, my mind willing my hand to go up is only the “occasional cause” of the effect.

When I will my hand to go up, I’m not the one with the causal power. God has the causal power. I’m

simply bringing about the occasion for God to interject and will my hand to go up. Suppose that I

hadn’t willed my hand to go up. If so, then there would’ve been no occasion for God to interject and my

hand would not have gone up. So, in some sense, I do appear to have some freedom regarding whether

my hand goes up or not. However, this doesn’t mean that I could will my hand to go up independently

of God’s will. I may be able to choose whether my hand goes up or not but I’m dependent on God to

make my hand go up at all. If God doesn’t interject and will my hand to go up when I bring about the



occasion for him to do so, then my hand will never go up. I don’t seem to contain within me any

genuine causal activity if I’m always dependent on God to cause my hand to go up. If I’m just

“signaling” to God to do his work when I will my hand to go up, then I’m certainly not the “true cause”

of my hand going up. If I will my hand to go up and God doesn’t do his work, then my hand doesn’t go

up. I need God to do his causal work and so God is the only being in the universe with genuine causal

activity.

The arguments made above by Malebranche demonstrate that he’s a rationalist regarding causal

relations since I don’t need to experience anything to draw the conclusions those arguments give. To be

a rationalist regarding causation is to claim for example, that I can conclude that A causes B simply by

introspecting and “looking into myself”. I don’t need to experience anything to draw the conclusion the

no-necessary connection argument gives. I may have alluded to experience to partially explain the no-

necessary connection argument but I didn’t need to. The main appeal of that argument is that I can only

conceive of a necessary connection between cause and effect when an infinitely powerful being is

willing something to be so. When I consider a finitely powerful being, I understand through

introspection that the finite being is fallible and he may do something wrong. It doesn’t always have to

be the case that whatever he wills comes to be. Likewise, in the continuous recreation argument, I

understand through introspection that if God were to walk away from his creation, and that if everything

finite is “essentially dependent” on God, then the finite things that God created wouldn’t be able to

independently keep themselves in existence. Since they essentially depend on God for their existence,

there are no sufficient causal powers in finite things to keep themselves in existence without God’s help.

This is a necessary a priori truth concerning “essential dependence”. If a thing’s existence is essentially

dependent on another thing, then it needs that thing to stick around in order to continue to exist.

E. A rationalist believes that causal relations are knowable a priori. For example, Malebranche believes

that God being the only “true cause” of events is a necessary a priori truth. He does not have to



experience anything in the world to be able to know that. For Malebranche, it must be so that whenever

God wills something, it comes to be. Hume, however, believes that causal relations are knowable only

through inferences from past experience. This makes him an empiricist.

If we do not rely on inferences from past experience, Hume claims that we cannot predict the

effects of anything. Suppose I am one of the first humans to ever exist and God asks me what will

happen when two pool balls collide with each other. I have had no past experiences; in fact I was just

created by God. I watch pool ball (A) moving towards pool ball (B). According to Descartes (a

rationalist), I should know a priori that when (A) moves towards (B), the force of (A) will move (B) in

some way. According to the Cartesian causal principle, whatever is contained formally or eminently in

a cause must be in the effect. Assuming (A) has a sufficient amount of formal reality to move (B), I

should expect (even without prior experiences) that based on this causal principle, (A) will move (B).

However, Hume claims that I won’t know what’s going to happen when these two things come together.

I’ve never seen these two objects before, so I have no idea what they’re capable of. Maybe I speculate

that (A) will start to levitate. Or maybe I think that (A) will explode. I have never seen these things,

and in fact, have never experienced two objects colliding with each other. So I’m just taking wild

guesses with my predictions. Hume doesn’t think I have any good reason to expect the outcome that

those with experiences of this sort will have; the outcome that (A) will move (B) forward in a very

ordinary way.

If I, as a mentally developed human (with no prior experiences) have no idea what will happen

when (A) moves towards (B), we shouldn’t think that an infant has any idea about causal relations

either. An Aristotelian might claim that when fire comes into contact with cotton, the cotton necessarily

will burn. But an infant doesn’t know that. Not only does the infant not have inaccurate expectations

(as I do in the pool ball case), but the infant has no expectations about what will happen when the fire

contacts the cotton. In order to have any expectations at all, one has to be mentally developed. But,



more importantly for Hume, one has to experience things in the world. The infant has never seen fire

applied to cotton. Someone with world experience maybe has seen fire applied to cotton 100 times, and

every time that it has happened, the cotton has burned. This person, taking into account what they have

seen from their past experiences, makes a very probable prediction (through inference) that the cotton

will burn. The infant is unable to make any such prediction.

However, even as someone who has seen fire burn cotton 100 times, all this person is making is

a highly probable prediction. They do not know with absolute certainty that the cotton will burn.

Suppose they’ve seen it burn 1 million times. Hume still would claim that the person doesn’t know the

cotton will burn with utter certainty. According to Hume, when a person infers “The cotton will burn”,

they aren’t claiming something that is deductively true. And only deductively true (or intuitively

certain) things are things we can know with utter certainty. For instance, we can know the conclusions

of deductive logical arguments with certainty. One might be “If it is a triangle, it has 3 sides. It is a

triangle. Therefore, it has 3 sides.” The two premises of the argument are known just by understanding

the nature of a triangle. It will always (and necessarily) be that a triangle has 3 sides. We cannot

conceive of a triangle that doesn’t have 3 sides.

However, we cannot know inductive arguments with utter certainty. The assumption that we

make in any inductive argument, is an assumption of the truthf ulness of the “uniformity of nature

principle”, which states that the future will resemble the past. But, Hume claims that we cannot know

the certainty of inductive arguments because we cannot assume the truthfulness of this principle. I know

the truthfulness of premises in the triangle argument through understanding a thing’s nature. But that

understanding alone tells me nothing about things that exist in the world. Only inductive arguments can

give me this information. However, we can conceive of the uniformity of nature principle not holding.

I may’ve seen fire burn the cotton many times. I infer, assuming that the future will resemble the past,

that this cotton in front of me will burn when fire is applied to it. However, it’s logically possible that



the cotton won’t burn, and somehow it will become immune to the flames. While I can still make a

highly probable prediction that the cotton will burn, I have to concede this logical possibility. Since I

have to concede this possibility, I cannot know the uniformity principle (and so any inductive argument)

with absolute certainty.

2- A & B. A bodily substance for Malebranche is a thing that has no active causal powers. Suppose I

get some wood and make a fire. An Aristotelian would say that this particular body (wood) has active

causal powers. And that there is a metaphysical necessity in that if I put the wood together in a certain

way, it will necessarily burn. However, Malebranche denies that bodies have any active causal powers

and he certainly denies metaphysical necessity in body-body causal relations. Malebranche claims that

bodies are passive. When considering Cartesian extension, Malebranche doesn’t see how it’s possible

for bodies to move themselves. Consider the continuous recreation argument. It concludes that all finite

things (including bodies) are essentially dependent on God for their existence. And if they are

essentially dependent on God for their existence, then surely they are essentially dependent on him for

motion. According to Malebranche, bodies cannot move independently of God’s will since they need

the “extra push” from him to do anything. Malebranche claims that the only thing bodies really “do” is

consist in relations of distance. One leaf is on one tree and another leaf on another tree. In order for

those leaves to move about, it takes a “force of nature” (like wind and wind is dependent on God’s will)

to do the work. Malebranche is a Cartesian in his views about bodily substance in some sense since

Descartes too saw bodies as things that consisted in relations of distance. In fact, the modes that

Cartesian bodies possess are things like extension, size and shape. And it is these modes that allow

bodies to exist in relations of distance. For instance, since a body is extended it takes up space. Since it

is extended, it has a size and shape. And if there are multiple bodies in existence with all of these

modes, then they will exist in relations of distance. It would seem to be a necessity that if multiple

things take up space, they will differ in their distances between one another.



However, Descartes believed that bodies had causal power. He believed that, for example, my

body can cause sensations in my mind. But, according to Malebranche, my body cannot cause

sensations in my mind. My body, like all other bodies, only exists in relations of distance. And it exists

in relations of distance because of the modes that it possesses. It doesn’t follow that a thing with

extension, size and shape has active causal powers. For Malebranche, to ascribe active causal powers to

a body would be a mistake. From the fact that my body is extended in space, I cannot conclude that it

has any active causal powers. While Malebranche might concede that bodies move about in space, it

doesn’t follow that they move about in space on their own. Instead, it takes interference from God for

bodies to move about at all. God has infinite power and so he can move what is otherwise a merely

passive body. Regarding the Cartesian belief that bodies can act on minds, there is nothing in the

Cartesian bodily modes that entails that a body has power to act on my mind. If my body does not have

this power, there does not appear to be a connection between my body causing sensations in my mind

and my mind having those sensations. Those sensations must have (ultimately) come from God. It

seems that if all a body has is extension, it is necessarily passive.

C. If we are to accept Malebranche’s occasionalist theory of bodies, then we must conclude that bodies

have no active causal powers. If bodies have no active causal powers, then they cannot “do” anything

unless God enables them to using his (infinite) causal powers. In other words, we have to conclude that

God is always doing all of the causal work. He’s continually preserving and “recreating” things and

keeping them in existence. If he doesn’t continually preserve things, they’ll pop out of existence. We

might think, intuitively, that God would create bodies that had active causal powers. If he did, then that

would lessen his workload. If he wanted to, he could take a break. He could “enjoy” his creation rather

than eternally be active in it. But, more importantly, if we are to assume that Malebranche’s

occasionalist theory of bodies is true, then we might conclude that God created all the bodies that he did

in vain. Since bodies have no active causal powers, they are seemingly useless. They cannot do



anything under their own power and are completely dependent on God. It’d seem to be a knock against

God’s infinite power and wisdom that he creates bodies in such a way that he allots himself more work

in their preservation, than he necessarily has to.

D. Berkeley’s “Relativity of Perception Argument” leads to a major problem for the realist, or the one

who thinks that mind-independent bodies exist. For example, according to the realist, there is an

objective fact of the matter about the temperature of water in a vessel. If I put a thermometer into the

vessel, and it reads 50 degrees, then the temperature of that water is 50 degrees. In other words, for the

realist, the quality of the water (its lukewarmness) that is perceived in the body of water is actually in

that body of water. This claim holds true whether or not there are human beings around to measure the

temperature of the water. Whether or not anyone measures the temperature of the water, the water is

still 50 degrees.

Berkley thinks the “Relativity of Perception Argument” undermines the above realist

assumption. Suppose that my hand is hot and your hand is cold. Also suppose that we are putting our

hands into uniformly lukewarm water at the same time. Since my hand is hot, the water feels cool to

me. And since it feels cool, it is a relief for me to put my hot hand into this water. Since your hand is

cold, the water feels warm for you. Your hand is relieved by what feels to you, to be soothingly warm

water. It appears that there are two different qualities in this body of water: coolness and warmth.

However, coolness and warmth cannot exist in the same body at the same time, they are opposites. A

uniform body of water, according to commonsense, should be either warm, cool, lukewarm or anything

in between. It should not contain two incompatible qualities. Furthermore, the realist claims that

whatever qualities we perceive to derive from bodies, are actually in those bodies. So, the realist would

have to hold here that coolness and warmth are actually in the body of water simultaneously. But, since

it contains two incompatible qualities, that’s absurd. It seems the realist assumption (at least what has



been assumed in these two paragraphs) has been undermined. Berkeley has shown that mind-

independent bodies (with objective qualities) do not exist.

Next, Berkeley will argue that mind-independent bodies cannot exist. Thus far, he has only

shown that mind-independent bodies do not exist in our world. However, the realist might still be able

to show how mind-independent bodies could exist in another possible world. If we are able to conceive

of a body that is completely mind-independent, then we might feel safe with the realist assumption that

mind-independent bodies can exist. However, Berkley thinks he undermines this realist assumption

with his “Master Argument”.

Berkeley claims that in order for us to conceive of a body existing mind-independently, we must

be able to conceive of a body existing unconceived. Suppose I try to conceive of a book existing mind-

independently. It seems possible. Intuitively, we think that if there were no human beings (or any

perceptive beings) on the planet, then the book would be able to exist without a mind perceiving it.

However, there’s a big problem. I’m unable to conceive of this book existing unconceived. After all,

there’s somebody conceiving it, namely me. In other words, the idea of this mind-independent book is

being conceived. This conception of this mind-independent book is located in my mind. It seems

necessary that, in order for something to be conceived, it has to be conceived of by a mind. A mind is

the only thing that we know of that can conceive things. Since I cannot conceive of a mind-independent

body that is unconceived of by a mind, it appears that mind-independent bodies cannot exist at all.

E. For Berkeley, a body is a set of sensible ideas that is located in a mind. Suppose I want to articulate

that I am at my desk sitting in a chair, according to Berkeley’s claim that bodies are just sets of ideas in

my mind. I would not simply say, as a realist would, that I am at my desk (which exists independently

of my mind) sitting in a chair (which also exists mind-independently). In order to describe the bodies

that I’m interacting with while writing this paper, I’d say in the “strict philosophical sense” that I have

the idea of a firm feeling, the idea of the color tan, the idea of lukewarmness, the idea of a light wood



color and so on. These ideas account for the desk and chair that I’m sitting at. I combine the ideas of

lukewarmness, the firm feeling, the color tan, and the idea of a light wood color to account for the desk

and chair. My mind perceives these multiple qualities from these two objects.

Berkeley is able to escape the problem that the realist faces in the “Relativity of Perception

Argument”. Suppose my friend gets in from outside and is really warm. If he were to sit in what I

perceive to be a lukewarm feeling chair, he may perceive it to be a cool feeling chair. My friend would

say, in the strict philosophical sense, that he has the idea of coolness to account for how the chair feels to

him. In other words, he perceives the quality of coolness to be in the chair. However, I have the idea of

lukewarmness to account for what appears to be the same chair. I perceive the quality of lukewarmness

to be in the chair. How can these two differing qualities be contained in the same chair? It seems that

Berkeley is facing the same problem that the realist faces. However, he’s not. Berkley would say that

we are not sitting in the same chair. Instead, I perceive a different chair from what my friend perceives.

My friend sits in a chair that he perceives, among other things, to have the quality of coolness. I sit in a

chair that I perceive, among other things, to have the quality of lukewarmness. Since they’re separate

chairs, we can perceive differing qualities in them. There’s nothing incompatible about a quality of

coolness in one chair and a quality of lukewarmness in another. The realist has to insist that differing

qualities are in the same object. Berkeley doesn’t, so he’s able to avoid the realist’s dilemma.

It should be noted that, when speaking in the “vulgar” (or everyday) sense, Berkley doesn’t think

it’s very practical for us to speak of objects in the strict philosophical sense. Suppose I were to ask

someone for a cup of coffee. I might say something like “Give me that set of sensible qualities that I

perceive right now, which are probably very similar to the set of sensible qualities that you perceive

right now”. Since Berkley doesn’t think it’s advisable to talk in this way, I might instead simply say

“Give me that coffee”. But saying “Give me that coffee” implies that I and whoever I ask are looking at

the same object. However, according to Berkeley’s account of bodies as sets of sensible ideas, we aren’t



looking at the same object. I might perceive hot sensible qualities in the coffee and the person I ask

might perceive lukewarm sensible qualities in the coffee. Berkley is okay with us using “vulgar”

language to express ourselves, but he wants us to be sure that we ignore the realist implications of our

everyday speech. The coffee that I look at and ask for is not the same coffee that the person I ask is

looking at. He wants us to keep that in mind when using vulgar speech.

Suppose that I’m not just perceiving sensible qualities from one or two objects. I’m not just at

my desk sitting in a chair. Instead, I’m at a rock concert. According to Berkeley’s account of bodies,

I’m perceiving a great deal of sensible qualities in such a situation. I might have the ideas of loud

sounds, of flashy colors, of the taste of a hot dog, of a wet feeling from sweating, of the smell of alcohol,

of the smell of nicotine and so on. One might ask “How do we put all of these ideas of sensible qualities

together and make sense of what we are perceiving?” This could be a problem for Berkeley’s account.

Imagine that I not only have the perceptions listed, but many more, including perceptions that seem to

be in conflict with each other (barely audible sounds/loud sounds, plain colors/flashy colors etc.). If I

were to combine these many sets of sensible qualities together, there might be some organization. I

might be able to distinguish the taste of a hot dog from the taste of beer very easily. However, assuming

that there are many more perceptions to organize, I might not be able to make similar distinctions. In

fact, based on what my sets of ideas are, if one were to paint my sets of sensible qualities on a canvas,

one might end up with things that appear to look “unreal”. Perhaps in the painting, someone would be

using a bottle of beer as a cigarette, or looking at a stage that appears to be many strange looking colors

at once, and it would not represent anything at all that we normally think would represent what the

external world looks like. This counterintuitive result might be an undesirable consequence for

Berkeley. Or it might just be a result that we have to accept, if we consider his arguments for idealism

to be good ones.

history of modern philosophy- final exam

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