history of modern philosophy- midterm

7/31/2019 History of Modern Philosophy- Midterm

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David Krajewski

Philosophy 321- Midterm (Essay #2)

2A. The Containment principle might seem plausible because it seems to correspond to a

commonsense account of causation. It appeals to the “commonsense” thought that “something

cannot come from nothing”. For example, we usually do not think that a cub springs into

existence under its own power. That thought is nonsensical. Instead, we observe that a cub is

born in virtue of its bear parents mating. We conclude that the mating of the parents caused the

cub’s birth. The Containment principle makes sense of this. The principle states that whatever

reality or perfection (property may be used in place of perfection) is contained formally in a

thing is contained formally or eminently in its total, efficient cause. Formal reality is the reality

that a thing contains if it actually contains that reality. The adult bears formally (actually)

contain the properties of bear genetics and a bear exterior. A cub formally (actually) contains the

properties of bear genetics and a bear exterior. The cub derives the formal properties it contains

from the formal properties that the bears contain. The mating allowed the bears to “pass on”

these properties to the cub. The mating might not be the “ultimate cause” of the cub (if God

exists) but it is at least a very important cause of the cub. Since the cause (mating of the bears)

contains a sufficient amount of formal reality to produce the effect (the cub) the Containment

principle holds here.

The bears formally contain the perfection (or property) of bear genetics. A tiger does not

have bear genetics. It has tiger genetics. Therefore a tiger does not formally contain bear

genetics. For the tiger to formally contain bear genetics it would literally have to have them

(within its body). Instead it literally has tiger genetics (within its body) and so it formally



contains tiger genetics. Adult bears cause cubs through formal containment by passing on their

genetics and adult tigers cause baby tigers the same way.

Now consider God and assume that he has no body. He does not literally have bear

genetics or tiger genetics meaning he cannot formally contain those properties. And so God

cannot cause a tiger in the way that two tiger parents can. But we assume that God is all-

powerful and is the cause of all things. How is it he can cause a tiger if he does not formally

contain tiger properties? He does so through eminent containment. Eminent containment might

be explained best by referring to the “chain of being”. The “chain of being” is a hierarchical

ranking of the things in the world according to the formal reality that they have. The higher the

formal reality that a thing has then the higher it is ranked in the hierarchy.

We assume God literally has infinite power. If he literally has infinite power then he

formally contains it. It seems infinite power would count for a lot of formal reality. Given that

he formally contains infinite power we can say that he is at least higher up in the hierarchy than a

tiger. Surely a tiger does not have infinite power. If God formally contains infinite power then

he could “plant” any properties he would like into something below him in the ranking. There is

nothing stopping him and it does not appear necessary that he would need to literally contain

tiger properties to cause something to have tiger properties. Suppose God sees that tigers are

going extinct but wants to keep the species going. He gets creative and turns some bears into

some tigers by changing their “bear properties” to “tiger properties”. He does this not by

containing tiger properties formally but instead containing them eminently. And he is able to

contain them eminently for he has more “tiger reality” than any tiger could formally have.

Infinite power implies that God’s power and thus the eminent reality he has (of tigers, bears or

whatever) is boundless.



A total cause might be said to be a “compound cause”. Consider a very simple cause. A

causes B to move backward by pushing B. All that is required is one thing (A) to cause another

thing (B) to move. But in the world there appear to be causes much more complex. B might be

a very heavy cart and A might be just one human. It will probably require more than A to push

the heavy cart. Four more people come help push the cart and succeed. It looks like five people

caused the cart to move. The cart is a body. The five people are also bodies (and minds).

According to the hierarchy (and containment principle) a body can cause another body to do

something as long as the effected body formally contains what is formally contained in its cause

(a body cannot contain eminent reality according to Descartes). The human bodies formally

contain bodily extension and motion (which just means that they take up space and endure

through time) which are sufficient to move the cart. The cart also formally contains bodily

extension and motion. The containment principle holds here. Since it took multiple things to

cause the cart to move then we can say that it took a “total cause” to move the cart.

B. The causal principle of ideas (hereafter CP) states that whatever property or perfection is

contained objectively in an idea is contained formally or else eminently in the total, efficient

cause of the idea. Some ideas are real and some are fictional. What will determine whether idea

A is “more real” than idea B is if the content of idea A represents more formal reality than the

content of idea B. If the content of idea A represents more formal reality than idea B then idea A

contains more “objective reality”. Take my ideas of God (A) and the moon (B). B is a body.

Remember that A is above everything in the hierarchy. Since God is above the moon in the

hierarchy then A represents more formal reality than B. And if A represents more formal reality

than B (in fact, it contains infinite reality) then A contains more objective reality. Note that CP

states whatever property is contained objectively in an idea is contained formally or eminently in



the cause of the idea. Idea A objectively contains the perfections of God. It follows that the

cause of my idea of God actually contains formally or eminently the formal reality that my idea

is representing. And so I conclude here that God must exist using CP. The same can be done

with B. B objectively contains the perfections of the moon. The cause of idea B actually

contains formally or eminently the formal reality that my idea of the moon represents. Therefore

the moon exists.

C. But I do not always need to have true ideas. In fact, according to CP, I might have untrue

ideas and they can still represent formal reality. So take the claim that “Bartlett Hall does not

exist”. I can still have the idea of Bartlett Hall and have it be that it is an idea that represents

formal reality. Suppose I have perceived (whether through sense perception or in my mind)

various buildings. Note that buildings are bodies and so an idea of a building will represent

“bodies” in formal reality. I have been to many college campuses and so I seem to have a good

understanding of what college buildings appear to be like. I have these ideas in my head of

actual college buildings I have seen. Suddenly I begin to combine all of them together.

Moments later I construct an idea of a college building different than any one I have seen before.

For some reason I decide to call it “Bartlett Hall”. It seems I have an idea of “Bartlett Hall”

despite the fact that it is nonexistent.

This idea of “Bartlett Hall” holds according to CP. My idea represents a vast array of

combined bodies (buildings) that contain formal reality. Therefore the cause of my idea must

contain the same formal reality that my idea is representing. The formal reality being

represented is not of an actual building but of a building combined using ideas of actual

buildings. And so my idea might be of a nonexistent thing but it does not follow that it is

constructed from false ideas. But there are other causal explanations for my idea of “Bartlett



Hall”. I do not necessarily have to combine buildings from formal reality to construct my idea.

Maybe an evil demon decides to just plant the idea of nonexistent Bartlett Hall into my head

through sensory deception. I do not know better and so I think my idea represents formal reality.

I may have had the idea planted into me but it is still compatible with CP. The evil demon is

ranked higher than me (a human body and mind) in the hierarchy. He eminently contains

“Bartlett Hall reality” which enables him to plant the idea. In this case my idea represents the

eminent reality that the evil demon contains rather than the formal reality that the combined

buildings contained in the previous case. Therefore the eminent reality my idea represents is

eminently contained in the cause of my idea. CP holds. Likewise we could replace the evil

demon with God and CP would again hold.

D. CP will also hold for the fictitious idea of a mermaid. In the “combined buildings case” I

combined things that represented formal reality to construct my idea of a fictitious building. I

can do something similar to construct the mermaid idea but it is not quite the same. There are no

actual mermaids in existence like there are actual buildings in existence. Constructing the idea

of a mermaid might not be as easy. Instead I will at least have to take the idea of a woman and a

fish and combine them together to form my idea of a mermaid. My idea of a woman represents a

body in formal reality and the same applies to the fish. I fuse them together and thus I get my

mermaid idea. My idea represents formal reality in the forms of a woman and a fish. That

formal reality is contained in the cause of my idea and so CP holds. But I do not see why an evil

demon could not deceive me into having a mermaid idea. He might be crafty and deceive me

into seeing a mermaid while on a boat. My idea represents the eminent reality of women and

fishes and whatever else he used to filter his idea of a mermaid into my sensory experience. CP



concludes that he (as the cause) eminently contains the properties of women and fish. And so it

holds.

Descartes claims that the idea of God cannot be like the idea of a mermaid (or any

fictitious thing). His idea of God is a being with infinite perfections. Remember that an idea’s

objective reality is equal to the formal reality that its content represents. My idea of God

represents infinite perfections (thus infinite formal reality) and so it follows that my idea contains

infinite objective reality. If my idea of God contains infinite objective reality and if CP dictates

that the cause of my idea must contain that reality formally or eminently, then God is the only

being that fits the criteria. He contains infinite formal reality. Therefore he exists. But this does

not yet show that my idea of God cannot be fictitious. He claims that his idea of God is a clear

and distinct idea while an idea about a mermaid lacks clarity and distinctness. It lacks clarity and

distinctness in the sense that the mermaid idea does not seem to contain any necessary amount of

objective reality while the God idea does.

Descartes has an idea of God that has infinite objective reality. The mermaid idea does

not have infinite objective reality since it just combines the woman and fish ideas. For an idea to

have infinite objective reality it seems necessary that it have infinite formal reality. For

Descartes it seems just as necessary as “2+2=4” or any other mathematical truth. On the

contrary there does not seem to be any necessary amount of objective reality for the mermaid

idea to have. My mermaid idea might combine certain “women and fish properties” that

somebody else’s mermaid idea does not. I might combine red hair with one type of fish.

Someone else might combine blonde hair with another type of fish. The mermaid idea seems

trivial. But the God idea does not. It just has to have infinite objective reality for the idea

represents infinite formal reality. There is no certain quantity of formal reality that the mermaid



idea represents. It appears that the amount of objective reality that a mermaid idea has will

depend on whoever is constructing the idea. Whereas the God idea will contain the same amount

of objective reality no matter who has the idea, according to Descartes. And that is why the idea

is clear and distinct.

E. Suppose I try to combine ideas (as I did with the mermaid and Bartlett Hall) that contain

formal reality in an attempt to come up with the idea of God. Note that it is necessary here to

add up enough ideas so that they are equal to infinity for my idea of God is infinite. For the

mermaid idea it seemed sufficient to just use the ideas of a woman and a fish. Descartes does not

think I can make an idea of God in the same way. Suppose I can add everything together that

contains formal reality (a difficult task). I would still need my self-constructed idea to be

complete and unified. This means, for Descartes, that the idea of God is something that is

“closed off”. God has infinite formal reality but that does not mean the formal reality he has

goes on and on forever ad infinitum. I can add a bunch of ideas together but it is just a “mashing

up” of various ideas. It does not constitute something that is “closed off”. Consider a

continuous straight line. My self-constructed idea of God is like a continuous straight line. I

might add “goodness” and “kindness” and a whole lot more perfections together to construct an

idea of God. But my line of perfections will not stop. It will, to repeat, go on ad infinitum.

My line of perfections represents something that is “potential”. In other words, there is

no necessity here that these perfections will function together “as a unit”. And if the perfections

will not necessarily function together as a unit, there does not seem to be a reason to call this

God. Surely they may function together as a unit but that is not enough for an idea of God. God

must be something that has a bunch of perfections that function together. Descartes writes

“God..I take to be actually infinite, so that nothing can be added to his perfection”. His idea of



God is something that necessarily is already complete for God contains infinite formal reality.

God already has all the perfections and since he already does then it seems incoherent for me to

add perfection after perfection to self-construct an idea of God. I am working my way up from

“bottom to top” to construct the idea. Descartes writes “this gradual increase in knowledge is

itself the surest sign of imperfection”. In other words, the idea of God is not something that is

“built up” by adding perfection to perfection to perfection. Once I have an idea of God then my

idea of God already represents the formal containment of all the perfections. There is no need

for me to sit here and attempt to think of every perfection and add each together. If my idea

already represents the formal containment of all the perfections then that would seem to be a

waste of time. Contrary to the continuous straight line, the idea of God should be more like a

circle. I cannot add anything to it and I cannot take away anything from it. The circle is

“complete and unified” in the sense that there is nothing I can do to change what is inside the

circle whereas I could alter the continuous straight line by adding things together. Whatever is

inside is contained (and sustained) there formally and eminently by God. In other words,

constructing an idea of God is not a trivial exercise. Everybody must come to have the same

idea of God.

history of modern philosophy- midterm

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