history of the international monetary system and its
TRANSCRIPT
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University of Tennessee Honors Thesis Projects University of Tennessee Honors Program
5-2010
History of the international monetary system andits potential reformulationCatherine Ardra KarczmarczykUniversity of Tennessee, [email protected]
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HistoryoftheInternationalMonetarySystem
anditsPotentialReformulation
CatherineA.Karczmarczyk
HonorsThesisProject
Dr.AnthonyNownesandDr.AnneMayhew
02May2010
Karczmarczyk 2
HISTORYOFTHEINTERNATIONALMONETARYSYSTEMANDITSPOTENTIAL
REFORMATION
Introduction
Theyear1252markedthemintingoftheveryfirstgoldcoininWesternEurope
sinceRomantimes.Sincethislandmark,theinternationalmonetarysystemhas
evolvedandtransformeditselfintothemodernsystemthatweusetoday.The
modernsystemhasitsrootsbeginninginthe19thcentury.InthisthesisIexplore
fourmainideasrelatedtothishistory.
Firstistheevolutionoftheinternationalmonetarysystem.WithinthisIwill
explorethedifferenterasthatmakeupthistime.Firstistheclassicgoldstandard,
thentheinterwarperiod,andfollowedbyBrettonWoods.Thissectionconcludes
withadiscussiononthecurrentera,alsoknownasthedirtyfloat.
Thesecondsectionwillexplorethetransitionperiodofthe1990s.This
sectionexplorestheAsianFinancialCrisisindetailandalsodiscussestheoriginsof
theeurozone.Thesesectionsbegintheanalysisportionofthethesis,andwhilethey
dogiveacertaindegreeofbackground,thesectionlargelyservesasatransitional
section.
Thethirdsectionisananalysisofthecurrentmonetarysystem.Theworldis
facingtwomajorissuesrightnow,thepotentialcollapseoftheeurozoneandthe
ChineseholdingofUSTreasurydebt.Inthissection,Iwillexploretheseissuesin
Karczmarczyk 3
depthandhighlighthowthehistoryoftheinternationalmonetarysystemhasledus
tothispoint.
Inthefourthandfinalsection,Ihighlightseveralpossibilitiesforreform.This
isnotacomprehensiveplanofaction,butratherideasofwhereIseereformis
needed.Actualreformpossibilitieshavebeencirculatingforyears,andtheseideas
representacombinationofthese.
EvolutionoftheInternationalMonetarySystem
TheClassicGoldStandard(18701914)
Inthissection,IwilldiscusstheriseandimportanceofthegoldstandardinGreat
Britain,theBankofEnglandasalenderoflastresort,andtheresultsofthe
continentjoiningthegoldstandard.Iwillconcludewithabriefdiscussionoftheend
oftheprewargoldstandardandtheoverallimportanceofitsevolutiontoboththe
interwarandpostwarperiodsbutalsotothemodernmonetarysystemtoday.
TheRiseoftheGoldStandardinGreatBritain
Theclassicgoldstandardstartedformostcountriesinandaroundthe1870s,but
forGreatBritain,itwasfarearlier.Manydatetheadventofthegoldstandardin
Britainto1717,whenSirIsaacNewtonsetthepriceofgoldattoolowarate,
causingsilvertodisappearfromthecountryentirely.Theactualdateof
demonetizationdidn’toccuruntil1774,theyearwhengoldwasrecoined,silverwas
recognizedassubsidiary,andlimitsweresetontheuseofsilvercoinsinexcessof
25pounds.
Karczmarczyk 4
Intheyearsleadinguptotheadoptionofthegoldstandardbycontinental
Europe,Britainfacedseveralinstancesofconvertibilityissues.WhentheReignof
Terrortookplaceinearly1793,therewasasharpoutflowofcapitalintheformof
bothgoldandsilverfromFrance.Thisproducedlargeamountsofliquidityin
Britain,fuelinganongoingmaniatoitspeak.Eventuallytheassignat,theFrench
papercurrencyofthetime,collapsed,forcingareflowofmoney.TheBritishpeople
panicked,andabankrunensued.Inresponse,theBritishgovernmentorderedthe
BankofEnglandtosuspendconvertibility,wellbeforereservesranoutinaneffort
tokeepgoldreservesfrombecomingexhaustedifalltheincreasednotestofinance
thewarwerecashedin.In1825,notlongafterconvertibilityresumption,Britain
onceagainfacedthethreatofabankrun.TheBankofFrancesteppedintoaidthem
atthistime,easingthefearofsuspension.
Britainrecognizedtheneedtoact.Suspensionofthecurrencyledtoan
inconsistentsystemalwaysfacingbankruns.Atthistime,however,thereweretwo
schoolsofthought,theCurrencySchoolandtheBankingSchool,eachwithdiffering
ideasonhowthemoneysupplyshouldbehandled.Theintricaciesofthesetwo
schoolsarebeyondthescopeofthispaper,butletitsufficetosaythattheBanking
Actof1844wasacompromisebetweenthetwo.FortheBankofEngland,itcreated
anIssueDepartment,whichwasresponsiblefortheissueofpapercurrency,andit
wouldalsocreateaBankingDepartment,responsibleformakingloansand
discountsuptoamultipleofitsreservesofbanknotesthathadbeenproducedby
theIssueDepartment(Kindleberger59).
Karczmarczyk 5
ApartfromafixedinitialquantityofBanknotesbackedbygovernment
securities,“everynoteissuedhadtobebackedbybullioninthevaultoftheIssue
Department.ThislimitedthequantityofBanknotesinanefforttoadheretothe
principlethat“thewaytoassureasoundpapercurrencyistorequireanyincrease
initsquantitytobebackedpoundforpoundbyincreasesinbullionreservesheldby
thecentralbank”(Dillard378).Basically,atthispointinthehistoryofbankingin
England,securitywasmoresacredthanflexibility.Choosingthispath,however,
madeitdifficultfortheBankofEnglandtosupplycreditintimesofemergency.
WhentheCrisesof1847,1857,and1866erupted,theBankofEnglandwasgiven
permissionbygovernmenttobreakthelawbyissuingnotesnotbackedbybullion.
TheBankActof1844hadanevenmorefundamentalissuehowever.It
presumedthat“controlofthequantityofbanknotes,andthereservesbehindthem,
wasthechieffunctionofcentralbanking”(Dillard378).Britishbanking,however,
wasenteringanewphase,thecheckingsystem.
TheBankofEnglandasaLenderofLastResort
Inthenewcheckingphaseofbanking,“themostimportantfunctionoftheBankof
Englandwasastheholderofthecentralreservessupportingthecheckingsystem
andasalenderoflastresortinemergencies”(Dillard379).Therehadlongbeen
debateinEnglandoverwhetherthelenderoflastresortshouldbetheExchequeror
theBankofEngland,buttheactionsoftheBankActof1844,leftlittledoubtasto
whomthejobwouldfall.Itwasaroundthistimeofthisnewphasethatitbecame
startlinglyclearthattheBankofEnglandwasnolonger“justanyotherbank.”Its
Karczmarczyk 6
reservesweretoolargeanditsroleasacreditcustodiantoowidelyaccepted.Ithad
to“standreadytolenditsreservesfreelyincriticalcreditsituations;formere
reluctanceonitspartwouldmakecrediteventighterandprecipitateacrisisor
makeanexistingcrisisworse”(Dillard379).
Privatebanksandothersuchinstitutionsneededbanknotes(thelegal
tender)toprovidefortheircustomers.Inordertodothis,however,theyhadto
haveaccesstothecentralbank.SuchanecessitygavetheBankofEnglandacertain
degreeofpower.TheBankofEngland“couldmakethebankersandbillbrokerspay
fornewmoneybyraisingtherateofinterest,but[atthesametime]itcouldhardly
refusetolend,providedtheborrowershadgoodsecuritiestosellorpledgeagainst
theirloans”(Dillard379).Thepower,andresponsibility,comesinbecausenow
becausetheBankingDepartment(nowthepowerfuldepartmentduetotheriseof
checking)washeldresponsibleforthecreditofallbanks,astheirabilitiesdepended
ontheliquidityofthecentralbank.
ContinentalEuropeJoinstheGoldStandard
ThegoldstandardinEnglandhadbeenaroundforseveralyearsbeforecontinental
Europedecidedtoalsojoinin.DuringthetimethatBritainhadbeenbuildingand
redefiningit’s(andeventuallytheworld’s)bankingsystem,theyhadalsobeen
experiencingtheIndustrialRevolution.Thisindustrializationleftthemasthe
“world’sleadingeconomicpowerandthemainsourceofforeignfinance”
(Eichengreen17).Countriesdesperatelywantedtotradewithsuchaneconomic
resource,andthebimetallicstandardsofmanyofthesecountriesdidn’tfacilitate
Karczmarczyk 7
easytrade.Portugalhaddecidedearlyonin1854thatit’stradewithBritainwas
crucial,andtheyinresponseadoptedthegoldstandardin1854.Othercountries,
however,hadyettocometothatconclusion.
Whenaseriesofevents,includingabriefboutofinconvertibility(associated
withtheFranco‐PrussianWar),decliningtransportationcosts,andlargesilver
discoveriesinthe1850s(inplacessuchasNevada),considerationsofjoiningthe
goldstandardwerepushedevenfurther.Ultimately,thefinalincentivecamein
1871,whenGermany,theleadingindustrialpowerofcontinentalEurope,choseto
liquidateitssilverholdingsinanefforttoopenupmoretradewithGreatBritain.
Theresultwasachainreactioncausedby“theincentiveforeachcountrytoadopt
themonetarystandardsharedbyitscommercialandfinancialneighbors
(Eichengreen17).Bytheendofthenineteenthcentury,Spainwastheonly
Europeancountrystilloninconvertiblepaper.Intherestoftheworld,theUnited
States,Japan,Russia,India,andLatinAmericaallalsoinstitutedgoldconvertibility.
SilverremainedthemonetarysystemonlyinChinaandafewothersmallcountries.
Underthegoldstandard,“theexchangeratesofthesemajorindustrial
countrieswerefirmlypeggedwithinnarrowbands(thegoldpoints)inan
environmentfreeofsignificantrestrictionsoninternationalflowsoffinancial
capital”(Bayoumi165).Therateofconvertibilityandpriceofgoldwasfixed,and
underthisfixedsystem,theworldenteredaperiodoftradeandglobalization
previouslyunmatchedinhistory.Thestabilityofexchangeratesunderthissystem
ledtotheopennessofthemarketsandbuoyancyoftrade,whichinturnoffered
Karczmarczyk 8
supportwithinthemselvesofthegoldstandard.Therewere,however,pressureson
theBankofEnglandwiththisincreaseduseoftheirreserveservices.Sameasinthe
domesticmarket,theinternationalgoldstandardrequiredondemandpaymentto
depositors.AsBanknotesweren’tlegaltenderinthisnewfoundinternational
exchange,goldhadtobeexportedifsodesiredbythedepositor.Increasesinthe
rateofinterest“broughtaboutbyincreasesintheBankratewereusedtoattract
moneytoLondonandtopreventadrainofEnglishreserves”(Dillard379).
InstabilityandFailure
Theoperationofthegold‐standardsystemrestedoncentralbanks’overriding
commitmentto“themaintenanceofexternalconvertibility(Eichengreen34).There
was,however,akeyproblemwiththis.Notallcountrieshadestablishedcentral
banks.EvenintheUnitedStatesFederalReservewasn’testablisheduntil1913.This
resultedfrequentlyincountriesbeingforcedtosuspendgoldconvertibilitytoallow
theircurrenciestodepreciateproperly.Yetthiswasjustoneissue.
Thebiggesttensionandpressureassociatedwiththegoldstandardwasthat
oftheroleoftheBankofEngland.Aspreviouslymentioned,theBankofEngland
wasoperatingasthestewardofthegoldstandard,andthusBritishparticipationin
thesystemwascritical.Itisn’tcoincidentalthatontwoseparateoccasions,1890
and1907,Britainreceivedforeignsupportwhenfacedwithinconvertibility.Yetby
theturnofthecentury,Britain’srolewas“beingunderminedbythemorerapid
paceofeconomicgrowthandfinancialdevelopmentinothercountries”
Karczmarczyk 9
(Eichengreen42).LessofitslendingreturnedtoLondonintheformofforeign
deposits.
Ultimately,noneoftheseissuesresultedinthedeathofthegoldstandard
despitetheirincreasinglyworrisomepossibilities.InJulyof1914WorldWarIbroke
out,andwhenEuropebecameentrenchedinthewar,“goldexportsweresuspended
inordertopreventtheflightofgold…[and]moreover,theenormousincreasesin
thequantityofpapercurrencyandbankcreditmadeimpossibletheirfree
convertibilityintogold”(Dillard510).TherealityofWorldWarIwasacomplete
shutdownininternationaltradeandtheendofthegoldstandard.
TheInterwarPeriod(19191939)
Theevolutionofourmodernpoliticalsystemhasamarkeddiscontinuityduetothe
outbreakofwarin1914.Inanefforttobeconcise,Iwillnotdiscusstheeconomics
oftheactualwar,asitisbeyondthescopeofthispaper.Instead,Iwillmoveon
directlytotheInterwarPeriod,whichcanbedividedintofourdistincttimes:
RecoveryandReparations(1919‐1925),theBoom(1925‐1929),theCollapse
(1929‐1933),andStruggledRecovery(1933‐1939).
RecoveryandReparations(19191925)
Reparationpayments,territorialchanges,hyperinflation,andadesiretoreturnto
goldcharacterizedtherealityofthistimeperiod.IntheArmisticeConventionsigned
onNovember11,1918,“itwasagreedthatGermanywastopayreparationtothe
victoriousAllies”(Kindleberger290).Theamountofsuchreparationswasleft
Karczmarczyk 10
undecided,butGermanywasforcedtosignthetreaty,takingonanyandall
responsibilityforthewar.Itwasgenerallyagreeduponatthistimethatsince
Germanywasresponsibleforthewar,theyshouldberesponsibleafterthewar,
meaningthattheywouldberequiredtopayforit.Becauseofextremedifferencesof
opinionontheAlliedsideabouthowmuchthisshouldbe,aspecialReparations
Commissionwascalledupon.InApril1921,theReparationsCommissionfixedan
amountof132billiongoldmarksplus26percentinexporttaxesoveraperiodof
forty‐twoyears(Kindleberger290).Germansweren’thappywiththisarrangement
asitwas,butgiventheirrelativepositionintheworldatthistime,therewaslittle
thattheycouldsay.ThewilltopayonthesideofGermanywasweak,andattimes,
completelymissing.
TerritorialChanges.Typically,economicrelationsarenotbasedonsuch
internationalrelationsissuesasterritorychanges.TheaftermathofWorldWarI
wasanexception.Germanylostapproximatelyone‐thirdofitscoalresources,
locatedinthekeyareaoftheSaarandUpperSilesia(Dillard511).France,underthe
provisionsontheVersaillesTreaty,hadtakenoverthisareapostwarinorderto
providecoaltoproducesteelintheLorraine,anareatakenbyGermansduringthe
war.Additionally,GermanywasobligatedundertheTreatytosupplyadditionalcoal
toFrance“tocompensateforthewardamagetocoalmines(Dillard511).”Thiswas
partofthegeneralreparationsthatGermanywastopay,buttheremainingcoalleft
aftersuchrepaymentswasn’tenoughtosupplyGermany’srebuildingeffortsand
postwarindustry.Coalwasn’ttheonlyresourcethatGermanyoncehadbutnow
lacked.TheLorrainewasalsorichinironore.Thesepostwarchangeshadinterfered
Karczmarczyk 11
withtheproductionsystem,andtheresultwasdisorganizationandlossofefficiency
intheEuropeansteelindustry.
InJanuary1922,GermanscalledforaconferenceinCannestodiscussa
potentialmoratoriumandtoreopenthereparationquestion.Britainhadbeen
pushingforarevisedandreducedschedule,largelyinfluencebyKeynes,and
openedtheconferenceupfortheideaofaninternationalloantoGermany.InApril
theReparationsCommissionmettofurtherexplorethispossibility,butinJune,the
committeedecidedthat“giventhereparationschedule,Germany’screditwasnot
sufficientlyhightojustifyaninternationalloan(Kindleberger293).
Hyperinflation.Latethatsummerandintothefollowingfall,Germany’s
reparationpaymentsfellcompletelyoffschedule.Germanshadnowayofmeeting
thedemandsplaceduponthem.Theywerelackingterritory,andevenmore,the
Frenchdidn’twantthecompetitionofGermanworkerstakingjobsawayfrom
domesticworkersintheirreconstructionefforts(Mayhew1).Thesituation
worsened.FrenchandBelgiantroopsweresenttooccupytheRuhrinanattemptto
enforcereparationpaymentdelivery.ThisresultedonlyinastrikeofGerman
workers,andinanefforttoaidtheseworkers,theGermangovernmentsimply
beganprintingmoremoney.Averagewholesalepricesrose“fromanindexof1,400
(wherepricesweremeasuredas100in1913)to126,000,000,000,000inDecember
of1923”(Mayhew1).Themarkwasrenderedworthlessandwasreplacedin
November(aftergreatdamagetothemiddleclass)bytheRentenmark,anentirely
Karczmarczyk 12
newcurrency.TheGermangovernmentalsoraisedtaxesatthistime.The
RentenmarkwasthenlaterreplacedbytheReichsmarkwiththeDawesPlan.
TheDawesPlan,createdbyaninternationalcommitteeofbothmoderates
andextremists,waskeyforGermany.AnnouncedinApril1924,itcreateda
reparationschedulebeginningwith“1billiongoldmarksforthefirstyear,2.5
billioninthefifth…[and]providedroomforchangesifgoldpricesmovedupor
downby10percent(Kindleberger294).Theprovisionsincludedbotha
ReparationsAgency,establishedinBerlintooverseefinances,andareorganization
oftheReichsmark.Finally,andmostimportantly,theDawesPlancreateda
provisionthatallowed800Reichsmarktobesoldonvariousmarkets.Despite
protestsonthesideoftheFrench,thegovernmentsofbothFranceandBelgium
appliedheavypressuretoprivatebankerstohavethemhandlethesharesofthe
loan.Forawhile,thissolutionseemedtowork,andGermanywasabletomakeits
paymentsonschedule.
Asitturnsout,thiswasadeceptivereality.Americanprivateinvestors,
particularlyoutofNewYorkCity,hadbeenmakinglargedollarloanstoGermany.It
wasthesedollarsthatwereusedtomakereparationpayments,whichtheAlliesin
turnusedtomakewardebtpayments(Dillard520).Wardebtswere“incurredfor
assistanceandforshipmentfromtheU.S.ofgrain,cotton,andothersuppliesduring
thewar”(Mayhew2).TheAmericansinsistedonthese,notfromGermany,butfrom
theAlliedforces.TheAmericangovernmenthad,however,madeitabundantlyclear
thattheydidn’twishtoreceiverepaymentintheformofgoodsbyinstituting
Karczmarczyk 13
ridiculouslyhightariffs.Withthiscycleofloansandwardebtpayments,theUnited
Stateswasessentiallypayingitself.
ReturntoGold.Duringthisinterwarperiod,thegoldstandardhadbeenlargely
abandonedwithonlyUnitedStatesandafewothersmallcountriesstillmaintaining
it.Thereasonforthisisthatcrucialaspectofthegoldstandardnolongerexisted:
moneywasnolongerexchangeableintogold.However,therewasstillastrong
desiretoreturntotheprewarsystemduelargelytothefactthatithadfacilitated
largeamountsofinternationaltradeandglobalization.Sobetween1923and1928
morethanthirtynationsrestoredthegoldstandardinsomeform(Dillard538).
Thegreatestdecisionconcerningthis,however,wasnotwhethertorestore
thegoldstandard,butratheratwhatleveltosetit.InGreatBritainthisdebates
existedoverwhethertheyshouldfixthepoundsterlingtoitsprewargoldcontent
orattheexistingpostwarvalueinrelationtoothercurrencies(Dillard538).
EventuallyitwasdecidedthatBritainwouldreturntothegoldstandardatthe
prewarlevel.Theyweretodothisbypermittingfreeexportofgoldbullionafter
April1,1925.Yetwhenthisdecisionwasmade,thepoundwasnowhereasstrong
asithadbeenintheprewaryears.Prewar,thepoundwasvaluedat$4.40,butin
thisinterwarperiod,itwasaround$4.87(Dillard538).Toreturntogoldmeantthat
thepoundwouldhavetoappreciate,andsotorestoretheparratiobetweenthe
dollarandpoundmeantthatpricesneededtoeitherriseintheUSorfallinthe
UnitedKingdom.GiventhestabilityoftheUnitedStatesinthepostWWItime
Karczmarczyk 14
period,thisfelltoBritain.Essentially,inordertomakethegoldstandardwork,
GreatBritainwouldhavetodeflateitspricelevels.
TheBritishwereencouragedtothenrelymoreheavilyonimportsasthe
Britishpoundsterlingwouldnowbuy10percentabroadmorethanbeforeandvery
littlemoreathome(Dillard539).Thisledtoanadversebalanceoftrade,but
meetingthisadversebalancebypermittinggoldtobeexportedwasundesirabledue
tothelowlevelsofgold.SotheBankofEnglandthenoptedtoincreasethebankrate
inorder“toattractloanstoBritaintocoverthedeficitinthebalanceofpayments”
(Dillard539).Thisultimatelyledtohousingshortages,unemployment,andlittle
construction.TheBritisheconomy“didnotenjoytheexpansionofproductionthat
tookplaceelsewhere”(Mayhew3).
TheBoom(19251929)
Withmostcountriesnoweitheronthegoldstandardormovingtowardsit,
“normalcy”seemedtoberestored.Butthistimewasnotwithoutitstensions.Inthe
timebeforetheWorldWar,Londonhadbeenthecenterofthefinancialworld,and
theBankofEnglandwasthelenderoflastresort.Duringthe1920s,however,
Europebecameunabletofunctionastheworld’sbanker.Britainhadcontinual
difficultyofmaintainingthepoundat$4.87whilehighinterestandunemployment
ratespersisted.Importanttonoteisatthesametimeofthisovervaluationofthe
pound,therewasanunderevaluationoftheFrenchfranc,whichhadledtoapileup
ofsterlingintheFrenchmonetarysystem(Kindleberger354).
Karczmarczyk 15
RoleoftheUnitedStates.Inlightofthis,theUnitedStatessteppedinto
replaceBritainastheworld’sbankerbyofferinglong‐termloans.Americanbanks
lentinverylargesumsandtheseloansledtoahighdependencylevelofEuropeon
theUnitedStates.Atthesametime,however,Americaneconomicpolicy“placed
majorobstaclesinthewayofrepaymentofloans”(Dillard541).Havingbeenin
suchalargecreditorrole,theUnitedStatesshouldhaveincreaseditsimportsin
orderforforeignerstohavetheopportunitytoearndollarswithwhichtheycould
thenservicetheirdebt.Loweringtariffswouldhavedonethis.TheUnitedStates,
however,didjusttheopposite.Inboth1922and1930,tariffsreachedtheirhighest
pointinhistory.Thoseforeignerswhohadreceivedloanspaidtheinterestontheir
debtstemporarilyoutoffurtherloansratherthanfromincreasedproductivity
(Dillard541).
Theboom,however,existedbecauseofanddependedlargelyuponthe
UnitedStates,whoseeconomywasbeginningtoshowsignsofweakening.
Consumerbuyingwasslowing,debtreacheditshighestlevelyetseen,and
constructionslowedconsiderablyasthedemandofnewhousingevaporated
(Mayhew4).Theseconditionsontopofthehightariffsputtheportionoftheworld
thatdependedontheUnitedStates(whichatthetimewasaconsiderableamount)
inaprecarioussituation.
Reparations.Reparationswerealsobecomingincreasinglyworrisomeduring
thistime.Theywerebeingfinancedbyborrowing,buttheyremaineddifficultto
maintain.Germanyinparticularwasbeginningtocrackunderthestrain.Inorderto
Karczmarczyk 16
meettheimmenseobligationsofthereparationagreements,Germanywouldhave
to(1)builduptremendouslyitsindustrialproductivecapacity;(2)haveexportsin
excessofimportsbyatleasttheamountofreparations;(3)disposeofthehuge
exportsurpluseitherdirectlytotheAlliesorsellincompetitiveworldmarkets;(4)
keepdomesticconsumptionfarbelowdomesticproductionforseveralgenerations
byheavytaxation(Dillard517).Eachoftheseprovedtobeultimatelyimpossible,
anditwasn’tlonguntilGermanywasnolongerwilling“toproducegreatsurplus
wealthforthebenefitoftheirvictoriousenemieswhiletheGermanstruggledator
nearsubsistence”(Dillard519).Thesedeterioratingconditionsledtotensionsthat
wouldultimatelyresultinacollapse.
Primaryproductinventories.Asafinalnote,Europeanrecoveryinthe
productionofprimaryproducts,suchasgrain,hadledtopricesto“turnsoft”as
earlyas1925(Kindleberger355).Thismeansthatasinventoriesofsuchproducts
begantogrow,pricesbegantofall.Theconsequencesofthishadthegreatest
ramificationsincountriessuchasAustraliaandNewZealandwhodependedon
exportoftheseproductsandforagriculturalregionsoftheUS.Essentially,theworld
had“morecapacitytogrowfoodthanithadcapacitytobuyfood”(Mayhew4).
TheCollapse(19291933)
Thetensionsduringtheboomperiodwererealizedwhenin1928foreign
lendingfromtheU.S.begantodrop.Schacht’scampaign,anattemptagainstGerman
borrowinginNewYork,resultedinaswitchtoshort‐termloans.Depressionin
Germanyhadstartedalittleearlier(around1927)andthehigherinterestrates
Karczmarczyk 17
necessarytoattractshort‐termfundspushedproductionstilllower(Kindleberger
355).Unemploymentroseexponentially,andtheFrankfurtInsuranceCompany
failedinAugust1929.IntheUnitedStates,thestockmarket,despitetheFed’sbest
efforts,begantorise.Inanefforttocombatthis,theFedraisedthediscountrate.
ThisWallStreetboominU.S.stocksledtostillafurtherdropinlong‐termlending.
Aroundthesametime,theBankofFrancepulledgoldoutofLondondueto
irritationovertheYoungPlan,whichinturnresultedinatightersituationinBritain.
TheBankofEnglandraiseditsdiscountratefrom5½percentto6½percenton
September26,1929.ThisledtopressureinScandinaviawherediscountrateswere
alsoraisedinanefforttokeepinlinewithBritain.Therewasacertainworryatthis
pointthatGreatBritainwouldbeforcedoffthegoldstandard,butsuchfearswere
delayedwiththestockmarketcrashonOctober24andthesubsequentBlack
TuesdayonOctober29(Kindleberger355).
DeclineinProduction.Bymid‐1929productionofgoodsandservicesbegan
tofallsharplyworldwide(Mayhew5).Itbecameincreasinglydifficulttonegotiate
thetermsonwhichgoodscouldbeconvertedintomoney,andsoonlossesreplaced
profits,“meaningthatattheendofaturnoverofcapitaltheproducershadless
moneythanatthestartoftheturnoverperiod”(Dillard543).Thegoalbecameto
conserve,notexpand,andgoodswhichcouldnolongerbeconvertedeasilyto
moneybecame“worthless,”atleasttothecapitalisticnotionsofthistime.Thisidea
playedoutinternationallyintheformofgold.Creditwasnolongeraworthy
substituteofmoney,andthusproductionhaltedinanefforttokeepgoldcloseto
home.Thisledtohugedeclinesinproductionandinemployment.Asthecycle
Karczmarczyk 18
continued,thesituationworsened.Considerthefollowingchart(whichassumesa
standardproductionof100for1929):
Mayhew,Anne.“NotesontheInterwarEconomiesofWesternEurope.”
DeparturefromtheGoldStandard.Aslong‐termAmericanloansendedand
internationaltradefell,debtornationssoughttoborrowshorttermathighinterest
ratesinanefforttocovertheirdeficits.Suchactionsmighthavebeensuccessfulif
thedepressionhadendedsoonthereafter,butwiththecontinuationofsuchadeep
depression,thehighinterestratesonshort‐termloansjustdrovethedepression
deeper.
PanicreachednewlevelsintheworldmoneymarketsinMay1931whenthe
largestbankinAustriacrashedduetothebadloanstheyhadmadetothe
agriculturalregionsofcentralEurope.Thisinturncausedacompletelackof
confidence,andmoneymarketsbegantocrashallovertheworld.London,New
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
U.K. France Germany U.S.A.
1929
1932
Karczmarczyk 19
York,andBerlinwereamongthem.Priortothiscrash,itisimportanttonotethat
duringtheearlymonthsof1931,theReichsbankhadlostnine‐tenthsofitsgold
reserve,whichhadresultedinseveralGermanbanksclosureandadiscountrateof
15percent(Dillard542).Germanyundernormalcircumstanceswouldhavegone
offthegoldstandardandallowedthecurrencytoreachitsnaturallevelin
internationalexchanges,buttherecenthyperinflationkeptthispolitically
impossible.Instead,Germany“suspendedallforeignpaymentsandimposedrigid
exchangecontrols”(Dillard542).
SuspensionofpaymentsinGermanyhadramificationsinBritain,where
Britishcreditswerenowfrozenanduncollectable.DepositorsoftheBankof
Englandbecamealarmedandbegantowithdrawheavily,despitetheBankof
England’seffortsinraisingthediscountrate.Ultimately,theylostmorethan200
millionpoundswithinjusttwomonthsofGermany’sforeignpaymentsuspension
(Dillard543).ThefinalblowcameonSeptember20,1931,afteraweeklong“gold
rush”wheregoldreservesdroppedtodangerouslevels.TheBankofEngland
decidedtosuspendgoldpayments,andofficiallytooktheUnitedKingdomoffofthe
goldstandard.Reparationshadalsostoppedentirely.
ReactionandRecovery(19331939)
Manycountriesquicklyfollowedsuitandtookthemselvesoffofthegoldstandard.
By1932,thirty‐fivecountrieshadcomeoffofthegoldstandard,eachwithdifferent
results.IntheUnitedKingdom,therewasasighofrelief.Theyenteredaperiodof
milddomesticinflation,increasedemployment,andrisingbusinessexpectations
Karczmarczyk 20
(Dillard544).Ofthelargenations,onlyFranceandtheUnitedStatesattemptedto
stayongold,andthey,inturn,sufferedforit.FrenchandAmericanexportersfound
thatnoonewantedtobuytheirgoodsbecausetheircurrencywasvaluedmuch
higherthanothers,andwhentheyfuthererectedhightariffsandimportquotas,
theysealedthemselvesofffromworldtrade.Theyimposedonthemselves
“continuingdeflationofdomesticpricestotheaccompanimentofrising
unemploymentandstilldeeperdepression”(Dillard544).
TheUnitedStatesfaceddeeperproblemsstillwhenforeignwithdrawals
coupledwithincreasingdomesticdemandforgoldcausedagoldcrisisduetothe
lackofcredit(Dillard544).Bankrunsbecameincreasinglymorecommon,andin
turn,thehoardingofgoldledtoaliquiditycrisis.Whenmorethan5000banksfailed
intwoyears,theUnitedStatestemporarilyclosedallbanksinMarchof1933.Soon
thereafter,theU.S.suspendedgoldandwasforcedoffthegoldstandard.France
collapsedsoonafterward,anactionwhichwouldresultinadecadeofmoderately
inefficiencyonthepartoftheFrenchgovernment.SowithFranceandtheUnited
Statesnowofficiallyoffgold,thegoldstandardandinternationaltradecrumpled.
AroundthistimetheNazis,however,werebeginninganactiveprogramof
recoverytoadepressedaGermany.Theunemployedwereputtoworkbuildingup
domesticinfrastructure.UnderthesecondFour‐YearPlan,beginningin1937,
rearmamentbecamethemostimportantaspectofGermanpolicy.By1938,
Germany’sindustrialproductionhadmorethandoubledits1932output(Dillard
558).TheeconomyduringWorldWarIIisbeyondthescopeofthispaper,butletit
Karczmarczyk 21
sufficetosaythattheGermansgaveanincredibleeconomicperformanceduringthe
war.Theaftermath,however,leftEuropeonceagaininruins.
TheBrettonWoodsEra(19441971)
Inanefforttokeepthishistoryconcise,Iwillnotbediscussingthewartime
economy,asitwithinitselfhadnodirecteffectontheevolutionoftheinternational
monetarysystem.Iwillinsteadmovedirectlytothepost‐warperiod,whichbegan
in1944.TheBrettonWoodsEracanbedividedintothreesubperiods:
Preconvertibility(1944‐1958),thePrimeYears(1959‐1967),andtheCollapse
(1968‐1971).Beforeexploringeachofthese,Iwillfirstdiscussthevisionofthe
architectsofBrettonWoods,asitisatellingstatementofthementalityofthe
period.
TheVisionoftheBrettonWoodsArchitects
Thesituationdirectlyfollowingthewarandtheexperienceoftheprevious
monetarytimeshadadirecteffectontheideasaboutanewinternationalmonetary
order.TheoriginalgoaloftheBrettonWoodssystemwastocombinethe
advantagesoftheclassicalgoldstandardwiththeadvantagesoffloatingrates.At
thesametime,theplanningofanewinternationalorderwaspredicatedonthe
beliefthatthemistakesoftheinterwarperiodweretobeavoided.Europewasalso
strugglingwiththerecoveryfromthedevastationofthewar,andhavingjustcome
offatimeoftwoworldwars,theinternationalcommunitysoughtasystemthat
wouldpromotepeaceandinterdependence.
Karczmarczyk 22
WorldWarIIresultedinpowershiftsthatinturnslanteddiscussionsofthe
creationofanewsystem.TheUnitedStateshademergedfromthewarasthe
strongestandrichestpowerintheworld,butGreatBritainhadbeenseverely
weakened(Bordo31).Againstthebackdropofwartimediplomaticnegotiations,
thesetwocountriesagreedtobeofassistancetoeachotherinthepost‐warworld.
JohnMaynardKeynesoftheBritishTreasuryandHarryDexterWhiteofthe
AmericanFederalReserveeachdraftedtwoplansofwhattheybelievedthepost‐
wareconomyshouldlooklike.Acompromisebetweenthesetwoplans,followinga
periodoftoughnegotiations,ledtotheJointStatementbyExpertsonthe
EstablishmentofanInternationalMonetaryFund,whichinturnservedasthe
workingdraftattheBrettonWoodsconferenceandleddirectlytotheArticlesof
AgreementoftheInternationalMonetaryFund.AlongwiththeIMF,BrettonWoods
alsocreatedtheWorldBank.
TheArticlesofAgreement.TheArticlesofAgreementwasacompromiseand
incorporatedaspectsofbothplans,butultimately,duetoitsnewworldpower
status,theUnitedStatesdominatedtheconcerns.Theobjectivesofthefundwere
“topromoteinternationalmonetarycooperation,tofacilitatethemaintenanceoffull
employmentandrapidgrowth,toproveamultilateralpaymentssystemand
eliminateexchangerestrictions,toprovideresourcestomeetbalanceofpayments
disequilibria,andtoshortenthedurationandlessenthedegreeofpayments
disequilibria”(Bordo35).
Karczmarczyk 23
Themethodthatthissystemwastoworkwasthreefold.First,allcurrencies
weretobetreatedasequalinthearticles.Ideally,eachcountrywasrequiredto
maintainitsparvaluebyinterveninginthecurrencyofeveryothercurrency,butin
reality,theUnitedStateswastheonlycountrythatpeggeditscurrency(intermsof
gold).Theotherssimplyfixedtheircurrencyintermsofthedollarandintervened
onlytokeeptheirexchangerateswithin1%ofparitywiththedollar(Bordo37).
Second,countrieswouldusetheirreservesordrawreservesfromtheFundto
financepaymentsdeficits.Third,capitalcontrolswererequiredtoprevent
destabilizingspeculationfromforcingmembertoaltertheirparitiesprematurelyor
unintentionally(Bordo37).Intheend,however,thegoalsofBrettonWoodsrealin
manywaysnotrealized,andtheinternationalmonetarysystemevolvedintoagold
dollarstandard.
Preconvertibility(19461958)
Reparations,whichwereoneofthemostdifficultproblemsinpost‐WWI,were
mostlyeliminatedafterWorldWarII(Kindleberger413).Yetevenstillthe
transitiontofullconvertibilitywasmuchmoredifficultthanhadbeenpreviously
thought.Thiscanbeattributedinitiallytotwointerrelatedproblems:bilateralism
andthedollarshortage.
Bilateralism.Duringthewar,manycountrieshadutilizedasystemof
exchangecontrols,whichwasatechniqueusedtoregulateinternationaltradeand
capitalmovements.Governmentswouldrequiresuchactionsasrequiringexporters
tosurrendertheforeignmoneyreceivedfromsalesabroadandrequiringimporters
Karczmarczyk 24
topurchaseforeignexchangefromauthorizedbanks(Dillard546).Suchcontrols
tendedtopromotebilateralarrangementsinforeigntrade.Themottowas“ifwe
buyfromyou,youmustagreetobuyfromus”(Dillard547).NearlyallEuropean
countriesusedthissystem.
Withthecreationofanewinternationalorder,thegoalwastoeventually
eliminatethese.UnderArticleXIVoftheBrettonWoodsagreement,“countriescould
continuetouseexchangecontrolsforanindefinitetransitionperiodafterthe
establishmentoftheIMFof1March1947”(Bordo38).Therationalegivenfor
continuingtheseduringthistransitionperiodwastheshortageofinternational
reserves.Controlswereneededtoallocateashortageofbothimportsandexports.
AsianandEuropeaneconomieswereinruinsafterthewar,andinordertoincrease
theirexportcapabilities,theyneedednewandimprovedcapital.Atthesametime,
therewasashortageofimportsineverythingfromcapitalequipmenttothe
necessitiesoflife(i.e.food).Thebilateralagreementshelpedcreateatemporary
systemoflicensesandquotasforimportsandexportsthroughthecentralbank.
TheDollarShortage.Europe’spostwarbalance‐of‐paymentscrisiscame
aboutduetothebreakdownoftheinternationalfinancialsystem.Reasonsinclude
thestrengthoftheUnitedStates,theEuropeanliquidationofforeigninvestments
earlyinthewar,thecutofftoEurope’schiefsourceofprewardollarsupplyin
southeastAsia,increasesinpopulationinunderdevelopedareas,theriseofpricesof
theprimaryproductimportedrelativetopricesofthemanufacturedgoods
exported,andthesplitbetweenEasternandWesternEurope(Dillard657‐648).The
Karczmarczyk 25
shortenedversionbeingthatEuropehadforyearsbeendependentuponexternal
marketsforexportsandforeignsourcesofsupplyforfoodandrawmaterials,andit
wasarguedthatthebalanceofpaymentsdeficitsfacingmostcountriesreflectedthe
incapacityoftheirexportindustries(Dillard645).Sinceatthistime,theUnited
Statesheldtwo‐thirdsoftheworld’smonetarygoldstock,theysuppliedtheneeded
imports(Bordo38).TheIMFwasalsopressuringmemberstodeclareparvalues.
Manybelievedthissituationtobepermanentduetothelargeamountofreservesin
theUnitedStatesandthedepletedamountinEurope.Suchargumentswerebased
ontheideathatEuropewouldneverreachtherateofproductivityofthatofthe
UnitedStates.
SuchasituationwasnotpreferableforeitherEuropeortheUnitedStates.In
ordertoachieveastronginternationalsystemandrestoreEurope’sequilibriumin
internationalpayments,theUnitedStatesimplementedtheMarshallPlan.Shortly
thereafter,aEuropeanPaymentsUnionwasformed,dollarconvertibilitywas
restored,andthedollarbecamethekeycurrency.
TheMarshallPlan.InanefforttoaidEurope,theAmericanSecretaryofState,
GeorgeC.Marshall,proposedaboldplantorestoreEurope’sequilibriumthrough
“massiveAmericanfinancingandintra‐Europeanplanning”(Dillard648).All
Europeannations,withtheexceptionofGermanyandSpain,wereinvitedtojointhe
conference,atwhichthelogisticsoftheplanwouldbeworkedout.Itwaswell
receivedinWesternEurope,butinEasternEurope,theysnubbedtheidea,largely
duetoSovietinfluence.Thus,itbecameawesternEuropeanRecoveryPlan,whose
Karczmarczyk 26
maingoalwas“tocoordinatetherecoveryeffortsofseventeencountriesand
financetheirdollarneeds(Dillard649).
TheUnitedStatespassedtheEconomicCooperationActof1948,which
officiallycreatedtheMarshallPlan.Inordertoadministertheplanfromthe
Americanside,theEconomicCooperationAdministration(ECA)wascreated.The
MarshallPlanchanneledabout$13billioninaidtoWesternEuropebetween1948
and1952(Bordo41).Thiswasconsiderablylessthantheprojectedoutlaysof17
billion(Dillard649).Itspurposewasto“helptheEuropeancountriesexpandtheir
economies,restoretheirexportcapacity,andbycreatingeconomicstability,
preservepoliticalstability”(Bordo41).Itrequiredthatallparticipantscooperatein
tradeandpaymentliberalization.
Thus,aEuropeancounterparttotheECAwasneeded,andinresponsetothis
needtheOrganizationforEuropeanEconomicCooperation(OEEC)wascreated.Its
responsibilitywastocreateaprogramforachievingabalanceofinternational
paymentswithinthefouryearsallocatedintheMarshallPlan(Dillard649).It
managedtheallocationoftheborrowedmoniestotheindividualnations,whichwas
donebasedonsizeoftheiraccountdeficits.Therecipientswererequiredtothen
matchthefundsintheirlocalcurrencytohelpinproductivityinvestmentin
infrastructure,industry,andagriculture.Asafinaloverarchinggoal,theOEECtried
topromoteeconomicinterdependencewithinWesternEurope,anideathatwould
takeonmorecreditatalaterdate.TheEPUwasalsocreatedontheEuropeanside,
whichisanorganizationIwilldiscussinmoredetaillater.
Karczmarczyk 27
TheMarshallPlanwasincrediblysuccessfulinaveryshortamountoftime.
By1952,theOEECcountrieshadachieveda39%increaseinindustrialproduction,
adoublingofexports,anincreaseinimportsbyone‐third,andacurrentaccount
surplus(Bordo42).ThechartbelowshowsindustrialrecoveryinWesternEurope
from1938until1950.Itstartsatbasepoint100.
COUNTRY 1938 1947 1948 1949 1950
Belgium 100 106 114 116 120
France 100 92 108 118 121
Germany,West 100 33 50 75 96
Italy 100 86 91 96 109
Netherlands 100 95 113 127 139
UnitedKingdom 100 115 128 137 150
Average 100 88 101 111 122
Dillard,Dudley.“IndustrialRecoveryinWesternEurope.”
EuropeanPaymentsUnion.EuroperespondedtotheECArequirementofthe
liberalizationoftradebycreatingtheEuropeanPaymentsUnion(EPU)in
September1950.Itspurposewastosimplifybilateralclearingandmovetowards
multilateralism,whichitdidbyactingthepartofacommercialbankclearinghouse.
Meaningthatitprovidedeachmembercountrywithonlyonesinglenetcreditor
Karczmarczyk 28
debitwiththeEPU.CreditsearnedbysellingtooneEuropeanmemberoftheEPU
couldoffsetdebitsincurredinbuyingfromsomeothermember(Dillard649).The
formeroperationofbilateralagreementswassuppressed,asitdoesn’tfunctionas
wellwithaneconomicalallocationofresources.TheECAcontributed$350million
totheEPUtobeusedforinitialworkingcapital.
TheEPUwasincrediblysuccessfulandsoonbecamethecenterofa
“worldwidemultilateralsettlementarea”(Bordo43).Italsoprovidedthemiddle
steptowardcurrencyconvertibility.Europeancurrencyatthistimewasnoteasily
transferrableintodollarduetothepersistentdollarshortage.Sowhilethis
organizationfosteredintra‐Europeantrade,internationalworldtrade,particularly
withthosenationspeggedtothedollar,wasdifficult.
RestoringConvertibilityandtheRiseoftheDollar.Depreciationofthepound
sterling,theDeutschemark,andseveralothercurrenciesagainstthedollarin
September1949helpedmanyEuropeancurrenciesmovetowardsconvertibility.At
theendofthe1950s,thefinalstepwastaken.PresidentCharlesdeGaulle(France)
depreciatedthefrancandshiftedtothe“newfranc”(Kindleberger430).Britain
tookthisopportunitytorestorethepoundtoconvertibility.OnDecember27,1958,
eightcountriesdeclaredtheircurrenciesconvertibleforaccounttransactions
(Bordo43).Withthisnewconvertibility,theEPUwasnolongeruseful,andthe
EuropeanMonetaryArrangementwouldsoonreplacetheEPUasameansof
currencyconsultation.
Karczmarczyk 29
Sowiththis,thedollarbecamethecurrencyofchoice,anditwasfrequently
thoughtthatthedollarwas“asgoodasgold.”Theriseofthedollarcanbeattributed
tothesizeoftheroleoftheUnitedStatesinthisnewworldeconomy,itsimportance
inworldtrade,anditsopencapitalmarkets(Bordo47).Thedollarwastheofficial
internationalmoneyofthistime,anditsimportanttonotethesimilaritiesbetween
thisandthegoldstandard.Insteadofpeggingcurrenciestogold,countriespegged
themtothedollar,anditwasnolongerGreatBritainasthefinancialcenterofthe
world,buttheUnitedStates.Thesekeypointsareimportanttorememberandwill
shapetheremainderofthehistoryoftheinternationalmonetarysystem.Itisalso
importanttonotethattheoriginalvisionofthearchitectsattheBrettonWoods
Conferencewasnotmet.TheoriginalroleoftheIMFhadbeen,inmanyways,
replacedbytheEPU.Withconvertibilityrestored,however,thesystemseemedto
beoperatingsmoothly.
ThePrimeYears(19591967)
OneofthemostimportanteventstohappenduringtheprimeyearsofBretton
WoodswastheeconomicintegrationofEurope.Additionally,therewasaseriesof
issues,whichwouldleadtoanevenfurtherdeviationfromtheoriginalgoalsofthe
BrettonWoodsarchitects.Thesewereadjustment,liquidity,andconfidence.Inthis
section,IwillfirstexplorethebeginningsofEuropeaneconomicintegration,and
thenmovetodiscusstheseproblemsthatplaguedthis“heyday”era.
EuropeanIntegrationundertheCommonMarket.TheideaofEuropean
integrationhadbeenaroundformanyyears,butwiththenewpoliticalspheresafter
Karczmarczyk 30
thesecondWorldWar,thepossibilitybecamereality.Themostimportant
predecessoroftheEuropeanCommonMarketwastheEuropeanCoalandSteel
Community.Itwasestablishedin1952byFrance,Germany,Italy,Belgium,the
Netherlands,andLuxembourg.Theobjectivesetforthwas“themostrational
distributionofproductionatthehighestlevelofproductivity”(Dillard654).”They
didsooriginallybyabolishingallcustomsandtradebarriersamongthenations.
Tariffsatthebordersweremadeuniform,andownershipoffacilitiesinanyofthe
nationscouldbemadepublicorprivate(Dillard654).Politically,theunionfaced
difficulties,mostadamantlythatbetweentheoldrivalriesofGermanyandFrance.
Thesepoliticaldiscoursesarebeyondthescopeofthispaper,butletitsufficetosay
thattheeconomicintegrationlentapeacetothecountriesthathadyettobe
experienced.
ThisexperimentthenledtotheEuropeanEconomicCommunity(EEC),also
knownastheCommonMarket.ItincludedtheoriginalsixmembersoftheEuropean
CoalandSteelCommunity,butbroadeneditsscopebeyondcoalandsteel.Themain
purposesweretheeliminationsofcustoms,duties,andquantitativerestrictionson
importsandexports;acommonexternaltarifftotherestoftheworld;thefree
movementofproductionfactorswithinthesixcountries;andageneralclose
economicintegrationthroughdomesticpolicies,includingagriculture,employment,
andtaxation(Dillard565).
TheTreatyofRomesolidifiedtheseeconomicgoals,andwhileitdidn’t
specificallyprovideforpoliticalintegration,itdidprovidethepoliticalinstitutions
Karczmarczyk 31
forimplementingeconomicpolicies.TheseinstitutionsincludetheEuropean
Commission,aCouncilofMinisters,anAssembly(themoderndayParliament),and
aCourtofJustice.ThesecreatedthemoderndayBrusselsandhelpedfacilitatea
laterpoliticalintegration.
ProblemsofthePrimeYears.Thethreeproblemsofadjustment,liquidity,and
confidencewereallinterconnected.TheUnitedStateswasnotoverlyconcerned
withitsbalanceofpaymentsinthe1950s.Thecurrentaccountbalancewaspositive,
andtheexcessliquidityandlendingoftheearly1950sledtoastrongconfidencein
thedollarbytheendofthe1950s.Thisconfidence,however,wasbeginningtoebb.
EconomistsbegantoworrywhatwouldhappenwhentheUnitedStatescorrected
itsliquiditydeficit.Bythis,theymeanthatintheUnitedStates,noaccountwas
takenofU.S.short‐termorlong‐termclaimsontherestoftheworld.Itwas
implicitlyassumed“thatforeignclaimsonthedollarwerelikelytobeencashed
momentarily,whileU.S.short‐termassestswereilliquid”(Kindleberger453).Thisis
problematicbecauseunderaliquiditydefinition,theUnitedStateshadbeenina
balanceofpaymentsdeficitasearlyas1951.
Manyarguedthattheidealsolutionwasreplacingbothgoldanddollarswith
SpecialDrawingRightsfromtheIMF.Othersstillarguedthatthisbalanceof
paymentswasmisleading.Theysaidthat“bankingcenterswerenotindeficitwhen
theylentlongandborrowedshort,providingliquiditytotherestoftheworld”
(Kindleberger453).ThiswouldmeanthattheUnitedStatesitselfwasactingasa
bankandthatbankswerenotindisequilibriumwhentheirdepositsroseeachyear
Karczmarczyk 32
alongwiththeirloans.Overall,thesewerebothoverlyoptimisticideas.Inorderfor
thistooperateeffectively,bankswouldneedaparallelriseofreservesalongwith
theirincreasesinloansanddeposits.
Giventhelosstheconfidence,thisgolddidn’tresultinariseofreserves,but
insteadwassoldtohoarders.Centralbankstookadditionstoreservesandeven,at
somepoints,wereconvertingthedollarsintogold.CentralbanksacrossEurope,
andtheworld,withdrewfromthegoldpoolin1960toholddownthepriceofgold.
TheFrenchgovernmenttookparticularaction.Theyoptedto“convertdollarsinto
goldasameansofdiscipliningtheUnitedStates”(Kindleberger453).Thisworked
untiltheyfoundthemselvesindireneedofdollarsasameanstosupportthefranc.
Yettheywerestillhesitanttosellgoldfordollars,soinsteadtheyundertookofficial
borrowingofdollarsintheEurobondmarket.
TheCollapse(19681971)
IntheUnitedStates,itwasdecidedthattheidealactionwouldbetobreakup
thegoldpoolandadoptatwo‐tiersystemforgold.Thispermittedtheprivateprice
toriseabouttheofficial$35.00anounce.Atthesametime,strongforeingpressure
wasexertedagainstforeigncentralbankchangingdollarsforgold,and“anumber
offinancialinstrumentswithexchangeguaranteesweremadeavailablebytheU.S.
Treasurytoofficladollarholderstoforestallgoldpurchases”(Kindleberger453).
TheUnitedStateswasfacingaseriouslossofconfidencethatthreatenedto
underminetheentiresystem.
Karczmarczyk 33
Comparabletothesummerof1931thesmallcountriesofEuropewent
aheadwiththeconvertingofdollarstogold.ThisinturnledtotheConnollyshockof
August1971,whichthenledtothesecretaryofthetreasuryimposinga10percent
importsurtaxinanefforttodevaluethecurrency.TheUnitedStatesfirstraisedthe
goldpricethento$38.00andthento$42.50,anditalsowideneditspermissiable
rangeoffluctuationagainstthedollarfrom1.5%to2.25%.
Errorsinmonetarypolicyandalsotheenormousoutflowofdollarstothe
Eurocurrencymarketin1970contributedtothebreakdownofBrettonWoodsas
well.RichardNixon’sreelectioncampaignhadhiseconomistsveryanxiousabout
creatingaprosperouseconomyby1972.Tothisend,theFederalReservesystemin
1970startedtolowerinterestrates.Thishappenedatthesametime,however,that
theBundesbankofGermanywasseekingtorestrictinflationinWestGermany.They
didsobyraisingtheirinterestrate.Thesepoliciesweren’tseparatedbygeographic
region,butwereinsteadinterconnectedthroughtheEurodollarmarket.The
resultingflowofdollarsultimatelylefttheliquiditydefintionbalanceofpayments
deficitintheUnitedStatesatamuchhigherrate.It,infact,rosefroma“$2‐4billion
ayearaverageinthe1960stoa$20billionin1970anda$30billionin1971”
(Kindleberger454).
Noneofthemeasurestakencouldcombattheeventsunfolding.The
confidenceinthedollarhadfallentoanalltimelow.Thesepressureseventually
causedPresidentNixontoendallgoldconvertabilityonAugust15,1971.This
Karczmarczyk 34
effectivelyendedtheBrettonWoodsera.Severalattemptsweremadetofixthe
systeminthenextfewyearsbutwithoutanysuccess.
TheDirtyFloat(1971present)
Therecentyearshavebeenmarkedbyseverecrisesandunevenmonetary
policy.Manyofthesespecificsarebeyondthescopeofthispaper,butIwillinstead
giveabriefoverview.InFebruaryof1973,thecurrencywassetfreetofloat.This
meansthatnolongerwascurrencypeggedtogold,butinsteadtheexchangerates
againstothercurrencieswereallowedtobedeterminedbythemarket.Many
economistsweresurprisedbyitseffects.Manythoughtthatitwoulddothesameas
ithadinthe1930s,andthatflexibleexchangerateswouldinhibitcapitalflows
becauseoftheuncertaintyofexchangerisk.Thisturnedouttonotbethecase.Ifone
neededasubstantialamountofcapital,itwasnecessarytoborrowdollars
(Kindleberger455).Quantityturnedouttobemoreimportantthanquality.
Economistsalsothoughthatthefloatingdollarwouldloseitspreeminence
anditsroleoftheinternationalunitedofaccount,standarddeferredpayment,store
ofvalue,andmeansofpyaments.Again,thesepredictionswereprovedtobewrong.
Itwasperhapsnotasstrongasithadbeeninthepast,butintheimmediate
aftermathoffloatingexchangerates,thedollarstillmaintaineditsrole.TheSDRof
theIMF,whichwaspreviouslymentioned,neverwasseenassatisfactory
alternative,andnevergainedanypositionintheinternationalmonetarysystem.
Atthesametime,however,thisperioddidbeginatimeofseverecrisesand
monetaryupheaval.ItisimportanttonotethatEuropeandependenceonthedollar
Karczmarczyk 35
hadbeenwellnotedbytheEuropeansafterthecollapseoftheBrettonWoodsera.
Afterthisseriesofevents,theEuropeanideaofacurrency(theEuro)beganto
reallyformulate.TheEuropeanMonetarysystemwasbasedlargelyonGerman
fiscalsense,afactthatwillbecomeincreasinglyimportantinlateryears,andwillbe
discussedatalaterpoint.
Itsalsoimportanttonotethatworldbanks,whichwerefullofnewfunds,
afterthebalanceofpaymentsproblemintheUnitedStates,startedtolookfornew
opportunitiestolend.Thisinitiatedtheboominsyndicatedbankloanstosovereign
states,especiallyinLatinAmerica.Theboominlendingwentunnoticedthroughthe
1970s.Bankerstrustedthatthesedevelopingcountrieswouldnotrepudiateon
theirloans.ThisawakeningoccurredinAugust1982forthefirsttimewhenMexico
failedtomakeitsinterestpayment.
ConclusionsfromtheDirtyFloat.Overalltheinabilityoftheinternational
monetarysystemtoreconstructasystemofpeggedbutadjustableexchangerates
failedrepeatedly.Thesourceofthefailurewastheineluctableriseininternational
capitalmobility,whichmade“currencypegsmorefragileandperiodicadjustments
moredifficult”(Eichengreen183).Growingnumbersofgovernmentsfound
themselvesforcedtofloattheircurrenciesduetothe“heightenedreluctanceoftheir
strong‐currencycounterpartstoprovidesupport”(Eichengreen183).
Developingcountriesinparticularhavesuffered.Theyfounditverydifficult
inthesethinfinancialmarketstoendurethevolatileeffectsofrapidexchangerate
fluctuations.EvenEuropeandtheUnitedStateshavefelttheeffects.TheEuropean
Karczmarczyk 36
marketeffortswereinterruptedatvarioustimesduetothis.EventheUnitedStates
andJapantemporarilylostfaithintheabilityofthemarketstodrivetheirbilateral
exchangeratesto“appropriatelevelsintheabsenceofforeignexchangemarket
intervention”(Eichengreen184).Suchdissatisfactionsledtoavarietyofpartial
measurestolimitcurrencyfluctuations
TheFluctuationsofthe1990s
The1990swereahighlyturbulenttimeofglobalimbalancesandfinancialcrises.In
ordertounderstandthevolatilityoftoday,itisfirstnecessarytounderstandthe
transitionalperiod.InthissectionIwillbrieflyexaminetheAsianfinancialcrisis
andtheEuro.Thesesectionswillnotnecessarilybeanhistoricalbackground
section,butwillinsteadfocusonhowtheydirectlyrelatetheinstabilityofthe
systemtodayandhighlightitsneedforchange.Afterexaminingthetransitional
periodofthesetimes,Iwillthenmovetoanentirelynewsection,whichwill
examinethecurrentsituation.
TheAsianFinancialCrisis.Asiahadforalongtimeseemedveryinsulatedfromthe
exchangeratevolatilitythatwasaffectingtherestoftheworld.Stronggovernments,
capitalcontrols,andrapidgrowthledbyexportskeptconfidencehighintheregion.
TheremarkablepartofthiscrisisisthattheAsiancrisisoccurreddespitethese
securities.
ForeigninvestmentwashighlyfavoredinAsiaduetothisstrongeconomic
record.YetcapitalwasflowingtotroubledcountrieslikethePhillipines,which
indicatedthatadditionalfactorswereatplay.Themostimportantofthesewerethe
Karczmarczyk 37
lowinterestratesinthemajorfinancialcenters.Thecostofborrwinginyenfellto
lowlevelsasaresultof“depressedconditionsinJapan,whileyieldoninvestmentin
theUnitedStatesweredepressedbyasoaringstockmarket”(Eichengreen192).
Investorsturnedtotheseemergingmarketsasameansofreliefbyborrowingin
yenanddollarstoinvestinsuchhighyieldingAsiansecuritiesasthecarrytrade.Its
importanttonotethatbankswereusedasaninstrumentofeconomicdevelopment
inAsiaatthistime.Foreigninvestorsusedthistotheiradvantageandlent
extensivelytoAsianbanks,allthetimebelievingthattheywouldnotbeallowedto
fail.Theimportantthingtotakeawayhereisthatnotforthefirsttime,global
conditionshelpedsetthestageforproblems.
Theareawasalsoplaguedwithaninconsistencyofcapital‐accountpolicy,
exchange‐ratepolicy,andpoliticalinstability.Theregionhadlargeand
unmanageablecapitalflowsandrelaxedbankingregulations.Atthesametime,
governmentsalsoopenedthecapitalaccountbeforemovingtoamoreflexible
exchangerate.Economictheoryandhistoryitselfdictatesagainstthis.
Againstthisbackdropthecrisishitwithaseriesofshocks.Itbeganin
ThailandwiththefinancialcollapseoftheThaibaht.Thiswascausedbythe
decisionoftheThaigovernmenttofloatthebahtandcutitspegtothedollar.The
governmenthadinthepastoverextendeditselfinanefforttosupportitandcould
nolongeraffordtodoso.Thailandhadalsoacquiredalargeamountofforeigndebt,
whichessentiallybankruptedthecountryevenbeforeitscurrencycollapsed.The
IMFhadwarnedtheThaigovernmentthatitscurrencywasseverelyovervalued,but
Karczmarczyk 38
itcontinuedalongitspathofdestruction.TheThaicollapsewasnosmallsurpriseto
theinternationalcommunity.ThesurprisecamelaterwhenotherAsiancountries
followeditslead.
PressurewasimmediatelyfeltinthePhilippines,acountrythatwasultimatelynot
stabletobeginwith.Thecountrywashighlydependentuponcapitalinflowsand
hadaveryrigiddollarpeg(keepinmindthatatthistimemostcountrieswereno
longerpeggedtothedollar).ThePhilippineauthoritiesdecidedtofloatthepeso
onlytendaysafterthebaht.ThisthenputpressureonIndonesiaandMalaysia,
whereinvestorstherereallybegantofaceaconfidencecrisis.Koreaalsofaceda
panic,buttheG7helpedstopthiscrisisbyconvincinginternationalbankstoextend
shorttermloanstoKoreainanefforttorenewtheircreditsandeffectivelybuying
timeforthegovernmenttoputreformsinplace.Indonesia,however,faceda
completebankingandfinancialsystemfailure,resultinginadisruptionin
productionandapainfulrecession.OnlyChinaremainedimmune.
Thecrisishighlightsjusthowvolatilethemarketsareandhowcontagioncan
spreadthroughoutaregion.ThecrisiscausedsharpdropsinoutputallacrossAsia.
Avarietyofreformsresultedfromthecrisis,includingcurrencydevaluation,
recapitalizedandrestructedbanks,andenhancedlendingprocedures.Eventoday,
someoftheseeconomieshavenotrecoveredtotheirpre‐crisisstateofproduction.
YetoneinterestinginitiativethatcameoutofthecrisiswastheChiangMai
Initiative,orCMI.Underthisagreement,Asiancentralbanksagreedtoprovide
financialsupportfortheirneighborsinthesamewayoftheEuropeanMonetary
Karczmarczyk 39
Ssytem.Thegloalwasthatnexttimeacountrysufferedacpitalflowreversalandits
currencycameunderattack,officlafundingwouldbeavailabletoreplaceprivate
funding(Eichengreen197).Theproblemwithsuchasystemisthatgovernments
areoftenunwillingtolendwithoutassurances,asIwilldiscussinmoredetailandin
adifferentcapacityatalatertime.
Asiaisnottheonlyplacewehaveseensuchcrisesandvolatility.Theroleof
theexchangerateandthefalsesenseofsecurityisremarkablysimilarinother
emergingmarketcrisis.Eachnationalcontextisuniqueofcourse,butArgentina,
Brazil,andTurkeyhaveallexperiencedhighinflation“rootedinlargebudget
deficitsandcompoundedbystructuralproblems”(Eichengreen199).
TheEuro.AfterthecollapseofBrettonWoods,theneedanddesirefora
Europeancurrencywasincreased.Despiteearlyfinancialproblems,Europewasset
onthiscoursesincetheearly1990s.TheUnitedKingdomandDenmarkdropped
outoftheprocessearlyon,buttheotherspersistedandtheMaastrichtTreatywas
formed.AtGermaninsistence,theTreatysettargetsforinflation,interestrates,
exchangeratestability,andfiscalstabilityforcountriesseekingtoqualifyfor
particpationintheunion.Fiscalcriteriawassetatabudgetdeficitofnotmorethan
3percetnofGDPandapublicdebtofnotmorethan60percent.Thesewereinsisted
uponmoststringently.Theideabehinditwastopreventweakeconomiccountries
fromenteringandpossiblyendangeringtheentiresystem.
Thechangeoverfromdomesticcurrencytothissupranationalcurrencywas
plannedwithexcruciatingdetail.Theoriginalmonetaryunionwasverysmalland
Karczmarczyk 40
centeredonFranceandGermany.Yetthefinalplanwasmuchlargerthanplanned
andincludedcountriessuchasIreland,Italy,SpainandPortugal,whohadnot
alwayshadthestrongestfinancials.Despitethis,therewastobeaEuropeanCentral
BankandaStabilityPactthatwasdesignedtoprovidecontinuedoversightof
nationalbudgets.Theprospectivemembersoftheeuroareaagreedthat“they
wouldirrevocablylocktheirexchangeratesasofJanuary1999atthesamelevel
prevailinginmid‐1998”(Eichenreen221).Thechangeoverwascompletedatthe
beginningof2002.
Theeurowasweakagainstthedollarforitsfirstfewyears,andmany
complainedthatthecentralbankwastootightonitsrequirements.Despitethis,the
monetaryunionransmoothlyandseeminglycreatedasenseof“Europeanness”that
hadyettobeseen,despitetheeffortsoftheUnionitself,formedover40years
before.Theeuroultimatelyinthecomingyearsenhancedpricetransparency,
encouragedcrossbordertrade,andcreatedacurrencytoeventuallyrivaltheeuro.
Itseemedalmosttoogoodtobetrue,andasrecenteventshighlight,
TheCurrentSituation
Since1971,theworldhasbeeninaperiodoffloatingexchangerates,whichinturn
hasledtohighlevelsofinstabilityandincreasedfinancialcrises.Inorderto
illustratethis,Iwillexaminetwotroublingcurrenteventsinourmonetarysystem:
thecurrentcrisisintheEurozoneconcerninggovernmentdebtinGreeceandthe
ChineseholdingofU.S.Treasurydebt.Togetherthesetwoeventshighlighttheneed
Karczmarczyk 41
forchangeandunderlinethecurrentproblemsfacingoursystem.Iwilldothis
througheconomicanalysisofcurrentnewspaperarticles.
GermanyandGreece:StrugglesintheEurozone
EuropeanenlargementhasbeenachallengeplaguingEuropeforthepast50years.
Sincethe1958TreatyofRome,whichestablishedtheEuropeanEconomic
Community,Europehastakenleapsandboundstowardstheirgoaloffullpolitical
andeconomicintegration.TherecentcrisisintheEurozone,whichisthe16
countrieswithintheEuropeanUnionthatoperatewiththeEuroastheircurrency,
hashighlightedthesinglemostimportantproblemtheyhavealwaysfaced:the
absenceofasinglegovernment.Theeurozoneisnotan“optimalcurrencyarea,”
andthusitlackstheimportanttoolstodealwithasymmetricshocks,meaning
shocksthataffectsomemembersmorethanothers.Inthissense,Imeantoolstobe
a“treasurywithpowerstotaxandborrowandacentralbankthatcanactaslender‐
of‐lastresorttomemberbanks”(Skidelsky1).Soinanefforttoillustratethis
problem,Iwillfirstanalyzethecomingofthiscrisis,theGreeksituation,theGerman
response,thepossibilitiesandramificationsofIMFinvolvement,andfinallywhat
thismeansfortheworldasawhole.
TheEncroachingCrisis.TheEuropeanMonetaryUnion,whichformedthe
basisoftheeurozone,beganwithgrandideasandplans.Therewerecountriessuch
asAustria,Finland,theNetherlands,andGermanywhohadstrongcurrencies
domesticallyandinternationally,buttherewerealsocountriessuchasFrance,
Belgium,Italy,Portugal,Spain,Greece,andItaly,whosecurrencieswereconsistently
Karczmarczyk 42
depreciatinganddidnotmaintainahighvalueinternationally.Suchasituation
createdanaturalinequality,buttheEuropeanintegratorsinsistedandtheunion
wasdevisedas“one‐size‐fits‐all”(Sorkin1).
Thecriteriatoentertheunionwerestrict,duelargelytotheGerman
influence,andmanyofthesecountrieswithdepreciatingcurrencieswereunableto
fitthecriteriatoentertheunion.Instead,theyreliedonwhathascometobeknown
as“creativeaccounting,”andsomecountries,forexampleGreece,evenwentsofar
asto“falsifyitsdebtanddeficitnumbers”(Sorkin1).Inthebeginning,however,this
didn’tposemuchofaproblem.Theunionitselfismadeupof27countriesandhas
formedwhatmanycalledthe“world’smostformidableeconomicbloc,
incorporating491peopleinanintegratedmarketthatproducesnearlyathirdmore
thantheUnitedStates”(Erlanger1).Granted,theunionhaditsissues,butthey
weatheredthestorminadmirablefashion.Itwasn’tuntilthe2008financialcrisis
thatthecracksbegantoshow.
Beforebeginningthediscussionofthecrisisitselfitisimportanttorecognize
thatthecentraltensionintheEuropeanUnionhasalwaysbeenbetweennational
prioritiesandcentralinterests(Erlanger2).Theideaof“European”hasneverbeen
asstrongasnationalism,andtheideaofcedingnationalpowerswitheverything
fromcurrencytocustomshasneverbeenaneasyonetodealwith.Whencrisesor
panicshit,theautomaticreactionistoturnnationalbyprotectingtheirown
resourcesandindustries.Whilethishasn’tdelayedintegrationuptothispoint,it
hasrecentlybeguna“scalingdown”ofambitions(Erlanger2).
Karczmarczyk 43
TheGreekSituation.ThesemountingtensionshavebeenrealizedintheGreek
economyrecently.Aspreviouslymentioned,Greecebenttherulesoftheeurozone
inanefforttobeadmitted,andalltheyearsof“unrestrainedspending,cheap
lending,andafailuretoimplementanyfinancialreforms”havecaughtupwith
them.Inearly2010,theideaandfearofasovereigndebtcrisisreallybeganto
developinmanytroubledeurozonecountries,includingSpainandPortugal,butthe
crisisdevelopedmostfullyinGreece.Thecrisisthenledtoaconfidenceproblem,
whichasshowninthebackgroundsectionhascausedseriousproblemsinour
monetarysysteminthepast,andthiswasnoexception.Italsoledtothewidening
ofbondyieldspreadsandriskinsuranceoncreditdefaultswapswithintheeuro
zone.Thesituationwasfurtherworsenedwhena500milliongovernmentbond
auctioninPortugalfailedtoraisethatamount.Insteadofthe500million,the
Portuguesegovernmentonlysuccessfullyraised300million.Panicensued,and
thesefearscombinedtoaweakenedeuroandawidespreadglobalcommodity
selloff.
Withthissituationintheworld,Greece’sdebtandfiscalissuescametolight.
Nationaldebtissaidtobeataround300billion,whichislargerthanthenation’s
economyitself.Someeconomistsarepredictingthatthedebtwillreach“120
percentofgrossdomesticproductin2010”(CNN1).Thecountriesdeficit,meaning
howmuchmoreitspendsthanittakesin,isat12.7percent.Thesenumbersare
incrediblyhighandwellbeyondtheboundsoftheeurozone.Inresponse,Greece’s
creditratinghasbeendowngradedandisnowamongthelowestofallmembersof
theeurozone.Thisdoesn’tbodewellforGreece,asitisnowa“financialblackhole”
Karczmarczyk 44
toallforeigninvestors(CNN1).Thecountryisstrugglingtopayoffthesedebtsand
tomakegoodontheircurrentbills,butitsdifficultconsideringthatinterestrates
arerisingontheexistingdebts.TheGreekgovernmenthasrespondedthrough
PrimeMinisterGeorgePandreoubyimplementingspendingcuts,anactwhichis
incrediblyunpopularamongtheGreekpopulace.Theyhavealsoimplemented
austeritymeasuresaimedatreducingthedeficitbymorethan10billioneuro.Taxes
havebeenincreasedonsuchproductssuchastobaccoandalcohol,theretirement
agehasbeenraised,publicsectorpaycutshaveensued,andtaxevasionregulations
havebeenstrengthened(CNN2).LiquidityisamajorissueinGreececurrently,and
thesedomesticactionswon’tbeenough.Greecealonecannotpullitselfoutofthis
financialhole.
TheEuroZoneResponse.InanApril9,2010article,CNNwrotethatGreeceis“in
dangerofdefaultingonitsnationaldebtasitsbondmarketcomesunderincreasing
pressure,unlessitsEuropeanneighborsintervene”(Smith1).Thisstatementsums
upthethoughtsheldnotonlyacrossEuropebutalsoacrosstheglobe.Thepressure,
however,doesn’tfalluponeitherofthese,butinsteadonthemembersoftheeuro
zone,specificallyGermany.Greece’sfinanceministerhassaidthat“yieldofalmost7
percent[onthesebonds]arehighenoughtogiveinvestorsagoodreturnfortherisk
involved”(Sorkin2).Butevenasthiswassaid,theGreekgovernment,as
highlightedabove,wasraisinghalfofitsfundingrequirementof53billionEuros
throughoutthespring.Inamarketsuchastheprevailingone,thisisn’tgood.
Karczmarczyk 45
Originally,theEuropeanUnionsetoutwithachallengetotherelativelyweak
governmentstoimposehightaxesandspendingcuts,whichGreece,asstatedabove,
did.Theaction,however,provedtonotbeenoughtogettheirdeficitsdownfrom
“over10percentofGDPtothebenchmarklevelscloseto3percentofGDPascalled
forintheEuropeantreatythatcreatedtheeuro(Sorkin2).JosephStiglitz,an
economistandcurrentadvisortoGreece,pointedoutthehypocrisyofthesituation
here.RichercountriesinEuropehasbeenallowedtoborrowheavilytopull
themselvesoutofrecession,butthepoorercountrieswereforcedto“takeaknifeto
theveryprogramsintendedtosoftentheblowofaneconomicdownturn”(Sorkin
2).InsteadoftakingcareofthesolutiondomesticallyStiglitzproposesthatEurope’s
richestcountries,suchasGermanyandFrance,taketheleadinaidingGreece.
Stiglitz’sadvicewouldeventuallybetakentoheart,butnotwithoutmuch
debate.Afterafulltwomonthsofdiscussion,theEuropeanUnionunveiledthe
detailsofitsGreekfinancialrescueplanonApril11th.Itsinvolvedthe16eurozone
members,andofferedGreeceupto30billionEurosinbilateralloansinthefirst
year,withmoreavailableinsubsequentyears.Interestratesweretobesetaround
5%forthree‐yearloansinitially.Thenumberwasacompromisebetweenthesmall
ratesthatthemarketsaredemandingandtheinterestratesbeingpaidbythe
weakestmembersofeurozone,likePortugalorSpain.Themembersoftheeuro
zoneareremainingfirmthatthisisnotabailout,andthatthe“nobailout”clause
shouldremainintact.Theydothisbystatingthat“theloansarerepayableand
containnoelementofsubsidy(TheSkiesBrighten2).
Karczmarczyk 46
Ofallthecountriesoftheeurozone,Germanywillcontributethemost,an
actionthatcametopassafterconsiderableresistance.AngelaMerkel,theGerman
chancellor,ledatoughresistancetotheideaofthebailout.Merkelwasbackedby
bothAustriaandtheNetherlands.InBrussels,theEUgovernanceagreedthat“the
eurozonestandsbyitsfoundingprinciplethatprofligatememberscannotbebailed
out,butthatGreecewouldalsonotbeallowedtofallvictimtoasovereigncredit
crunch”(TheSkiesBrighten2).Ultimately,Germany,withthecurrentaccount
surplus,decidedtocontributetotheEuropeanproject,ifonlyduetotheclose
financialtiesbetweenthecountries.GermanbanksholdlargeamountsofGreek
governmentdebtandintheeventofaGreekdefaultwouldsufferlargely(TheSkies
Brighten2).
Thebailoutplanisbeingofferedasalastresort,andasidefromthebilateral
loans,theIMFhasofferedfundsandtechnicalassistance.ThedetailsofIMF
involvementwillbedetailedinthenextsection.
IMFInvolvement.TheGreekbailoutinvolvesfundsfrombothinternalsourcesand
alsotheIMF.IMFinvolvementwasheavilypushedbyAngelaMerkel,whowaseager
toshowGermanythat“theircountrywouldnothavetofoottheentirebilltohelp
Greece”(EUapproves1).Notallwereasexcitedover“substantialInternational
MonetaryFundfinancing,”however,astheGermans(1).EUleadershadbeen
hesitantuptothispointoverinvolvingtheFund,astheyweren’ttechnically
“European.”IMFinvolvementcouldweakentheeurofurther,resultinginitsfall
againstothercurrencies.
Karczmarczyk 47
Despitetherisk,theIMFispreparedtolendGreecearound10billionEuros.
EuropeanUnionnationsoutsideoftheeurozone,suchasHungaryandRomania,
haveallreceivedsupportfromtheIMF,whichthenpromptly“imposedvarious
fiscalrequirementsintendedtoinsuretheycanpaybacktheloans”(Sorkin3).The
differencenowistheeurozoneboundary,andIMFinvolvementmakestheEUlook
weak.MirandaXafa,aformerexecutiveboardoftheIMF,makesagoodpoint,
however.Shebelievesthat“thetimehascomeforEuropetoacknowledgethatithas
neitherthetechnicalexpertisetomonitorgovernmentbehaviornortheabilityto
raiserescuefunds”(Sorkin3).ItsbelievedbytheIMFthattheirinvolvementwould
helptheothercountriesandrestoreconfidence.InBrussels,theviewistheexact
opposite.
WhatThisMeansfortheFutureofEuropeandtheWorldasaWhole.ForGreece,the
bailoutwasanecessaryaction.Itcouldnothavealleviateditsdebtwithoutsome
formofinvolvementfromeithertheIMFortheEuropeanUnion.Inrecentdays
Greecehascontinuedtostruggle.MarketanxietyhaspushedGreece’slong‐term
bondyieldsto“theirhighestlevelssincethecountryjoinedthesinglecurrency
nearlyadecadeago”(TheSkiesBrighten2).Fitch,acredit‐ratingagencyalso
downgradedthecountry’sdebtbytwonotchestothelowestinvestmentgrade,one
gradeabove“junk”status.FitchhasalsorecentlycastdoubtontheGreek
government’spoliticalvowstocutthepublicdeficitbyathirdthisyear.Essentially,
therecessionisdeepeningandthecostsofservicingtheirhighdebtareincreasing.
So,asIseeit,itisonlyamatteroftimebeforeGreecemustimplementtheEuropean
rescuemechanism.OnceGreecehasdecidedthatthereisnothingmoretheycando
Karczmarczyk 48
domestically,officialsfromtheEuropeanCentralBankandtheEuropean
Commission“mustagreethatGreeceisoutofoptions”(TheSkiesBrighten3).Once
thisdecisionismade,theeurozonewillbewhippedintoafrenzyofaction,asthings
arepredictedtomoveveryfast.
Fortheeurozone,thishasplacedtensionontheinternalrelationships.
Germany,intheirreluctancetoaid,isturningevermoreinwarddomestically.As
theyhavesincethehyperinflationalwaysbeenveryfiscallysound,such
irresponsibilityfinanciallydoesn’turgethetypeofinternationalcooperationand
integrationthatispromotedbythetreatiesoftheEuropeanUnion.
Asthisisthefirsttimethishashappened,Germanydidprovidethereliefthat
Greeceneeded.Whathappens,however,ifthishappensagainandsoon?TheGreek
crisiscouldbeonlythefirstofpredictedmultipletremors.Theconfinesoftheeuro
zonehavecreatedproblems.IfGreecehadbeenoutsidetheeurozone,forexample,
itcould“devalueitscurrencytomakeitmorecompetitive,anditsforeigndebts
couldberenegotiatedinaninternationalconference(Starbatty1).Instead,wehave
enteredintoasovereigndebtcrisiswiththestrongestcurrencyintheworld
threateningtoplummet.SpainandPortugalaren’tfarbehindGreeceistheirrelative
weakness.Italyisalsoaconcernasitisthethirdlargestsovereigndebtor.Ifit
comestopassthatthesecountriesalsoneedabailout,andGermanyandFranceare
supposedtoprovide,whothenwillrescuetherescuers?
Inanefforttokeepthesecrisesfromhappeningagain,TheEuropean
CommissionisdiscussinggivingtheEUexecutivepowersto“recommendeconomic
Karczmarczyk 49
overhaulprogramstoindividualscountries,andtonameandshamelaggardsby
sendingwarningsincasesofinadequateresponses”(Taylor2).Ontheoutside,this
isasolidplan,butintherealitiesoftheeurozone,countriesdon’twanttocede
authoritytoalargersupranationalbody.GermanyasthebiggestEuropean
economy,has“madeitclearthatitdoesnotwantEUscrutinyofitsownexport
orientedpolicies,whichgeneratebigcurrentaccountsurplusesthateconomistssay
arepartlyresponsibleforwideningimbalancesintheeurozone”(Taylor2).
Furthermore,ithasbeensuggestedthattheEUneedstocreateaEuropean
monetaryfundwhosefunctionistooperatelikeanIMFstyleassistanceprogram,
butonlyforeurocountriesinfiscaldanger.Yet,thisrunsagainstthefoundingideas
oftheEuropeanUnion.ThetreatiesoftheEUforbidsuchbailoutactions,andasthe
recentLisbontreatyhasshown,itisnoteasytogetchangestotreatiespassedin
Europe.
Atthesametime,shouldGreecedefaultonitsloansandachainofbank
insolvenciesensue,perhapstheEuropeanUnionwouldbemadestronger.Nations
oftencometogetherintimesofcrisis,andahitontheEurowouldcertainlyqualify
asacrisisinthissense.Thisseemsoverlyoptimistic,however,asthetrendin
Europehasforyearsbeentoveertowardsnationalinterestsintimesofcrisis.
Despiteallofthis,itisunlikelythatanycountrywouldleavetheeurozone.The
effectsarenationalizedandthereforebeyondthescopeofthispaper,butletit
sufficetosaythattheseeffectswouldbedisastrousandenormousforthecountry
thatoptedtodoso.
Karczmarczyk 50
Overall,theGreekeconomy,asIseeit,willbeeventuallybailedoutbythe
plancreatedbytheEuropeansandtheIMF.IMFinvolvementiscrucialasitshows
thecontinuedusageoftheinstitution.Whenimplementinganypotentialreform,it
isnecessarytokeepthisideaofaninternationallenderoflastresortatthe
forefront.Itprovidesadegreeofstabilityandequalizationinthishighlyglobalized
world.TheeffectsandpossibilitiesoftheGreekbailoutarestillunfolding,asthe
crisisisongoing.Regardlessofwhathappens,however,ithighlightsadeeper
problemwithintheinternationalmonetarysystem.IftheEuroweretofail,itwould
causetremorsacrosstheglobe.Iftheeuroistomakeit,thenwillitsoonreplacethe
dollarastheprimarycurrency?Allofthesequestionsareunanswerablenow,but
theybearscrutinywhendiscussingtheformingofanewinternationalmonetary
system.
ChinaandtheUnitedStates:ToughEconomicRelations
Europeisn’ttheonlycountryfacingaformofdebtcrisis.TheUnitedStateshasa
verylargepublicdebt(ofwhichitisnotalone).Yetthisinandofitselfisn’t
concerning.Theconcerningfactoristhataroundtwentyfivepercentofthisdebtis
inthehandsofforeigninvestors,whomaychosetosellitoffatanygivenmoment.
Naturally,therearereasonsthatthishasn’thappenedyet,butasthefinancialcrisis
hitstherealityofthebusinessworld,theseconcernsarebecomingevermore
prevalent.Iftheseconcernswereevertobecomeareality,thenentireinternational
monetarysystemcouldcollapse.Theironyisthatit’sthecurrentinternational
monetarysystemthatledtothisprobleminthefirstplace.Inanefforttoillustrate
Karczmarczyk 51
thisissue,IwillfirstanalyzethenatureoftheUSpublicdebtanditsbuyers,other
factorsintheUS‐Chineserelationship,thecurrentsituation,theroleofsovereign
wealthfunds,andfinallywhatthismeansfortheworldasawhole.
TheNatureofUSPublicDebtanditsBuyers.ThebiggestholderofTreasury
debtistheUnitedStatesgovernment,witharound52percent(Schoen1).Mostof
theseholdingscomeintheformofSocialSecurityandMedicare.Thisleavestherest
inpublichands,ofwhichthelargestpercentageisheldbyforeigngovernments.In
2007,thiswasaround25%of$8.5trillion(Schoen1).Otherholdersincludestate
andlocalgovernmentsandindividualinvestors,butthesefactorsarebeyondthe
scopeofthispaper,asthissectionwillfocusontheinternationalsphere.Before
goingintothedetails,however,itisimportanttounderstandthebasicsofthe
treasurydebtbuyingprocess.SchoendescribesTreasurysecuritiesas“abigbatch
ofIOUsthatareauctionedoffeverythreemonths”(1).Thisistrueinitssimplest
form.Astheauctiondateapproaches,theTreasurydecideshowmuchitwillneedto
coverthegovernment’sneeds.Whentheauctionarrives,buyerssubmitbidsinthe
formoftheinterestratetheyarewillingtoaccept(1).Theyaregivenachoice
betweenmakingacompetitivebid,whichisaskingforaspecificrate,oranon‐
competitivebid,whichisacceptingtheaveragerateofotherwinningbids.Oncethe
bidsarein,theTreasurystartsacceptingthebidsatthebottomofinterestrate
spectrum,andcontinuestoacceptthemuntiltheyhaveenoughmoneytocover
theirborrowing.
Karczmarczyk 52
ThelifeoftheTreasurybonddoesn’tstopthere.Onceissuedatauction,
Treasurysecurities“enjoyahealthysecondlifewhenthey’retradedintheso‐called
‘secondarymarket(akathebondmarket)”(2).Thepricesofbondsboughtonthis
openmarketvaryasthemarketreactstooutsidefactors(includingspeculation,
inflation,etc).Oncethebondisbought,however,regardlessofthepriceaperson
paysforit,thegovernmentowesthefullamountthatwasborrowedwhenthedebt
wasfirstauctionedandborrowed.Thisfactisimportanttotherestofthissection.
Sothen,thequestionbecomeswhichforeigninvestorsexactlyownthese
Treasurysecurities.Inordertodisplaythisinformation,Ihavecompiledachart
fromtheTreasurywebsite:
MajorHoldersofTreasurySecurities(inbillionsofdollars)
Country Feb10 %ofTotal 9Feb %ofTotal
China 877.5 23.40% 744.2 23.54%
Japan 768.5 20.49% 661.9 20.90%
UnitedKingdom 231.7 6.18% 129 4.08%
OilExporters 218.8 5.83% 181.8 5.75%
Brazil 170.8 4.55% 130.8 4.14%
HongKong 152.4 4.06% 76.3 2.41%
CaribBankingCntrs 144.5 3.85% 189.5 5.99%
Karczmarczyk 53
Taiwan 121.4 3.24% 72.6 2.30%
Russia 120.2 3.20% 130.1 4.11%
Allothers 944.2 25.18% 845.3 26.74%
GrandTotal 3750.5 3161.5
MajorForeignHoldersofTreasurySecurities,www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt
Asthetableillustrates,ChinaandJapanarethetwolargestholdersofforeigndebt,
withatotalofaround44%.TheyallowtheUnitedStatestorunsuchahighdebt
becausetheUSissuchastrongeconomyandsuchalargecustomerthattheywant
themtocontinuebuyingexports.Overall,theamountofforeigninvestinginUS
Treasurysecuritieshasincreasedbyalmostdouble.Thecurrentfigure,as
previouslymentioned,is25%,butitwaslessthan13%in1988(TreasuryReport
5).Governmentdebtisinherentlynotaproblem.Theproblemiswhentheseforeign
securitiesturnintoanationaleconomicandsecurityissue.
ChinaandU.S.EconomicRelations.TheChineseeconomywasaround$8.8
trillionin2009,thusmakingChinatheworld’sthirdlargesteconomy,rightafterthe
UnitedStatesandtheEuropeanUnion(Amadeo1).Itisalsotheworld’ssecond
largestexporter(rightaftertheEU),andtheU.S.inparticularreliesheavilyonthe
Chineseexports.Reversely,theChinesealsorelyheavilyontheUnitedStates,butas
timegoeson,thislessens.ChinahasrecentlybeenincreasingtradewithHongKong
andJapan,aswellastheAfricanandLatinAmericancountries.Yetthestandardof
livingisrelativelylowinChina,whichtheyuseasamethodtokeeplabor,andin
Karczmarczyk 54
turnexports,cheap.Itdependsonkeepingthevalueoftheyuanlow,andinorderto
dothis,itneedstokeepthevalueofthedollarhigh.Alowyuanensurescheaplabor,
andtheChinesehavemanagedtokeepthisarealitydespiteUSpressuretoraisethe
competivenessoftheyuaninanefforttoimproveAmericancompetitiveness.China
hasalsofixedthevalueofitscurrencytothedollar.Currently,thedollarisworth
around6.8yuan(Amadeo1).IfChinaweretolettheircurrencyfloat,manyanalysts
believeitwouldbemorevaluablethanthedollarduetothestrongChinese
economy.YetChinakeepitspeggedinorderto,onceagain,ensurecheaperproducts
thantheUS,thuskeepingexportandtradedeficitwiththeU.S.
EvenbeyondtheUSTreasurysecuritiesdebate,theeconomicrelationship
betweentheUnitedStatesandChinaistense,atbest.Whilethedetailsofthese
tensionsarebeyondthescopeofthispaper,themoodsurroundingthesecurities
debateplayalargerole,andthepasttensionsplayaroleinthismood.Soits
importanttounderstandthelevelofcompetitionthatexistsbetweenthetwo
countries.TheUnitedStatesistheleadingworldpower,andChinaistherapidly
growingthreat.TheUnitedStateshasdevelopedtothepointthatitisnolongera
hugemanufacturerandisinsteadmovingtowardsaservicebasedsociety.China
manufacturersthegoodsthattheUnitedStatesneedsandatthesametime,relieson
themoneytheUSpaysforthegoods.CongressiscontinuallyaccusingChinaof
surpassingimportquotas,andChinaisconstantlyaccusingtheUnitedStatesof
protectionism.Thistenseeconomicrelationshipwillcontinuetoexistforsolongas
thetwocountriesneedeachother,butthequestioniswhathappenstotheUSif
ChinareachesapointwheretheynolongerareinneedoftheUS?
Karczmarczyk 55
TheCurrentSituation.Withallthesefactorscomingintoplay,thecurrent
situationisparticularlytense.Thefinancialcrisishashighlightedthesetensionsto
thepointthatmanyeconomistsareconcerned.Earlythisyear,Chinabegantosell
U.S.securities,andtheyhavecurrentlyfallenby$62.4billionsincelastJuly(Craft1).
Bondmarketshaven’tyetcrashedduetoJapan,theUK,andoilexportingcountries
pickinguptheslackandaddingaround$258billiontotheircombinedholdings
(Craft1).EvensorecentlyasFebruary,ChinatrimmeditsholdingofUSTreasury
debtby1.3percent,makingitthefourthconsecutivedecline(Crutsinger1).
InanarticlebytheAssociatedPress,WinThin,aseniorcurrencystrategistat
BrownBrotherHarriman&Companysaidthathebelieved“theMarchreportcould
wellshowareboundinpurchasesbyChina…[and]thatpartofthechanges[inthe
pastterms]reflectedadecisionbyChinatorebalanceitsholdingsawayfrom
shorter‐termTreasurybills”(Crutsinger1).HemaintainsthatChinais“stillastead
buyerofU.S.Treasurynotesandbondsbuthas[simply]beenparingbackits
Treasury‐billholdings”(1).AnotherexplanationisthatChineseinvestorsmaybe
simplybuyingtheirsecuritiesthroughBritainandHongKong(Crutsinger1).
Despitethesereassurances,however,theproblemremains.Unlessforeign
demandforU.S.Treasurydebtremainsstrong,theinterestratesthatthe
governmentpaysonthedebtcouldriseexponentially,thusmakingthedeficitofthe
UnitedStatesevenworse.Theserisinginterestrateswouldalsoputanupward
pressureonprivatedebt(Crutsinger1).Thisupwardtrendinborrowingcosts
wouldaffectU.S.businessesandconsumers.Highercostsleadtolowerconsumption
Karczmarczyk 56
andlowerborrowing/lending.Itcouldultimatelyfreezeupthecreditlanes,which
wouldaddanotherrisktotheU.S.economy.
Furthermore,asthedebateaboutwhatChinaisdoingwiththeir
holdingsragesonward,theUnitedStatesisalsoincreasinglyconcernedaboutthe
Chineseallowingtheyuantoriseinvalueagainstthedollar.Bydoingso,theyare
keepingthecurrencyartificiallylowandharmingUSeconomicinternational
growth.Itisestimatedthatbydoingso,itwouldaddanestimated$2.4trilliontothe
world’ssupplyofTreasurydebtthisyear(Craft1).PresidentBarackObamahas
addressedthisissue.HemetwithPresidentHuJintaoofChinatheweekofApril13th
inaneffortto“movetowardamoremarket‐orientedexchangerate”(MrObamaand
Mr.Hu1).Mr.HureportedlyrespondedthatChinadidplantomoveawayfromthe
fixedcurrencypeg,butdidnotsaywhen.Chinadidreportthattheywouldnotbe
respondingtoforeignpressure,thedecisionwouldbemadeontheirowntime
frame.
TheRoleofSovereignWealthFunds.Anotherpointofcontentionintermsof
Chinese‐USeconomicrelationsaresovereignwealthfunds.Untilrecently,China,
Japan,andotherexportershavebeencontentwithkeeping“mostoftheirtrillionsof
dollarsinreservesinsafeinvestmentslikebankdepositsandUnitedStates
Treasurydebt”(Times1).Aspreviouslydemonstrated,theseholdingsarecurrently
indoubt,butanalystsaren’tentirelysurewherethenextstepforChinawouldbe.As
theinvestmentinUStreasurydebtdeclines,theinvestmentintotheprivatesectors
forhigherreturnsisincreasing.Withthishugebase,governmentinvestorsdiversity
Karczmarczyk 57
moreandcanriskhigheryieldingoptions.Thesehighlydiverse,nationalfundsare
calledsovereignwealthfunds.
Theterm,accordingtotheNewYorkTimes,applies“togovernment‐owned
fundssetupbytheworld’sleadingexporters,especiallyChinaandthemajoroil
producers,thatarebeingemployedmoreassertivelyforinvestmentinbanks,
privatecompanies,equityfunds,realpropertyandotherassets”(1).Thefunds
gainedinpopularityduringthepre‐financialcrisisyearsof2006and2007.Many
sawthefundsasengagingin“crossbordernationalization”(SovereignWealth
Funds1).Thiswasconcerningduetothepowerthatthehomegovernmentofthe
sovereignwealthfundsmighthaveinthecountrieswheretheyinvest.TheWestern
worldisparticularlyconcernedduelargelytothefactthatthecountriesyielding
thesefundsaren’tthemoststable,orfriendly,ofallies.Politicalleadersare
concernedthatthesefundsareconcealingattemptstoinvestforpoliticalgainor
influence.
Theroleoftheseinstitutionshasbeenseverelydiminishedinthewakeofthe
financialcrisisof2008.Manyofthesesovereignwealthfundshadinvestedheavily
ininstitutionsthatwentsouth.OfparticularinteresthereistheChinaInvestment
Corporation,theChineseSWF.Theyoriginallyhada$3billioninvestmentin
BlackstoneGroup,butwhenthegroupturneddownward,theChinesegovernment
lostadegreeoflatitude.OtherSWF’shavedonemuchbetter.Thesovereignwealth
fundofKuwaitmade“aprofitof$1.1billiononits$3billioninvestmentin
Citigroup”(Times1).
Karczmarczyk 58
Concernstillexists,however,despitethedeclineofChina’sSWFinthe
aftermathofthe2008financialcrisis.ThePetersonInstituteofInternational
EconomicscurrentlysaysthatthebiggestSWF’sareownedrespectivelybyUnited
ArabEmirates,Singapore,Norway,Kuwait,Russia,andChina.Itwouldn’tbe
surprisingtoseeChinasoontaketheleadhereduetotheir$1.3trillioninforeign
exchangereserves.GiventheconcernsoftheWesternworldaboutthepolitical
influenceofsuchfunds,thisisnotanidealsituationfortheUnitedStates.The
Chinesegovernmentalreadyowns20%ofUnitedStatesforeigndebt,andto
increasetheirpowerwithpoliticallyplaced,powerfulfunds,wouldn’tbodewellfor
nationaloreconomicsecurity.
WhatthismeansfortheUnitedStatesandtherestoftheworld.Asofnow,
thereisnodangeroftheChinesesellingofftheircurrentholdofUSTreasurydebt.
TheUnitedStatesandChinaarestillheavilyreliantuponeachother,andtheUS
dollarmaintainsastrongholdintheworldeconomy.However,imaginingtheworst,
iftheChinesesoldalloftheirUSdebt,thedollarwouldcollapse,sendingtheUnited
Statesintoarecessionneverbeforeseen.Thisismostimprobable.
Therestoftheworldisalsoaffectedbythegrowingdebtproblemsofnot
justtheUnitedStates,butavarietyofcountries.Therehavebeensharprisesin
governmentdebtingeneral,notjustthechronicproblemoftheUnitedStates,and
manyinstitutions,theIMFincluded,areconcernedaboutgrowingsovereignrisk.
Slowgrowthintherealeconomyandhighlevelsofunemployment(andthe“jobless
Karczmarczyk 59
recovery”)willkeeptaxrevenueslowandthusrequirehighergovernmentspending
tohelpcounteractthis.
Iincludethisjusttoprovethepointthatdespiterecentimprovementsin
economicforecasting,thefinancialsystemhasyettoberestored.Qualitymustbe
improvedinavarietyofareas,butuntilitis,investorsremainjittery.Astheyworry
aboutlong‐rungovernmentsolvency,bondpricescoulddeclineinthemost
advancedeconomies.Ifthisweretohappen,banks,especiallythosejustrecovering
fromthemostrecentseriesofhits,couldfaceevennewhits.Risinginterestcostson
publicdebtalsofactorhereastheycouldflowthroughtheprivatesector,raising
borrowingcostsforallinvolved(Rowe1).TherelationswithChinaaffectallofthis,
andithighlightstheinterconnectednessoftheeconomiesandtheinternational
monetarysystemtoday.
AReformedMonetarySystem
Astheprevioustwosectionshighlight,theworldiscurrentlyundergoingaseriesof
changes.Europeisfacingitsowninternaldebtcrisis,butthefactthatitisthe
world’slargestexporter,andoneofthelargesteconomicblocsintheworld,make
theissueinternational.ThesameholdstrueforChinese‐U.S.economicrelations.The
financialcrisishasmadethissituationmuchworse,andtheinternationalmonetary
systemisteeteringontheedgeofcollapse.Asthebackgroundsectionhighlighted,
therehavebeendefinitivemomentsofchangeinthehistoryofthemonetary
system.Thisisoneofthosemoments.Beforethesystemcollapsesaroundus,anew
systemmustbeenacted.Theideasforsuchasystemhavelongbeendebated,but
Karczmarczyk 60
hereIwilloutlinewhatIseeassomeofthemorefeasibleoptions.Thebulkofmy
thesishasbeendevotedtoprovingthattherewasareasontochangesoalarge,
detailedsectionhereisbeyondthescopeofmyresearch.BecauseofthisIwill
highlightaonlyafewideas.
Theneedforarevisedsystemhasbeennotedbyseveralworldleaders.
NicolasSarkozyhassaid,“wemustrethinkthefinancialsystemfromscratch,asat
BrettonWoods”(Eurodad1).Furthermore,attheG20conferencethisyear,a
realignmentofcurrencyexchangerateswasdiscussed.Mostrecently,Prime
MinisterPapandreouofGreecewroteanop‐edintheInternationalHeraldTribune.
Hewrotethefollowing:
“Democraticgovernmentsworldwidemustestablishanew
globalfinancialarchitecture,asboldinitsownwayas
BrettonWoods,asboldasthecreationoftheEuropean
CommunityandEuropeanMonetaryUnion.Andweneedit
fast.Onlythiswillbuildanewconfidenceandfairnessthat
ourcitizenscantrust,andthatcanpreventeachnewcrisis
frombecominganepidemic”(Papandreou1).
Thedesiretorecreatetheinternationalmonetarysystemisthere,butnowthe
cooperationoftheworldisnecessary.
Karczmarczyk 61
ThefirstofthesereformationideaswaspromotedbyWorldBankpresident
RobertZoellick.Inaspeechduring2008,hecalledfora“newmultilateralnetwork
foranewglobaleconomy”(Eurodad1).Essentially,theG7isnotworking,anditis
anoutdatedmodeofviewingtheworld.Zoellicksuggestedanewsteeringgroup
includingthenationsofBrazil,China,India,Mexico,Russia,SaudiArabia,South
Africa,aswellasthecurrentG7members.Yetitisimportanttorecognizethat
simplyputtingnewcountriesonthe“steeringgroup”willnotremakethesystem.It
wouldsimplybeupdatinganoldandtiredsystem.Thesystemneedstobe
reevaluatedonaten‐yearbasisastonotethegrowthsintheworld.
TheIMFmustalsobereformed.Thefinancialsectorassessmentprogram
waslaunchedbytheIMFjustaftertheAsianfinancialcrisisinanefforttoidentify
therisksandproblemsinbankregulation.TheUnitedStatesprovedtobedifficultin
thesenegotiationsandonlysignedonaround2007.TheIMF,whichhasbeen
frequentlycriticizedforbeingunderthethumboftheUnitedStates,recognizedthe
slowdownintherecentUShousingmarketcollapsewellbeforethecollapseactually
tookplace.Itnotedthat“thisweaknesshasbeencontainedtocertainportionsofthe
subprimemarket…,andisnotlikelytoposeaseriessystematicthreat”(Eurodad1).
Obviously,thispredictionfailedtohappen.Developed,economicpowerhousesare
usedtoconductingtheworld’seconomicdirection,andtheinstitutionsdesignedto
helptheunderdeveloped,suchastheIMFandWorldBank,arereluctantorunable
topreventthis.TherecentFinancialStabilityReporthasindicatedthatthe“financial
crisisthatemergedfromtheUnitedStateshasestablishedaverychallenging
environmentforsomecountries,especiallythosewithagreaterrelianceonshort‐
Karczmarczyk 62
termfloworwithleveragedbankingsystemfundedinternationally”(Eurodad1).
TheIMFfailedtoactonwhatwouldeventuallybecometheglobalfinancialcrisisof
2008.Theactualitiesofreformarewellbeyondthescopeofthispaper,butthepoint
Ihopetomakeisthatcriticalneedwithwhichitmustbedone.
TheoriginalideasoftheIMFremainsound,however,andmanycountries
wouldliketoseeanenhancedrolefortheIMFjustinadifferentcapacity.TheIMF
couldbeusedto“improvesurveillanceofcomplexfinancialmarketsandhelp
preventsuchexcessesbuildingupinthefuture”(Seager1).TheroleoftheIMF
needstobeonceagainclearlydefined.Theyhaveinrecentyearsmorphedintoa
similarinstitutionastheWorldBankwheninrealitytheyweredesignedtodo
entirelydifferentthings.TheIMFshouldbeinchargeofregulatingthefinancial
markets,whichhaveinrecentyearsbeenfartooweak.Theresultingglobalfinancial
crisishasproventhis.YetsuchanorganizationastheIMFcould“forcebankstohold
greatercapitalcushionsormakethempaybonusesinsharesthatwouldbeheldina
company,forsayfiveyears,tomakesureitwasthelonger‐terminterestsofthe
shareholdersthatwasthefocusratherthanthebanker’sshortterminterests”
(Seager1).Basically,IseetheIMFperformingtheroleasaninternationalregulator.
TheWorldBankisalsoindireneedofreform.Manyofthepoliciesproposed
bytheBankforpovertyalleviationintheglobalsouthhavedisastrouseffectsonthe
environment.ThelargeinfrastructureprojectsitspromotesadheretoWestern
valuesandideals,andinmanycaseshaveprovedtobe“economicallyunsound,
destroyedpristinerainforest,rivers,andestuaries,andhaveuprootedthe
Karczmarczyk 63
livelihoodsofmillionsofThirdworldcitizenswhoareaffectedbythem(Chebucto
1).TheWorldBankStructuralAdjustmentProgramshavealsorecentlycomeunder
firefortheirenvironmentalunacceptabilityandtheiradherencetoWestern
economics.
Beforeimplantingthesereforms,however,wemustfirstridourselvesofthe
globalfinancialcrisisthatplaguestheworld.Unsustainabledebthasbecomea
problem,andthecountriesthathaveasurplus,i.e.Germany,muststepintohelp
solvethisshort‐termliquiditycrisis.Thisisobviouslyaverycomplexideaandissue
withmuchtobesaid.Yet,oncetheworldhasworkedthroughtheseissues,thenwe
canstepupanddothereformationsnecessary.
Inconclusionofthissection,Iwouldliketosaythatthesearesimplyideas,
notaconcreteplanofreformation.Aconcreteplanwouldrequireyearsofthought.
Apolicyideagonerightusuallytakestimeandmanysmallscaletests.Asthisisthe
entireinternationalmonetarysystemthatwearediscussion,Iwouldadvocate
nothingless.
Conclusion
Theinternationalmonetarysystemhascomealongwaysincetheearlydaysofthe
goldstandard.Itbeganwiththegoldstandardinthe1800s,hasbeeninterruptedby
twomajorworldwars,createdtwoofthelargestfinancialinstitutionstheworldhas
everseen,andweatheredmultiplefinancialcrises.Yetasweapproachthenextera,
itisquestionableastowhetherthesystemasitistodaycanexist.Theeurocrisis
andtheChineseholdingofUSTreasurydebtaretwoofthelargestissuesthesystem
Karczmarczyk 64
haseverfaced,andwhenwelookbackonthehistoryofthesystem,itcanbeseen
thatintimesofbigissues,thesystemchangesirrevocably.
Withthisinmind,itistimethatwebegintoformulatethesystemintheway
thatisbestfortheworld,andnotsimplyletwhathappenshappen.Asthe1970s
indicated,thisisnotnecessarilythebestmodeofaction.Wedidthatthenandended
upwiththehighlyvolatilesystemthatwehavetoday.Thetimeforactionand
creationisnow.
Theultimategoalofthisthesiswastohighlightthisurgency.Thesystemhas
evolvedconsiderablyanditisyettofinish.Solongasweliveinaglobalworld,there
willbeaneedforaglobalsystem,andunlikeeverbefore,itstimetocreateatruly
equalized,globalizedinternationalfinancialsystem.
Karczmarczyk 65
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