history of the u.s. marine corps in wwii vol iii - central ... of the u.s... · 2. the central...

CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE

History of U.S. Marine Corps

Operations in World War II

VOLUME III

HISTORICAL BRANCH, G-3 DIVISION, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

PCN 19000262600

Central Pacific

DriveHISTORY OF U. S. MARINE CORPS

OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II

VOLUME HI

by

HENRY I. SHAW, JR.

BERNARD C. NALTY

EDWIN T. TURNBLADH

Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps

1966

Other Volumes in this Series

I

LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.

Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanul

II

Henry I. Shaw, Jr. and Maj Douglas T. Kane

1801dion of Raba.ul

Library of Congress Catalog Card No, 58-60002

ForsalebytheSuperintendentofDocuments,US. GovernmentPrintingOfficeWashington,D.C.20402-Price$7.25

Foreword

This book, the third in a projected five-volume series, continues thecomprehensive history of Marine Corps operations in World War II. Thestory of individual campaigns, once told in separate detail in preliminarymonographs, has been reevaluated and rewritten to show events in properproportion to each other and in correct perspective to the war as a whole.New material, particularly from Japanese sources, which has becomeavailable since the writing of the monographs, has been included to providefresh insight into the Marine Corps’ contribution to the final victory in theP~cific-

During the period covered in these pages, we learned a great dealabout the theory and practice of amphibious warfare. But most of all weconfirmed the basic soundness of the doctrine which had been developed inprewar years by a dedicated and farsighted group of Navy and MarineCorps officers. These men, the leaders and workers in the evolution ofmodern amphibious tactics and techniques, served their country well.Anticipating the demands of a vast naval campaign in the Pacific, theydeveloped requirements and tested prototypes for the landing craft andvehicles which first began to appear in large numbers at the time of theCentral Pacific battles. Many of the senior officers among these prewarteachers and planners were the commanders who led the forces afloat andashore in the Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas.

Allied strategy envisioned two converging drives upon the inner coreof Japanese defenses, one mounted in the Southwest Pacific under GeneralMacArthur’s command, the other in the Central Pacific under AdmiralNimitz. Although Marines fought on land and in the air in the campaignto isolate Rabaul, and played a part significant beyond their numbers, itwas in the Central Pacific that the majority of Fleet Marine Force unitssaw action. Here, a smoothly functioning Navy-Marine Corps team,ably supported by Army ground and air units, took part in a series ofamphibious assaults that ranged in complexity from the seizure of tinyand heavily-defended islets, where there was little room for maneuver andno respite from combat, to large islands where two and three divisionscould advance in concert.

It was my privilege to take part in much of this campaign, first asoperations officer with Tactical Group 1 in the Marshalls and later in thesame capacity with the 2d Marine Division in the Marianas. I prize the

,.—

IV FOREWORD

associations formed then with the officers and men who won the victories,not only those of the Marine Corps but also those of the other services inour joint commands. Sparked by knowledge hard-won at Tarawa, wewere able to plan and execute effectively the operations at Kwaj alein andmove forward, on incredibly short notice, to Eniwetok, seizing there theislands that guarded the lagoon from which most of our ships staged forthe Marianas. In the fighting for Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, Marinesproved conclusively that their demonstrated effectiveness in short-termamphibious assault carried over to extended combat ashore.

As the narrative in this volume clearly shows, victory against a foe asdetermined and as competent as the Japanese could not have been wonwithout a high cost in the lives of the men who did the fighting. Ouradvance from Tarawa to Guam was paid for in the blood of brave men,ordinary Americans whose sacrifice for their country should never beforgotten. Nor will it be by those who were honored to serve with them.

WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS

COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

Reviewed and approved8 December 1965

. . .

Preface

The series of Central Pacific operations that began at Tarawa inNovember 1943 marked a period of steadily increasing momentum inour drive toward the Japanese home islands. To a great extent, theseoperations were periods of trial—and occasionally of error—when ouramphibious striking force, the Fifth Fleet and the V Amphibious Corps,tested and proved the basic soundness of the doctrine, tactics, and tech-niques developed by the Navy and Marine Corps in the years before WorldWar II. This was a time of innovation too, when new weapons, improvedmethods of fire support, and organizational developments all played a largepart in our victories. The lessons learned in the Gilberts, reaffirmed andapplied with increasing effect in the Marshalls and Marianas, were ofpriceless value in shortening the war.

Our purpose in publishing this operational history in durable form isto make the Marine Corps record permanently available for study bymilitary personnel and the general public as well as by serious students ofmilitary history. We have made a conscious effort to be objective in ourtreatment of the actions of Marines and of the men of other services whofought at their side. We have tried to write with understanding about ourformer enemies and in this effort have received invaluable help from theJapanese themselves. Few people so militant and unyielding in war havebeen as dispassionate and analytical about their actions in peace. We owea special debt of gratitude to Mr. Susumu Nishiura, Chief of the WarHistory Office, Defense Agency of Japan and to the many researchers andhistorians of his office that reviewed our draft manuscripts.

This volume was planned and outlined by Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,senior historian assigned to the World War II historical project. Mr.Bernard T. Nalty, originally assigned as the author of this volume, wrotethe narrative of the Gilberts and Marshalls campaigns and began the storyof Saipan before he left the Marine Corps to become an historian with theJoint Chiefs of Staff. In his work, Mr. Nalty made use of the researchmaterial gathered for the monographs prepared by Captain James R.Stockman, The Battle for Tarawa, Lieutenant Colonels Robert D. Heinl, Jr.and John A. Crown, The Marshalls: Incream”ng the Tempo, and Major CarlW. Hoffman, Saipan: The Beginning of the End. Mr. Edwin T. Turnbladhfinished the work on Saipan begun by Mr. Nalty and wrote the partconcerning Tinian, using much of the research data amassed by MajorHoffman for his monograph, The Seizure of Tinian. Shortly after he hadstarted working on the Guam narrative, Mr. Turnbladh left the MarineCorps to become an Air Force research analyst, and Mr. Shaw completedthe book, revising and editing it for publication. In his research on theGuam operation, Mr. Shaw frequently consulted the material assembledfor Major Orlan R. Lodge’s monograph, The Recapture of Guam. The

VI PREFACE

appendices concerning casualties, command and staff, division table oforganization, and chronology were prepared by Mr. George W. Garand;the remainder were completed by Mr. Shaw. Successive Heads of theHistorical Branch-Colonel William M. Miller, Major John H. Johnstone,Colonel Thomas G. Roe, Colonel Joseph F. Wagner, Jr., and LieutenantColonel Richard J. Schening—made the final critical review of portions ofthe manuscript. The book was completed under the direction of ColonelFrank C. Caldwell, present head of the branch.

A number of leading participants in the actions described havecommented on the preliminary drafts of pertinent portions of the book.Their valuable assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Several seniorofficers, in particular General David M. Shoup, Admiral Harry W. Hill,Lieutenant General Julian C. Smith, and Rear Admiral Charles J. Moore,made valuable additions to their written comments during personal inter-views.

Special thanks are due to the historical agencies of the other servicesfor their critical readings of draft chapters of this book. Outstandingamong the many official historians who measurably assisted the authorswere: Dr. John Miller, Jr., Deputy Chief Historian, Office of the Chief ofMilitary History, Department of the Army; Mr. Dean C. Allard, Head,Operational Archives Branch, Naval History Division, Department of theNavy; and Dr. Robert F. Futrell, Historian, U.S. Air Force HistoricalDivision, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air ForceBase.

First Lieutenant John J. Hainsworth, and his predecessors asHistorical Branch Administrative Officer, First Lieutenant D’Arty E.Grisier and Chief Warrant Officer Patrick R. Brewer, ably handled themany exacting duties involved in processing the volume from first draftsthrough final printed form. Many of the early preliminary typescriptswere prepared by Mrs. Miriam R. Smallwood and the remainder were doneby Miss Kay P. Sue, who expertly handled the painstaking task of typingthe final manuscript for the printer. Much of the meticulous workdemanded by the index was done by Miss Sue and Miss Linnea A. Coleman.

The maps were originally drafted by Corporal Robert F. Stibil; laterrevisions and additions were made by Corporal Thomas L. Russell. OfficialDepartment of Defense photographs have been used throughout the text.

VU*A7.6IAL’L-&W. R. COLLINS

MAJOR GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3

... .,

Contents

PART I LAUNCHING THE CENTRAL PACIFIC OFFENSIVE

CHAPTER

1. Early Plans for a War with Japan . . . . . . . .2. The Central Pacific in Global Strategy . . . . . . .3. The Central Pacific Battleground . . . . . . . . .

PART 11 THE GILBERTS OPERATION

1. Preparing to Take the Offensive . . . . . . . . .2. The Assault on Betio . . . . . . . . . . . . .3. Amphibious Victory . . . . . . . , . . . . . .4. Completing the Capture . . . . . . . . . . . .5. The Importance of GALVANIC . . . . . . . . .

PART 111 THE MARSHALLS : QUICKENING THE PACE

1. FLINTLOCK Plans and Preparations . . . . . . .2. D-Day in the Marshalls . . . . . . . . . . . .3. FLINTLOCK: Completing the Conquest . . . . . .4. Westward to Eniwetok . . . . . . . . . . . . .5. The CATCHPOLE Operation . . . . . . . . . .6. The Fruits of Victory . . . . . . . . . . . . .

PART IV SAIPAN : THE DECISIVE BATT.LE

1. Background to FORAGER . . . . . . . . . . .2. American and Japanese Preparations . . . . . . .3. Saipan: The First Day... . . . . . . . . .4. The Conquest of Southern Saipan . . . . . . . . .5. The Fight for Central Saipan . . . . . . . . . .6. Northern Saipan: End of the Campaign . . . . . .

PAGE

38

14

23537292

103

117142155181196220

231251263280305332

,.

VIII CONTENTS

PART V ASSAULT ON TINIAN

CHAPTER PAGE

1. The Inevitable Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . 3552. J-Day and Night . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3773. Southward on Tinian. . . . . . . . . . . . . 3934. The Island Secured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411

PART VI THE RETURN TO GUAM

l. Preparing for Guam... . . . . . . . . . . 4312. W-Day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4573. Consolidating a Foothold . . . . . . . . . . . . 4794. Continuing the Offensive . . . . . . . . . . . . 5035. Seizure of Northern Guam . . . . . . . . . . . 5356. Finish in the Marianas . . . . . . . . . . . . 568

APPENDICES

A.B.c.D.E.F.G.H.I.

Bibliographical Notes . . . . . . . . .Guide to Abbreviations . . . . . . . .Military Map Symbols . . . . . . . . .Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fleet Marine Force Status—30 October 1943 .Table of Organization F–100—Marine DivisionMarine Task Organization and Command ListMarine Casualties . . . . . . . . , .Unit Commendations . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . 587

. . . . . 597

. . . . . 601

. . . . . 602

. . . . . 607

. . . . . 618

. . . . . 620

. . . . . 636

. . . . . 638

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 650

ILLUSTRATIONS

Betio Island Two Weeks After the Battle . . . . .Assault Troops on Betio . . . . . . . . . .Damaged LVTS at Betio . . . . . . . . . . .Rubber Raft Carrying Wounded Marines . . . . .Squad Leader Points Out the Enemy . . . . . .Reinforcements Wade Ashore at Betio . . . . . .Machine Gun Ammunition Bearers . . . . . . .Flamethrower Smoke Over a Japanese Bombproof .Light Tanks and Artillery Leave Betio . . . . . .Soldiers of 2/165 Assault Makin . . . . . . . .Roi-Namur Under Bombing Attack . . . . . . .105mm Ammunition Being Unloaded At Menu Island24th Marines at Namur . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . 41

. . . . 41

. . . . 58

. . . . 58

. . . . 82

. . . . 82

. . . . 88

. . . . 88

. . . . 96

. . . . 96

. . . . 138

. . . . 146

. . . . 146

.,,

CONTENTS IX

ILLUSTRATIONS-Continued PAGE

Marine Light Tank on Namur . . . . . . . . . . . .Japanese Prisoners on Roi-Namur . . . . . . . . . . .Army 37mm Antitank Gun on Kwajalein . . . . . . . . .Marine 105mm Howitzers Set Up to Fire on Engebi . . . . .22d Marines Assault Waves Approach Engebi . . . . . . .Navy Fighter Attacks at Eniwetok Atoll . . . . . . . . .Marine Heavy Machine Guns on Eniwetok Island . . . . . .Navy Corpsmen on Eniwetok Island . . . . . . . . . .Riflemen of 22d Marines on Parry Island . . . . . . . . .Marianas Invasion Force at Eniwetok . . . . . . . . . .Fire Teamon Saipan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Japanese Medium Tanks Knocked Out at Saipan . . . . . .Hand Grenades Tossed by Marines on Saipan . . . . . . .Skirmish Line of 27th Division Infantrymen . . . . . . ,Marines Dig Inon Saipan . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Company CPin Garapan. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Truck-Mounted Rocket Launchers . . . . . . . . . . .Flame Tank Hits Enemy Cave on Saipan . . . . . . . . .Observation Plane Over Northern Saipan . . . . . . . .Supporting Cruiser Fires on Tinian . . . . . . . . . ,Medium Tanks Land on Tinian . . . . . . . . . . . .2d Division Marines Advance on Tinian . . . . . . . . .Machine Gun on a Half-Track Lays Down Searching Fire . . .Pack Howitzer Fires on Enemy Caves on Tinian . . . . . .3d Division Assault Troops on the Asan Beaches . . . . . .Flamethrower Blasts Enemy Dugout on Guam . . . . . . .Shermans and Riflemen of the 1st Brigade Advance . . . . .Firing Line of 3d Division Riflemen . . . . . . . . . .Pontoon Barge Off Guam.. . . . . . . . . . . . .Guamanian Women in Refugee Camp . . . . . . . . . .Column of 305th Infantry Moves Cross-Island . . . . . , .Jungle Trail Scouted by Marine Tanks and Infantry . . . . .Army Tanks Hit and Aflame At Yigo . . . . . . . . . .Jungle Patrol Near Tarague . . . . . . . . . . . . .Corsairs of MAG–21 on Orote Airfield . . . . . . . . . .B–29s Approach North Field on Guam . . . . . . . . .

MAPS

164164178178202202212212223223272272296296324324344344349349386386416416464464513513532532536536558558581581

l. Gilbert Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...242. Tarawa Atoll, November 1943 . . . . . . . . . . . 333. Betio Island, 21–22 November 1943 . . . . . . . . . 69

x CONTENTS

MAPS—Continued

4.5.6.7.8.9,

10.11,12.13.14.15.16.17.18,19.20.21.

22.23.24.25.26.27.28.29.30.31.

Makin Island, Showing Landings 20 November 1943 . . .Conquest of Tarawa Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . .Apamama Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Marshall Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kwajalein (Carillon) Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . .Capture of Roi, 1 February 1944 . . . . . . . . . .Capture of Namur, 1–2 February 1944 . . . . . . . .Kwajalein Island, 14 February 1944 . . . . . . . .Eniwetok (Downside) Atoll . . . . . . . . . . . .Seizure of Eniwetok Atoll, 18–22 February 1944 . . . . .Southern Marianas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Saipan, Showing Japanese Defense Sectors . . . . . .D-Day at Sampan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Saipan, 16–22 June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . .Saipan, 23–30 June 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . .Saipan,2–4July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Saipan,5–8July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tinian and Southern Saipan, Showing Japanese Defense

Sectors and American Artillery Groupments . . . . .Tinian, 24–26 July 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tinian, 27 July—1 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . .Guam, Showing Terrain Relief . . . . . . . . . .Guam, Showing Japanese Dispositions, 21 July 1944 . . .Southern Beachhead, 22–24 July 1944 . . . . . . . .3d Marine Division Progress, 22–26 July 1944 . . . . .Capture of Orote Peninsula, 25–30 July 1944 . . . . . .Guam, 28 July—4 August 1944 . . . . . . . . . .Guam, 5–10August 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . .Schematic Sketch of Japanese Tank Action in 3d Marines

I.II.

111.

IV.v.

VI.VII.

VIII.

Zone, 8–10 August . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Scene of Battle 1943–1944 . . . . . . . . .Betio Island, Showing Main Japanese Defenses . .Betio Island, Landing and Situation 1800, 20 No-

vember . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Betio Island, Situation 1800 D +3. . . . . . .Roi and Namur Islands, Japanese Defenses Based on

Post-Battle Study . . . . . . . . . . .Banzai Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . .W-Day on Guam, 21 July 1944 . . . . . . .Japanese Counterattack Plan, 25–26 July 1944 . .

PAGE

9499

101119126162168176184198236259265287310334338

357382400438445481490519527551

563

Map SectionMap Section

Map SectionMap Section

Map SectionMap SectionMap SectionMap Section

.,,

PART I

Launching the Central Pac#ic Offensive

CHAPTER 1

Early Plans for a War with Japan

Between November 1943 and Augustof the following year, American forcescaptured a series of key outposts inthe Gilbert, Marshall, and MarianaIslands. Under the direction of Ad-miral Chester W. Nimitz, amphibiousforces advanced almost 2,000 nauticalmiles, thrusting from Tarawa on theouter fringe of the enemy’s defenses towithin aerial striking distance ofthe Japanese homeland. Althoughthis Central Pacific campaign saw theintroduction of many new weapons, thestrategy of attacking directly westwardagainst Japan had for several decadesbeen under study by American warplanners. (See Map ‘I,

THE EVOLUTION OFORANGE PLAN

American acquisition

Map Section. )

from Spain ofGuam and the Philippine Islands wasfollowed within a few years by theemergence of Japan as a world power.The question arose whether the Philip-pines, at the end of a long and vulner-able line of communications, could bedefended against the modern armedforces of Japan. Since both the Amer-ican Army and Navy would take part indefending these islands, the JointBoard, an agency created to developplans and policies which would mosteffectively use the available forces ofboth services, turned its attention todeveloping a coordinated plan for a pos-

sible war in the Pacific. Defendingthe Philippines, however, seemed sodifficult a task that President TheodoreRoosevelt, writing in 1907, termed theislands “our heel of Achilles.” 1

War plans of this era derived theirtitles from the code name of the prob-able enemy, and because Japan wasdesignated ORANGE, the plan dealingwith a conflict in the Far East wascalled ORANGE Plan. The earliestdrafts required the Army to defend thePhilippines until the fleet could shep-herd reinforcements across the Pacific.Planners believed that the JapaneseNavy would challenge the approach ofthe American armada and that theensuing battle would decide not onlythe fate of the Philippines but the out-come of the war.

Naval strategists realized that beforea relief expedition could be dispatchedto the Far East, Japan certainly wouldhave seized Guam, thus depriving theUnited States of its only fleet anchoragebetween Pearl Harbor and Manila Bay.Either Guam would have to be retakenor some other site occupied as a coalingand repair station. Whichever courseof action was adopted, a landing forcemade up from the various ships’ crewscould not be used. With Japanesebattleships lurking just over the hori-

‘ Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: ABiognzph~ (New York: Harcourt and Brace,1931) , p. 408.

3

4 CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE

zon, the Philippine relief expeditioncould not afford to have any large num-ber of Bluejackets and Marines servingashore and absent from their battlestations.z

Since the recapture of Guam or thetaking of some other island—Truk wasmost frequently designated theprime objective 3—was an integral partof the war at sea, such missions fell tothe naval services and specifically to theMarine Corps, which was especiallysuited to those operations, During theSpanish-American War, a Marine bat-talion had landed at Guantanamo Bayto obtain a coaling station for theAmerican ships blockading Cuba. Fol-lowing the war, Marine units inheritedthe mission of occupying and defendingadvanced naval bases, and some navalofficers began to urge that speciallyequipped defense forces be incorpo-rated into each American squadron.Various planners cooperated in apply-ing the lessons learned at GuantanamoBay to the situation in the Pacific.

Among the first Marines to claim fortheir Corps an important role in anORANGE war were Major DionWilliams and Captain Earl H. Ellis.Writing in 1912, Williams offered

2Capt William R. Shoemaker, USN, “Strat-egy of the Pacific: An Exposition of theORANGE War Plan,” dtd Aug14; Admin andStratSecs, ORANGE Plan, dtd Mar16 (NAfolder no. 40, OP 29 folder no. 5, OAB, NHD).

‘ RAdm Charles J. Moore cmts on draft MSand interview by HistBr, G–3, dtd 26Nov62,hereafter Moore comments ( Gilberts CommentFile, HistBr, HQMC). Admiral Moore, whoserved as Admiral Spruance’s chief of staff,noted: “This Truk operation became an obses-sion of the Navy and Marine Corps and wasnot eliminated as an objective until the raidon Truk on 17 February 1944.”

tables of organization for a brigade toaccompany the battle fleet and assist itby occupying poorly defended anchor-ages, emplacing weapons, and guardingagainst counterattack.4 Ellis, whosestudy appeared a few years later,agreed with the basic theory set forthby Williams, but he prophesied that theday might come when the enemy hadfortified those islands suitable as ad-vanced bases. Should this happen, theMarine contingent would be called uponto seize a defended beach. The cap-ture of the objective rather than itssubsequent defense would become theprimary task of the Marines supportingthe battle fleet.5

As a result of World War I, duringwhich Japan and the United States hadbeen allies, America’s potential enemygained control over the former Germanpossessions in the MarshalIs, Carolines,and Marianas. The Philippines weremore vulnerable than before and Guamnow was ringed by Japanese outposts.By 1921, the Marine Corps had evalu-ated recent gains by Japan and devel-oped a realistic framework for its ownoperational and logistical planning.Staff officers believed that Guam andprobably the Philippines would fall tothe enemy shortly after the outbreak ofwar, and that Marine Corps units, incooperation with Army troops, wouldface the task of seizing bases in theMarshalIs, Carolines, Marianas, andPhilippines. In addition, they assumed

4Maj Dion Williams, “The Naval AdvancedBase,” dtd 26Ju112 (NA folder no. 29, OP 29folder no. 6, OAB, NHD) .

‘ Capt Earl H. Ellis, “The Security of Ad-vanced Bases and Advanced Base Operations,”ca. 1913 (IntelSec, DivOps and Trng Files,HistBr, HQMC).

. . . .

EARLY PLANS FOR A WAR WITH JAPAN 5

that the Marine Corps was to take partin the final advance from the Philip-pines to Japan itself.e

Earl Ellis, now a major, concentratedon one segment of a war againstORANGE and devised Operation Plan712, which dealt with the systematicreduction of the Marshall Islands. Healso outlined the tactics to be usedagainst such objectives as Eniwetok,Wotj e, and Maloelap. Although histheories were limited by the equipmentthen available, he made several soundrecommendations, urging among otherthings that troops fighting ashore haveat their disposal the on-call fire of sup-porting warships. Yet, the amphibiousassault depicted by Ellis was under-standably crude in comparison to theskilfully coordinated landings of WorldWar 11.7

Whatever the flaws in his theory,Ellis’s plan marked a complete breakwith tradition. No longer wouldMarines be used primarily to defendadvanced bases. Instead, they wouldseize these bases from the enemy.

During the 1920s and 1930s, variousMarine Corps officers elaborated uponEllis’ amphibious doctrine. Key Pa-cific islands were studied as potentialbattlefields, new types of landing craftwere tested, and more efficient landingtechniques came into use. Thus didthe Marine Corps devote its energies topreparing for whatever amphibiousmissions might be assigned it in anORANGE war.a

“ MarCorps War Plan against ORANGE,Resume, 1921 (War Plans File, HistBr,HQMC).

‘ Maj Earl H. Ellis, OPlan 712, 1921 (WarPlans File, HistBr, HQMC).

“ For the story of the Marine Corps role in

Framing the broad strategy for apossible war in the Pacific remained thetask of the Joint Army and NavyBoard. The ORANGE Plan, actually apreferred course of action rather thana detailed war plan, needed little re-vision, and the missions first assignedthe services before World War I re-mained much the same as World WarII approached. The Army was to denyManila Bay to the enemy for as long atime as possible, while the Navy, cap-turing en route as many bases as itmight need, steamed westward todefeat the Japanese fleet and break thesiege of the Philippines. Althoughsome planners doubted that the Philip-pine garrison could hold out until helparrived, and in fact believed that theislands were indefensible, the basicconcept persisted throughout the1930s.g Finally, on the eve of warwith the Axis powers, ORANGE Plan,which had presumed that Japan would

the development of amphibious doctrine andequipment, see LtCol Frank O. Hough, MajVerle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal—HistoW of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II,v. I (Washington: HistBr, G-3, HQMC, 1958),pp. S-34, hereafter Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw,Pearl Harbor to Guadakanal.

o Development of Joint Army-Navy WarPlan ORANGE (RG 115, WPD 2720-22,WWIIRecsDiv, FRC, Alexandria, Vs.) ; Louis Mor-ton, “Strategy and Command: Turning theTide, 1941–1943—The War in the Pacific—U. S. Army in World War II,” MS in OCMH,pt II, pp, 24-31, 3S-41, hereafter Morton MS.See Louis Morton, The Fall of the PhMpp”nes—The War in the Pacific-U. S. Army inWo~ld Way 11 (Washington: OCMH, DA,1953), paeeim, for a discussion of the strongbody of Army opinion which held that theislands could not be successfully defended withthe forces available.


be the only enemy, was incorporatedinto an overall strategy designed tomeet the needs of a two-ocean conflict.

STRATEGY FORA GLOBAL WAR

As early as 1937, the United StatesNavy had sent a representative toGreat Britain to discuss the employ-ment of the American fleet in the eventthat these two nations should go to warwith Japan. During the conversa-tions, the possibility that Japan mightjoin forces with Italy and Germany wasexplored. The British Admiraltywas satisfied that, in the event of an-other world war, the United States Navyshould concentrate in the Pacific, leav-ing the effort in the Atlantic to GreatBritain and her continental allies.l”By June 1939, American planners werefully aware that Japan, possibly with-out the aid of Germany and Italy, mighttake advantage of the European crisisto seize British, French, or even Amer-ican holdings in the Orient. Becausethe potential enemies might either actindependently or combine their efforts,the Joint Board in June 1939 orderedthat five new war plans be written, theRAINBOW series, each of which mightincorporate the features of several“color” plans such as ORANGE.These new plans were designed to meetdanger from various sources. Two ofthem dealt with the defense of thewestern hemisphere, two others with awar in the Pacific, and still another,RAINBOW 5, with a war in Europe orAfrica that pitted the United States,France, and Great Britain against Ger-many and Italy.

10 Morton MS, Pt, 111, P. 2.

Although a greatly expanded RAIN-BOW 5 eventually became the basis ofAmerica’s World War II strategy,work on this particular plan got off to adiscouraging start, for France sud-denly collapsed, and the Axis nationssigned a formal military alliance.A two-ocean war now seemed probable,a conflict in which winning the battleof the Atlantic would be of more con-sequence than a victory in the Pacific.In the words of Admiral Harold R.Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations,“if Britain wins decisively against Ger-many we could win everywhere;but . . . if she loses the problem con-fronting us would be very great; and,while we might not lose everywhere,we might, possibly, not win any-where.” 11 During January 1941,President Franklin D. Roosevelt an-nounced a policy that emphasized thegreatest possible aid to Britain, and aseries of Anglo-American conferencesbegan that same month which saw thetwo nations agree upon defeating Ger-many and Italy before turning their fullmight against Japan.12

Since the United States was nowcommitted to assuming a strategic de-fensive on the outbreak of war in thePacific, joint planners began rewritingRAINBOW 5 to include the probabilitythat Japan would cooperate with herAxis partners in any future conflict.

“ Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell,Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare;19J1–1942—The War Department—The U. S.Army in World War II (Washington: OCMH,DA, 1953) , p. 25.

UMorton MS, pt. III, pp. 34&35,37; LouisMorton, “American and Allied Strategy in theFar East,” Military Review, v. 29, no. 9(Dec49), p. 33, hereafter Morton, “Strategy.”

EARLY PLANS FOR A WAR WITH JAPAN 7

Essentially, this revision consisted indelaying indefinitely the Central Pa-cific campaign advocated by theORANGE Plans. Instead of seekingimmediately a decisive sea battle inPhilippine waters, the Navy would berestricted in its early operations toattacks upon the Marshalls designed toprevent the enemy from concentrating

his forces against Singapore. In brief,the naval offensive against Japan, towhich the Navy and Marine Corps haddevoted so much thought, became but asingle element in a global strategy de-signed primarily to crush Germany andItaly as rapidly as possible.ls

u Morton,“Strategy,” pp. 37-38.

214-881O-67—2

CHAPTER 2

The Central Pacific in Global Strategy

The devastating raid on Pearl Har-bor, coupled with the destructive at-tacks on airfields in the Philippines,enabled Japan to seize the initiative inthe Pacific. Since many of its battle-ships had been disabled by enemybombs and torpedoes, the AmericanNavy could do nothing to divert theJapanese from Singapore. Thisbastion fell, the Netherlands Indieswere overwhelmed, and the inadequategarrison holding out in the Philippineswas encircled. Instead of conductingextensive raids in the Marshalls andpreparing for an eventual drive acrossthe Pacific, the United States and herAllies were trying desperately to holda perimeter that extended from Burmathrough Australia to Hawaii and theAleutians. As the triumphant Japa-nese pushed southward, existing Amer-ican war plans were abandoned, andthe security of Australia became theprincipal task of the Allies in the Pacificarea.

Like the United States, Japan early inthe war revised her Pacific strategy.The enemy’s change of plans, however,was not caused by unforeseen setbacksbut by the ease with which she hadgained her primary objectives.Originally, Japan’s principal aimwas the conquest of the NetherlandsIndies, Malaya, the Philippines, andBurma, areas rich in natural resources.Once these regions were taken, the

8

Japanese empire, now self-sufficient inoil, tin, and rubber, would be capableof defending a perimeter that stretchedfrom the Kuriles, along the outer Mar-shalls, through the Bismarck Archi-pelago, across the Netherlands Indies, toMalaya and Burma. With Malaya, thePhilippines, and the Netherlands colo-nies firmly in her control, Japan, ratherthan pausing as planned to consolidatethese gains, decided to expand stillfarther.

These secondary conquests were in asense defensive, for the enemy wishedonly to protect his earlier gains.Japan hoped to seize Port Moresby inNew Guinea, capture Midway, establishoutposts in the Aleutians, and isolateAustralia by taking New Caledonia,Fiji, and Samoa. Should these opera-tions succeed, Australia would be use-less as an Allied base, and the UnitedStates fleet would be confined within atriangle bounded by Alaska, Hawaii,and Panama.

This series of operations ended indisaster for the overextended enemy..The Battle of the Coral Sea stoppedthe immediate threat to Port Moresby.A month later the Japanese fleet metdefeat off Midway, a blow that causedthe cancellation of the offensive aimedat the line of communication withAustralia. The attempt to gain a foot-hold in the Aleutians did succeed, butbefore the summer of 1942 had ended

THE CENTRAL PACIFIC IN GLOBAL STRATEGY 9

the Americans took the initiative bylanding at Guadalcanal in the lowerSolomons.1

THE CASABLANCACONFERENCE 2

Since the war against the Axispowers was a combined effort, both theUnited States and Great Britain had amajor voice in determining Alliedstrategy. The agency charged withdeveloping the program of Allied mili-tary operations and allocating the re-sources of the two nations was theCombined Chiefs of Staff (CCS),which was composed of the principalmilitary advisers of President Roose-velt and British Prime Minister Win-ston Churchill. Shortly after theattack on Pearl Harbor, the CCS gaveto the United States primary responsi-bility for the war against Japan, ex-cluding operations in defense ofMalaya, Sumatra, and Burma.Thus, planning for the Pacific war fellto the American Joint Chiefs of Staff(JCS).

By the end of 1942, Japan had lost theinitiative, and the JCS could begin ex-ploring the most effective ways of dam-aging the enemy. A limited offensivehad already been approved for theSouth and Southwest Pacific Areas, an

‘ See Hough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Har-bor to (hadalcanal, pp. 235–374, for the storyof Marine operations in the Guadalcanal cam-paign.

=Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis section is derived from: CCS, Minutes ofthe 55th-60th Meetings 14–18Jan43 (ABCFiles, WWH RecsDiv, FRC, Alexandria, Vs. ) ;John Miller, Jr., “The Casablanca Conferencein Pacific Strategy,” Military Affairs, V. 13,no. 4 (Winter 49), p. 209.

operation undertaken to protect theline of communication to Australia.Now the JCS had to determine whetherthe advance northward and westwardfrom Australia would prove more de-cisive than a drive across the CentralPacific and then to convince the othermembers of the CCS of the wisdom ofits strategy.

The conference of Allied leadersat Casablanca in January 1943 gaveAmerican planners their first opportun-ity to present to the British theirdetailed views on Pacific strategy.Admiral Ernest J. King, Commanderin Chief, U. S. Fleet and Chief of NavalOperations, expressed his belief that aneventual goal of any Pacific offensiveshould be the Philippines. Theseislands lay astride the sea lanes overwhich rubber, oil, and tin were trans-ported to Japan from the conqueredterritories. Submarines and aircraftoperating from the Philippines couldhalt the flow of raw materials neededby Japanese industry.

Turning to the problem of selectingof the best route of advance toward thePhilippines, King urged a move acrossthe Central Pacific. Both the admiraland General George C. Marshall, ArmyChief of Staff, hoped to outflank thedefenses that the Japanese were pre-paring in the area north of Australia.This could be done by striking west-ward through the Marshalls andCarolines to the Marianas. Sinceplanes flying from the Marianas couldstrike Japan while submarines based inthese islands isolated the Philippines,King looked upon them as importantintermediate objectives on the waywestward.

British strategists, however, were not


willing to expand the effort againstJapan at the expense of the Europeanwar. They agreed that limited offen-sives were necessary but wanted toundertake only those operations whichwould help protect India and Australia.British planners believed that theAllies should seize the key enemy baseat Rabaul on New Britain, and recoverBurma, while remaining on the defen-sive elsewhere in the Pacific.

Actually, a compromise was easilyreached, once the JCS had agreed in-formally to avoid becoming involved ina series of offensives throughout thePacific. The Burma operation couldnot begin immediately, and it appearedthat Rabaul might fall in the near fu-ture. A Central Pacific campaign,limited in scope, would maintain pres-sure on the enemy during the periodbetween the capture of Rabaul and theattack from India. After General Mar-shall stated that the move toward theCarolines would be undertaken withresources available in the Central Pa-cific Areas, the CCS recommended thatthe heads of state accept this broaden-ing of the war against Japan. Presi-dent Roosevelt and Prime MinisterChurchill, the final arbiters of Alliedstrategy, agreed with their advisers.

COORDINATING PACIFICSTRATEGY

Late in February 1943, AdmiralKing discussed with AdmiralNimitz, Commander in Chief, PacificFleet (CinCPac), means of carryingout the policies decided upon at Casa-blanca. Although General DouglasMacArthur, responsible for directingthe war in the Southwest Pacific, had

disclosed only the general outline of hisproposed operations, King and Nimitzattempted to plot the course of eventsin the Central Pacific. Nimitz wishedto remain temporarily on the defensive,gradually whittling down Japanesestrength while augmenting his own.During this build-up, submarinesand aircraft would carry the war to theenemy. King agreed that to strikewestward with the men, ships, andplanes available in 1943 was to take avery considerable calculated risk, buthe considered that the American forcesmust keep the initiative and that theyhad to be used in order to justify theirallocation by the CCS.S

As a result of their conference, thetwo admirals agreed to a limited thrustin the general direction of the Philip-pines, but neither the objectives northe timing of the attack were selected.In the meantime, the JCS had beenarranging a conference of representa-tives from the Central Pacific, SouthPacific, and Southwest Pacific Areas.At this series of meetings held in Wash-ington, beginning on 12 March 1943,American planners heard additionaldetails concerning the strategic designthat had been prepared by GeneralMacArthur.

Delegates to the Pacific Military Con-ference, as these meetings were termed,did not learn of MacArthur’s plannedreturn to the Philippines, for his repre-sentatives concerned themselves withimmediate operations for the capture ofRabaul. ELKTON, the Rabaul plan,

SFAdm Ernest J. King and Cdr WalterMuir Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A NavalRecord (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.,1952), pp. 431–432, hereafter King and White-hill, Fleet Admiral King.

.,,


called for continuing cooperation be-tween the South and Southwest PacificAreas in the capture of airfield sites onNew Guinea, New Georgia, and Bou-gainvillea and in the seizure of twomighty bases–Kavieng on New Irelandand Rabaul itself.

Since a minimum of 79,000 Japanesetroops were believed to be stationed inthe area through which General Mac-Arthur proposed to advance, his repre-sentatives told the conference that fiveadditional divisions and as many airgroups would be needed to sustain theoffensive. Unfortunately, the JCScould spare neither the men nor theaircraft which MacArthur needed andhad no choice but to order ELKTONrevised. Instead of seizing Rabaul asquickly as possible, Allied forces in theSouth and Southwest Pacific would,during 1943, occupy Woodlark and Kiri-wina Islands, continue the war in NewGuinea, land on New Britain, and ad-vance along the Solomons chain by wayof New Georgia to Bougainvillea.These changes enabled MacArthur andAdmiral William F. Halsey, who di-rected operations in the South Pacifictheater, to get along with fewer troops,planes, and ships, some of which mightnow be employed in the CentralPacific.4 Although the Pacific Mili-tary Conference brought about a tailor-

4John Miller, Jr., CARTWHEEL: The Re-duction of Rabaul—The War in the Pacific—The U. S. Armg in World Wa~ II (Washing-ton: OCMH, DA, 1959), pp. 12–19. For thestory of the role of the Marine Corps in oper-ations against Rabaul, see Henry I. Shaw, Jr.and Maj Douglas T. Kane, Zsolation of Rabaul—History of U. S. Marine Corps Operationsin World War II, v. 11 (Washington: HistBr,G–3, HQMC, 1963), hereafter Shaw and Kane,Isolation of Rabaul.

ing of ELKTON to fit the resourcesavailable for the operation, no attemptwas made to coordinate this offensivewith the attack scheduled for the Cen-tral Pacific. The JCS postponed thisdecision until the next meeting of theCCS which was scheduled to convene atWashington in May 1943.

During the discussions held at Wash-ington the American Strategic Plan forthe Defeat of Japan, a general state-ment of the strategy which wouldfinally force the unconditional sur-render of that nation, was presentedfor British approval. As at Casa-blanca, Admiral King urged that apowerful blow be struck through theCentral Pacific, a more direct routetoward the enemy heartland than thecarefully guarded approach from thesouth. In Admiral Nimitz’ theater,the American fleet could disrupt Japa-nese supply lines and hinder any effortto strengthen the defenses in theregion. The vast expanse of ocean wasdotted with potential naval bases, sothe attackers could select their objec-tives with a view to inflicting themaximum strategic damage with thefewest possible men, ships, and air-craft. In short, the Central Pacificoffered an ideal opportunity to use car-rier task forces in conjunction withamphibious troops to launch a series ofswift thrusts across hundreds of milesof water.

Admiral King, however, did notintend to abandon the Solomons-NewBritain-New Guinea offensive. Al-lied forces fighting in this area couldnot simply suspend their operationsand begin shifting men and equipmentto the Central Pacific. Such a maneu-ver would alert the enemy to the im-


pending offensive and weaken thedefenses of Australia. Rather thanhurl all Allied resources into a singledrive, the American strategist desiredtwo offensives, a major effort throughthe Central Pacific and a complemen-tary push from the South and South-west Pacific. Exact timing and thejudicious use of available strengthwould keep the Japanese off balance andprevent their deploying men and shipsfrom the southern defenses to the Caro-lines and Marshalls.5

After listening to Admiral King’sarguments, the CCS accepted theAmerican position with one majormodification. Originally, the Amer-ican plan had called for the Allies,while continuing the offensive againstGermany, “to maintain and extend un-remitting pressure against Japan withthe purpose of continually reducing hermilitary power and attaining positionsfrom which her ultimate unconditionalsurrender can be forced.” G Britishmembers of the CCS considered thisstatement to be permission to strike atJapan without regard to the waragainst Germany, and all the Americanrepresentatives except King agreed thatthe language was too strong. Finally,the British suggested that the effect ofany extension of the Pacific war onoverall strategy should be consideredby the CCS before actual operationswere begun, a sentence to this effect

‘ Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love,S’eizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls-TheWar in the Pacific-The U. S. Army in WorldWar 11 (Washington: OCMH, DA, 1955), pp.12–14, hereafter Crowl and Love, Gilberts andMarshalls.

“ King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King,p. 441.

was inserted, and the document ap-proved,’ Included among the goals pro-posed for 1943–1944 were the seizure ofthe Marshalls and Carolines as well ascertain operations in Burma and China,the reconquest of the Aleutians,s and acontinuation of the effort in the Southand Southwest Pacific Areas.g

FINAL. APPROVAL FOR THECENTRAL PACIFIC OFFENSIVE

As soon as the Washington- Confer-ence adjourned, King hurried to SanFrancisco to discuss with Nimitz theattack against the Marshalls. He re-peated his conviction that the MarianaIslands formed the most importantintermediate objective on the road toTokyo and recommended that the con-quest of the Marshalls be the first stepin the march westward. Because theresources available to Admiral Nimitzwould determine the final selection oftargets, the two officers also discussedthe possibility of striking first at theGilberts, a group of islands believedto be more vulnerable than theMarshalls.l”

7Ibid.‘ The invasion of Attu, one of the two Aleu-

tian outposts seized by the Japanese, had be-gun on 11 May. Since Japan was unable tomount an offensive from this quarter, Attucould have been ignored, but its recapture,along with the planned reconquest of Kiska,would put additional pressure on the enemy,drive him from the fringes of the WesternHemisphere, and release American ships andtroops for service elsewhere.

“ CCS 239/1, Operations in the Pacific andFar East in 1943–1944, dtd 22May43 (ABCFiles, WWII RecsDiv, FRC, Alexandria, Vs.).

‘0King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King,pp. 443444.


In the meantime, General Mac-Arthur was informed of the proposedoffensive in Nimitz’ theater, an attackwhich was to be launched in mid-No-vember by the 1st and 2d MarineDivisions. Neither the strategicplan nor its means of execution coin-cided with MacArthur’s views. Thegeneral believed that the best avenueof approach to the Philippines was byway of New Guinea. ELKTON wasbut the first phase of MacArthur’spromised return to the Philippines, andeven this plan would be jeopardized bythe loss of the two Marine divisions,then under his command.

MacArthur objected to the JCS thata campaign in the Central Pacificwould be no more than a diversionaryeffort and that the withdrawal of theMarine units would delay the seizure ofRabaul. American strategists wereable to effect a compromise by orderingthe release of the 2d Marine Division,then in the South Pacific, while leavingthe 1st Marine Division under Mac-Arthur’s control. Instead of capturingRabaul, the South and Southwest Pa-cific forces were to neutralize and by-pass this fortress.li

Even before MacArthur hadvoiced his objections to the proposedCentral Pacific operations, appropri-ate agencies of the JCS were at workselecting objectives for AdmiralNimitz. So little intelligence was

UMiller, CARTWHELL, op. cit., pp. 223-225.

available on the Marshalls thatplanners urged the capture instead ofbases in the Gilberts from which Amer-ican reconnaissance planes could pene-trate the neighboring island group.The defenses of the Gilberts appearedto be weaker than those of the Mar-shalls, and the proposed objective areawas near enough to the South Pacificto permit naval forces to support oper-ations in both places. Finally, controlof the Gilberts would reduce Japanesethreats to American bases in the ElliceIslands and Samoa and shorten as wellas protect the line of communication toNew Zealand and Australia.” On 20July, the JCS directed Nimitz to beginplanning for the capture of NauruIsland and of bases in the Gilberts.Well within American capabilities, thislimited offensive would open the wayinto the Marshalls, which in turn wouldprovide the bases for a later move tothe Marianas.13

The following month, the CCS, meet-ing at Quebec, added the Gilbert Islandsto a list of proposed Central Pacificoperations designed to carry the war tothe Marianas by the end of 1944.14 Atlast the stage was set for a CentralPacific offensive similar in concept tothe campaign outlined in the earliestORANGE Plans.

UMoore Comments.= Crowl and Love, The Gilberts and Mar-

shalls, pp. 21-24.14 King ~n~ Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King,

p. 489.

The Central Pacific Battleground

In American military terminology,the scene of the proposed offensive wasthe Central Pacific Area, a subdivisionof the Pacific Ocean Areas that ex-tended from the western coast of NorthAmerica to the shores of China andreached from the equator northward tothe 42d parallel. Canton Island, justsouth of the equator, was included inthe Central Pacific, but the Philippinesand those parts of the NetherlandsIndies that lay in the northern hemi-sphere were not.1 Admiral Nimitz,Allied commander-in-chief through-out the Pacific Ocean Areas (CinC-POA), retained immediate control overoperations in the Central Pacific.Within this area lay Micronesia, amyriad of islands of varying size andtype, the region in which the forthcom-ing Central Pacific battles would befought.

THE GEOGRAPHY OFMICRONESIA 2

That part of Micronesia nearest Ja-pan is the Mariana group of 15 vol-

1The Pacific Ocean Areas contained threesubdivisions: the North Pacific Area north ofthe 42d parallel, the Central Pacific Area, andsouth of the equator, the South Pacific Area.Australia, its adjacent islands, most of theNetherlands Indies, and the Philippinesformed the Southwest Pacific Area under Gen-eral MacArthur.

sUnless otherwise noted, the material in

14

canic islands. The Marianas curvesouthward from the 20th to the 13thparallel north latitude, with the centerof the chain lying at about 144 degreeseast longitude. The islands them-selves, five of which were inhabited atthe outbreak of war, are by Micronesiastandards vast and mountainous.Guam, the largest, boasts an area of228 square miles and peaks rising toover 1,000 feet. The highest elevationin the entire group is 3,166 feeton smaller Agrigan. Although thetemperature is warm but not unpleas-ant, rains occur frequently, and thereis the threat of typhoons and an occa-sional earthquake. Saipan, near thecenter of the Marianas, lies 1,285 nau-tical miles southeast of Yokohama.(See Map I, Map Section.)

South of the Marianas are the Caro-lines, a belt of over 500 volcanic islandsand coral atolls extending eastwardfrom, Babelthuap in the Palaus, 134 de-grees east longitude, to Kusaie at 163degrees. The long axis of this groupcoincides roughly with the seventhparallel north latitude. At the ap-proximate center of the Carolines, 590

this section is derived from: Morton MS, In-troduction, p. 14; R. W. Robson, The PacificIslands Handbook, 19.44,North American cd.,(New York: Macmillan Co., 1945), pp. 132–175; Fairfield Osborne, cd., The Pacific World(New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1944),pp. 155-159.

THE CENTWL PACIFIC BATTLEGROUND 15

miles southeast of Saipan, is Truk, siteof a Japanese naval base. The climatein this area is healthful, but the aver-age temperatures are slightly higherthan in the Marianas. Some of thelarger Caroline Islands are covered withluxuriant vegetation.

Northeast of Kusaie are the Mar-shalls, a group of 32 flat coral atolls a’ndislands scattered from 5 to 15 degreesnorth latitude and 162 to 173 degreeseast longitude. The highest eleva-tion in the entire group is no more than40 feet. Kwajalein, the largest atoll inthe world, lies near the center of theMarshalls, 955 miles from Truk. Theclimate is hot and humid.

On a map, the Gilberts appear to bean extension of the Marshalls, an ap-pendix of 16 atolls that terminatesthree degrees south of the equator.Tarawa, slightly north of the equator,is 540 nautical miles southeast ofKwajalein and 2,085 miles southwestof Pearl Harbor. Heat and humidityare extreme during the rainy season,the soil is poor, and portions of thegroup are occasionally visited bydroughts.

The most striking feature of theMicronesia battlefield is its vastness.An island as big as Guam is little morethan a chip of wood afloat in a pond.Although the total expanse of ocean islarger than the continental UnitedStates, the numerous islands add up toless than 2,000 square miles, a land areasmaller than Delaware.

At one time, all of Micronesia exceptfor the British Gilberts had belongedto Spain. The United States seizedGuam during the Spanish-AmericanWar, and Spain later sold her remain-ing Central Pacific holdings to Ger-

many. After World War I, the Leagueof Nations made Japan the mandatepower in the Marshalls, Carolines, andMarianas (except Guam). Under theterms of the mandate, a reward forparticipating in the war against Ger-many, the Japanese were to govern anddevelop the islands, but were forbiddento fortify them. This bar to fortifica-tion was reinforced by the WashingtonNaval Treaty of 1922.

In 1935, however, Japan withdrewfrom the League of Nations without sur-rendering her authority over thePacific isles. Because of the strict se-curity regulations enforced throughoutthe region, Japan succeeded in screen-ing her activities for the six years im-mediately preceding the attack on PearlHarbor. As late as 1939, a Japanesescholar assured the English-speakingpeoples that his nation was not usingthe islands of Micronesia for militarypurposes.3 The strength of thedefenses in this area would not beaccurately determined until the CentralPacific campaign was underway.

THE ROLE OFTHE MARINE CORPS

Throughout his arguments for an of-fensive across Micronesia, Admiral Kinghad desired to use Marines as assaulttroops, for the Marine Corps hadpioneered in the development of am-phibious doctrine, and its officers andmen were schooled in this type of oper-ation.4 Major General Holland M.

‘ Tadao Yanaihara, Pacific Islands underJapanese Mandate (London: Oxford Univer-sity Press, 1940), p. 305.

‘ King and Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King,p. 481.


Smith, who would command the VAmphibious Corps (VAC) for most ofthe Central Pacific campaign, had di-rected the amphibious training ofArmy troops that had participated inthe invasion of North Africa. Thesame staff which would accompany himwestward had helped him prepare ele-ments of the 7th Infantry Division forthe Attu operation.’ Experiencedleadership would not be lacking, butveteran Marine divisions were at apremium.

Three Marine divisions, two of themproven in combat, were overseas whenAdmiral Nimitz received the JCS direc-tive to prepare plans for a blow at theGilberts. The 2d Marine Division,which was recovering from the malar-ial ravages of the Guadalcanal cam-paign, continued to train in the tem-perate climate of New Zealand after itsrelease to Admiral Nimitz and incorp-oration into General Holland Smith’samphibious corps. The other malaria-riddled veteran unit of the battle forGuadalcanal, the 1st Marine Divi-sion, was in Australia. This divisionwas left in General MacArthur’s South-west Pacific Area to execute a part ofthe revised ELKTON plan, the landingat Cape Gloucester on New Britain.The 3d Marine Division, untested incombat and new to Vice Admiral Wil-liam F. Halsey’s South Pacific Area,was completing its movement fromNew Zealand to the southern Solomonswhere it would train for the invasion

‘ Jeter A. Isely and Philip Crowl, The U. S.Marines and Amphibious War, Its Theo~,and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 61-63,hereafter Isely and Crowl, Marines and Am-phibious Wwr.

of Bougainvillea, an operation that wasto begin in November 1943. Althoughstill in training in the United States, the4th Marine Division was scheduled tobe ready by the end of 1943 for servicein the Central Pacific.

Also present in the South Pacific wereseveral other Marine combat organiza-tions larger than a battalion in size.The 1st Raider Regiment wascommitted to the Central Solomons of-fensive; one battalion was alreadyfighting on New Georgia, and anotherhad just landed on that island. The1st Parachute Regiment, an airborneunit in name only, was preparing inNew Caledonia for possible employ-ment during the advance into thenorthern Solomons. The 22d Marines,a reinforced regiment that eventu-ally would see action in the CentralPacific, was at this time standing guardover American Samoa.e

Like the ground combat units, thebulk of Marine Corps aviationsquadrons overseas at the time werestationed in the distant reaches of theSouth Pacific. An exception wasthe 4th Marine Base Defense AircraftWing. Although the wing, at the timeof the JCS directive, was preparing toshift its headquarters from Hawaii toSamoa and most of its squadrons werestaging southward, one fighter and onescout-bomber squadron were in theEllice group near the northern bound-ary of the South Pacific Area. Sincethe planes based in the Ellice Islandswere short range craft and the pilotsunused to carrier operations, neitherunit could participate in the Gilberts

‘ StaSheet, FMF Grid, dtd 31Ju143 (HistBr,HQMC).

THE CENTRAL PACIFIC BATTLEGROUND 17

invasion.7 At Tarawa, the 2d MarineDivision would be supported by Navycarrier squadrons.

TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OFTHE MARINE DIVISION

The Marine division that figured inAdmiral Nimitz’ plans for the Gilbertswas organized according to the E seriestables of organization adopted in April1943. With an authorized strength of19,965 officers and men, the divisionwas constructed in a triangular fashion—three infantry regiments, each ofwhich had three infantry battalions.This arrangement enabled the divisioncommanding general to hold in reservean entire regiment without impairingthe ability of his command to attack orto remain on the defensive. A regi-mental commander could exercise thissame option with his battalions, andthe battalion commander with his riflecompanies, as well as with a headquar-ters company and a weapons company.An infantry regiment was authorized abasic strength of 3,242, a battalion 953,and a rifle company 196.

Supporting the divisional infantrycomponents were an engineer regimentof three battalions (engineer, pioneer,and naval construction), an artilleryregiment with three battalions of 75-mm pack howitzers and two of 105mmhowitzers, Special Troops, and ServiceTroops. Special Troops, its total

‘ StaSheet, Air, dtd 31Ju143 (HistBr, HQ-MC) ; Robert Sherrod, History of MarineCOTPS Aviation in World Wmr 11 (Washing-ton: Combat Forces Press, 1952), pp. 222, 224,43S-439, hereafter Sherrod, Marine Air His-to~.

strength 2,315, consisted of a light tankbattalion which included the divisionscout company, a special weapons bat-talion equipped with antitank and anti-aircraft guns, and the divisionheadquarters battalion which con-tained headquarters, signal, and mili-tary police companies. Service, motortransport, amphibian tractor, and med-ical battalions, with a total of 2,200 of-ficers and men, made up Service Troops.The division chaplains, doctors, den-tists, hospital corpsmen, and the Sea-bees of its naval construction battalionwere members of the U. S. Navy.

The infantry units, too, had theirown support elements. A weaponscompany armed with heavy machineguns, 37mm antitank guns, and self-propelled 75mm guns was under thedirect control of each regimental com-mander. The battalion commanderhad his own company of heavy machineguns and 81mm mortars, and a com-pany commander could rely on the lightmachine guns and 60mm mortars ofhis weapons platoon.

The basic structure of both divisionand regiment was altered when neces-sary. Troops normally under corpscontrol, such as reconnaissance,medium tank, or artillery units, mightbe used to reinforce the division. Foramphibious operations, each regi-ment was made a combat team by theaddition of troops from the artilleryand engineer regiments, the amphibiantractor, medical, motor transport, serv-ice, tank, and special weapons battal-ions. These attachments increased thestrength of the regiment to as much as5,393. Some of the additionaltroops were reassigned to the infantrybattalions, so that the combat team

18 CENTRALPACIFICDRIVE

generally consisted of three landingteams, each with its own engineer, ar-tillery, medical, and tank support.~

THE ENEMY’S BASIC TACTICALORGANIZATION

During the drive westward, Marinedivisions would be opposed by JapaneseSpecial Naval Landing Forces as wellas by the enemy’s infantry divisions.When employed in the attack, a SpecialNaval Landing Force usually consistedof two infantry companies and a heavyweapons unit, plus communications,engineer, medical, supply and trans-portation elements. With a strengthof 1,000–1,500, this organization wascomparable in size to a Marine battal-ion reinforced as a landing team. Ar-tillery support for the landing forcewas provided by from 8 to 24 guns andhowitzers ranging from 70mm to120mm.

On the defense, however, a SpecialNaval Landing Force could be rein-forced to a strength of 2,000, with anappropriate increase in the number ofautomatic weapons and the addition ofantitank guns, mortars, or both. In ad-dition, the Marines might expect toencounter, among the naval units,trained guard forces. Construction orpioneer units, both types composed inpart of Korean laborers, were engagedin building airfields and defensiveinstallations throughout Micronesia.The strength of these organizations

depended on the particular project as-signed them, and their zeal for combatand state of training varied accordingto the policies of individual island com-manders.

Like the Imperial Navy, the JapaneseArmy habitually altered the strengthand composition of its field units tomeet the task at hand. The standardinfantry division consisted of some20,000 men organized into a cavalry orreconnaissance regiment, an infantrygroup of three regiments, and artillery,engineer, and transportation regiments.Signal, hospital, water purification, ord-nance, and veterinary units wereconsidered parts of the division head-quarters. For the most part, the Japa-nese adhered to the triangular concept,for each of the three infantry regimentsof 3,845 men contained three I, IOO-manbattalions. If judged necessary, the sizeof a division could be increased to over29,000 officers and men.

Usually, these reinforcements weretroops not assigned to any division, forthe Japanese Army had created a be-wildering variety of independent units.Some were larger than the ordinaryinfantry regiment; others as small asa tank company. By combining inde-pendent units or attaching them todivisions, the enemy was able to formtask forces to capture or defend a par-ticular place.g

These were the forces that wouldbattle for Micronesia. With many po-tential anchorages in the region,

‘ OrgChart, MarDiv, dtd 15Apr43 ( SubjFile:Admiral Nimitz ‘could feint with his

T/Os, HistBr, HQMC ). A copy of this table of carriers before striking with his as-

organization and equipment is contained inShaw and Kane, Isolation of Rabaul, pp. 571– “ WD, TM–E 30–480, Handbook on Japanese573. Military Forces, dtd 15Sep44, pp. 19-21, 76-81.

THE CENTRAL PACIFIC BATTLEGROUND 19

sault troops. Yet, the task of de- ported by aircraft, naval gunfire, andstroying the individual enemy would all the firepower organic to the Marineinevitably fall to the infantryman sub- division.

PART II

i%e Gilberts Operation

CHAPTER 1

Preparing to Take the Offensive 1

PLANNING FOR OPERATIONGALVANIC

The summer of 1943 saw a revival ofthe strategy contained in both OR-ANGE and RAINBOW Plans as well asrigorous training in amphibious tech-niques, methods that stemmed from fur-ther elaboration of the theories ofamphibious warfare first advanced byMajor Earl Ellis. The Central Pacificoffensive, for so many years the key-

‘ Unless otherwisenoted, the material inthis chapter is derived from: CinCPac OPlan1–43, dtd 50ct43, hereafter CinCPac OPkmI–43; ComCenPacFor OPlan 1-43, dtd 250ct43, hereafter ComCenPacFor OPlan 1–43; VPhibFor AR Gilbert Islands, dtd 4Dec43, here-after V PhibFor AR; CTF 54 OPlan A2–43,dtd 230ct43; CTF 53 OPO A101-43, dtd 170ct43, hereafter CTF 53 OpO AI OI-.43; VAC ARGALVANIC, dtd llJan44, hereafter VACAR; VAC OPlan 1-43, dtd 130ct43; 2d MarDiv OpO No. 14, dtd 250ct43, hereafter 2dMarDiv OpO No. 14; TF 11 AR Baker Island,Sep43 (Baker Island Area OpFile, HistBr,HQMC) ; Samuel Eliot Morison, Aleutians,Gilberts, and Manshalls, June 1942-April 1944—History of United States Naval Operationsin World Way II, v. VII (Boston: Little,Brown and Company, 1960 cd.), hereafterMorison, Aleutians, Gilbertsj and Marshalls;Crowl and Love, Gitberts and Mamhalls; Iselyand Crowl, Marines and Amphibious War;Capt James R. Stockman, !!’he Battle for Ta-rawa (Washington: HistSec, DivPubInfo,HQMC, 1947), hereafter Stockman, Tarawa.Unless otherwise noted, all documents cited inthis part are located in the Gilberts Area OpFile and the Gilberts CmtFile, HistBr, HQMC.

214-881O-67—3

stone of American naval planning, wasabout to begin with operations againstthe Gilbert Islands.2 The attack onthis group of atolls would test theMarine Corps concept of the amphibi-ous assault, an idea originated by Ellisand greatly modified by his successors.The major had been confident that adefended beach could be taken bystorm, and since his death new equip-ment and tactics had been perfected toaid the attackers, but the fact remainedthat such an operation had never beentried against a determined enemy dugin on a small island. Was Ellis’ con-clusion still valid ? Could an army riseout of the sea to overwhelm prepareddefenses ? These questions soon wouldbe answered. (See Map I, Map Sec-tion. )

On 20 July the JCS ordered AdmiralNimitz to begin preparing for the cap-ture, development, and defense of basesin the Gilbert group and on NauruIsland. This directive also providedfor the occupation of any other islandsthat might be needed as air bases ornaval facilities for the carrying out ofthe primary mission. GALVANICwas the code name assigned to theGilberts-Nauru venture. The opera-tion was intended to be a preliminarystep to an attack against the Marshalls.

‘It is interesting to note that the Gilbertsdid not appear as an objective in the ORANGEPlans. Moore Comments.

23

PREPARING TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 25

At the same time, a lodgement in theGilberts, in addition to bringing theMarshalls within range of land-basedbombers, also would insure the safetyof Samoa and shorten the line ofcommunication to the South and South-west Pacific.

The bulk of the Pacific Fleet, theCentral Pacific Force under Vice Admi-ral Raymond A. Spruance, was com-mitted to the Gilberts operation. Ascommander of the GALVANIC expedi-tion, Spruance was the immediate sub-ordinate of Admiral Nimitz. The ac-tual landings would be conducted by VAmphibious Force, headed by RearAdmiral Richmond K. Turner. Thisorganization, established on 24 August1943, was similar to the amphibiousforce that had carried out the Attuinvasion. Within Turner’s force wasV Amphibious Corps (VAC), organ-ized on 4 September and commanded byMarine Major General Holland M.Smith. The general had with him thesame staff, with representatives fromall services, that had aided in prepar-ing for the Aleutians offensive. Likethe original Amphibious Corps, PacificFleet, the new VAC was to train andcontrol the troops required for futureoperations in the Pacific Ocean Areas.“ ‘~imitz had entrusted GALVANIC toa group of experienced Navy and Ma-rine Corps officers. Spruance had com-manded a carrier task force at theBattle of Midway; Turner had led theamphibious force that landed the Ma-rines at Guadalcanal and Tulagi andhad directed a similar force in opera-tions against New Georgia; and Hol-land Smith had helped train troops foramphibious operations in Europe,North Africa, and the Aleutians. Pre-

parations for the Gilberts invasion hadbeen placed in capable hands.

The man who would actually com-mand the amphibious phase of theTarawa operation, Rear Admiral HarryW. Hill, reported to Admiral Turner on18 September 1943. Hill, a veteranbattleship and escort carrier groupcommander fresh from the SouthPacific battles, was designated Com-mander, Amphibious Group 2. Hisgroup would transport, land, and sup-port the assault troops at Tarawa,while a similar group, which AdmiralTurner retained under his direct com-mand, would be part of the attack forceat Makin. When Hill arrived, the pro-jected D-Day for GALVANIC was 1November, which was later changed to20 November, a date which providedonly two months to weld a widely scat-tered force of ships and troops into aneffective teams

The major Marine unit available toTurner’s amphibious force was the 2dMarine Division, commanded by MajorGeneral Julian C. Smith. This divi-sion had fought at Guadalcanal andwas currently reorganizing in NewZealand. The division commander, aMarine Corps officer since 1909, joinedthe unit after it had sailed from Guad-alcanal; but during his career he hadseen action at Vera Cruz, in Haiti,Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, andhad served in Panama and Cuba aswell. In the words of the division his-torian, Julian Smith’s “entirelyunassuming manner and friendly hazeleyes clothed a determined personality

3Adm Harry W. Hill interview with HistBr,G-3, HQMC and cmts on draft MS, dtd 40ct62, hereafter Hill interview/comments.


that could be forcefully displayed indecisive moments. His concern for hismen was deep and genuine.” 4

Because of the scope of the proposedCentral Pacific campaign and theneed in other theaters for Marineamphibious divisions, Army troops ap-peared certain to be needed forGALVANIC and later operations.Preliminary training, administration,and logistical support of these Armydivisions fell to the Commanding Gen-eral, Army Forces, Pacific OceanAreas, Lieutenant General Robert C.Richardson. In carrying on his work,General Richardson was subject to thedirection of Admiral Nimitz.

When the JCS first began exploringthe possibility of a thrust into the Gil-berts, Admiral King had urged thatonly Marines be used in the operation.General MacArthur’s needs for am-phibious troops and the shortage oftransports to bring a second Marinedivision to the Central Pacific pre-vented the carrying out of King’s rec-ommendation. General Marshall, on29 July offered an Army unit instead,the 27th Infantry Division then inHawaii, close to the scene of future com-bat. Although the unit had receivedno amphibious training, this was a defi-ciency that Holland Smith’s VAC couldsolve.

A part of the New York NationalGuard, the 27th Division had been in-ducted into the federal service in thefall of 1940. Upon the outbreak of war,the unit had been ordered from Fort

4Richard W. Johnston, Follow Me! TheStory of the 2d Marine Division in World WarZZ (New York: Random House, 1948), p. 89,hereafter Johnston, Follow Me!

McClellan, Alabama, to various instal-lations in California. After standingguard on the Pacific coast, the divisionsailed in March 1942 for the HawaiianIslands. In command of the 27th Di-vision when it was assigned to Opera-tion GALVANIC was Major GeneralRalph C. Smith, who had studied andlater lectured at France’s Ecole deGuerre and who was considered a keentactician.5

During the planning for and fightingon Guadalcanal, a naval officer, AdmiralTurner, had the final responsibility forthe conduct of operations, both afloatand ashore. The views of the admiral,a man sure in his opinions and forcefulin presenting them, did not alwayscoincide with those of the landing forcecommander, Major General AlexanderA. Vandegrift, when the question wasthe proper employment of troops.General Vandegrift, who recognized theabsolute necessity of naval control ofthe assault, wanted unquestionedauthority over operations ashore. Adispatch to Admiral King proposingthis command setup was drafted in lateOctober 1942 by the Commandant,Lieutenant General Thomas Holcomb,who was on an inspection trip to theSouth Pacific, signed by Admiral Hal-sey, and endorsed by Admiral Nimitz.On his return to Washington, Holcombindicated to King that he concurred inthe concept that the landing force andnaval task force commanders shouldhave equal authority, reporting to ajoint superior, once the landing phaseof the amphibious assault was com-

SEdmund G, Love, The 27th Infantry Divi-sion in World Wa~ II (Washington: InfantryJournal Press, 1949), pp. 11–22.


pleted.G Although such a change indoctrine evolved eventually, in the re-latively brief operations against thesmall atolls of the Central Pacific, therole of the naval comander in tacticaloperations remained paramount.

In setting up the planning machineryfor GALVANIC, Admiral Spruancefollowed the Guadalcanal precedentand made VAC completely subordinateto Turner. Holland Smith, a man justas forceful and outspoken as Turner,objected vigorously and successfully tothis setup, Spruance so revised hissystem that Holland Smith and Turnerfaced each other as equals throughoutthe planning phase. On the surface itwould seem that the Navy officer andthe Marine had equal voice in shapingplans for GALVANIC, but Spruancenaturally looked upon Turner as hisprincipal amphibious planner. The de-cisions of the force commander, how-ever, depended upon the schemeof maneuver advanced by the corpscommander, in this case HollandSmith.’

In one respect, their dislike forNauru as an objective, Spruance,Turner, and Holland Smith were in com-plete agreement. They did not want todivide the available naval forces andconduct two simultaneous amphibiousoperations separated by 380 miles, withthe enemy naval base at Truk beyondthe reach of any land-based reconnais-

“ Gen Thomas Holcomb interview by LtColRobert D. Heinl, Jr., dtd 12Apr49, cited inHough, Ludwig, and Shaw, Pearl Harbor toGuadalcanal, p. 342.

7Adm Raymond A. Spruance, “The Victoryin the Pacific,” Journal of the Royal UnitedService Institution, v. 91, no. 564 (Nov46) , p.544; Moore comments.

sance planes. Admiral Spruance vig-orously protested the selection ofNauru and argued for the substitutionof Makin Atoll in its stead. Herecalled:

Kelly Turner and I both discussed thissituation with Holland Smith at length.It appeared to me that Nauru had beenuseful to the Japanese as a position fromwhich to search to the southward the areabetween the Gilbert and Ellice Groups onthe east and the Solomons on the west.Once this area was controlled by us, Nauruwas not needed by us, and we could keep itpounded down. On the other hand, Makinwas 100miles closer to the Marshalls wherewe were going, and it tied in well from thepoint of view of fleet coverage with an op-eration against Tarawa. The more westudied the details of capturing Nauru,the tougher the operation appeared to be,and finally it seemed doubtful that thetroops assigned for it could take it. Thetransports available for trooplift werethe limiting factor. Makin . . . was an en-tirely suitable objective, and its capturewas well within our capabilities.*

The upshot of these discussions wasthat Holland Smith offered a revisedestimate of the situation, endorsed byTurner, that led to a revision of the con-cept of GALVANIC. On 19 Sep-tember, the general pointed out that atleast one entire division would be re-quired to seize rocky, cave-riddledNauru. In addition, this island lackeda lagoon as an anchorage for smallcraft and had only a tiny airfield.This estimate was presented to Nimitzon 24 September, while Admiral Kingwas in Pearl Harbor for a conferencewith CinCPac, and Spruance recom-mended to both that the Nauru portionof the plan be scrapped. Proposed sub-

‘ Adm Raymond A. Spruance ltr to ACofS,G–3, HQMC, dtd 24Ju162.


stitute for this target was Makin Atoll,which boasted a lagoon and ample roomfor airstrips. The defenses ofMakin appeared weaker than those ofNauru, its beaches better, and its loca-tion near enough to Tarawa to permitthe concentration of American ship-ping. Convinced by the arguments ofthe GALVANIC commanders, “Ad-miral King agreed to recommend to theJCS the substitution of Makin forNauru.” 9

There was little quarrel with the se-lection of Tarawa as an objective of theGALVANIC forces. Although thisatoll was heavily defended, its capturewould cut in half the distance thatAmerican bombers would have to fly inraiding the Marshalls. Also, BetioIsland in this atoll was the nerve centerfor the Japanese defense of theGilberts. The responsible planners be-lieved that the Gilberts could not beneutralized with the Americanstrength then available until Tarawawas overrun.

The capture of Apamama was alsothought necessary if the Americanswere to consolidate their hold on theGilberts. Again, the primary consid-eration was to gain an air base fromwhich to strike the Marshalls. Thisatoll promised to be the least difficult ofthe three objectives that CentralPacific planners wished to include inGALVANIC.

The JCS promptly agreed to the sub-stitution of Makin for Nauru, and on 5October, Admiral Nimitz issued Oper-ation Plan 13-43, containing the revisedconcept of GALVANIC. This docu-ment assigned Admiral Spruance the

‘ Ibid,

mission of capturing, developing,and defending bases at Makin, Tarawa,and Apamama. The operation wasdesigned to gain control of the Gilbertsand by so doing to smooth the way intothe MarshalIs, improve the security andshorten the line of communication withAustralia, and support operations inthe South Pacific, Southwest Pacific,and Burma areas by exerting pressureon the Japanese. (See Map 1.)

THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT 10

Although the Gilberts group was notincluded by popular journalists among“Japan’s Islands of Mystery,” Americanplanners knew very little about the one-time British possession. Charts andtide tables provided by the Navy Hydro-graphic Office proved unreliable. Infact, the maps prepared by the Wilkesexpedition of 1841 were found to be asaccurate as some of the more modernefforts. If the assault troops were toget ashore successfully, detailed intelli-gence had to be obtained on beachconditions, tides, and the depth ofwater over the reefs that fringed theatolls. Principal sources of such infor-mation were photographs taken fromaircraft and submarines as well as in-terviews with former residents of theislands.

American photo planes, both land-

‘0Additional sources for this section in-clude: VAC G–2 Study, TO Gilbert Islands,Nauru, Ocean, dtd 20Sep43, pp. 21–48, 61–67;2d MarDiv Est of Sit–Gilberts, dtd 50ct43;2d MarDiv SupplEst of Sit, dtd 250ct43; 2dMarDiv D–2 Study of Makin Island and LittleMakin, n.d.; 2d MarDiv D–2 Study of Tarawa,n.d.; IntelEst, Anx D to 2d MarDiv OpO No.14.

PREPARING TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE 2 9

based Liberators (B-24s) and carrieraircraft, soared over Tarawa on 18-19September and again on 20 October.Makin was photographed on 23 Julyand 13 October. Of the two atolls,Tarawa received better coverage, foronly vertical aerial photos of Makinreached the joint intelligence center.Without oblique prints, photo interpret-ers had difficulty in estimating beachconditions and determining the exactnature of shore installations.

In spite of this handicap, and the in-ability of interpreters to gauge thedepth of water from aerial photographsalone, other information was evaluatedin conjunction with the photographsand the work done by intelligence offi-cers proved to be extremely accurate.The remarkable ability of the aerialcamera to locate enemy positions andthe skill with which these photographswere analyzed enabled the interpretersto estimate the size of the enemy garri-son from a picture that showed theshoreline latrines on Betio.

In commenting on this impressive bitof detective work, the 2d Division op-erations officer (D-3) ,11 later called thepicture they used “the best single aerialphoto taken during WWII.” lz Us-ing it, he was able to select the spotwhere he thought “the headman’s CPwas, since it was the only place with a

I1 During much of World War II, Marinedivision general staff officers were designatedD-l, D-Z, D-3, and D-4, and comparable corpsstaff officers as C-l, etc. Eventually, the Ma-rine Corps adopted the Army system of desig-nating all general staff officers at division andabove as G-l, etc.

=Gen David M. Shoup interview with HistBr, G-3, HQMC and cmts on draft MS, dtd14Aug62, hereafter Shoup interview/comments.

baffle and sufficient room to drive a ve-hicle between the baffle and thedoor.” I3 He also was able to deter-mine which of the latrines were prob-ably used by officers by the difference intype. F i g u r i n g t h a t t h e J a p a n e s ewould assign more men per latrine thanan American force, he was able to pre-sent intelligence officers with an inter-esting problem and method of findingthe size of the garrison. Utilizingthese factors, the D-2 (intelligence)section came up with a figure that Japa-nese documents later indicated waswithin a few men of the actual count.The D-3 commented: “This didn’t helpmuch in determining strategy and tac-tics, but it provided the valuable knowl-edge of enemy strength. By the lawsof chance we happened to strike itright.” I4

Additional and extremely valuabledata on reefs, beaches, and currentswas obtained by the submarine Nauti-lus. This vessel had been fitted out totake pictures of the atolls through herperiscope. None of the cameras issuedfor this mission could take an intelligi-ble picture, but fortunately one of herofficers owned a camera that wouldwork? For 18 days Nautilus cruisedthrough the Gilberts, pausing to takepanoramic shots of Apamama, Tarawa,a n d Makin. T h e n e g a t i v e s d i d n o treach Hawaii until 7 October, but thephotos were developed, interpreted, and

xx Ibid.l4 Ibid.‘Ls Tests of this camera, made with the coop-

eration of VAC and 27th Division G-2 officers,“resulted in the development of a holdingframe, sequence timing for stereo overlap,etc.” Co1 Cecil W. Shuler comments on draftMS, dtd 12Dec62.

30

the information contained in them dis-seminated in time for the invasion.

Intelligence officers also were able togather together 16 persons familiarwith the Gilberts. Travelers, traders,or former residents of the British col-ony, they were attached to AdmiralTurner’s staff. Those most familiarwith Tarawa were sent to Wellingtonwhere the 2d Marine Division wastraining, while those who knew Makinbest were assigned to the 27th InfantryDivision in Hawaii. Additional intelli-gence on Makin came from LieutenantColonel James Roosevelt, who hadfought there as executive oflicer of the2d Marine Raider Battalion during theraid of 17–18 August 1942.

Tarawa, the intelligence officersfound, was the sort of objective thatEarl Ellis had pictured when he firstbegan his study of the amphibious as-sault. The target for which the 2dMarine Division had been alerted toprepare was a coral atoll triangular inshape, two legs of the triangle beingformed by reef-fringed chains ofislands and the third by a barrier reef.The southern chain measured 12 miles,the northeastern 18 miles, and thewestern or reef side 121/2 miles. Amile-wide passage through which war-ships could enter the lagoon pierced thecoral barrier. (See Map 2.)

Key to the defenses of Tarawa wasBetio, southwestern-most island in theatoll, just three and one-half milesfrom the lagoon entrance. On Betiothe Japanese had built an airfield, andbases for planes were what the Amer-icans wanted. Like the rest ofTarawa, this island was flat; indeed,the highest point in the entire atoll wasbut 10 feet above sea level. Betio, com-


pletely surrounded by reefs, was only 3

miles long and some 600 yards across

at its widest point. The Joint Intelli-

gence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, after

weighing all the evidence estimated

that between 2,500 and 3,100 Japanese

troops were crammed onto the island.

The intelligence officers also reported

that the enemy might have 8 or 9

coastal defense guns including 8-inCh

guns “, 12 heavy antiaircraft guns, 12

medium antiaircraft guns, and em-placements for 82 antiboat guns and 52machine guns or light cannon. Thefighting on Betio would be bloody, buta difficult problem had to be solved be-fore the Marines could come to gripswith the enemy. A way had to befound to cross the reefs that encircledthe island. (See Map II, Map Sec-tion.)

The best solution would have been toland the division in amphibian tractors(LVTS), for these vehicles, like thelegendary river gunboats of the Amer-ican Civil War, could navigate on themorning dew. Unfortunately, thetractors were in short supply, so thatmost of the troops would have to comeashore in LCVPS (Landing Craft, Ve-hicle and Personnel), boats which drewabout 31/2 feet of water. Because theassault on Betio had been scheduled for20 N’ovember, a day on which the differ-ence between high and low tide would

be slight, the attackers could not relyon any flood of water to float them overthe troublesome reef. The successof the operation well might de-

‘“ The determination of the caliber of theseguns was made by relating their size in aerialphotographs to the known dimensions ofwrecked aircraft on the airfield at Betio. Shoupintewview/commen ts.


penal upon an accurate estimate on thedepth of the water off Betio.

The first estimate made by amphibi-ous force intelligence officers predictedthat during the period of lowest tidesno more than two feet of water wouldcover the reefs off the northern coast ofBetio. Turner’s staff also wasaware that during the lowest period,tides at the island might ebb and flowseveral times in a single day. Therewas the remote possibility of a freak“dodging tide,” a tide with an eccentriccourse that could not be foreseen orpredicted. Such tides had been re-ported, but few of the islanders had ex-perienced one. On the other hand,those officers responsible for GAL-VANIC could take heart from the factthat some of the island traders who hadsailed among the Gilberts predictedthat there would be five feet of water,more than enough for the landing craft.Some of the Americans chose to beoptimistic.

Among those who entertained doubtsconcerning the depth of water over reefat Betio was Major F. L. G. Holland, aNew Zealander and former resident ofTarawa Atoll. Assigned to the staff ofGeneral Julian Smith, Holland did notaccept the estimate of five feet, but hecould not disprove the tide tables pre-pared by his fellow experts. He could,however, point out that during theneap period tides ebbed and flowed ir-regularly and warn the Marines to ex-pect as little as three feet of water athigh tide.

After listening to the New Zealandmajor, Julian Smith decided to preparefor the worst. The troops embarked inLCVPS were briefed to be ready to facethe possible ordeal of wading ashore in

the face of Japanese fire. The bestthat Julian Smith could foresee was a50-50 chance that landing craft wouldclear the reef.

Hydrographic and reef conditionsalso helped dictate the choice of landingbeaches. On the south or ocean side ofBetio, the reef lay about 600 yards fromthe island proper, but heavy swellsrolled in from the open sea, a factorwhich might complicate the landings.To land directly from the west wouldmean crossing both the barrier andfringing reefs as well as battling strongand unpredictable currents. Aerialphotographs showed that the enemydefenses were strongest on the seawardside and that the beaches were heavilymined.” The choice, then, nar-rowed to the lagoon side where the reef,though wide, rose gradually to the sur-face. In addition, the island itselfwould serve as a breakwater to shipsmaneuvering within the lagoon.

Makin, northernmost of the Gilberts,was the objective of a reinforced regi-ment of the 27th Infantry Division.Like Tarawa, this atoll was shaped likea distorted triangle. Southeast of thespacious lagoon lay the large islands ofBuiaritari and Kuma. A long reef

‘7VAC and 2d Division planners couldplainly see the seaward beaches were mined,but the lagoon side was a different matter.The enemy troops there “were in the businessof working on their defenses—unloading steelrails, concrete, etc., besides their regular logis-tic support within the lagoon. . . . The questionwas what you would do if you were on theisland,” General Shoup recalled. “Chances areyou would mine everything but the place youuse daily—that would be the last place to besewed up. This conclusion was a very definitefactor in our decision to land where we did.”Ibid.


formed the northern leg of the triangle,but the western portion, made up ofscattered islets and reefs, was for themost part open to the sea. Butaritari,some six miles in length, was the prin-cipal island in the atoll. Intelligenceofficers discovered that the westernpart of the narrow island was swampyand somewhat overgrown. Much ofButaritari, however, had been givenover to the cultivation of coconut palmsand of the native staple food, tare.(See Map 6.)

Photographs of Butaritari, best clueto Japanese strength, led planners tobelieve that only 500 to 800 troops wereavailable for the defense of the island.This total included an infantry com-pany, a battery of four heavy antiair-craft guns, and two antiaircraftmachine gun batteries. Most of theenemy installations were located in thevicinity of Butaritari Village withinan area bounded on east and west byantitank ditches.

Unlike the reef off Betio, the coraloutcropping around Butaritari was notconsidered a particularly difficult ob-stacle. Along the lagoon shore and offthe southern part of the west coast atthe island, the reef was considered tobe so close to the beaches or so flat thatit could be crossed quickly. Even ifthe LCVPS grounded at the edge of thereef, intelligence officers felt that thesoldiers could wade ashore withoutdifficulty.

Apamama, according to intelli-gence estimates, should cause its at-tackers no trouble at all. As late as 18October, the atoll was not occupied byany organized defensive force. Theonly emplacement that photo interpre-ters could locate was for a single

pedestal-mounted 5-inch naval gun, aweapon that appeared to have beenabandoned. It was thought possible,however, that several coastwatchersmight lurk among the islands thatformed the atoll.” (See Map 5.)

TASK ORGANIZATION ANDCOMMAND STRUCTURE

The basic organization for GAL-VANIC was established by OperationPlan 143, issued by Admiral Spruanceon 25 October. The task organizationconsisted of three major groups: RearAdmiral Charles A. Pownall’s CarrierTask Force (TF 50), Admiral Turner’sAssault Force (TF 54), and DefenseForces and Land-based Air (TF 57)commanded by Rear Admiral John H.Hoover. The Assault Force was di-vided into two attack forces. One ofthese, the Northern Attack Force (TF52) remained under Turner’s commandand was assigned to capture Makin.The other, Southern Attack Force (TF53) under Admiral Hill, was to seizeTarawa and Apamama.

Admiral Pownall’s TF 50 was toplay an important part in the forth-coming operation. In addition to estab-lishing and maintaining aerialsuperiority in the area, the carrierpilots were to aid the amphibiousassault by neutralizing Japanese de-fenses, helping to spot the fall of sup-porting naval gunfire, and flyingobservation missions over Makin,Tarawa, and Apamama. They alsohad the mission of searching ahead ofthe convoys, providing fighter cover for

m2d MarDiv OPlan No. 1, dtd 300ct43.


the operation, and guarding againstsubmarine attack.

The land-based planes of TF 57 wereto help gain mastery of the skies overthe Gilberts. Flying from airstrips onBaker Island and in the Ellice, Phoenix,and Samoan groups, Admiral Hoover’saircraft, including the planes of theSeventh Air Force, were to blast thosebases from which the enemy mightinterfere with GALVANIC. In ad-dition, this force was to bomb theassault objectives and conduct long-range searches.

Before preparing the command rela-tionships paragraph of Admiral Spru-ante’s operation order, his chief ofstaff, Captain Charles J. Moore, hadlong discussions with the commandersinvolved. Continual revisions weremade to clarify Holland Smith’s positionand to satisfy him regarding the role ofthe landing force commanders atTarawa and Makin. At each objec-tive, Julian Smith and Ralph Smithwere to take independent command oftheir own forces, once they were estab-lished ashore, but “their gunfire sup-port and logistic support and they,themselves, remained under the com-mand of their respective Assault TaskCommanders.” 19 In the case of Hol-land Smith as a tactical corpscommander, the naval leaders con-sidered—although the Marine generaldisagreed—that he had no function” indirecting the operations of the two in-dependent commanders ashore at Betioand Makin. He could do nothing with-out the functioning of the Task Force

Commander who controlled theships. ” ~

General Holland Smith was to sail inthe Assault Force flagship and com-mand the landing force; however, Ad-miral Spruance made directives issuedby the general subject to the approvalof Admiral Turner, since the employ-ment of troops was governed by “thecapabilities of the surface units to landand support them.”’1 The oper-ation plan issued by Turner followedthis definition of Holland Smith’s duties.The general was to advise the AssaultForce commander on the employ-ment of the landing force and the useof reserves, but at both Makin andTarawa the Attack Force command-ers would exercise authority throughthe commanders ashore. AlthoughSpruance directed that the assaulttroops would be free of naval controlafter the beachhead had been secured,his command alignment did not followthe theories advanced by the Marineswho had fought at Guadalcanal. Un-questionably, the Central Pacificcommander determined that GAL-VANIC, with two widely separatedlandings either of which might attractthe Japanese battle fleet, was an oper-ation which required naval controlthroughout all its stages.zz

As he had done concerning his role inplanning, Holland Smith protested histactical command position to Spruance.The naval officer replied that VAC re-tained operational control over threegarrison units: the 2d and 8th MarineDefense Battalions and the 7th Army

~ Ibid.n ComCenPacFor OPlan 1-43, p. IL= Moore Comments.u Moore Comments.


Defense Battalion; overall command ofassault troops would be exercised byTurner through Holland Smith. “It isconsidered essential,” Spruance contin-ued, “that the responsibility for theassault be placed on the CommanderFifth Amphibious Force. He will re-quire the benefit of your knowledge ofamphibious training and operations toensure the success of the operation withthe minimum losses to the troops en-gaged.” 23 In response to a queryfrom General Richardson, who receiveda copy of this letter, as to whetherAdmiral Turner or General HollandSmith was the “immediate superiorcombat commander” of Army troopsengaged in GALVANIC, Admiral Nim-itz replied that the “immediate super-ior combat commander of theCommanding General, 27th Infantry Di-vision (Army), is the CommandingGeneral, 5th Amphibious Corps, MajorGeneral Holland Smith, USMC.” 24

THE SCHEME OF ATTACK

The overall plan for GALVANICcalled for the 2d Marine Division (lessone regiment in corps reserve) to stormTarawa, while the 165th Infantry of the27th Division took Makin. Ele-ments of the Marine reserve regiment

= ComdrCenPacFor ltr to CG, VAC, ser0081, dtd 140ct43 (S–1 File, Cored Relation-ships, HistBr, HQMC).

“ CinCPOA ltr to CGAFPOA, ser 00249,dtd250ct43 (OAB, NHD). General Richardson’srequest for clarification of the tactical com-mand structure was made to insure that itwas in accord with Army doctrine and thatthe corps commander would be the superiorofficer from whom the 27th Division coman-der received his combat orders. CGAFPOAltr to CinCPOA, dtd 170ct43 (OAB, NHD).

could be employed at either objective,depending upon the enemy’s reac-tion, or used to occupy Apamama.When and where the reserve would becommitted was a decision that AdmiralTurner alone would make. The forcecommander, however, might rely uponthe advice of Holland Smith.

At both Makin and Tarawa, it wasplanned that the first few waves wouldchurn ashore in amphibian tractors,vehicles that had been ferried to theobjective in tank landing ships (LSTS).Off the atolls, the landing ships wouldstop, open the huge doors in their bowsand disgorge the tractors down a low-ered ramp into the water. Since theassault troops would be in transports,it was necessary that they first climbdown heavy nets to enter LCVPS fromwhich they later would transfer toLVTS. The tractors would then ma-neuver to form waves, each onedestined for a particular beach. Planscalled for minesweepers to sweep thelagoon entrance, anchor buoys to markthe cleared channel, and take positionat the line of departure. At this line,the waves were to be guided into lanesleading directly to the assigned beachand at a given signal sent racing acrossthe line toward the island.

The procedure planned for laterwaves was slightly different, for LVTShad been reserved for the leading as-sault elements. Since no transfer wasnecessary, the same LCVPS in whichthe infantrymen and artillerymen lefttheir transports would carry them tothe rendezvous area for the formationof assault waves, to the line of depar-ture where the shoreward movementwould be coordinated, and finally to theembattled beachhead. Two Landing

3 6 CENTRAL PACIFIC DRIVE

Ships, Dock (LSDs) , the USS Ashlandand Belle Grove, had been assigned tocarry the medium tanks for OperationGALVANIC. These ships wouldperform basically the same service forthe Landing Craft, Medium (LCMs)and the tanks they carried that thesmaller LSTs did for the amphibiantractors. The holds of the LSDswould be flooded to enable the landingcraft to float through an opening in thestern. Once afloat, the LCMs wouldhead for the rendezvous area for as-signment to the proper boat wave, thefirst leg in their journey into battle.

D-Day at both objectives was to beushered in with an aerial attack.From 0545 to 0615 carrier planeswould bomb and strafe enemy troopsand installations. After the aviatorshad completed their final runs, the firesupport ships would begin a Q/2-hour hammering of the objectives.Scheduled to blast Butaritari Island atMakin were four old battleships, fourcruisers, and six destroyers. BetioIsland, Tarawa Atoll, was destined toshudder under the weight of high ex-plosives thrown into it by three battle-ships, five cruisers, and nine destroyers.Never before had such powerful sea-borne batteries been massed againstsuch small targets. The result, navalgunfire planners optimistically hoped,would be devastating, although few ex-perienced officers looked for total de-struction of the enemy defenses.2s

26 The commanding officer of the transportgroup which landed the Marines at Tarawa,recalled stating his doubts of the efficacy ofthis fire “very forcibly during a conference atWell ington, N.Z. I had witnessed a similarbombing and bombardment of Gavutu Island,in the Solomons, where I landed a Marine

When the naval guns had ceased theirthundering, the carrier planes wouldreturn for a five-minute attack on theinvasion beaches as the assault waveswere moving ashore.

Naval gunfire, to be delivered on D-Day and after, was scheduled for bothobjectives. When the ships openedfire depended upon the enemy’s reac-tion, for any Japanese batteries thatthreatened the unloading would have tobe silenced. Preparatory fires onD-Day, divided into two phases, wereto begin after the first air strike.First, the support ships would deliver75 minutes of pre-arranged neutraliza-tion and counterbattery fire, if neces-sary closing the range to as little as2,000 yards in order to knock out pro-tected coastal defense guns. Thesecond phase, to last for 45 minutes,called for an increasingly heavy bom-bardment of assigned areas with thecombined purposes of destroyingemplacements along the invasionbeaches and neutralizing enemy de-fenses throughout the islands. AtTarawa, the support ships were posi-tioned to fire from the west acrossBetio, since fire from the south mightcause ricochetting shells that could fallinto troop assembly areas on the lagoonside of the island.ZG Once the assaulttroops were ashore, certain warshipscould be called upon to blast specifictargets that impeded the American ad-

Paratroop outfit. From daylight to noon thislittle island was subjected to repeated bomb-ing attacks and bombardment by cruisers anddestroyers. The results had been most disap-pointing.” RAdm Herbert B. Knowles Itr toACofS, G-3, HQMC, dtd lSep62, hereafterKnowles ltr.

x Hill interview/comments.

PREPARING TO TAKE THE OFFENSIVE

vance. During the preparatory shell-ing, however, all ships were to fire forthe most part into areas rather than atselected strongpoints.

Target destruction fires were to bedelivered simultaneously with theneutralization of the remainder of thearea in which the target was located.The idea of combining neutralizationwith destruction did not appeal to the2d Marine Division staff, but naval plan-ners were determined to rain down ex-plosives on the whole of Betio in orderto devastate the island in the shortestpossible time. The final approvednaval gunfire support plan was anamalgam of the desires of the naval andlanding force commanders. In com-menting on the planning period, Gen-eral Julian Smith recalled:

We Marines, all of whom had studied,and in some cases seen in actual combat,the effect of land artillery fire, ships’ gun-fire, and aerial bombardment, found navalofficers unduly optimistic as to the resultsto be obtained from the bombardment, butnever any lack of willingness on their partto listen to our problems and to cooperatemost fully in assisting in their solution.n

The plan prepared by the 2d MarineDivision had its origin early in August,when Admiral Spruance visited GeneralJulian Smith’s headquarters at Well-ington, New Zealand. At this time theadmiral verbally assigned the captureof Tarawa Atoll to the division. Dur-ing the conference, the problem of the

2’LtGenJulian C. Smith, “Tarawa,” U. S.Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 79, no. 11 ( Nov53), p. 1170,hereafter Smith, “Tarawa”; VACNGF Spt Plan, dtd 130ct43, Anx B to VACOPlan 1–43, dtd 50ct43; TF 53 NGF Spt n.d.,Encl A to TF 53 Rpt of Tarawa Ops, dtd13Dec43, hereafter TF 53 AR.

37

reef at Betio was discussed, and divi-sion planners made a tentative decisionto land the first three waves in amphib-ian tractors. The final judgmentwould depend upon the results of testsof the ability of LVTS to clamber overcoral ledges.

Following these talks, the divisionreceived its first written directives, doc-uments based on the original Gilberts-Nauru concept. Since the Marines’objectives were Tarawa and Apamama,the later substitution of Makin forNauru did not disrupt staff planning.

The 2d Marine Division was attachedto VAC on 15 September, and on 2October, Julian Smith and members ofhis staff flew to Pearl Harbor to coordi-nate plans with Holland Smith, Turner,and Hill. During the time between hisconversations with Spruance and histrip to Pearl Harbor, Julian Smith hadbeen devising a plan for the conquestof Betio. A striking feature of thistentative scheme was the landing ofartillery on an island adjacent to Betioprior to the main assault. At PearlHarbor, Julian Smith learned that theenemy was considered capable oflaunching a combined air and subma-rine attack within three days after theAmerican ships arrived off the atoll.Landing howitzers in anticipation ofthe assault on Betio would forewarnthe Japanese, and the enemy might beable to catch the transports beforethese vessels could be unloaded. An-other unpleasant fact that came to lightat this time was the decision to holdone regiment of Julian Smith’s com-mand in corps reserve. The 2d MarineDivision would lack even the strengthto make simultaneous assaults againstBetio and a secondary objective which


might serve as the site for artillery.One alternative remained—a directfrontal attack without the prelandingsupport of division artillery.

Aware that an assault of the typeconfronting him was the most costly ofoperations, Julian Smith asked for def-inite orders. “I discussed the matterfully with the Corps commander,” helater recalled, “and when informed thatthe decision to make the attack directlyon Betio was final and must be accom-plished by the Second Marine Divisionless the combat team assigned to Corpsreserve, I requested that my orders beso worded as I did not feel that the planshould be my responsibility. ” 28 Or-ders were promptly issued by VAC toseize Betio before occupying any of theremaining islands in the atoll.

After the approval of the 2d Divisionplan, Julian Smith and his party re-turned to New Zealand. On 19 Octo-ber, Admiral Hill and key members ofhis staff followed to go over last-minutedetails before the issuance of the finalplans. Hill brought with him a roughdraft of Admiral Spruance’s communi-cations plan, whose final version wasnot available to Task Force 53 untilthree weeks later, just an hour beforethe ships left their staging area for thetarget. When he reached New Zea-land, Hill got his first look at his flag-ship, the USS Mccryland. The battle-ship still had 20 yard workmen onboard making the necessary alterationsfor its role as command center for theTarawa operation.zg

= Smith, “Tarawa,” p. 1167; LtGen JulianC. Smith ltr to ACofS, G–3, HQMC, hereafterJulian Smith h%-.

= Hill interview/comments.

The 2d Marine Division operationsorder, completed on 25 October,called for Combat Team 2 (2d Marines,reinforced, with 2/8 attached) tomake the assault landings. The re-maining two battalions of the 8thMarines, along with the regimentalheadquarters, were held in division re-serve, while the 6th Marines remainedunder corps control. Elements of the10th Marines, division artillery, a partof Combat Team 2, would be landed asquickly as possible to support opera-tions ashore. From the 18th MarinesjJulian Smith’s engineers, came anotherpart of the combat team, demolitionsand flamethrower men to assist the in-fantry battalions, as well as the shoreparty that had the task of speedingsupplies to the front lines.

Combat Team 2 planned to assaultBeaches Red 1, Red 2, and Red 3, all onthe lagoon side of the island and eachthe objective of one battalion landingteam. As a result of the removal ofone regiment from Julian Smith’s con-trol, the 2d Marine Division had onlyan estimated two-to-one numerical edgein infantry over the defendingJapanese. Instead of reinforcements,Combat Team 2 would have to rely onthe effect of the massive preliminarybombardment in its effort to drive com-pletely across the island, capture theairfield, change direction, and launch atwo-battalion thrust down the long axisof the objective. (See Map 111, MapSection. )

Minor adjustments had to be madethroughout the planning phase. Ex-periments proved that amphibian trac-tors could crawl across a coral reef, butthese vehicles were in short supply.The 2d Division had 100 tractors, all of


them primitive LVT ( 1)s which hadbeen designed primarily as cargo car-riers and lacked armor protection.Julian Smith’s staff obtained sheets oflight armor which were fixed to thetractors while the division was in NewZealand. Many of these LVTS, veteransof the Guadalcanal fighting, had out-lived their usefulness, but mechanicsmanaged to breathe new life into 75 ofthem. Each LVT ( 1) had room for 20fully equipped men in addition to itscrew of 3. Unless the division com-mander received more LVTS, he did nothave enough vehicles for the first threeassault waves .30

The nearest source of additional trac-tors was San Diego. Although therewas neither time nor shipping to getlarge numbers of these vehicles to NewZealand, 50 LVT (2)s were shipped toSamoa. Members of the 2d Am-phibian Tractor Battalion went to thatisland to form a new company whichwould join the division off Tarawa.The new LVT (2) was an improved ver-sion of the tractor already in use bythe division. Horsepower had beenboosted from 146 to 200, a changewhich enabled the LVT (2 ) to moveslightly faster while carrying 4 moremen or 1,500 more pounds of cargo thanits predecessor. Also, the newmodel could cruise for 75 miles in thewater, compared to 50 miles for theLVT ( 1). Tests were ordered in whichthe new tractors ran 4,000 yards with afull battle load to determine the timeit would take the LVT (2), which proved

w Ibid., p. 1166. For details concerning vari-ous models of the LVT, see ONI, ND, Supple-ment No. 1 to ONI .226, Allied Landing Craftand Ships (Washington, 1945).

capable of making at least four milesan hour.3’ Each LVT (2) wasequipped with portable armor plate forthe front, sides, and cab. These platescould be used during assault landingsor removed if there was no danger ofenemy fire.

Another proposed refinement inthe basic plan was a request for addi-tional aerial bombardment. Lieu-tenant Colonel David M. Shoup, divisionoperations officer, urged that SeventhAir Force planes drop one-ton “daisy-cutters” on and beyond the invasionbeaches during the ship-to-shore move-ment. In addition to killing Japanese,the heavy bombs would shatter build-ings that otherwise might providecover for enemy snipers. This request,although endorsed by the division andlisted in the air operations plan, wasnot carried out.s2 The approach planprepared by Task Force 53 called forcertain of the fire support ships toseparate from the main group as thetransports neared the transport area.These warships would steam to desig-nated positions to the south, west, andnorthwest of Betio. Two mine-sweepers were to lead the destroyerscreen into the lagoon. Next to passthrough the gap in the barrier reefwould be an LSD carrying the medium

= Hill interview/comments.32 zb~d. General Shoup was later told that

three B–24s with these bombs on board actu-ally took off, but that one crashed on takeoff,one flew into the water, and the third did notreach its destination. Shoup interview/com-ments. A search of Seventh Air Force recordsin the USAF Historical Archives failed to re-veal any mention of this request. Dr. RobertF. Futrell, USAF Historian, ltr to Head, HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 20Aug62.

214-881O-67—4

40

tanks of the division and finally theinitial waves of landing craft.

Planning for the employment of the27th Infantry Division was handicappedby the substitution of Makin Atoll forNauru Island. In addition, there was adifference of opinion between GeneralRalph Smith, the division commander,and General Holland Smith of VAC.The corps commander preferred to as-sault Butaritari from the lagoon side,bringing the maximum strength tobear against a small portion of thecoast. On the other hand, the Armygeneral wanted to land two battalionson the west coast of the island and twohours later send a single battalion

ashore near the waist of objective.

This second blow would be delivered

from the lagoon. Ralph Smith’s views

prevailed, and the Marine general gave

rather reluctant approval to the

scheme.

Assigned to the Makin operation was

the 165th Regimental Combat Team

(RGT). With a total of 6,470 men, this

heavily reinforced unit outnumbered

the estimated defenders of Butari-

tari by roughly 8-to-1. Three rein-

forced companies from the 105th Infan-

try, 582 officers and men in all, had been

assigned to the landing force. One of

these companies would, if LVTS became

available, spearhead each of the assault

battalions. This mixing of units was

brought about by the shortage of am-

phibian tractors. Since it seemed for

a time that none of these vehicles would

be available, Ralph Smith scheduled all

assault elements of the 165th Infantry

to train with and land from LCVPS,

while reserving the tractors for the

men of the 105th. Thus, there would

be no need to adjust his plans if the


promised tractors did not arrive, for

the men from the 105th could remain

in reserve. On the other hand, if the

LVTS did appear, they could be used by

the detachments from the 105th Infan-

try, and again no violence would be

done to the basic landing plan.

In Ralph Smith’s opinion, the rapid

capture of the tank barrier guarding

the western limits of the main defenses

was of the greatest importance, It was

to gain this end that he had proposed

two separate landings followed by a

pincers movement against the enemy

stronghold. Such a maneuver, how-

ever, would depend on close coordina-

tion between the attacking units and

reliable communications with the artil-

lery batteries that had landed over the

western beaches. Another solution

to the problem posed by the tank bar-

rier would have been to rake the ob-

stacle with naval gunfire. At the time,however, neither Ralph Smith nor hisstaff were impressed with theeffectiveness of seaborne artillery.Instead of seeking aid from sharp-shooting destroyers, they preferred acombination of land weapons— infan-try, artillery, and armor.

COMMUNICATIONS ANDSUPPLY 33

In general, the overall communica-

= Additional sources for this section include:CinCPac Comm Plan, n.d., Anx A to CinCPacOPlan 1-43, dtd 50ct43; Rpt of GALVANICComm, dtd 4Dec43, Encl D to V PhibFor AR;TransArea Debarkation and Unloading Plan,n.d., and Unloading and Beach Pty Plan, n.d.,Apps 1 and 2 to Anx D to TF 53 OpO AIol–4.9; SigRpt, dtd 4Dec43 with Suppl, dtd 3Jan44, and TQM Report, dtd 30Dec43, Encl Fto VAC AR.


tions plan for GALVANIC was consid-ered adequate, even though it couldhave been improved. Principal ob-j ections to the communications annexissued by Spruance’s headquarters weretwofold: it was too long, 214 mimeo-graphed pages, and it should have beendistributed sooner. The second criti-cism was justified, but the staff hadworked against an impossible deadline;those who objected to the bulk of thedocument would later admit that anoverall plan, huge though it might be,was preferable to several briefer, lessdetailed, and possibly conflicting plans.

Secrecy was the watchword duringthe preparation for GALVANIC,and this mood of caution was to prevailduring the approach of the expedition-ary force. Since strict radio silencewas necessary, only VHF (Very HighFrequency) and TBS (Talk BetweenShips) equipment could be used withinthe convoys. Visual signals were sub-stituted whenever possible for routineradio messages, but signalmenproved rusty at first. Although speedcame with practice, the vast number ofvisual signals, which reached as manyas 80 per day off Tarawa, led to theestablishment, en route to the target, ofareas of operational responsibilitywithin the task force. Had this prac-tice not been adopted, hours would havebeen lost in passing messages from shipto ship to insure that every element ofthe force had got the information. Asit was, certain vessels were to pass oninformation to ships within specifiedsectors.

Keeping contact between ships andshore was certain to be the most diffi-cult aspect of the GALVANIC com-munications problem. Neither LSTS,

transports, nor the beachmasters wereequipped with the SCR–61O radio, andthis set turned out to be the best pieceof signal equipment ashore on Betio.34During the first crucial days, these setswould often provide the only means ofradio contact between the beach andthe task force. The Marines them-selves were saddled with the TBX andTBY, two low power sets whose generalworthlessness brought the postopera-tion comment that: “light weight butpowerful and rugged portable equip-ment having full frequency range andcapable of sustained operation does notappear available in any standardtype.” 35 The TBX lacked thenecessary range, and the TBY was notsufficiently waterproof.

Both the Marines and soldiers hadwire equipment with which to establishcommunications within the beach-head area. Unfortunately, the gener-ator armature of the standard EE–8field telephone and the drop coil of itscompanion switchboard were notwaterproof and therefore unreliable inamphibious operations. Also, to avoiddamage by troops and tracked vehiclesas well as short circuits caused bydampness, it was desirable tostring telephone wires above theground, something that could not easilybe done in the face of enemy fire.

“ “The SCR–61O and the ship-carried SCR-608 were Army radios ‘appropriated’ by theNavy transports that served in the Aleutiansand were now to take part in GALVANIC.We had to dole them out where most neededand never had anywhere near enough of themduring the GALVANIC Operation.” Knowleslt’r.

% V PhibFor Rpt of GALVANIC Comm, op.cit., p. 2.


GALVANIC could not succeed unlessa steady current of supplies was keptmoving from the holds of the trans-ports to the front lines. First step inthis process was the rapid unloading ofcargo, and to gain speed both the Armyand Marine divisions combat loadedtheir shipping. Cargo was so stowedthat items needed early in the fightingwere at the top of the holds and closeto the hatches. Because vessels weredispatched to the 2d Marine Divisionpiecemeal, as quickly as they were re-leased from other duties, the divisionstaff could not predict how much cargospace would be available. Sometimesthe blueprints provided by the arrivingships were outdated and no help to thehard-pressed planners. The Marines,nevertheless, managed to do a credit-able job; in fact, the only snag in un-loading came as a result of there-arranging of cargo in ships atanchor off Tarawa.

The vessels carrying the 27th Infan-try Division troops also were effectivelycombat loaded. Lieutenant ColonelCharles B. Ferris, division G-4, organ-ized a transport quartermasterschool and sent his students to PearlHarbor to learn the characteristics ofnaval transports as well as loadingtechniques. In addition, the supply sec-tion of the Army division resurrectedthe stowage plans drawn up for theAttu operation, studied them, and usedthem as guides for plans of their own.

In handling cargo, the Army divisionhad a decided advantage over itsMarine counterpart. While the 27thInfantry Division had some 1,800 sledand toboggan type pallets, the 2d Ma-rine Division had almost none, a defi-ciency caused when the necessary

materials to build them failed to reachWellington in time. Pallets meanteasier handling of cargo becauseseveral heavy boxes could be lashed toa wooden platform, stowed and un-loaded as a single unit, and hauled in-tact to the using unit.

At Makin, the scheme of maneuverand the relatively small Japanese gar-rison indicated that cargo could beferried to the beach without seriousenemy interference. Sailors and apart of a company from the 105thInfantry were to act as ship unloadingdetails. On the beachhead, the 102dEngineer Battalion, reinforced bysmall detachments from the 165thInfantry, would provide shore partiesto sort supplies and rush them inland.One engineer company was attachedfor this purpose to each assault battal-ion.~G

Tarawa, however, offered a fargreater logistical challenge. The as-sault waves were to slam directly intothe enemy’s defenses on Betio, and thecraft carrying supplies for the 2d Ma-rine Division also might encounterfierce opposition. Landing craftwere certain to be sunk, so extra servicewould be required of the survivors.Every man was expected to do his dutyand more. “Use your brains . . . andguts,” urged Captain Herbert B.Knowles, transport group commander;“keep the boats moving, and get thestuff to the Marines.” 37

As soon as the assault waves had hitthe beach and landing craft became

= SP Ops, Anx 4 to 27th InfDiv AdminO 11,dtd 260ct43; see also Crowl and Love, Gilbertsand Marshalls, pp. 48–49, 102.

wTF 53 Unloading and Beach Pty Plan,op. cit.


available, Marines and sailors would be-gin unloading cargo from the trans-ports. Supplies were to be loaded intothe boats according to a fixed priority,but dispatchers would not send theboats shoreward unless told to do so bythe commander of the regiment forwhom the cargo was destined. Enroute to the beach, all supply craft hadto report to control officers who madesure that the incoming boats wereheaded toward the proper sector andthat a shore party was on hand to un-load them. LVTS, LCVPS, and LCMSall might haul supplies, but the last,with its 30-ton capacity, was consideredmost valuable.

An orderly logistical effort alsorequired that beach party and shoreparty units land with the assault bat-talions. In charge of each beach partywas a naval officer, the beachmaster,who assisted the shore party com-mander, and also supervised markingthe beaches, evacuating the wounded,and the other tasks performed by hismen. A Marine officer commanded theshore party, which was primarily con-cerned with unloading the incomingboats, sorting supplies, and storingthem or moving them inland. At Betiosome of these activities could be con-centrated at the long pier near thewaist of the island. This structurewas accessible to landing craft, for itsjutted beyond the reef, and a boat chan-nel had been dredged along its westernside.

Since protracted fighting wasexpected at neither Makin nor Tarawa,both divisions limited the amount ofsupplies to be carried to the targetarea. The transports assigned the165th RCT carried the assault troops,

their equipment and weapons, 5 unitsof fire per weapon, plus 10 days’rations, 2 days’ K rations, and suchmiscellaneous items as medical supplies,ordnance spare parts and cleaningequipment, and fuel enough to last thevehicles on board for 7 days. Stowedin the assault cargo ship assigned tothe Makin landing force were 24 days’B rations for the entire command,15,000 gallons of water, 8 days’ motorfuel, and additional ammunition.Three LSTS carried still other supplies.

The 2d Marine Division also at-tempted to keep a tight rein on its sup-plies. To be embarked with the convoycarrying the assault and garrisonforces were 30 days’ B rations, 5 days’C or K rations (later changed to 3 days’K and 10 days’ C), 2 days’ D rations,and enough water to provide 2 gallonsper day to each member of the com-mand for a period of 5 days.38 Withinfive days, water distillation equipmentwould be operating. Enough main-tenance supplies, fuels, and lubricantsto last 30 days were loaded in thetransports. Also on hand were con-struction, medical, and aviation sup-plies for 30 days. Although antiair-craft weapons were allotted 10 units offire, coast defense guns and all otherweapons received 5.

= The usual components of standard rationswere: D, an emergency individual ration—aspecial chocolate bar; C, the individual com-bat ration—canned hash, stew, or meat andbeans, biscuits, sugar, powdered coffee, andcandy; K, another emergency or combat ra-tion—breakfast, dinner, and supper units,each consisting of tinned luncheon meat, bis-cuits, sugar, and gum; B, a rear-area unit ra-tion—canned meats, dried or canned fruit andvegetables, canned bread, or biscuits.


The number of vehicles was to havebeen reduced to the minimum necessaryfor operations on an island the size ofBetio, but as planning progressed thenumber of trucks, tanks, half-tracks,LVTS, and trailers thought vital for theattack continued to increase. Eventu-ally, the Marines lifted to the targetmore vehicles than they could use.The final total, including LVTS, for theassault echelon was 732 wheeled andtracked vehicles plus 205 trailers. TheMakin landing force made a similarmiscalculation, bringing with it 372tracked or wheeled vehicles, and 39trailers.sg

TRAINING ANDPRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

Upon assuming command of the 2dMarine Division on 1 May 1943, JulianSmith inherited a veteran unit but onethat still was suffering the effects ofthe Gua”dalcanal fighting. The divi-sion had arrived in New Zealand with12,500 diagnosed cases of malaria,many of whom eventually were evac-uated to the United States. So seriouswas the health problem that as late as10 October malaria victims were beingadmitted to the hospital at the rate of40 per day. Even as the new com-manding general was taking charge,the first replacements began arriv-ing. More would follow until the or-ganization reached combat strength.Fitting these men into the divisionteam was one of the problems facingthe new commander and his staff.

= Details of Loading of GALVANIC Ship,Encl 1 to V PhibFor AR; VAC AdminO 4-43,dtd 130ct43; 2d MarDiv OpO No. 14.

In addition to shattering the health ofthe division, the Guadalcanal campaignweakened it in a tactical sense. AtGuadalcanal, the 2d Marine Divisionhad fought for the most part as a col-lection of combat teams rather than asa tightly organized unit. The lessonsof jungle warfare had to be put aside,and the various elements of the com-mand welded into an effective and well-coordinated striking force capable ofseizing a defended atoll.40

Late in September, as transports be-came available, the transition fromjungle fighters to amphibious assaulttroops began in earnest. First the bat-talion landing teams, then the regi-ments practiced off Paekakariki, atHawke Bay, and in Wellington Harbor,while a few LVTS were sent to the Fijisto test their ability against reefs sim-ilar to those that guarded Betio. Af-ter these preliminary landings, theMarines returned to camp to rest, re-pair equipment, and prepare for whatthey thought was going to be a full-scale division exercise.41

During this period, the same fewships did most of the work with theMarines, since new arrivals destinedfor the transport group of the SouthernAttack Force needed “to have engineer-ing work done, boats from the scrappedboat pool ashore overhauled and sup-plied them, and some semblance of com-munications equipment furnished.” 42The group commander, CaptainKnowles, commented:

Most of these ships arrived lacking fullcrews, full boat complements and woefully

= Smith, “Tarawa,” pp. 1165–1166.“ Shoup interoiew/comments.a Knowles ltr.

46

lacking in communications facilities. Someof these ships had been diverted to Well-ington while still on ‘shakedown’ opera-tions. The transport group commander didnot know that he was destined for any-thing except conduct of amphibious train-ing with 2nd Mar. Div. until about themiddle of the month; then he had to or-ganize 3 divisions of transports and getthem ready for sea by 1 November. Hisflapship Morvroviu had been stripped ofeverything useful in the way of communi-cation facilities except basic commercialship radios. At Efate we had to install asmall command station above the ship’sbridge plus sufficient signal yards andsignal flags to do the job ahead. Had wenot had extra naval personnel and ArmySCRS (both ‘appropriated’ at the end ofthe Aleutian Operation) we would havebeen in anevensorrier mess than we were.The few ships that had been in the Aleu-tians furnished officers and men to giveat least a minimum of [experienced] per-sonnel to new arrivals.=

Marine Division had a strong leavening

of combat experienced men spread

combat experienced men spread

throughout its units. These vet-

erans gave emphasis to the constant

theme in training—keep the attack

moving. Should officers fall or units

become disorganized, noncommis-

sioned officers would have to assume

command, and this would often happen

at Betio. Also emphasized were local

security and fire discipline during the

night, tactics that would forestall Japa-

nese infiltration and local counter-

attacks. One criticism of the division

training program was its failure to

spend enough time drilling infantry-

men, tank crews, and demolitions men

to act as integrated teams in reducing

strongpoints. At the time no one real-

ized the tenacity with which the enemy

- Ibid.


would fight even after the island

seemed doomed to fall.AA

The 27th Infantry Division, untried

in combat, was also new to the tech-

niques of amphibious warfare. Pre-

paring this division for Operation

GALVANIC was a task shared between

General Richardson’s headquarters and

Holland Smith’s VAC. The Army

command handled training for ground

combat as well as certain phases of

pre-amphibious training, while the

Marine headquarters concentrated on

the ship-to-shore movement. Logis-

tical planning and routine administra-

tion for Army troops also lay within

the province of General Richardson.

In actual practice, the distinction be-

tween ground, pre-amphibious, and am-

phibious matters tended to disappear.

The 27th Infantry Division was first

introduced to amphibious warfare in

December 1942, when two officers from

the unit attended a school offered at

San Diego by Amphibious Corps, Pacific

Fleet. The information gained at San

Diego was passed on to other division

officers in a school conducted in Hawaii.

After the division had been selected to

provide troops for GALVANIC, the

tempo of training increased, and those

portions of amphibious training which

could be carried out ashore were under-

taken at Army installations. In addi-

tion, the division began organizing

liaison parties to direct naval gunfire

and drilling its supply personnel in the

complexities of combat loading. Ship-

to-shore exercises, however, awaited

u Ibid., p. 1168; Maj Arthur J. Rauchle ltrto CMC, dtd 12Jun47; 2d MarDiv, 3/2, and3/6 WarDs, Ott–Nov43 (Unit Rpt File, HistBr, HQMC) ; Johnston, Follow Mel, pp. 94-95.


Admiral Turner’s ships and GeneralHolland Smith’s instructors.

While the training of Army troops forGALVANIC was getting underway,VAC found itself preoccupied with twodemanding tasks, organization of thecorps itself and planning for the sched-uled operation. In the meantime, Gen-eral Richardson went ahead with histraining program, absorbing the neces-sary amphibious doctrine from WarDepartment manuals, Navy and MarineCorps publications, and the recordedexperience of other Army divisions.Of particular value were notes preparedby the 9th Infantry Division during itsindoctrination under Holland Smith aswell as the original loading plans forthe Attu landing. By the time thatVAC began to assert itself in the train-ing setup, Richardson had come to lookupon the Marine organization as simplyanother echelon to clutter up the chainof command. The Army general be-lieved that Admiral Turner, who con-trolled the necessary ships, was thelogical person to train troops for theship-to-shore movement, and felt thatthere was no need at the time for acorps of any sort.45

Thus, on the eve of GALVANIC bothRichardson and Holland Smith werecomplaining about the status of VAC.The Marine general objected becausehis headquarters had been restricted inits exercise of tactical command, andthe Army general urged that the corpsbe abolished completely. Their re-spective higher headquarters gave each

essentially the same advice: to makethe best of the situation. This theydid, and preparations for combat con-tinued.4e

Training of the 27th Infantry Di-vision came to a climax with a series ofamphibious exercises held in the Ha-waiian Islands. Bad weather and poorbeaches hampered the earlier efforts,and the rehearsals were of questionablevalue. During the first two rehearsals,the troops landed, but no supplies wereput ashore. Because of rock-strewnbeaches, assault craft did not advancebeyond the line of departure in thethird or dress rehearsal. Preservingscarce LVTS from possible damage wasjudged more important than any les-sons the troops might learn.

Preparations for the Gilberts in-vasion included certain preliminarycombat operations, some remotely con-nected with GALVANIC, and othersdesigned specifically to batter the as-sault objectives. American might firstmade itself felt in the Gilberts in Feb-ruary 1942 when carrier planes lashedat Makin Atoll. In August of the sameyear, Marine Raiders startled the Jap-anese by making a sudden descent onButaritari Island. In April of the fol-lowing year, after a series of reconnais-sance flights, heavy bombers of theSeventh Air Force, operating fromFunafuti and Canton Island, be-gan harassing Nauru and targets in theGilberts.

These early aerial efforts were sorelyhandicapped by the lack of bases closeto the Gilberts. To remedy this situa-

%LtGen Robert C. Richardson, Jr., USA,tion, the 7th Marine Defense Battalion

Itr to LtGen Thomas T. Handy, USA, dtd 5NOV occupied Nanomea Atoll in the Ellice

43 (OPD File 384 PTO–Sec “II, RG” 115, WWII RecsDiv, FRC, Alexandria, Vs.). HMorton MS, ch. 23, pp. 22–25.


Islands and the 2d Marine AirdromeBattalion established itself at Nu-kufetau in the same island group.Both landings were made during Aug-ust 1943. A third air base was estab-lished in September at Baker Island, anAmerican possession which had goneunoccupied since the coming of war.The last of these fields to be completed,that at Nukufetau, was ready on 9October.

The Seventh Air Force began itssystematic support of GALVANICon 13 November by launching 18 Funa-futi-based B–24s against Tarawa. Onthe following day, the hulking bombersdivided their attention between Tar-awa and Mine in the Marshalls. Grad-ually the list of targets was expandedto include Makin, Jaluit, Maloelap, andeven Kwaja]ein. Between 13 and 17November, planes of the Seventh AirForce dropped 173 tons of high explo-sives on various targets in the Gilbertsand Marshalls and destroyed 5enemy aircraft. Admiral Hoover’sland-based naval planes and patrolbombers also began their offensive on13 November, but limited themselves tonight strikes against Nauru, Tarawa,and Makin. (See Map I, Map Sectionand Map 7.)

The Navy was far from reluctant torisk its carrier planes against Japan’sisland fortresses. In fact, AdmiralPownall’s fast carriers went into actioneven before the Seventh Air Force hadlaunched its intensive aerial campaign.On 17 and 18 September, planes fromthree aircraft carriers blasted Makin,Apamama, Tarawa, and Nauru. Thenaval aviators were assisted by B–24sfrom Guadalcanal, Canton Island, andFunafuti, aircraft which carried cam-

eras as well as bombs, and other Lib-erator bombers struck the Gilberts onthe following day as the carriers werewithdrawing. Next the carriers at-tacked Wake Island on 5 and 6 Nov-vember.

The final phase of this campaign ofpreliminary aerial bombardment tookplace on 18 and 19 November.Seventh Air Force planes blasted Tar-awa and Makin and helped carrieraircraft attack Nauru. After pound-ing Nauru, Admiral Pownall’s fliers on19 November dropped 130 tons ofbombs on Jaluit and Mine. Air powerhad done its best to isolate the objec-tives and soften their defenses for theamphibious assault.47

THE ENEMY 48

Japan seized control of the Gilbertson 10 December 1941 in a move de-signed to gain bases from which toobserve American activity in the SouthPacific. Since the occupied islandswere considered mere observationposts, little was done to fortify them.A handful of men were posted at

47WesleyFrankCravenandJamesLea Cate,eds., The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan—TheAvm~ Ai~ Forces in Wodd War II, v. 4, (Chi-cago: University of Chicago Pressj 1950) pp.290-302 hereafter Craven and Cate, Guadal-canal to Saipan; TF 50 AR GALVANIC, 10-27Nov43, dtd 4Jan44; CinCPac-CinCPOAWarD, Nov43, dtd 28Feb44 ( CinCPac File,HistBr, HQMC).

‘sAdditional sources for this section include:JICPOA Buls 4–44, Study of Japanese Instlson Butaritari Island, Makin Atoll, dtd 14Jan44, and 8-44, Japanese Fors in the Gilbert Is-lands, n.d (IntelFile, HistBr, HQMC); VACG-2 Study and Rpt, Betio, dtd 23Dec43; 2dMarDiv and JICPOA Study of Japanese Defof Betio Island, Tarawa, dtd 20Dec43.


Tarawa, coastwatchers were scatteredthroughout the island group, and a sea-plane base along with some rudimen-tary defenses were built on Makin.Apparently the Japanese became con-vinced that geography plus the batter-ing given the American Fleet at PearlHarbor had made the Gilberts invulner-able, for the small garrisons wereshortly reduced. On 17 August 1942,when the hatches of two American sub-marines eased open and 221 Marinesbegan paddling toward Butaritari Is-land, only 70 Japanese could bemustered to oppose them.4g

Although Japanese strategists dis-missed the Makin raid as an attemptto pin down troops in the Central Pa-cific while new operations werelaunched to the southwest, the vulner-ability of the Gilberts certainly shockedthem. Unless these outlying islandswere garrisoned in some strength, theywould fall to the Americans and serveas bases for a thrust into the far morevaluable Marshalls. Reinforcementswere started toward the Gilberts, forti-fications were thrown up throughoutthe group, and British citizens over-looked since the occupation werehunted down.

While the Gilberts were being rein-forced, Japanese strategy was beingrevised. As early as March 1943, theImperial Navy was thinking in termsof “interception operations,” in whichits ships would fall upon and annihilateany American fleet attempting to landtroops along the fringes of Micronesia.Operations of this sort would be pos-

4’Chief, War Hist Off, Def Agency of JapanItr to Head, HistBr, G–3, HQMC, dtd 19Nov62,hereafter Japanese Gilberts comments.

sible only if the defending garrisonwere strong enough to hold the attack-ers at bay until Japanese aircraft,submarines, and surface craft couldreach the area.50

In May 1943, Japanese naval leadersconferred at Truk, and out of thesediscussions evolved a plan to counterany American thrust into the Gilberts.Should Nimitz choose to attack, Japa-nese bombers from the Bismarckswould swoop down on his convoys, landat fields in the Gilberts and Marshalls,refuel, rearm, and return to action.Meanwhile, short-range planes were tobe shuttled into the threatened area byway of Truk and other bases. Fleetunits would steam eastward from Trukto cooperate with Bismarcks-based sub-marines in destroying the already bat-tered invasion force.

This scheme for the defense of theGilberts was but a single aspect of ZOperation, an overall plan of defense.This larger concept called for the estab-lishment of an outer perimeter stretch-ing from the Aleutians through theMarshalls and Gilberts to the Bis-marcks. Vigorous action by the Impe-rial Fleet coupled with a stubborn fightby the island garrisons would thwartany American attempt to penetrate thebarrier. The type of strategy espoused

~ Mil HistSec, Japanese Research Div, HQ,AFFE, Japanese Monographs No. 161, InnerSouth Seas Islands Area NavOps, Pt. 1: Gil-bert Islands (Nov41–Nov43) and No. 173,Inner South Seas Area NavOps, Pt. 2: Mar-shall Islands ( Dec41–Feb44) ; Takushiro Hat-tori, Dai Toa Senso Zenshi [The CompleteHistory of the Greater East Asia War] (To-kyo: Masu Publishing Company, 1953—MStranslation in 4 vols. at OCMH) , 11, pt. 5, p.43, hereafter Hattori, Complete History,


in Z Operation, modified because ofAmerican successes in the Aleutians,was reviewed at an Imperial conferenceheld during September 1943 and wasconsidered acceptable.5i

Betio Island, in keeping with defen-sive theory advanced as part of Z Oper-ation, was heavily fortified. The basicdefensive pattern selected for theisland called for a series of strongpointswith the spaces between them coveredby fire. American assault forces wereto be cut down at the beach. Shouldthe invaders manage to gain a footholdon the island, determined counter-attacks would be launched to hurl themback into the sea.

In command at Tarawa was RearAdmiral Keiji Shibasaki of the $dSpecial Base Force. He had at hisdisposal 1,122 members of this forceand 1,497 men of the Sasebo 7th Spe-cial Naval Landing Force (SNLF). Inaddition to these combat troops, theadmiral had a large contingent of la-borers, 1,247 from the 111th Construc-tion Unit and 970 from the hth FleetConstruction Department Detachment.Since many of the laborers wereKoreans and most were untrained,Shibasaki could rely on no more thanabout 3,000 effective.

The defenses of Betio were cleverlyintegrated, with coast defense guns,automatic weapons, and various kindsof obstacles complementing one an-other. Upon approaching the island,the invader would have to brave thefire of 20 coastal defense guns, rangingin size from 80mm to 8-inch. Con-crete tetrahedrons scattered along thereef would be encountered next; these

mHattori, Complete Histor~, III, p. 4-5.

had been placed to force assault craftto follow routes swept by fire from thesmaller coastal defense weapons, auto-matic cannon, and machine guns. Toscourge the incoming waves, the Japa-nese on Betio had, in addition to theweapons already mentioned, 10 75mmmountain howitzers, 6 70mm guns, 937mm field pieces, at least 31 13mmmachine guns, and an unknown numberof 7.7mm machine guns.s2 The de-fenders could also press into servicedual-purpose antiaircraft weapons andthe 37mm guns of seven light tanks.To make the firepower of this arsenalmore effective, the Japanese strungdouble-apron barbed-wire fences be-tween reef and beach and along thebeaches themselves. (See Map II, MapSection.)

Admiral Shibasaki planned to de-stroy the enemy forces as they landed,but he did not overlook the possibilitythat the attackers might gain a lodg-ment on the island. A log fence justinland of the beaches, antitank ditches,and other obstacles were arranged toconfine the assault force to a tiny stripof coral sand, where it could be wipedout.

If the ring of defenses along theshores of Betio could be penetrated, theattackers would find the inland defen-ses organized in a more haphazardfashion. The command posts, ammu-nition dumps, and communicationscenters were housed in massive bunkersof reinforced concrete, structures thatwere built to withstand even direct hitsby high explosive naval shells or ae-

- So great was the destruction on the islandthat a postoperation count of light machineguns was impossible.


rial bombs. These positions, however,were not designed primarily for defen-sive fighting. Although some fittedinto patterns of mutual defense, mostof them had blind spots, not covered byfire, from which flamethrower or dem-olition teams could close for the kill.

Far less formidable were the defen-ses of Butaritari Island. There Lieu-tenant Junior Grade Seizo Ishikawacommanded no more than 384 combattroops, 100 of them marooned aviationpersonnel and the remainder membersof his 3rd Speciul Base Force MakinDetachment. Also present, but ofdoubtful effectiveness, were 138 men ofthe 111 th Construction Unit and 276from the -4th Fleet Construction De-partment Detachment.

Japanese defenses on Butaritari wereconcentrated around King’s Wharf,about one-third of the way down thelagoon side of the island from its west-ern foot. At the base of the wharf, theJapanese had built their seaplane base.The perimeter was bounded on thesouthwest by an antitank ditch linkedto an earthen barricade. This obsta-cle, about 2,000 yards from King’sWharf, stretched almost across the is-land but was defended by only oneantitank gun, a single pillbox, six ma-chine gun emplacements, and numerousrifle pits. A similar ditch-and-barri-cade combination was located about thesame distance from King’s in the oppo-site direction and marked the north-eastern limits of the main defenses.Six machine guns, three pillboxes, anda string of rifle pits guarded this bar-rier. Throughout the principal defen-sive area, the majority of heavyweapons pointed seaward, so the great-est threat to an assault from the lagoon

lay in the trio of 80mm guns emplacedat the base of King’s Wharf. (SeeMap 6.)

ON TO TARAWA

The departure from Wellington of the2d Marine Division was shrouded insecrecy. Announced destination of thedivision was Hawkes Bay, the site ofmost amphibious exercises, and a rumorwas planted that the troops would beback in Wellington in time for a sched-uled dance. “With regard to thedance,” reminisced Julian Smith, “oneof the Division wits remarked thatmaybe we didn’t leave many brokenhearts in New Zealand but we certainlyleft a lot of broken dates.” 58

Instead of steaming to Hawkes Bay,the transports joined Admiral Hill’sSouthern Attack Force at Efate in theNew Hebrides, where rehearsals wereheld. During the first of these, troopslanded at Mele Bay while the supportships simulated a bombardment ofPango Point. The second rehearsalsaw the division land again at MeleBay and the warships actually pumpshells into Erradaka Island. At thistime, the commander of the assaultregiment, Colonel William McN. Mar-shall, fell ill. To replace the strickenleader, Julian Smith selected hisoperations officer, Lieutenant ColonelDavid M. Shoup, who was spot pro-moted to colonel.

On 13 November, Task Force 53 setsail for Tarawa, but not until the fol-lowing day did Julian Smith announceto his men the name of the islandwhich they were to assault. “I know

~ Smith, “Tarawa,” p. 1169.


. . . ,“ read his message to the division,“you will decisively defeat and destroythe treacherous enemies of our country;your success will add new laurels to theglorious tradition of our Corps.” 54 Anintensive briefing for all hands followedthis announcement, and the mightytask force bored onward toward itsgoal.

The first contact with the enemy cameon 18 November, when a carrier planesighted a Japanese aircraft far in thedistance. On the following morning, afour-engine patrol bomber was pickedup on radar, intercepted, and destroyed.No waves of bombers challenged Hill’sships as they began their final approachto Tarawa. At 2033, 19 November,USS Ringgold, the destroyer leadingthe task force, picked up Maina Atoll,and Hill’s ships altered course to closewith their objective.

Around midnight the fire support sec-tions began steaming to their assignedstations. Transports crammed with Ma-rines eased into unloading areas.Finally, at 0507 on 20 November, shorebatteries on Betio opened fire, and thebattle was underway.

General Holland Smith did not ac-company the Tarawa expedition, for hehad been ordered to embark in AdmiralTurner’s flagship, and the latter officerhad taken personal command of theMakin task force. The admiral rea-soned that since Makin was nearer tothe Marshalls, Japanese surface units,if they chose to intervene, would prob-

“ Quoted in Stockman, Tarawa, p. 86.

ably strike the Northern Attack Force.Events during the approach of the

Northern Attack Force seemed to bearout Turner’s theory. On 18 Novembera Japanese bomber attacked a group ofLSTS but was beaten off by antiaircraftfire. Another bomber appeared thefollowing afternoon and fell victim toNavy fighters. A night attack, deliv-ered against the LSTS on 19 November,ended with the destruction of one en-emy bomber and the escape of a sec-ond.55 The Japanese, however, did notcontest the final maneuvering of thetask force, and at first light on 20 No-vember the preliminary bombardmentbegan.

The Japanese were never able tocarry out the ambitious program ofcounterattacks against a Gilberts inva-sion force envisioned in their Z Opera-tion plan, The carrier aircraft thatwere to have sortied from Truk and theBismarcks had been severely depleted ina series of air battles over Rabaul inearly November, as Admiral Halsey’sand General MacArthur’s fliers struckthe enemy base in covering strikes forthe landing at Bougainville.5e Al-though it was not known at the time,Admiral Turner’s Assault Force wasinsured against an enemy attack in anysignificant strength.

mFour Japanese bombers failed to returnfrom attacks made on the 19th and 10 fromattacks mounted on the 20th. Japanese Gil-berts Comments.

MFor the story of this significant series ofaerial assaults see Shaw and Kane, Isolationof Rabaul, pp. 481-486.

CHAPTER .2

The Assault on Betio’

PREPARATIONS PRIOR TO H-HOUR

The transports halted at approx-imately 0355,2 and the Marines of Com-bat Team 2 began groping down thesides of their ships toward the LCVPSwaiting below. The troopships, vic-tims of an unexpectedly strong current,had halted in the wrong area and

‘ Unless otherwise noted, the material inthis chapter is derived from: VA C AR; TF59 AR; 2d MarDiv Rpt on GALVANIC, dtd22Dec43, hereafter 2d MarDiv OpRpt; 2dMarDiv D-3 Jnl, 19Nov–4Dec43, hereafter 2dMa~Div D-8 J-d; 2d MarDiv ADC Jnl, 19–21Dec43; 2d Mar Rpt of Ops, Betio Island (in-cluding 1/2, 2/2, 3/2, 2/8, WpnsCo, and H&SCo ARs), dtd 21Dec43, hereafter 2d Ma~ OpRpt; 2d Mar UJnl, 12-24Nov43; 8thMar SAR(including 3/8 AR), dtd lDec43, hereafter 8thMar SAR; 18th Mar CbtRpt (including 1/18,2/18, and 3/18 CbtRpts), dtd 23Dec43, here-after 18th Mar CbtRpt; 10th Mar Rpt of Ops,Tarawa, (including 1/10,2/10, 3/10,4/10, and5~10 Notes on or Rpt.s of Ops), dtd 22Dec43,hereafter 1(M Mm OpRpt; 2d PhibTracBnSAR, dtd 23Dec43, hereafter 2d PhibTrmBnSAR; 2d TkBn SAR, dtd 14Dec43, hereafter2d TkBn SAR; BGen Merritt A. Edson, “Ta-rawa Operation,” lecture delivered at MCS,Quantico, Vs., 8Jan44, cited hereafter as .EcLson Lecture; Stockman, Tarawa; Johnston,Follow Me; Isley and Crowl, Marines and Am-phibious War; Morison, Aleutians, G-ilberts,and Marshalle.

s TF 59 AR, Anx A, p. 18. The times forvarious actions of the task force contained inthis document have been accepted as accurate.Stockman, Twawa, p. 11, maintains that dis-embarkation had begun by 0320.

masked certain of Admiral Hill’s fire-support ships. The task force com-mander at 04313 ordered the transportsto stop disgorging the troops and steamnorthward to their proper positions.As the larger vessels glided off into thenight, the landing craft attempted tofollow, but some of the LCVPS becameseparated from their assigned ships.Rounding up these strays further de-layed unloading, subsequent transfer ofmen from landing craft to amphibiantractors, and the final formation of theassault waves.

From 0507, when enemy shore batter-ies first opened fire, until 0542, Ameri-can warships attempted to reduce thesetroublesome batteries and neutralizeknown enemy positions. The navalguns then fell silent to enable carrierplanes to scourge the objective. Ad-miral Hill ceased firing to prevent pos-sible collisions between shells andplanes as well as to allow the dust raisedby explosions to settle before the pilotsbegan diving toward their targets.Unexpectedly, the aircraft failed to ap-pear. One explanation for this failureis that the request for a dawn attackmay have been misunderstood, with theresult that the strike was scheduled in-

sCrowl and Love, Gilberts and Mamhulls,holds that this maneuver took place at 0550.Other sources indicate that the transports ac-tually shifted position sometime between 0430and 0510.

63


stead for sunrise. This seems logical,for the fast carriers, from which theplanes were to be launched, had beenexcused from the Efate rehearsalswhere any misinterpretation of orderswould have come to light. Anotherversion maintains that the principalcommanders of Task Force 52 hadagreed to a strike at 0610 because pilotsdiving from sun-filled skies toward thedarkened earth could not locate theirtargets. This change, the account con-tinues, was incorporated into the overallplan for both task forces, the informa-tion was passed to the carrier pilots,but somehow word did not reach Ad-miral Hill at Efate. Since the planesmaterialized over both Makin andTarawa within a few minutes of sun-rise, this too seems plausible.4 What-ever the reason, the enemy was granteda brief respite from the storm of highexplosives that was breaking aroundhim.

Earlier that morning, when theMaryland had opened fire against Betio,the concussion from her main batterieshad damaged her radio equipment, leav-ing Admiral Hill without any means ofcontacting the tardy planes. WhileHill waited, Japanese gunners took ad-vantage of the lull to hurl shells at thetransports. The admiral scanned theskies until 0605, at which time he againturned his guns on the island. Afterthe supporting warships had resumedfiring, the transports, which had un-loaded all troops in the initial assaultwaves, steamed out of range of the de-termined enemy gunners. At 0613, the

‘ Cf. Crowl and Love, Gilberts and MaT-shalls, p. 219n; Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts,and MarshalZe, p. 156.

aircraft finally appeared over Betio,naval gunfire again ceased, and forabout 10 minutes the planes swept lowover the objective, raking it with bombsand machine gun fire. Because theJapanese had taken cover in concrete orlog emplacements, neither bomb frag-ments nor bullets did them much harm.Yet, the blossoming explosions lookeddeadly, and as the pilots winged sea-ward, the warships returned to theirgrim task of battering the island. Thisresumption of naval gunfire marked thebeginning of the prelanding bombard-ment.

A few minutes after sunrise, theminesweeper USS Pursuit, carrying onboard a pilot familiar with the atoll, be-gan clearing the entrance to Tarawalagoon. Astern of this vessel was an-other minesweeper, USS Requisite.Smoke pots laid by LCVPS were used toscreen the sweeping operation.6 Twodestroyers, the USS Ringgold andDa.shie12, waited off the entrance untila passage had been cleared. Fortu-nately for both Pursuit and Requisite,the pair of destroyers were in positionto silence, at least temporarily, theshore batteries that had opened fire onthe minesweepers. Once a path hadbeen cleared, the Pursuit, assisted by anobservation plane, began marking theline of departure, assault lanes, andthose shoals which might cripple shipsor small craft. In the meantime, theother minesweeper steamed out to seato pick up the destroyers and lead theminto the lagoon.

The enemy batteries, so recently si-lenced, again began firing as the de-stroyers came through the passage. A

‘ Hill interview/comments.

THE ASSAULT ON BEITO 55

shell sliced through the thin skin of theRinggold, penetrated to the after engineroom, but failed to explode. Anotherdud glanced off a torpedo tube, whistledthrough the sick bay, and thudded to astop in the emergency radio room. Mo-ments after the guns of the ship hadbeen unleashed at the supposed artilleryposition, a vivid explosion rocked thearea. One of the destroyer shells musthave touched off the enemy ammunitionSupply.

At 0715, the Pursuit, which had takenposition astride the line of departure,switched on her searchlight to guide thewaves of LVTS through the curtain ofdust and smoke that hung between theminesweeper and the assembly area.While the Ringgold was fighting herduel with Japanese cannoneers, thePursuit tracked the approaching waveson radar. The minesweeper reportedto Admiral Hill that the assault waveswere 24 minutes behind schedule andcould not possibly reach the beaches by0830, the time designated as H-Hour.GLieutenant Commander Robert A. McP-herson, flying spotter plane off theMaryland, also reported that the LVTScould not meet the schedule, so Hill, inthe Maryland, radioed instructions topostpone H-Hour until 0845.7

When the task force commander is-sued this order the erratic radios of theMaryland were still misbehaving.Though in contact with surface craft,Hill could not raise the aircraft thatwere scheduled to attack Betio just be-fore H-Hour.a While his communica-

0 USS Pursuit, Requisite, and Ringgotd ARs,dtd 6, 13, and lDec43.

‘ Hill interview/comments.8In regard to the communicationsetup on

his flagship,AdmiralHill reported: “not only

tions men were struggling with thebalky radio sets, the admiral at 0823received a report from Lieutenant Com-mander McPherson that the amphibiantractors had just crossed the line of de-parture.’ Since tests had indicated thelead LVT (2)s could make 4–41~ knots,he granted them an additional 40 min-utes in which to reach the beach andannounced that H-Hour would be 0900.

At this point, carrier planes reap-peared over Betio and began strafingthe assault beaches, delivering whatwas supposed to have been a last-minuteattack. The cessation of main batteryfire on the Mary2and enabled its supportair control radio to reach the planes sothat Hill could call off the prematurestrike. The aviators finally made theirruns between 0855 and 0900.

While the fliers were waiting theirturn, the task force continued blastingthe island. Five minutes before H-Hour, Hill’s support ships shifted theirfires inland, the planes strafed thebeaches, and at 0900 the bombardment,except for the shells fired by the twodestroyers in the lagoon, was stopped.

Awesome as it had been, the prelimi-nary bombardment did not knock outall the defenses. The coast defenseguns had been silenced, many of thedual purpose antiaircraft weapons andantiboat guns had been put out of ac-tion, but most of the concrete pillboxesand emplacements protected by coconutlogs and sand survived both bombs and

are the transmitters, receivers, and antenna soclose to each other as to cause mutual inter-ference, but several of the installations, partic-ular y SAC [Support Air Control] equipmentwere made entirely inoperative during mainbattery gunfire.” TF 53 AR, Anx A, p. 62.

‘ Hill interview/comments.

214-681O-67—5


shells. Of major importance, however,was the effect of the preliminary bom-bardment on Japanese communications.According to some of the prisonerstaken during the battle, the preinvasionshelling had ripped up the enemy’s wireand forced him to rely on messengers.Since these runners often were killed orpinned down by bursting shells, fewmessages got through.

Betio has been compared in shape toa bird, whose legs were formed by the500-yard pier that passed just beyondthe fringing reef. On 20 November, asH-Hour drew near, the bird appearedlifeless, the plumage on its carcassbadly charred. Colonel Shoup had de-cided to use three of his landing teamsin the assault and hold one in reserve.Major Henry P. Crowe’s 2/8, attachedfor this operation to the 2d Marines,was given the job of storming BeachRed 3. This objective was the bird’sbelly, the invasion beach that lay eastof the long pier. Ordered to land onCrowe’s right was Lieutenant ColonelHerbert Amey’s 2/2. Amey was to at-tack Beach Red 2, the breast of thebird, which included the base of thepier and stretched 500 yards westwardto an indentation in the shoreline. Ma-jor John F. Schoettel’s 3/2 would landto the right of Amey’s battalion, as-saulting Beach Red 1, a crescent-shapedportion of the coast that measuredabout 500 yards in width and served asthroat and lower bill for the bird ofBetio. The legs, or long pier, were re-served for the 2d Scout-Sniper Platoon,which was to secure its objective im-mediately before the assault waveslanded. In regimental reserve was 1/2commanded by Major Wood B. Kyle.(See Map III, Map Section.)

THE LANDINGS

The precisely arranged waves of am-phibian tractors that roared across theline of departure had difficulty in mak-ing headway toward the island. At thetime, the slowness of the assault waveswas blamed upon “overloading, wind,sea, and an ebb tide, together with poormechanical condition of a number of theleading LVTS.” ‘0 Students of the op-eration, as well as the men who foughtat Betio, have since absolved the wind,sea, and tide of some of the responsi-bility for the tardiness of the assaultwaves. The time lost earlier in themorning when the transports had firstshifted their anchorage could not bemade up. Because they had missed therehearsals, the drivers of the newLVT (2)s were not familiar with sig-nals, speeds, and load limitations, a fac-tor which slowed both the transfer ofmen from the LCVPS and the formingof assault waves. The waves had todress on the slowest tractors, and fullyloaded LVT ( 1)s could not keep up withthe LVT (2)s. The older vehicles werenot in sound enough mechanical condi-tion to maintain even 4 knots duringtheir long journey from assembly areato the assault beaches.11

While the assault waves were movingfrom the line of departure toward theBetio reef, Japanese shells first beganbursting over the Marines huddled in-side the amphibian tractors. These airbursts proved ineffectual, as did the

‘0CinCPac Monthly Rpt, Nov43, Anx E(CinCPac File, HistBr, HQMC).

n Isley and Crowl, Marines and AmphibiousWar, pp. 227-228; MajGenThomasE. Watsonltr to CMC,dtd17Jun47,hereafterWatson l$r;Hill interview/comments.


long-range fire of machine guns onBetio, and none of the tractors was

damaged. Upon crossing the reef, the

LVTS swam into a hail of machine gun

and antiboat fire, but even so casualties

among the troops were relatively light.

Few of the LVTS failed to reach the

beach.

The first unit to land on Betio was

First Lieutenant William D. Hawkins’

2d Scout-Sniper Platoon,’2 a part of

which gained the end of the pier at

0855. Hawkins, with engineer Second

Lieutenant Alan G. Leslie, Jr., and four

men, secured the ramp that sloped

downward from the pier to the edge of

the reef. Next, the platoon leader or-

dered the men who had remained in the

boat to scramble up the ramp. When

enemy fire began crackling around the

gasoline drums that the Japanese had

stored at the end of the pier, Hawkins

waved the men back into their LCVP.

With his four scouts and Leslie, who

was carrying a flamethrower, he began

advancing shoreward along the pier,

methodically destroying or clearing

anything that might shelter enemy

snipers. Blazing gasoline from Leslie’s

weapon splattered against two shacks

that were thought to be serving as ma-

chinegun nests, the flimsy structures

ignited like twin torches, but unfortu-

nately the flames spread to the pier it-

self. Although the gap burned in the

pier by this fire would later handicap

the movement of supplies, this difficulty

was a small price to pay for driving the

enemy from a position that gave him

UA scout-sniper platoon from the 8th Ma-rines also saw action at Betio. There is norecord of the employment of a similar unit bythe 6th Marines.

the opportunity of pouring enfilade fireinto the assault waves.

After the Japanese on the pier had

been killed, Hawkins and his handful of

men rejoined the rest of the section in

the LCVP and moved along the boatchannel toward the island. Beyond theend of the pier, Hawkins tried unsuc-cessfully to commandeer an LVT tocarry his men to the beach. In themeantime, the second boatload of scoutisnipers was being held off the reef onorder of a control officer. The platoonleader finally made contact with them,got hold of three LVTS, and started theentire platoon toward shore. Twotractor loads, Hawkins among them,landed in the proper place and reportedto the regimental command post, butthe third group came ashore on theboundary between Red 1 and Red 2 tojoin in the fighting there. The diffi-culties in getting ashore experienced bythe 2d Scout-Sniper Platoon were typi-cal of the Betio operation.13

Two of the assault battalions hurledagainst Betio made the last part oftheir shoreward journey unaided bynaval gunfire. Dust and smokescreened the movement of the LVTS, sothat the distance yet to be traveledcould not be accurately gauged. At0855, according to plan, all but twoships in Hill’s task force lifted their firesto avoid striking either the advancingtractors or the planes which were be-ginning their final 5-minute strafing ofthe beaches. Out” in the lagoon, how-ever, the destroyers Ringgold andDa.shiell continued to loft 5-inch shellsinto Red 3. These ships, whose officers

MH&S Co OpRpt of Set-Sniper Plat, dtd15Dec43, Encl J to 2d MarDiv OpRpt.

THE ASSAULT ON BETIO 59

were able to follow the progress of thetractor waves, did not cease firing until0910.

The first assault battalion to reach itsassigned beach was Major Schoettel’s3/2, which landed on Red 1 at 0910.On the right half of that beach, and atthe extreme right of Combat Team 2,the Marines of Company I leaped fromtheir LVTS, clambered over the logbeach barricade, and began advancinginland. On the left of the beach,astride the boundary between Red 1 andRed 2, was a Japanese strongpoint,which raked Company K with flankingfire before that unit could gain the shel-ter of the barricade. After gettingashore, Company K was to have tied inwith the troops on neighboring Red 2.Since the company commander couldsee no Marines in that direction, hemade contact with Company I and didnot attempt to advance toward his left.l~During the next two hours, these as-sault companies of 3/2 would lose overhalf their men.

Little better was the lot of CompanyL and the battalion mortar platoon.These units, boated in LCVPS, groundedon the reef 500 yards offshore. Whilewading toward Red 1, Company L suf-fered 35 percent casualties.

The next battalion to touch down onBetio was Major Crowe’s 2/8, whichreached Red 3 at 0917, just seven min-utes after the destroyers in the lagoonhad ceased firing. The fire of thesewarships had kept the Japanese under-ground as the Marines neared thebeach, and the enemy did not have time

“ Rpt of Capt James W. Crain, n.d., in Rptsof 2d MarDiv BnComdrs, dtd 22Dec43, here-after Rpts of 2d MarDiv BnComdrs.

to recover from the effects of the bar-rage before the incoming troops wereupon him. Two LVTS found a gap inthe beach barricade and were able tochurn as far inland as the airstrip be-fore unloading their men. The other am-phibians halted before the log obstacle,discharged their troops, and turnedabout to report to the control boatscruising in the lagoon. Of the 552 menin the first three waves that struck Red3, fewer than 25 became casualties dur-ing the landing.

The most violently opposed landingwas that made by Lieutenant ColonelAmey’s 2/2. Company F and most ofCompany E gained Red 2 at 0922, butone platoon of Company E was drivenoff course by machine gun and antiboatfire and forced to land on Red 1. Al-though Company G arrived only threeminutes behind the other companies tolend its weight to the attack, the bat-talion could do no more than carve outa beachhead about 50 yards in depth.Losses were heavy, with about half themen of Company F becoming casualties.

NOTHING LEFT TO LAND

Behind the first three waves of am-phibian tractors, came two waves ofLCVPS and LCMS carrying additionalinfantrymen, tanks, and artillery.When the leading waves had crawledacross the reef, they discovered that thedepth of water over this obstacle variedfrom three feet to a few inches. Sincestandard landing craft had drafts closeto four feet, they were barred from ap-proaching the beach. Infantrymenand pack howitzer crews had to trans-fer to LVTS or wade ashore with theirweapons and equipment. The tanks


were forced to leave the LCMS at the

edge of the reef and try to reach Betio

under their own power.The men who attempted to wade to

the island suffered the heaviest casual-ties on D-Day. Japanese riflemen andmachine gunners caught the reserve ele-

ments as they struggled through the

water.1’ The only cover available was

that provided by the long pier, and a

great many men died before theyreached this structure, During the

movement to the beach, platoons andsections became separated from theirparent companies, but junior officers

and noncommissioned officers met the

challenge by pushing their men forwardon their own initiative. On D-Day,few reserve units reached Betio organ-ized in their normal combat teams.

Like the reserve and supportingunits, the battalion command groupswere unable to move directly to theirproper beaches. All the battalion com-

manders, each with a part of his staff,

had embarked in landing craft whichtook position between the third andfourth waves as their units startedtoward the island. As was true withthe assault waves, the least difficultywas encountered at Red 3, but estab-lishing command posts on Red 2 andRed 1 proved extremely hazardous.

The first landing craft to slam onto

the reef off Red 3 was that carryingMajor Crowe, a part of his communica-tions section, and other members of hisbattalion headquarters. On the way

in, one of Crowe’s officers told him thatif things did not go well on the first

* Capt James R. Stockman, Notes on an In-terview with Col David M. Shoup, dtd 26 May1947, hereafter Shoup-Stockman interview.

day, the staff could swim back to the

transport, brew some coffee, and decidewhat to do next. “Jim Crowe,” re-

called First Lieutenant Kenneth J. Fa-

gan, “let out with his bull bellow of a

laugh and said it was today, and damnsoon, or not at all.” 16 When his boatgrounded on the reef, Crowe fitted ac-tion to these words, ordered his men to

spread out and start immediately forthe island, and reached Betio about fourminutes after his assault companies.Such speed was impossible on Red 2 andRed 1, beaches that had not received alast-minute shelling from the pair of

destroyers in the lagoon.Off Red 2, Lieutenant Colonel Amey’s

LCM also failed to float over the reef,but the commander of 2/2 was fortunateenough to flag down two empty LVTSthat were headed back to the trans-ports. These amphibian tractors be-

came separated during the trip towardthe island, and the one carrying Ameyhalted before a barbed wire entangle-ment. The battalion commander thenattempted to wade the rest of the dis-tance, but after he had taken a few

steps he was killed by a burst from amachine gun. Lieutenant ColonelWalter I. Jordan, an observer from the

4th Marine Division and the senior of-

ficer present, was ordered by Colonel

Shoup to take command until Major

Howard J. Rice, the battalion executive

officer, could get ashore.1’ Although

Rice was a mere 13 minutes behind the

first assault waves, he was in no posi-

‘“ Quoted in Watson ltr.‘7 Shoup interviewjcommcmts; Rpt of LtCol

Walter I. Jordan, dtd 2’70ct43, in Rpts bySplObservers on GALVANIC, Encl G to VACAR, hererafter Jordan Rpt.


tion to relieve Jordan of responsibility

for 2/2. The executive officer was

pinned down and out of contact with

his unit, so Jordan retained command

until he was relieved of this task by

Shoup.

Though the beachhead held by Jor-

dan’s men was admittedly precarious,

the most disturbing news came from

neighboring Red 1, where 3~2 was in

action. There the battalion com-

mander, Major Schoettel, was unable to

get ashore until late in the afternoon.

At 0959, Schoettel informed Colonel

Shoup that the situation on Red 1 was

in doubt. “Boats held up on reef of

right flank Red l,” said his next mes-

sage, “troops receiving heavy fire in

water.” Shoup then ordered the bat-

talion commander to land his reserve

over Red 2 and attack westward. To

this the major replied, “We have noth-

ing left to land.” la

Colonel Shoup and his regimental

headquarters experienced difficulties

similar to those that had plagued the

battalion commanders. At the reef,

Shoup happened upon an LVT which

was carrying wounded out to the trans-

ports. The colonel had these casualties

transferred to his LCVP, comman-

deered the amphibian tractor, and

started toward the left half of Red 2.

As the tractor neared the island, it en-

tered a maelstrom of fire and a hail of

shell fragments “started coming down

out of the air. It was strong enough to

go through your dungarees and cutyou,” Shoup recalled. Then, as thecommand group continued its way

mLT 3/2 to CO CT 2, ser no. 27, CO CT 2to LT 3/2, ser no. 28, and LT 3/2 to CO CT2, ser no. 30, in 2d MarDiv D-3 Jnl.

shoreward, he said, “a kid named Whitewas shot, the LVT was holed, and thedriver went into the water. At thatpoint I said, ‘let’s get out of here,’moved my staff over the side and wadedto the pier. From then on it was amatter of getting from the pier ondown. You could say my CP was inthe boat, then in the LVT, and then onthe pier on the way in, but there wasvery little business conducted.” lo Af-ter determining what portion of Red 2was in the hands of 2/2, Shoup estab-lished his command post on that beachat approximately 1200.

Even before he reached the island,Colonel Shoup kept a close rein on theoperations of his command, At 0958,in the midst of his exchange of mes-sages with Major Schoettel, he directedhis reserve battalion, 1/2, to land onRed 2 and attack westward toward theembattled Marines on Red 1. Shoup’splan, however, was slow of execution,for only enough LVTS could be roundedup to carry Companies A and B. Com-pany C had to wait until noon fortransportation. While Major Kyle’sbattalion was moving toward Red 2, theleading waves of amphibian tractorsdrew heavy fire from the right handportion of the beach. As a result, someof the vehicles veered from course totouch down on Red 1, and the 4 officersand 110 men that they carried joinedin the fighting there. The remainderof the LVTS bored onward to the lefthalf of Red 2, where the bulk of Kyle’scommand aided in expanding the beach-head. Not until the morning of thesecond day was the entire battalionashore on Betio.

mShoup intmwiew/comments.


3/8 IS COMMITTED

At his command post in the Marykznd,General Julian Smith was convincedthat a foothold had been won, but herealized how vital it was that the at-tack be kept moving. Because the 6thMarines had been placed under the con-trol of Turner, Julian Smith had buttwo battalion landing teams as his ownreserve. These two units were MajorRobert H. Ruud’s 3/8 and 1/8 com-manded by Major Lawrence C. Hays,Jr. The commanding general could se-lect the regimental headquarters of theparent 8th Marines to control either orboth of its battalions.

At 1018 on the morning of D-Day,Julian Smith radioed Colonel Elmer E.Hall, commanding officer of the 8th Ma-rines, to send 3,/8 to the line of depar-ture where it would come under thetactical control of Colonel Shoup.Since Shoup was more familiar withthe situation on Betio, it was logicalthat he, rather than Hall, should deter-mine where this portion of the reservewould be landed. Ruud’s battalion be-came a part of Shoup’s command at1103 and was promptly ordered to landon Red 3 in support of Crowe’s 2/8.

Since Shoup and his party were mov-ing alongside the pier at this time, hecould watch what was happening to theincoming Marines. As soon as theirboats grounded on the reef and theramps were lowered, Ruud’s menstarted wading toward the island.Landward of the reef, the water proveddeep, in places well over a man’s head.Some Marines, weighted down by theequipment, plunged into deep water anddrowned; others were killed by enemybullets and shell fragments. Only 100

men from Ruud’s first wave, approxi-mately 30 percent of the total, survivedthe ordeal to set foot on Betio.

From the pier, Shoup and his staffsignalled frantically to the men of thesecond wave, directing these troops toseek the shelter of the pier. Thisstructure, however, offered little pro-tection, so the toll claimed by Japanesegunners continued to mount. “Thirdwave landed on Beach Red 3 were prac-tically wiped out,” reported Ruud———who had lost radio contact with Shoup—to Hall. “Fourth wave landed onBeach Red 3,” he continued, “but onlya few men got ashore and the remain-der pulled away under heavy MG and37mm fire.” 20 Shortly after the fourthwave landed, the battalion commanderreceived a message to “Land no furthertroops until directed.” The remainderof the battalion gathered off the end ofthe pier and was finally ordered inabout 1500. By 1730, all of 3/8 wasashore, and, on Shoup’s orders, Rudddeployed one of his companies to plug agap directly inland from the pier be-tween 2/8 and 1/2.2’ Company K,which had landed in the first waves,was already attached to Crowe’s battal-ion and continued to serve with 2/8through the rest of the battle.

SUSTAINING MOMENTUM

In spite of the light losses suffered bythe LVTS that carried the assaultwaves, the number of amphibian trac-tors available to the division dwindled

wLT 3/8 to CO CT 8, ser no. 88, 2d MarDivD+’ Jnl.

“ CO1 Robert H. Ruud comments on draftMS, dtd ca. 10Aug62.


rapidly as the day progressed. Somewere destroyed while bringing suppliesor reinforcements to the island, otherswere so badly damaged that they sankupon reaching the deep water of the la-goon, and a few either broke down orran out of gas. To reduce losses to aminimum, the LVTS had to be restrictedto the boat channel that paralleled thelong pier, but even so Japanese gunnersstill managed to cripple some of the in-coming amphibians.

General Julian Smith realized that hecould not afford a stalemate at thebeaches. Strength would have to bebuilt up rapidly and the attack pressedvigorously if Betio were to be takenwith a minimum of losses. Yet, afterthe assault waves had gained a foot-hold, the operation bogged down, forthe reef effectively barred landingboats, and the number of LVTS avail-able for duty was fast diminishing.Since the battle was raging only a fewyards inland, the reserve units that at-tempted to wade ashore were under firefrom the moment they stepped into thewater. Those who survived the trekfrom reef to beach found themselves inthe thick of the fight as soon as theyset foot on the island.

Reserve units became so disorganizedwhile wading toward shore that battal-ion and even company control wasvirtually impossible. The resultantconfusion was offset by the grim deter-mination of the individual Marines,who simply kept coming in spite of allthe enemy could hurl at them. For adistance of 400 yards, Japanese ma-chine gunners or riflemen grazed thewater with streams of bullets. Theonly cover available to the Marines wasthat afforded by the pier, and even from

here they had no opportunity to fightback. All the attackers could do wastake their punishment and keep mov-ing. Many Marines were hit in thewater, but the survivors waded onward,moving doggedly to join their comradesashore.

During the early morning, the situa-tion on Betio was literally cloudy, forthe explosions of shells and bombs hadsent a column of dust and smoke tower-ing above the island. As the morningwore on, the smoke from burning em-placements and buildings continued tocloak parts of the island so that it wasimpossible, even from the air, to seemuch of the island at one time.Neither Julian Smith nor Colonel Shoupcould observe much of the action ashore.The general had remained in the Mary-land, the best place, given adequatecommunications, from which to controlhis division.= The movements of thecommander ashore were restricted andhis communications, especially with theunit on Red 1, unreliable. ColonelShoup, however, was by no meanspinned down. “Once ashore,” he re-called, “I was never off my feet for over50 hours, standing for the most timeprotected by an enemy pillbox with 26live Japs therein.” 23

By noon, the situation ashore beganto come into sharper focus. ColonelShoup made contact with his subordi-nates, and requests for medical sup-plies, ammunition, and air support

= The transport group commander offeredthe opinion that Julian Smith “could have hadmuch more ready communication means (ra-dio, boats, etc.) than were available to him onthe Ma~yland” on board the comparativelyclose-in transport flagship. Knowles ltr.

= Shoup-Stockman interview.


began trickling back to the Maryland.Julian Smith also profited from obser-vation flights made during the af-ternoon by naval pilots. Littleinformation, however, could be hadconcerning the battle on Red 1.

THE FIGHTING ASHORE

A source of grave concern throughoutthe morning was the fate of 3/2 onBeach Red 1. Actually, Major Schoet-tel’s men, though isolated from theother Marines on Betio, had fared betterthan Julian Smith suspected. The as-sault companies had received a severescourging as they started moving in-land, but Major Michael P. Ryan, com-mander of Company L, managed toorganize an effective fighting forcefrom remnants of several units. Bymidafternoon, his contingent couldboast portions of every company of 3/2,four platoons and part of the headquar-ters of 2/2, as well as the 113 officersand men of 1/2 who had been drivenoff course during their attempt toreach Red 2. Among the members of2/2 who ended up on Red 1 was MajorRice, the battalion executive officer,who had with him a usable radio.This set provided Ryan his only linkwith Colonel Shoup’s command post.

During the afternoon, Ryan’s Marinesconsolidated their beachhead on Betio’sbeak, clearing an area 500 yards deepand 150 yards wide. The farthestpenetration made by this conglomeratecommand was to the antitank ditch 300yards from the south coast of the is-land, but this advanced position couldnot be held with the number of men atRyan’s disposal. For this reason hepulled back to within 300 yards of the

tip of the beak and dug in for the night.The key to Ryan’s success was the

pair of medium tanks that reached Red1 about 1130. All Shermans employedat Betio were from the Company C, IMarine Amphibious Corps (IMAC)Tank Battalion, the entire companyhaving been attached to the 2d MarineDivision for GALVANIC. Company Cjoined the division at Efate and madethe voyage to Tarawa in the USS Ash-land, a new LSD.

On D-Day morning, a total of sixmedium tanks started toward Red 1 inLCMS, but the coxswains of these craftcould find no place to unload. Fortu-nate y, Major Schoettel happened uponthese boats as they were circling off thereef and ordered them to run up on thereef and lower their ramps. The Sher-mans then nosed into the water to be-gin a 1,200-yard journey to the island.Reconnaissance parties waded in frontof the tanks, carefully marking pot-holes with flags, so none of the tanksdrowned out before reaching the beach.As the lumbering vehicles approached agap already blown in the log barricade,the platoon leader saw to his horrorthat the coral sands were littered withwounded and dead. Rather than riskcrushing those Marines who were stillalive, he led the platoon back into thewater, drove to a position off GreenBeach, and waited for engineers topierce the barrier. During this secondmove, four tanks wandered into pot-holes, drowning out their engines.24Both the surviving Shermans were hitduring Ryan’s advance. One wasgutted by flames, but the other, withonly its bow machine gun still in work-

WIbid.


ing order, was used to protect the flankof the beachhead during the night.

Ryan’s men held the beak of theBetio bird, but the head, throat, back,and most of the breast were controlledby the enemy. The nearest Americantroops were elements of 1/2 and 2/2fighting on that part of Red 2 near thepier, an area some 600 yards from theRed 1 perimeter. That part of the linemanned by 1/2, originally Shoup’s re-serve, extended from a point about 350yards inland from the base of the pieralong the triangular plot formed by therunway and west taxiway then veeredtoward the beach. The area between1/2 and the edge of the water was thezone of 2/2, the battalion that hadstormed Red 2.

Both medium tanks and artilleryreached Red 2 before D-Day had ended.Three Shermans that had landed onRed 3 crossed the boundary and haltedin a previously selected assembly area.This trio of tanks supported 2/2 in itsadvance toward the runway by rollingup to pillboxes and firing at point blankrange through the openings in thesestructures. Two of the Shermans wereknocked out, but one of these was re-trieved on the following morning.

The artillery that arrived on Red 2,1/10 commanded by Lieutenant ColonelPresley M. Rixey, had first been des-tined for Red 1. A member of ColonelShoup’s command post group, Rixeyhad landed before noon. In the mean-time, his 75mm pack howitzers andtheir crews were boated at the line ofdeparture awaiting further orders.During the afternoon it became appar-ent to both Shoup and Rixey that Red 1was no place to land artillery, and theyfinally decided to bring the battalion

ashore over Red 2. Since the boatscarrying the unit could not cross thereef, LVTS had to be found. Two gunsections, one from Battery A and onefrom Battery B, were transferred toamphibian tractors and at dusk orderedashore. Also ordered to land werethree howitzers and crews of BatteryC, elements that were believed to be inLVTS but which had not yet actuallybeen shifted from their original landingcraft. The two sections in the tractorsmoved rapidly to Red 2. The otherthree were boated to the edge of thepier where the artillerymen plungedinto the water and began wading ashorecarrying their dismantled pack how-itzers. None of the guns reached thebeach until after dark, and the crewscould do little more than wait, ready tomove into position at dawn.zs

Inland of the pier, at the dividingline between Red 2 and Red 3, responsi-bility passed to elements of 3j8 andCrowe’s 2/8. Its initial blow at themidsection of Betio had carried a partof Crowe’s battalion into the triangleformed by the runway and taxistrip,but on the left flank his men collidedwith a powerful strongpoint near thebase of the Burns-Philp pier. Duringthe afternoon, some 70 Marines from3/8 were sent into the triangle to holdthat sector of the line. A group of

men, survivors of various battalions

whose weapons had been lost or ruined

by water, were found crouching under

the Burns-Philp pier, led ashore, re-

armed, and fed into the battle being

waged on Crowe’s left flank.28

Throughout D-Day, the Marines of

= Shoup intevview/comments.“ Watson ltr.


2/8 attempted to batter their waythrough the fortifications inland ofBurns-Philp pier in order to advanceeastward along Betio’s tail. Four me-dium tanks from the Company C, IMACTank Battalion, threw their weight andfirepower into this effort but to no avail.One Sherman was destroyed by afriendly dive bomber, a second bulledits way into an excavation used by theenemy as a fuel dump and was burnedwhen an American plane set the gaso-line aflame, and a third was disabled byJapanese gunners. Although damagedby an enemy shell, the fourth tank con-tinued to fight.

REBUILDING A RESERVE

General Julian Smith’s decision toland 3/8 left him with but a single land-ing team in division reserve. Early inthe afternoon, it began to appear asthough it might be necessary to land1/8, the last of the reserve, to help thefive battalions already in the fight. Ifthis were done, the general would beleft with no reserve except for his sup-port group, made up of elements of the10th Marines (artillery), the 18th Ma-rines (engineers), Special Troops, andService Troops. In short, he would beforced to rely upon an assortment ofspecialists in case of an emergency.

There was present, however, an or-ganized unit which might spell the dif-ference between victory and defeat.This was the 6th Marines, designatedas corps reserve and under the controlof Admiral Turner. Having informedHolland Smith of the situation at Betio,the division commander at 1331 re-quested the release of the 6th Marinesto his control. Admiral Hill seconded

Julian Smith’s request and within 50minutes Turner’s message of approvalarrived. “Meanwhile,” commentedJulian Smith, “consideration was beinggiven to a plan to organize the supportgroup into provisional battalions.” 27

Once the 6th Marines had been re-leased to him, Julian Smith felt it safeto land 1/8. At 1343, Colonel Hall’sregimental headquarters and his re-maining landing team, commanded byMajor Hays, was ordered to proceed tothe line of departure and wait there forfurther orders. The division com-mander then asked Colonel Shoup torecommend the best site for a nightlanding by this battalion.

This message concerning Hall’s unitnever reached Colonel Shoup, anotherof the communications failures so typi-cal of the Tarawa operation. The ra-dios of the Marylund had proved balky,and the portable sets carried ashore bythe assault troops were little better.Water, shell fragments, bullets, andrough handling played havoc with com-munications equipment, but some radioswere repaired with parts pirated fromother damaged sets. Both the TBYsand the MUS, the latter light-weighthand sets, were exceptionally vulner-able to water damage, and the TBXthe more durable and somewhat water-proof battalion radio, was so heavy thatit could hardly be called portable.

Colonel Hall’s headquarters and 1/8,“cramped, wet, hungry, tired, and alarge number . . . seasick,” 28 waitedthroughout the afternoon at the line ofdeparture. At 1625, Julian Smith sent

~ Smith, “Tarawa)” p. 1173.= LtCol Rathvon McC. Tompkins ltr to CMC,

dtd 13Jun47.


a message ordering Hall to land on thenorth shore of the extreme eastern endof the island. These last uncommittedelements of the 8th Marines were tohave gone ashore at 1745 and to haveattacked to the northwest, but the or-ders failed to reach the regimental com-mander.

To observe the general progress ofthe battle, a scout plane was launchedfrom the Mcwykmd at 1548. ColonelMerritt A. Edson, division chief ofstaff, and Lieutenant Colonel Arnold F.Johnston, the operations officer, con-tacted the plane and asked the fliers toreport any movements in the areawhere 1/8 was waiting. As the obser-vation craft circled overhead, an artil-lery battery from 1/10 started towardRed 2. Since Hall was believed to havereceived his orders, the artillerymenwere mistaken for a portion of 1/8.The thought that Hall was landing onthe wrong beach caused consternationat division headquarters, but his sup-posed position was duly plotted on thesituation map. Not until midnight didthe division staff discover that Hall’scommand was still waiting on the lineof departure.

THE FLOW OF SUPPLIES AND IN-FORMA TION 29

In assessing the work of his shoreparty, Lieutenant Colonel Chester J.Salazar admitted that carefully pre-

= Additional source for this section include:Rpts of LtCol Chester J. Salazar and MajGeorge L. H. Cooper, dtd 22Dec43, in Rpts of.f?dMarDiv BnComdrs; Rpt of LtCol Evans F.Carlson, dtd 270ct43, in Rpts by SplObserverson GALVANIC, Encl G to VAC AR, hereafterCa~kon Rpt; Maj Gen Leo D. Hermle ltr to

pared and basically sound standing op-erating procedure had to be abandonedduring the Tarawa operation. Ele-ments of the shore party had difficultyin finding the combat units to whichthey were assigned. Salazar’s demoli-tions men and bulldozer operators wereneeded to blast or bury enemy posi-tions, and the assault battalions couldnot spare riflemen to serve as steve-dores on the crowded, hard-won beach-heads. Finally, there were not enoughLVTS to move supplies directly to thebattalions from the ships offshore.

With Colonel Shoup throughout themorning of D-Day was Lieutenant Colo-nel Evans F. Carlson, leader of theprevious year’s Makin raid, who hadbeen assigned to GALVANIC as an ob-server. Because of the continuing dif-ficulty in keeping radio contact withdivision, Shoup at 1230 asked Carlsonto make his way to the Maryland andsketch for Julian Smith an accuratepicture of what was happening ashore.The commander of Combat Team 2could then be certain that higher head-quarters knew his basic plan for theconquest of Betio—to expand south-ward and to unite the beachheads be-fore attempting a final thrust. Thedivision could best help by landing re-serves on Red 2. As the two menparted, Shoup told Carlson, “You tellthe general and the admiral that we aregoing to stick and fight it out.” 30

Before starting toward the lagoon,Carlson noticed some Marines fromRuud’s 3/8 clinging to the pier and un-able to get into the fight. With

CMC, dtd 9Jun47; Maj Ben K. WeatherwaxItr to CMC, dtd 17Jun47.

~ Shoup+!tockman interview.


Shoup’s permission, Carlson inter-rupted his journey to bring severalLVT-loads of able-bodied infantrymento the island, returning each time withwounded men whom he had transferredto boats at the reef. This done, he lefthis tractor at the reef, embarked in anLCVP, and at 1800 reported to JulianSmith in the MaWlamL

Early in the afternoon the divisioncommander ordered Brigadier Gen-eral Leo D. Hermle, assistant divisioncommander, to prepare to land his com-mand post group on order. GeneralHermle was told at 1343 to go to theend of the pier, form an estimate of thesituation, and report his findings toGeneral Julian Smith. On the way tothe pier he attempted to learn the lo-cation of Shoup’s command post butcould not contact the regimental com-mander by radio. At 1740, Hermle re-ported that he had reached the pier andwas under fire. He tried a short timelater to radio to the Maryland details ofthe action ashore, but again he was vic-tim of a communications failure. Hethen entrusted the information to amessenger.

While he was on the pier, Hermlemanaged to establish intermittentradio contact with Shoup and Crowe,who informed him that ammunitionand water were desperately neededashore. Since many Marines from3/8 had taken cover beneath the pier,Hermle had enough men available toorganize carrying parties to bringthese vital items to the island.Supplies, which kept arriving by boatthroughout the night, were unloadedby the carrying parties and man-handled to the beach. En route toBetio, the Marines doing this important

job had to wade through a 50-yardarea that was exposed to Japanese fire.

In addition to the able-bodied menwho were formed into carrying parties,a number of wounded Marines hadgained protection of the pier. CaptainFrench R. Moore (MC), USN, assistantdivision surgeon and a member ofHermle’s party, had the wounded col-lected, given first aid, and evacuated inlanding craft that had finished unload-ing supplies. The captain later re-turned to the transport area with aboatload of seriously wounded men.

General Hermle’s radio link withShoup and Crowe was severed early inthe evening. About 1930, the assistantdivision commander sent MajorRathvon McC. Tompkins and CaptainThomas C. Dutton to find Shoup’s com-mand post and learn where and whenthe regimental commander wanted thereserves to land. The two officers,after working their way across a 600-yard strip of coral swept by enemymachine gun fire, reached their goal.They found out the needed information,but it was 0345 before they could reportback to Hermle.

Although he had obtained answers toJulian Smith’s questions, Hermlelacked a rapid means of communicatingthis intelligence to the division com-mander. For this reason, the assistantdivision commander and his party ven-tured into the lagoon to use the radioon the destroyer Ringgold. Word thatShoup wanted 1J8 to land near thepier on Red 2 was dispatched to theMaryland at 0445.

General Hermle next was ordered toreport to Julian Smith in the battle-ship. Here he learned that at 1750 anorder had been issued giving him com-


mand of the troops ashore. Because ofa communications failure, the messagehad gone astray. Command ashorewas to remain the responsibility ofColonel Shoup.

The transports had been unloadingwater, plasma, ammunition, and othersupplies throughout the day, but judg-ing from the requests that continued topour in from the island, few of thesearticles were finding their way to thefront lines. Captain Knowles, com-mander of the transport group, whoshared with the division supply sectionresponsibility for coordinating the log-istical effort, directed the AssistantD–4, Major Ben K. Weatherwax, to goto Betio and find out what had gonewrong. The major was to contacteither General Hermle or ColonelShoup.

Weatherwax left the transport USSMonrovia at 2100 and went to thePursuit, where he obtained directions

for landing. He approached Betio by

way of the pier, climbing out of his

boat on the beach side of the gap

burned in the structure by Hawkins’

men. Had the major landed at the end

of the pier instead of following the boat

channel, he would have met General

Hermle and learned the details of the

logistical situation. As it was, he

reached the beachhead, made his way

to Shoup’s command post, and there

learned that the troops ashore needed

still more of the types of supplies that

already had been sent them. Weather-

wax then encountered the same

problem that had plagued Hermle—ina-

bility to reach the Monrovia by radio.He finally went along the pier until hefound a boat and arrived at the trans-port just before dawn. There, he in-

formed Captain Knowles of the supplysituation and of the need for gettingadditional tanks ashore. The trans-port group commander gave Weather-wax authority to order in any boat witha tank aboard to any beach where therewas a good chance for the armor toland.31

THE EVENING OF D-DAY

As daylight waned on 20 November,the position of the Marines on Betioseemed precarious. The front lineswere perilously close to the beach, andthe enemy had effectively dammed thetorrent of supplies that was to havesustained the embattled riflemen.Small boats dashed to the end of thepier and unloaded. Carrying partiesmanaged to keep a trickle of suppliesmoving toward the island, an effortthat was supplemented by the work ofthe surviving LVTS. During theafternoon these tractors had carriedwater, ammunition, and medical sup-plies directly to the beaches. In themeantime, the transports were unload-ing as rapidly as possible. Soon thewaters around the line of departurewere dotted with landing craft waitingfor an opportunity to dart toward thepier and unload their cargoes.

The picture ashore seemed equallyconfused, with the assault battalionsconfined to small, crowded areas. For-ward progress had been slow, a matterof a few feet at a time. It was worth aman’s life to raise his head a fewinches. Yet, a Marine could not firehis weapon unless he exposed himself,however briefly. Shoup’s men did this

= Knowles ltr.

THE ASSAULT ON BETIO 71

and even more. “A surprising num-ber . . . ,“ the colonel would recall,“displayed a fearless eagerness to go tothe extreme for their country and fel-low men.” 32

At dusk, the Marines held two sep-arate portions of Betio Island. On theright, Major Ryan’s composite unit,isolated from the remainder of ColonelShoup’s command, had withdrawn to acompact perimeter on the island beak.Another perimeter fanned out from thebase of the long pier. The segmentnearest Ryan’s lines was manned bytroops from 1/2 and 2J2 and curvedfrom the water into the triangle formedby runway and taxiway. Within thistriangle, the left-hand portion of theline was held by 3/8, while 2/8 hadresponsibility for the sector facing thestrongpoint at the base of Burns-Philppier. The larger perimeter was not acontinuous line, for this beachhead wasdefended by small groups of Marineswho had taken advantage of whatevercover they could find.

Most of the Marines on Betio pre-pared for the night with the uneasyfeeling that a Japanese counter-attack was inevitable. On the con-

= Gen David M. Shoup, “Some of MyThoughts” (Gen David M. Shoup PersonalFolder, HistBr, HQMC). This folder containsnotes, impressions, and reminiscences datingfrom early in the general’s career until hisappointment as CMC.

trol vessels and transports there was arestless feeling that at any momentreports would come flooding in tellingof a Japanese attempt to hurl the in-vaders into the sea. In the Marykm.d,the division staff strained to pick upthe sounds of rifle fire that wouldherald the enemy attack. Silencereigned. Marine fire discipline wassuperb; few shots were wasted onimagined targets. Enemy weaponstoo were quiet, for the expected attacknever came.

According to Julian Smith, AdmiralShibasaki lost the battle by failing tocounterattack on that first night, fornever again would the beachhead be sovulnerable. Shibasaki’s failure wasprobably due to a collapse of his com-munications. The fact that fewfield message blanks were captured dur-ing the course of the battle seems toindicate a reliance on wire communica-tion. Naval gunfire ripped out thecarefully strung wire, and the Japanesecommand post was isolated from troopsit was to direct.33 Important as thislapse in control may have been, it wasthe combat effectiveness of Shoup’sMarines, men who overcame incredibleobstacles to maintain cohesive fightingteams, that promised failure to anyenemy assault.

= Smith, “Tarawa,” pp. 1173–1174; MajorEugene P. Boardman Itr to CMC, dtd 16Jun47.

214-81?1O-67—6