hms victory fire suppression system - final reportthe report describes fire performance tests that...

HMS Victory Fire Suppression System - Final Report Prepared for: BAE Systems 2 August 2013

Client report number 289017

1 HMS Victory Fire Suppression System - Final Report

BRE Global Client report number 289017 Commercial in confidence

© BRE Global Ltd 2013

Prepared on behalf of BRE Global by

Name Richard Chitty

Position Principal Fire Consultant

Signature

Reviewed / checked on behalf of BRE Global by

Name Raman Chagger


Signature

Approved on behalf of BRE Global by

Name Dr Corinne Williams


Date 2 August 2013

Signature

BRE Global Bucknalls Lane Watford Herts WD25 9XX T + 44 (0) 1923 664100 F + 44 (0) 1923 664994 E [email protected] www.breglobal.com

This report is made on behalf of BRE Global. By receiving the report and acting on it, the client - or any third party relying on it - accepts that no individual is personally liable in contract, tort or breach of statutory duty (including negligence).

mailto:[email protected]




Executive Summary

BRE Global was commissioned by BAE systems to develop a specification for fire detection and suppression systems for HMS Victory, including order of magnitude costs and supporting justification.

A fire suppression system for HMS Victory cannot be an “off the shelf” system designed to BS, EN or IMO standards due to the heritage, construction and use of the Ship, although individual components should meet relevant standards. Preparation of a specification for an effective design, that is sympathetic to the historical nature of the Ship and the activities that it is required to host, needs a holistic approach and input from key stakeholders.

BRE Global has identified the following systems to be the most appropriate fire detection and suppression systems for HMS Victory:

• Wireless “advanced” fire detector network throughout the Ship with:

o An aspirated system to monitor the hull void o Flame detectors for the external areas of the Ship (including the dry dock) o Manual call points o Audible and visual alarm devices.

A radio survey following the requirements of BS 5839:1 (sections 27.2g and 27.2h) should be conducted prior to the tendering process.

• Low pressure water mist suppression system throughout the Ship with the exception of:

o The Fore and Aft Hanging Magazines o The electrical intake. o The hull void.

• Improved compartmentation for the fore and aft hanging magazines and the electrical intake.

• No suppression is recommended in the hull void.

The report describes fire performance tests that should be conducted to determine the low pressure water mist system design parameters which are relevant to the Ship.

This final report includes details of:

• Installation and commissioning • Maintenance • Rough order of magnitude costing




• Safety issues (including the impact of a suppression system on the Hazard Log) • Environmental impact • Observations of the fire suppression system on Cutty Sark.

Background material, leading to the identified systems, is appended including a report of a fire test using a hammock from HMS Victory.




Contents

Contents 4

Abbreviations 6

1 Introduction 7

2 Background 9

3 System requirements and objectives 10 3.1 User requirements and limitations 10

4 System details: proposed suppression system 11 4.1 Water mist system 11 4.1.1 Water mist system fire performance testing 14 4.2 Other systems 14 4.3 Suppression system outline 14 4.3.1 Hull void 15 4.3.2 Protection against low temperatures 16 4.3.3 Auxiliary equipment 16 4.3.4 Isolating zones 17 4.3.5 Approved products/installers 17

5 System details: proposed detection system 18 5.1 Point detector locations 18 5.2 Manual call points 19 5.3 External detection 19 5.4 Alarm and repeater panel 20 5.5 Fire alarm zones 20 5.6 Dry dock 20 5.7 Detection system – design testing 21 5.7.1 Approved products/installers 21

6 Installation 22 6.1 Overview 22 6.2 Variations 23 6.3 Time line 23 6.4 Removal of old detection system 25

7 Commissioning 26 7.1 Suppression system – commissioning/acceptance testing 26 7.2 Detection system – commissioning/acceptance testing 26

8 Maintenance 27 8.1 Suppression system – maintenance 27 8.2 Detection system – maintenance 28




9 Rough order of magnitude costing 29 9.1 Suppression system: capital cost 29 9.2 Suppression system: maintenance cost 29 9.3 Detection system: capital cost 30 9.4 Detection system: maintenance cost 30

10 Conclusions 31

11 References 32

Appendix A – Project timetable

Appendix B - Stakeholders and consultation

Appendix C – Classification of fires

Appendix D - Fire growth and suppression

Appendix E - Multiple criteria decision analysis

Appendix F - Fire suppression technologies

Appendix G - Water-based fire suppression systems

Appendix H - Suppression system activation

Appendix I - Suppression system criteria and selection

Appendix J - Fire detection and alarm system

Appendix K - Detection system criteria and selection

Appendix L – HMS Victory hammock fire test

Appendix M – HMS Victory suppression system design fire performance testing

Appendix N - Defence Lines of Development

Appendix O - Safety assessment

Appendix P - Environmental impacts

Appendix Q – Observations of the fire suppression system on Cutty Sark




Abbreviations

Abbreviation Meaning

BS British Standard

CIE Control and indicating equipment

COEIA Combined Operational Effectiveness and Investment Appraisal

DD Draft for Development

DLoD Defence lines of Development

EN European Standard

FSS IMO Fire Safety Systems Code

GWP Global Warming Potential

HFRS Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service

Iaw In accordance with

IMO International Maritime Organisation

MCDA Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis

MJC Multiple Jet Controller

NMRN National Museum of the Royal Navy

ODP Ozone Depleting Potential

QM Quarter Master

RN Royal Navy

ROM Rough Order of Magnitude

SOLAS Safety of Ships at Sea

7 HMS Victory - Fire Suppression System: Final Report



1 Introduction

BRE Global has been commissioned by BAE Systems to develop a specification for a fire suppression system for HMS Victory, including order of magnitude costs and supporting justification. This programme of work is based on tasks described in Section 8.3 of “HMS Victory – Fire Suppression Assessment“(BMT Defence Services [1]) as presented in BRE Global proposal 131784 (30th August 2012) [2].

BRE Global considers sympathetic installation to be a key feature to the success of the project. This has a fundamental impact on some of the design decisions such as routing of pipe work and location of associated equipment which are influenced by heritage and aesthetic factors, and the ability of the Ship’s structure to support the equipment.

The activities in the Assessment Document [1] were divided into the following tasks:

Task A Refine system requirements Task B1 Develop outline systems Task B2 Assess outline systems Task C Time lines Task D Risk and opportunities management Task E Defence lines of development Task F Safety and environmental assessment Task G Test and acceptance Task H Installation strategy

Delivery of these tasks and other key dates are given in Appendix A.

The work programme has included meetings with Stakeholders to inform on progress and establish critical requirements (Appendix B). Some photographs of the fire suppression system on Cutty Sark (Appendix Q) are included for information.

BRE Global has identified the following systems to be most appropriate fire detection and suppression systems for HMS Victory:


o An aspirated system to monitor the hull void o Flame detectors for the external areas of the ship (including the dry dock) o Manual call points o Audible and visual alarm devices.






o The hull void o The Fore and Aft Hanging Magazines o The electrical intake.

• Improved compartmentation for the fore and aft hanging magazines and the electrical intake.



These systems need to be linked through the fire alarm control panel to provide the pre-action function for the suppression system and give the appropriate alarms, information and controls to the Ship’s crew and fire-fighters.

This final report presents descriptions of the fire detection and suppression systems recommended by BRE Global in the main text with Appendices providing background and supporting information.

Appendices include

• The decision making methodology

• Background fire engineering analysis of some smoke movement on HMS Victory

• Report of a fire test using a hammock from HMS Victory

• Safety issues (including the impact of a suppression system on the Hazard Log)

• Environmental impact

• Observations of the fire suppression system on Cutty Sark.




2 Background

HMS Victory is currently a living museum to the Georgian navy as part of the National Museum of the Royal Navy at Portsmouth and the Flagship of the First Sea Lord. In addition to these functions, a major restoration programme is on-going; this creates many challenges. One of these challenges is to maintain fire safety on the Ship.

Currently the emphasis is on fire prevention and early detection. HMS Victory has a Royal Navy Crew who have undergone fire-fighter training and who are on board 24/7 and conduct regular patrols. When the Ship is open to the public there are also guides on each deck or conducting tours. The Ship has an extensive fire detection system with a large number of addressable heat and smoke heads distributed throughout the Ship. The detectors are grouped in to 14 zones and the operation of specific heads can be identified at the alarm panel. Extinguishers and hose reels are available for first aid fire-fighting.

Fire-fighting would be undertaken by Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service (HFRS). Local fire crews have frequent acquaintance visits and drills on the Ship. Deck plans are available to all their appliances.

There are very few potential sources of ignition on the Ship. The Ship has recently been rewired and there is a trend towards the use of low energy LED lighting. Most of the combustible materials on the Ship are either very substantial (e.g. the Ship’s timbers) or fire retarded fabrics which would be difficult to ignite.

It is recognised that the hazards related to restoration work probably present the highest fire risks to the Ship. This is reflected in the cause of the Cutty Sark fire in May 2007 and its outcome (Appendix Q).

The installation of a fire suppression system will provide an additional level of fire protection on the Ship, but this should not necessarily be seen as a replacement for any of the current measures. The overall fire safety strategy on HMS Victory will need to be reviewed when the fire suppression system is operational. The presence of a fire suppression system may offer opportunities to modify current procedures.




3 System requirements and objectives

3.1 User requirements and limitations

Protecting HMS Victory from damage by fire and creating a “fire safe” environment for visitors and people working on the Ship raises a number of issues where solutions, following published standards, used in sea-going ships and buildings cannot be followed.

For example the ladders between decks do not conform to the requirements of stairs used as means of escape in buildings; however the ladders are a feature of the Ship reflecting its use as a Royal Navy warship in the 18th and 19th centuries. Means of escape has been addressed by providing exits so that a maximum of one change of level is needed to leave the Ship; this is indicated to visitors by signs and guides are available to provide assistance. This example illustrates a situation where current day standards cannot be met on the Ship because of the nature of some of the Ship’s historical features.

Similar issues arise when considering the installation of fire suppression and detection systems on the Ship. A workshop was held with Stakeholders (Appendix B) and the following main issues and requirements were identified:

• The suppression system is required to provide protection of the asset (i.e. HMS Victory) during the current restoration programme (20 years) and beyond.

• The installation of the suppression system must be sympathetic to the appearance, fabric and use of the Ship.

• It is not expected that conventional design rules for suppression systems can be followed throughout the Ship; however approved products should be used where possible.

• The final suppression system may include more than one form of suppression technology.

• The 24/7 presence of RN staff on the ship may be exploited (e.g. activation after investigation of first alarm).

• The suppression system will be expected to prevent the spread of fire until extinguishment by Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service (HFRS).

Following the workshop, it was established by BAE Systems that the current detection system on HMS Victory could not be extended and was approaching the end of its serviceable life. As a consequence, “suppression system” in the above list should be read as “suppression and detection systems”.




4 System details: proposed suppression system

Following a review of the probable fire development on HMS Victory (Appendices C and D) and the available fire suppression technologies (Appendix F), BRE Global has identified a low pressure water mist system as being the most appropriate system for most areas of HMS Victory (Appendices E to I). The exceptions are: the electrical intake near the bread store, hull void and the fore and aft hanging magazines.

4.1 Water mist system

Due to the presence of the beams crossing the Ship under the deckhead, the movement of smoke and heat from a fire is more complex than in a building with flat ceilings; this is also related to the low deckhead in some areas of the Ship.

Some computer simulations have indicated (Appendix H) that the flow of smoke is predominantly across the Ship towards the hull and then back towards the centre line. This does not significantly delay the operation of smoke detectors, but as smoke is routed away from the fire, the first detector to operate may not be those nearest to the fire location.

Automatic water mist nozzles contain a heat sensitive element (typically a glass bulb filled with liquid) which, when it reaches a specified temperature breaks and allows the flow of water from the nozzle. As with the smoke detectors, due to the presence of the beams at the deckhead, the first nozzles to operate may not be those nearest the fire; however, it is important that the nozzles that operate are those closest to the fire so that water from the suppression system is delivered effectively. Nozzles that operate remotely from the fire will reduce the flow of water to heads/nozzles near the fire and may create unnecessary water damage.

A solution to this problem proposed here is the use of multiple jet controllers (MJC). These devices use a heat sensitive element (as in an automatic nozzle) to operate a valve connected to pipework with open nozzles. This means that the thermal sensing element can be some distance from the point where water is delivered. In the context of HMS Victory, the MJCs can be mounted on the hull and control a row of open nozzles across the Ship, see Figure 1. This arrangement takes advantage of another effect seen in the simulations where the smoke and hot gases deepen when they reach a wall.




Figure 1 - Single MJC and nozzles (plan view)

This arrangement is intended to provide water around the area of the fire origin, thereby controlling the spread of fire on the Ship. The computer simulations (Appendix H) indicate that for the fire growth rates expected to be representative of fires on HMS Victory, smoke detectors should begin to operate after 25s and suppression system operation between 3 and 3.5 minutes for a MEDIUM growth rate fire.

Figure 2 shows how pipe work could be arranged on the gun decks using a distribution ring main at deck level.

Figure 2 - Ring main and range pipes (plan)

Locating the distribution ring at deck level takes advantage of a relatively uncluttered and inconspicuous area of the Ship to locate the pipes, see Figure 3. The supply of water to the distribution ring can be at any point(s) around the perimeter of the Ship, located depending on the position of the pump(s) and water supply tanks. Locations near existing fire hoses could utilise existing openings between decks.

Multiple jet controller

Open nozzle

Fire location

Hull Hull

Beam

Beam

Beam

Ring Range pipes




Figure 3 - Deck meeting inner hull on Lower Gun Deck

The range pipes can be routed up to the deck head from the distribution ring via the MJC. For the Orlop range pipes should come down from the Lower Gun Deck (the location of ribs on the Orlop prevents the inconspicuous routing of a distribution pipe following the approach used on the gun decks, see Figure 4.

Figure 4 - Ring main and range pipes (section)

Confined areas of the Ship, i.e. cabins, can use automatic nozzles. The hold may also be protected by a grid of automatic nozzles under the deck head.

Ring main MJC Nozzle

Ring main on gun decks Orlop supplied by ring main on Lower Gun Deck

beams beams

Possible pipe location




4.1.1 Water mist system fire performance testing The use of water mist systems for fire suppression is an emerging technology and standards for design and installation are currently under development (Appendix F). DD 8489-1 ‘Draft for Development Fixed fire protection systems - Industrial and commercial water mist systems – Part 1 Code of practice for design and installation’ recommends that system fire performance test system test should be carried out simulating the identified hazards.

BRE Global considers that the “Bunk bed” test and the “Work station” tests described in DD 8489-7 ‘Draft for Development Fixed fire protection systems - Industrial and commercial water mist systems – Part 7 Tests and requirements for watermist systems for the protection of low hazard occupancies’ are representative of fires in small spaces on HMS Victory and in the Hold, respectively. In addition, BRE Global proposes the test described in Appendix M to demonstrate a suppression system’s performance in open deck areas such as the gun decks and the Orlop. These tests may identify that different nozzles, spacings and operating pressures are required in different areas of the Ship.

These results should be entered into the suppression system supplier’s design manual.

4.2 Other systems

Not all the areas on HMS Victory are suitable for a water mist suppression system:

• Electrical intake: BRE Global recommends the enclosure surrounding the electrical intake is upgraded to a structure with 1 hour fire resistance (Appendix I). For example, a stud work frame with two layers of moisture resistance plasterboard on each side with an appropriated door will provide 1 hour resistance in both directions i.e. a fire from the electrical equipment breaking out or an external fire break in.

• Fore and Aft Hanging Magazines: BRE Global recommends that the magazines are fitted with doors containing fire resisting glazing and suitable seals so that any fire is contained in the space until the arrival of the Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service (Appendix I).

4.3 Suppression system outline

Table 1 identifies the suppression arrangement recommended by BRE Global for different areas of the Ship.




Table 1 - Suppression system arrangement

Location “Type” of space Suppression Notes Poop Deck External None Hardy’s Cabin (+) Cabin Automatic nozzle Quarter deck, waists, brow

External None

Grand Cabin Cabin Automatic nozzle Galley Cabin Automatic nozzle Upper Gun Deck Gun Deck MJC open nozzle Sick Bay Cabin Automatic nozzle PA room/store Cabin Automatic nozzle RN Offices Cabin Automatic nozzle Mess Cabin Automatic nozzle Low head room due to

camber on floor Middle Gun Deck Gun Deck MJC open nozzle Tiller/Assisted visitors Cabin Automatic nozzle Book Shop/food preparation area

Gun deck Local automatic nozzle

Lower Gun Deck Gun Deck MJC open nozzle Stable Cabin Automatic nozzle Bread Store Cabin Automatic nozzle Electrical intake Small space Containment Aft walkway Cabin Automatic nozzle Aft Orlop Cabins Cabin Automatic nozzle Aft Hanging magazine Small space Containment No public access Orlop “Shrine” No fuel, sensitive area Orlop rope and sail store “Gun Deck” MJC open nozzle Forward Hanging Magazine

Small space Containment No public access

Orlop forward cabins/workshops

Cabin

Grand Magazine Cabin Automatic nozzle Coal Store Cabin Automatic nozzle Hold Forward Large space (5m high) Grid of automatic nozzle Pump Large space (5m high) Automatic nozzle Hold Aft Large space (5m high) Grid of automatic nozzle

4.3.1 Hull void BRE Global has not recommended a fire suppression system for the hull void. A fire detection system for a hull void fire has been included and this should provide the general location of a fire. Due to the restricted ventilation, fires in the hull void should develop slowly, but could develop into a large smouldering area. On arrival, the Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service should be able to precisely locate the fire with thermal imaging cameras; however extinguishing a hull void fire would be difficult and would probably require damage to the internal hull to provide access to the space.




4.3.2 Protection against low temperatures Suppression systems installed in buildings (with the exception of cold stores etc.) would not normally be exposed to temperatures below 0°C and do not need protection against freezing. However, on HMS Victory, freezing temperatures can occur during the winter. BRE Global recommends a pre action system: normally the pipework is not charged with water. On detection of the fire (by the detection system), the water supply pumps are started and the pipe work is charged. Water is only discharged on activation of an automatic nozzle or MJC.

Some pipe work may require trace heating (electrical heating using a jacket around the pipe work), notably the pipe work between the water tank and the control valves.

4.3.3 Auxiliary equipment In addition to the delivery nozzles and pipe work, the fire suppression system will require:

• Water tank(s) • Pumps and control valves • Test nozzle • Fittings for the fire and rescue service to “top-up” the water tank.

BS EN 12845 ‘Fixed firefighting systems — Automatic sprinkler systems — Design, installation and maintenance’, recommends that the minimum water storage capacity for Low Hazard occupancies (such as HMS Victory) should provide a duration of at least 30 minutes. Considering the difficult conditions that fire-fighters may encounter on the Ship, there may be a significant time between their arrival on the site and the time when they can start to fight the fire. BRE Global therefore considers it prudent to provide a water storage capacity giving a duration of 1 hour.

If it is assumed that 8 nozzles (as an example) operate and supply 40 litres of water per minute, this gives a required water storage capacity of 8 x 40 x 60 /1000 = 19.2 m3 (approximately 20 m3). This may be achieved with a tank with the dimensions 5m by 2m by 2m. The tank needs to be sited close to the Ship and the pump house. Note that the filled tank would have a mass of approximately 20 tonnes.

BRE Global recommends the use of electric pumps, as the fuel storage required for a diesel pump would probably create a hazard greater than any other hazard on the Ship or in the immediate area. Provision of two independent power supplies would be desirable. The pump and associated control valves need to be protected from the weather in a small, heated, enclosure. A space 2m by 2m by 2m should be adequate.

Fittings for a test nozzle outside the pump enclosure should be provided to conduct flow tests without charging the pipework on the Ship. The pump enclosure and control valves should be maintained at a temperature of at least 4°C (DD 8489-1 paragraph 8.5.2).

One of the challenges for the suppression system designer will be to achieve adequate pressure at nozzles remote from the pump location, considering the length of pipes, differences in level between the pump and the nozzle and the desirability of using, less conspicuous, small diameter pipe work, where possible. The option to use two (or more) tanks and pumps may assist with these requirements. It may also be easier to find an acceptable aesthetic solution for siting two small tanks compared to one larger tank.




4.3.4 Isolating zones Valves can be located around the distribution ring so that sections of the system can be isolated, mainly to accommodate the restoration programme. The valves should be lockable and clearly indicate their position. BRE Global recommends that a procedure is established to isolate a zone so that large sections of a deck are not inadvertently isolated. If a section of the suppression system is isolated then detectors in the isolated areas should not activate the water pumps. Alternative suppression arrangements should be provided in an isolated area.

4.3.5 Approved products/installers While it is recognised the a suppression system on HMS Victory will not be fully compliant with any published standards, BRE Global recommends the use of components and installers which are approved by a recognised certification body where possible.




5 System details: proposed detection system

Following a review of the available fire detection technologies (Appendix J), BRE Global has identified a network of wireless multi-sensor point detectors as being most appropriated for most areas of HMS Victory (Appendix K). In principal, this is similar to the current system with the following advantages:

• Use of advanced detector technology o Reduced false alarms due to water droplets etc.

• No requirement for cables between detectors and the alarm panel o Reduced visual impact o Simplified installation and reconfiguration o Elimination of false alarms due to cable faults o No cable entry to detector head, removing potential path for water ingress.

As with the current system, detectors will be addressable and can be grouped into zones.

Manual call points can also be added to the wireless network; however using cable routes to the required locations are already established, wired manual call points would provide a cost saving.

Due to the power requirements, BRE Global recommends that audible and visual warning devices are wired devices.

The system should, as far as is practical on the Ship, follow the recommendations in BS 5839-1:2013 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings – Part 1: Code of practice for design, installation, commissioning and maintenance of systems in non-domestic premises’. The main part of the standard that cannot be followed will be detector spacing, due to the low headroom and deckhead detail.

5.1 Point detector locations

BS 5839-1:2013 recommends in section 22 the maximum spacing between detectors (7.5m for smoke detectors) and gives further recommendations of how this value should be varied for sloping ceilings, voids over perforated ceilings, presences of beams and down-stands and clear spaces required around detectors. These recommendations cannot be followed rigorously on HMS Victory due to the low head height and the close spacing of beams under the deckhead. Locating detectors on the underside of beams would not usually be acceptable on HMS Victory as they would be subject to damage (collision, interference by visitors) and would be visually intrusive.

BRE Global recommends that where possible recommendations for detector spacing in BS 5839-1 are followed; however, the emphasis should be to consider the location of combustible materials and provide detectors to cover specific hazards. One of the advantages of the proposed use of wireless detectors is that the detectors can easily be relocated if displays on the Ship are changed.

BRE Global recommends that manufacturers supply components to protect devices from water ingress.




5.2 Manual call points

BRE Global recommends that these are installed with protective covers that need to be lifted before the call point can be operated.

5.3 External detection

Currently, there is no fire detection on the external areas of the Ship. BRE Global recommends that flame detectors are used to provide coverage of the exposed decks; this could be extended to cover the areas under the Ship in the dry dock. Figure 5 shows a possible arrangement of three detectors to cover the exposed decks.

Figure 5 - External flame detector coverage

The flame detector units are of the order of 100mm by 50mm by 80mm and could be discretely located in the rigging, possibly under the platforms on the masts (fore top and main top). These should be sensitive enough to detect flames 0.1m high over most of the exposed deck.

Detection in the hull void

HMS Victory is constructed with a double skin hull resulting in a narrow void between the layers. This is currently ventilated by a gap in the external planking around the perimeter of the Ship. BRE Global understands that renovation work has found sawdust in the hull void; this creates a hazard due to self-heating. Self-heating can cause fires in grain silos, haystacks etc. Briefly, self-heating of a material is initiated by biological activity raising the material’s temperature. If the material is a good thermal insulator then heat may be generated much faster than it can be lost to the external environment. This can raise the temperature to the point where exothermic chemical reactions can occur (combustion). In the case of HMS Victory, a fire in the hull void would be limited by the amount of oxygen available but a small slow burning fire could be initiated. This could progress slowly, carbonising timber in the immediate area. (Similar effects can be caused by hot flue pipes passing through timber).

BRE Global recommends that an aspirated detection system is used to detect fires in the hull void (Appendix K). This is essentially a long sampling tube that extracts a small flow of air from the void and

Detect 0.1m flame

Detect 0.4m flame




uses sensitive detectors to indicate smoke from a fire. As an alternative, NMRN may wish to consider continuous monitoring of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the hull void. This would indicate any increased biological activity in the void, a pre cursor to self-heating, and, in addition, may also provide useful data for conservationists.

5.4 Alarm and repeater panel

The alarm panel (referred to in BS 5839-1 as control and indicating equipment, CIE) is the central hub of a fire detection system. The panel:

• Receives signals from detectors and call points • Determines if the signals correspond to alarm signals • Indicates a fire alarm condition (audibly and visually) • Indicates the location of the device indicating an alarm • Records the information.

In addition, the panel is used to indicate the correct functioning of the system and give warnings if fault signals are detected. Finally, the panel may:

• Activate audible, visual or voice alarm signals • Send messages to a fire alarm receiving centre • Control fire suppression systems • Relay data to other equipment such as a repeater panel.

The system required for HMS Victory will need to be configured to operate in one of at least two modes to provide different response sequences during visitor and non-visitor hours. There should also be the capability to isolate zones during events or as part of the conservation programme (These will require a specific risk assessment and alternative cover).

Locating the fire alarm panel in the Quartermaster’s office near the Middle Gun Deck starboard entrance (the location of the existing panel) provides easy access for day-to-day use; the area is permanently manned and restricted to authorised staff. In the event of a fire, smoke may be present in the area in and around the Quartermaster’s office which could restrict access to the panel by fire-fighters. BRE Global suggests that a repeater or mimic panel is installed in the arena gate house (the “Bubble”); this would provide fire-fighters with access to the fire alarm information without needing to board the Ship.

5.5 Fire alarm zones

BRE Global recommends the fire alarm zones for the new system are based on the existing arrangement of 14 fire alarm zones. It may be advantageous (considering the requirement to isolation of areas for conservation) to divide the Lower and Middle Gun Decks into three zones (currently two) covering forward, centre and aft sections of the decks.

5.6 Dry dock

BRE Global recommends that manual call points, sounders and visual alarm devices are installed in the dry dock.




5.7 Detection system – design testing

The current use of wireless technology on HMS Victory to monitor the Ship’s movement indicates that the use of radio controlled devices on the Ship can be effective; however, a radio survey following the requirements of BS 5839:1 (sections 27.2g and 27.2h) should be conducted prior to the tendering process to ensure that specific fire detection systems will operated correctly and not interfere with other systems. A trial of candidate systems on HMS Victory is recommended.

5.7.1 Approved products/installers While it is recognised the a detection system on HMS Victory will not be fully compliant with any published standards BRE Global recommends the use of components and installers which are approved by a recognised certification body.

Flame detectors should meet the Marine Equipment Directive (MED).




6 Installation

6.1 Overview

The installation of a replacement fire detection system and new fire suppression system should be scheduled so that safety on the Ship will tend to increase as the installation progresses. It would be unacceptable to completely remove the existing detection system and then begin installation of the other systems as this would involve a period when the Ship would be without any detection system.

The following sequence is suggested:

Phase 1: • Detailed suppression system design

o Fire suppression performance testing § Nozzle type, spacings, pressure requirements

o Hydraulic calculations (pipe sizes) o Surveys to establish exact pipe runs and nozzle locations o Testing spacing link

• Detailed detection system design o Control panel preparation (i.e. programming cause and effect)

Phase 2: • Install fire detection control panel and repeater panel • Install water, pump and suppression control valves • Install suppression system for electrical intake

Links between the detection system and water pumps can be tested and commissioned.

Phase 3: • Install new detectors, commission detection system • Test sounders and warning devices out of public opening hours • Cover new manual call points until change over • Training for new detection system • Begin installation of water distribution network

Phase 4: • Commission detection system • Change over detection to new detection system (include call signal to Unicorn Gate)

Phase 5: • Complete water distribution network for suppression system




• Install range pipes, MJCs and nozzles • Pneumatic testing • Training for suppression system

Phase 6: • Commission and handover of fire suppression system.

Phase 7: • Remove old detector cabling and fixing; this should be integrated with restoration programme.

6.2 Variations

Depending on the renovation programme and other events on the Ship, it may be more desirable to complete and commission the suppression system zone by zone (valves isolating zones should be addressable and provide a warning signal to the alarm panel if a zone is isolated); however this may mean that there are short periods when the suppression system is out of service during connection and commissioning of new zones. Installation by zone would reduce the impact on visitors and events on the Ship.

Once Phase 4 is complete, a full detection and partial suppression system can be activated. It is recommended that the detection system is fully completed and handed over in one step so that a situation where there are two control panels being used simultaneously does not arise.

BRE Global recommends that all the manual call points from the old system are removed, and where this cannot be done without a visually unsatisfactory result, the device should be covered so that it not confused with active units. Detectors should be removed and replaced with base covers; bases and cabling can then be removed when the area is restored.

6.3 Time line

Figure 6 shows the sequence of tasks with estimated (by BRE Global) durations (in weeks) with a critical path shown in orange. This results in a period of 23 weeks for the final system design and installation process. This assumes that there is no significant time for the delivery of components and that the installation programme is not delayed by activities on the Ship. The programme of work shown in Figure 6 has some flexibility as some items on the critical path could be started early. The time required for Phase 6 should not be compressed as this involves installation of pipework on the Ship and physical or aesthetic issues with pipe routing will need to be resolved.

Part of the Phase 1 activity should be to review and revise Figure 6, if required.

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24 H

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Victory Fire S

uppression System

- Final Report

Phase Task/activity Duration(weeks)

Off site preparation

Handover detection system

Handover suppression system

1 Detailed suppression system design 6 to 8Detailed detections system design, panel preparation 6 to 8

2 Build pump house 1Install water tank 1Install pumps valves 1commission suppression system water supply 1

3 Install control panel 2install repeater panel 1install suppression system controls 1install detectors 1install sounders 1install manual call points 1establish alarm link to gate 1establish link to PA system 1

4 commission new detection system 2handover to new detection system 1decommission old alarm points and sounders 1

5 Install Water distribution pipework on Ship 46 Install zone by zone and commission 8

Install all zones and commission 87 Remove old detector cabling Integrate with restoration programme

remove old detectors

task

Critical path and duration (weeks) at end of task

Sequence

8

910

11

13

15

19

23

8

Figure 6 - Installation time line for installation of a fire detection and suppression system on HMS Victory




6.4 Removal of old detection system

Removal of the old system could result in unsightly marking of the Ship indicating where old cables and devices had been located. For example, Figure 7 shows the call point and sounder near Hardy’s cabin. Removing the cables and devices would require some repainting; however, colour matching may be difficult and it may be less obtrusive to leave the cables in place until the area is renovated. The redundant call point should be covered so that is not confused with an active device.

Figure 7 - Call point and sounder near Hardy’s cabin




7 Commissioning

7.1 Suppression system – commissioning/acceptance testing

The pre-commissioning and commissioning tests specified in DD 8489-1:2011 section 10 should be followed as a minimum requirement.

Briefly these tests are:

Pre commissioning

• Confirm pipework is clean and free from swarf • Confirm the as-built system is as designed • Pneumatic test on pipe work (a specified air pressure must be maintained for at least 24 hours) • Hydraulic test on pipe work (a specified air pressure must be maintained for at least 2 hours).

In view of the sensitivity of HMS Victory to water damage, is it suggested that a more severe pneumatic test is applied and that the dry pipe work is charged to 2.5 bar for not less than 24 hours after which the pressure drop should not be greater than 0.05 bar (DD 8489-7 requires that the pressure drop should not be greater than 0.15 bar) to reduce the possibility of water leakage during the hydraulic test.

Commissioning tests

• Test electrical detection and activation in accordance with BS 5829-1, BS 7273-2 and BS 7273-5 • Check function of all resettable valves (unless this would result in water delivery from nozzles) • Perform weekly and monthly system check • Supply handover documentation.

The DD and relevant standards should be consulted for full details of the tests.

The Fire Protection Association has developed, with a group of UK insurers (RISCAuthority) [3], a questionnaire to record the design specification and associated evidence for water mist fire suppression systems in buildings. BRE Global recommends that this questionnaire is completed, as far as is possible, for any water mist fire suppression system installed on HMS Victory.

7.2 Detection system – commissioning/acceptance testing

BS 5839-1 includes detailed recommendations for the installation and commissioning of fire detection and alarm systems. In general, the recommendations for the siting of detectors and manual call points should follow those given in BS 5839-1 (20.2, 22.3); however due to the construction of the Ship and, in some cases aesthetic reasons, this will not be possible throughout the Ship.




8 Maintenance

8.1 Suppression system – maintenance

DD 8489-1 Section 11 states the requirements for inspection and maintenance of water mist suppression systems; this includes the information that should be included in a user’s operation and maintenance manual. Briefly the inspection tasks are, as follows:

• Weekly o Check water levels and position of stop values o Pump starting test o Trace heating and localised heating test

• Monthly o As weekly including checks of electrolyte levels of any lead acid cells used as a standby

power supply. • Quarterly

o Review any changes in the hazards on the Ship o Inspect nozzles for deposits and change if required o Check pipework supports and earthing connections o Test water supplies o Check stop valves o Check flow switches o Replenish stock of replacement parts

• Half yearly o Check control valves following manufacturer’s instructions o Check transmission of alarm signal to Unicorn gate o Test fire detection system

• Yearly o Pump flow test o Check inflow valves on water tank(s) o Inspect and clean strainers, identify and remedy any source of corrosion

• Three yearly o Inspect tanks for corrosion (drain and inspect internally) o Paint or refurbish corrosion protection o Examine, check and overhaul all stop and control valves.

The DD should be consulted for full details of the tests.

BRE Global recommends that the provision is made in the design for a test nozzle to be installed (possibly near the pump house, discharging to the dry dock) so that a flow test can be conducted without charging the pipe work in HMS Victory. The nozzle should be inspected after any test for residues that would indicate failure (or near failure) of the strainers due to corroded material from the tank and pipework. This is an additional requirement of LPS1283 [4] to the requirements of the DD.




All checks and tests should be carried out by a competent person (see definitions in DD 8489-1).

8.2 Detection system – maintenance

BS 5839-1 includes detailed recommendations for the maintenance of a fire detection system. Briefly, the tasks are as follows:

• Weekly o A manual call point should be operated to confirm that the control panel can receive a

signal and then respond by activating sounders and sending appropriate remote signals. A different manual call point should be used each week.

• Monthly o Visual inspection of batteries used for standby power

• Six monthly o System inspection and test

• Yearly (this work may be divided over two six month intervals) o Functional check of all detectors and call points

• Non-routine o Appointment of new servicing organisation o On repair of faults o On modifications to system o On action to reduce false alarm rate o After a fire event o After long period of disconnection

BS 5839-1 should be consulted for full details of these tests and inspections.

All checks and tests should be carried out by a competent person (see definitions in BS 5839-1).

It should be noted that 25 pages of BS 5839-1 address testing of a fire detection system, referring in places to other Standards. Most of this is relevant to HMS Victory. A model outline for a system logbook and various certificates are included.




9 Rough order of magnitude costing

9.1 Suppression system: capital cost

In 2007, a consultant, EC Harris [5], was appointed by the Department of Education and Skills to examine the costs of installing sprinkler systems in schools. While there are little apparent similarities between HMS Victory and a school building, some of the costs for suppression system hardware and maintenance will be common. BRE Global has used this document to provide an initial rough order of magnitude cost for a suppression system on HMS Victory. The EC Harris report gives an installation cost between £23/m2 and £68/m2 (average £39/m2), based on tender values and some final costs for a new build. The higher figure reflects costs for smaller buildings where there fewer economies of scale. For an existing building, EC Harris included a further £21.05/m2 for additional builders work giving a total of £60.01/m2 (an additional 53% of the new build cost).

A BAFSA/Arup report [6] based on 2004 prices gives installation costs of £23 to £28/m2 for Light hazard and £27-£37/m2 for Ordinary hazard sprinkler systems. Spon’s architects and builders’ price book 2012 [7] gives costs for a sprinkler system between £14 to £31/m2 for new build. Adding an additional 53% indicated by EC Harris for the additional costs required for installations in existing buildings, these give a cost of about £45/m2, indicating that the EC Harris values are at the top of the range.

Assuming each of the decks from the Hold to Upper Gun Deck (5 decks) has an area of 15m x 55m and the area including Hardy’s cabin has an area of 15m x 15m, then the total area to be protected by the suppression system is 4350m2 giving a cost estimate of £261,000 based on £60/m2.

BRE Global understands that costs of suppression systems have not changed significantly since the EC Harris and BAFSA reports were published.

A supplier of low pressure water mist systems, with experience of heritage buildings, suggested a guidance cost of £120 per nozzle with each nozzle covering a 3m by 3m area (as an example) for a water mist system i.e. £13/m2. Adding the cost for additional work required on existing buildings (53%) gives a total of £19/m2 resulting in cost estimate of £83,000. This value includes costs for water tanks and pumps. This “rule-of–thumb” based value may be more appropriated for smaller, simpler systems. BRE Global considers the higher estimate based tenders and final costs to be more reliable then the second, BRE Global would therefore suggest rough order of magnitude cost for a low pressure water mist suppression system on HMS Victory of £300 000 noting that this is probably a conservative value.

9.2 Suppression system: maintenance cost

The maintenance tasks for a fire suppression system are outlined in section 7 of this report.

EC Harris gives a maintenance cost for a fire suppression system in a school of £1000pa. The BAFSA/Arup report gives values of £250 to £750pa for a school and £750 to £1500pa for warehouses and retail premises.




BRE Global suggests that the upper end of these values could be taken as a rough order of magnitude maintenance cost, i.e. £1500 pa.

9.3 Detection system: capital cost

Use of wireless technology for the fire detection system will incur much lower installation costs for the majority of the detectors compared to the suppression system. BRE Global considers that most of the installation cost will be related to the installation, programming and testing of the panel. Some cabling will be required for the sounders and visual alarm devices; however existing cable routes may be used and, in general, aesthetic issues can take priority to precise location of the devices.

Industry representatives were asked to provide budgeting costs for the flowing items, as they were not aware of the end use, the installation and commissioning costs may be considered to be under estimates.

1 Panel 1 Repeater Panel 200 multi-sensor (smoke and heat) devices (wireless) 5 heat detectors (wireless) 15 Manual Call Points 10 Sounders 10 Visual Alarm Devices 4 Flame detectors (marine specification) 1 four pipe aspirator Installation and commissioning costs.

Costs from:

• An internet supplier indicate a total of approximately £86 000 • Supplier 1 £80 300 • Supplier 2 £90 000 • Supplier 3 £85 000.

Spon’s architects and builders’ price book 2012 [7] gives costs for a detection system for a shopping mall (which may have similar zoning and control requirements to HMS Victory) between £11 and £15 /m2.for new build adding 50% for the additional costs incurred of an existing structure gives a cost of ,£16.5 and £22.5 /m2. From the estimate of floor area above (4350m2), this gives a total cost of £72 000 to £98 000.

BRE Global would therefore suggest a rough order of magnitude cost for a wireless based fire detection on HMS Victory of £100 000.

9.4 Detection system: maintenance cost

The maintenance tasks for a fire detection system are outlined in section 7 of this report.

BRE Global considers that the annual maintenance costs would be similar to those for the suppression system, i.e. £1500 pa.




10 Conclusions

BRE Global has identified the following systems to be most appropriate fire detection and suppression systems for HMS Victory:


o An aspirated system to monitor the hull void o Flame detectors for the external areas of the ship (including the dry dock) o Manual call points o Audible and visual alarm devices.



o Fore and Aft Hanging Magazines o The electrical intake. o The hull void.

• Improved compartmentation for the Fore and Aft Hanging Magazines and the electrical intake.



BRE Global has estimated rough order of magnitude capital costs as:

• Suppression system: £300 000

• Detection system: £100 000.

Rough order of magnitude maintenance costs are:

• Suppression system: £1 500 pa

• Detection system: £1 500 pa.




11 References

1. ‘‘HMS Victory – Fire Suppression Assessment’, BMT Defence Services, NS181/R4664/1, November 2011.

2. ‘HMS Victory: Fire Suppression System’, BRE proposal 131784, revised 30 August 2012.

3. The Fire Protection Association, water mist questionnaire. Downloaded from: http://www.msilm.com/downloads/pdfs/water_mist_questionnaire.pdf

4. ‘Requirements and test methods for approval of watermist systems for use in commercial low hazard occupancies’, Loss Prevention Standard LPS 1283, LPCB, 2012.

5. EC Harris ‘A cost analysis of sprinklers for schools’ Department for Education and Skills, 2007.

6. Arup Fire ‘Sprinklers for Safety: Uses and benefits of incorporating sprinklers in buildings and structures ‘, BAFSA, 2006.

7. ‘Spon’s architects’ and builders’ price book 2012’ 137th Edition, Spon Press, London.

8. ‘HMS Victory: Review of Fire Suppression Options’ BRE Global Report 250573, 12th October 2009.

9. K McGrattan et al. ‘Fire Dynamics Simulator (Version 5) User’s Guide’ NIST Special Publication 1019-5, NIST, 2010.

10. Example of multiple jet controller, see www.angussprinkler.co.uk

11. G Cox and R Chitty ‘Some deterministic properties of unbound fire plumes’ Combustion and Flame, 39, p191-209, 1980.

12. www.industry.siemens.uk

13. HMS Victory Hazard Log (5115940-08 HMS Victory Hazard Log - Version 0-1 7-06-2013.xlsx).

http://www.msilm.com/downloads/pdfs/water_mist_questionnaire.pdf

http://www.angussprinkler.co.uk

http://www.industry.siemens.uk




Standard documents

BS 5306-0:2011 Fire protection installations and equipment on premises Part 0: Guide for selection of installed systems and other fire equipment’, BSI, 2011.

BS 5839-1:2013 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems in buildings – Part 1: Code of practice for design, installation, commissioning and maintenance in non-domestic premises’, BSI, 2013.

BS 5839-8:1998, Fire detection and alarm systems for buildings — Part 8: Code of practice for the design, installation and servicing of voice alarm systems, BSI, 1998.

BS 7273-3: 2008 ‘Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures –Part 3: Electrical actuation of pre-action water mist and sprinkler systems’, BSI, 2008.

BS 7273-5: 2008 ‘Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures Part 5: Electrical actuation of water mist systems (except pre-action systems)’, BSI, 2008.

BS EN 2:1992 ‘Classification of Fires’, BSI, 1992.

BS EN 54-2 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 2: Control and indicating equipment’, BSI 1997+A1:2006.

BS EN 54-3 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 3: Fire alarm devices — Sounders’, BSI, 2001.

BS EN 54-4 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 4: Power supply equipment’, BSI, 1998.

BS EN 54-5 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 5: Heat detectors — Point detectors’, BSI, 2001.

BS EN 54-7 ’Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 7: Smoke detectors — Point detectors using scattered light, transmitted light or ionization’, BSI, 2001.

BS EN 54-10 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 10: Flame detectors’, BSI, 2002.

BS EN 54-11 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 11: Manual call points’, BSI, 2001.

BS EN 54-12 ’Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 12: Smoke detectors — Optical beam detectors’, BSI, 2002.

BS EN 54-17 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 17 Short circuit isolators’, BSI, 2005.

BS EN 54-20 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 20: Aspirating smoke detectors’, BSI, 2006.

BS EN 54-23 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 23: Fire alarm devices — Visual alarm devices’, BSI, 2010.

BS EN 54-25 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 25: Components using radio links and system requirements’, BSI, 2008.

BS EN 12845:2004+A2:2009 ‘Fixed firefighting systems — Automatic sprinkler systems — Design, installation and maintenance’, BSI, 2009.




CEA 4012:2003 ‘Specification for fire detection and fire alarm systems – Requirements and test methods for multisensory detectors which respond to smoke and heat, and smoke detectors with more than one smoke sensor’, CEA, 2003.

CEN/TS 14816: 2008 ‘Fixed fire fighting systems – water spray systems – Design, installation and maintenance’, 2008.

DD 8489 ‘Fixed fire protection systems- Industrial water mist systems’, series, Drsafts for development, BSI, 2011.

DD 8489-1:2011 ‘Fixed fire protection systems – Industrial and commercial watermist systems – Part 1 Code of practice for design and installation’, Draft for development, BSI, 2011.

DD 8489-7:2011 ‘Fixed fire protection systems – Industrial and commercial watermist systems – Part 7 Tests and requirements for watermist systems for the protection of low hazard occupancies’, Draft for development, BSI, 2011.

PD 7974:1 ‘Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings – Part 1: Initiation and development of fire within the enclosure of origin’, BSI, 2003.

PD 7974:4 ‘Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings – Part 4: Detection of fire and activation of fire protection systems’, BSI, 2003.




Appendix A – Project timetable

Activity Date

Kick off meeting at BRE 27 February 2013

Visit HMS Victory • Richard Chitty • Raman Chagger (detection) • Corinne Williams (suppression)

12 March 2013

Stakeholder Workshop 20 March 2013

Task A End of Task Progress Report 27 March 2013

Meeting with Insurer: John Perera (RSA) Meeting with BAE and Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service

24 April 2013

Item in “Redbook News” April 2013 3 May 2013

Task B1 End of Task Progress Report 3 May 2013

Visit HMS Victory (discuss project with BAE, investigate air movement on ship, confirm some construction details)

21 June 2013

Visit Cutty Sark (as a visitor making observations of suppression system installation)

27 June 2013

Task D End of Task Progress Report (Reviewed) 28 June 2013

Task B2 End of Task Progress Report (for Review) 30 June 2013

Tasks E and F End of Task Progress Report (approved) 5 July 2013

Stakeholder meeting 10 July 2013

Tasks G, H and C End of Task Progress Report (approved) 19 July 2013

Delivery of hammock for fire testing (arranged at stakeholder meeting on 10th July ) 25 July 2013

Hammock fire test 30 July 2013

Final report (This Report) 2 August 2013




Appendix B - Stakeholders and consultation

A stakeholder workshop was held on 20th March 2013 to discuss the requirements and limitations for a fire suppression system on HMS Victory. This was attended by representatives of:

• The National Museum of the Royal Navy • The Royal Navy • BAE Systems

o HMS Victory Project Management o Product Safety o Fire Alarm Engineer o Quality Assurance

• BRE Global.

Further meetings were held with the Insurers and Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service.

The following key issues were identified:

• The suppression system is required to provide protection of the asset (i.e. HMS Victory and artefact on the Ship) during the current restoration programme (20 years) and beyond.

• The suppression system should not introduce any additional hazards to people on board the Ship.

• The installation of the suppression system must be sympathetic to the appearance, fabric and use of the Ship.

• The suppression system should provide protection throughout the inside of the Ship including the void between the inner and outer planking of the hull.

• The suppression system may be required to provide protection to parts of the external surface of the hull during restoration.

• It is not expected that conventional design rules for suppression systems can be followed throughout the Ship; however approved products should be used where possible.

• The final suppression system may include more than one form of suppression technology.

• The current detection system may require modification or replacement to provide integration with the proposed suppression system.

• The 24/7 presence of RN staff on the ship may be exploited (e.g. activation after investigation of first alarm).

• A zoned system is required.

• The suppression system will be expected to prevent the spread of fire until extinguishment by Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service (HFRS).




• The system must be adaptable to accommodate the requirements in different locations of the Ship at different times during the restoration programme.

Following the workshop it was established by BAE Systems that the current detection system on HMS Victory could not be extended and was approaching the end of its serviceable life. As a consequence “suppression system” in the above list should be read as “suppression and detection systems”.




Appendix C – Classification of fires

Fires involving different materials generally require different extinguishing media. In most cases, use of the “wrong” media on a particular fire will just result in inefficient extinguishment. However, there are some cases where use of the “wrong” media will be dangerous, intensifying the fire or creating an explosion hazard (e.g. applying water to a metal fire).

To clarify this situation, the fire protection industry has identified different classes of fires and available extinguishing methods can be selected based on their appropriateness for particular fire classes. The classes are specified in BS EN 2:1992 ‘Classification of Fires’. These classes are described below with the relevance of the types of materials that may be present on HMS Victory.

Class A: ‘Fires involving solid materials, usually of an organic nature, in which combustion normally takes places with the formation of glowing embers’

Typical materials: Wood, textiles, paper, plastics

Relevance to HMS Victory: Most of the materials on HMS Victory would produce Class A fires; this includes the display materials (e.g. textiles) office and cabin contents and the structure of the Ship.

Class B: ‘Fires involving liquids or liquefiable solids’

Typical materials: Petrol, diesel, solvents, some paints and varnishes.

Relevance to HMS Victory: During normal running of the Ship, the amount of combustible liquids on board would be very small (some cleaning fluids, probably less than 500ml); however, for some restoration processes significant quantities may be present (varnish, paint, solvents, epoxy systems for wood preservation). The preservation activities will have additional fire suppression requirements determined by individual risk assessments for the specific tasks. These may include bunding (creating a dam around an area to limit the extent of a spill) and availability of portable foam extinguishers; these may be part of a “spills kit”.

Class C: ‘Fires involving gases’

Typical materials: Methane, propane, acetylene

Relevance to HMS Victory: HMS Victory does not have a gas supply. During restoration work, there may be a requirement for propane/acetylene for hot working. The detection/suppression system may require isolation /override/alternative control during hot working; however, a functioning




fire suppression system / procedure will still be required as this may be expected to be when the Ship is at greatest risk from fire.

Class D: ‘Fires involving metals’

Typical materials: Magnesium, Lithium

Relevance to HMS Victory: Remote: The only scenario that BRE Global can envisage of a metal fire on HMS Victory would involve Lithium batteries (or similar battery technology). While there have been highly publicised incidents relating to lithium-ion batteries (e.g. a fire on a Boeing 787 “Dreamliner”, Boston 7/1/2013), these incidents are infrequent and, considering the large number of these batteries in use (e.g. in mobile phones, pads, cameras etc.), do not present a significant risk.

Class F: ‘Fires involving cooking media (vegetable or animal oils and fats) in cooking appliances’

Typical materials: Cooking oil

Relevance to HMS Victory: None. Methods for preparing food for hospitality functions are restricted so that the use of hot cooking oils on board the Ship is not required. This restriction needs to be maintained in future versions of the Ship’s procedures.

Electrical fires Electrical fires are not classified separately as electricity is an ignition source, not a fuel source. Generally, an electrically initiated fire would be a Class A fire; however, the supply must be isolated before an electrically conducting extinguishing media is applied (some water extinguishers may contain an additive to allow their use on electrical fires). A procedure for reinstating power will be required. Note some electrical devices may store a significant residual electrical charge when switched off.

Relevance to HMS Victory: The electrical system on HMS Victory is sparse, other than the office area at the aft of the Middle Gun Deck. The main electrical intake is near the bread store aft of the Orlop deck in a purpose-built enclosure. All circuits on HMS Victory are protected by circuit breakers that would be expected to operate rapidly in the event of a fire, thereby removing any electrical hazard from a fire.

Summary

In general, any fires on HMS Victory would be expected to be Class A fires; however, consideration should be given to the use of a non-conducting extinguishing media to protect the electrical intake. In addition, areas of the Ship being restored may involve the use of materials that would have fires of other classes; these will require specific risk assessments.




Appendix D - Fire growth and suppression

Most fires develop from small sources, for example discarded smoking materials, an over-heated electrical item or a small flame. There may be a long incubation period while heat accumulates in the material initially involved, until an established flaming ignition occurs. The growth rate then accelerates as more fuel ignites creating a larger flaming region that, in turn, involves more fuel (a positive feedback cycle). This growth may become very rapid, almost explosive, and is finally limited by the extent of the exposed fuel or the availability of oxygen for the combustion process. The rapid growth leading to ignition of all the combustible surfaces in a compartment is known as flashover.

From the initial ignition, the fire will generate smoke and hot gases. These will initially move away from the fire source driven by the normal air movement in the space (e.g. ventilation air flow). However as the fire grows, the heat output increase and the buoyancy of the fire gases rapidly become significant and the movement of smoke is predominantly upwards where it will accumulate under a ceiling forming a layer. At some point, early in the development of a fire, smoke detection devices should operate.

Ideally, operation of a suppression system would lead to a fire being extinguished; however due to the uncertainties in any fire scenario it is more realistic to assume that a system will stop the growth of a fire and begin to reduce the heat output.

Figure D1 shows the growth phases of a fire without a suppression system (red line) and the effect of a suppression system controlling (dark blue line), and suppressing the fire (light blue line). Figure D1 also shows a case when the suppression system fails to control the fire which continues to grow (green line).

The objective for a suppression system on HMS Victory is to prevent further growth of the fire after the system operates so that the local authority fire service (Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service) do not have an extensive fire to extinguish and that fire damage on the Ship is confined to the area around the initial ignition location.




Figure D1 - Fire development

Fire growth rate

A key input variable for most fire safety engineering problems is a description of the fire growth period shown in Figure D1. This determines the time to detection of a fire and the time before conditions that are hazardous to life (or property) occur, leading to estimates for the time available to evacuate a building. However, except for some clearly defined hazards, (e.g. an area surrounding a piece of equipment where a release of fuel or oil could accumulate) fire growth and heat release rate are difficult to quantify. To address this problem, a group of four generic fire growth curves have been defined for fire safety engineering design. These are summarised in Table D1, from BS 7974:1‘Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings – Part 1: Initiation and development of fire within the enclosure of origin’.

Table D1 - Design fire curves Name Example Time to reach

1MW (seconds) Formulae (t time in seconds)

SLOW Picture gallery 600 Q=0.0029 t2 MEDIUM Dwelling/office 300 Q=0.012 t2 FAST Shop 150 Q=0.047 t2 ULTRA FAST Industrial

storage/plant 75 Q=0.188 t2

Most of the items on HMS Victory would be difficult to ignite and not burn especially rapidly and could be represented by a SLOW or MEDIUM fire growth rate. Appendix L describes a fire test using a HMS Victory Hammock that burnt close to the SLOW rate. The heat release rate of the SLOW and MEDIUM fire growth rates are shown in Figure D2 with an estimate of the flame heights based on those heat release rates. It should be noted that these fire growth curves may be preceded by a long incubation period (as shown in Figure D1) from the time of ignition, while the fire becomes established.




Figure D2 - SLOW and MEDIUM fire growth rates

To illustrate the values plotted in Figure D2, Figure D3 is a photograph of a fire with a heat release rate of approximately 100kW. To grow to this stage from an established ignition would take about 3 minutes with a SLOW growth rate and 1.5 minutes with a MEDIUM growth rate.

Figure D3 - Clothing and upholstery fire of approximately 100kW

Response time for detectors and heat detectors

Automatic sprinkler heads and water mist nozzles operate when a heat sensitive component in the head/nozzle breaks. These components (usually glass bulbs, but also metal links) are designed and tested




to operate at a specified temperature and time response. A typical sprinkler head is shown in Figure D4, highlighting the heat sensitive component.

Figure D4 - Typical sprinkler head

Due to its thermal mass, the temperature of the heat sensitive element will lag behind the temperature of the surrounding gases. Figure D5 shows the temperature of the heat sensitive element of a head suddenly exposed to hot gases from a fire. (This is the situation reproduced in the “plunge test” [8] used to measure the response time of automatic heads/nozzles). This shows that the heat sensitive element can take a significant time to reach the local gas temperature.

Figure D5 - Temperature rise of heat sensitive element

To predict the operation time of an automatic head/nozzle, Equation D1 taken from PD 7974:4 4 ‘Application of fire safety engineering principles to the design of buildings – Part 4: Detection of fire and activation of fire protection systems’ equation 4 may be used:

Equation D1

Where

Heat sensitive component (glass bulb)




Td is the temperature of the heat sensitive component (°C) Tg is the gas temperature (°C) u is the speed of the gases passing the heat sensitive element (m/s) Tp is the temperature of the pipework (°C) C is a conduction factor (m/s)1/2 RTI is the Response time index (m1/2s1/2)

The values of C and RTI are characteristics of specific heads/nozzles and values can be found in manufacturer’s data sheets and approvals documentation.

There are a range of calculation methods that can be used to estimate the temperature of hot gases in a compartment with a fire, depending on the fire growth rate, the compartment size, areas of openings, wall materials etc. These range from correlations derived from experimental data to computational fluid dynamics (a technique used to predict the flow of fluids, e.g. the flow of air over an aerodynamic surface, weather forecasting and performance of internal combustion engines). These can provide the gas temperature and speed required by equation D1 so that the operation times of automatic suppression heads can be predicted under different circumstances.

In addition, smoke detectors do not respond instantly to the presences of a fire, smoke must travel from the fire source and then accumulate inside the detector housing where either the obscuration or temperature of the smoke is measured; this is much faster (a few seconds) than a the time required to operate an automatic suppression head/nozzle (possibly several minutes).




Appendix E - Multiple criteria decision analysis

Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis

Multiple Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) provides a way of comparing a number of different options by assessing each option against a number of criteria. In this case we are considering the performance of fire detection and suppression systems in different areas of HMS Victory (e.g. the cabins on the Orlop deck) using criteria such as visual appearance of the system, ease of maintenance, “damage” to the Ship required for installation, etc. This provides a systematic method of comparison.

For each area on the Ship, values are assigned, indicating the relative value of a particular system considering each of the criteria. A total, T, is then found for system/area using

Equation E1

Where F is the functional suitability of the system and

wi is the weighting of criteria i

vi the assigned value of criteria i

The ranges of values and weightings have been selected so that high values are “good”. The option with highest total for each area of the Ship will indicate the most appropriate system for that area. The factor F ensures that the total for a system that is not practical or will not function in a particular area will give a total value of zero regardless of any other values.

BRE Global has selected the weightings and values based on the outcomes of Stakeholder workshop and further discussions with BAE, the insurer (Royal Sun Alliance) and fire-fighters (Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service) and the capabilities of each system. This is a subjective determination based on the information available to BRE Global at this time. The Excel workbook used to perform this MCDA has been supplied to the client to modify if alternative values and weightings seem more appropriate in the future.

Spaces on HMS Victory

For this analysis, HMS Victory has been divided into the areas given in Table E1, acknowledging that there may not be a “one answer fits all” outcome.




Table E1 - Areas of Ship Area Description

Gun decks Upper, Middle and Lower Gun Decks (open spaces) (also sick bay)

RN Offices RN area on Middle Gun Deck (including Quartermaster’s cabin) Aft cabins Grand cabin, galley, Nelson’s dining and sleeping area,

Hardy’s cabin and adjacent cabins Orlop – open area Rope store, “shrine”, surgeon’s area Orlop – aft cabins After cabins, bread store and walkways Orlop – electrical intake Electrical intake and panel near Bread store Orlop forward compartments Boatswain’s, gunner’s, carpenter’s cabins/workshops, walkways Grand magazine Includes access routes from Orlop Hanging magazines Hold Include lower pump well and coal store Hull void Gap between inner and outer hull planking External decks and dock Poop deck, quarter deck

Hull void

BRE Global has not included a fire suppression system in the hull void. The fire detection system for a hull void fire has been included and this should provide the general location of the fire. Due to the restricted ventilation, fires in the hull void should develop slowly, but could develop into a large smouldering area. On arrival, the Hampshire Fire and Rescue Service should be able to precisely locate the fire with thermal imaging cameras; however extinguishing a hull void fire would be difficult and would probably require damage to the internal hull to provide access to the space.

External decks and dry dock

Suppression systems for the external decks and in the dry dock are outside the scope of this investigation and have not been included in the MCDA.




Appendix F - Fire suppression technologies

Previous reports [1], [8] and BS 5306-0:2011 ‘Fire protection installations and equipment on premises Part 0: Guide for selection of installed systems and other fire equipment’ summarise the various suppression systems that are currently available. These are listed below, indicating their suitability or otherwise for use on HMS Victory.

Water based systems Water is the most widely used fire extinguishing medium and is a highly efficient due to its high heat capacity removing heat from both hot gases and the fuel. Additives can be added to increase the wetting properties and reduce electrical conductivity.

Water can be delivered through sprinkler sprays, water mist or drencher systems and is effective on Class A fires.

Effects on people

Water is non-toxic (stored water needs to be monitored for contaminants such as legionella) but may present a hazard in the presence of live electrical systems. This should be minimised by the uses of Residual Current Circuit Breakers (RCCB) units.

Effects on property

Dissolved salts may be corrosive. Automatic systems would usually result in a localised application of water limiting any damage to property.

Suitability for HMS Victory: Water is an excellent extinguishing medium for the Class A fires that would be most probable on HMS Victory. There are a number of options for the delivery system that would be appropriate for different areas of the Ship. Providing a means of removing water discharged by a suppression system from the Ship, particularly on the lower decks, needs to be considered.

Gas extinguishing systems Gas extinguishing systems suppress fires either by reducing the concentration of oxygen in the vicinity of a fire (by dilution) so that the atmosphere is outside the flammability limits of the fuel, or to interact with the combustion chemistry breaking the sequence of reactions. There may also be a secondary cooling effect.

Gas extinguishing systems work well in confined spaces where ventilation can be controlled to prevent loss of the extinguishing media and replacement with fresh air. Significant quantities of the gases need to be stored in pressurised vessels near the location where they will be required.

Hypoxic systems are used as a fire prevention measure by creating a low oxygen concentration atmosphere to prevent ignition.




Effects on people

Inert gas systems function by reducing the oxygen concentration from 21% (normal oxygen concentration in air) to between 12% and 14% so that combustion is not supported. This may cause adverse health effects. The use of carbon dioxide could create lethal conditions in confined spaces. Halocarbon systems chemically interfere with combustion reactions and may create toxic products.

Release of a gaseous suppression media can create a loud noise and condensation of water drops from the atmosphere which may obscure vision.

Effects on property

Inert gases are “clean” and do not leave deposits that require cleaning after use. Halocarbons may produce very corrosive decomposition products. The discharge of a gas suppression system may also result in a high pressure rise that could be damaging and so adequate pressure relief needs to be provided,

Suitability for HMS Victory: The well ventilated environment of HMS Victory is not compatible with the air tightness required for effective operation of a gas suppression system. Operation of the system may produce an atmosphere that would be harmful to any occupants on the Ship. The presence of pressurised gas storage on or near the Ship introduces an additional hazard in the area. A gas system may be appropriate to protect the electrical take on HMS Victory, this a well contained area and the “clean” nature of gas suppression would facilitate a prompt reinstatement of the electrical supply after an incident.

Powder systems A selection of powders is available for either general use (ABC powders) or specific hazards (BC powders for liquids and gases or D powders for metal fires). Powders are most commonly found in portable fire extinguishers, but they can be used in localised fixed systems for specific hazards. ABC powders melt in contact with a burning solid and form a coating that isolates the fuel from the surrounding air. A large system to protect the whole of HMS Victory would not be practical and powders are not considered any further at this stage. Powders (as portable extinguishers) may, however, be a suitable suppression media for materials used during restoration.

Aerosol systems Aerosol systems release small solid particles that interact with, and stop, the combustion chemistry. These may be condensed systems where the particles are generated in the system chemically, or dispersed systems where the particles are stored as a powder and released with a propellant gas. Aerosol systems may be used in the presence of electrical systems. However, these, like gas systems, need to be used in a confined space. This is a relatively new technology.

Effects on people

The aerosol will obscure vision and may cause breathing problems and therefore they should not be activated in occupied spaces.




Effects on property

Due to its nature, the fine aerosol will lead to a deposit of fine powder (mainly potassium salts) that may be difficult to remove in complex spaces. Condensed systems may release the aerosol at a relatively high temperature (200-300°C)

Suitability for HMS Victory: Aerosol systems would not be suitable for general application throughout the Ship for the same reasons as gas systems. However use in confined localised areas with electrical equipment, such as the main power intake in the bread store and possibly the hanging magazine, is an option.

Foams Fire-fighting foams form a barrier between the fuel surface and air preventing oxygen and vaporised fuel mixing and burning. There may also be a cooling effect. Different foams are available that are optimised to different classes of fire. High expansion foams can be used to fill large volumes whilst other foams are intended to cover the burning surface and adjacent items.

Effects on people

Foams are not toxic but may cause respiratory problems if they are applied as a spray. High expansion foams applied to a significant depth could result in people being totally immersed in the foam losing vision and hearing and becoming disorientated. For total flooding systems a warning should be given before the system is activated to allow any occupants of the space to leave.

Effects on property

Most fire-fighting foams can cause corrosion and items that have been exposed to these foams would require careful cleaning.

Suitability for HMS Victory: Foams would be very difficult to clean from some of the artefacts on the Ship (e.g. ropes and cables on the Orlop deck). Low and medium expansion foams are especially suitable for fires involving flammable liquids, which would not normally be found on HMS Victory. High expansion foams can be used on goods stored in high racks or in confined spaces such as cable tunnels, however they provide very little cooling which would be required to remove the residual heat from the class A fires that would be predominant on HMS Victory.

Containment

As an alternative to suppression or extinguishing system, the spread of fire can be limited by using fire resisting materials in the structure. This is frequently achieved in buildings by constructing fire resisting walls, with fire rated doors, windows and seals.

Effects on people

Introducing doors etc. to create a barrier in the case of a fire may impede escape routes and self-closing devices may need to be used to ensure doors are kept shut during a fire.

Effects on property

Fire resisting walls can be significant structures; however they are very effective in preventing the spread of fire through a building.




Suitability for HMS Victory:

Introducing fire resisting barriers on HMS Victory is not an option; as this would involve changes to the fabric and layout of the Ship; however HMS Victory was constructed with some compartments having (by the standards of the day) some fire resistance. These compartments are the Ship’s magazines which were constructed with consideration to preventing a fire on the Ship reaching the explosives stored in the magazines. Containment is an approach that should be considered for the fore and aft hanging magazines.

Choice of suppression media

The information above has been collated in Table F1 using a traffic light system to indicate suitability.

Table F1 - Selection of fire suppression media

Suppression Media

Class A fires Effects on people Effects on property

Suitability for HMS Victory

Water Local wetting Local wetting, runoff below fire area

Gas Require sealed space

Suitable in non- public confined areas

Aerosol Breathing and vision Difficult to clean up Suitable in non- public confined areas

Foams High expansions foams not suitable for deep seated fires

Breathing and vision Difficult to clean up

Compartmentation Limits spread of fire Restricts egress Relies on structure Generally unsuitable, but good for a few specific areas

A more comprehensive version of Table F1 is provided in the BMT report [1]).

Good

OK

Unsuitable

None

Limited

Unsuitable

Minor

Limited

Unsuitable

Good

OK

Unsuitable




From Table F1, the BMT [1] and the BRE [8] reports, BRE Global has concluded that the most suitable extinguishing medium for use in a suppression system on HMS Victory would be water, although for some confined non-public spaces with a specific hazard (e.g. the electrical intake) aerosols, gas systems or containment may be appropriate.




Appendix G - Water-based fire suppression systems

There are several methods for delivering water in an automatic suppression system:

• Drenchers (also known as deluge or water spray systems)

• Sprinklers

• High pressure water mist

• Low pressure water mist.

Water systems may be “wet”, “dry” or “alternate” systems. Wet systems are charged with water so that immediately the system is activated water is present at the delivery head. Dry and pre-action systems do not initially contain water and there is time delay between when the system is activated to when water flows from the pumps to the delivery head. These systems are used when there are low ambient temperatures and there is a risk of water freezing in the pipe work. Alternate systems are set up as wet systems when there is no risk of freezing (i.e. in the summer) and drained and run as a dry system when the ambient temperature is lower (i.e. in winter).

Note that water storage tanks for water based fire suppression systems may require precautions to control legionella.

Drencher systems

Drencher systems are simply a group of water spray nozzles connected to a water supply and pumps that deliver a spray of water over walls, roofs, windows etc. to protect them from an adjacent fire. Typical applications are to provide protection to LPG storage tanks and to cool the safety curtain in a proscenium style theatre stage. Drenchers do not usually provide localised water delivery but provide a sheet of water over a surface for cooling and to reduce thermal radiation from a near-by fire. The heads are available to give different water distributions for various applications.

Relevant standard CEN/TS 14816: 2008 ‘Fixed fire fighting systems – water spray systems – Design, installation and maintenance’.

Relevance to HMS Victory Internally, the requirement for a suppression system on HMS Victory is to ensure control of a localised fire. A drencher system would not discriminate enough and would deliver excessive amounts of water which could damage artefacts and may be detrimental to the conservation of the Ship.

Externally, HMS Victory is not sited near to any other structures that would pose a significant hazard to the Ship if they were involved in a fire. However, a drencher system may be appropriated




for the protection of the exposed decks (Poop deck, Quarter deck etc.). In addition, temporary drencher systems to protect parts of the external hull in the dry dock during restoration may be appropriate. A system could be integrated into the scaffolding.

Sprinkler systems

Sprinkler systems are designed to deliver water sprays with a relatively large drop size. Normally only a few heads would operate so that water delivery is limited to the area around the fire. The sensing elements may either be glass bulbs or metal links and are available in a range of operating temperatures and response times.

Sprinkler systems are a well-established technology dating back over 120 years.

Relevant standard BS EN 12845:2004+A2:2009 ‘Fixed firefighting systems — Automatic sprinkler systems — Design, installation and maintenance’ BSI, 2009.

Relevance to HMS Victory Sprinkler systems are suitable for Class A fires and the relatively large water drop size will allow water to reach the fuel surface.

Water mist systems

Water mist systems generate fine water drops to fill a volume involved in a fire; the small drops are carried into the flames by convective air currents and extinguish or suppress the flames by cooling and local oxygen reduction. The mist reduces thermal radiation reaching non burning items to reduce fire spread. Wetting and cooling of deep seated fires may not be very effective. Water mist systems use significantly less water than sprinkler systems, reducing potential water damage.

Low pressure water mist systems produce drops in the range of 0.2 to 1mm diameter and high pressure mist systems in the range of 0.025 to 0.2mm, compared with drops from sprinklers in the range of 1 to 5mm.

Smaller drops create a much larger surface area for heat transfer between flames and hot gases giving a greater cooling effect than systems producing larger drops. Small drops are easily influenced by air movement; this may be advantageous as drops may be drawn into the fire, but in some locations ventilation air currents could direct the drops away from the fire.

Water mist is an emerging technology and standards and standard test methods are still evolving; however the technology has become established for some applications.

Due to the bespoke nature of water mist systems, water mist system standards contain “generic rules” rather than “prescriptive design rules”. Therefore, relevant fire performance tests that are appropriate for the ‘real life’ application for a manufacturer’s proposed water mist system design are critical and necessary to determine the systems design and components characteristics.

It is essential that fire performance tests are carried out by a recognised third party laboratory. The purpose of these fire tests is to assess the performance of the water mist system. These fire tests




should be representative of the premises and likely realistic fire scenarios. The system tested should be the same as that proposed for an intended real application.

If possible, fire tests should be to an appropriate standard fire test protocol but may need to be specially designed.

Successful results in the fire performance tests are critical and necessary to determine the systems design and components characteristics as well as the permissible scope of application. The fire tests are used to establish for each manufacturer’s equipment: the necessary number of nozzles; nozzle locations; nozzle spacing; system flows; system operating pressures and other required design characteristics.

Relevant standard DD 8489 ‘Fixed fire protection systems- Industrial water mist systems’, series, BSI, 2011.

Relevance to HMS Victory The lower water volume requirement and smaller pipe sizes required are attractive for an installation on HMS Victory. In addition, the mechanisms where water droplets drift into the flaming region make the systems suitable for complex spaces. The fire suppression performance of water mist on the fire load present in HMS Victory will need to be demonstrated.

The small water drops created by water mist suppression systems can be deflected by air movement caused by the wind or natural (buoyancy driven) ventilation. HMS Victory is a very open structure and quite strong air movement can be felt on some occasions. This will need to be considered when assessing the possibility of using a water mist suppression system on HMS Victory. The use of smoke curtains may increase the effectiveness of a water mist suppression system in addition to limiting smoke spread.

Water mist technology is present in some heritage sites (e.g. Cutty Sark).

Comparison of water suppression technologies

Water was identified as being the most appropriate fire suppression media for use in most area of HMS Victory in Appendix F. Table G1 compares sprinkler systems with low pressure (system pressure is less than or equal to 12.5 bar) and high pressure (system pressure is greater than or equal to 35 bar) water mist systems.

This table is used to guide the selection of values for the MCDA in Appendix I




Table G1 - Qualitative comparison between suppression systems (sprinklers, low pressure water mist and high pressure water mist)

Suppression technology Aspect Sprinkler system Low pressure water

mist system High pressure water mist system

General Design performance objective

Same Same Same

Design rules Standardised rules available for design and installation which will be used where applicable

Bespoke systems, design will be in accordance with the supplier’s design manual

Bespoke systems, design will be in accordance with the supplier’s design manual

Installation Many UK third party approved installers available

Very few UK third party approved installers (currently one)

Very few UK third party approved installers (currently two)

Maintenance Need regular maintenance in accordance with the standardised rules

Need regular maintenance in accordance with the client/manufacturer’s agreed scheme

Need regular maintenance in accordance with the client/manufacturer’s agreed scheme

Water supplies Quantity Stored water Less stored water Even less stored water Medium Water Water

Can sometimes involve the use of water additives

Water Can also involve the use of inert gas propellants

Water quality - Water quality needs to be considered

Water quality needs to be considered

System pressures ~4 bar < 12 Bar

Ø 35 bar Pressure Equipment Regulations need to be adhered to

Duration of water supplies

Depends on hazard classification



Water droplet size About 1 to 5 mm diameter

About 0.2 to 1 mm diameter

About 0.025 to 0.2 mm diameter

Components Third party approvals

Third party approved products available for most components

No European third party approved products available. Some nozzles may be internationally approved

No European third party approved products available. Some nozzles may be internationally approved

Heads/nozzles The number of nozzles and their spacings are specified in design rules, where applicable

The number of nozzles and their spacings are stated by the supplier in the design manual, verified by successful and relevant fire performance tests

The number of nozzles and their spacings are stated by the supplier in the design manual, verified by successful and relevant fire performance tests




Nozzles have small orifices, strainers and can involve moving parts

Nozzles have small orifices, strainers and can involve moving parts

Pipework array Larger (inner) bore pipe Various options for pipe material

Smaller (inner) bore pipe Various options for pipe materials

Even smaller (inner) bore pipe Various options for pipe materials Stainless steel pipe needed

Water delivery and fire performance Water delivery density

Can specify minimum mm/min water delivery density for different fire hazards

Minimum water delivery density will vary between suppliers and depend on fire performance test evidence for different fire hazards

Minimum water delivery density will vary between suppliers and depend on fire performance test evidence for different fire hazards

Fire performance tests

This may be needed for applications falling outside the standardised rules and specialised sprinkler heads

Fire performance test always necessary to prove performance and determine water mist design parameters for particular application

Fire performance test always necessary to prove performance and determine water mist design parameters for particular application

Performance sensitivity

- Good performance in small sealed spaces. Good on some fire types. Can be detrimentally affected by ventilation, some fire types

Good performance in small sealed spaces. Good on some fire types. Can be detrimentally affected by ventilation, some fire types

Reliability Reliability Proven high reliability

in the long term - historical performance records, established standards for design, installation and maintenance, third party approved products and installers

Emerging technology, reliability is not always proven in the long term

Emerging technology, reliability is not always proven in the long term




Appendix H - Suppression system activation

Water based suppression systems can be activated in a number of ways either from a detection system or by a thermally sensitive bulb or strut built into an automatic delivery head/nozzle or a device controlling a number of open delivery heads/nozzle (multiple jet controllers).

Automatic head/nozzles

An automatic head/nozzle includes a thermally sensitive bulb or metal strut that fractures when heated. When the bulb or strut breaks the device opens to allow the flow of water. The head/nozzle acts as both detector and delivery point so that water is only discharged from the affected head/nozzle.

Wet and dry systems

Where there is no risk of freezing the pipe work can be charged with water up to the nozzles; these are wet systems. If there is a possibility of low temperatures that could cause water to freeze in the pipework then the pipe port is initially pressurised with air; these are dry systems. When a head/nozzle in a dry pipe system operates the air pressure is released starting the pumps to provide the supply of water into the pipework and to the activated head/nozzle. The time for pumps to start and supply water to the head/nozzle introduces a delay into the operation of a dry suppression system.

Pre-action systems

Pre-action systems use automatic heads/nozzles. The pipe work is normally dry, but when a fire is detected by a detection system, the water supply is activated and pipes are charged so that when automatic head/nozzle operates, the water supply is available. This reduces the time delay between head/nozzle activation and water delivery.

Water spray (deluge) systems

These are systems with open delivery head/nozzle. The water flow may be controlled by a multiple jet controller (MJC) where a water flow valve is operated by a device similar to a sprinkler bulb or link. The pipe work is arranged so that operation of the MJC delivers water to a number of open heads/nozzles.. Alternatively the water flow can be initiated by a detection system. Water is delivered from all the heads/nozzles linked to the valve.

Summary

Systems with open heads/nozzles heads are used to protect either a specific space or a localised hazard within a space. Closed heads/nozzles systems are more discriminating and deliver water close to the fire source rather than a prescribed location and do not require an additional detection system unless pre-action operation is required.




Relevant standards

BS 7273-3: 2008 ‘Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures – Part 3: Electrical actuation of pre-action water mist and sprinkler systems’, BSI, 2008.

BS 7273-5: 2008 ‘Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures - Part 5: Electrical actuation of water mist systems (except pre-action systems)’, BSI, 2008.

Relevance to HMS Victory

Due to the low ambient temperature during the winter, HMS Victory will require a dry system and would benefit from a pre-action system so that pumps would be running and water can be delivered as soon as an automatic suppression head/nozzle operates.

Sprinkler head or water mist nozzle head location

A major issue on HMS Victory will be the obstructions (beams) and low height of the deckhead. Sprinkler heads and water mist nozzles are designed for a ceiling height of at least 2.4m; the minimum clear height on HMS Victory is approximately 1.6m. This means a head or nozzle mounted near the deckhead will cover a smaller area than would be expected from a head/nozzle installed in a more conventional scenario. In addition, the beams will also restrict the water delivery. This may be less of an issue with a water mist system. The presence of the beams will also direct the flow of smoke and hot gases across the Ship so that heads or nozzles relatively close to the fire may not operate promptly. Figure H1 shows a fire scenario with a water spray in a conventional scenario (e.g. shop or office).

Figure H1 - Conventional fire scenario with water spray

Figure H2 shows how the low deckhead height and beams could affect the operation of a water based suppression system on HMS Victory. Figure H2 shows the beams deflecting smoke and hot gases away from the head or nozzle on the left delaying its operation and restricts the spread of the water spray from the other head or nozzle on the right.




Figure H2 - Possible fire scenario on HMS Victory with a water spray (looking across the Ship)

Consequently, an array of automatic heads or nozzles between the beams under the deck head on HMS Victory could result in reduced water coverage (and thereby reduced suppression capability) on a fire compared to a similar scenario with a flat ceiling.

Placing a head or nozzle under the beams is not an option on most parts of the Ship as this would be hazard to people on the Ship, be susceptible to vandalism or accidental damage and not satisfy the criteria for having a low visual impact.

On HMS Victory, it will not possible to deliver water onto a fire as effectively as in a conventional office or storage water based fire suppression system; however, adequate water may be provided to the area surrounding the fire to significantly reduce the rate of fire spread so that fire-fighters will encounter a readily controllable fire.

Movement smoke and heat from a fire on HMS Victory

To predict the temperature of the smoke and hot gases at the location of an automatic head, the growth rate of possible fire scenarios needs to be considered. This will depend a large number of factors including the burning material, size of the ignition source, orientation of the burning object, ventilation etc. The number of obstructions (e.g. beams) under the deckhead on HMS Victory means that it is not possible to use simplified calculation methods to estimate of the temperature of the smoke and hot gases from a fire at different location on a deck; however, a number of software tools based on Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) have been developed and validated for fire safety applications.

One of these tools, Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) [9], developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), has been used here to simulate a fire in a simplified cross section of a single deck of HMS Victory to examine the general smoke movement pattern and to estimate the operation time of automatic heads/nozzles and smoke detectors at different locations.

Figure H3 shows the location of head/nozzles and smoke detectors on the inner hull, between the deckhead beams and under the deckhead beams for two initial simulations using SLOW and MEDIUM growth rate fires (Appendix D). These simulations are confined to head/nozzle/detector operation times and do not include any suppression of the fire by the water sprays so that the operation times of head/nozzles at alternative locations can be compared.




Figure H3 - SLOW and MEDIUM fire growth rate simulation configurations

Table H1 shows the results of the initial simulations.

Table H1 – Estimated detector/head operation times (fire growth rate) Location SLOW growth rate fire MEDIUM growth rate fire

Time (s) Heat release rate (kW)

Time (s) Heat release rate (kW)

S1 Smoke detector between beams 110 35 85 86 S2 Smoke detector between beams 92 24 77 71 S3 Smoke detector between beams 81 19 66 52 S4 Smoke detector between beams 52 7 38 17 H1 Heat detector on Hull 287 238 209 524 H2 Heat detector on Hull 219 139 157 295 H3 Heat detector on Hull 201 117 152 277 H4 Heat detector on Hull 179 93 139 213 H5 Heat detector between beams >330 >250 H6 Heat detector between beams 312 282 239 685 H7 Heat detector between beams 280 58 209 524 H8 Heat detector between beams 142 230 108 140 H9 Heat detector under beam 282 264 226 612 H10 Heat detector under beam 302 89 213 544 H11 Heat detector under beam 284 174 184 406 H12 Heat detector under beam 245 233 126 190 H13 Heat detector under beam 176 264 55 36

If the fire is located under a bay between a pair of beams containing a smoke detector or heat detector, then there will be rapid operation of either type of device. In other cases, smoke detectors between beams will operate first followed by heat detectors on the hull or under the beams.

Optical smoke detector Heat detector RTI 50, operating temperature 68C

H4

H1 H2 H3

H8 H7 H6 H5

H13

H12 H11 H10

S4

S1

S2 S3

H9




It should be noted that when the smoke and hot gases from a fire near the centre of the Ship reach the hull, the hot gas layer deepens and envelopes heat detectors mounted on the hull of the Ship below the level of the deckhead beams, see Figure H4.

Figure H4 - Hot gas and smoke temperature across Ship from a central fire

Operation times of detectors and automatic suppression nozzles

Figure H5 shows the general pattern of smoke movement under the deckhead in the relative open areas of the Ship, based on the simulation discussed previously.

Figure H5 - General pattern of smoke spread

Most of the detectors on HMS Victory are located at the deckhead in bays between beams. The operation times of detectors S3 and S4 and heat detectors H6, H7 and H8 illustrate the impact of obstructions on the deckhead. Taking the results of the MEDIUM fire simulation, if the fire occurs under a bay between beams beam with smoke and heat detectors then the smoke detector (S4) will respond in about 40 seconds and

1. Smoke moves from fire to hull between beams

2. Smoke layer becomes deeper at the side of Ship

3. Smoke fills the bay between beams from side

4. Smoke spreads from Hull to centre

Deep layer




the heat detector (H8), which could be an automatic nozzle for a suppression system, would operate at about 1 minute 50 seconds.

However, if the fire was not under a channel between beams, then the smoke detector (S3) would operate after 1 minute and the heat detector (H7) after 3 minutes 30 seconds. This indicates that unless detectors and automatic suppression system nozzles are located between every primary beam, detection and suppression system operation times could be significantly delayed. During this delay, the fire will grow, creating a more difficult task for the suppression system and increasing the amount of smoke being distributed throughout the Ship.

However, the deepening of the smoke layer when it reaches the hull of the Ship can be exploited. From Table H1, the operation of the heat detectors H2, H3 and H4 is between 2 minute 20 and 2 minutes 40 seconds, indicating a suppression nozzle at any of these sidewall locations would operate about a minute faster that a nearer head/nozzle in a beam channel that is adjacent to the fire. The sidewall location is not, however, the best location for water delivery, if the fire is located on the centre line of the Ship.

Locating automatic heads/nozzles along the inside of the Hull of the Ship could provide a reasonable response time and the water spray/mist may not be significantly obstructed by the deckhead beams; however, the water may not be able to reach the centre line of the Ship (up to 7m), especially considering the number of artefacts that are displayed on the Ship that could obstruct the delivery of water.

A possible solution is to use a multiple jet controller (MJC) on the side of the Ship to control the flow of water to a number of open sprinkler heads or water mist nozzles on a pipe directed towards the centre line of the Ship. A MJC is a device with a heat sensitive element similar to an automatic head/nozzle. However, on operation, instead or releasing water directly, the MJC operates a valve to allow the flow of water along a pipe for delivery at a number of heads/nozzles. A typical MJC is shown in Figure H6 [10].

Figure H6 - Multiple Jet Controller

Controlling the delivery of water from the side of the Ship also partly addresses the issue of water distribution to different parts of the Ship.




Detailed simulations

The simulations used to create Table H1 used a simplified representative section of a single deck of the Ship modelled as box open at each end and with a number of beams, across the Ship, under the deckhead. This has allowed BRE Global to establish the concept of activating the suppression system using MJC’s on the side of the Ship. However, more detailed features of the Ship may influence the movement of smoke and hot gases, and thereby affecting the activation time of a suppression system.

These features are:

• The tumblehome (vertical curvature of the hull) • Openings for gun ports, ladders and grilles • Objects on the decks • Secondary beams at the deckhead.

A model of the Middle Gun Deck (between the main mast and the galley) was developed for FDS, see Figure H7. Figure H7 shows the current location of smoke detectors in the area and two fire locations used for the simulations.

Figure H7 – Plan of simulation model showing fire and detector locations

This location was selected as there are a number of openings to both the Lower and Upper Gun Decks; the tumblehome of the hull is the most extreme. Some images illustrating the model are shown in Figure H8.




Figure H8 - FDS model of Middle Gun Deck

Optical smoke detectors were located at the positions currently (2013) used on the deck, and heat detectors to operate the suppression system were located on the inner hull, see Figure H7. Simulations were conducted with MEDIUM growth rate fires located on the centre line and edge of the deck as shown in Figure H7. Detectors were also included above the ladder openings to the Upper Gun Deck to indicate when detectors on that deck would start to operate. Heat detectors, with an operating temperature of 68°C and RTI of 50 (ms)1/2 were included along the edge of the deck.

Figure H9 shows the predicted temperature distribution across the deck at 130s for the fire located in the centre of the deck. This shows the increasing depth of the hot gas layer at the edge of the deck has been decreased (compared with Figure H4) due to the presence of the secondary beams at the deckhead.




Figure H9 - Temperature predictions across deck at 130s

Table H2 gives the predicted operation time for the detectors for the two fire locations highlighting the first detectors to operate.

Table H2 – Detector operating times for the MEDIUM centre and edge fires

Detector location Smoke detector operation time (seconds) Centre fire Edge fire PORT

68 93 100 71 67 81 73 67 56

CENTRE 65 121 97 76 24 38

STARBOARD 81 93 85 80 60 51 79 37 26

UPPER GUN DECK 87 68 Heat detector operation time (seconds) Side wall 214 188

For both fire locations, the MEDIUM growth rate fire is detected at approximately 25 seconds when the heat release rate would be 7.5kW (flame tip height ~0.4m). The second detector would operate at about 40s (heat release rate (19kW, flame tip 0.6m). By 60 seconds, most of the detectors in the affected area of the Middle Gun Deck would have operated and by 79s to 90s. Detectors on the Upper Gun Deck would also be operating. Note the estimate of the flame tip height is calculated using reference [11] which assumes the flames are not obstructed by a ceiling.

Less deepening compared with Figure 6




BRE Global would expect timings for fires on the Upper and Lower Gun Decks to be similar to the Middle Gun Deck. The detectors on the Orlop would be expected to operate more quickly due to the lower deckhead level and detection in the Hold may be slower due to the higher deckhead.

The heat detectors (representing a multiple jet controller, which would enable the flow of water from a number of suppression heads/nozzles) operate at between 3 and 3.5 minutes. The heat release rates and flame tip heights for a MEDIUM growth rate fire are given in Table H3 for this time span (highlighted).

Table H3 - Fire details at operation time of suppression system

Time Heat release rate (kW)

Flame height (m)

2 min 45s 325 2.0 3 min 390 2.2 3 min 15s 460 2.3 3 min 30s 530 2.4 3 min 45s 610 2.6

As the flame tip heights given in Table H3 would, on most parts of the Ship, be greater than the deckhead, this indicates that flames would be starting to spread under the deckhead along the bays between the beams (in a similar way to the initial spread of smoke) when the suppression system operates.




Appendix I - Suppression system criteria and selection

From the criteria established during the workshop (Appendix B), BRE Global has selected the criteria and weightings in Table I1 for the MCDA to assessing the appropriate fire suppression technology for HMS Victory.

Table I1 - Suppression technology criteria Criteria Description Range Weighting

Functional suitability Will the system suppress the predominant fire type in the selected area?

10 Ideal 0 Not suitable/practical

NA

Complex geometry Delivery of media to sheltered regions

10 Good 0 Poor

3

Delivery nozzle cost Nozzles (activation device)

10 Low cost per device 0 High cost per device

2

Supply and distribution system cost

Tanks pumps, pipe work and valves

10 Low 0 High

2

Runoff to remove water

Potential damage from media

10 Low 0 High

2

Installation “damage” Need for holes, and fixings to the Ship’s structure

10 No damage 5 Mainly use existing holes 0 New large holes

5

Installation flexibility Ability to locate system depending on Ship structure/requirement not system limitations

10 Free to position in general area 0 Rigid positioning rules

2

Visibility Indication of how obtrusive a system would be

10 Hidden 5 As current system 0 Very visible

5

Maintenance Effort required for maintenance

10 Maintenance free 0 Frequent, difficult to access, complex

2

Zoning Ability to group heads/nozzles in zones for local operation, and capability for isolating areas for maintenance etc.

10 No limitations at installation 0 No zoning options

2

Reconfiguration Easy reconfiguring of zones for conservation or events

10 100% reconfigurable 0 Fixed as installed

1

Use of approved Reliability 10 Recognised approval body 0




products 0 Unapproved product Tamper proof Prevent abuse by public,

accidental damage 10 Sealed fixed units 0 Removable units

2

Hazard to occupants Would activation harm people on the Ship

10 None 0 Evacuation prior to operation essential

5

Training (Crew) 10 Easy to use (< 1 hour training) 0 Difficult to use (> 1 day training)

0

Training (Maintenance)

10 Approved technicians on site 5 Training courses available 0 Manufacturer only

0

Shaded criteria cannot be assessed without reference to a specific product. Including these items may be useful when evaluating tenders; a more precise assessment of cost can also be included at that stage.

Suppression technologies

The MCDA has been performed for different water delivery systems and suppression technologies identified in Appendices F and G; these are listed in Table I2.

Table I2 - Suppression technologies Technology Description

Sprinkler system Water pressure ~5bar Drop size 1-5mm Low pressure water mist Water pressure <12bar Drop size 0.2-1mm High pressure water mist Water pressure typically >35bar Drop size 0.025-0.2mm Aerosol canister Units for confined spaces Gas (CO2) Units for confined spaces Compartmentation For confined spaces

Suppression MCDA

Using the weightings from Table I1 for each criterion, values were assigned for each combination of criteria, location and suppression method (e.g. visibility of a sprinkler system in a cabin). The values are then multiplied by the criteria weighting factor and totalled for each space (Appendix E). For the weightings given in Table I1, the maximum total would be 3300. Table I3 shows the outcome of the MCDA for the suppression system, the highest values are shaded to indicate the “best” option.

The approach used to determine the values was to assign a base value for the sprinkler case and then assign values for other methods depend on whether the combination was considered to be better or worse than the sprinkler case.

Since the values and weightings are subjective the Microsoft Excel Workbook developed to perform the MCDA the analysis is provided to the client.




Table I3 - Suppression system MCDA outcome

Sprin

kler

Low

pre

ssur

e

High

pre

ssur

e

Aero

sol

Gas

Cont

ainm

ant

General (Gun decks) 1274 1393 1302 0 0 0RN Offices 1274 1393 1302 0 0 0Aft cabins 1274 1393 1302 0 0 0Orlop open areas 1274 1393 1302 0 0 0Orlop aft cabins 1274 1393 1302 995 0 0Orlop electrical intake 0 0 0 1990 1940 2130Orlop forward compartments 1274 1393 1302 995 805 0Grand magazine 1274 1393 1302 0 0 0Hanging magazine 1274 1393 1302 995 1610 2580Hold 1274 1393 1302 0 0 0Hull void 0 0 0 0 0 0Exposed deck and Dock 0 0 0 0 0 0

Table I3 shows identifies a low pressure water mist fire suppression system as being most appropriate for the Ship, with the exception of the electrical intake and hanging magazine, where compartmentation would be beneficial.




Appendix J - Fire detection and alarm system

Existing (2013) detection system

BRE Global understands that BAE Systems have established that the current detection system is coming towards the end of its useful life. There is no capability to extend the current system further, some cabling needs replacement, and water ingress into the detector heads has been an on-going issue.

The existing system consists of:

• manual call points, • optical point detectors • dual heat and optical detectors • fire alarm panel with display and printer • standby power • alarm sounders and alarm transmission to Unicorn Gate.

The addressable, zoned system identifies which detector has operated and the zone where the detector is located so that the RN crew in the QM office can locate the fire. The system may be used with a delay between detection and alarm to allow the crew to investigate a detector or call point activation or can go directly to alarm.

The key objective of the current detection system is to provide early detection of a fire and to locate its position.

The Ship also has a zoned “Tannoy” system so that announcements from the QM office can be made throughout or to selected areas of the Ship.

Replacement detection system

As the Ship is considered to be a non-domestic building, the overall design of a replacement detection system should be based on “BS 5839-1:2013 Fire detection and fire alarm systems for buildings – Part 1: Code of practice for design, installation, commissioning and maintenance of systems in non-domestic premises” using approved products, where possible.

Fire alarm systems are divided into three categories:

• Manual Systems (M) • Life safety systems (L)

o Five levels (L1-L5) • Property safety systems (P)

o Two Levels (P1 –P2).

As the fire detection system on HMS Victory is used to alert crew members and, if required, initiate evacuation of visitors from the Ship, a category L1 system is required, From BS 5839-1 (Paragraph 5.1.3a):




‘The objective of a Category L1 system is to offer the earliest possible warning of fire so as to achieve the longest time available for escape’. This requires that the system is installed throughout all areas of the building (Ship).

Detection system components

Point detection

Currently, all the detectors on the Ship are addressable point detectors sensing a fire due to the presence of smoke and/or heat at the location of the detector. Including short circuit isolators in the detector loop wiring would improve reliability. Since the cables need replacement the locations of each detector can be reviewed; it may be possible to reduce the number of detectors in some areas based on the current used of the Ship; alternatively some areas may need more detectors. The use of wireless technology can be considered in areas where cabling would be obtrusive.

Gateway devices can be used to transmit the signals from wireless detectors to a hard wired system enabling wireless detectors to be mounted in locations where hard wiring is not possible. Wireless detectors would be battery powered and routine checks would need to be performed

Relevant standards BS EN 54-5 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 5: Heat detectors — Point detectors’, BSI, 2001.

BS EN 54-7 ’Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 7: Smoke detectors — Point detectors using scattered light, transmitted light or ionization’, BSI, 2001.

CEA 4012:2003 ‘Specification for fire detection and fire alarm systems – Requirements and test methods for multisensory detectors which respond to smoke and heat, and smoke detectors with more than one smoke sensor’, CEA, 2003.

BS EN 54-25 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 25: Components using radio links and system requirements’, BSI, 2008.

BS EN 54-17 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 17 Short circuit Isolators’, BSI, 2005.

Manual call points

There are currently only a few manual call points on the Ship. Guides are provided with radios so that they can contact the QM’s office if required which, to some degree, negates the requirement for manual call points. This should be reviewed with operators of the Ship.

Relevant standards BS EN 54-11 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 11: Manual call points’, BSI, 2001.

Distributed detection

In addition to point detection, systems are available that will detect fires in large spaces without the need for a large number of detectors.




Beam detectors monitor the attenuation of a light beam across a large space such as an atrium or storage area. Aspirated detectors consist of a pipe with a number of holes along it length, this is used to sample the air in a compartments or space.

Distributed detection systems do not provide precise information on the location of a fire.

An aspirated system will be considered to monitor the void between the inner and outer skins of the Ship’s hull.

Relevant standards BS EN 54-12 ’Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 12: Smoke detectors — Optical beam detectors’, BSI, 2002.

BS EN 54-20 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 20: Aspirating smoke detectors’, BSI, 2006.

Flame detection

Flame detectors use infra-red or ultra-violet detectors to detect the ‘flickering’ of a flame (This prevents false alarms from reflected sunlight etc.). These may be useful to monitor the exposed decks of the Ship which are not currently covered by the detection system.

Relevant standards BS EN 54-10 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 10: Flame detectors’, BSI, 2002.

Fire alarm panel

The fire alarm panel needs to provide a clear indication of the zone and location of any detection signals. The system may be required to operate in different modes during visitor and non-visitor hours. In addition, there should be the capability to isolate zones for maintenance and during restoration.

The panel will be located in the QM’s cabin on the Middle Gun Deck.

Providing a repeater panel in the gatehouse adjacent to the Ship (the “Bubble) would be useful to fire-fighters.

The use of repeater panels may also need to be considered to provide valuable live information to others that are not in the vicinity of the fire alarm panel. Currently repeater or mimic panels are not covered by any British Standard.

Relevant standards BS EN 54-2 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 2: Control and indicating equipment’, BSI 1997+A1:2006.

BS EN 54-4 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 4: Power supply equipment’, BSI, 1998.




Audible and visual alarm devices

The current system uses sounders throughout the Ship which may be supplemented by use of the Tannoy system. There is the opportunity to upgrade to an automated voice alarm system; however, given the complexity of the Ship and the possibility of temporarily restricting access to parts of the Ship during restoration, the current system, with the possible addition of more sounders and possible warning beacons, may be more flexible. Visual alarm devices (e.g. beacons) should be used in any locations where the deaf and hard of hearing are likely to be present and may not be alerted in the event of a fire.

BRE Global suggests that linking the Tannoy system to the alarm panel, so that alarm sounders are silenced during an announcement, would be beneficial.

Relevant standards BS 5839-8:1998, Fire detection and alarm systems for buildings — Part 8: Code of practice for the design, installation and servicing of voice alarm systems, 1998.

BS EN 54-3 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 3: Fire alarm devices — Sounders’, BSI, 2001.

BS EN 54-23 ‘Fire detection and fire alarm systems — Part 23: Fire alarm devices — Visual alarm devices’, BSI, 2010.




Appendix K - Detection system criteria and selection

Simply, a fire detection system can be considered as a number of sensing devices linked to a control panel. The control panel will be common to many systems of sensors and provides a central hub, taking processing information from the sensors, sounding alarms, activating control equipment and displaying information to operators. The panel may include functions, such as “double knock”, where sounding of an alarm is delayed until activation of secondary detectors or confirmation from a staff member investigating the operation of the first detector. The alarm panel would include displays indicating which detectors have operated (possibly with a printer record). Under non-fire conditions, the panel would indicate its operating mode and any fault signals from the detectors. The panel may also have the capability to activate other equipment and send messages to call centres.

From the criteria established during the workshop (Appendix B), BRE Global has selected the criteria and weightings in Table K1 for the MCDA to assessing the appropriate fire detection technology for HMS Victory.




Table K1 - Detector technology criteria Criteria Description Range Weighting

Functional suitability Will the system detect the presence of a fire promptly and locate the fires position?

10 Ideal 0 Not suitable/practical

NA

False alarms 1 Triggered by non-fire events

10 Good discrimination 0 Over sensitive

2

False alarms 2 Trigger by fires away from sensor

10 Local fires only 0

1

Component cost Relative cost of detectors/sensors (per sensing point)

10 Low cost per sensor 0 High cost per sensor

1

Installation cost Relative cost of installation per sensing point

10 Low cost per sensor 0 High cost per sensor

1

Installation “damage” Need for holes, and fixings to Ship’s structure

10 No damage 5 Mainly use existing holes 0 New large holes

5

Installation flexibility Ability to locate detectors depending on Ship structure/requirement - not system limitations

10 Free to position in general area 0 Rigid positioning rules

2

Visibility Indication of how obtrusive a system would be

10 Hidden 5 As current system 0 Very visible

5

Maintenance Effort required for maintenance

10 Maintenance free 0 Frequent, difficult to access

2

Zoning Ability to group detectors in zones for: identifying general area, isolating for maintenance etc.

10 No limitations at installation 0 No zoning options

2

Reconfiguration Easy reconfiguring of zones for conservation or events

10 100% reconfigurable 0 Fixed as installed

1

Use of approved products

Reliability 10 Recognised approval body 0 Unapproved product

4

Tamper proof Prevent abuse by public, accidental damage

10 Sealed fixed units 0 Removable units

2

Training (Crew) 10 Easy to use (< 1 hour training) 0 Difficult to use (> 1 day training)

2

Training (Maintenance) 10 Approved technicians on site 5 Training courses available 0 Manufacturer only

2

Shaded criteria cannot be assessed without reference to a specific product. Including these items may be useful when evaluating tenders; a more precise assessment of cost can also be included at that stage.




Detection technologies

The MCDA has been performed for the detector technologies given in Table K2

Table K2 - Detection technologies Technology Description

Wired network of optical and heat point detectors

Network of wired simple detectors, (current system)

Wired network of combined point detectors

Network of wired advanced detectors (note 1)

Wireless network optical and heat point detectors

Network of wireless simple detectors (note 2)

Wireless network of combined point detectors

Network of wireless (note 2) advanced detectors (note 1)

Aspirated detectors Sampling line (multiple sample points) to multiplexed or multiply sensors

Beam detectors Light beam across space Line detectors Wire (or optical fibre) routed around space Flame detectors Detection of IR/UV + flicker to discriminate flaming in field of view

Note 1: The advanced detectors referred to contain multiple sensing devices so that several criteria can be combined using sophisticated signal processing to identify a fire (e.g. Siemens ASA technology [12])

Note 2: Devices shall have a battery life of at least 4 years.

Detection MCDA

Using the weightings from Table K1 for each criterion, values were assigned for each combination of criteria, location and detection technology (e.g. visibility of a detector head in a cabin). The values are then multiplied by the criteria weighting factor and totalled for each space (Appendix E). For the weightings given in Table K1, the maximum total would be 2400. Table K3 shows the outcome of the MCDA for the detection system; the highest values are shaded to indicate the “best” option.

The approach used to determine the values was to assign a base value for the current system and then assign values for other methods depending on whether the combination was considered to be better or worse than the current (2013) system.

Since the values and weightings are subjective, the Microsoft Excel Workbook developed to perform the MCDA the analysis is provided to the client.




Table K3 - Detection system MCDA outcome

Wire

d ne

twor

k- S

impl

e

Wire

d ne

twor

k- A

dvan

ced

Wire

less

net

wor

k- S

impl

e

Wire

less

net

wor

k- A

dvan

ced

Aspi

rate

d de

tect

ion

Beam

det

ectio

n

Line

det

ectio

n

Flam

e de

tect

ion

General (Gun decks) 635 655 775 825 660 282 423 630RN Offices 903 931 1113 1183 952 0 0 868Aft cabins 903 931 1113 1183 952 0 0 868Orlop open areas 635 655 775 825 660 705 705 630Orlop aft cabins 917 945 1113 1183 952 0 0 630Orlop electrical intake 875 903 1113 1183 952 0 0 600Orlop forward compartments 903 931 1113 1183 952 0 0 868Grand magazine 903 931 1113 1183 952 0 0 868Hanging magazine 847 875 1113 1183 952 0 0 840Hold 615 635 775 825 660 695 705 630Hull void 0 0 0 0 1230 0 1016 0Exposed deck and Dock 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1240

Table K3 shows that dual sensor wireless detectors for the fire detection system as being most appropriate for the Ship, with the exception of the hull void, exposed decks and dry dock. An aspirated detector would be appropriate for the hull void and flame detectors for the external decks and dry dock.




Appendix L – HMS Victory hammock fire test

At the project update meeting held on 10th July 2013 NMRN agreed to provide a hammock, removed from display on HMS Victory, to BRE Global for a fire test. This was tested on 30th July 2013.

The tests were attended by the following BRE Global staff: Richard Chitty, Phil Clark, Tony Field and Dr Sung-Han Koo.

The hammock was suspended in an open area of the BRE Burn Hall and monitored using two video cameras, see Figure L1. A number of still images were taken during the tests.

Figure L1 - Hammock prior to the fire tests

The hammock was a canvas structure supplied with bedding material and two pillows. Only one pillow was used during the tests.

Test objectives

The tests were conducted with the following objectives:

• To determine the size of ignition source required to provide sustained burning of a hammock • To observe the rate of growth of a fire in a hammock • To observe the qualitative burning characteristics of a hammock.

Test programme

Since only one hammock was available, a sequence of ignition trials was conducted using 10 second followed by 20 second exposures to a small flame. This was followed by a larger ignition source using three pieces of screwed-up paper between the bedding and the pillow. The sequence was intended to find the smallest ignition source that could result in sustained burning of the hammock.




Small flame tests

A hand held gas lighter with a 30mm long flame was used as an ignition source.

A description and outcome of the small flame tests are given in Table L1.

Table L1 - Small flame tests Test Item ignited Flame application Result 1 Canvas structure 10s Scorched, no ignition 2 Canvas structure 20s Weak initial flaming for 1 minute

Smouldering with some smoke production 3 Pillow 10s Scorched, no ignition 4 Pillow 20s Scorched, no ignition 5 Bedding 10s Weak flaming for 2 minutes

Smouldering with some smoke production

The outcomes of Test 1 and the smouldering phase of Test 2 are shown in Figure L2. While the canvas was smouldering during Test 2, BRE Global considers that there would have been sufficient smoke to operate a detector in a confined space. During the smouldering phase, the canvas only showed a few glowing embers; this could be difficult to locate in the Ship.

Figure L2 - Test 1 and smouldering phase of Test 2

Larger ignition source

The larger ignition source was made from three sheets of paper (2 A4, 1 A3) screwed up into balls and placed between the bedding and pillow, as shown in Figure L3.

Scorching from 10s exposure

Smouldering with glowing embers after 20s exposure




Figure L3 - Larger ignition source

The outcome of the test with the larger ignition source is given in Table L2.




Table L2 - Events during larger ignition source fire Time

(minutes: seconds) Description Notes

0:0 Ignition of three sheets of paper screwed-up into loose balls

40s Pillow cover ignited 51s Flames to top of pillow 1:20 Flaming behind pillow 1:35 Pillow surrounded by flames 2:15 Flames ~0.3m above hammock Estimated heat release rate 30kW

(Note 1) 3:0 Ropes begin to burn through, hammock

structure opens up

3:30 Pillow falls to floor and stops flaming Pillow continues to smoulder 4.0 Flames ~0.5m above hammock Estimated heat release rate 100kW 4:15 Hammock burns through 5:0 Ropes flaming 0.6-0.7m

Bedding burning to 1/3 length of hammock, flames ~0.2m. Pillow smoking

Estimated heat release rate 230kW

7:0 Bedding fire reaches ½ length of hammock, flame 0.1-0.2m high. Ropes at head of hammock fire going out.


8:0 Canvas burning on inside 3/4 length of hammock, flames 0.1-0.2m high

Burning 50% along hammock length 9:30 Ropes at head of hammock extinguished

10:30 Flames reach end of bedding across ½ width of hammock

12:0 CO in smoke from pillow >1000ppm 14:30 Burning across full width of hammock 15:15 Canvas and ropes burning at foot of

hammock

16:30 0.3m high flames on ropes Estimated heat release rate 30kW 18:00 0.4m high flame son ropes, stating to burn

through Estimated heat release rate 60kW

18:15 Flames under hammock, 0.5m high flaming above hammock


19:45 Flames decaying 20:15 Final rope at foot of hammock burns

through. Test terminated.

Note 1. Estimates of the fire heat release rate given in Table L2 are based on the correlation from Cox and Chitty [11].




It should be noted that after the pillow fell to the floor it continued to smoulder producing significant quantities of white/grey smoke, see Figure L3. Placing a carbon monoxide meter in this smoke at approximately 12 minutes from ignition showed high concentrations of CO, in excess of 1000ppm, indicating that this smoke could create a hazardous atmosphere in a confined space.

Figure L3 - Smouldering pillow

During most of the test, flaming was limited to a small section of the hammock as seen in Figure L4, and would not be difficult to extinguish.

Figure L4 - Flames progressing along the hammock

Figure L5 shows the estimates of heat release rate shown in Table L2 plotted against time with the SLOW fire growth rate discussed in Appendix H.




Figure L5 - Estimated heat release rate from the hammock test and SLOW growth rate curve

Figure L5 shows the SLOW fire growth rate is followed until the hammock ropes burn through. There is then a period while the fire travels along the bedding and canvas hammock, at a low heat release rate, until the ropes at the foot of the hammock are reached and the burning rate increases.

Discussion

The small flame tests indicate that hammocks could not be ignited by a casual act of vandalism using, for example a lighter, although this may lead to some weak flaming, scorching and possibly enough smoke to activate a detector. Hammocks can be ignited with a more substantial source and produce significant amounts of smoke.

On HMS Victory, some hammocks are close to the deckhead and to other hammocks as shown in Figure L6.

Hammock ropes burn through




Figure L6 - Hammocks on HMS Victory Lower Gun Deck

Close proximity to the deckhead, may increase the heat release rate, but this will only become significant when flames reach the deckhead. This will occur when the hammock ropes are burning and may result in the ropes burning through more quickly. When the ropes have burnt through, the burning hammock would fall away from adjacent hammocks. From the initial tests, it has been shown that the canvas material requires being in contact with a flame for at least 20s to ignite. Consequently, one hammock directly igniting an adjacent hammock is unlikely. However, when the rope holding a hammock burns through, flaming material will swing down onto the deck or on to other items below the hammock, which may then be ignited and could, in turn, ignite more hammocks.

The fire from the fuel packages used in the water mist suppression system tests described in Appendix M requires the system being tested to control a fire of 750kW, equivalent to at least three HMS Victory hammocks, each at their peak heat release rate.




Appendix M – HMS Victory suppression system design fire performance testing

Suppression system design testing

Water mist fire suppression is a relatively new technology; standards are currently being developed and manufacturer’s products can vary considerably as the development of different systems may depend on differing objectives and criteria. BSI Draft for Development DD 8489-1 ‘Fixed fire protection systems- Industrial and commercial watermist systems – Part 1: Code of Practice for design and installation’ recommends a number of fire performance tests for different applications of water mist fire suppression systems for different applications, including low hazard occupancies, which are applicable to HMS Victory and are presented in Part 7 of the DD.

It should be noted the DD 8489 specifically excludes water mist systems on ships; it does however include museums offices and churches (which may include significant use of substantial timbers in the structure, but otherwise have a low fire load). As HMS Victory is permanently in a dry dock, it does not have the requirements that are needed on a sea-going ship and is considered here as to be a museum. Consequently, BRE Global has referred to DD 8489 in preference to IMO Standards which are specifically for sea-going ships.

DD 8489-7 tests

DD 8489 part 7 gives test procedures, construction details and pass/fail criteria for eight tests using four test rooms and four fuel packages; the combinations considered by the DD are summarised in Table M1:

Table M1 - DD 8489-7 test configurations Reference in DD 8489-7

Compartment Fuel package Number of nozzles

6.2 Small (A.1) (3m x 4m by 2.4m high

Bunk beds (B.1) 1 (centre or sidewall)

6.3 Large (A.2) based on nozzle water coverage

Simulated furniture (B.2)

4 (centre or sidewall)

6.4 Open (A.3) 80m2 5m high Sofa (B.3) 1 6.5 Open (A.3) 80m2 5m high Sofa (B.3) 2 6.6 Open (A.3) 80m2 5m high Sofa (B.3) 4 6.7 Open (A.4) 36m2 5m high Workstation (B.4) 1 6.8 Open (A.4) 36m2 5m high Workstation (B.4) 2 6.9 Open (A.4) 36m2 5m high Workstation (B.4) 4

Each fuel package is a representation of a real fire hazard designed to give repeatable results using easily available materials. These are summarised here in Table M2.




Table M2 - DD 8489-7 fuel packages Package Representing Materials used

Bunk beds (B.1) Two sets of bunk beds on opposite sides of a room

Polyether foam blocks and cotton fabric

Simulated furniture (B.2) Chairs, tables etc. Polyether foam, plywood, wooden crib

Sofas (B.3) Four sofas Polyether foam, cotton fabric

Workstation (B.4) Open plan office work area

Plywood, wooden/plastic cribs, box files and paper

See Figure M1

These test arrangements are intended to provide challenging environments for the water mist systems by creating areas where the fire would be shielded from direct water impingement from the water delivery nozzle. A photograph of the workstation fuel package (B.4) is shown in Figure M1.

Figure M1 - Workstation fuel package (B.4)

The pass/fail criterion for each test is based on the proportion of material burnt, maximum temperatures reached at specified locations. In addition, the mean temperature at a specified location should remain steady, or decrease, after 5 minutes into the test. (Full details are given in section 7 of the DD).

Some of the DD 8489-7 tests arrangements have a similarity to scenarios that could occur on HMS Victory. These are as follows:

HMS Victory: sick bay (Upper Gun Deck) and small spaces

One of the principal potential fuel items found in confined spaces, such as the sick bay, are hammocks, bedding or displays of mainly textile materials. An example is shown in Figure M2.




Figure M2 - HMS Victory sick bay on Upper Gun Deck

The DD 8489-7 test 6.2 is required to limit the maximum temperature in the test enclosure with a B.1 fuel package (bunk bed) to 315°C. Using Equation 7 from PD 7974:1, an experimental correlation derived by McCaffrey, Quintiere and Harkleroad, relating compartment temperature for fire heat release rate, compartment size and door opening, indicates a maximum heat release rate of approximately 750kW during a successful test.

BRE Global has conducted a simple fire test on a hammock previously displayed on HMS Victory and estimated the peak heat release of a single hammock to be approximately 250kW (Appendix L). This indicates that a suppression system capable of passing the DD 8489-7 test 6.2 should control a fire involving three HMS Victory hammocks burning simultaneously.

BRE Global would consider that the DD 8489-7 6.2 test would provide a reasonable representation of many potential fires in the smaller compartments/cabins on the Ship; consequently suppression systems that meet the pass/fails for these tests should provide the required control of a fire on HMS Victory until HFRS fire-fighters can extinguish the fire.

HMS Victory: hold

The main open space in the hold has a deck height of approximately 5m and contains a display of casks and simulated ballast. The fire load in the hold is similar to the DD 8489-7 fuel package B.4, in that both are predominantly Class A materials and that some items would be shielded from a water spray or mist by other items. The open space compartments specified in DD 8489-7 (as in compartments A.3 and A.4) have a ceiling height of 5m and may be used to represent HMS Victory’s hold.

BRE Global considers that the DD 8489-7 6.9 test would provide a reasonable representation a fire in the hold of HMS Victory.

HMS Victory: Orlop and gun decks

The DD 8489-7 tests do not include a test that is a close representation of the Orlop and gun decks on HMS Victory due to the Ship’s deckhead detail, height and fire load. A further test is required to show that the suggested multiple jet controller (MJC) arrangement will operate in a reasonable time and that there will




be an effective water delivery from the nozzles at low deckhead heights, with deckhead obstructions, typical of those on the Orlop deck of HMS Victory.

BRE Global has proposed a specification for an appropriate test as follows.

Specification for additional test

Test structure

The test structure described here is not intended to represent a specific section of HMS Victory, but to include some of the key features that would influence the spread of smoke, activation of a MJC and effectiveness of the suppression system.

The test structure should not be less than 8m by 4m and at least 1.8m high. Only one wall and the ceiling are required. There should be three beams along the long dimension of the compartment with a cross section of 0.3m wide by 0.4m deep and a downstand on the open short side. See Figures M3 and M4.

The wall and ceiling of the structure may be constructed from plasterboard.

It may be possible for laboratories to use an existing structure; if this is the case, platforms may be required so that the base of the fire can be located 1.8m below the ceiling.

It is intended that two fire tests are conducted using the fire locations shown in Figure M2. In addition, suppliers may wish to use the structure to investigate the water distribution from the nozzles with the ceiling obstructions and low ceiling height.

Figure M2 - Plan of test compartment

The roof can be supported on either a frame of wooden battens or scaffolding as indicated in Figure M3.

Beams 0.3m wide, 0.4m deep

1.6m

1.6m

Crib as DD8489-7 Fuel package B4

Multiple jet controllers 0.5m below ceiling

Open nozzle

Temperature measurement 0.2m below ceiling

Location A

Location B




Figure M3 - 3D view of proposed test structure

Fuel package

For consistency with the other fire tests, the fuel load will consist of two cribs as described in DD 8489-7 Fuel package B4. The cribs should be on a platform of non-combustible material so that the distance between the bottom of the crib and the ceiling of the compartment is 1.8m (based on the height of the Orlop deckhead). The fuel packages will be located as shown in Figure M2.

Two tests will be conducted using each of the fire locations:

• Location A tests the activation of the system with a fire located at position most remote from the MJC and with nozzle obstructed by a beam.

• Location B tests the performance of a nozzle over a fire indicating any issues with a “hollow cone” discharge.

Suppression system

A MJC will be placed on the short side of the compartment and will control the flow of water to open nozzles on a range pipe located along the side of one of the beams as shown in Figure M2. The number of nozzles required and the nozzle spacing will follow manufacturer’s specifications for a 1.8m ceiling height (this is expected to require up to three nozzles). One of the objectives of the test is to demonstrate reasonable water coverage within the test structure.

Measurements

Temperature measurement using thermocouples should be included at the locations shown in Figure M2. Video and photographic records should be made.




Test procedure

With the pump running and water charged to the multiple jet controller, the fire will be ignited using the method described in DD 8489-7. The test will run for a duration of 20 minutes.

Pass criteria

The multiple jet controller should operate in less than 5 minutes and control the spread of fire so that the fire does not does not spread to the end of the cribs. The average temperature from the four measurements should remain constant or fall after 1 minute of the multiple jet controller operating.

Reporting

A test report will include:

• Details of the suppression system o Water pressure o Nozzle spacing o MJC operating temperature and response time index (RTI) o Nozzle identification

• Operation time of MJC • Temperature data (as measured and average of the four measured values) plotted against time • Proportion of flame spread on second crib (post fire photographs) • Statement confirming the system passed or failed the criteria.

Suppression system design testing conclusion

BRE Global recommends that a water mist system for HMS Victory should have passed DD 8489-7 tests 6.2 and 6.9. BRE Global proposes that the additional test described here is also used to demonstrate the capability of a water mist suppression system to control fires in areas of the Ship that are dissimilar to the scenarios represented by the DD 8489-7 tests.

It should be noted that the outcome of these tests may indicate that different nozzles and nozzle spacing are required in different areas of the Ship.




Appendix N - Defence Lines of Development

While HMS Victory is now part of the National Museum of the Royal Navy, some of the MOD procedures itemised in the BMT Defence Systems report [1] outlining the procurement procedure for a fire suppression system are still relevant. “Defence Lines of Development” (DLoD) provides a framework to consider additional requirements and integration of a system using a holistic approach. The framework is broken down into 8 components (remembered using the acronym “Tepid-oil”):

• Training • Equipment • Personnel • Information • Concepts and Doctrine • Organisation • Infrastructure • Logistics

The BMT report [1] section 8.3.12 suggested that for the procurement of a fire suppression system on HMS Victory the following issues should be included:

a) Managing the Support Solutions Envelope, including identifying who will be responsible for the routine maintenance and repair of the fire suppression system and the integration of any necessary spares with the logistics network. (Logistics)

b) If multiple fire suppression technologies/solutions are used to tailor particular classes or types of fire in order to utilise the technology best suited to contain them then an element of system integration will be required in order to provide system wide monitoring from a single location (Equipment)

c) The need for additional training or for a change in the skills levels of the HMS Victory Crew to allow then to operate and possibly maintain the fire suppression system safely. (Training)

d) Changes to the shore-side infrastructure, for example change to power or water supplies to HMS Victory or to install water storage tanks on the dockside if they cannot be accommodated in the hull. (Infrastructure)

e) Interfaces with the HMS Victory electrical system, for example including any requirements for an independent power supply to allow the main power supply to be isolated without shutting down the fire suppression system.(Infrastructure)

BRE Global has considered each of the DLoD components for the fire suppression and detection systems.




Training

Crew: The basic procedures in the event of a fire alarm on HMS Victory will remain unchanged; however Crew members may need to be familiar with a different type of alarm panel and will need further instructions to deactivate the suppression system. Maintenance: The system may be maintained either by the manufacturers or by BAE Systems. Some onsite capability would be required to drain the suppression system in the event of a false alarm. More detailed training would be required if BAE Systems staff are required to re-programme the alarm panel (as can be done with the current system), to add or to remove detectors, modify zoning or change time delays.

Equipment

Existing Systems: There is no existing fire suppression system. The existing fire detection system is configured to its maximum capacity and is approaching the end of its working life. A phased replacement is recommended so that a working detection system is maintained throughout the installation of the proposed detection and suppression system; this is described in section 6 of this report.

New Equipment: The suppression system will require the installation of a network of water delivery pipes throughout the Ship and a pump and water supply tank either on the dockside or in the dry dock. The proposed detection system with wireless detectors only requires installation of the detector heads (and possibly some repeater units). An aspirated system to monitor the hull void requires installation of flexible pipework around the void; it may be possible to exploit the missing plank on the external hull for this. The hub of the system will be a replacement fire alarm panel; this may be a similar unit to the existing unit. The alarm panel provides the link between the detection and suppression systems. Improved compartmentation has been identified as being more appropriate for the electrical in-take near the bread store and the Fore and Aft hanging magazines.

Personnel

Installation: Installation of the suppression system will require the skills necessary to customise the pipe work to the shape and available openings on the Ship (i.e. a specialist installer). This will require supervision from staff with a detailed knowledge of the Ship’s construction to establish pipe routes to minimise structural damage and visual impact.

Crew: No change in numbers or skills required.

Information

Ships standing orders will require modification to describe the operation of the new fire alarm panel and to include procedures in the event of the suppression system operating.

The suppliers/installers should provide: • Operating/maintenance manuals and schedules • Details of installation (e.g. “as constructed” drawings) • Details of hydraulic calculations • Cause and effect matrix • Certificate of completion (including detail of any non-conformity to Standards)




Concepts and Doctrine

The main objective of the fire detection and suppression system is to protect the Ship so that in the event of a fire the fire growth is restricted so that the Local Authority Fire and Rescue Service have a relatively small fire to extinguish on arrival. Prompt detection (and identification of location) of a fire will enable a timely evacuation of the Ship and, for smaller fires, provide the opportunity for first aid fire-fighting as an alternative to activation of the suppression system.

Due to low temperatures on board the Ship during the winter, the suppression system will be a pre-action system. Normally the pipe work will be dry. On activation of a detector, the crew will be alerted to investigate the alarm; pumps for the fire suppression system will be started and the pipework charged with water. On activation of a thermally sensitive device, (2 to 3 minutes after the operation of the first smoke detector) water would be supplied to several water mist nozzles in the location of the fire providing a dense mist of small water droplets that will cool the flames and hot gases, act as a barrier to thermal radiation and wet combustible materials near the fire. Locally, in the combustion region, the droplets and steam from boiling droplets will reduce the oxygen concentration. These mechanisms will limit the growth of the fire, but would not necessarily extinguish it.

The fire alarm panel can be programmed to operate the suppression system as described above and to provide facilities for the crew and fire-fighters to override the sequence and to reset the system. An alarm signal can also be sent to the Dockyard entrance.

The presence of a fire detection and suppression system should be considered as the last line of defence against fire and not a substitute for good housekeeping, management and maintenance to minimise fire hazards.

Organisation

BRE Global suggests the organisational structure shown in Figure N1 is applied to the fire detection and suppression system. This is presented here as an “Aunt Sally” for the stakeholders to discus and integrate into the existing hierarchy of responsibilities for different aspects of the Ship.

Figure N1 - Fire detection and suppression system responsibilities

“Owner”: NMRN

User: RN Crew Maintenance and Support: BAE Systems

Fire and Rescue Service Equipment manufacturer/ supplier/ installer




Infrastructure

The principal impacts on HMS Victory’s infrastructure are the water storage requirements, pumps and associated equipment for the suppression system. These can be located on the dockside, or possibly in the dry dock.

Independent power supplies (and/or backup systems) are required so that the detection and suppression system will continue to function in the event of the loss of the main power supply to the Ship.

The possibility of a “slave” fire alarm panel display in the gate house (bubble) to the Victory Arena is recommended.

Logistics

The Dockyard has a number of fire detection and suppression systems in the Dockyard buildings and maintains fire protection systems on Royal Navy Ships. Consequently, there are staff on site with expertise in the operation and maintenance of fire detection and suppression systems and some stores of replaceable items. However, BRE Global considers that HMS Victory presents some unique challenges to a fire detection and suppression system and the solution may not necessarily use equipment used elsewhere in the dockyard. Clearly, there are advantages if common skills and components can be utilised but this should not be at the expense of the capability of the system to detect and supress fire on HMS Victory.




Appendix O - Safety assessment

The introduction of the proposed suppression system will introduce the following hazards to HMS Victory:

• Trip or collision hazard with pipework and suppression head/nozzles

• Detection system disabled for maintenance

• Suppression system disabled for maintenance

• Discharge of the water mist system while the Ship is occupied

• Discharge of the aerosol system with people in the location of the electrical intake

• Legionella risk in stored water tanks for water mist suppression.

Table O1 presents these hazards in the format used by the HMS Victory Hazard Log [13]. These hazards should be reduced to ALARP as part of design and installation.

Table O2 notes the impact of the proposed fire detection and suppression system on items in the Hazard Log Version 0-1 7-06-2013 [13].

Failure of the suppression to discharge would not increase the hazard to the Ship compared with the current (2013) situation.



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Table O1 - Items to be included and reviewed in hazard log

What are the hazards

Who may be harmed and how

What are you already doing

Prob. Serv. Risk Do you need to do anything to manage the risk?

Notes

Fire

and

Sm

oke

(incl

udin

g ev

acua

tion)

P

eopl

e ar

e in

jure

d in

the

even

t of F

ire /S

mok

e on

boa

rd H

MS

Vic

tory

and

the

subs

eque

nt e

vacu

atio

n Update working procedures at

electrical intake to include suppression system

Include signage warning of automatic suppression system at electrical intake [discuss provision of local isolation of suppression system]

Prepare procedure for cleaning and reinstatement electrical intake after suppression operation

Create working procedure if suppression system is disabled

Create working procedure if detection system is disabled

Include warnings to staff and visitors regarding suppression system pipes and nozzles in trips procedures

Design should not create trip hazards, low deckhead may lead to unavoidable collision hazards (nozzle guards may be required in some areas)

Staff should be aware of likely time between alarm sounding and suppression operation (2-3 minutes)

Evacuate away from fire location. Use all exits and avoid area where suppression system is operating.

Create procedure to check for Legionella in water storage tanks

Create procedures for routine maintenance of suppression system



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Table O2 - Notes on items in Hazard Log Version 0-1 7-06-2013

Who might be harmed and how

What you are already doing Effect of proposed detection and suppression system

People are injured in the event of Fire /Smoke onboard HMS Victory and the subsequent evacuation

Staff are alerted to a fire onboard by the onboard Fire Detection and Alarm System [SSO, Chapter 4, Section 0402] - 8 manual call points at each exit

More manual call points can be provided

All escape routes (walkways) are clearly marked, ensuring effective evacuation of staff and visitors from the ship.

-

Twice yearly evacuation drills are undertaken on HMS Victory, (the local fire brigade and included annually) and NMRN staff.

-

A Tannoy system in place, which is operated from the security cabin onboard, from where staff and visitors can be made aware of fire and escape arrangements.

Detection system should have reduced false alarm rate compared to current system

All electrical equipment onboard are subject to testing upon installation and yearly PAT testing.

-

Ships Standing Orders includes hourly ship rounds to check key areas for signs of smoke & fire.

-

The local Fire brigade is provided with plans of the ship, carried onboard all fire engines. All local fire watches have been on a tour of the ship.

-

Fire extinguishers are provided for the fighting of small fires on board.

Suppression system will limit the spread of fires that cannot be extinguished by first aid fire fighting

Naked flames (including smoking) are not permitted onboard HMS Victory, extensive signage is provided.

Flame detectors on exposed deck will help enforce restriction

NMRN staff are trained to supervise visitors, to keep them away from high risk areas and to warn them of the inherent hazards associated with HMS Victory and the Arena area. (see SSO, Chapter 6, Visitors Section).

-

A permit to work system is in place for all maintenance (including hot work) on HMS Victory - damp down procedure for half an hour.

Detector zoning to allow areas to be isolated for hot work

Risk Assessments of special events are conducted prior to the event to ensure appropriate fire safety and evacuation arrangements are in place.

Detection and suppression system will provide increased protection for special events



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To ensure all staff are aware of ongoing maintenance activities, weekly diary meetings are held to inform all stakeholders of scheduled maintenance/events to minimise potentially hazardous situations / conflicts.

Detection and suppression system will provide increased protection for maintenance activities

During an evacuation to the movement of people on/off the brow is managed by NMRN guides or HMS Victory staff (during normal opening hours) or Events Staff (during evening functions). Reducing the risk of a disorganised/dangerous transit of the escape br

-

Local water supply pressure (at CFHR) are checked on ships rounds.

Removal of firefighting hose reels. Regular (weekly) checks of suppression system.

Establish a LOTO system / permit to work system for work affecting the fire main and water supply systems,

No longer required for hose reels

Fire reels are checked in PMS. No longer required Where possible flammable materials have been removed from HMS Victory, or where they could not be removed has been protected with a with a fire retardant treatment.

-

There are no hydraulic or POL based systems or materials stored on HMS Victory.

-

All historical areas are free of sawdust, which have previously been used to create an historical representation of the ship during service.

-

A LOTO system / permit to work system is in place for work that impacts upon the effectiveness of the Tanoy system.

-

A tannoy system has been extended in to the dock bottom for altering staff in the dock bottom of fire events.

-

The fire alarm sounders are to be regularly tested. Modify procedures to accommodate alternative fire alarm panel

The entire sound system is to be included in the PMS. - For events there is a procedure in place for isolating electrical equipment…

-

The NMRN have a procedure for the evacuation of HMS Victory of which all staff (PC, Events Team, RN, NMRN) are trained to comply with.

-




Appendix P - Environmental impacts

Detection system

Disposal of the components of the current fire detection system would be subject to the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment recycling (WEEE) regulations 2006. BRE Global understands that the detectors on HMS Victory are either optical or heat detectors and there are no ionisation detectors. However if ionisation detectors are found then, in the first instance, the manufacturer should be consulted for disposal instructions.

Suppression system

BS 5306-0:2011 discusses the withdrawal of halons as a fire extinguishing agent following the 1987 Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer. Halon systems have not been considered by BRE Global. Foams can also have an environmental impact and cannot be discharged to groundwater. Powders are also considered as hazardous waste.

The main suppression system identified for HMS Victory is a water mist system. Water mist systems are considered to have a low environmental impact (no effects on the environment are referred to in BS 5306-0:2011). The use of antifreeze in water storage tanks may have an environmental impact.

Ideally, the pumps for the water suppression system would be electrical having independent supplies from different areas of the dockyard; however if this is not practical, then a diesel generator may be required; the generator fuel storage would have an environmental impact.

The aerosol systems considered as an option for the electrical in-take are described as having Zero Ozone Depleting Potential (ODP) and Zero Global Warming Potential (GWP).




Appendix Q – Observations of the fire suppression system on Cutty Sark

On 27th June 2013, Richard Chitty, BRE Global had the opportunity of a brief visit to Cutty Sark to see the water mist fire suppression system. This visit was without the knowledge of the Royal Museums Greenwich as the opportunity for the visit arose from a meeting in the area finishing early.

The following images show the pipework and nozzles for the low pressure water mist system on Cutty Sark.

Figure Q1 – Water mist nozzle and pipework on lower deck




Figure Q2 – Water mist nozzle and pipework on “tween” deck




Figure Q3 - Suppression pipework on “tween” deck (pipe being used as hand rail)




Figure Q4 - Suppression nozzle and pipework on “tween” deck

Figure Q5 - Water mist nozzle




Figure Q6 - Water mist nozzle (sidewall?) with trace heated pipe work (cabin on upper deck)

Observations

There appears to have been no attempt to conceal or disguise the pipework and nozzles; however most of the exhibits are arranged along the centre line of the Ship and visitors do not pay a lot of attention to the sides or deckhead.

The water mist nozzle shown in Figure Q5 is an automatic nozzle with a glass bulb in the centre. The nozzles were mounted about 250mm below the deckhead. This may result in a long operation time for the nozzles.

In general, there is very low fire load on the Ship other than the combustible decks and hull.

The suppression system is only installed on the Ship; not in the dock area (and Café) below the Ship. Water storage tanks and the pump room are built into the side of the dock.

hms victory fire suppression system - final reportthe report describes fire performance tests that...

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