hobsbawm, e.j. 17th cent european econom crisis
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
1/22
Past and Present Society and Oxford University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Past & Present.
http://www.jstor.org
ast and resent Society
The General Crisis of the European Economy in the 17th CenturyAuthor(s): E. J. HobsbawmSource: Past & Present, No. 5 (May, 1954), pp. 33-53Published by: on behalf ofOxford University Press Past and Present SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/649822Accessed: 23-11-2015 11:49 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of contentin a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pasthttp://www.jstor.org/stable/649822http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/649822http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=pasthttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/ -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
2/22
33
The General
Crisis
of the
EuropeanEconomy
in the 17thCentury
IN THIS ARTICLE I WISH
TO
SUGGEST THAT THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY
passed
through general
risis
during
he
I7th
century,
he ast
phase
of the
general
ransitionrom feudal o
a
capitalistconomy.
Since
1300
or
so,
when
omethinglearly
egan
o
go
seriously
rong
with
uropean
eudal
ociety1
here avebeenseveral ccasionswhen
parts
of
Europe
trembled n the brink f
capitalism.
There is a
taste
of
bourgeois
and
industrial revolution bout
14th-
century
Tuscany
and
Flanders or
early
I6th-century ermany.
Yet it
is
only
from he
middle
of the I7th
century
hat this taste
becomes
more
han
a
seasoning
o an
essentially
edieval r feudal
dish.
The earlier
urban
societies
never
quite
succeeded n
the
revolutions
hey
foreshadowed.From the
early
i8th
century,
however,
bourgeois society
dvanced
without ubstantialhecks.
The
I7th
century
risis
thus
differs
rom
ts
predecessors
n that
it led to as fundamental solutionof the difficulties hich had
previously
tood
n
the
way
of the
triumph
f
capitalism,
s that
system
will
permit.
In this rticle
propose
o marshal omeof
the
evidence
or he existence f a
general
risis,
which s still
disputed
by
some,
nd to
suggest
n
explanation
f
t.
In a
subsequent
rticle
I
propose
o discuss ome
ofthe
changes
t
produced,
nd
how t was
overcome.
It is
veryprobable
hat
great
deal of
historicalwork
willbe done
on
this
ubject
nd
period
n thenext ew
years.
Indeed,
lately
historians n various countrieshave
tentativelyuggested
somethingike that generalcheck to economicdevelopment
or
general
crisis
with
which his
paper
deals.2
It
may
hereforee
convenient
o take
a
bird's
eye
view of the
field,
nd to
speculate
about
some sort
of
working
ypothesis,
f
only
to stimulate
etter
ones,
or further ork.
Evidence
or
a
general
crisis
A
good
deal of evidence
for the
general
crisis is
available.
We
must,
however,
e careful o avoid the
argument
hat
general
crisis quals economic etrogression,hichhas bedevilledmuch of
the discussion
about
the 'feudal crisis of the
I4th
and
I5th
centuries.
It is
perfectly
learthat here
was a
good
deal of retro-
gression
n the
7th
century.
For
the first ime in
history
he
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
3/22
PAST
AND
PRESENT
Mediterraneaneasedto be a
major
entre f economic
nd
political,
and
eventually
f cultural nfluence nd became an
impoverished
backwater.The Iberianpowers,taly,Turkeywereplainly n the
downgrade:
Venice was on the
way
to
becoming
touristcentre.
With
he
exception
f a few
places dependent
n the
Northwestern
states
generally
ree
ports)
and
the
piratemetropolis
f
Algiers,
which also
operated
n the
Atlantic,3
here was little advance.
Further
orth,
he decline f
Germany
s
patent, hough
ot
wholly
unrelieved.
In the
Baltic
Poland,
Denmark
nd
the
Hanse
were
on the
way
down.
Though
the
power
nd
influence
f
Habsburg
Austria increased
(perhaps largely
because others declined so
dramatically),erresourcesemained oor,hermilitaryndpolitical
structure
ickety
ven t the
period
f
her
greatest
lory
n the
early
i8th
century.
On the other and n the Maritime
owers
nd their
dependencies England,
the
United
Provinces, weden,
and in
Russia and
some minor reas like
Switzerland,
he
impression
s
one
of advance rather
han
stagnation;
n
England,
of decisive
advance. France
occupied
an intermediate
osition,
hough
ven
here
political
riumph
was not balanced
ygreat
conomic dvance
until the
end
of
the
century,
and then
only intermittently.
Indeed an atmospherefgloom ndcrisis ills hediscussionshere
after
68o,
though
onditionsn
the
previous alf-century
an
hardly
have
been
superior.
(Possibly
the
huge
catastrophe
f
I693-4
accounts
or
his.')
It
was in
the
i6th not the
I7th
century
hat
invading
mercenaries
marvelled t
how
much there
was to loot
in
France,
and
men in Richelieu's nd Colbert's ra looked
back on
Henry
V's as a
sort
of
golden
ge.
It
is
indeed
possible
that,
for
some
decades n the middleof
the
century
he
gains
made
in the
Atlantic id not
replace
the losses in the
Mediterranean,
entral
Europeanand Baltic,the totalproceedsfrombothstagnatingr
perhaps
declining.
Nevertheless hat
s
important
s the decisive
advance
n
the
progress
f
capitalism
whichresulted.
The
scattered
igures
or
European
population
uggest,
t
worst
an actual
decline,
t best a level
or
slightly
ising lateau
between
the
mounting
lopes
of
the
population
urve n the later 6th
and
18th
centuries.
Except
for
the
Netherlands,
orway
nd
perhaps
Sweden
nd Switzerlandnd some
ocal
areas
no
major
ncreases
n
population
appear
to be recorded.
Spain
was a
by-word
for
depopulation,outherntalymayhavesuffered,ndtheravages f
the
mid-century
n
Germany
and
Eastern
France are
known.
Though
Pirenne has
argued
that
Belgian population
ncreased,
figures
or Brabant
do
not
seem to bear him out.
Hungarian
34
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
4/22
GENERALCRISIS
OF
EUROPEAN
ECONOMY
IN
I7TH
CENTURY
35
population
fell;
that of
Poland
even
more.
English
population
growth
robably
loweddown
rapidly
nd
may
ctually
ave ceased
after 630.5 In fact t is noteasyto see whyClarkconcludes hat
the
I7th
century
n most
f
Europe
saw,
ikethe
i6th,
a
moderate
increase
n
population. 6
Mortality
was
certainly
igher
han
in
either
he
i6th or
i8th.
No
century
ince
the
I4th
has
a worse
record
or
pidemic
isease
and recent
workhas
demonstrated
hat
its
ravages
annot
e dissociated
rom
hose ffamine.7
While
hand-
ful
of
ourt
nd
administrative
etropoles
r centres
f
international
trade
nd
finance
rew
o
great
ize
the
number f
great
ities,
which
had
risen
n the
6th
century,
emained
table nd
small nd
medium
townsfrequentlyeclined. This appearsto apply in part even
to the
maritime
ountries.8
What
happened
o
production
We
simply
o not know.
Some
areas
were
plainly
e-industrialized,
otably
taly
which ransformed
itself rom
he
most
urbanised nd
industrialized
ountry
f
Europe
into a
typical
backward
easant
area,
most of
Germany, arts
of
France
and
Poland.9
On
the
other
hand
there was
fairly
apid
industrial
evelopment
n
some
places
Switzerland,
nd
in
the
extractive
ndustries,
ngland
nd
Sweden,
nd an
important
rowth
ofrural ut-workt theexpense f urbanor local craft roduction
in
many
reas
which
may
or
may
not have meant
net
ncrease
n
total
output.
If
prices
re
any
guide
we shouldnot
expect
o
find
a
general
decline
n
production,
or
the
deflationaryeriod
which
followed
he
great
price-rise
f the
pre-I64o
era
is
more
easily
explained
y
a
relative r absolute
alling-off
n demand ather
han
by
a decline
n
the
upply
f
money.
However,
n
the
basic
ndustry
of
textiles here
may
have
been not
only
a shift
rom
old to
new
draperies,
ut a
decline
of total
output
for
part
of
the
century. 0
The crisis
n commerceas
more
general.
The
two main
areas
of
established
nternational
rade,
he Mediterranean
nd
the
Baltic
underwent
evolution,
nd
probably
emporary
ecline
n the
volume
of
trade.
The Baltic
the
European
olony
f
the western
rban-
ized countries
changed
ts
staple exports
from
foodstuffs
o
products
ike
timber,
metals nd
naval
stores,
while ts
traditional
imports
f westernwoollens
diminished.
Trade
as
measured
by
the Sound
tolls
reached
ts
peak
in
I590-I620,
collapsed
n
the
I62os, and declinedcatastrophicallyfter omerecoveryntilthe
I65os,
remaining
n the doldrums
until I68o
or
so.ll
After
650,
the
Mediterranean
ecame ike
the Baltic n
area
exchanging
ocally
produced oods,
mainly
aw
materials,
or
he Atlantic
manufactures
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
5/22
PAST
AND
PRESENT
and the oriental
goods
now
monopolized
y
the
Northwest.
By
the
end
of
the
entury
he
Levant
got
ts
spices
from he
North,
not
theEast. FrenchLevantine radehalvedbetween
620
and 1635,
sank
almost o zero
by
the
i65os
and
did
not
really
ecover rom
depression
evels
until
afterthe
i670os.
Dutch
Levantine
trade
did
poorly
rom
bout
617
to
about
650.12
Even then
heFrench
hardly
xceeded
pre-depression
evels much
before
700.
Did the
British
nd Dutch sales
drive n the
South
make
up
for osses
n
the
Baltic markets
Probably
not. It
may
barely
have
made
up
for
the decline n
previous
ales of
Italian
products.
The
international
trade n
foodstuffs Baltic
orn,
Dutch
herrings
nd
Newfoundland
fish did notmaintaintsJacobeanevels. The internationalrade
in
woollen loths
may
have
shrunk;
or
was t
mmediately eplaced
by
other
extiles,
or
the
great
centres f
exportable
inen,
Silesia
and
Lusatia,
seem to have declined
omewhat
fter
620. In
fact
it
is
not
unlikely
hat
general
alance
of
rising
nd
declining
rade
would
produce xport igures
hich
id
not
rise
ignificantly
etween
1620 and i66o.
Outside he maritimetates t is
unlikely
hat
ales
on
the
home-markets ade
up
for his.
As
we know
rom
he
9th
century,
hemalaise
f business
annot
be measured imply ytrade ndproductionigures, hateverhese
may
e.
(It
is
nevertheless
ignificant
hat he
whole one f
conomic
discussion
assumed
stable markets and
profit
opportunities.
Colbertian
mercantilism,
t has oftenbeen
said,
was
a
policy
of
economicwarfare or
arge
lices
of
a
world rade-cake f
fixed ize.
There
s
no reason
why
dministratorsnd
traders
for
economics
was not
yet
n
academic
ubject
shouldhave
adopted
iews
which
were
greatly
t variancewith
ppearances).
It
is certain
hateven
in countrieswhich
did
not decline there
were secular
business
difficulties. nglish East India trade languished until the
Restoration.13
Though
that of the Dutch
increased
handsomely,
the
average
nnual dividend f their
East India
Company
ell
for
each
of the
ten-year
eriods
rom he
I63os
to
the
i670s
(including
both), except
for
a
slight
rise in the
I66os.
Between
I627
and
I687
sixteen
years
were
without
ividend;
n
the rest
of
the
Company's
history
rom
602
to
I782
none.
(The
value of ts
goods
remained
stable between
I640
and
i66o).
Similarly
he
profits
f the
Amsterdam isselbank eached
peak
n the
63os
and then
eclined
for coupleofdecades.14 Again, t maynot be wholly ccidental
that
he
greatest
messianicmovement f
Jewish
istory
ccurred
t
this
moment,
weeping
he communitiesf
the
great
rading
entres
-
Smyrna, eghorn,
enice,
Amsterdam,
amburg
off heir eet
36
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
6/22
GENERAL CRISIS OF
EUROPEAN
ECONOMY
IN I7TH CENTURY
37
with
special
success
n the middle
66os as
prices
eached
almost
their
owest
point.
It is also clearthat the expansion f Europepassed through
crisis.
Though
thefoundations
f
the fabulous
olonial
ystem
f
the I8th
century
werelaid
mainly
fter
65015,
arlier
here
may
actually
have
been some contraction
f
European
nfluence
xcept
in the hinterlands
f Siberia
and
America.
The
Spanish
and
Portuguesempires
f course
contracted,
nd
changed
character.
But it
is also worth
noting
hat the
Dutch did
not maintain
he
remarkable
ate of
expansion
of I6oo to
I640
and their
Empire
actually
hrank n the next
30 years.16
The
collapse
ofthe
Dutch
West ndiacompanyfterhe 64os,and the imultaneousinding-up
of
the
English
Africa
ompany
nd the Dutch West
ndia
Company
in
the
arly
67os
may
be mentioned
n
passing.
It will be
generallygreed
hat he
I7th
century
as one of
social
revoltboth
in Western nd
Eastern
Europe.
This
clustering
f
revolutions,
as led some historians
o
see
something
ike
a
general
social-revolutionary
risis
n the middleof
the
century.17
France
had its
Frondes,
whichwere
mportant
ocial
movements;
atalan,
Neapolitan
and
Portugese
revolutions
marked
the crisis
of
the
Spanish mpiren the 64os; theSwisspeasantwar f 653 expressed
both
he
post-war
risis nd the
ncreasingxploitation
f
peasant
y
town,
while
in
England
revolution
riumphed
with
portentous
results.18
Though peasant
unrest idnot
cease
n
the West
-
the
stampedpaper
rising
which
combined
middle
lass,
maritime
and
peasant
unrest
n
Bordeaux
nd
Brittany
ccurred
n
1675,
the
Camisard
wars even ater19 those ofEastern
Europe
were more
significant.
n
the i6th
century
here
had been
fewrevolts
gainst
the
growing
nserfment
f
peasants.
The
Ukrainian
evolution
f
I648-54 maybe regardeds a major ervile pheaval. So must he
various Kurucz movements
n
Hungary,
heir
ery
ame
harking
back
to Dozsa's
peasant
rebels
of
I5I4,
their
memory
nshrined
in
folksongs
bout
Rakoczy
s that of the Russian
revolt
f
I672
is
in
the
song
about
Stenka
Razin.
A
major
Bohemian
peasant
rising
n i68o
opened
a
period
of endemic
erf
unrest here.20
It
wouldbe
easy
o
lengthen
his
atalogue
f
major
ocial
upheavals
for
nstance
y
ncluding
herevolts f
he
rish
n
164I
and
1689.
Only
n one
respect
did
the
I7th
century
s
a whole overcome
rather han experience ifficulties. utsidethe maritime owers
with
heir
new,
nd
experimental
ourgeois
egimes
most
f
Europe
found n
efficient
nd
stable
form f
government
n absolutism
n
the
Frenchmodel.
(But
the rise
ofabsolutism
as
been
taken
s
a
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
7/22
PAST AND
PRESENT
direct
ign
f
economic
weakness.21
The
question
sworth
xploring
further).
The
great
ge
ofad
hoc
devices n
politics,
ar ndadmin-
istrationanishedwith hegreatworld mpires fthei6thcentury,
the
Spanish
nd
Turkish.
For the
first ime
arge
territorial
tates
seemed
apable
of
solving
heir hree
undamental
roblems:
owto
have
the
ordersof
government
beyed
directly
ver a
large
area,
how to
have
enough
cash
for the
large
ump-sum
ayments
hey
periodically
eeded,
nd
-
partly
n
consequence
fthis
howto
run
their
wn armies. The
age
of the
great
ndependent
inancial
and
military
ub-contractors
aded with
the
Thirty
Years'
War.
States till
had
to
subcontract,
s
the
practice
f
selling
ffices
nd
farmingaxes bearswitness.22However, he wholebusinesswas
now
officially
ontrolled
y governments,
ot
merely
ontrolledn
practice y
the
fact
hat,
s the
Fuggers
nd
Wallenstein ad
found
to
their
ost,
he
monopoly
uyer
an
dictate
erms s
much
as the
monopoly
eller.
Perhaps
this
obvious
political
success of
the
absolutist erritorial
tates
with heir
omp
and
splendour
as
n the
past
distracted
ttentionrom he
general
ifficulties
f he
ge.
If
only art
f his
vidence olds
water,
e are
ustified
n
speaking
of
a
general
risis
in the
7th
entury;
hough
ne
of ts
character-
isticswas therelativemmunityf thestateswhichhad undergone
bourgeois
evolution. It is
probable
though
ere
we
venture
on the
complex erritory
f
pricehistory23
thatthe
crisis
began
about
620;
perhaps
with he
slumpperiod
from
619
into
the
early
I62os.
It seems
certain
hat,
fter
ome
distortionf
price
move-
ments
by
the
Thirty
Years'
War,
t
reached ts
most
acute
phase
between
640
and the
I670s,though recise
dates are
out
of
order
in the
discussion f
ong-term
conomic
movements.
From hen
n
the
evidence s
conflicting.
robably
he
signs
of
revival
utweigh
thoseof crisisnotonly obviously)n theMaritime tatesbutelse-
where.
However,
he
wild oscillations f boom
and
depression,
the
famines, evolts,
pidemics
nd
other
igns
f
profound
conomic
trouble
n
I680-I720
should
warn
us
against nte-dating
he
period
of full
ecovery.
If
thetrendwas
upwards
rom,
ay,
he
i68os-or
evenearliern individual
ountries it was still
iable
o
disastrous
fluctuations.
It
may,
owever,
e
argued
hatwhat have
described s a
general
crisis was
merely
heresult f
7th
century
ars,
articularly
fthe
Thirty ears'War I618-I648). In thepasthistoriansave n fact
tended
o take
or
rather o
imply)
hisview.
But
the crisis
ffected
manyparts
of
Europe
not
ravaged
y generals
nd
quartermasters;
and
conversely,
ometraditional
cockpits
f
Europe
(e.g.
Saxony
38
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
8/22
GENERAL CRISIS
OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN
I7TH
CENTURY
39
and
the
Low
Countries)
did
notably
better han
more
tranquil
regions.
Moreover,
there has been
a
persistent
endency
to
exaggerate he long-termnd permanent amage done by
X7th
century
wars. We
now know
that
other
hings
being equal)
the
losses of
population,
roduction
nd
capital quipment
f even 20th
century
wars,
whose
destructive
apacities
re much
greater,
an
be
made
good
within
matter f
20-25
years.
if
they
werenot n
in the I7th
century,
t was because wars
ggravatedlready xisting
tendencies f
crisis. This
is
not
to
deny
their
mportance,
hough
their ffects ere more
complex
han
appears
t
first
ight.
Thus
against
he
ravages
of
the
Thirty
Years'
War
in
parts
of
Central
Europewe must et the stimulus t gaveto mining ndmetallurgy
in
general,
nd the
temporary
ooms
t
stimulated
n
non-combatant
countries
to
the
temporary
enefit f Charles in the
63os).
It is
also
probable
hat,
but for
t,
the
great price-rise
would have
ended
in the i6ios
and
not the
i64os.
The
war
almost
ertainly
shifted he incidenceof the
crisis and
may,
on
balance,
have
aggravated
t.
Lastly,
t
is
worth
considering
hether he
crisis
did not to some
extent
produce
a
situation
which
provoked
or
prolonged
warfare.
However,
his
point,
which s
noC ssential o
the rgument,sperhapsoospeculativeobe worth ursuing.
The causes
of
the crisis
In
discussing
he
7th
century
risiswe
are
really
sking ne of
the
fundamental
uestions
bout the
rise
of
capitalism:why
did the
expansion
f the ater
5th
and i6th
centuries ot
ead
straight
nto
the
epoch
of
the i8th
and
I9th
century
ndustrial
Revolution?
What,
n
other
words,
were the obstacles n the
way
of
capitalist
expansion
The
answers,
t
may
be
suggested,
re
both
general
nd
particular.
The
general argumentmay
be
summarized s
follows.
if
capitalism
s to
triumph,
he social
structure f
feudalor
agrarian
society
mustbe revolutionized.
The
social
division
f
abour
must
be
greatly
laborated
f
productivity
s
to
increase;
he
social
abour
force
must be
radically
edistributedrom
griculture
o
industry
while
this
happens.
The
proportion
f
production
which
is
exchanged
n the
supra-local
marketmust
rise
dramatically.
o
long
as
there
s no
large body
of
wage-workers;
o
long
as
most
mensupply heirneeds from heir wnproductionrbyexchange
in
the
multiplicity
f more
r ess
autarchicocal
markets
hich
xist
even n
primitive
ocieties,
here s
a limit o the
horizon f
capitalist
profit
nd
very
ittle
ncentive o undertake
hat
we
may oosely
all
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
9/22
PAST
AND
PRESENT
mass
production,
he
basis
of
capitalist
ndustrial
expansion.
Historically,
hese
processes
annot
lways
be
separated
rom
ne
another. We may speakof the creation f the capitalist ome
market or
the
divorce f he
producers
rom hemeans
f
production
whichMarx called
primitive
ccumulation
4: the
creation
of a
large
and
expanding
market
or
goods
and
a
large
and available
free
abourforce
o
together,
wo
aspects
f
the same
process.
It is sometimes ssumed
hat
the
development
f
a
capitalist
class and of the
lements f
he
apitalist
ode
of
production
ithin
feudal
ociety utomaticallyroduce
hese
conditions.
In
the
ong
run,
taking
the
widest view over the centuriesfrom
1000
to
I800 this s no doubtso. In the shorter un it is not. Unless
certainonditionsre
present
it
s
by
no means
yet
lear
what
hey
are
-
the
cope
of
capitalist xpansion
will
be
limited
y
the
general
prevalence
fthefeudal tructuref
society,
.e. of the
predominant
rural
ector r
perhaps y
ome ther
tructure hich
immobilizes
both
the
potential
abour-force,
he
potential urplus
or
productive
investment,
nd
the
potential
emandfor
capitalisticallyroduced
goods,
such as
the
prevalence
f
tribaiism r
petty commodity
production.
Under hose
onditions,
s Marx
showed
n the case of
mercantilenterprise25usinessmight dapt tself o operatingn a
generally
eudal
ramework,
ccepting
ts
imitations
nd the
peculiar
demand
for
ts
services,
nd
becoming
n
a
sense
parasitic
n
it.
That
part
of t whichdid so
wouldbe
unable
o overcome
he
crises
of
feudal
society,
nd
might
ven
aggravate
hem. For
capitalist
expansion
s
blind.
The
weakness
f
the
old theories
hich scribed
the
triumph
f
capitalism
o the
development
f
the
capitalist
spirit
or the
entrepreneurial
pirit
is,
that the
desire to
pursue
the maximum
rofit
without
imitdoes
not
automaticallyroduce
that ocialand technicai evolution hich s required. Atthevery
leasttheremust
be mass
production
i.e.
production
or
he
greatest
aggregate rofit largeprofits,
ut not
necessarily
arge
profits
er
sale)
instead
of
production
or
the maximum
rofit er
unit sale.
Yet one
of
the essentialdifficultiesf
capitalist evelopment
n
societieswhich
keep
the mass of
the
population
utside
ts
scope
(so
that
hey
re neither
ellers
f
abour-power
or
serious
buyers
of
commodities)
s that n the shortview the
profits
f
the
really
revolutionary
types
f
capitalist roduction
re
almost
ess,
or
ook
less attractive,han those of theotherkind; especiallywhenthey
involve
eavy apital
nvestment.Christian ior then
ooks
more
attractive
roposition
han
Montagu
Burton. To corner
epper
n
the
i6th
century
would seem
much
sounder han to
start
ugar-
40
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
10/22
GENERAL
CRISIS
OF
EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN
I7TH
CENTURY
41
plantations
n the
Americas;
o
sell
Bologna
ilks
thanto sell Ulm
fustian.
Yet we
know that
in
subsequent
centuries
far vaster
profits ere chieved ysugar nd cotton hanbypepper nd silk;
and
that
ugar
nd
cotton
ontributed
ar
more
o
the
creation f
a
world
apitalistconomy
han
he
other wo.
Under
certain ircumstances
uch
trade
ould,
even under
feudal
conditions,
roduce arge enough aggregate rofits
o
give
rise to
large-scale
roduction;
or
nstance
f
it
catered
for
exceptionally
large organizations
uch as
kingdoms
r the
church;
f
the
thinly
spread
demand of an entire ontinent
ere concentratednto
the
handsof businessmenn a few
pecialized
entres
uch as the
talian
and Flemish textile owns;if a large lateral extension of the
field f
enterprise
ook
place,
e.g.
by conquest
r
colonization.
A
fair mount f socialre-division as also
possible
without
isturbing
the
fundamentally
eudal
structure f society for nstance
he
urbanizationf theNetherlandsnd
Italy
on
the basis
of
food
and
raw materials
mported
rom emi-colonialerritories.Nevertheless
the imits f the marketwere
narrow.
Medieval
and
early
modern
society
was
a
good
deal more
ike
natural
conomy
than
we care
to recall.
The
i6th and
I7th century
French
peasant
is
said
hardly
to haveusedmoney xcept or his transactionsith heState;retail
trade n German ownswas
unspecialized,
ikethat
n
village hops,
until the late i6th
century.26 xcept among
a
small
uxury
lass
(and
even there
changing
ashion
n
the modern ense
probably
developed
ate)
therate
f
replacement
f clothes
r household
oods
was slow.
Expansion
was
possible
nd took
place;
butso
long
s
the
general
tructurer rural
ociety
ad not been revolutionizedt was
limited,
r created ts own
limits;
nd when t
encountered
hem,
entered
period
f
crisis.
The expansion f the I5th and i6th centurieswas essentiallyf
this
ort;
nd
t therefore
reated
ts own
crisis othwithin he
home
market and the overseas
market. This crisis
the feudal
businessmen who were the richestand most
powerfiul
ust
because hebest
dapted
or
making ig money
n a feudal
ociety
were
unable
to
overcome.
Their
inadaptability
ntensifiedt.
Before
nalysing
hese
things
urther,
t
may
be worth
tressing
that
the
purely
echnical
bstacles o
capitalist evelopment
n the
i6th
and 17th
century
were
not
insuperable.
While the
i6th
centurymaynot have been capableofsolving ertain undamental
problems
of
technique,
such as
that
of a
compact
nd
mobile
source
of
power
which
o baffled
eonardo,
twas
quite capable
of
at least s
much
nnovations
produced
he
8th
century
evolution.
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
11/22
PAST AND
PRESENT
Nef and
othershave
made us
familiar
with he innovations
hich
actually
occurred,
though
the
phrase
Industrial
Revolution
seems less apt forthe period
I540-I640
than forthe Germany of
I450-I520
which evolved the
printing press,
effective
fire-arms,
watches,
nd the
remarkable dvance n
mining
nd
metallurgy
summarizedn Agricola'sDe Re
Metallica
1556).
Nor
was there
a
crippling
hortage
f capitalor
capitalist
nterprise
r
of
labour,
at
least
in the
advanced reas. Sizeable
blocks of
mobile
capital
anxious
for investment
nd,
especially
n the
period
of
rising
population, uite mportant
eservoirsf free
wage-labour
f
varying
skill xisted. The
point
s,
thatneither ere
poured
nto
ndustry
f
a potentially odernype. Moreover,methods or vercominguch
shortages
nd
rigidities
f
capital
and labour
supplies
might
have
been
utilized
s
fully
s in the
i8th and
I9th
centuries. The
I7th
century
risis
annot
e
explained y
the
nadequacies
f the
equip-
ment for Industrial
Revolution,
n
any narrowly
echnical nd
organizational
ense.
Let
us
now urn
o
themain ausesofthe
risis.
The specialization f feudal capitalists : thecase of taly
The
decline
of
Italy
and
the
old
centres f
medieval ommerce
and
manufacturen
general)
was the
most dramatic esultof
the
crisis. It illustrateshe
weaknesses
f
capitalism
parasitic
n
a
feudal world.
Thus i6th
century
talians
probably
ontrolled
he
greatest gglomerations
f
capital,
butmisinvestedhem
flagrantly.
They
mmobilizedhem
n
buildings
nd
squandered
hem n
foreign
lending during
the
price-revolution
which
naturally
favoured
debtors)
r
diverted hem
from
manufacturingctivities o
various
forms f immobile nvestment. t has been plausibly uggested
that the
failure f Italian manufacture
o
maintain
tself
against
Dutch,
English
nd French
during
he
I7th
century
as due
to
this
diversion
f resources.'7
It
would
be
ironic
o find hat he
Medici
were
taly's
ruin,
not
only
s bankers
ut as
patrons
f
the
expensive
arts,
nd
philistine
istoriansre
welcome
o
observe
hat he
only
majorcity
tatewhich never
produced
ny
art
worth
mentioning,
Genoa,
maintained ts commerce
nd
finance etter han
the rest.
Yet Italian
investors,
who had
long
been aware that
too
large
cathedrals harm business,28were acting quite sensibly. The
experience
f
centuries ad shown
hat he
highest
rofits
erenot
to
be
got
in technical
rogress
r
even in
production.
They
had
adapted
themselves o business
activities n the
comparatively
42
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
12/22
GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN
ECONOMY IN
7TH
CENTURY
43
narrow
ield
which emainedor hem
nce
one
eft sidethe
majority
of the
population
f
Europe
as
economically
eutral. If
they
spentvast amounts f capital non-productively,t mayhave been
simply
because
therewas no more
room to
invest
t
progressively
on
any
scale
within he limitsof this
capitalist
ector.
(The
I7th
century
utch
palliated
similar
lut
of
capitalby multiplying
household
oods
and works f
art29
hough hey
lso discovered he
more modern
device of a
speculative
nvestment
oom). Perhaps
the Italians
would have been shocked
nto different
ehaviour
y
economic
dversity; hough hey
had
made
money
for
so
long
by
providing
he
feudalworldwith ts trade nd finance hat
hey
would
not have learnedeasily. However, he generalboom of the later
I6th
century
like
the
Indian summer of Edwardian
Britain)
and the
uddenly xpanded
emands f
the
great
bsolute
monarchies
which
reliedon
private
ontractors,
nd the
unprecedenteduxury
of their
aristocracies,
ostponed
the
evil
day.
When
it
came,
bringing ecay
to Italian trade
and
manufacture,
t
left Italian
finance till
upright, hough
no
longer
dominant.
Again,
Italian
industrymight
well
have maintained ome of its old
positions y
switching
more
completely
rom
ts old
high-quality
oods
to the
shoddier ndcheapernewdraperies f theNorth. Butwho, n the
greatperiod
of
uxury
uying
rom
580-1620
would
guess that he
future
f
high-quality
extileswas limited Did
not
the
courtof
Lorraine,
n the
first
hird f the
century
se more extiles
mported
from
taly
than
from
ll
othernon-French
ountries
ut
together
30
(One
would like to reserve
udgment
n the
argument
hat
Italy
lostgroundbecause
of
higher
roduction
osts for
goods
of
equal
quality,
ntil
tronger
vidence or t is
brought
orward r
untilwe
have
a
satisfactory
xplanation
or he failure f Italian
production,
after romising eginnings,o shift s wholeheartedlyrom owns
to
countryside
s did the
extilendustriesfother ountries.3
)
The
case of
taly
hows
whyparticular
ountries entdown n the
crisis,
ot
necessarily
hy
t occurred. We must
thereforeonsider
the
contradictionsfthe
very
rocess
f
6th
centuryxpansion.
The
contradictions
f
expansion:
Eastern
Europe
The
comparative
pecialization
f
west-European
ownson trade
and
manufacture as
to some
extent
chieved n
the
I5th
and
i6th
centuriesythecreation f a sizeable urplus fexportableood n
Eastern
Europe
and
perhapsby
ocean fisheries.32 ut in Eastern
Europe
hiswas
achieved
y
the
creationf serf
griculture
n a
large
scale;
i.e.
a
local
strengthening
ffeudalism.
This,
we
may uggest,
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
13/22
PAST AND
PRESENT
had
three
ffects. t
turned he
peasant
nto
ess of
a cashcustomer
than
he
had
been
or
might
have
been.
(Or
else it
forcedhim
off
good-qualitywestern extiles nto cheap locally producedcloth).
It diminished he number
nd wealth
f
the minor
nobility
or he
benefit
f
a
handful f
magnates.
In
Polandthe former
ontrolled
43.80/
of
ploughs
in the
mid-I5th
century,
I.6%
in
the
mid-I7th;
the
share of the latter
rose
from
I3.3
to
30.7
in the
same
period.
Lastly,
t
sacrificedhe iveliermarket f the
towns o
the free
rade
interests f
exporting
andlords,
r
else seized much of whattrade
was
going
for the benefit
f the
already
bloated lords.33
The
expansion
hus
had
two
results.
While
creating
he
onditionsor he
expansionfmanufacturesnWestern urope,t cutdown, or time
at
east,
he
outlets fthesemanufacturesn theBaltic rea
perhaps
its most
mportant
market. The
desire
to cash in
rapidly
n
the
growing
emandfor orn
-
the
Balticnow
began
to feed
not
only
Northern
urope
but
also
the
Mediterranean
tempted
serf-lords
into
that
headlong xpansion
f
theirdominions nd intensification
of
exploitation
hich ed to the
Ukrainian
evolution,
nd
perhaps
also to
demographicatastrophes.34
Thecontradictionsfexpansion:overseas nd colonial markets
Much of
the
radebetween
urope
and the rest
f
the world
had,
as we
know,
been
passive throughout
he
ages,
because Orientals
did not
need
Europeangoods
to the
same extent
s
Europe
needed
theirs. It
had
been balanced
by
bullion
payments,
upplemented
from ime
to time
by
such
exports
s
slaves,
furs,
mberor
other
luxuries. Until
the
Industrial
Revolution
he sales of
European
manufactures
ere
not
important. African
rade,
which
was
not
deficitary, ay
be an
exception
ecauseof
the
taggeringly
avourable
terms f radewhich uropean oods ommandedmong he gnorant
local
buyers
and
indeed
-
almost
by
definition
--
because the
continent
as valued
chiefly
s
a
source
of bullion
until ate n the
I7th
century.
In
I665
the
Royal
African
Company
still
estimated
ts
gain
from
gold
at twice
ts
gain
from slaves.35)
The
European conquest
of the main trade-routesnd of America
did
not
change
his
structure
undamentally,
or ven the Americas
exported
morethan
they
mported.
It
greatly
iminished he
cost
of
Eastern
goods by cutting
ut
middlemen,
essening ransport
charges ndenabling uropeanmerchantsnd armedbands to rob
and
cheatwith
mpunity.
It also
greatly
ncreasedbullion
upplies,
presenting
s
withAmerican nd
African
eters o be robbed o
pay
the
Asian
Pauls.
Unquestionablyurope
derived mmense
windfall
44
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
14/22
GENERAL
CRISIS
OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN
I7TH
CENTURY
45
gains
from
his. General
usiness
ctivity
as
mmensely
timulated
as
wellas
capital
ccumulated;
ut
our
exports
f
manufactures
ere
on the whole notgreatly xpanded. Colonialpowers- in good
medieval
business
tradition
followed
a
policy
of
systematic
restriction
f
output
and
systematic
monopoly.
Hence
there
was
no
reason
why xports
f home manufactures
hould
benefit.
The
benefit
which
Europe
drew
from these initial
conquests
was thus n thenature
f
single
onus atherhan
regular
ividend.
When it was
exhausted,
risis
was
likely
o
follow.
Among
the
colonial
powers
costs and
overheads ose faster han
profits.
In
both
East
and West
we
may distinguish
hree
tages:
that
of
easy
profits,hatofcrisis, nd with uckeventuallyhatof a stableand
moremodest
rosperity.
n
the nitial
haseconquest
r
nterloping
broughtemporarilynchallenged
rofits
t
low costs.
In the
East,
where
rofits
ested n
the
monopoly
f a
restricted
utput
f
spices
and the
like,
the crisis
was
probably
rought
n
by
the
steep
rise
in
protection
osts
against
ld and new
rivals;
rising
ll the
more
steeply
he
more
he
colonial
power
ried o
screw
up
the
monopoly
price.
It
has been estimated hat he
Portuguese
pice
trade
barely
paid
its
way
for these reasons.38 n
the
West,
where
hey
rested
on the cheapbulkproductionf bullion nd otherrawmaterials,
protection
osts
probably layed
a smaller
part,
though hey
also
rose with
piracy
and
competition.
However,
here
the technical
limits
fthe
primitive
rat-hole
mining
fthe
Spaniards
were
oon
reached
even
allowing
for the uses of the
mercury
rocess),
nd
very
possibly
he abourforcewas
virtually
orked
o
death,
being
treated
s an
expendable
asset.37
At
any
rate
American
silver
exports
iminished
fter
6IO
or so.
Eventually,
f
course,
n the
East
colonial
powers
djusted
hemselveso the
new
level of over-
heads ndperhaps ound ew ources f ocal taxationo offsethem.
In the
West
the
familiartructuref
quasi-feudal
arge
states ame
into
being
n the
I7th
century.38
ince
the
economic
asis
of the
Spanish
olonial
ystem
was
broader han he
Portuguese,
he
results
of crisis
would be more
far-reaching.
hus
the
early emigration
to the Americas
emporarily
timulatedhe
export
f
goods
from he
home
country;
ut
as,
inevitably,
any
fthe
colonists'wants
came
to be
supplied
ocally,
he
expanded
manufacturesf
Spain
had
to
pay
the
price.
The
attempt
o
tighten
he
metropolitan
onopoly
merelymade matters orse ydiscouraginghedevelopment,mong
other
hings,
f the
potentially
evolutionary
lantation
conomy.39
The
effects f the influx f
bullion nto
Spain
are too
well-known
to
need discussion.
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
15/22
PAST
AND
PRESENT
It is
therefore
nderstandablehat
the
old
colonial
system
passed
through
profound
risis;
nd that ts
effects
n
the
general
Europeaneconomywerefar-reaching.A newpattern f colonial
exploitation
which
produced
steadilyrising
exports
of
manu-
factures
rom
urope
did
indeed
replace
t.
(Acting
argely
n
their
own the
sugar
planters
f Northern
razil
had
shown he
way
to it
from he
nd ofthe 6th
century).
Yet the
ure
of the
old
monopoly
profits
as
rresistible
o all
thosewho
had
a
chance
f
apturing
hem.
Even the Dutch
remained
resolutely
old-fashioned n
their
colonialism
ntilthe i8th
century,
hough
heir
ntrepot
position
in
Europe
saved them
rom he
consequence
f
colonial
nefficiency.
Old colonialismid notgrow ver ntonewcolonialism;tcollapsed
and was
replaced
y
t.
The
contradictions
f
the home
markets
There
can be little
doubt thatthe
i6th
century
ame
nearer o
creating
he conditions
or
a
really
widespread
doption
f the
capitalist
modeof
production
han
ny
previous
ge;
perhaps
ecause
of the
impetusgivenby
overseas
oot,
perhaps
because
of the
en-
couragement
f
rapidly
rowing
opulation
nd
markets
nd
rising
prices. (It isnot he bject f his rticleo discuss hereasonswhich
caused
this
xpansion
o follow he
feudal
risis
of the
i4th
and
I5th
centuries).
A
powerful
ombination f
forces,
ncluding
ven
large
feudal nterests40
eriously
hreatened
he
resistance
f
gild-
dominated owns. Rural
industry,
f the
putting-out
type,
which
had
previously
een
largely
onfined o
textiles,
pread
n
various
ountries nd to new
branches f
production
e.g.
metals),
especially
owards he end of
the
period.
Yet
the
expansion
red
its own
obstacles. We
may
briefly
onsider
omeof
them.
Except perhaps in England no agrarianrevolution of a
capitalist
ype
ccompanied
ndustrial
hange,
s
it
was
to do in the
i8th
century; hough
here
was
plenty
f
upheaval
n
the
countryside.
Here
again
we
find he
generally
eudalnature
f the
social
frame-
work
distorting
nd
diverting
orces
which
might
therwise ave
made
for direct dvance
owards
modern
apitalism.
In the
East,
where
agrarian hange
took the
form
f a
revival
of
serfdom
y
exporting
ords,
he
conditions
or
uch
development
ere
nhibited
locally, though
made
possible
elsewhere. In
other
regions
the
price-rise,heupheavalsn andownership,ndthegrowthfdemand
for
grarian
roducemight
well
have ed to the
mergence
f
capitalist
farming
y
gentlemen
nd the
kulak-type
f
peasant
on a
greater
scale than
appears
to have
occurred.4'
Yet
what
happened?
46
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
16/22
GENERAL CRISIS
OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN
I7TH CENTURY
47
French ords
often
bourgeois
who
had
bought
hemselvesnto
feudal
tatus)
reversed
he
trend o
peasant
ndependence
rom he
middle f the 6thcentury,nd ncreasinglyecoveredostground.42
Towns,
merchants
nd local middlemen
nvested
n
the
and,
partly
no doubt
because of
the
security
f
farm
produce
n an
age
of
inflation,
artly
ecause
the
surplus
was
easy
to draw from t
in a
feudal
manner,
heir
xploitationeing
ll themore ffectiveor
eing
combined
with
usury;partly erhaps
n direct
olitical
ivalry
ith
feudalists.43
ndeed,
the
relationship
f
towns nd
their nhabitants
as
a whole to
the
surrounding easantry
was
still,
s
always
n a
generally
eudal
ociety,
hat
of a
special
kind
of
feudal ord.
(The
peasants n the town-dominatedantons of Switzerland nd in
inland
Netherlands
ere
not
actually
mancipated
ntil he
French
Revolution.
4)
The mere xistence
furban
nvestment
n
agriculture
or urban
nfluence ver
the
countryside,
herefore,
id not
imply
the
creation
f rural
apitalism.
Thus
the
spread
f
share-cropping
in
France,
though heoretically arking
step
towards
apitalism,
in fact ften
roduced
merely bourgeoisie arasitic
n a
peasantry
increasingly
xhausted
y
t,
and
by
the
rising
emands f the
State;
and
consequent
ecline.45 The
old social structure
redominated
still.
Two results
may
have followed rom his.
First,
tis
improbable
that
therewas much
technical
nnovation,
hough
he
first
Italian)
handbook n
crop
rotation
ppeared
n the
mid-i6th
entury,
nd
certain hat
the ncrease n
agrarian
utput
did not
keep pace
with
demand.46 Hence towards
he end of the
period
there re
signs
of
diminishing
eturns
nd
foodshortage,
f
exporting
reas
using
up
their
crops
for ocal needs
etc.,
preludes
to the famines nd
epidemics
of
the
crisis-period.47
econd,
the
rural
population,
subjectto the doublepressure f landlords nd townsmennotto
mention he
State),
nd in
any
case much
ess
capable
of
protecting
itself
gainst
amine nd war han
hey,
uffered.48 n some
regions
this
short-sightedsqueeze
may
ctually
have led to a
declining
trend n
productivityuring
he
I7th
century.49
The
countryside
was sacrificed
o
ord,
own nd State.
Its
appalling
ate
f
mortality
-
if
the
relativelyprosperous
Beauvaisis
is
any guide
- -
was second
only
to that of
the domestic
utworkers,
lso
increasingly
ural.50
Expansion
nder heseconditions
red crisis.
Whathappenedn thenon-agriculturalectors epended argelyn
the
agricultural.
Costs
of
manufacture
ay
have
been
unduly
raised
by
the
more
rapid
rise of
agrarian
han of
industrial
rices,
thus
narrowing
he
profit-margin
f
manufacturers.51
However,
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
17/22
PAST
AND
PRESENT
manufacturers
ncreasingly
sed the
cheap
abour frural
utworkers,
who
were
again exploited
o the
point
of
debility.)
The
market
also had its difficulties. he ruralmarket s a whole must have
proved
disappointing.Many freeholding
easants
benefited rom
the
price-rise
nd the
demandfortheir
goods,
provided hey
had
enough
and to feedthemselves
ven
n
bad
years, regular
urplus
for
ale,
and a
good
head
forbusiness.52
But
f
such
yeomen ought
much more
than
before,
heybought
ess than
townsmen
f
equal
standing,being
more self-sufficient.53he experienceof
i9th
century
rance showsthat middle nd rich
peasantry
s
about as
univiting
marketormassmanufacturess
may
be
found,
nd does
not encouragecapitalists o revolutionizeroduction. Its wants
are
traditional;
most
of
ts wealth
oes
nto
more and and
cattle,
r
into
hoards,
r
nto
new
building,
r
even nto heer
waste,
ike hose
gargantuan
weddings,
unerals,
nd other feastswhich
disturbed
continental
rinces
t the turn f the 6th
century.54
he
increase
in the demand
from
the
non-agricultural
ector
towns, uxury
market,
overnment
emand
tc.) may
for timehave
obscured
he
fact
hat
t
grew
ess
rapidly
han
productive
apacity,
nd that the
persistent
ecline
of
the real income of
wage-earners
n
the
iong
inflation ayactually, ccordingoNef,havestopped thegrowth
of
the demand for
some
industrial
products. 55
However,
the
slumps
n the
export
markets rom
he
late i6ios on
brought
he
fact ome.
Once
the decline
had
begun,
of
course,
an additionalfactor
increased he difficulties
f manufacture:he rise n
labour costs.
For
there
s evidence hat
-
in the
towns t
least
--
the
bargaining
power
f
abour
rose
sharply
uring
he
crisis,
erhaps
wing
o the
fall
or
stagnation
n
town
populations.
At
any
rate
real
wages
rose
inEngland, taly, painandGermany,ndthemid-centuryaw the
formation f effective
ourneymen's
rganizations
n
most western
countries.56
his
may
not have affected
he labour costs of
the
putting-out
ndustries,
s
theirworkerswere n a
weaker
position
to benefit
rom he
situation,
nd their
iece-ratewages
were more
easily
ut.
However,
t s
clearly
ot
negligible
actor.
Moreover,
the
slackening
f
population
ncrease
nd
the
stabilizationf
prices
musthave
depressed
manufacturesurther.
These
different
spects
of the crisis
may
be reduced o a
single
formula: conomic xpansion ookplacewithin socialframework
which
t
was not
yet trong nough
o
burst,
nd in
ways
dapted
o
it rather
han o the world f modern
apitalism. Specialists
n the
Jacobean
eriod
must
etermine hat
ctually recipitated
he crisis:
48
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
18/22
GENERAL CRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN
I7TH
CENTURY
49
the decline n American
ilver,
he
collapse
of the Baltic market
r
some
of
many
ther
ossible
actors. Once
the
first rack
ppeared,
the wholeunstable tructure as boundto totter. It didtotter,nd
in the
subsequentperiod
of
economic
crisis and social
upheaval
the
decisive
hift rom
apitalist nterprisedapted
to
a
generally
feudal
rameworko
capitalist nterprise
ransforming
he
world
n
ts
own
pattern
ook
place.
The
Revolution
n
England
was
thus
the
mostdramatic
ncident n the
crisis,
nd its
turning-point.
This
nation wroteSamuel
Fortrey
n
1663
in his
England's
nterest
and
Improvement
can
expect
no less than to
becomethe most
great
nd
flourishing
f all others. It could and
it
did;
and the
effects n theworldwereto be portentous.
Birkbeck
ollege.
E.
J.
Hobsbawm
A NOTE
ON
PRICE HISTORY
Long-term price
movements
have been
deliberatelykept
outside the
main
argument,
because
other discussions
of
long-term
economic
development
emphasize
them so
much;
perhaps
too
much.
Nevertheless,
the course
of
prices
calls for some
comment.
The traditional
iew,
as
put
forward
by
Simiand
and
accepted by
Labrousse
and others,
s
that the long price-risecame to an end around
I640
and wasfollowedby a price-fall, r fluctuations ound a stable trend until the second
quarter
of
the i8th
century.
This view seems too
simple.
There are
signs
of a
change
in the
price
trend
between
I605
and
I620;
for nstance n
Spanish
wheat
prices.
Cipolla
has also noted that Milanese
prices
cease to
rise
rapidly
after
605
and continue
steady
or
rising
lowly
from hen
until
I630.
(Allouve-
ments
monetaires
ans
l'dtat
de
Milan
I580-I700.
I952).
We
should
expect
this,
since Hamilton shows
that the
import
of
American bullion reached its
peak
in
I590-I6I0,
though
it
held
up quite
well
until 1620 or so
(American
Treasure,
5).
If
prices
went on
rising
until
640
(or
I635,
which seems
to
have
been
the
turning-point
n
Italy)
it was
probably
due
to
debasementof
coinage,
to
the demand
for
scarce
goods
in the
Thirty
Years'
War,
or to a
combination
of
both. Hence
it
is not
unlikely
hat,
but
forthe
war,
the
period
of
price-fall
orprice-stability ould havebegunin
I610-20.
The end of the war ntensified
the
crisis,
which
undoubtedly
eached ts most
acute
phase
(and
the
owest
point
of
prices)
n the
I66os
and
early 67os.
The
effects f drastic
post-war
deflation
may
be
studied in
the
typical
war-profiteering
ountry
of
Switzerland,
where
they
ed to the
peasant
war
of
I653.
The course
of
prices
differed,
of
course,
according
to
regions
and
commodities,
and
some of the local
and
sectional
phenomena
are still
very
obscure.
No
attempt
can be
made
here to account
for
them.
In
general,
however,
secular
price-movements
ally quite
well
with
the
periods
of the
crisis as discussed
in
the
text.
NOTES
1Perroy,Boutruche,Hilton have discussedthis n recentyears n theAnnales
and elsewhere. See
also the
discussion
among
Dobb,
Sweezy,
Takahashi,
Hilton and Hill
in Science and
Society
I950-53,
and the
general survey by
Malowist
in Kwartainik
Historiczny
953,
I. (I
am indebted
to
the Polish
Institute,
London
for a translation f
this).
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
19/22
PAST
AND
PRESENT
0
2
Braudel,
La Mediterranee
.
. au
temps
e
Philippe
I,
1097.
R.
Romano,
Industries
textiles t
conjoncture
a
Florence
au
I7e
s.
(Annales
Oct.-Dec.
I952, 5sI).
French historians
regard
the
phase
de contraction
du
I7e
siecle as un faitmaintenant tabli (Rev. Hist. 428 (I953), 379). In what
follows
owe
a
great
deal to
discussion with
J.
Meuvret who
confirmed
many
of
my
non-specialistguesses.
However
I
doubt whetherhe would
agree
with
much of this
paper.
3
C. A.
Julien,
Histoire
de
l'Afrique
du
Nord,
538
ff;
the industrial
revolution in
piracy,
due to
the introduction
f
Northern
sails
by English
and Dutch after
604
may
be noted.
4
J.
Meuvret in
Melanges
d'Histoire Sociale
V,
I944,
27-44;
in
Population,
1946,
653-50
and an
unpublishedpaper
on
the
effects
f the
I693-4
and
I709-10
famines
on
French
diplomacy.
5
There
are,
of
course,
no reliable statistics nd not
always
good
indirect
indices. This
paragraph
is
based,
in
particular,
on:
K.
Larsen,
History of
Norway,I948, 304 (figures nlyforI665 and after);Mayer, The Populationof
Switzerland
(1952),
and Patavino's estimate for
I6o8
which
is as
great
as
M's for
700
in
Nabholz, Muralt, Feller,
Bonjour,
Gesch.
d
Schweiz
II,
5;
H.
Wopfner,
Gueterteilung
.
Uebervoelkerung,
938,
202
ff;
H. v. z.
Muehlen,
Entstehung
d. Gutsherrschaft
n
Oberschlesien ,
n
Vierteljahrschrift
.
Soz.
und
Wirtsch.
Gesch.
XXXVIII,
334-60o;
Beloch,
Bevoelkerungsgeschichte
Italiens
,
I53, 225
ff;
Keyser,
Bevoelkerungsgesch.
eutschlands,
94I,
36I
ff,
304
ff;
Roupnel,
La
vie et la
campagne
dijonnaises
u
I7e
s.;
P.
Goubert,
Problemes
demographiques
du Beauvaisis
au
I7e
s.
(Annales,
Oct.-Dec.
1952,
452-468),
for an
area
which
seems to
have suffered
ather
ess;
G.
Debien,
En
Haut-Poitou;
Defricheurs
u
Travail
(XV-XVIII
s.)
and
for
absence
of
forest-clearing
nd
recovery
f forestsBull. Soc.
Hist. Mod.
Mai-Juillet
953,
6-9;
Pirenne,
Hist. de
Belgique
V,
439-40;
A.
Cosemans,
Bevolke,
ng
v.
Brabant
ende I7e eeuw 939,
220-4;
G. N. Clark, The Seventeenthentury;Rutkowski,
Hist. Econ. de
la
Pologne
avant les
Partages,
927,
9I-2;
Stone
in IX
Congres
International es Sciences
Historiques
I,
I95I,
49-50,
Hoskins,
The
Rebuilding
of
Rural
England
I570-I640,
Past and Present
,
I953.
Op.
cit. 6.
The
same criticism
may
be
made of the estimatesof
Urlanis,
Rost nasielenia
v.
Jewropie
Moscow I94I)
I58
which
seem rather
optimistic.
I am indebted
to
Mr. A.
Jenkin
or
drawing
my
attention o these
figures.
7
S.
Peller,
Studies in
mortality
ince
the
Renaissance
(Bull.
Inst. Hist.
of
Medicine)
I943, 443, 445, 452,
and
esp. 456;
ibid
I947,
67, 79.
Meuvret
and
Goubert
op.
cit. and
the
literature
uoted
in
Habbakuk,
English
Population
in
the i8th
Century
Econ.
Hist. Rev. 2dS.
VI,
2,
I953).
For
the
epidemiology
of the
century,
n addition to innumerable ocal
studies, Haeser,
Gesch.
d.
Medizin u. d. epidem.KrankheitenJena 882), C. Creighton,Hist. of Epidemics
in
Britain
I89I, I894),
L. F.
Hirst,
The
Conquest
f
Plague
(I953);
Prinzing,
Epidemics resulting
rom
wars
(I916);
Brownlee,
Epidemiology
of Phthisis
in
Great Britain
and
Ireland
(Medical
Research Council
I918);
Campbell,
The
Epidemiology
of influenza
(Bull.
Inst. Hist. Medicine
I3,
I943);
W.
J.
Simpson,
A
Treatise
n
the
Plague
(I905).
8
Sombart,
Luxus u.
Kapitalismus,
26-7;
Schmoller,
DeutschesStaedtewesen
in
aelterer
eit,
1922,
60-95;
B.
Bretholz,
Gesch.
Boehmens
.
Maehrens
1924,
III,
61I-3;
Baasch,
Hollaendische
Wirtschaftsgeschichte,
4-5.
Cipolla,
The Decline of
Italy
(Econ.
Hist. Rev.
2
S.V., 2,
1952);
Roupnel, op.
cit. for
reversion
f
Burgundy
to
autarky;
Reuss,
Hist.
de Stras-
bourg,
1922,
28o-6;
P.
Boissonade,
La
crise de l'industrie
languedocienne
I600-I66o
(Annales du
Midi,
I909);
G. Aubin
and
H.
Kunze,
Leinener-
zeugung . .im oestl.Mitteldeutschland,
940.
10
For
figures
f
the
Dutch and Florentine
production,
N. W.
Posthumus,
Gesch.
v. d. LeidscheLakenindustrie
II,
932;
Romano
in
Annales,
oc
cit.
11
Bang
and
Korst,
Tabeller
over
Skibsfart;
A.
Christensen,
Dutch Trade
and
theBaltic about
600
(Copenhagen
I940).
This content downloaded from 87.77.127.12 on Mon, 23 Nov 2015 11:49:35 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp -
7/23/2019 HOBSBAWM, E.J. 17th Cent European Econom Crisis
20/22
GENERALCRISIS OF EUROPEAN ECONOMY IN
I7TH
CENTURY
51
12
G.
Tongas,
Relations entre la France et
l'Empire
Ottoman durant
la
premiere
moitie
u 17e
s.,
1942;
P.
Masson,
Le
Commerce rancais dans le Levant
au I7e
s.,
1892,
esp.
130-4,
App.
XV,
236;
H.
Watjen,
D. Niederlander m
Mittelmeergebiet,
909,
145, 149.
13
Bal
Krishna,
Commercial elationsbetween ndia and
England
1601-1757,
caps
ii-v;
S. A.
Khan,
East
India
Trade
n
the 17th
C.,
1923,
74,
ff.
14
C.
de
Lannoy
and
H.
Van
der
Linden,
Hist. de
l'Expansion
des
Peuples
Europeens:
Neerlande
et
Danemark
XVII
et
XVIII
ss.), 1911,
334, 344-5, 363.
The
indebtedness
of
the
Company
was
also
higher
han beforeor after.
J.
G. Van
Dillen,
Bronnen
ot
d.
Geschiedenis.
Wisselbanken,
925,
II,
971
ff.
15
Barbados
began
to
export
sugar
n
1646, Jamaica
started
planting
n
1664.
Haiti re-established
lantation
n
1655,
Martinique
began
it in the same
year,
St. Kitts'
sugar
exportspassed
its
ndigo
exports
n I66o.
(Lippman,
Gesch.
d.
Zuckers,
929).
16
For a
comparison
of its
size
in
1641
and
1667,
J.
Saintoyant,
a
Colonis-
ationEuropeenne,947,27
1-3.
17
B.
Porshnev
in
Biryukovitch,
orshnev,
Skazkin
etc.,
Novaya
Istoriya
1640-1789
(Moscow
1951),
444.
This follows
a
suggestion
of Marx
in
1850
(Sel.
Essays,
ed.
Stenning,
1926,
203).
The
coincidence
has
often
been
noted,
e.g