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INTEGRITYAND

DISRESPECT

Principles

of

a Conception f

Morality

Basedon theTheoryof Recognition

AXEL

HONNETH

Universityof

Frankfurt

N

HIS

BOOK

aturalLaw and

Human

Dignity,

Emst

Bloch

sought

o

uncovera

single

moral ntuition t the heartof the

widely divergent

p-

proachesaken

n

the

traditionf natural

aw.

As is well

known, heconclu-

sionhe

reached

n

this

study,

whichremains

fascinating

ocumentorthe

modemreader,was thatunlike he

eudemonicntentions haracteristicf

social

utopias,

atural

aw takesas its

goal

the

protectionf

human

ignity.

Employing

sober

diom

haracterized

y analytical

istinctionsnd

utterly

devoidof the

expressiveness

f which

he was a

master,

Bloch

writes

at a

decisive

point

n the

book:

Social

utopias

primarily

aim

to

bring about

happiness,

or

at

least

to

eliminate

distress

and the conditions which

preserve

or

generate it. Theories of natural aw

aim ...

primarily

o

bring

about

dignity,

human

rights, uridicalguarantees

or

the security or

liberty

of

man,

treating hese as categories of human

pride. Social utopias are, accord-

ingly,

oriented

predominantly

oward the elimination of human

misery,

natural

aw

predominantlyowardthe eliminationof humandegradation.I

The fact

thatBlochapproacheshe

problem

negatively

here

reveals

wo

considerationsf

principle

whichfunction s

determiningremises

n his

reasoning:irst,thattheessenceof

everythingwhich,

n moral heory,s

known s

human

ignity

an

only

be

ascertained

ndirectly y

determining

the forms

of

personal

egradation

nd

njury; nd

second,

hat t

wasonly

such

negative xperiences

f

disrespect

nd nsult hat urnedhe

normative

AUTHOR'S NOTE: This

essay

is a

modified version of the

inaugural

lecture held at the

Departmentof

Philosophy,

University

of Frankfurt

n June

28,

1990.

POLMCAL

THEORY,

Vl.

20 No.

2, May

1992 187-201

C

1992

SagePublications,

nc.

187





188

POLITICALTHEORY

May

1992

goal

of

securing

human

dignity

nto a

driving

orce

in

history.

The

first

premise

would

appear

o rest

on a

proposition

ut

in theterms

of

moral

philosophy,

hesecond

premise n a thesisascribableo what

might

be

called

moral

ociology.

SinceBloch

employs

hetwo

only

as a

theoretical

oil

for

a

Marxist

ppropriation

f

thenaturalaw

tradition,

e

allowsboth o

stand

as

unresolved

hilosophical

ypotheses.

Although

e

situates hemat

the

center f his

arguments

n moral

heory,

n

order o

uphold

he

hermeneutic

framework

f his

study,

he refrains

rom

urning

hese

premises

hemselves

intoan

object f

independent

eflection. his

approach,

owever,

aused

him

tooverlookwhatactuallys thephilosophicalhrust f his book. f inacon-

ceptof

the

dignity,

he

complete

ntegrity

f man

s

only

to be

approximated

by

determining

hat

forms

personal

nsult

and

disrespect

ake,

hen,

con-

versely, t

would

hold hat

he

constitutionf human

ntegrity

s

dependent

on

the

experience f

intersubjective

ecognition.

Without

ealizingt,

Bloch

avails

himself

f a

normative

heory

f

mutual

ecognition;

ccording

o this

theory, he

integrity

f

human

ubjects,

vulnerable s

they

are to

injury

throughnsult

nd

disrespect,

epends

n

their

eceiving

pproval

nd

espect

fromothers.

In

theremarks

hat

ollow,

I

attempt

o

go one

step

furthern

clarifying

this

project

of an

interrelation

etween

disrespect

nd human

ntegrity

outlined

n

negative erms

by

Bloch, but not

followed

through

by

him.

Starting

rom

he

first

premise f

Bloch's

tudy, seek to draw

a

systematic

distinction

etween

different

orms

of

personal

isrespect.

his

differentia-

tion

of

three

asic

orms f

disrespect

ill,

in

a

subsequent

tep,

yield

ndirect

insights

nto

the

totality

of

experiences

f

recognition

n

which a

person

depends orthe safeguardingf his integrity.Onlyafterundertakinghis

excursusnto

the

theory

of

recognition

an I

conclude

by

treating

Bloch's

second

premise,

which,cast

in

the

terms

of

moral

sociology,

deems

the

experience f

personal

isrespecto

represent

moral

driving

orce n

the

process

f

societal

development.

I

The

anguage

f

everyday

ife is

still

nvested

witha

knowledge-which

we

take

or

granted-

hatwe

owe

our

ntegrity,

n a

subliminal

ay,to

the

receipt f

approval r

recognition

romother

persons.Up

to

the

present

ay,

when

individuals

who see

themselvesas

victimsof

moral

maltreatment

describe

hemselves,

hey

assign

a

dominant

oleto

categorieshat,

as

with

insult

r

degradation,

re

related

o

formsof

disrespect,

o

thedenial

of





HonnethINTEGRITYNDDISRESPECT 189

recognition. egative oncepts f thiskindareusedto characterize

form

of behavior

hatdoes not

represent

n

injustice

olely

because

t constrains

the subjects

n

their reedom or actionor does them

harm.

Rather,

uch

behavior s injuriousbecause

it

impairs

hese

persons

n

their

positive

understanding

f

self- an

understandingcquired y

intersubjective

eans.

There anbe no meaningful se whatsoever

f the

concepts

f

disrespect

or

insult

were

it

not

for the

implicit

eferenceo a

subject's

laim

o be

granted ecognition y others.Hence he language f everydayife,

which

Bloch himself nvokes

as a matter f

course,

contains he reference o

a

conceptbased on the theoryof intersubjectivity;his conceptholds the

invulnerabilitynd ntegrity f human eings o depend

n

approval eing

forthcoming

romothers.Not

only Hegel's heory

f recognition

ut

espe-

ciallyG.

H. Mead's ocial

psychology

ransformedhis ntuitive

nowledge

intoa basis

or he rameworkf a

systematicheory.

ccording

o

this

heory,

human ndividuations a

process

n which the individual an unfold

a

practicaldentity

o the extent hathe is

capable

f

reassuring

imselfof

recognition y

a

growing

circle of

partners

o communication.2ubjects

capableof languageand actionare constituted s individualsolely by

learning,

rom the

perspective

f otherswho offer

approval,

o

relate o

themselves s

beings

who

possess

certain

positivequalities

nd abilities.

Thusastheir onsciousnessf their ndividualityrows, heycome

o

depend

to an

ever ncreasingxtent n theconditions

f

recognitionhey

areafforded

by

the ife-world

f their

ocialenvironment.hat

particular

uman

ulner-

ability ignifiedby

the

concept

f

disrespect

rises rom his

nterlocking

of individuationnd

recognition

n

which

both

Hegel

andMeadbased heir

inquiries. ince, nhisnormativemageof self- somethingMeadwould all

his Me - every individual

s

dependent n

the

possibility

of constant

reassurance

y

the

Other; he experience f disrespect oses

the riskof an

injury hatcancause he dentity f theentireperson o collapse.

It is

obvious hat

we

use the terms disrespect r insult

n

everyday

language o designatea varietyof degreesof psychological

njury o a

subject.

Theuse of a

singleexpression ould hreateno efface

hecategor-

ical

difference

etween heblatant

egradation

hich s bound

up

withthe

deprivation

f basichuman

ights

nd hesubtlehumiliationhataccompan-

ies

public tatements s to the failingsof a givenperson.

However,hefact

thatwe are also intuitivelynclined o breakdown thepositivecounter-

concept

of

respect

nto a number f

intuitive

radations

lreadymplies

that nternal ifferencesxistbetweenndividualorms f

disrespect.

ant's

introduction

f the

concept

f

respect

nto

he ieldof moral

heorys attested

to

in

a

discussion

f the

notion till

underwayoday.There, variety

f means





190

POLITICALTHEORY

May

1992

-

be

they

phenomenological

r drawn rom

an

analytical

hilosophy f

language has been employed n an attempto distinguish etween he

differing

egrees

f

respect

ccorded nother

erson

n terms

fwhich

of

his

personalityraits

chieve

ecognition

nd

n

what

way.3

As

I seek

to set

up

a

systematiclassificationf

three orms f

disrespect,

will

implicitly

efer

backto this debate.

The differences

etween heseformsaremeasured

y

the

degree

o which

hey

can

upset

a

person's

ractical

elationship

o self

by

depriving

his

person

f

the

recognition

f certain laims

o

identity.

If

we base our

standardsf

comparison

n

suchan

approach,

t

would

appearensible o start roma typeof disrespecthatpertainso a person's

physical

ntegrity. hose ormsof

practical

maltreatment

n

whicha

person

is

forcibly'deprivedf

any

opportunity

o

dispose

reely

over

his own

body

represent

hemost

undamental

ype

of

personal

egradation.

his

s

the

case

because

very

attempto

seize

control f a

person's

ody

against

his

will,

irrespective

f the

ntention

nvolved,

auses

a

degree

f

humiliation,

hich,

by

comparisono

other orms

of

disrespect,

asa

more

profoundly

estruc-

tive

mpact

n an

ndividual's

ractical

elationship

oself.

Forwhat s

special

about uch ormsofphysicalnjury, sexemplified ytorture rrape,snot

the raw

pain

experienced

y

the

body

but he

coupling

f

this

pain

with

the

feeling

of

being

defenselessly tthe

mercy f

another

ubject,o the

point

of

being

deprived f

all

senseof

reality.4

he

physical

maltreatment

f

a

subject

represents

type

of

disrespecthat

does

lasting

damage o

the

subject's

confidence,

cquiredt an

early

tate, hat

he can

coordinate

isown

body

autonomously.enceone

of the

consequences,

edded o

a type

of

social

shame,

s

the

oss of

self-confidence

nd rustn

the

world,

nd

his

adversely

affectsallpracticalnteraction ithother ubjects, venataphysicalevel.

Throughhe

experience f

this

typeof

disrespect,

herefore,he

person s

deprived

f

that orm

of

recognition

hat s

expressedn

unconditional

espect

for

autonomous

ontrol

ver

hisown

body,a

form

of

respect

cquired

ust

through

xperiencing

motional

ttachment

n

the

socialization

rocess.

lhe

successful

ntegration

f

physical

nd

emotional

ualities f

behavior

s

thus

shattered

ost

facto

from

without,

rippling

he

most

fundamental

orm

of

the

practical

elationshipo

self,

namely,

onfidencen

oneself.

Thisextreme ypeof disrespect,whichinterruptshe continuity f a

positive

mageof

self

even

at

the

corporealevel,

s

tobe

distinguished

rom

formsof

degradationhat

affecta

person's

ormative

nderstanding

f self.

I

am

referring

o

those

orms

f

personal

isrespect hich

a

subject

ndergoes

by

being

structurally

xcluded

rom

he

possession

f

certain

ightswithin

a

given

society.

We

can

construe

he

term

rights o

signify

hose

ndividual

claims

thata

personcan

legitimately

xpect

society

to

fulfill,

since, as a





Honneth INTEGRITYAND DISRESPECI

191

full-fledged

member

f a

community,

e

hasan

equal

right

o

participate

n

its

institutionalrder. houldhenowbe

systematically

enied ertain

ights

of this

kind,

the

implication

s

thathe

is not deemed

o

possess

the

same

degree

f moral

ccountability

s othermembers f

society.

The

distinguish-

ing

feature f such ormsof

disrespect,

s

typified y

the denialof

rights

r

by

social ostracism,

hus lies not

solely

in

comparative

estrictions n

personal

autonomy

ut

in

the

combination f these restrictions

ith

the

feeling

hat he

subject

acks

he

status

f

full-fledged artners

ointeraction

who

all

possess

the

samemoral

rights.

For

the

individual, aving

ocially

valid egalrightswithheldromhimorher ignifies violation f theperson's

intersubjective

xpectationhathe

or

she

will

be

recognized

s

a

subject

capable

f

reaching

moral

udgments.

o

this

extent,

he

experience

f

being

denied

ights

s

typically oupled

witha loss

of

self-respect,

f the

ability

o

relate o oneselfas a

partnero interactionnpossession f

equal ights n a

par

with all

other

individuals.5hrough

he

experience f this

type

of

disrespect,herefore,he

person

s

deprived

f that

orm

of

recognition

hat

takes he

shape

of

cognitive espect

or moral

ccountability.

he

atter,

or

itspart,wasonlypainstakinglycquirednthe nteractiverocessesnvolved

in

socialization.

This second

type

of

disrespect,

which

has

a

detrimentalffect

on

a

subject's

ormative

nderstanding

f

self,

is to be set off from

a thirdand

final ypeofdegradation,hich

entailsnegative

onsequencesorthesocial

valueof individuals

r groups.Only

when we consider hese,as it

were,

evaluative orms

of

disrespect,namely, he

denigration f individual

r

collective

ife-styles, owe actually

rrive t the ormof

behavioror

which

oureverydayanguage rovides uchdesignationss insult r

degrada-

tion.

The

honor, dignity r, o use

themodem erm,

status f aperson

canbe

understoodo

signify hedegree f

social

acceptanceorthcomingor

a

person'smethod

f

self-realizationithin hehorizon

f cultural

raditions

in

a

givensociety.6

f

thishierarchyf societalvalues

s structuredo as

to

downgrade

ndividual

ormsof

livingandconvictions

or being nferior r

deficient,

hen t

robs he

subjects

n

question f every

opportunityo

accord

theirabilities ocialvalue.Onceconfronted ithan evaluationhatdown-

gradescertain

patterns f

self-realization,hosewho

have opted orthese

patterns

annot

elate o theirmodeof

fulfillment

ssomethingnvestedwith

positivesignificancewithin

heir

community. he

individualwhoexperi-

ences

this

type

of

social

devaluationypically alls

preyto a loss of

self-

esteem that

s,

he is

no

longer

n a

position o

conceive f himself s a

being

whose

characteristic

raitsandabilities

reworthyof esteem.Through

he

experience

f this

type

of

disrespect,

herefore,

he

person sdeprived f

the





192

POLITICALTHEORY May 1992

form of

recognition

hat is

expressed

n

society'sapproval

f a

type

of

self-realizationhatthe personhadonlybeenable to acquirehrough n

arduous rocess

nvolving

ncouragement

n the

form

of

group

olidarity.

It is

a standardeature

f the three

groups

of

experiences

f

disrespect

distinguished

n

the

foregoing

nalysis

hat

heir

onsequences

orthe

indi-

vidual

areregularly

escribed

with

metaphors

erived

rom tates

of

decay

of

thehuman ody.

Psychological

tudies

nvestigating

he

personal

fteref-

fects of

experiencing

orture

r

rape

frequently peak

of

psychological

death.

Research

nto the collective

processing

f

being

denied

rights

and

socialostracism, hich akes lavery s itsexample, owroutinely perates

with theconceptof social

death.

And

the

category

f

injury

ccupies

a

privileged ositionn

discussions f the

kind

of

disrespect

ssociated

with

the

cultural

owngrading

f a

formof

living.7

These

metaphorical

llusions

to

physical

uffering

nd death

express

he

fact that he various ormsof

disrespect

or

psychologicalntegrity

ake on

the same

negative

ole that

organic

diseases

play

in

the contextof

body

processes.

The

experience

f

social

degradationnd

humiliation

eopardizes

he

dentity

f human

eings

to the samedegreeas thesuffering f illnesses eopardizesheirphysical

well-being.

f

there s anytruthn this ink

suggested y

the

conventions

f

our

language,t followsthatour

survey

of

the various ormsof

disrespect

should

also enableus to draw onclusions s

to

the

factors hat osterwhat

maybetermed

sychological

health

r human

ntegrity.een

n

this

ight,

the

preventive

reatment

f

illnesseswould orrespondo

thesocial

guarantee

of

relations

f

recognition

hatare

capable

f

providing

he

subjectwith he

greatestpossible

protection

romanexperience f

disrespect. n the

next

section,I venturea briefexplanation f thethesiswhichthisconnection

implies.

*I

If,

takingour cue from

ErnstBloch,we

regard hedefenseof

human

integrityhroughrotectionromdegradationnd nsultas thecentralmoral

thrust

f

the

various trands f

the natural

aw tradition,henwe can

begin

to

reformulateurproblemn

positive erms.

Theclassificationf three

orms

of

disrespect, hich

hasbeen he

ocalpointof the

presentnquiry p

to this

point,

tself

contains

n indirect

eferenceo

intersubjectiveelationshipsf

recognitionwhose

collective

existence ormsthe

prerequisiteor

human

integrity. s HegelandMead

convincingly

emonstrated,ubjects

apable

of

actionowe

their

potentialor

developing positive

elationshipo

self to





Honneth INTEGRITY

AND DISRESPECT 193

the

experience

f mutual

ecognition.

ince

t can

only

earn

elf-confidence

andself-respectrom heperspectivef theapprovingeactions f partners

to interaction,heirpracticalEgo is dependentn intersubjective

elation-

ships

n which t

is

capable

f

experiencingecognition.

his

being

he

case,

it mustbe possible

o

apply

o

theserelationships

f mutual

ecognition

he

samedistinctions

s we haveobserved etween he

various ormsof

social

disrespect.

After

all,

each

type

of

insultand

degradation

hatwe examined

involved he injuryof a specific nstance f positiverelationshipo self,

which,

n

turn, t seemscan only come about

f

the correspondingpecific

relation f recognitionxists.Tothisextent, hedifferentiationf three orms

of

disrespect rovides

s

with

the

key

to

classifying

n identical umber f

relationshipsf mutual ecognition.

f this

argumentation

s

accurate,

hen

these

relationships

stablishhemoral nfrastructure

f a social ife-world

n

whichindividualsanboth acquire ndpreserveheir ntegrity s human

beings.

I

basedmy distinctions

n

those

forms

of disrespect resent

n

acts of

physicalhumiliation,uchas torture

r

rape.

Thesecouldbe classedas the

most undamentalypeof human egradationecauseheystripaperson f

what has becomea physicalautonomyn interaction ith self and thus

destroy art

of

his

basic rust

n

the

world.What

orresponds

o this

ype

of

disrespects a relation

f

recognition, hich,because

t

enables he ndividual

to

develop

his

body-relatedelf-confidence

n

thefirstplace, akes heform

of

emotional

attachment

f the sort that

Hegel,

the

Romantic, ought

o

express

n

the

concept f

love. As needsand

emotions,

n

a certain

ense,

can

only

receive confirmation

y being directly atisfiedor answered,

recognition

n

thiscase must tselftake he formof emotional pproval nd

encouragement.

hisrelation f

recognition

husalso

depends

n

the con-

crete

physical

xistence

f other

persons

who

acknowledgeach

otherwith

special eelings

of

appreciation.

he

positive

ttitude hich he ndividual

s

capable

f

assumingoward imself

f he

experienceshis ypeof emotional

recognitions thatof self-confidence. am referring,n otherwords, o the

underlyingayer f anemotional, ody-relatedenseof securityn expressing

one sown needsand eelings,alayerwhich orms hepsychological rereq-

uisite

or

the

developmentf

all

further ttitudes f self-respect.8hereare

no moregeneral erms or this modeof reciprocal ecognition eyond he

circle

of

primary

ocial

relationships

uchas areto be found

n

emotional

ties

pattemed

fter

amilies, riendships,

nd

ove

affairs.

Becauseattitudes

of

emotionalaffirmation re

tied to theprerequisitesf attraction hich

individuals

o not

haveat

theiruniquedisposal, heseattitudes annotbe

indefinitely xtended

o

cover a largernumber f partnerso interaction.





194

POLITICAL

THEORY

May 1992

Hencethis relation f

recognition

nherently

ntails

a moral

particularism

whichnoattempttgeneralizationansucceedndissolving.

The

physical

maltreatment,

hich

has

as its

positive

counterparthe

emotional

attachments

n

primary

elationships

f

this

kind,

was

distin-

guished roma second

orm

of

disrespect,

amely,

enying

omeone

ights

and

ostracizing

hem

socially.

With his

form,

a human

being

incurs

he

dishonor f

having

he

community

efuse o

grant

im he

moral

ccountabil-

itythat

a

full-fledged

egalmember f that

ommunity

ould

have.

Accord-

ingly,

this

type

of

disrespect

mustbe

paired

with a

condition f

mutual

recognitionnwhich he ndividualearns o seehimself rom heperspective

of

his

partners

o

interaction

s

a

bearer

f

equal

rights.

The

mechanism

y

which

his

akesplace

was dentified

y

Mead

s

the

process

f

assuming

he

perspective f a

generalized

ther,

ho,

at the

same imeas

prescribing

certain

esponsibilities,

uarantees

he

Self

(as

in

the

practical

elationship

to

self) that

specificclaimswill

be

fulfilled. t

follows

that,

n

contrasto

intimate

elationships,his

typeof

relation

f

recognitions

invested

with

a

primarily

ognitive

haracter:

go

andalter

mutually

ecognize ach

other

as legalpersons,n that heysharea knowledge f thosenormsby which

their

particular

ommunity

uperintends

he

rights

and

responsibilities

o

which

they

are

equallyentitled.

The

positive

attitude

hata

subjectcan

assume

oward

imself

f

he

experiences

his

kindof

legal

recognition

s that

of

fundamental

elf-respect.

He is

able to

consider

himself

a

personwho

shareswith

all

other

members

f

his

community

he

qualities f a

morally

accountable

ctive

subject.9 his

egal

relationship

ontrasts ith

therela-

tionsof

recognitionn

the

primary

elationshipor

t

permits

hat

medium f

recognitionniqueothesubjectobegeneralizedntwodirections:tallows

for

the

expansion f

rights

nboth

objective

nd

social

grounds.

nthe

first

instance, he

rights

are

enhanced

n

terms

of

their

material

ontent;

s a

consequence,

he

individual

ifferences

n

the

opportunities

or

realizing

intersubjectively

uaranteed

reedoms re

ncreasingly

akennto

egal

ac-

count.

n

the

second

nstance,

owever,

he

egal

relationships

universalized

in

the

sensethata

growing

circle of

hitherto

xcluded

or

disadvantaged

groups

as

he

same

rights

xtendedo

it

as are

enjoyed yall

other

members

of thecommunity. ence heconditions nderwhichrightsarerecognized

inherentlyntail

a

principle f

universalism,

hich

unfoldsn

the

courseof

historical

truggles.

Finally, he

third

ype

of

disrespect

istinguishedn

the

foregoing

pro-

posed

classification

nvolves

he

downgradingf

the

social

value

of forms

of

self-realization.

uch

patterns

f

denigrative

valuation

f

certain

orms

of

living

rob

the

subjects

n

question

f the

potentialor

taking

a

positive





Honneth INTEGRITY

AND DISRESPECT

195

view in the sense

of social acceptance

of the

abilities

hatthey

have

acquired

n thecourse f their ives.Accordingly,

he

counterpart

f this orm

of disrespect

s a relationshipf recognitionhatcan aid the

individual

n

acquiring

his kind of self-esteem

a

conditionof

solidaritywith,

and

approval f,

unconventionalife-styles.This conditionwould

enable he

subjects

o find

recognition

asedon mutual

ncouragement

iventheir

special

characteristics

s

persons

whose

individuality

as

been

formed

by

their

pecific

biographies.

Meadhad

this

type

of relation f

recognitionn

mindwhen

he

argued

hatbecause

he

Self

(as

in the

practical

elationship

to self) hadto reassuretselfthat t was notonlyan autonomousut an

individuatedeing,

t was alsoforced

o

assume

he

perspective

f a

gener-

alizedOther

rom

whomwith

ntersubjectivepproval

s

forthcoming

or

its claim o uniqueness

nd rreplaceability.10

hepotential

or

thistypeof

ethical elf-reassurance

s provided ya condition f

mutual

ecognition

n

whichego

andalter

encounter

ne another gainst

horizon

f valuesand

goals,whereby

hese

ignal

o

the

respective

Other

he

ndispensableignif-

icance

of

Ego's

ife

for

him

or her. nsofar s thisform

of recognitionould

notexistwere t not orthevitalexperiencefcommonlyhared urdens nd

responsibilities,t

alwaysgoes beyond hebounds

f the

cognitive

moment

of ethical

knowledge,ncorporating

n

emotional lement

f

solidarity

nd

sympathy.

he

positive

attitudewhich

a

subject

an

assume

oward imself

if

he receives ecognition

nthis orms thatof acquiringsteem

orhimself:

since

he is

respectedby

his

partners

o interaction s

a

personwhose

individuality as

been formedby his

biography,he subjects capableof

unreserveddentificationithhis

particular

ualities

ndabilities. orMead,

then, he specific eature f sucha relation f ethical ecognitionies in the

fact

hat

t

is

geared

nternallyoward

hepossibility

f a

successive pening

to the tendencies

hat he Self

hasfor self-realization.

he

ethicalnorms

n

the

ight

of which

ndividualsmutually

ecognizeheir

ndividualharacter-

isticsareopen o theirbeing nfluenced

ytheprocess f detraditionalization.

As

this

process

unfolds,ncreasing

evels

of generalization

trip hesenorms

of their

prescriptiveharacternd he

mannern

which heygenerate

ierar-

chies. Thus

a

principle

f

egalitarian

ifferencenheres

n

the relation f

recognition asedon solidarity rethics,and t is a principlehat anunfold

if

individualized

ubjects ringpressureo bear.

Thesethreepatterns f recognition

love, rights,and

solidarityset

down

the

formal

requirements

or

conditions

f interaction ithinwhich

human eingscanfeel assured f their

dignity r integrity.

heseprecon-

ditions

are

fonnal n

the

sense that hey,andthe typesof

recognition n

which

they

are

based,

are meant

only

to distinguishtructuraleatures f





196

POLITICALTHEORY

May

1992

formsof communication.

hey

do

not

go

as

faras to

outline

he

nstitutional

frameworknwhich hese ormsmayberealized. y listing he hreepatterns

of

recognition,

we have

specified

he moral

nfrastructureshat a

social

life-world

must xhibit

f it is

to

be

able

o

protect

ts members.

ccordingly,

hereagain

integrity an

only

mean hat

a

subjectmay regard

ociety

as

supporting

imovertheentire

ange

of

his

practical

elationships

o self.

If

the subject articipates

n a

social

ife-worldn which he

tripartite

ierarchy

of

patterns

f recognition

s

present, egardless

f the concreteorm

hese

take,

he

may

anchor

his

relationship

o self

in

the

positive

modesof

self-

confidence,elf-respect,nd elf-esteem. his ineofthought,notherwords,

provides way of

restating

n

positive erms he

moral-philosophical

hesis

that Bloch

expounded

n his

major

study.

Morality,

f understood s

an

institutionor

the protection

f human

dignity,

defends he

reciprocity

f

love, theuniversalism

f rights, nd he

egalitarianism

f

solidarity gainst

their

being relinquished

n

favorof force and

repression.

n

other

words,

morality

nherently

ontains n nterest

n

the

cultivation

f those

principles

that

provide

structuralasis or

thevarious ormsof

recognition.

ow,

he

secondpremiseof Bloch'sstudy,andwe regardedt as a pieceof moral

sociology,

s thatan

element f social

reality

n

the historical

rocess

must,

when

viewed

n

thislight,help

fostermorality. he finalsection

addresses

this

second

premise,

lthough

he

argument ill

be restricted

o references

to a

few

key examples.

III

At

variouspoints n

his book,Bloch,always

rue,

however,o thefervor

that

washis

trademark,ocusesattention n the

sources f

moralmotivation

underlying

ocial

change.Were t

not for the

added eeling of

wounded

dignity,Bloch

writes,hemere

xperience f

economic istress nd

political

dependence

would

have neverbecome a

driving orce

of the practical

revolutionary

ovementsn

history. oeconomic rivation

r social

repres-

sion

alwayshad to be added hefeelingof individualshat heirclaimto

personalntegrity

adbeen

disregarded.'1loch

advanceseflections f

this

kind, or

whichhis

study s admittedlyery

short n

historical vidence,

n

order o

pinpoint moral isposition

n man

whichhe regards

s anempirical

counterparto

the

morality f

naturalaw,defined y him n

negative

erms.

Morality

an

expectpracticalupport

ithin

ocialreality ocomenot

from

such

sources f

positive

motivation

s altruismr respect ut

ratherrom

he

experience

f

social

disrespect,

hichmanifeststself

repeatedly nd

spon-





Honneth

INTEGRITY

AND DISRESPECT

197

taneously.

o

my

mind,

his ine

of

argumentoints

oward n

approach

hat

servespartiallyo

redress

he failure f

contemporary

oral heory

o

deal

adequately

ith

he

question

f

motivation. 2

owever,hisapproach

eces-

sitates

our

anchoring

he

responsibilities

f

morality

more

directly

n

the

intersubjective

laims

of

corporeal

ubjects

han s

currently

he

case,

o

take

one example,

with

attempts

o

ground

morality

n the

theory

f

language.

If

they

are to

establish

productive

elationship

o

self,

human

eings

are to

return ne

last time to the

insights

hared

by Hegel

and Mead

dependent

n the

intersubjective

ecognition

f

theirabilitiesand

achieve-

ments.Should his form of socialapprovalail to arise at any level of

development,

t

opensup,

as

it

were,

a

psychological

ap

within he per-

sonality,

which he

person

eeksto expressby

meansof the negative

mo-

tional

reactions f shame

or anger, ffense

or contempt.

he

experience

f

disrespect

s,

as a consequence, lways

accompanied y

emotionswhich

disclose

o the ndividualhat,

n principle,

ocietys depriving

im

of certain

formsof recognition.

t

wouldseem

advisable o

drawon the concept

of

human motions

utforward

riginally

y JohnDewey n

his pragmaticist

psychologyn order ogivethiscomplexpropositiont least hevestigesof

plausibility.

In

some

of his

early

ssays,Dewey

argued

hat hewidespread

onception

of human motions

s forms hat entexpression

o an

nner motional tate

waswrong.

Hemaintainedhat

ucha

conception,

nestilltobe encountered

in the

workof William

ames,nevitably

misjudged

he unction

f emotions

with regard o

action,for

it alwaysassumed

hat psychic

activitywas

something inside he

actions hat

were aimed

outwards. 13ewey,

by

contrast, roceeds rom the observationhat emotions n the horizonof

human

xperience

epend ither ositively

rnegatively

ntheexecution

f

actions.They either

accompanyhe

experience

f particularly

uccessful

communication

with

hings

or

persons)

n the formof corporeally

ased

excitementr arise

as the experience

f the repellenceelt

in unsuccessful,

disruptedttempts

o execute

anaction. t s theanalysis

f such

experiences

of

repellence

hat

provides

Dewey with

the key with which

to devise

an

action-theoretic

onception

f human motions.

This analysis

eveals hat

negative eelings,such as anger, ndignation,nd sorrow, omprise he

affective

esponse

nvolved

when he

person oncerned

nevitablyhifts

his

attentiono focus on

his

own

expectations

hemoment he

further onse-

quences

planned

or a

completed ction

arenotforthcoming.

ositive

eel-

ings,such as joy

or pride,

are,by contrast,he

subject's eaction

o

being

freed uddenlyroma burdensome

tate

of excitementy

havingbeen

able

to find a suitable uccessful

olution

o a pressing

actionproblem.

Thus





198

POLITICAL

THEORY

May

1992

Dewey

regardseelings,

n

principle,

s

the affective

eactions

rising

rom

therepelleduccessor failure f the ntentionsf ouractions.

If

we take this approach

s the

generalstartingpoint,

then we

can

differentiatemotions till

further,ssuming

hat he

types

of

disruptances,

which

may

n

principle ause

habitual uman ctions

o

fail,

canbe

distin-

guished

rom one anothermore

closely.

Given

that

such

disruptances

r

failuresare to be assessed

against

he

background

f the

orientational

expectationshatpreceded

he

completion

f

the

action,

we

can

make

an

initial,

oughdivisionbetween wo differentypes

of

expectations.

outine

humanactionscancomeup againstobstacles ither n the framework f

expectations

f instrumental

uccessor

in the

context

of normative

ehav-

ioral

expectations. hould

uccess-oriented

ctions

ail, owing

to theiren-

countering

nforeseen bstructionsn thearea n which hetaskshave

o

be

carriedut,then

his

eads o technical

isruptances

n thewidest ense

of

the

word.

Should,by

contrast,

ctions hatadhere

o

specific

norms ebound

in

certain ituations wing

o a violation

f the

norms hat

are

assumed

o be

valid, hen his eads o moral

onflicts

n

the

social

ife-world.

his

second

formof disruptancesn thecompletionf actions onstituteshehorizon f

experienceshat

serves

as the

practicalocation f humanmoral motional

reactions. he latter an be

understoodnDewey'ssenseas those

ormsof

emotional xcitementhatariseas

theperson's eactiono

experiencing

he

unforeseen

epellence

of his

action

as a

consequence

f

a violationof

normative

ehavioralxpectations. he

differences etween he

individual

feelings

an

be measured

uite

lementarily

n

terms f

whether

he

violation

of a normwhich

hinders n

action

s

caused

by

the

subject imself r

by

the

partnero interaction.ntheformer ase,therepellence f an action auses

the

person

o

experiencefeelingof guiltand, n

the atter,moral

ndignation.

In

both

cases,however,whatDeweyregarded s

typical or such

situations

in

which

repelledactions

are experienced

ffectivelyholds true.

For,by

shifting

one's

attention

o

focus on one's ownexpectations, ne

becomes

conscious

lso of the

cognitive lements f

thoseexpectations-in his in-

stance,

moral

nowledge,

lements f whichnformedheoriginally

lanned,

now

hindered ction.

Shame s the mostopenof ourmoral eelings, o the extent hat t does

not refer

imply o shyness

at the exposure f the person's ody,a

shyness

which

evidentlyhas deep

anthropological

oots.

n the case of shame, t is

not

clear rom

he outsetwhichof the partnerso

interactions

responsible

for

that

violationof the

normwhich,as it were,the subject an no

longer

draw

n in

orderocontinue

outinely ithhis

action.Theemotional

ontents

of

shame

consist,as

psychoanalyticalndphenomenological

pproaches





Honneth INTEGRITY

AND DISRESPECT

199

have

concurrently

hown,

of a

form of

lowering

one's own

feeling

of

self-esteem.The

subject

who

is

ashamed

f himselfwhen

experiencinghe

repellence f his action, xperiences imselfas

being

of

lower

socialvalue

than

previously

ssumed.Psychoanalyticallypeaking,

his means hat

he

action-inhibiting

iolation

f

a

moralnorm

has

a

negative mpact

oton

the

SuperEgobut on the

subject's

Ego ideals.'4

uch

a formof shame

s ex-

perienced

nly

in

the

presence

f a realor

imaginary artner

o

interaction

who s, as it were,accordedheroleof

witnessing

hedashed

Ego

deals.

This

type

of shame

can

be caused

by

the

person xperiencing

t or

alternatively

maybetheconsequence

f extemal auses.

n he ormer

nstance,

he

person

experiences

himself

as

inferiorbecause

he has violateda moral

norm,

adherence

o

which

onstituted

principle

f his

Ego

deals.

n

he atter

ase,

by

contrast,

he

person

s

oppressed y

the

feeling

of

lacking

elf-esteem

because

his

partner

n

interactioniolatesmoral

norms,

dherenceo which

hadenabled im

o

countas thepersonwhichhe desiredo be

in

terms f his

Ego

deals.

n

thiscontext, hemoral risis

n

communications

triggered y

the

act hatnormative

xpectations

re

dashed, xpectations

hich

heactive

personbelieved he couldhave with regard o the interactive artner's

willingnesso respect

im.To thisextent, hissecond

ype

of moral

hame

representsheemotional

xcitementhatovercomes personwho

s notable

simply

to continuewith his

action,owingto his

being confronted

with

disrespector his Ego

claims.

In

this

affective ituation,what

the person

experiences bout

himself s the constitutive

ependence f his

person

on

recognition y others.

In other

words,a

morality

hat

attemptso bring he

principles

f

mutual

recognitiono bearcanonly finda weakempiricalooting n the affective

reaction f shame, or

thecognitive onvictionhat hepractical

ccurrence

of

disrespect nflicts

damage

on the

intersubjectiveonditions f human

societalizationlways

merges

n

such

principles. heprinciplesf a moral-

ity

construed

n

terms

f a theory f recognitionnlyhavea

meager hance

of

being

realizedn

thesocial ife-worldo the

extent hathumanubjects re

incapable

f

reacting

withneutraleelings osocial njury, uch

as physical

abuse,underprivileging,

nddegradation.

nynegative motional eactions

elicitedbytheexperience f disrespect aid o claims orecognition oten-

tiallyenablethe

subject

n

question o

acquirea cognitivegraspof the

injustice e

hassuffered.

Tothisextent, he

eelingsof moral

ndignation ithwhich

human eings

react o

insultand

disrespectontain he

potentialoran

dealizing nticipa-

tionof

conditions f

successful, ndistorted

ecognition. he

admitted eak-

nessof this

practical illar f

morality ithin

ocietal

eality

sevidenced y





200 POLMCALTHEORY

May

1992

the

fact that these emotional eactions

o

not

automatically

isclose

the

injusticewhichdisrespectntailsbut only bearthepotentialordoingso.

Whether

he

cognitivepotential

nherent

n

the

feelings

of social

shame

and

offenseevolves ntoa moral

onviction

ependsargely ntheform hat he

politicalandcultural

nvironment

f

the

subjects

n

question

akes.

If

the

experience

f

disrespect

s to

become

a

source

of

motivation

or

acts of

political

esistance,

hena socialmovement

must

existvia

which

t

can

be

articulatedndthus

manifesttself in

positive orm.Once he

emotionally

firedcondemnationf

disrespect nd

insulttakes the

shape of a social

struggle, owever,t representsn empiricalnterestwhichcorrespondso

the

theoretical

oncernsof

morality.A conceptof

morality asedon

the

theory f recognition ould

rely, herefore,

n the support

f historicalnd

sociologicaltudies hatare

capable f

showing hatmoral

progresss born

of the

struggle

or

recognition.

NOTES

1.

Ernst

Bloch,

Naturrecht

und

menschliche

Wurde

Frankfurt:

uhrkamp,

1961),234.

2.

In

my

Habilitationschrift,

undertook detailed

reconstruction

f this

concept;

see

Axel

Honneth,

Kampfum

Erkennung,

in

Theorieprogrammn

Anschluss n

Hegel

und

Mead

(Frankfurt,

989).

3.

For

examples,

see

Aron

Gurewitsch,Zur

Geschichte

desActungbegriffsundzur Theorie

der

sittlichen

Gefuehle,

Inaugural

dissertation

Wuerzburg,

1897);

Rudolf von

Ihering,

Der

Zweck

im

Recht, 2

vols.

(Leipzig,

1905),

388ff.

A

modern

study from the

perspective

of

linguistics s putforwardby StephenL Darwall, TwoKindsof Respect, Ethics88, no. 1,36ff.

4. For

an

excellent

study

of

loss of

realityas a result

of

torture,

ee

Elaine

Scary,

The

Body

in

Pain:

The

Making

and

Unmaking

of the World

New York:Oxford

University

Press,

1985),

chap.

1. A

survey

of

the

literature s

provided

by Guenter

Frankenberg,

Politisches

Asyl-

ein

Menschenrecht?

n

Kritische

Justiz.

5. On

the

connection

between

rights

and

self-respect,

see

Joel

Feinberg, The

Natureand

Value f

Rights, n

his

Rights,

ustice

nd

heBounds

f

Liberty:

ssaysn

Social

Philosophy

(Princeton,NJ:

Princeton

University

Press,

1980),

143ff.

Amore

differentiated

ersion

has

since

been

providedby

Andreas

Wild,

Recht und

Selbstachtung

manuscript,

990).

6.

Among the

exhaustive

iterature n

the

subject,the

clearest

exposition of this phenom-

enon

is,

in

my

opinion, Wilhelm

Korff,

Ehre,

Prestige,

Gewissen

(Cologne,

1966).

Of

interest

from

the

sociological

perspective

are

Peter

Berger,

On

the

Obsolescence

of

the

Concept

of

Honor, n

European

Journal

of

Sociology

11(1970):

339, and

Hans

Speier,

Honor

and

Social

Structure, n

Social

Order

ndthe

Risksof

War:

apers

n

Political

Sociology

New

York,

1952),

36ff.

7.

Among

studies

pointingto

the

categoryof

psychological

death

are

those of

Bruno

Bettelheim,

n

Surviving

and

Other

Essays

(London:

Thames

&

Hudson,

1979),

especially

part

1.

On the

category

of

social

deal,

see,

among

others,

Orlando

Patterson,

Slavery

and

Social





HonnethINTEGRITY

NDDISRESPECI 201

Death:

A

Comparativetudy Cambridge,

A:

Harvard

niversity ress,1982),

and

Claude

Meillassoux,

nthropologie

erSklaverei

Frankfurt,

989),part1, chap.

5.

8. Forasystematicnalysis f self-confidencestheresult fexperiencesf attachment

in

early hildhood,ee ErikH.Erikson,

dentity

nd heLife-CyckLondon:980).

Fora

study

in terms f theory f recognitionrawing n Hegelian oncepts utusing

advanced

sychoan-

alytical ools,

see Jessica

Benjamin,

heBonds

of

Love:

Psychoanalysis,

eminism nd the

Problem f DominationNewYork, 988), sp.chap.

1.

9. On this

point,

ee

G.

H.

Mead,Geist,

Identitaet

nd

Gesellschaft

Frankfurt,973),

263ff. A reconstructionrom heperspectivef self-respects undertakeny

Ernst

Tugendhat,

SelbstbewusstseinndSelbstbestimmungFrankfurt,979), ecture 2,

282ff.

10.On

his

point,

ee

Mead, 44ff.Myownreconstruction

ocuses n his

ssue;

ee

Honneth,

Kampf m

Anerkenmung

Frankfort:uhrkamp,orthcoming),sp.

183ff.

11. SeeBloch,309 ff.

12. Foran examinationf thispointwithreferenceothetheories f MaxHorkheimer,ee

Herbert chnaedelbach,axHorkheimernddieMoraphilosophieesdeutschendealismus,

inMaxHorkheimerheute:erk ndWirkiung,dited y Norbert ltwickerndAlfred chmidt

(Frankfurt,986),

52ff.

13.

See John

Dewey, TheTheory f Emotion Psychological

eview

1894): 53ff.,

and

TheTheory f Emotion I, Psychological eview 1895):13ff.Fora usefuldiscussion f

Dewey's heory f emotion, ee Eduard aumgarten,ies giestigenGrundlagenes amer-

ikanischenGemeinwesens,ol. 2, Der Pragmatismus:.

W

Emerson,W.James,J. Dewey

(Frankfurt/Main,938),274ff.

14.As examples f thisargument,ee Gerhartiers ndMiltonB. Singer, hame ndGuilt:

A

Psychoanalyticnda Cultural tudy NewYork,1971), sp. 23ff.;andHelenM. Lynd,On

Shame nd heSearchor IdentityNewYork, 958), hap.2. GeorgSimmelwas aiming t a

similardefinition

n

this ZurPsychologie erScham 1901)publishedn his Schriftenur

Soziologie, ditedby J.-J.Dahme nd0. RammstedtFrankfurt/Main,983),140ff.

AxelHonneths Professor fPhilosophyt theUniversityfFrankfurtndauthor f

several

books, mong

hem

The

Critiquef Power ndSocialAction ndHuman ature.

honnethdisrespect.pdf2014.pdf

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