Housing Recovery in Chile: A Qualitative Mid-program Review Mary C. Comerioa)

ABSTRACT

The Magnitude 8.8 earthquake, and subsequent tsunami, which struck the

south central region of Chile on February 27, 2010 affected75% of the population

of the country and damaged or destroyed 370,000 housing units (about 10% of the

housing in six regions). Within six months, the Ministry of Housing and Urban

Development published a plan to repair or rebuild 220,000 units of low- and

middle-income housing with government assistance within four years. In October

2012, at the mid-point of a four-year program, 84% of those housing units have

started construction and 54% are complete and occupied. Several factors

contribute to the program’s success: 1) strong leadership at the national and local

levels; 2) use of existing programs and institutions; 3) flexibility to adapt

programs over time; 4) a strong technical staff; 5) a robust economy; and 6)

political will. When compared to housing recovery programs in other countries,

Chile’s program stands out, combining both top-down strong government

management and bottom-up citizen participation. The reconstruction plan also

included goals for improved design and construction of social condominiums,

updated zoning plans, road and infrastructure improvements, heritage recovery

and new master plans for impacted cities. While the housing reconstruction will

be completed within the four-year time frame, the master plans require a longer

implementation time. Going forward, the earthquake may have a legacy far

beyond the successful housing replacement. Chile’s efforts to use the recovery

planning efforts to expand national urban policy will help to provide a larger

planning framework at the local level where citizens can participate in the

physical, social and economic decisions necessary for ongoing community

development.

a) Department of Architecture, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1800

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INTRODUCTION

At 3:34 a.m. local time on Saturday, 27 February 2010, a great earthquake of Magnitude

(M) 8.8 struck the south central region of Chile. The earthquake occurred on the interface

between the Nazca and the South American Plates, with a rupture zone extending over an

area approximately 500 km long and 100 km wide. Over 12 million people (about 75% of the

population of Chile) experienced intensity VII or stronger shaking. In the first month

following the main shock there were 1,300 aftershocks, with 19 in the range of M 6.0-6.9.

The earthquake produced a tsunami that caused major damage over more than 500 km of

coastline (Moehle and Frost 2012). The earthquake and tsunami together resulted in 526

deaths (with 31 persons still missing). The earthquake damaged highways, bridges, railroads,

ports and airports as well as 40 hospitals and over 4,000 schools1 (MINVU 2010, 2011).

Estimates suggest that approximately 50 to 100 multistory reinforced concrete buildings were

severely damaged and 4 collapsed partially or totally. Lifeline infrastructure generally

performed well, given the magnitude of the event, but failure of some elements led to power

outages affecting much of the population for days. However, given Chile’s s long history of

frequent earthquakes, rigorous building codes and standards for infrastructure operability

served to limit damage and save lives.

The earthquake was Chile’s largest disaster in terms of property and economic loss. The

total estimated loss of US$30 billion (18% of Gross National Product) is composed of US$21

billion to physical assets (including buildings, housing, roads and schools)2 and US$9 billion

in business and indirect losses. An estimated US$7-8 billion of the loss will be paid for with

insurance and the remainder by government or private individuals (AACH 2012, Siembieda,

Johnson and Franco 2012).

Chile is a country with stable institutions and a prosperous economy, but like many

emerging and developed economies, it is a nation with income inequality and many marginal

structures (particularly adobe housing) at high risk in earthquakes. The government, through

the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU) has a long tradition of improving

housing conditions for low-income families and working to eliminate informal housing. In

the 1980s, thousands of “sanitary units” (a concrete structure with a kitchen and bathroom)

were installed on home sites lacking these amenities. In fact, in many of the 1 The data on earthquake losses is reported in MINVU documents but the original source is data from the Ministry of Interior. 2 According to the MINVU Reconstruction Plan, US$10 billion of the total losses was in public infrastructure.

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earthquake/tsunami-impacted zones, these units were the only structures left standing (see

Fig. 1). Over the past 20-30 years, the government has also built social condominiums3,

providing home-ownership to 60% of the lowest quintile of income (Pérez Interview, 2012).

This history of experience in improving housing conditions by the Ministry is a crucial

element in the government’s capacity to respond to the housing needs after the earthquake in

February 2010.

Figure 1. View of sanitary units amid damage two weeks after the tsunami in Dichato, Chile. (Photo P. Ivelic)

This report provides an overview of the status of the housing recovery program in Chile

at the mid-point, two years after the plans were published (and two and a half years after the

earthquake. The report is divided into three major sections. The first reviews the overall

housing recovery program in terms of its development and implementation, as well as the

integration of urban planning and heritage recovery. The second section discusses community

involvement and local impacts of the construction process. The third section compares the

recovery experience in Chile to those in other nations, to identify key elements of successful

programs. It concludes with recovery lessons and challenges based on the Chile experience.

HOUSING PROGRAM DECISIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION

Overall, the earthquake damaged 370,000 housing units. The Chilean government is

rebuilding or repairing 222,000 units (60%) for low- and middle-income families, while the

3 Social condominiums are government built housing for low-income and vulnerable populations. Families are given ownership of their unit and have the right to sell it after a five-year period.

4

remainders have been financed through insurance4 and private funds (AACH 2012, ONEMI,

2010, Siembieda, Johnson and Franco 2012, SVS 2012). Of the 222,000 targeted for

government assistance, 109,000 involved repairs of damaged homes and 113,000 required

rebuilding (MINVU 2010). Within a few months after the earthquake a National

Reconstruction Plan was developed which required special legislation and funding through

various business taxes, and (non-affected) property tax increases. The plans covered major

sectors including infrastructure, hospitals, schools, heritage sites, etc. Housing, a central

element of the plan, is managed by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. The

Ministry, whose mission is to improve the quality of housing for vulnerable populations, felt

that the earthquake and tsunami overturned four years of housing program efforts to reduce

the already existing housing deficit.

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, however, emergency response was in the

hands of an outgoing administration and the scale of the losses had to be understood by an

incoming government. After 20 years of rule by a center-left coalition (Concertación),

Sebastián Piñera (of the center-right coalition Alianza) assumed the Presidency on March 11,

two weeks after the earthquake. The transition is important to recovery planning. The new

government wanted to show they could do things better, and organized for a national effort,

but at the same time, new political appointees were inexperienced, with limited knowledge of

staff and programs. Three key individuals were brought into the Ministry of Housing and

Urban Development (MINVU) within days of the earthquake: Andres Iacobelli, as

undersecretary and architect of the reconstruction program; Pablo Ivelic, as coordinator of

housing reconstruction; and Pablo Allard, as coordinator of urban design and historic

patrimony5. Together they evaluated conditions in the disaster zone and began assembling

data on damage and the number of families affected, estimating a need for US$2.5 billion in

housing as the administration took office.

The timeline for the housing recovery, combined with other key recovery actions, is

shown in Table 1. Many important decisions were made in the first months after the

earthquake and the housing recovery program was in the planning phase at the same time that

4 According to data provided by insurance companies to the Chilean Securities and Insurance Supervisor (Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros – SVS), as of August 31, 2010, 156,000 claims had been paid. 5 A fourth individual, Francisco Irarrázaval, joined the MINVU leadership team later, as coordinator of social condominiums. Immediately following the earthquake, he served on the President’s emergency committee.

5

emergency housing (typically known in the United States and other nations as “temporary” or

“transitional” housing) were under construction.

Table 1. Timeline of Earthquake Housing Recovery Key Events 2010-2014 Year Month Date Event or Key decision or key date for action/close of action

February Feb. 27 M 8.8 earthquake strikes S. Central Chile 3:34 am local time4,538 schools and 40 hospitals damaged, plus public infrastructure Data collection on housing loss by various agencies local and national

Mar. 11 President Piñera assumes officeMinistries of Public Works, Health, Education begin rebuilding programsPresident appoints 2 coordinators for reconstruction (emergency and reconstruction)Decision to operate Housing Recovery through MINVU existing programsAnnounce owner-site program and othersCreate PRES / PRU (new planning instruments)

Mar. 29 Piñera anounce the Housing reconstruction program . US$ 2,5 billionsApril Apr.11 Assign mayors task of creating a registry

Begin taking applications for subsidies at local SERVIUs expand staffsCreation of Committee of Ministers to oversee reconstruction Emergency schools finished / all students start classesNegotiate w builders/ require certification by Ministry

May First allocated subsidiesJune June 21 (4

months after)80,000 emergency houses completed (95% located at the owners site, only 4,500 in emergency villages)

July Creation of Executive Committee to oversee reconstruction (Led by Minsitry of Interior Affairs)Start first construction of housing (from 3 const companies)

August 6 months after Registry of Victims closed

JanuaryFebruary 1 year after Subsidies allocated 60%; In construction 35%; Completed 5% (repairs &

construction)May Rodrigo Pérez becomes Minister of Housing and Urban DevelopmentAugust New housing programs (Do It Yourself [DIY] and Urban Densification)

NovemberPérez creates New Department of "City Projects" area to expand urban planning

December Create rent program for people in camps to avoid 2nd winter in campsFebruary 2 years after Subsidies allocated 100%; In construction 67%; Completed 37% (repairs

& construction)Completion of Roads/bridges (99%)Hospital repairs 96% completedDichato Festival

August 2.5 years after Subsidies allocated 100%; In construction 82%; Completed 53% (repairs & construction)

January…February.. 3 years after Estimate 210,000 In construction (95%); Completed 150,000 units (68%)DecemberJanuary…February 4 yrs after Assume 95 % + completion of housing recovery construction

Completion of school rebuilding or repairs

2014

March

2010

2011

2013

6

As the recovery program ramped up, and programs were put in place, 60% of the housing

subsidies were allocated one year after the earthquake and 100% were allocated two years

after the earthquake. Two-thirds of the housing was under construction by the second

anniversary.

CRITICAL DECISIONS

Eight critical decisions were made early in the development of the housing recovery

program. The decisions provided a balance of strong central government leadership with

significant efforts to engage local communities and involve citizens in housing decisions.

Government Funding. Funding by the national government for the repair and

replacement of housing was timely and adequate. The government was able to fund the

recovery in part because of a robust economy and in part because the earthquake impacted a

large portion of the population, so that new taxes and targeted programs were politically

acceptable across the political spectrum. The budgetary sources for the recovery included

taxes on copper mining, tobacco, and non-affected high value properties, international

donations, and reallocation among various government budgets (MINVU, 2011).

Use Existing Programs. Given the structure of the Chilean government, with strong

ministries and regional staff offices, the second critical decision was to use the existing

ministries and their programs and budget lines for the recovery effort. They consciously

chose not to create a “super-minister” or special agency for reconstruction. Instead, MINVU

was given charge of the reconstruction of cities and housing, and Public Works took on roads

and other infrastructure. These were the largest recovery domains, but in addition, other

ministries, such as Health and Education managed programs in their areas as well. Initially, a

Committee of Emergency worked directly under the President, but this was replaced with a

committee of Ministers (Comité Interministerial de Ciudad y Territorio) to coordinate

reconstruction policies at a national level, and Governors (Intendentes) to coordinate the

intervention at a local level. These groups met monthly with the President on the

reconstruction planning.6 One critique of this strategy is that the government lost an

opportunity to build local capacity for urban regeneration with new rules and programs, but

6 Later, the coordination was delegated to an executive committee led by senior staff from the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which typically coordinates all regional issues with the governors. This executive committee met weekly and coordinated with regional and local governments.

7

Ministry authorities did not want to delay reconstruction with new tools and processes. Thus

the decision was to use and adapt existing programs.

Clarify Need and Identify Beneficiaries. In order to design recovery-focused programs,

the government needed data on the extent of the damage and social conditions. Baseline data

on damage was collected by the Oficina Nacional de Emergencia del Ministerio del Interior y

Seguridad Pública (ONEMI)7 in coordination with local municipalities. In addition, the

outgoing administration contracted with several universities to undertake risk mapping in

relation to the damage assessment and this was not easily coordinated with the incoming

administration. Misunderstandings led to contract disputes and only two universities

continued the data mapping at the same time that multiple agencies and independent entities

were surveying damage with little coordination. It should be noted that no government is well

prepared for this level of data collection. Typically agencies collect data for their own use, so

the formats are not necessarily coordinated with those of other agencies. Damage data

collection is one area in which a single government super-coordinator would have been

useful and more efficient. MINVU took whatever surveys on damage were available from

local governments and overlaid these with census data, social conditions, and building

typologies to develop preliminary estimates of housing need.

A third critical decision made by MINVU was to identify what portion of the population

should be beneficiaries of a government recovery program. They chose the lowest three

quartiles—60% of the population. It was hard to match income and need to actual conditions.

Even a middle-class person with a job who had lost their home would need help. Thus the

program was generously aimed at low- and middle-income populations who did not own a

second home, and whose annual income was below US$12,000 per family per year, and

whose home value was less than US$88,000.8 Essentially anyone with housing damage who

did not own a second home could apply for a subsidy.

Empower Local Communities. A fourth decision was that MINVU gave mayors six

months to create a Registry of Disaster Victims—names attached to each damaged building,

with information on whether the building needed repair or replacement. The registry served

as the basis for all housing subsidies, and it gave a critical responsibility to local government

7 ONEMI is a national government agency that is equivalent to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in the United States. 8 Chile has experienced significant economic grown in recent decades with average personal income increasing from US$2,200 in 1990 to $12,200 in 2010.

8

to represent the needs in their communities. This kept the municipalities in the loop and

served to link the municipalities with the regional and national programs.

Replace Housing On-Site. The fifth and perhaps most critical decision was to subsidize

housing demand rather than direct supply. A “supply-side” subsidy entails government

contracting with large local or international companies to build thousands of units on green-

field sites. The “demand-side” subsidy was focused on keeping families in place. It meant

putting emergency shelters on individual home sites and planning for rebuilding on those

same sites. Practically speaking, this meant that the housing reconstruction program would be

scattered over thousands of towns and rural regions, on individually owned sites. The

decision was not popular with the building industry, or with many politicians, as it was seen

as slow and cumbersome. However, two years into the recovery, it is clear that this was the

single most important decision made. The use of existing home sites kept people in their

communities, with access to their jobs and family members, and the recovery was on their

land, where they could monitor the construction. This decision applied to the great majority

of disaster-impacted families. Only about 4,000 families were housed in temporary

emergency camps (out of the 80,000 emergency units constructed), because their home sites

or social condominiums were in the tsunami zone or because they were renters in damaged

homes who needed new alternative housing.

Codes, Local Management, and Housing Choice. Three additional decisions were part

of the overall housing recovery program development, and further exemplify the balance

between a strong government role and citizen involvement. 1) The ministry established strict

construction norms for all new housing—with particular focus on materials, structure,

thermal capacity and habitability (in terms of minimum unit size). Essentially every builder

had to have their model units certified by ministry engineers before it could be presented to a

family or community. 2) Funding for technical assistance, inspection, quality control and

oversight was built into the subsidies and this went to local architects, local governments and

ministry offices. 3) Finally, housing recovery programs were tailored to specific types of

damage and specific social conditions, but one key principle was that all families would be

able to choose from a variety of building types and contractors. For families, the capacity to

choose a model home gave them an active role in their own recovery process.

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Families without land—those in damaged social condominiums, renters, those doubled-

up in single units—were accommodated in temporary camps, while new social condominium

projects or new single family house developments were designed and completed. Social

condominiums were designed on sites selected for pre-organized groups of families, that is,

families who signed up to participate in the project. New developments and acquisition

subsidies were designed for non-land owners such as renters or families who shared space in

damaged homes.

Table 2. Breakdown of number of units for repair and rebuilding program options (MINVU 2012)

Problem ► ▼Approach

Repairable House Non-repairable house Land owner

Non Land owner

Self Led Community

12,000 Bank of Materials (for repairs)

5,000 Acquisition 1,000 Do It Yourself

17,000 Acquisition Subsidy

State Led Government

12,000 Social Condo Repair Buildings

8,000 Social Condo Demo/Rebuild

30,000 New Development

Third Party Intermediary

85,000 Repair Subsidy 48,000 Pre-certified Houses

4,000 Urban Densification

These projects typically improved on previous housing quality in terms of unit size (from

older units that were 27-38 sq. meters to new units at 50 sq. meters), services and site

amenities. In cities such as Talca, where 30% of the housing stock was severely damaged,

additional subsidies enabled builders to increase density on inner-city sites in an attempt to

counteract the rush to build on the periphery. The variety of program options demonstrates a

serious commitment to housing choice and at the same time, to recognition of the variety of

needs and family circumstances.

IMPLEMENTATION

Both the large-scale urban redevelopment projects and the homeowner on–site rebuilding

programs are time consuming and complex to implement. The first estimations of housing

damage was provided by ONEMI and surveys made by Ministry of Social Affairs using an

instrument called Ficha EFU (Encuesta Familiar Unica de Emergencia or Unique Emergency

Family Survey) with input from local mayors. While the Ministry was designing the housing

recovery program, mayors were given that task of creating the Registry of Disaster Victims

for families that needed help to rebuild, in six month time period. The registry helped to

define the number of subsidies needed and began the subsidy application process with the

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families. Then regional offices of the Ministry, the SERVIU9, which are normally tasked with

implementing Ministry policies, worked with the Mayors in their region to understand the

social, legal and technical problems after the earthquake and to process all applications for

housing subsidies. In total, the Housing Reconstruction Program, through the regional

SERVIU offices, would allocate over 220,000 subsidies (half for repair and half for new

construction).

Regional Management of Housing Subsidies. The regional SERVIU offices had to

augment their office staff. In the O’Higgins region, for example, the staff normally served

6,000 families per year, but after the earthquake, they needed to assist 30,000 families. Some

offices, such as the Maule office in Talca, had to deal with the loss of their offices (just as

some municipalities lost buildings) at the same time that they increased staff and organized

services. These offices were the government’s main point of contact for local victims and

they were not only helping families with applications for subsidies (which could include

paperwork to clarify land tenancy), they were also looking for existing homes to buy or rent,

negotiating land purchases, attempting to limit land speculators, attempting to limit duplicate

or fraudulent applications, and reaching out to local financial and construction companies

(Fodón Interview 2012). The leaders of the local SERVIU had a particularly difficult job

trying to provide services and manage unrealistic expectations by victims and politicians.

Additionally, the SERVIU offices recognized that in some urban areas, the demand was

“double the size of the problem” in the sense that often two families shared a damaged house

or there were renters in the damaged units (Ayala Interview 2012). For example, in central

Talca the registry included 1,200 owner-site families, 1800 renters (plus 3,700 in need of

home repairs as well as an existing housing deficit suggesting a need for another 1,600 urban

units). Such information led the Ministry to develop special subsidies for increasing housing

density in urban settings.

Both the local SERVIU offices and the program planners at the Ministry met with local

and national building contractors, to bring them into the process early in the planning stage.

The Chamber of Contractors (Cámara Chilena de la Construcción, CChC) was initially

opposed to the owner-site programs. In fact, given the economy and the demand for

9 There are two branches on the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU) in the regions: the SEREMI (Secretaría Regional Ministerial / Regional Secretary) branch represents the Minister and has political responsibilities, while the SERVIU (Servicio de Vivienda y Urbanismo / Service of Housing and Urban Development) implements Ministry policies and programs has some autonomy from politics.

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contractors in the northern mining regions, the on-site program opened opportunities for

small local builders and expansion-potential for companies that had already worked with

SERVIU on rural subsidy and social housing programs, and for companies developing

prefabricated housing.

For example, MINGATEK (later renamed Sinergia), a manufactured housing producer,

moved their small company from the south of Chile to Linares (a town located mid-way

between the O’Higgins and Biobío regions) in May 2010 to take advantage of the post-

earthquake demand. They met with Ministry officials to create designs that would meet

regulations and developed five model houses for different site conditions. In two years they

have built the company to produce 50 houses per month with 100 employees in the plant and

170 in the company. Three medium sized builders (Iraira Ltd, Hurtado y Carrasco, and S&C

LC.), who each had previous experience with SERVIU rural projects, all had to restructure

their businesses to meet the demands of the owner-site reconstruction program. Each of them

chose to develop a house kit of construction materials that would fit on one truck, and hire

local labor. While all found the transition slow, all report significant growth for their

companies. At the same time, micro-contractors who previously built one or two houses per

year also were able to compete for local projects and grew their businesses as well10.

At the national level, the MINVU housing reconstruction team focused on tailoring the

programs to meet the variety of needs. Pablo Ivelic created pilot programs in each region as

test cases for managing the subsidy-application paperwork, certifying land ownership,

providing access to water and sewer, as well as providing families with a mechanism for

choosing contractors and house designs. These processes were frustratingly slow at the

beginning but became more efficient over time.

Social Condominiums Program. Although the majority of the housing effort would be

on repair and rebuilding on owner-sites, about 20,000 units of social condominiums needed

repair or rebuilding and these presented unique problems. Social condominiums are similar to

public housing in the United States with the main difference being that in Chile the residents

own the units. Families qualify for the program through a “scorecard” that estimates a

family’s social vulnerability. In the 1980s when the program began, the scorecard was based

on a social worker evaluation of a family’s housing conditions, amenities (refrigerator, 10 All of the builders expect to maintain their businesses after the surge of earthquake related construction based on the contacts they have made and the experience gained during the reconstruction.

13

plumbing) and the number of people per unit. Today (since 2006) the scorecard is based on

family income (as opposed to housing conditions).

Families living in social condominiums are in the lowest-income bracket in the country.

Many of the damaged units were older buildings in poor condition with small (28 sq. meter

or 300 sq. ft.) units (see Figure 3a). When the Ministry evaluated the cost of earthquake

repairs plus the cost of bringing the units up to current standards, they decided to build an

additional 30,000 units in new developments (beyond the 8,000 which were severely

damaged). The new developments for displaced non-land owners—families who were

renters, or who shared housing with other families included both single family homes and

condominiums, all at the 50 square meter standard—bringing the total to 38,000 new units.

The inhabitants of damaged social condominiums could not shelter on site, and in some

cases, families in tsunami-impacted coastal communities had no safe site to return to. For the

4,350 families without alternatives, the government built 107 emergency camps, which were

supported with access to schools, day care, job training, health clinics and other government

social services. The process of assembling (or clearing) sites, preparing for the infrastructure,

developing designs and working with families took almost two years. A unique feature of

social housing in Chile is that families are organized by community leaders into groups for

the purpose of applying for social housing as a group with their individual vouchers.

Needless to say the family organizing process took time and effort. In addition, some families

in older condominiums may have sold or rented their units, thus adding additional complexity

to the process of organizing families into groups for new social condominiums.

(a) (b) Figure 3. (a) Damaged and vacant social condominium buildings, Villa Cordillera, (b) New development for Villa Cordillera inhabitants, Rancagua, Chile (Photos: M. Comerio)

14

For the ministry, this meant that only a small percentage of the social condominiums and

new developments would be ready for occupancy by the second winter after the earthquake.

In order to provide an alternative (especially for the elderly and families with small children),

the Ministry devised a rent-subsidy program—allowing camp dwellers to opt out of the

camps and rent a housing unit with government assistance until their new unit was complete.

The numbers of families in various emergency camps who took advantage of the option

ranged from 17% to 55%, but it was important that people felt empowered by the choice.

Completion Rates. One year after the earthquake, 60% of the subsidies were allocated,

35% of the housing was in construction and 5 % was complete. By the second anniversary,

February 2012, 100% of the subsidies were allocated, 67% was in construction and 37% had

completed construction—although the majority of the projects completed were home repairs,

with only 10% new construction. Despite all government efforts, many towns had not seen

much new construction on the second anniversary of the earthquake, leading to frustration, as

exhibited in Figure 4.

In fact, the construction component of the housing recovery program took time to ramp-

up and is now running smoothly, and the pace of production has increased. Further, the

decision to build on-site replacement housing made it both more complex and less visible

than new developments because the reconstruction is blended into the existing urban fabric.

With all the subsidies allocated as of February 2012, seven months later (October 2012), the

percentage of units with construction started has increased to 84% and the percentage

completed to 54% (MINVU 2012, see Table 3).

Table 3. MINVU housing program subsidy statistics with project start and completion rates as of September 2012 (MINVU 2012)

# SubsidiesAssigned

# ProjectsStarted

# ProjectsCompleted

% Projects Started

% ProjectsCompleted

Programs for Repairable HousesBank of Material 12,550 7,009 4,135 56% 33%Repair Subsidy 96,298 85,845 78,521 89% 82%

Programs for Owners w/non‐Repairable HousesVoucher for purchase or construction 5,310 5,288 2,508 100% 47%Assistance for Self‐help construction 997 254 45 25% 5%Owner Site with EGIS (social housing management entity) 14,940 14,453 6,758 97% 45%Pre‐certified house voucher 32,575 19,772 10,948 61% 34%

Programs for Non‐Land Owners and Social CondosAcquisition of Existing houses 17,089 16,585 4,768 97% 28%Urban Densification 3,716 1,533 0 41% 0%Rebuild social condominiums and New Devpts. 38,943 36,218 13,369 93% 34%

Total 222,418 186,957 121,052 84% 54%

15

The reconstruction program is scheduled for completion in four years and appears to be

on track (see Tables 1 and 3). It is an astounding effort to combine new, safe building

technologies, with local vernacular lifestyles and cultures, improve the welfare standards for

a significant portion of the population, and at the same time, give that population a sense of

control over their lives and fate.

Figure 4. Handmade sign in Cauquenes, Chile 2 February 2012 (photo: M. Dear). Translation: Reconstruction is like God. Everyone knows it exists, but nobody has seen it.

Of course, it was extremely difficult to accomplish housing reconstruction quickly—the

process of creating and managing such a high-volume housing program takes time. The first

year involved not only program planning, but also the creation of the registry and the

management of the application process. While construction was begun at the end of the first

year, it took a second year to streamline the delivery process across many regions. The

Chilean housing program is, in fact, much faster than recovery programs in most other

nations.

INTEGRATION OF URBAN PLANNING WITH HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION

The earthquake and tsunami affected three metropolitan areas, five cities with over

100,000 in habitants, 45 cities with over 5,000 inhabitants and over 900 rural and coastal

towns and communities (MINVU 2010). In coastal cities, new master plans were needed for

tsunami protection, infrastructure and urban relocations. At the time of the earthquake, all of

Chile’s cities had basic zoning plan requirements, but little more. Given the need to

incorporate risk mitigation with land use conditions and infrastructure investment, the

opportunity to develop master plans for impacted cities was led by Pablo Allard at MINVU

but coordinated with local efforts.

16

For example, when a local industry, a Cellulose plant in Constitución, wanted to give the

city a plan, MINVU developed a method to use their help and develop a model for other

cities. They created a new planning instrument, the Planes Maestros de Reconstrucción

Estratégica Sustentable, PRES, (Strategic and Sustainable Reconstruction Plan) for

Constitución. The work was completed in 90 days with an interdisciplinary team and

financed by the company. The plan had to be endorsed by the Municipal Council but the plan

was referential, not binding. Plans for many other cities followed, including Juan Fernández

Island, Curicó, and Talca (the only plan not endorsed by the Municipal Council). Urban

designers in Chile developed the plans, some with the assistance of international teams.

Because NGOs or corporations paid for the projects using private consultants, the process

moved quickly without requirements for public funds and competitive bids.

The Governor of the Biobío region developed another planning program at the same time.

Jacqueline Van Rysselberghe organized reconstruction plans for 18 towns on the coastline

following the PRES model, using in-house staff. To develop the Planes de Reconstrucción de

Borde Costero (PRBC), she took advantage of private donations to pay for risk assessment

and tsunami consultants to assist the planning effort. In total, 27 master plans were developed

(9 PRES + 18 PRBC regional Biobío). The government funded an additional 110 Planes de

Regeneración Urbana (PRU) master plans for groups of small towns with assistance from the

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). On a local level, the plans helped guide

redevelopment. On a national level, the Ministry was able to use the plans to prioritize

proposed projects for government funding, based on economic and social need (Allard

Interview 2012).

In all cases, the planners revised and updated the zoning plans11 to incorporate risk

assessment studies, bringing the concept of resilience into the planning process. This was

particularly important on the coast. Although the master plans were referential and non-

binding, they created a moral imperative for change in the municipalities. All but one were

accepted by the local councils, and will serve in guiding future development decisions. In

Dichato and similar coastal towns, MINVU did not want to finance homes to be rebuilt in the

high-hazard areas, so they developed land use protocols for a tsunami mitigation park and a

commercial zone to buffer traditional residential areas (see Figure 5). Some allowances were

made for elevated housing in the buffer zone, acknowledging that fishermen needed access to 11 Adoption of zoning plans by municipalities can take several years, so these served as reference documents until the plans could be adopted.

17

their boats and livelihoods. Although tsunami resilient design regulations for construction in

tsunami flooding areas is not mandatory, all housing built by the Ministry in the buffer zones

has been elevated.

Figure 5. Dichato section through plan with tsunami-mitigation park and elevated housing (commercial zone not shown in this graphic).

HERITAGE CONSTRUCTION

A last challenge for MINVU was historic reconstruction. Adobe houses were 27% of the

homes damaged in the earthquake, and 84% were located in the regions O’Higgins, Maule

and Biobío. While some were merely old and poorly built houses, others were located in

zones that had been declared Zones of Historic Conservation. In some cities and towns

without the historic designation, the new master plans, with input from local authorities,

identified and delineated specific areas with historic patrimonial value so that residences

could be allocated an additional amount of special heritage subsidy (MINVU 2010). These

included villages with continuous facades and or covered sidewalks. In all, approximately

5,000 units were designated as having historic value.

In some communities, MINVU encouraged contractors to develop a series of

conventionally built reinforced masonry model homes with continuous facades to maintain

an urban continuity in the streetscape (see Figure 6a). In others, a more traditional historic

restoration was needed. In the town of Lolol (Region VI), architects devised a structural

system with wood framing inside adobe finishes, while others used a straw-bale method of

construction, maintaining the façades and covered sidewalks (see Figure 6b). These were not

pure historic reconstructions but they allowed families to rebuild safely and preserve the

town image, which was seen as crucial to maintaining their attraction as tourism destinations.

18

(a) (b)

Figure 6. (a) Continuous façade in Cumpeo; (b) adobe/wood construction in Lolol

Although the National Monuments Council (Consejo Nacional de Monuments) exists for

historic designations, there was no institutional framework or funds for repairing or

rebuilding damaged historic homes. The homes in the national registry of historic buildings

each needed approvals from the National Council, but at the same time the local SERVIU

offices did not know how to handle approvals for adobe buildings for which no building code

existed and which did not meet SERVIU rules, budget limits, and minimum size

requirements. New regulations, checklists and approval processes had to be adapted for

heritage projects.

In Vichuquén (Region VII), a small, isolated, but nationally known town with 400 year

old adobe construction, many families wanted to demolish their damaged homes, but the

Mayor, a town native, argued that they should preserve the community. He sought advice

from the National Monuments Council, took a team to Cusco, Peru to learn about adobe

construction and received substantial help from a heritage expert working for the Barrick

Mining Company NGO. The Barrick Mining Company CEO had a previous relationship with

the town and chose to support the repairs, not only with funding, but also with technical

expertise. This meant that residential buildings eligible for SERVIU funds (US$30,000 to

replace or US$11,000 for repair) could also receive an additional $3,000 to $30,000 from the

Barrick NGO. Although there is significant variation from house to house, the average NGO

grant is $17,000 above the government subsidy. The construction work has created jobs for 5

small local contractors (not initially in the SERVIU registry), who learned techniques from

Peruvian craftsmen and Getty Foundation repair manuals.

19

The Vichuquén experience is an excellent example of a public-private partnership in

recovery but it is not without problems. The approvals process is time-consuming, and repair

problems increased as damaged buildings sat vacant through two winters. Equally important,

even after repairs, the town will have voids in the urban fabric as some owners may choose

not to rebuild (for example, owners of second homes not eligible for subsidy). Further, there

are concerns that the town’s aging population will not stay or be capable of maintaining the

historic properties, and some question whether the investment is appropriate or fair. Perhaps

the large investment in these private homes should come with some restrictions on future

sales or other measures to maintain the quality and viability of the town for future

generations.

(a) (b)

Figure 7. (a) Vichuquén repair of street façade; (b) Curepto main street after demolition

By contrast, Curepto, a town with similar architectural heritage buildings (see Figure 7),

had a very different outcome. Here, in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the Mayor

received an offer of heavy equipment to demolish heavily damaged buildings. This gave

owners clean sites but eliminated the possibility of restoring the heritage buildings.12 There

are arguments for both positions. Graffiti on the side of one building read, “My real heritage

is my sons, not this house, so let me demolish.” Some owners may want to get on with life,

while others want to preserve the old ways. The Ministry took an active role in heritage

preservation, targeting funds and creating focused programs and partnerships, but they were

12 One interesting case is a large and heavily damaged building on Curepto’s main street (not demolished after the earthquake) is now in negotiation for government repair funds. One requirement will be that the street corridors and the interior courtyard be maintained as public space—evidence of an increased sophistication in the use of public funding.

20

also flexible in numerous situations, trying to find the balance between community and

individual values.

COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN RECONSTRUCTION

One of the early decisions to make mayors responsible for the registry of damaged homes

created an important opportunity for involving local government in the national housing

recovery program. There is always an information crisis at the transition between the

emergency relief stage and the development of recovery programs, so putting trust in mayors

to account for local victims gave them the responsibility to accurately account for their

citizen’s needs. At the same time, because citizens came to the municipal offices to register,

they connected with each other and with local government officials. This was particularly

important in the first months after the earthquake, because the local governments were

instrumental in linking citizens with emergency housing.

The installation of 80,000 shelters by the national government was accomplished with the

collaboration of corporations and NGOs promoting a sense of “national unity” that

characterized the emergency phase. Local governments tracked the needs of their citizens,

and insured that families had shelter and other emergency aid, whether from the government

or from donors13. Municipalities received some help for their efforts from MINVU through

the PGC (Programa de Gestión de Calidad), which provided funding designated to strengthen

a municipality’s capacities and hire new professionals.

Similarly, using the regional SERVIU offices to manage applications for housing

subsidies not only required each office to bolster its staff, but also took advantage of their

local knowledge to manage the reconstruction process. Because they already had regular

procedures for individual and social housing subsidy applications, they could use those and

adapt their systems and norms for the national programs specific to earthquake reconstruction

conditions.

13 The work done by local governments is similar to the “case-management” approach used by some NGOs and some government agencies in various disasters—creating a “one-stop-shop” to assist disaster victims with a variety of needs and problems.

21

ON-SITE HOME RECONSTRUCTION

The largest portion of the housing program was dedicated to families who needed to

repair or replace a damaged home. Almost three-quarters of the total number of units

receiving subsidies went to homeowners for repair (108,839) or rebuilding (53,822) (see

Table 3). These families documented their housing damage in the registry, and then applied

for subsidy through the local SERVIU office. The ministry devised a number of alternative

mechanisms to deliver assistance—with the goal of providing the homeowners choice in

terms of who did the work and what kind of replacement house they could have.

To complete the repairs, owners could hire a contractor, or do the work themselves;

acquiring materials though a voucher program at local hardware and building supply stores.

For reconstruction, the Ministry initially attempted to allow each individual owner select a

model unit, but quickly realized that this was inefficient, because the damage was widely

distributed throughout the regions. Instead, they grouped owners together in a town or

village, and had several builders make presentations on their products. The houses were

typically about 50 square meters in size (538 square feet), either pre-fabricated or site built,

either wood-frame or reinforced masonry, and all pre-certified by the Ministry, according to

the minimum standards defined by the Ministry and existing construction norms (see Figure

8a, b, c). The families would listen to the presentations; discuss the various models and vote.

The builder whose house model received the most votes would receive the contract for that

community.

This system provided a mechanism for family choice and it also created economic

incentives of scale for builders to work in rural regions. In some areas, the local SERVIU

would develop a model house design so that small local builders could compete for the jobs.

For the families who were living in an emergency shelter on the site, they were there to watch

the construction of their homes, they got to know the builders, and they insured that few

materials were ever stolen from the site. The builders were able to develop a reputation in the

community and almost all grew their businesses, hired local workers and expanded their skill

sets. Because the mining industry in the north of Chile absorbed many builders and workers,

the opportunities for small and medium sized contractors to offer local construction jobs

helped the economy of the earthquake impacted regions.

22

(a) (b)

(c) (d) Figure 8. (a) Site built wood; (b) Site built masonry; (c) prefabricated; and (d) elevated house

Families made choices about the model units based on a variety of features. In some

cases, people voted for the pre-fabricated units because they could be acquired quickly. For

the elderly, or families with small children, this was often an important criterion. For some,

their location influenced their decision. It was impossible to deliver a pre-fabricated home to

some very remote home sites, as the building could be damaged driving over dirt roads.

Some builders specialized in designing a model home where all the materials could be

packed onto one truck and delivered to the site. In some cases, families chose reinforced

masonry because it reminded them of what they had before, whereas in others, people chose

wood frame because they were afraid of living in adobe or masonry. Sometimes, features

added by the builders would sway the decision. A builder might include solar heating, a bay

window, or extra finishes as part of their model, suggesting that the competition among

builders increased as each became more confortable with the program.

23

A housing program that allows families to stay on their home sites and choose a model

home has produced genuine satisfaction14 with the government recovery policy. One

important feature of the program is flexibility. The Ministry has developed a capacity to

adapt to unique needs and local conditions—such as continuous façade models for some

urban settings (see Figure 6a), additional subsidies and specialized technical assistance for

historic towns (see Figure 7a), elevated tsunami-resistant housing for waterfront communities

(see Figure 8d), technical assistance for do-it-yourself (DIY) home builders, and special

sanitary solutions for rural areas. The Ministry’s flexibility—not only in house models but

also in service delivery and subsidy funds—has certainly contributed to the general

satisfaction with the owner-site recovery programs.

At the same time, the overall program is focused on the delivery of housing, and does not

solve every family’s social or economic needs. The government provided some 47,000

additional housing through acquisition subsidies, new single-family home developments and

social condominiums (see Tables 2 and 3) for non-land owners in cases where two families

were sharing or for renters in damaged units. However, the improved housing quality for two

families does not replace the income derived from rent for the owner of the damaged larger

home. Similarly, those who ran small enterprises out of their homes—everything from candy

stores to machine repairs—also lost space for the economic activities that sustained the

family. While this may be a minor criticism of the housing program, it points to a general

lack of integration with economic development, which will be discussed in more detail in the

next section on Integration of Planning with Housing Reconstruction. While other

government programs were involved in efforts to rebuild local economies, it remains

extremely difficult for the government to solve all the economic and social problems created

by earthquake damage.

SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS

The concept of citizen involvement is embedded in the social condominium program. The

standard process, in place before the earthquake, required families with vouchers to organize

through a committee with a community leader, who would then bring the group application

for a social housing project to the SERVIU as part of the project development. This required

a good deal of community organizing, but also a long lead-time because all the paperwork

14 In interviews with more than two dozen families, all expressed delight with their homes. The only complaint was frustration with the necessary paperwork.

24

had to be complete before construction begins. After the earthquake, residents of social

condominiums that were damaged were most likely to be sheltered in emergency camps, and

had to be re-organized for new condominium projects. Some families took the option of

moving to new developments of single-family homes nearby, but many chose to stay with

their condominium group.

Overall, twenty-one social housing sites had damage. Some were truly uninhabitable

because of damage, but others had a combination of repairable earthquake damage with

extreme maintenance issues, old and small units, and social problems. For the older

developments, the Ministry’s calculation was that it would be more expensive to repair the

existing buildings and bring them up to a contemporary standard than to simply replace the

units. There were approximately 8,000 units significantly damaged but 30,000 additional

units were needed to replace the poor quality units and accommodate the additional need

from sublet renters and doubled-up families (See Tables 2 and 3).

Each project was unique, not only in terms of physical needs but also in terms of how

families made decisions. For example in Dichato, three projects had different outcomes. In

one, a 91 unit existing project was left uninhabitable by the earthquake, but the families

decided to rebuild on the site (which was not in the no-build tsunami mitigation zone). The

community leader, Maria Angelica Torres was actively involved in organizing families, and

lobbied for detailed improvements in the project design. This group of families moved into

their units at the end of February 2012, two years after the earthquake, and is already

planning to apply for subsidies to build extensions on some units.

Four hundred and fifty families in the El Molino Emergency village (about 1 km outside

of Dichato, on a hill above the town) were displaced by tsunami damage, and many did not

want to return to the town. Although the Ministry worked with the social leaders and families

to insure that people had housing vouchers, the “freedom of choice” on where to live made

the process slower, even as expectations were heightened. The frustrations led to a

community strike, which blocked the main road into town in July, 2011 and the President

sent in Felipe Kast, a former Minister of Social Development, to work with the families. The

social leader, Ximena Toledo, believes that the housing development now under construction

across the road from the camp is a direct result of Mr. Kast’s intervention. In fact, the site

negotiations were in progress before the strike, but the high-level intervention helped calm

the frustrations of people who were living in difficult conditions. By October of 2012, with

25

210 prefabricated houses under construction across from the camp and many more in the

town, the mood has shifted and Ms. Toledo is already planning for future activities such as

training residents to maintain their homes.

The number of homes on the site reflects family choices: 210 wanted to remain on the hill

site while others chose to go back to units in the town. Units are assigned in an interesting

manner. The social leader gets first pick, followed by the six directors. Families with stores

are distributed around the site on corner locations, and the remainder used a lottery. After the

initial distribution, some sites were traded among lottery families. A sub-group of the

families with elderly or disabled members will be placed in homes at the bottom of the hill

for easier health care access.

When the families move into the new units in February 2013, three years after the

earthquake, the Ministry will close the emergency camp and give each family the building

materials from their emergency unit, worth about $1,000 to each family but not salvageable

by the government. This has been used in other camp closings to encourage families who

might want to build an extension to their new homes, and to eliminate continued use of the

camps as informal housing settlements. In addition, dismantling the camp buildings will

discourage families from staying in the camp in order to rent their new homes to tourists for

the summer season. Thus, even closing the camps, which should be something to be

celebrated, requires work on the part of local officials and social leaders.

(a) (b) Figure 9. (a) El Molino Emergency Village, Dichato; (b) New prefabricated housing under construction across the road from the village

A third social housing project in Dichato provides a unique example of a project that was

started before all the families were organized. This project is set back from the shore, but the

26

condominium buildings are elevated to withstand a tsunami equivalent is scale to the 2010

event. Here the social leader, Ivonne Vera, who owns a small store near the site, could only

organize 15 families to commit to the condominium site because families could not

understand the project design. In this case, the Ministry went ahead with construction of 128

units (half the original planned size), knowing that the housing need in Dichato was great.

Now, with units under construction (see Figure 10a), families are impressed with the

development and are asking the Ministry to complete the second portion of the site. This will

be done as a general social housing program, not exclusively for earthquake replacement

housing.

In Rancagua, the Villa Cordillera social housing project (see Figure 3a) was built in the

1980s with 1,950 units, ranging in size from 27 to 44 square meters. The project had roof and

wall leaks and other maintenance problems before the earthquake and while the damage

could have been repaired, it did not seem reasonable or cost efficient. Because there were

renters and families living in the houses of others (known as “allegados”); the total number of

families who required housing units was not 1,950 but 2,900. A development of that size,

with 55 square meter units would not fit on the site. However, families in 3 buildings decided

they wanted to stay in place and negotiated repairs for those buildings (see Figure 10b).

Others chose to move to one of three new developments (with 400 units each) nearby (see

Figure 3b), so the remaining families will return to a newly designed, smaller project (with

larger units) on the original site.

In Coronel, at the Mártires del Carbon project, another experiment with improving social

condominiums was underway. While the earthquake did not severely damage this project, the

redesign of the buildings was a pilot for other earthquake repairs of social housing. Here, the

social leaders organized families in 3 buildings where the redesign converted three units into

two units, enlarging each unit from 42 to 64 square meters (see Figure 10c). In the case of

these three buildings, one-third of the families chose to move to other developments nearby,

and the remainder stayed in one building during the renovation of the other two buildings.

Once other residents of the complex saw the new units, they were eager to organize and

participate in future renovations. The second phase of construction will start in 2013.

27

(a) (b) (c) Figure 10. (a) Elevated social housing, Dichato; (b) repaired building in Villa Cordillera, Rancagua; (c) existing and renovated units under construction, Mártires del Carbon, Coronel

Overall, the social condominiums have strong citizen participation in organizing for the

selection of housing unit types and family groups for buildings or projects. How this

translates into other aspects of managing the community is less clear. As with many

developments that concentrate low-income populations, there is also a concentration of social

problems and a lack of services such as banks supermarkets, police and fire stations. The

ministry has developed a “second chance” program called Blocks: Segunda oportunidad, to

improve the lives of families living in extreme social vulnerability and overcrowded

condominiums. The program will renovate or rebuild units to reduce density and improve

conditions in older, problematic developments. Participation by families will be voluntary.

This is clearly an important step—where general housing policy is learning from the

earthquake recovery policy. However, as discussed in the next section, housing needs to be

coupled with better urban and site planning to address public space, security, and other

issues.

URBAN PLANNING

While Chile has a long tradition in the provision of social housing, its urban planning

system is weak. According to Minister Rodrigo Pérez (Interview 2012), there is no fully

articulated policy, many actors, and little or no cooperation between government,

municipalities and the private sector. There are no metropolitan systems (and Santiago has 32

different municipalities) and it can take years to approve local plans. It is within this context

that the Ministry approached post-earthquake planning and attempted to build a degree of

coordination into the institutional framework.

28

As discussed in the above section on integration of urban planning with housing

reconstruction, the post-earthquake planning efforts introduced the concepts of resilience and

hazards mitigation, as well as master planning to cities and towns that had previously used

only zoning as a planning instrument. While zoning designates what types of uses can be

located in a particular area, the master planning was both proactive (in terms of hazard

mitigation) and coordinated, in terms of targeting and encouraging specific types of short-

and long-term development.

The Dichato Case. There were 18 coastal cities and towns in the Biobío Region that

suffered extensive tsunami damage and the planning efforts brought new thinking on land use

as part of the housing and community recovery (MINVU 2010). In Dichato, with a

population of about 4,000, some 600 families (and 200 renters) were displaced by the

earthquake and tsunami, which destroyed over 1,300 homes. The town was particularly hard

hit because of its geographic position and wave direction. The planning effort involved

detailed risk analysis and the design of numerous mitigation elements, including a tsunami

wall on the beachfront backed by a mitigation park with hills and trees. The park’s size and

layout were designed to reduce tsunami energy (from an event equivalent to the one of

February 2010) by 35%. This meant that the original coastline was moved 20 meters inland

and 113 properties along the waterfront would be expropriated for the park, new roads and

other significant infrastructure. Housing could not be built until other infrastructure,

including the reinforcement of the river channel was completed. These required funding from

the Ministry of Public Works. Other ministries funded corollary projects. For example,

Ministry of Education funding was used to move a school out of the hazard zone.

Only commercial activities would be allowed in the first zone behind the park; a second

zone would allow elevated housing; and only behind those would regular housing be

permitted (see Figure 3). While these restrictions are currently in place for all subsidized (i.e.

government-built) housing, they will become mandatory when the zoning plan is updated.

However, given the public investment in infrastructure, the plan is effectively in place. These

are dramatic changes to introduce to a community, which was traumatized by their losses.

Needless to say, people were not uniformly supportive of the changes. Those with homes or

second-homes in the expropriation zone did not want to lose their beachfront property.

Fishermen and tourist-serving businesses were concerned about losing waterfront access and

29

income. Families were divided over whether they wanted to return to living in town or move

to higher ground.

Some of the community concerns and fears were alleviated by an experiment known as

the Dichato festival. At one tense community meeting, where every issue appeared to be

characterized by winners and losers in a zero-sum game, one local person named Claudia

Gonzalez, raised her hand and said, “”Forget the other issues, what we need is jobs.” Felipe

Kast took inspiration from that discussion and asked a popular singer Miriam Hernández to

do a concert, but her husband Jorge Saint-Jean suggested a one-month music and arts festival,

to bring people into Dichato and create jobs. Tickets were free, and available by lottery on

the Monday before the Saturday performance, creating a buzz before each weekend. In all,

35,000 people came to Dichato in February of 2012, and the concerts were broadcast live on

television. The event was so successful that it will be replicated in February 2013.

Community anxiety has also been alleviated as citizens now see the housing construction

underway. New waterfront infrastructure has given a new look to the city, and local

businesses, some of which have operated for the past two years in an emergency mall, can

now look toward more permanent sites and anticipate a summer business cycle, as the goal

for the infrastructure completion is February 2013 (see Figure 11). Still, many citizens are

deeply opposed to the tsunami park. They believe it is too big, and they are concerned about

the lack of maintenance in the future. This type of public space is not in the Chilean culture.

With the exception of traditional town plazas, little public open space exists in urban settings.

Although the government intends to create a maintenance entity located in the park,

modeled after a park management organization for a large Santiago park, the local

community is skeptical. The only open spaces they have experienced are the troublesome

open spaces in large social housing developments and they cannot imagine that the park will

be free of vandals or crime. These are legitimate concerns and they could be addressed

through increased concessions and public uses (boat clubs for example) to give local

merchants and civic groups a sense of ownership and control in the public spaces. The

government led planning effort is based on sound design principals, but additional steps are

needed to bring local governments and community groups into long-term relationships that

support the planning intentions.

30

(a) (b) Figure 11. (a) Tsunami wall and infrastructure; (b) fenced zone for mitigation park with new elevated single family housing behind, Dichato.

The Talca case. Talca is a mid-sized city of 220,000 people and capital of the Maule

region. Thirty percent of the city was severely damaged, because the center-city

neighborhoods were filled with old adobe structures. The rubble was cleared in in about one

month and on-site emergency houses were used, just as in rural areas. Because many of the

adobe houses were large, it was common for the owners to rent portions of the house. Thus,

the vulnerable population in Talca was large, but they did not need emergency villages

because other family members with undamaged homes took in displaced families. If Dichato

had the worst damage, Talca was the second in terms of overall earthquake impacts15.

As discussed above, Talca had more than double the number of families in need because

of the high number of renters in central neighborhoods. In some areas, it did not seem logical

to simply rebuild 50 square meter single-family homes on high value land. In addition, given

the need by displaced renters, new developments on the periphery of the city were inevitable.

To counteract this trend, the Ministry created a program to add density to the city, by

providing a subsidy to builders to develop infill center city sites with proximity to shopping,

health care and other services16. Earthquake victims in the registry would have first priority

to purchase the condominiums (equivalent to a single family home voucher) but the builder

15 Constitución was the third most impacted city. While not discussed in detail here, many of the planning issues were similar to those in Dichato. 16 The urban densification program works differently than other Ministry housing subsidies. To qualify for subsidies, the project has to meet design guides established by the Ministry to preserve the urban image (e.g. height restrictions, façade details, first floor apartments, and public space). The subsidy varies according to the price of the units. Typically the subsidy ranges between US$14,500 and $24,000 per unit, decreasing as unit prices rise. To ensure access to units for earthquake victims, the Ministry required that 20% of the units are limited to a price of $38,400. When the subsidy is deducted, the family would get a loan to pay $14,400 for the unit (MINVU 2012).

31

would receive an additional loan of US$4,800 per unit to cover the costs of urban

construction. After a certain period, unsold condos would be made available on the market

for people who qualify for regular subsidy programs.

One of these projects is under development in the Las Heras neighborhood (see Figure

12). The goal of projects such as this is to keep families in the neighborhood and encourage

higher density development in central neighborhoods. While the intention is laudable, it is

not clear that the builder subsidies and complementary zoning is enough to regenerate central

neighborhoods. The program will certainly add some multi-story condominium buildings on

larger sites, but a greater public intervention may be needed to really transform the areas.

Unlike Dichato, where the mitigation park and new infrastructure (necessitated by hazard

reduction) reshaped the commercial core of the town, the Talca neighborhoods will not be re-

shaped by higher density housing on scattered sites. These neighborhoods will need sites to

be grouped for high-density development, more investment in public amenities as well as

economic development to revitalize the communities; and that will require more planning

tools than are presently available in Chile.

(a) (b) Figure 12. Two views of an urban infill condominium project in Las Heras neighborhood, Talca.

It is hard to criticize the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development for a creative

program that uses the subsidy tools available through the Ministry and adapts them to

improve housing conditions in an urban setting. However, the situation in the Las Heras

neighborhood, and Talca in general, is complicated. Despite the fact that 60% of the damaged

homes were adobe, there were no heritage zones in Talca, perhaps because the adobe homes

were scattered among wood frame and masonry houses. While there is a mix of incomes in

the neighborhood, almost half the residents were in the lowest income category. According to

32

a study by the Public Policy Center at Catholic University, families in Las Heras and Abate

Molina neighborhoods would stay in the neighborhood with or without the added density.

The study also concluded that better coordination between housing and urban policy was

needed, as well as better information and participatory processes (Mora and Polanco

Interview 2012).

A community leader in Las Heras echoed these views. She lived with two families in her

damaged home, could not resolve the land tenancy problems, and missed the deadline for the

registry. She is living in an emergency house on her home-site. She does not believe the

neighborhood is improved by the big condominium building. She is more concerned about

the number of empty sites scattered throughout the neighborhood, and the extra distance her

children must walk to school. It is understandable that she is wary of change. At the same

time, her sentiments reflect deeper economic and social problems in the community.

There are economic difficulties for families who have lost rental incomes from their old

homes and there are social problems for families who may have depended on sharing

arrangements for help with child or elder care. For these urban families, the provision of a

basic house or condominium is not a full solution to their loss—especially if their old house

was a source of income.

For the neighborhood, increased density on a few sites will not solve the loss of cohesion

in the urban fabric. Ultimately, there needs to be more urban planning tools such as a local

redevelopment authority or enterprise zone. These and other contemporary planning

instruments could create a variety of opportunities: 1) to acquire land for concentrations of

commerce or mid-rise housing; 2) to develop community services and amenities that will

lead to neighborhood revitalization and 3) to encourage community involvement in providing

for a greater diversity of housing choice (including owners, renters and sharing

arrangements). This applies not only to Talca, but also to Curicó, Chillán, Constitución, and

other mid-sized cities whose urban problems need urban scale solutions. In these settings,

housing is not necessarily the only tool needed to reconstruct the community.

COMPARISON WITH OTHER HOUSING RECOVERY PROGRAMS

It is extremely difficult to compare disaster losses and recovery programs in different

countries when local conditions make each situation unique. However, some generalizations

33

can be made. The greatest loss of life tends to be concentrated in developing countries,

whereas high property losses typically are a result of urban disasters in developed countries.

The scale of housing loss is a combination of the earthquake intensity, soil conditions,

tsunami generation, the level of building code enforcement and the quality of construction.

Housing recovery (and recovery in general) is often a combination of a proactive government

role in the reconstruction process, opportunities for individual households community

participation and available funding.

To measure the success of recovery, it is important to look at different scales of

intervention, over different time frames. Success in recovery will first depend on the scale at

which that recovery is measured: at the level of the individual or household, at the level of

the neighborhood or community, and at the level of the city or region. Success in recovery

will also depend on the time frame in which recovery is measured: in years or in decades.

Finally, the degree of success in recovery will depend on the perspective of the evaluator: a

family, a community, a government, an outside funder, or an independent evaluator (Comerio

2005).

With the caveat that comparisons are difficult and tempered by differing perspectives and

time frames, it can be useful to compare Chile’s housing recovery to that in other countries

with a strong central government role in recovery management and to those where recovery

is characterized by a more limited government role. Table 4 provides a comparison of losses

in six recent disasters, three (in blue) with strong national government leadership in recovery

and three with more limited government roles.

Table 4. Comparison of Losses in Selected Recent Disasters

U. S. H. Katrina

2005

China

2008

Haiti

2010

Chile

2010

New Zealand

2010-11

Japan

2011 Damage Value

$80-150 B. $30-50B $12 B $30B $40B est. $300B est.

Housing Units Lost

500,000 5 million 300,000+ 370,000 10-15,000 est. 113,000 est. (+evacuation)

Deaths

1,970 90,000 316,000 526 184 19,000

34

STRONG GOVERNMENT RECOVERY MANAGEMENT

In the Chile case, there were extensive housing losses over a large geographic area in a

country with excellent building codes but little insurance. The government took a proactive

stance in raising taxes to fund recovery and to expand existing housing programs for low-

and middle-income families. The government also ran parallel rebuilding programs for

schools, hospitals and other infrastructure. Families were able to stay on their home sites and

were allowed to chose among model homes. Plans for hazard abatement were integrated into

coastal redevelopment and efforts were made to rebuild with greater density to counteract

exurban development. The four-year goal for completing housing provided adequate time to

adjust the programs to address unique local conditions, although larger urban settings may

require more extensive planning interventions than housing subsidies can provide.

China. By comparison, the M 7.9 Sichuan earthquake of May 12, 2008, in western

China, had extensive damage in a large and remote region. Good building codes exist in

China, but regulations in the region were less well enforced, resulting in a high death toll.

The central government took a proactive role, requiring wealthier eastern provinces to

contribute 1% of their GDP to the recovery, in a program where damaged cities were twinned

with contributors. As was common in China, planning and central management was used to

develop new towns and large scale housing construction. The goal of moving families out of

temporary housing after two winters meant there was little time to review building codes,

little time to consult impacted residents about their desires or needs, and little environmental

review of site selection. There was also no real choice of housing type or location available to

families. China’s strong emphasis on expediency may have compromised overall

construction quality and limited integration with jobs and social services. Thus, while the

central government of China focused on a massive and speedy rebuilding program, they lost

opportunities for sustainable development and hazards mitigation, as well as opportunities to

reduce social vulnerability through coordinated efforts in jobs, health care and other services.

Further, victims had little choice in their housing options and many families were separated

because new housing was not near jobs.

New Zealand. In Christchurch, New Zealand, the February 22, 2011 M.6.3 earthquake

was one of a series of earthquakes that impacted the city, but this one—epicentered near the

downtown—severely damaged the central business district. Widespread liquefaction also

caused extensive damage to utilities and housing across the city. Here, losses were covered

35

by government required earthquake insurance, provided by a national Earthquake

Commission (EQC). Approximately 87% of the homes in greater Christchurch were

damaged. Of those, 30% had major damage and 70% had minor damage (Markum 2012).

There have been approximately 459,000 claims and some NZ$3 billion (US$ 2.5 billion) paid

out as of May 2012 (EQC 2012). For residents, the wait for payment from the insurance

claims and the government decision to zone land areas where rebuilding will and will not be

allowed are sources of considerable stress.

Land was zoned red (no rebuilding allowed), orange (further study needed) and green

(rebuilding allowed) based on geotechnical studies and assessments of where utilities could

be replaced. More than 7,000 homes in the red zones were offered a buy-out package to leave

their unsalvageable houses. The government will buy their land (more than 700 hectares),

which is now subject to an increased threat of river and ocean flooding. Another 2,500 homes

are on-hold in the orange zone pending further study. The green zone has been complicated

by a subdivision into three sub-zones by the Department of Building and Housing. Here some

10-15,000 homes in Technical Category 3 may require substantial foundation work in order

to be considered habitable. The homeowners in green TC3 are afraid that they will never be

able to afford the complex structural foundation repairs or sell the homes in the future.

Homeowners in TC 3 would rather be zoned red (Markum 2012). These engineering

standards are critical to the city’s long-term redevelopment and yet the effect, when

combined with uncertain job prospects due to downtown losses, could push many residents to

leave the city, despite the insurance coverage intended to support home repair.

Italy, Turkey, and India. The M 6.3 earthquake in the Abruzzo region of Italy on April

6, 2009 devastated many small towns as well as the central city of L’Aquila and left more

than 60,000 homeless. Within six months, the national government quickly built base-

isolated housing for 15,000 people, on a variety of sites in the region. Intended as long-term

temporary housing, the units would be repurposed as student housing after 20 years (Calvi,

2010). Although the effort was critical for many families with no housing options, larger

recovery efforts have stalled for lack of funding. Families who did not receive the new

housing lived in hotels and coastal towns (2 hours away) for 2-3 years and many have

relocated permanently. University students commute 2 hours from Avenzano. It is unclear

how the university, the tourist industry, or local business will support their own recovery

without greater housing stability.

36

Other examples of strong central government recovery management come from recovery

efforts after earthquakes in Turkey (Kocaeli and Düzce, 1999) and India (Maharashtra 1993

and Gujarat 2001) where World Bank funding was channelled through national and state

governments to support rebuilding programs. Although the finance mechanisms were

different, the approaches were similar to those undertaken in China and Italy with heavy

investment in replacement units in new developments. Some limited efforts by NGOs

engaged small sub-sets of the affected population in self-building and repair programs.

There is no single approach to housing recovery. In all these cases, governments used

existing agencies and programs to deliver housing after disasters. Some, as in China and

L’Aquila, Italy, were highly centralized with little opportunities for housing choice or

participation in planning by the citizenry, while others provided varying degrees of flexibility

and housing choice to earthquake victims (although in many cases constrained by the limits

of available funding and engineering requirements). For the more recent events, it will be

valuable to re-look at the relationship between post-earthquake housing construction and

community economic and social stability ten years post-event to see how the impacted

populations have fared.

LIMITED GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT WITH PRIVATE INVESTMENT

The U.S. and Japan are similar in their approach to a more limited role for government in

disaster recovery, with a focus on public funding primarily for infrastructure, limited

government support for housing (and all private sector recovery), and a general lack of

disaster insurance for homes.

Hurricane Katrina. The largest U. S. disaster in recent years was Hurricane Katrina,

which devastated New Orleans and the Gulf coast in August of 2005. The damage was

distributed over a large geographic area but included one major city, New Orleans. With

100,000 New Orleans units (50% of city households) and 400,000 units lost across the Gulf

Coast region, there was not enough capacity to provide temporary housing (such as mobile

homes and trailers) and many families were evacuated to other cities and states.

Government flood insurance17 did not cover all of the storm damage for homeowners, and

all government assistance programs were hampered by politics at all levels of government.

Housing repairs and reconstruction required substantial private investment and relatively

17 There is no equivalent government insurance for other disasters such as tornados or earthquakes.

37

little low-income and multi-family housing was rebuilt. New Orleans now has about 25%

fewer habitable housing units than before the storm. Similar issues will arise with the most

recent hurricane, Sandy, which hit New York and New Jersey in October 2012, where public

investment in infrastructure will encourage private investment in high-income areas but leave

lower income regions with few options for recovery finance.

Tohoku, Japan. Japan’s March 11, 2011 Great Eastern Japan earthquake and tsunami

devastated a large coastal region, similar in scale to region affected in the Chile earthquake.

Because of the additional complexity created by the nuclear power plant damage, housing

recovery will go beyond the replacement of disaster losses to include long-term evacuation

from undamaged communities affected by fallout. With limited insurance for homes,

declining economies as well as an aging population in coastal fishing villages, and complex

social adjustments for nuclear-displaced families, there will be a prolonged recovery which

will require a combination of public and private investment. Studies estimate that rubble

removal alone will take three years. Coastal planning similar to that undertaken in Chile to

mitigate tsunami hazards has been completed, however decision making, distribution of

funding and plan implementation are taking place at central government, prefecture, and the

local municipality level without good coordination (Maki 2012).

Past events in the U. S. and Japan—1989 M 7.1 Loma Prieta earthquake in the San

Francisco Bay Area, the 1994 M 6.8 Northridge (Los Angeles) earthquake, and the 1995 M

7.2 Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe, Japan) earthquake—demonstrate the outcomes from a limited

government approach to housing recovery.

San Francisco Bay Area. Some 15 years after Loma Prieta, major investments in public

infrastructure brought about the transformation of the San Francisco waterfront (resulting

from the demolition of the Embarcadero freeway), the rebuilding of museums, cultural, and

civic buildings as well as the revitalization of the Hayes Valley neighborhood with the

replacement of the damaged Central freeway with a boulevard design. By contrast, only 75

percent of the total housing destroyed by the earthquake was replaced ten years after the

event. While high-income areas recovered quickly, many residents of low-income single

room occupancy hotels and apartments were left homeless after the Loma Prieta earthquake.

The time consuming repair and replacement of these units was largely carried out by non-

profit housing groups, which meant that no additional units of affordable housing were added

in the decade after the earthquake (Comerio 1998).

38

Los Angeles. After the Northridge earthquake, almost 300,000 owners of damaged

single-family homes made claims on their earthquake insurance and repairs required two to

five years to complete. Rebuilding multi-family housing was more difficult. Two-thirds of

the 59,000 multi-family units declared uninhabitable required 5 years for repairs, while the

remaining one-third were abandoned or torn down (Comerio 1996, 1998). High rental

vacancies in the San Fernando Valley at the time of the earthquake provided families with

relocation options so people were not displaced and the rebuilt apartments typically served

newcomers to the area.

Kobe. In Kobe, some 400,000 housing units were damaged or destroyed. The

government provided 48,300 temporary units, which were occupied for six to eight years

after the event. A complex planning process involved a variety of land-use and zoning

adjustments to aid the rebuilding process, which were effective but time consuming. The

government set a target of 125,000 replacement-housing units, of which 38,600 were

designated for low-income people. The Phoenix plan stated that two-thirds of the new units

were to be built by the public sector and one-third by the private sector. Five years after the

event, private sector housing was being built much faster than public sector housing,

particularly in outlying areas (Preuss 1998 Olshansky, Johnson and Topping 2005). Although

the overall housing replacement goal was ultimately met, many of the earthquake victims

were displaced and new housing in Kobe served a gentrified population. Some 10% of Kobe

population left the city and it took 10 years for the population to return to pre-earthquake

levels (Maki 2102).

Both the United States and Japan are developed nations, willing to accept a higher

reliance on the private sector for disaster recovery, even if that recovery is uneven across

income groups. In developing countries, a limited government role in disaster recovery can

extend the hardships for disaster victims.

Haiti. The devastating recent losses in Port-au-Prince from the January 12 2010, M. 7.0

earthquake—in terms of the number of deaths as well as the physical losses in housing,

schools, hospitals and public buildings—extend to the capacity to manage the country. Haiti

lost a significant portion of its weak national government in the earthquake and was already

dependent on the NGOs for many social services (Farmer, 2011). For any developing

country, the losses incurred in natural disasters are in part products of their pre-disaster

conditions—poverty, lack of jobs, lack of education and training. Post disaster, the problems

39

are often compounded by the unintended consequences of international aid. In Haiti, less than

one percent of the aid went to the public sector, and yet, long-term recovery requires a

functioning public sector. An NGO can build a school or a clinic but the building is of limited

use without a public mechanism to pay teachers or nurses.

Here again, it is too early to know the outcome of the recovery and reconstruction efforts

in Haiti. There are hopeful signs that the Ministry of Public Works is involved in the

development of building standards and the coordination of NGOs. A new Ministry of

Housing has been created and many people have left the emergency camps, although their

living circumstances remain uncertain. However, as of December 2012, 357,000 Haitians are

still in 496 tent camps (Sontag 2012), and there is much to be done in the resolution of land

ownership, the development of public services (water, sanitation, education and health care,

job training and economic development along with the provision of housing.

COMPARISON OF PROGRAMS

When the housing recovery in Chile is compared to other countries, two metrics stand

out: 1) a strong or weak role of government in management and coordination, and 2) more or

less individual choice in housing combined with citizen participation in larger planning

processes. A more limited government role will undoubtedly lead to a more uneven recovery,

while a more holistic, human-centered, participatory approach will promote the capacity for

affected populations to make decisions on their own behalf and encourage local institutions

(both governmental and non-governmental) to develop fair and coordinated redevelopment

plans.

The chart in Figure 13 is a way of looking at the balance between government roles and

citizen participation. While the placement of each country is based on the author’s judgment,

the aim is to represent the variety of approaches used, for better or for worse. The chart

shows that Chile and New Zealand have combined both “top-down” and “bottom-up”

approaches, providing government leadership and funding along with community

empowerment in decision-making. It is important to recognize that these approaches are not

mutually exclusive, and can be effectively combined. By contrast, China and Italy took

strong government leadership roles in providing replacement housing but did not engage

local communities in most aspects of the decision-making. Turkey and India had mixed

programs—with some housing developed by government in large tracts and some village

programs where NGO’s worked with residents on self-help construction. The US and Japan

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41

CONCLUSION

After a disaster, anyone who has lost a home and all semblance of normal life, may be

confused, disorganized, and demoralized. They grieve for what was lost. Their need goes

beyond physical replacements. Family-focused approaches, that is, recovery programs that

engage citizens in decisions about the future, have the advantage of empowerment for these

individuals, turning passive into active, lack of control into control, and promoting

community engagement. Psychiatrist, Dr. Craig Van Dyke (2012) writes, “…the grief

literature describes the endpoint of successful mourning as a point when the individual is

capable of making new emotional investments in the future. It is not defined by happiness or

even well-being. Rather it is an acknowledgement that one is forever changed, but it is time

to get on with life and make new investments and not have one's personal development

permanently arrested.”

In Chile, the housing recovery program has helped the great majority of earthquake

victims to re-start their lives in a reasonable time frame. With 121,000 families (more than

50% of the allocated subsidies) already living in repaired or rebuilt homes and condominiums

just two and a half years after the earthquake, it is a testament to the design and

implementation of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development’s reconstruction plan.

The plan benefitted from strong leadership at the national level. The political commitment by

the newly elected government was critical to funding and managing the overall process. In

addition, the young professional leadership by engineers, architects and urban planners in the

Ministry and among the regional SERVIU staffs, and technical assistants was exemplary.

These individuals combined best professional and technical practices with creative thinking

to craft flexible and targeted programs that were manageable and accountable by government

standards. They worked within existing programs and institutions, but they re-wrote the plan

and stretched the rules to accommodate the varied conditions they encountered among the

damaged housing and family circumstances. Ultimately, the flexibility in both program

development and implementation is critical to its success. Of course, a good economy and

good political timing (the transition to a new administration) were helpful, providing the

capacity to finance the programs and the opportunity to bring in new leaders and new

thinking into existing government programs. Ten lessons emerge from the Chilean

experience that can be useful to other nations coping with a large-scale disaster and extensive

housing losses:

42

1. Disasters create anxiety and opportunity. It takes government leadership—at national

and local levels—to manage both.

2. Existing programs and institutions have the benefit of in-place staff, procedures, and

budget lines.

3. Recognize that many existing programs will not fit with disaster conditions, and thus

will require the willingness to be flexible, to adapt, and to develop new programs, within the

existing structures.

4. Hire young and forward thinking managers to run programs, and back them up with

seasoned politicians to be the public face of the recovery efforts.

5. Recognize that national unity will last only a few weeks or months and disasters

require a vast effort to manage information and expectations.

6. Recognize that cooperation between the national and local levels of government is

essential—programs need local input and cooperation to succeed.

7. Recognize that need for human “case-management”—that is processes to help victims

with all of the many problems they encounter after a disaster. This includes food and shelter,

medical help, child care, jobs, alternate jobs, and most important, their expectations.

8. Recognize that it takes time to implement a recovery effort. In the first year, it may be

possible to fix basic infrastructure, but major urban redevelopment and new civic institutions

can take 10-20 years.

9. For large-scale housing reconstruction, the first year will produce few tangible results.

While the process of developing loss data, programs and finance is underway, keep families

on their home sites, if possible, and build a large variety of model homes developments to

help families living in shelters to understand the next phase. A long-term vision helps to

explain the realities of construction times as well as the social and economic recovery goals.

10. In all recovery efforts, find the balance between government assistance and individual

responsibility, government leadership and community involvement. Post-disaster assistance

should enable citizens to recover, not create entitlements.

Beyond the direct lessons, it is also important to note that, the transition from creating a

recovery program to winding it down requires continued planning and creative

improvements. For the families at the “end of the queue”—those who will not move into a

43

rebuilt home until the end of the third or fourth year of the program—it might be valuable to

think of ways to thank those families for their patience. While the recovery may be seen to be

accomplished in record time by the disaster research community, three to four years is a

really long time for families coping with cramped, temporary accommodations. For staff

(especially the staff that was added to SERVIU offices at the regional levels), the Ministry

will have to think about how these jobs will evolve and change, and how to take advantage of

the skills learned in the earthquake recovery program for future initiatives.

One of those will be the need for planning and design tools as well as political and

practical changes at the national and municipal levels as part of a National Urban Policy, now

under discussion. Historically, the government, through the Ministries, has invested in

improving the physical conditions for housing, infrastructure, schools, hospitals and other

public services. Going forward, the earthquake has pushed the Ministry of Housing and

Urban Development to think beyond housing supply and consider the role of urban planning

and citizen participation. This will require significant professional development, coordination

across traditional disciplines and political changes, but necessary next steps. Thus, to go

beyond measuring the success of disaster recovery through specific rebuilding programs, it is

also important to evaluate whether reconstruction will enhance community resilience and

develop community engagement. In the long term, Chile’s changes to urban design and

development policies will continue to contribute to the formal recovery programs. The

earthquake may have a legacy far beyond a successful recovery, if the recovery efforts begin

a new phase in national urban policy and provide a larger planning framework at the local

level where citizens can participate in the planning process.

RESEARCH METHOD

This paper is based on extensive interviews conducted during two trips to Chile: five days

in February and 15 days in October of 2012. The trips were organized by the Ministry of

Housing and Urban Development and funded by the United Nations Development Program

(UNDP). Interviews were conducted with individuals with positions in the current

government, the previous government, regional offices, technical assistance, academia,

businesses, local officials and families who received government housing subsidies.

These include Minister Rodrigo Peréz, Pablo Ivelic, coordinator of the Housing

Reconstruction Program, Maria Ignacia Arrasate, Program manager, Felipe Kast, in charge of

44

Emergency Camps, Andres Iacobelli, former undersecretary of MINVU, Pablo Allard,

former coordinator of the Urban Design and Historic Patrimony Program, Fernando Fodón,

former Regional Administrator of O’Higgins Region VI and currently working at the

Ministry, Luis Eduardo Bresciani, former coordinator of urban development in the previous

administration and currently an academic, Clarisa Ayala, Director of SERVIU in Maule, Luis

Valenzuela, an academic planner involved in post-earthquake data collection, Pía Mora and

María Ignacia Polanco, academics with the Center for Public Policy, Catholic University and

Ned Strong, Director of the Harvard Program in Latin America.

At the local level, Diego Vergara, Mayor of Paine, Claudio Guajardo, Mayor of Rio

Claro, Román Pavez, Mayor of Vichuquén, Marco Marín, Mayor of Lolol, Gonzalo Tejos,

Mayor of Emperado and Duverlis Valenzuela, Mayor San Rosendo.

Builders included Julio Watson, South zone manager of Inmobiliaria Sinergía

(MINGATEK), Linares; Franz Iraira Quezada, Yasna Iraira, and María Cristina Quezada,

Constructora Iraira Limitada; Felipe Hernán Carrasco Hurtado and Hugo Ricardo Carrasco

Hurtado, HURTADO Y CARRASCO; Bernardo Heredia and Rodrigo Pereira, SERVICIOS

Y CONSTRUCCIONES LC.; Marcelo Retamal, Ingeniería y Construcción Cardenal;

SALFA; Small builders include Sergio Reyes Valdivia.

Architects included MOEBIS, designers of mitigation parks, and those involved in

technical assistance: Patricia Jiménez, Rodrigo Cháves Rodríguez, Guillermo Vasquez, Carol

Loyola, Claudio Deney, Yasna Cortez, Carolina Vergara, Cristián Lopez. Hardware store

owners or managers include Ferretería Ramirez, Doñihue and Ferrever Ltda. in Lolol.

Social Leaders included: Maria Angelica Torres, Ximena, Toledo, and Ivonne Vera in

Dichato, and Cristina Carter, Las Heras, Talca. More than two dozens beneficiaries opened

their homes and construction sites to show the work completed and in progress.

Towns and cities visited include Paine in the Santiago Metropolitan region. In Region VI

(O’Higgins) towns include Doñihue, Machalí, Rancagua, San Fernando, Santa Cruz and

Lolol; in Region VII (Maule) towns include Curicó, Talca, Linares, Río Claro, Vichuquén,

Curepto, Constitución, and Empedrado; in Region VIII (Biobío) towns include San Carlos,

Chillán, Coliumo, Dichato, Tomé, Talcahuano, Concepción, Coronel and San Rosendo.

Many thanks are due to all the people who gave so generously of their time, but in

particular, Maria Ignacia Arrasate, without whom the research could never have happened.

45

REFERENCES

Asociacion de Asguradores de Chile (AACH), 2012. Various reports available at http://www.aach.cl,

accessed February-March, 2011 and December 2012.

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