how bureaucracies become effective

7/21/2019 How Bureaucracies Become Effective

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How State Bureaucracies Become Effective

David Delfs Erbo Andersen∗

[email protected]

Kim Sass Mikkelsen∗

[email protected]

Abstract

The effectiveness of bureaucracy is increasingly acknowledged as importantfor democratic stability. The dominating presumption in the literature isthat what underlies administrative effectiveness of bureaucracy is the bu-reaucracy’s autonomy in hiring and firing its own staff. We point to animportant omission in this framework: We argue that bureaucratic auton-omy only contributes to administrative effectiveness if bureaucrats are loyalto the political executive (or government) of the day. Furthermore, we argue

that if such executive loyalty is not established prior to bureaucratic auton-omy, the government faces a serious problem of political control that maynot be solved without conflict. Empirically, we illustrate these propositionsby analyzing bureaucratic developments from the Peace of Westphalia to theinterwar period in Spain, Germany, Denmark, and England. We show thatadministrative effectiveness in Denmark and England was secured by au-tonomy and executive loyalty, and because loyalty preceded autonomy. Bycontrast, implementation by the state administration of Spain was highlyimprecise and slow because the bureaucracy featured neither executive loy-alty nor autonomy. Most importantly, the German case illustrates that anautonomous but politically disloyal bureaucracy may obstruct governmentpolicies, and even demands a special place in policy making. The resulting

dissonance with political demands may, in times of severe social conflict,delegitimize and destabilize democratic regimes. Thus, our analysis sug-gests that studies of administrative effectiveness should not only considerwhether bureaucracies are autonomous in employment matters but increasetheir scope of inquiry to include how bureaucrats handle their freedom frompolitical pressure.

Early draft. Please do not quote, cite or redistribute.

∗Department of Political Science and Government, Aarhus University

1

mailto:[email protected]






Dear Colleagues,

Thank you for reading. This paper is still in the somewhat early stages of its development. As it stands, we give an introduction and a theoreticalperspective on the problem we are interested in but the case analyses mightstill be a good deal away from being finalized. They need to be sharpenedand some of them shortened. The overall lines of the argument and how thecases fit into it should be clear, however.

As the comparisons between our cases are not yet as focused as it will be-come, it is worth noting what our cases are meant to achieve. First, thecases are selected with a view to diversity without a bounded population of interest. Second, as always we use the cases to control for alternative expla-

nations. This will be done both through comparisons and thought pointingto inconsistencies in existing analyses of each case.

To guide the discussion concerning alternative explanations we should pointout what an alternative explanation would be. We do not propose an accountof democratic breakdown or survival in interwar Europe. Instead we buildon existing work arguing that administrative effectiveness is important forthese outcomes and explore the origins of administrative effectiveness. Thatsaid, alternative explanations ought to be alternative accounts of administra-tive effectiveness, not democratic stability. In particular, we are interestedin alternative accounts which open backdoor paths around our key variables,bureaucratic autonomy and executive loyalty. We are not concerned thatour variables have causes of their own. Instead, we are interested in alter-native explanations of how administrative effectiveness could be generatedaround the specific sequencing of the two that we propose, i.e. loyalty beforeautonomy.

Thanks again for reading, we look forward to your comments.

David and Kim

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Recapitulating administrative effectiveness

In studies of democratization and democratic stability, the need for a better

understanding of the effectiveness of state administrations is all-encompassing:

it applies to the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical levels alike.1 At the

most basic level, there is simply no agreement on what the core features

of an effective state administration are, and how we comprehend such ad-

ministrative effectiveness in a context of modern mass democracy. These

disagreements inhibit clear theorization of the relationship between admin-

istrative effectiveness and democracy and thus robust empirical analysis.2

Since a universal theory of administrative effectiveness in mass democra-

cies demands in-depth empirical analyses across time and space, this paper

limits its empirical scope to the perhaps most powerful setup for compara-

tive inference, namely that of the trajectory of mass democracy in Interwar

West-Central Europe. For this case sample, it has been forcefully shown that

administrative effectiveness was one among many, mostly party-political, fac-tors that explain the initiation of socioeconomic measures to combat the

extremities of the Great Depression and, consequently, the pattern of demo-

cratic breakdown and survival.3 While we acknowledge the crucial impor-

tance of states’ implementation ability, we disagree with the current tendency

to equate administrative effectiveness with bureaucracy’s autonomy in hir-

ing and firing its own personnel (henceforth, ‘bureaucratic autonomy’). In

turn, we show that a conceptual and theoretical recapitulation of the basis

of modern state administration helps explaining administrative effectiveness

in Interwar West-Central Europe.4

1Berman, 2014; Munck, 2011.2Fukuyama, 2013.3Berman, 2014; Rothstein, 2011, Ch.6.4As we prioritize the theoretical argument in this format, a congruency of facts fitting

our theory suffices but more rigorous causal process tracing will be needed to verify ourclaim.

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As pointed out by a number of analyses by Quality of Government schol-

ars in particular5, a dominance of political hiring and firing in the central

and upper ranks of the state administration politicizes the implementation as

large groups of bureaucrats are replaced by party or politically biased ones.

In such a situation, administrative effectiveness is undermined because ongo-

ing implementation projects are ceased and implementation becomes partial,

or even particularistic. This increases the stakes at play in elections, in turn

creating a centrifugal pattern of political competition in which parties and

voters are exponentially antagonized, particularly in a context of social con-

flict. Eventually, democracy risks succumbing to a coup led by established

elites who are willing to take extra-constitutional action against radical op-

positional forces. In contrast, bureaucratic autonomy makes implementation

more impartial thereby increasing incentives for competing parties to com-

promise on social or other emerging policy concerns. This puts the brakes

on radicalization.

We argue that bureaucratic autonomy is neither the sole criterion of ad-ministrative effectiveness nor a one-sided blessing for democratic stability.

We base this on the paradigmatic case of Interwar Germany6 about which we

emphasize two points: First, the administrative effectiveness of the Weimar

Republic was undermined , rather than strengthened, by bureaucratic au-

tonomy because autonomy enabled a continuance of poor relationships be-

tween government and administration. Unsuccessful administrative reform

attempts antagonized key ministries that already longed for their pre-WWI

hegemonic status. Ultimately, this led to the support for NSDAP in the

transition to dictatorship in 1933.

Second, by undermining the social and economic policies of various, mostly

social democratic but also bourgeois-republic, governments during the 1920s,

5Cornell, 2014; Cornell and Lapuente, 2012, 2014; Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell, 2011;Lapuente and Rothstein, 2014.

6cf. Weber, 1978, 956-958.

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the autonomous bureaucracy was partly responsible for the gradual disillu-

sionment of the electorate and the decisive electoral victories of the Nazis

from 1928-1932.7

The German case thus questions what the different features of and roads

to administrative ineffectiveness in Interwar West-Central Europe were. As

comparative lessons are vital in answering such a question, we have chosen

four cases in which we will analyze how administrative effectiveness came

about: The democratic breakdown cases of Spain and Germany and the

survival cases of Denmark and England. These cases are fruitful as they rep-

resent both cases of democratic breakdown and survival and, as we will argue,

the extremities in the variation of administrative effectiveness in the interwar

period. Why did Denmark and UK enjoy administrative effectiveness while

Spain and Germany did not when the social crises hit in the 1930s?

In studying these cases, we make systematic historical comparisons.8 To

account for the different historical paths, such an analysis must begin at

a point in time when the cases were fairly similar on the variable of inter-est, that is, the state’s administrative effectiveness9. This takes us back to

the mid-17th century when the Peace of Westphalia marked what has been

termed the “crucial phase 2of modern state-building” in which centraliza-

tion of government and administration, that is, absolutist bureaucratization,

was introduced.10 The state administrations that gradually emerged in West-

Central Europe during the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries were qualita-

tively different – much bigger, more powerful, and functionally differentiated

– from the pre-Westphalian ones. But, as we show, these administrations

ended up being highly different from each other when they each introduced

democracy.11

7Caplan, 1988, 30-31; Mommsen, 1991, Ch.5; McElligott, 2014.8cf. Slater and Ziblatt, 2013.9cf. Slater and Simmons, 2010.10Braun, 1975, 268.11We define and base our measurement of democracy on the data set of Boix, Miller,

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We proceed in four steps: First, we present our basic distinctions per-

taining to the dimensions of administrative effectiveness. Second, we present

three propositions. The argument is that while administrative ineffectiveness

rises from a tradition of political hiring and firing, it also results from a bu-

reaucratically dominated system in the absence of what we term ’executive

loyalty’. Only when executive loyalty is present was bureaucratic autonomy

beneficial for administrative effectiveness. Additionally, we theorize that se-

quencing matters in the establishment of administrative effectiveness in the

sense that executive loyalty must be established before bureaucratic auton-

omy. If the political executive attempts to install executive loyalty when

they are already protected by the laws and procedures of an autonomous

bureaucracy, conflicts between political and administrative levels thrive and,

consequently, administrative ineffectiveness is likely to continue or escalate.

In the third and fourth steps, we present empirical analyses of, first, the

breakdown precursors of Spain and Germany and then the survival precursors

of Denmark and England. Next, we discuss to what extent our propositionscan be generalized to current problems of building effective state administra-

tions in new democracies. Finally, we conclude.

Distinctions

In this section, we present our key conceptual distinctions. This involves dis-

entangling what is typically meant by bureaucratic autonomy. We analyze

some critical assumptions underlying the concept of bureaucratic autonomy

as the recipe for administrative effectiveness and democratic stability. Ac-

cordingly, we argue for a more encompassing, two-dimensional understanding

and Rosato, 2012 stressing that the government is chosen in a free and fair electionwith multiple parties/candidates and, at the minimum, universal male suffrage. Bythat measurement, the first instances of democracy were: Spain 1931, Germany 1919,Denmark 1901, and England 1885.

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of administrative effectiveness.

The idea of bureaucratic autonomy as paramount for effective public pol-

icy delivery and thus democratic stability originates in theories of good gover-

nance and public administration as well as some concrete empirical analyses.

Bureaucratic autonomy here entails that civil servants (not ministers) are

recruited via systematic civil service procedures.12

Among other contributions, the bureaucratic-autonomy view is based on

Rauch and Evans’13 analysis, showing the superiority of autonomous, merit-

based bureaucracies in lowering corruption and minimizing delays in imple-

mentation, as well as analyses of the positive effect of administrative capacity

and impartiality on the survival of democratic governments.14 Brought to a

head, administrative effectiveness is understood as the ability of the state

bureaucracy to implement decisions throughout the state territory without

political interference .15 We believe this understanding overlooks central el-

ements of effectiveness. Specifically, we challenge four core assumptions in

the theory of bureaucratic autonomy.First, if bureaucratic autonomy leads to impartial administration, civil

servants must be assumed politically neutral. However, as is evident from

both the American and North-European debate, civil servants can never

clearly separate administration and politics since they inevitably engage in

politics every day when applying policy principles to individual cases. Im-

plementing policies means acting politically. In modern bureaucracies, which

12In this way, it is usually equated with meritocracy. Yet, we hold that bureaucratic

autonomy does not necessarily imply meritocracy as bureaucracies can be autonomousof political pressure yet recruit on the basis of non-merit based criteria. However, forthe purpose of this analysis we equate bureaucratic autonomy and meritocracy becausethey have tended to cluster together in the time period at hand, see Raadschelders andRutgers, 1996a, 71-89.

13Rauch and Evans, 2000.14Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rothstein, 2011.15Despite a general lack of clarity, similar definitions dominate debates on measurement,

see ’Bureaucracy Quality’ in the International Country Risk Guide PRS, 2014, Septem-ber 22, 7 and ’Government Effectiveness’ in the World Bank’s Governance Mattersproject Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2009, 6.

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exhibit strong career incentives, civil servants are typically highly attentive

to political intentions (this attention likely increases with the servant’s close-

ness to the political level) because they need these intentions for applying

legislation in the manner intended.16 In this sense, there is no such thing as

an ’neutral standard’ applied ’neutrally’.17

Moreover, as the demand for states’ infrastructural capacity has increased

through time and exploded with globalization, civil servants have increas-

ingly engaged as experts and political advisors in policy-making inhibiting

neutrality in the first place.18 Despite the apparent trade-off between respon-

siveness and competence, civil servants need to, and in reality often manage

to, balance attention to the wishes of their political executive and their own

professional expertise.19

Second, as bureaucratic autonomy is a theory of effective policy imple-

mentation, it must assume that employees in the bureaucracy are responsive

to the political executive of the day. Otherwise, they are more than sheer ad-

ministrators. However, bureaucrats are rational, strategic, and self-interestedagents. Despite being hired as neutral servants in an ultimately political hier-

archy, they may engage in slack generation, shirking or sabotage to obstruct

government policies that conflict with their interests, or they deliberately

try to influence the content of policies to favor their own position by, for

instance, maximizing budgets.20 Narrow self-interest is not the only possible

reason for unresponsiveness. Bureaucrats can be motivated by a range of

goals, including pursuance of large societally beneficial ones.21

Ultimately, bureaucrats can harbor convictions that they know better

than the government what is good for policy, state, nation, or society. Such

16e.g. Christensen, 1991, 307.17Aberbach and Rockman, 1994, 462.18Soifer and Hau, 2008.19Dogan, 1975, 4; Christensen, 1991, 315.20Brehm and Gates, 1997; Niskanen, 1971.21Downs, 1967.

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convictions do not have to constitute a large problem. But they generate un-

responsiveness and unstable situations when bureaucrats disagree with the

government and cannot be brought into line. Bureaucrats able and willing to

circumvent the wishes of their political executives are perhaps mostly asso-

ciated with corrupt, neo-patrimonial administrations in developing countries

but may in fact be more significant in developed countries where bureau-

cracies are older and more institutionalized.22 These inspections reveal that

in assessing administrative effectiveness one cannot rely solely on knowledge

of employment procedures but must include day-to-day interactions between

civil servants and politicians.

Below the two assumptions we have discussed lie two more general as-

sumptions, namely that political control is necessarily negative and that bu-

reaucratic autonomy is necessarily positive for administrative effectiveness

and democratic stability. In the next section, we engage with these assump-

tions more formally but at this point, some distinctions should prepare the

reader.Apart from running the risk of ineffectiveness, a bureaucracy that is com-

pletely autonomous of political (that is, government) control is fundamentally

undemocratic because it then implements policies that do not originate in

parliament.23 Concretely, political control, or more precisely bureaucratic re-

sponsiveness, is necessary for cooptation in a democratic system that allows

and breeds political opposition and competition.24 This does not mean that

parties or governments should have direct control over hirings and firings in

their bureaucracies. But they should have control of and hold civil servants

accountable to their daily implementation decisions. However, excessive po-

litical control limits the display of professional expertise and may thus lead

to immediate, unintended or unproductive results in implementation. The

22Nordlinger, 1981.23Held, 2006, 87.24Finer, 1941; Fukuyama, 2013, 11.

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future relationship between professional civil servants and their political ex-

ecutives may also be severely harmed if professional norms are repeatedly

undermined.25

Thus, bureaucratic autonomy is not necessarily positive for administra-

tive effectiveness, though politicization is not either. And democracy and

political control is not necessarily negative, though it can be if it is too wide-

ranging. This poses the dilemma of how to balance the need for bureaucratic

autonomy which conditions expertise, consistency, and the rule of law in

the policy implementation process with political control which conditions

accountability and a focus on public goods delivery.

What is the solution to this dilemma? The above discussion has high-

lighted the need for a definition of administrative effectiveness that more

explicitly relates the administration to the political level. Fundamentally, in

the nomenclature of agency theory, attention must be directed towards iden-

tifying civil servants as agents and the government as political principal. We

thus define administrative effectiveness as the capacity of the bureaucracy toconstruct and implement government policies regarding public services and

regulations accurately and swiftly throughout the territory. This ensures that

bureaucratic skills only make sense if they are directed at implementing the

policies of incumbent governments . But it also makes clear that the capacity

to construct and implement is a bureaucratic prerogative that, along with

attention to political intentions, involves the autonomy of the professional

expertise of civil servants. Furthermore, it is sufficiently broad to capture

variations of modern bureaucracies across time and space.26

Hereby, we argue that the current literature on administrative effective-

ness in comparative politics conflates what we believe are two conceptually

separate yet empirically interacting dimensions of state administrative effec-

25Gruber, 2007, Ch. 3.26see, e.g., Fukuyama, 2013; Greif, 2007, 4-5.

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tiveness: Bureaucratic autonomy (in hiring and firing) and executive loyalty

of agents (to political principals across shifting governments).

The first dimension deals exclusively with the staffing of the state ad-

ministration as indicated. The contradistinctions are bureaucratic vis-a-vis

political hirings and firings. From medieval times, state bureaucracies have

gradually gained more discretion in hirings and firings but still today, many

bureaucracies are dominated by political appointments and even where bu-

reaucracies are basically autonomous do we find some degree of political

interference at the top levels.27

The contradistinctions of the second dimension are executive vis-a-vis

broken agent loyalty. They stem directly from the insights of principal-agent

models and, as opposed to the first dimension, deals exclusively with day-

to-day interactions. By executive loyalty, we mean the willingness of civil

servants to implement the proposed policies of shifting governments no mat-

ter the content. Note that this safeguards against tautological reasoning as

executive loyalty could involve obedience of policies that would, by inten-sion or not, lead to democratic breakdown, which has been the case in, for

instance, contemporary Venezuela and Russia where democratically elected

governments have deliberately and gradually brought democracy to an end.

Executive loyalty is thus not loyalty to a specific political order but loyalty

to any government at any time.

Broken loyalty, by contrast, is the willingness of civil servants to serve

their own private or third-party interests when they conflict with serving

those of the government. Bureaucracies with no executive loyalty at all are

rare but broken loyalty thrives in regimes with weak government institu-

tions. Broken loyalty may also dominate in patrimonial and neo-patrimonial

bureaucracies if patronage is scarce (complicating the maintenance of loy-

27Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell, 2011.

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alty)28, and in charismatic regimes because loyalty through affection must be

reestablished with every new political leader.29 However, as we show in the

next section, the lack of executive loyalty need not reach extremes like these

to create problems for administrative effectiveness.

Summing up, administrative effectiveness in mass democracies may be

fruitfully conceived as the intersection of bureaucratic autonomy and exec-

utive loyalty, each necessary and jointly sufficient for administrative effec-

tiveness. The next section proposes how the establishment of administrative

effectiveness unfolds.

Propositions

Next we put our distinctions to work. Given the importance of administra-

tive effectiveness in the determination of interwar outcomes, what would we

expect of the precursors of breakdown and survival in terms of their state

administrations? As we show in this subsection, the precursors to break-down are equifinal. While the survival cases we examine fundamentally look

alike, we argue that breakdowns occur through two qualitatively distinct

paths. Briefly, survival cases developed administrations that featured both

executive loyalty and bureaucratic autonomy prior to the interwar period

whereas breakdown occurred in different ways and for different reasons when

either executive loyalty or bureaucratic autonomy was lacking. Moreover,

we stress that, to achieve both executive loyalty and bureaucratic autonomy,

politicians had to ensure the former before the latter. Sequencing mattered.

We begin with the question of autonomy. Lapuente and Rothstein30 ar-

gue that bureaucratic autonomy is important because absent the possibility

to politicize public administration incumbents can credibly commit to not

28Silberman, 1993, 34.29Rudolph and Rudolph, 1979, 224.30Lapuente and Rothstein, 2014.

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ΨPL ΨBU

Α

Figure 1: The basic problem

use the state against their political opponents or to politicize implementa-

tion. By contrast, when extensive politicization is possible, the state is used

for political gain at the expense of the opposition. The following partial

implementation radicalizes existing political conflicts and paves the way to

democratic breakdown.

We see no need to disagree on these points. However, this focus diverts

attention from an important motivation for politicization: Political control.31

Beyond blunt clientelism, politicization serves the purpose of ensuring that

bureaucracies implement the policies they are meant to implement in the way

they are meant to implement them. Correct, this may lead to commitment

problems vis-a-vis the political opposition. But politicization is directed at

solving a different problem.

To see this, let us consider an abstract case where two actors interact in a

hierarchical relationship. One actor, the political leadership or government,

wants to direct the other actor, the bureaucracy, to faithfully implement its

policy. To keep matters simple, we consider only an instance where policies

are located on one dimension A as shown in Figure 1.32 On our policy dimen-

sion, both the government and the bureaucrats have ‘zones of acceptance’,illustrated in Figure 1 as boxes covering subsets of A and denoted ΨPL and

ΨBU , respectively.

Herbert Simon33 introduces zones of acceptance in his discussion of au-

31Kopecky, Mair, and Spirova, 2012; Peters and Pierre, 2004, e.g.32For a multi-dimensional analysis of similar ideas, see e.g.Hammond and Knott, 1999.33Simon, 1976, 11-12.

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thority. In authority relations, administrators let their behavior be guided

by superiors’ decisions without examining the quality of that decision inde-

pendently. Obedience thus occurs where there is an intersection between the

government’s zone of acceptance (ΨPL) and the bureaucracy’s ditto (ΨBU ).34

But if a policy is too far removed from an administrator’s preferences, if it

is outside her zone of acceptance as it is depicted in Figure 1, disobedience

results. That is, the government policy will not be effectively implemented

as bureaucrats shirk or sabotage it. Figure 1, then, presents a problem for

the political leadership.

Politicization is one possible remedy to this problem: If an agent is not

working to produce the outcome the government wants her to, she can be

replaced with a more co-operative agent. We show this in the upper panel of

Figure 2 where the bureaucratic agent has been replaced by a different bu-

reaucratic agent whose zone of acceptance (ΨBU ∗) does include policies that

the government will accept. In a less stylized line of thinking, of course, the

government does not replace the whole bureaucracy but replaces managers,department or agency heads, or other key employees.

But for achieving administrative effectiveness, politicization is not an

optimal strategy for several reasons (beyond those mentioned by Lapuente

and Rothstein). First, politicization tends to lead to politicization. We show

why in the lower panel of Figure 2. This panel illustrates what can happen

when the government is replaced (e.g. through elections). Given that the

new government’s policies are different from the former government, there

will be no intersection of the new government’s zone of acceptance (ΨPL∗)

and the old bureaucracy’s (ΨBU ∗). Thus, the new government faces the

same problem as its predecessor for which politicization is a solution. If

Lapuente and Rothstein are correct that particularistic uses of the state

34As we assume agents to be bounded rational and thus satisfize rather than optimizewhen making their decisions, any intersection results in obedience. Both actors will seeoutcomes within the overlapping region as ’good enough’.

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service37; and it permits the government or related interest groups to pursue

rents through the administration at the cost of the pursuit of its more general

duties.38 Additionally, because bureaucrats’ job situation is particularly inse-

cure in a condition of politicization, incoming bureaucrats have less incentive

to commit to the implementation of ongoing policies.39

In sum, politicization is a solution to a problem of loyalty but politiciza-

tion creates its own set of problems related to competence and performance

which go beyond the chiefly political consequences Lapuente and Rothstein

correctly point to. We expect politicization to be one path to ineffective

state administration. Specifically we expect the following to hold in politi-

cized cases:

1. The government staffs the administration with political/party loyalists.

2. The administration is loyal to their appointing government.

3. Implementation is poor, and the administration is used for political or

personal purposes.

The numerous negative consequences of politicization taken aside, we now

show that bureaucratic autonomy may harm administrative effectiveness as

well. If politicization is the problem, insulation of the bureaucracy from

politics is the solution. The government can use the improved performance

of a de-politicized bureaucracy to bolster its position, when its existence is

threatened by external war, popular resentment, or coup plotters.40

However, granting autonomy in itself does not solve the problem of achiev-

ing political control: As indicated, faced with having to implement unaccept-

able policies an autonomous bureaucracy might become unresponsive, shirk

37Gailmard and Patty, 2007.38Miller, 2000.39Cornell, 2014.40Ertman, 1997.

16



and sabotage these policies because it then has the motivation and opportu-

nity to do so. Thus, autonomy only makes the problem of political control

worse as the government is cut off from the politicization solution. As Weber

famously saw, the expertise of professional bureaucrats may divert policy

further away from politicians: ’The power position of a fully developed bu-

reaucracy is always great, under normal conditions overtowering’.41 Even if

disciplinary tools are in the hands of politicians, bureaucratic expertise makes

control through disciplinary measures less preferable. Thus, expertise only

adds to the problem of bureaucratic autonomy.

In bureaucracies, there will likely always be some shirking, some budget

maximization, and some policy zealotry not intended by the government.

Much of this will not be relevant for our purposes. But unresponsiveness

can become a threat to political stability in the extreme where bureaucra-

cies shirk, sabotage, and ignore political direction on a very large scale,

and cannot be controlled. In the politically polarized environment of in-

terwar Europe, bureaucratic autonomy would likely be a significant problemas politicians’ and bureaucrats’ zones of acceptance would likely be diver-

gent. Consequently, political leaders facing an autonomous bureaucracy can

become stuck in a situation like that depicted in Figure 1. If this happens

on a large enough scale, popular dissatisfaction can become acute as govern-

ment promises of social, educational, labor market and other reforms never

’hit the ground’ as they are supposed to. Ultimately, voters may become

attracted to extreme political groupings promising better performance and

remove the overly bureaucratic order. In sum, we see autonomous, unre-

sponsive bureaucracies as a second route to ineffective administration and

democratic breakdown. Specifically, we expect the following:

1. The administration staffs itself.

41Weber, 1978, 991.

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2. The interest of the administration diverts from that of at least some

governments.

3. The administration resists implementing government policies.

If there is no intersection between the bureaucratic and political zones

of acceptance and the bureaucratic agents cannot be removed, how can the

government get its policies implemented without resistance? Our answer,

and Herbert Simon’s, is that the width of the zone of acceptance is not fixed

but can be enlarged by enticements broadly understood.42 Enticements may

serve to induce executive loyalty. As conceptualized earlier, executive loyalty

widens the bureaucratic zone of acceptance in the sense that it accepts a wider

range of policies simply because their source is the government of the day.

We argue that, in the interwar context, what distinguished administrations

in being executively (dis)loyal was an ethos of government service based on

the notion that service to the government was service to the wider community

of the national state.We show how executive loyalty works in Figure 3. In the upper panel,

the situation we depicted in Figure 1 has been adjusted to capture the idea

that bureaucrats are executive loyalists. In contrast to Figure 2 bureaucrats

are not replaced. Instead, their executive loyalty permits them to accept a

wider range of policies. Consequently, ΨBU now covers a much wider span

of policies on A including policies that are acceptable to the government.

Notice also that the height of ΨBU remains the same as in Figure 1 to signify

that the performance-damaging effects of politicization are avoided. The

upper panel in Figure 3 illustrates a bureaucracy that is both willing to and

capable of implementing government policies effectively. Moreover, because

the bureaucratic zone of acceptance is widened, it rarely creates problems

when governments are replaced as we show in the lower panel of Figure

42cf. Simon, 1976, 115-117, 130-134.

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ΨPL ΨBU

Α

ΨPL* ΨBU

Α

Figure 3: Executive loyalty

3. The left-over bureaucrats will be as willing to implement the policies of

(most) incoming governments as those of its predecessors. This is the key of

executive loyalty.

It is worth cautioning against misunderstanding at this point. Executive

loyalty is not a characteristic of bureaucracies as wholes; it is a characteristic

of individuals. But this neither entails that each individual administrator

engages in interactions with the government; nor that all administrators or

supervisors agree on what policies are acceptable; nor does each administra-

tor determine her loyalty in isolation. Most interactions do not involve the

government but the heads of agencies, departments, and other organizations

on the one hand and their subordinates on the other, and administrative

behavior is determined not only by the interplay between subordinate and

superior but equally in interactions between subordinates.43 In the aggregate,

executive loyalty is emergent from these interactions when they produce su-

periors who accept the directions of the government and subordinates who

accept the directives of their superiors. Executive loyalty’s opposite is emer-

43Brehm and Gates, 1997; Simon, 1976.

19



gent from the dysfunction of either of these hierarchical relationships. Mod-

elling this emergence would be interesting but would take us too far afield

from the purpose of this paper.

The question of how bureaucrats become executive loyalists is interesting

but not a prime concern here since our paper focuses on loyalty’s relation

to administrative effectiveness. Stated bluntly, bureaucrats must have some-

thing to gain from becoming executive loyalists. Therefore, the government

may fruitfully use disciplinary tools, financial controls, and financial depen-

dence on being publically employed to work bureaucrats’ incentives in the

direction of executive loyalty. It is more relevant to ask how the two compo-

nents of administrative effectiveness, bureaucratic autonomy and executive

loyalty, condition each other. We propose that administrative effectiveness

only emerged in administrations which became executively loyal prior to the

granting of its autonomy from political hiring and firing.

To see this, note that if the bureaucracy is made autonomous when ex-

ecutive loyalty is not present, politically discretionary hiring and firing islimited to an extent that makes forcing loyalty on the bureaucracy harder.

Protection and permanent tenure protects bureaucrats from the possibility

of quick mass layoffs. Competent bureaucracies often unite in its insulation

to defend their established privileges.44

However, even if executive loyalty is in place when bureaucracy becomes

autonomous in employment matters, the question rises how the executive

loyalty can at all preserve its credibility. How can autonomy be granted

when the government must realize that bureaucrats have all the reason in

the world to defect on their loyalty once autonomy is granted? The answer

lies in professional interactions. One might argue that professionalism is the

stuff of executive loyalty in public organizations via professionals’ influence

44Shefter, 1994.

20



Rothstein’s analysis of Spain but go deeper to assess executive loyalty and

its effects on administrative effectiveness. Finally, we assess executive loyalty

and autonomy developments in first Denmark and then England.

Germany

The origins of the Weimar administration lie in late 17th century Prussia.

Known as the ’Great Elector’, Frederick William was the first in the series of

Hohenzollern kings who centralized, refined, and empowered an administra-

tion combining revenue collection with militay functional-hierarchical prac-

tice. Prussia’s central government branches became very effective in terms

of public goods provision and tax collection.47 Neither bureaucratic auton-

omy nor executive loyalty as conceptualized here but some premature forms

of them formed this administrative effectiveness compared with the rest of

contemporary Europe: Bureaucracy was far from autonomous since hirings

and firings were managed politically, by Frederick William personally andunder the next three Hohenzollern kings increasingly by commissions under

royal supervision. Frederick William, and his successors including Freder-

ick II the Great, effectively rooted out patrimonial tendencies at the central

levels of administration by recruiting middle-class people on the basis of mer-

its and in-job performance. It was no genuine meritocracy, however, since

higher-level civil servants were restricted to noble families and non-noble but

wealthy men.48

It is fruitful to distinguish between the central and local levels when as-

sessing autonomy and loyalty. Civil servant loyalty at central level was more

directed to the nearest superior officer than to the royal, political level. The

bureaucracy was unified and obedient of royal policies because of its militarily

47Fischer and Lundgreen, 1975, 510-517.48Fischer and Lundgreen, 1975, 521-522; Ertman, 1997, 248, 253-254.

22



organized hierarchy, transparent and stable career paths.49 As many servants

were educated in the military and shared the royal ambition of national de-

fense and military conquest, one might say there was a certain overlap in the

kings’ and servants’ zones of acceptance at the time. Yet, as this militarist

bureaucracy excelled in revenue collection and were moneyed and equipped,

it developed a self-sufficient attitude very well aware that any Prussian king

was completely dependent upon its effort and expertise in tax collection.50

One litmus test of executive loyalty is how well policies are implemented

before and after the reign of a certain political principal if the bureaucrats

and the contents of the policies stay the same. Such a test is provided

by Kiser and Schneider51 in their analysis of tax collection in 18th century

Prussia. Interestingly, they find that taxation efficiency worsened dramati-

cally when the energetic Frederick the Great was succeeded by the indolent

and pleasure-loving Frederick William II. Demands for raising taxes were

the same but the degree of control of tax officials conducted by the king

and his commissars decreased sharply.

52

This example confirms the generalimpression among scholars that the admiration of each king in person and

disciplinary measures of royal oversight and the threat of arbitrary firings

were the keys to administrative effectiveness in the 18th century.53 These

measures and union in military ambition constituted only a temporary and

fragile alignment of bureaucrats’ and politician’s zone of acceptance – not

genuine executive loyalty.

The greatest correction to the Weberian description of Prussian bureau-

cracy stems from the decentralized levels of administration and an under-

standing of the role of the Junkers. Although the Hohenzollern kings man-

aged to decrease the fused economic and administrative powers of the Junker

49Braun, 1975, 276-277.50Fischer and Lundgreen, 1975, 510-517.51Kiser and Schneider, 1994.52Kiser and Schneider, 1994, 194, 196.53Rudolph and Rudolph, 1979, 207.

23



estates in East Elbia during the 17th and 18th centuries, the Junkers pre-

served their local-administrative authority and right to nominate candidates

for the main office of local administration, that is, county commissioner in

the Landrats .54 In matters of land, agriculture, and taxation, the Junkers’

zone of acceptance differed substantially from that of the king and, given

the Junkers’ economic power and position as controller of peasants, firing

of Junkers was not an option and no sensible Prussian king would intervene

in the daily decisions of Junkers without compromise. Consequently, the

Junkers and the king negotiated a separate tax system for land and towns.

Being autonomous and questionably loyal, the Junkers had to be heavily

monitored in taxation55, which, as indicated, was a flawed system. However,

they never got a stake in the executive power by becoming co-legislators dur-

ing the 18th century as landed elites had become in Sweden and England.56

In effect, even though the Junkers were gradually brought in line with the

basic monarchic interests of military conquest as their sons were enrolled into

the Prussian army, Junker loyalty to the king was fragile and more personalthan executive.57

As the above trajectory makes clear, the Prussian administration was fit

for autonomy but not for executive loyalty when entering the 19th century.

In 1794, a code established the class of professional civil servants, Beamten-

stand , which formalized the centralized meritocratic bureaucracy with the

purpose of replacing hereditary servants when they did not fulfill their duties

to the state. Only a decade later, in 1807, and thus coinciding with similar

reforms in other Western European countries aimed at dealing more effec-

tively with increasing socioeconomic complexity, all state offices were opened

to competition on the basis of merits. Even though this system, along with

54Braun, 1975, 273.55Braun, 1975, 270, 300-301.56Ertman, 1997, 241.57Muncy, 1944, 13-15.

24



increased social mobility in education and income, put pressure on the bu-

reaucratic unilateralism of the wealthiest and the aristocracy, recruitment

still favored these groups because of general inequalities.58

This marked the codification of genuine bureaucratic autonomy but also

that loyalty was given to the nation state rather than the government of

the day. The weakness of Frederick William III (1797-1840) gave increased

influence in government activities, including legislation, for the Beamten .

Symptomatically, Gillis59 refers to them as ’Plato’s Guardian Class’, deeply

engaged and sure of their prerogative in policy-making by virtue of their

power of knowledge and organization despite adhering strictly to a principle

of neutrality beyond politics. This exact feature was the main point of criti-

cism by the liberals during the 1840s but when revolution finally approached

in 1848, the bureaucratic class managed to preserve its power at the center

of political decision-making by gradually reforming itself without altering

its basic identity. Despite notable reforms aimed at politicizing bureaucracy

during the 1840s and 1850s (for instance, political access to firing if continuedviolation of public duty, tightened disciplinary measures, and reduced access

to political participation60), the bureaucratic class managed to preserve its

powers as an autonomous and politically important group – finally, it was

consolidated by Bismarck when he assumed the chancellorship in 1871.61

Important for our purpose is the way Beamten used their political power

and what that shows about their loyalty to the political leadership. With the

establishment of a ministerial system in 1848, bureaucrats only strengthened

their power vis-a-vis politicians and preserved the St¨ andestaat . Ministers

were to countersign all decrees by the king62. Did this phenomenon extend

beyond the Prussian context to the whole of Germany after the unification

58Gillis, 1971, 6-7, 11.59Gillis, 1971, 16.60Gillis, 1971, 45-46, 125-126, 140, 151.61Gillis, 1971, 172; Mommsen, 1991, 79.62Friedrich, 1933, 188-189.

25



of 1871? Yes. In his extensive study of the 19th century federalization of

Germany, Daniel Ziblatt63 finds that the federalization process was relatively

easy because Prussia’s and the other Germanic states had relatively similar

state capacity and types of bureaucratic organization based on concentration,

specialization, and professionalism. The now German Beamten continued its

political influence as issue experts in the National Council, (Reichsrat ), an

executive body that was unaccountable to the parliament, Reichstag .64

As several accounts confirm65, the bureaucracy was extremely influential

in German politics but its zone of acceptance never equaled that of the polit-

ical leadership for long periods of time. Under Bismarck, a common concern

for the welfare of the nation state and the means to this end between the bu-

reaucracy, Bismarck, and the emperor secured administrative effectiveness.

However, after Bismarck’s withdrawal from power various different German

governments experienced problems with governing through bureaucracy be-

cause bureaucracy ran its own course.66 Bureaucracy was loyal to the nation

state and the king above all and saw circumvention of parliamentary and gov-ernment policies to the protection of the nation state and king as its primary

entitlement.67 From early 19th century when SPD entered parliamentary

politics and later in 1912 became Germany’s most popular party, bureau-

cracy was increasingly conflicting with governments, and the public esteem

of civil servants, which was traditionally unusually high, deteriorated with

the rise of socialism.68 As this reveals, competence rather than autonomy

gave bureaucrats access to political decision-making but autonomy blocked

the government and parliament from chucking out disloyal bureaucrats.

At the brink of revolution in 1918-1919, what were the prospects of bu-

63Ziblatt, 2006, 113-115.64Friedrich, 1933, 195.65e.g. Friedrich, 1933, 201; Mann, 1985, 85-86; Mommsen, 1991, 79.66Mann, 1985, 85.67Mann, 1985, 85-86; Gillis, 1971, 33.68Mommsen, 1991, 79.

26



reaucratic loyalty to the coming democratic-republican system? And were

these prospects not just a function of the infiltration of bureaucracy by con-

servative classes? Remember here that executive loyalty means that the

bureaucracy ultimately acts in accordance with the wishes of the govern-

ment in place. By implication, any fundamental political reservations on the

part of the bureaucracy can hinder executive loyalty. Whether such reserva-

tions occur because bureaucracy is infiltrated by outside interests does not

undermine the independent, negative effect of administrative ineffectiveness

and bureaucratic autonomy. In fact, the German case shows that bureau-

cratic autonomy may underlie the fusion, preservation, and strengthening of

bureaucratic-conservatives elites who greatly oppose a democratic regime.

From 1815, a split in bureaucracy widened between moderates (typi-

cally Beamten ) agitating industrialization and, mostly, Junkers opposing it.69

Gradually, the Beamten got the upper hand as the number and influence of

Junkers in the administration decreased in the second half of the 19th cen-

tury. The Junkers’ loyalty turned decisively to the king (and Bismarck) from1871 but they kept challenging administrative oversight and regulations from

the central levels. As their influence on political direction was challenged,

they grew more materialistic, self-centered, and hostile to parliament (whom

they saw as responsible for the development).70 Despite decreasing influence

at ministerial levels, the courts and local level were still the locus of adminis-

trative power and here, Junkers retained their vital influence after 1914 as de

facto leaders in Landratsamt , Regierungs-Praesident , and Ober-Praesident .71

Conversely, the political and bureaucratic Beamten increasingly engaged

with SPD, but on a mutually beneficial interest in furthering social stability

and industrialization.72 and the interaction was still weak.73 Gary Bonham

69Ziblatt, 2006, 38.70Muncy, 1944, 31-32.71Muncy, 1944, 191, 209.72Mommsen, 1991, 80.73Caplan, 1988, 8-9.

27



has reviewed the many competing interpretations of these inter-bureaucratic

conflict lines and the German bureaucracy’s general autonomy of society.

Along the lines of the above sketch, he finds that while Junkers (and conser-

vatives more generally) opposed democracy and socialism, even the Beamten

who opposed Junker conservatism opposed democracy because of a distaste

of parliamentary politics.74 That is, however heterogeneous, there was a gen-

uine, coherent bureaucratic zone of acceptance that did not include truly

democratic regime types.

For our purposes of assessing administrative effectiveness in the interwar

period, it seems fit to focus on how bureaucrats interacted with politicians

and reacted to reform proposals.75 We here zoom in on the constitutional

negotiations around 1918-1919, the cut-backs and reforms of administration

in the 1920s, and the presidential cabinets from 1930 to Hitler’s takeover in

1933.

Constitutional negotiation of 1918-1919 in many ways was a replay of

former political-bureaucratic interaction despite the unusual circumstancesof democratization and war defeat. SPD was moderate in contrast to the

communists but still opted for a radical break with the past by installing

genuine, social democracy. However, SPD was considerably constrained by

the Beamten bureaucrats because of their expertise, popularity in the pop-

ulation, and sheer size that necessitated their support – an additional yet

important reason was that their protected status made firings impossible.76

Thus, the constitution recognized civil servants’ protected status, privileges,

and the power of ministries in policy-making. Also, the peculiar eligibility

for parliament amidst a strong assertion of neutrality beyond party politics

was explicitly codified and maintained in practice as Beamten quickly be-

came active members of parties in parliament and formed strong civil service

74Bonham, 1983, 650.75cf. Caplan, 1988, 13.76Bockenforde, 1985, 15-16.

28



trade unions.77 From the start of the Weimar republic, bureaucracy was thus

not changed in its personnel composition. Instead, the legacies of a strong

professional organization whose internal disciplinary measures were aimed at

forging care for bureaucratic management of the nation state rather than

implementation of government programs remained dominant.78 In turn, the

most radical socialist reforms were either redirected in the ministries or sim-

ply never put to a vote because of the bargaining power of high-level civil

servants.79 Even the labor ministry, which was highly influenced by social

democratic ideas in the first years, eventually was taken over by conserva-

tive civil servants from 1924 sidelining trade unions.80 Bureaucracy generally

guided social change towards pre-WWI economic policies benefitting heavy

industry as opposed to workers and farmers which continued across economic

cycles.81 Again, this shows the pointlessness in speaking of administrative ef-

fectiveness in an otherwise competent, law-abiding, and efficient bureaucracy

when the zones of acceptance of the bureaucrats and political executives do

not overlap.Some reforms in the start of the 1920s cut back on salary and strengthened

meritocracy by rooting out remaining social privileges within medium- and

low-level bureaucratic ranks but as these groups fiercely protested no larger

reform was initiated. From late 1920s and under Bruning from 1930, cut-

backs and rationalization grew more substantial.82 This served to break down

the confidence between these lower-level (especially street-level) bureaucrats

and the government institution but the more and more open outcries and

political attitudes of the civil servants only led to a dramatic decrease in the

public esteem of bureaucracy.83 Bureaucracy’s traditional legitimacy van-

77Frank, 1966, 736; Mommsen, 1991, 80.78Frank, 1966, 730-734.79Mading, 1985, 96.80Liu, 1997, 363.81Petzina, 1985, 46, 55-56.82Caplan, 1988, 76-77.83Caplan, 1988, 94-95.

29



ished.

From 1930, German democracy entered the face of rule by presidential

emergency decree. This phase, which eventually led to Hitler’s takeover in

1933, was a tumultuous time where forces in the world economy, parliament,

and among voters changed dramatically. Historical accounts have clearly

established that the Reichstag functioned poorly in terms of forming last-

ing governments throughout the Weimar period but, as recent statistical

analyses shows84, this was less an internal party systemic problem as it was

determined by outside factors such as unemployment. As NSDAP attracted

voters who were angry with the management of unemployment, the elections

from 1930-1932 produced no possibility of a viable coalition excluding the

anti-democrats of NSDAP, KPD, and DNVP. But what role did the state

administration play in paving the way for extremist voting?

Even though constant in its character and membership, the state admin-

istration was far from any stabilizing force. In fact, severe administrative

problems enfeebled functioning parliamentary politics and government for-mation and radicalized a broad spectrum of people to join NSDAP or the

Communist Party (KPD). Through the 1920s and early 1930s, high-level bu-

reaucrats in the ministries persuaded governments to withdraw certain rights

from the Reichstag by giving the President the right to nominate his own

personal candidates and increasing the use of civil servants as ministers. In

this sense, emergency rule was a gradual result of developments from within

the parliament-bureaucracy relationship starting before NSDAP’s first elec-

toral triumph in 1928.85 In effect, bureaucracy became the most important

governmental force to the disposal of Bruning, and, by giving high-level bu-

reaucrats discretion in financial matters, Bruning unleashed the deflation-

ary politics and cut-backs on social services and unemployment insurances

84Lehmann, 2010; Stogbauer, 2001.85Mommsen, 1991, 82.

30



that radicalized the unemployed and public sector middle classes into voting

Nazi86 That is, the professional bureaucrats of Germany implemented policies

swiftly and precisely but even though Bruning agreed on the policies, these

policies’ origins were more bureaucratic than political. High-level bureau-

crats circumvented the zones of acceptance of SPD and the liberal parties,

which were paralyzed by the parliamentary dead-lock. Moreover, the legacy

of bureaucratic autonomy amidst executive disloyalty drove lower-level civil

servants into supporting NSDAP at elections as Bruning’s cut-backs starting

hitting them.87

To come full circle in the administration, the Junkers contributed to the

delegitimization of democracy by implementing cut-backs in the L¨ ander On

numerous occasions, judgments were in favor of the institutions of Wilhelmine

Germany: Junkers, the Reichswehr, big business, and monarchist supporters.

This caused an alienation of the workers from their own project: the Weimar

democracy. Workers were driven in the arms of Hitler who promised them

more fair government and a revitalization of the German nation which thecurrent decentral and central administrations seemed unable to.88

Summing up, bureaucratic autonomy amidst executive disloyalty caused

government-bureaucratic conflicts which enfeebled administrative effective-

ness and eroded the legitimacy of Weimar democracy eventually making

Hitler’s rise to executive power hardly unavoidable.

Spain[The following is the preliminary conclusions on the Spanish case. . . ] We

show that our two-dimensional understanding of administrative effectiveness

provides important additions to Lapuente and Rothstein’s account of the

86Mommsen, 1991, 83, 86, 90, 100, 111-112.87Caplan, 1988, 94-95.88Petzina, 1985, 63; McElligott, 2014, 111, 118.

31



role of the Spanish state administration in the demise of democracy leading

to its breakdown in October 1936. Thus, we show that the Spanish monar-

chy’s traditional (from the 11th century) reliance on patronage payment of

landed elites for decentralized administration; the continued use of wealthy

financially non-dependents as civil servants in the ministries through the

19th century; and the ongoing regional conflicts and weak central authority

caused massive disloyalty to Crown policies at the decentral and central lev-

els of administration. Lapuente and Rothstein point to the introduction of

a spoils system (Liberals and Conservatives alternated in power and staffed

bureaucracy with party loyalists), Turno Pacifico, under the Restoration sys-

tem from 1874 as the cause of politicization and polarization which led to

democratic breakdown. However, we add that the political motivation for

the spoils system was the lack of political control of the administration his-

torically culminating in the revolutionary years from 1823-1874. Liberals

and conservatives wanted to bring the bureaucrats’ zone of acceptance to

intersect with their own but chose the path of politicization instead of merit-recruitment from lower classes.

In need of better administrative performance, bureaucratic autonomy was

formally established in 1918 with the Civil Act but in practice, the spoils sys-

tem dominated administrative staffing through Rivera’s dictatorship and the

Second Republic (1931-1936). In turn, as argued by Lapuente and Rothstein,

the socialist government from 1931-1933, the center-right government from

1934-1936, and another socialist government functioning through the spring

of 1936 politicized administrations which then implemented anti-extremist

legislation and agricultural reform in biased ways antagonizing workers and

peasants. Interestingly, this was not a problem of administrative ineffective-

ness – quite the contrary. But our framework highlights additional features

that contributed to administrative ineffectiveness and democratic breakdown.

First, hiring of party loyalists drained bureaucracy for competent ca-

32



reerists. Despite ideological unity between bureaucracy and government, the

performance of bureaucrats was limited, that is, the discrepancy between

the actual and demanded performance of bureaucrats grew larger. Thus,

implementation of the greatly wanted agrarian reform (demanded by the so-

cialist governments and the majority of people) was stalled, inconsistent, and

resource-drained by corruption. Second, the system of governmental hirings

and firings was far from coherent or dominating in all ministries and levels of

administration. Even during the socialist government from 1931 which was

backed by a clear majority of parties in the proposal for an agrarian reform,

implementation of the agrarian reform was never close to fulfillment and dif-

fered considerably in quality between regions. This was primarily because of

the resistance of local bosses, Caciques , who managed local implementation

but whose loyalty had traditionally resided with their own local influence

rather than any notion of government service; and because of the general

slack and shirking in the administrative system that was a consistent feature

of Spanish state administration from before the 19th century.In drawing the full picture of Spain’s administrative ineffectiveness, we

thus need to move beyond employment matters: The introduction of the

spoils system was caused by centuries of problems of bureaucratic disloyalty

and lack of political control, and further, the spoils system cannot explain

why the agrarian reform was never implemented during the periods of social-

ist government, which could have given the socialists electoral support for a

new incumbency in 1933 and hindered radicalization.

Denmark

The Danish case gives us the more gradual path to administrative effective-

ness of the two survival-precursor cases. With military defeat and economic

disaster in the late 1650s, the long powerful Danish nobility was forced, in

33



a coup d’etat in 1660, to give up its power to the King. A very extensive

form of absolutism resulted in which the King was the hereditary sovereign

and, according to the King’s law of 1665, had unrestricted and absolute

power.89 On this background, the King sought to establish an administration

that would be loyal to him personally and more effective in terms of raising

money and armies for state protection. He largely succeeded by assuming full

control of appointments to all public positions. He made the final decision on

all appointments in principle and used discretionary dismissal as a means to

punish disloyal administrators.90 As laid down in the King’s Law, the admin-

istration at this point was far from an autonomous, politically disinterested

meritocracy.

The unrestricted use of appointments served to establish loyalty beyond

one king but on to the next. Office was bestowed on those who had the

King’s support. This meant in particular that the Crown pursued a deliberate

strategy of employing officials of non-noble decent as these officials were more

dependent on their royal employer and less resistant to his policies.

91

As FriskJensen writes: “[B]y deliberately replacing administrators from the noble

families with the sons of the bourgeoisie the King sought to ensure that no

real aristocratic power alternative to absolutist Royal power could arise”92.

We see here a major contrast to the German case. When absolutism was

established in 1660, 40 per cent of the small Royal administration’s personnel

were of noble decent. But as the King sought to build loyal military and civil

services, the share of notables dropped. By the beginning of the 19th century,

15 per cent of the royal servants had a noble background93

Professional qualifications became increasingly important in the King’s

89Lind, 2000.90Lind, 2000.91Knudsen and Rothstein, 1994, 205,Frisk Jensen, 2013b, 64.92Frisk Jensen, 2013a, 44.93Frisk Jensen, 2013a, 42-44,Knudsen and Rothstein, 1994, 208-209.

34



choice of appointment.94 The increased recruitment of legal graduates of

bourgeois decent only accelerated the decreasing trend of administration by

notables. Eventually, in 1821 recruitment came to formally require legal

training.95 By the mid-19th century, legal graduates had acquired a virtual

monopoly in the central administration.96

With meritocracy firmly established, there was little political parties

could afford to do in practice to politicize the administration when the demo-

cratic constitution of 1849 entered into force.97 Over time, bureaucrats be-

came protected from discretionary dismissal as well. Thus, the administra-

tion could avoid the slack, sleaze, particularism, and corruption associated

with politicized administration.98. As we show next, party governments suc-

cessfully relied on executive loyalty, which was in place by the 19th century,

to ensure bureaucratic responsiveness.

Early absolutist monarchs pursued a deliberate strategy to secure the

loyalty of the administration. Royal servants swore an oath to consciously

serve Royal demands, and were – in the central administration at least –given status and comparatively high wages in return.99 The employment of

bourgeois administrators meant that wages tied the individual bureaucrat

to the Crown in what Mungiu-Pippidi100 refers to as “a form of interdepen-

dence”. As we have said, loyalty is more easily achieved through financial

94The sale of nominations for office was used in brief interim periods in the early 18thcentury to finance wars and infrastructure investments. But the sold offices were not theofficials’ property and buying a nomination did not mean circumventing the increasingmerit requirement Frisk Jensen, 2013b.

95

Frisk Jensen, 2013a, 43-44.96Feldbæk, 2000, 318-325.97Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011 The qualification ‘in practice’ is important. The Danish central

bureaucracy became very much controlled by ministers, and politicization of appoint-ments was not prevented by legal statutes. But as actual replacement of personnel canbe both financially and politically costly, governments have consistently refrained frompursuing it Bischoff, 2012.

98Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell, 2012; Lapuente and Rothstein, 2014.99Frisk Jensen, 2013a, 45, 58-60.100Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011.

35



dependence. Additionally, regulations and financial oversight and auditing

of local and regional administrations helped rooting out slackers, plotters,

and the corrupt throughout the administration and contributed to marking

how loyalty was to be directed upwards to the King.101

In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, incoming legal-trained admin-

istrators developed a professional sense of community. Increasingly, they

saw themselves as loyal servants of the state rather than of the person of

the King.102 Even when new Kings disrupted state organization, they met

with little bureaucratic resistance. For instance, prince Frederik VI’s dras-

tic change to the structure of government by reinstating the old Council of

the Realm was rapidly accepted by the old administrative elite as they saw

Frederik as the rightful heir to the Throne.103 Equally illustrative, when the

mentally ill Christian VII proved incapable of reliable decision-making, the

old administrative elite continued implementation and policy-making for the

state unabated.104 These examples illustrate that the administration at this

point had become loyal to the monarchy rather than the King’s person. Thecontrast with changes on the Throne in Prussia is clear.

The Danish bureaucracy rarely resisted dictates from governments, ei-

ther under absolutism or after the democratic constitutional change in 1849

whereas parts of the German bureaucracy fought democratic government

tooth and nail. Danish bureaucrats did not have a special, democratic ethos.

Rather, the bureaucratic locus of power in the chancellery fought alongside

the kings of the 1830s and 1840s to preserve the monarchy by extending

political rights to peasants. Thus, bureaucrats helped pushing for the 1849

constitutional change and agreed with the incoming parliamentary govern-

ment led by ’the Right’.105

101Frisk Jensen, 2013a,b.102Frisk Jensen, 2013a.103Feldbæk, 2000, 285.104Knudsen, 1995, 121-122.105Jørgensen, 2000, 397-400; Knudsen, 2000, 489-495.

36



argues, was paved here with the reforms that secured the support of work-

ers and peasants for the established democratic order. Denmark was not a

priori safe from democratic breakdown, nor was its effective administration

the sole source for democratic stability. But the bureaucracy helped facili-

tate and make possible the reforms needed for a stable democratic outcome

throughout the crisis years.

As Lapuente and Rothstein111 conclude, it was meritocratic autonomous

bureaucratic elites established in late 19th century that preconditioned the

compromise of Saltsj¨ obaden ; the equivalent of Denmark’s Kanslergade Agree-

ment in form and function. Given the similarities in state-building between

Denmark and Sweden, how do we explain this? In fact, even though Sweden’s

aristocracy remained a stronghold as in Prussia but opposed to Denmark,

Swedish historical accounts confirm that stable rule of law was forged much

sooner through the 17th and 18th centuries by the establishment of a civil

service organization who served the king’s decrees.112 Furthermore, the in-

clusion of nobilities in local and national parliaments and balance of powerto the king ensured a system of mutual loyalty between kings and nobles

despite formal absolutism and the widespread access to purchase of public

offices.113 As the contrast with Spain reveals, without this knowledge it is

hard to explain why Swedish politicians would give bureaucracy autonomy

and why Saltsj¨ obaden was effectuated.

EnglandWith the end of the Glorious Revolution in 1688 in England, a system rose in

which the King in Parliament was the central figure of an administration that

was neither autonomous nor staffed with executive loyalists. There was little

111Lapuente and Rothstein, 2014.112Nilsson, 1993, 31-32, 56, 61.113Asker, 1993, 69.

38



by way of formal requirements for posts and officials were Crown appoint-

ments.114 Pressured by the expense of war, the Crown appointed officials to

positions in return for payment. These officials did not receive salaries but

took their payment from the expenses of the offices they held. Though this

system was certainly widespread and damaging to administrative effective-

ness, it was not all pervasive. In key departments and agencies – not least

those related to finance – professional administration developed relatively

soon after 1688. But even these parts of the administration were clearly not

yet autonomous. Purges followed political crises until the 18th century.115

In sum, the English bureaucracy in the late 18th century was a patchwork of

relatively professional organizations, politicized organizations, and outright

proprietary office holding.116

From the late 18th to the mid-19th century, drastic changes occurred in

English administration. Many of these appear to have been part of strate-

gic parliamentary attempts to limit the ‘influence of the Crown’ which had

resulted from the settlement of 1688.

117

The first priority was securing aloyal and diligent administration. But unlike in Denmark, English executive

loyalty developed from the struggle between the Crown and Parliament. In

fact, the sequencing of loyalty and autonomy was an explicit strategic con-

cern of 19th century civil service reformers. By 1780, patronage and Crown

appointments had come to be seen as large problems in Parliament. With

the governments of Lord North and Pitt the Younger began an attempt to

bring the administration under more strict fiscal control, end the ‘Old Cor-

ruption’, and tighten political control.118 These reforms started to form “the

idea of public service and public accountability ”119 which led the ground for

114Silberman, 1993, 297-317.115Brewer, 1989, 12-20, 53-66; Parris, 1968, 148-149; O’Gorman, 2001, 58.116e.g. Parris, 1968, Harling, 1996, Ch. 1, Brewer, 1989, 58-59.117Foord, 1947.118Harling, 1996, 42-55; O’Gorman, 2001.119O’Gorman, 2001, 60.

39



executive loyalty.

When Pitt left office in 1801, reforms had not yet gone far.120 But re-

forms continued. In 1816, public service salaries became the responsibility

of Parliament rather than the departments; by the late 1830s, promotion

was increasingly based on merit rather than seniority; and over time, the

Treasury department overtook control of all spending and initiated oversight

and inspections.121 Administrators increasingly faced the choice between dili-

gently working towards policy aims or suffering consequences to their careers.

Their executive loyalty was increased by force and their zones of acceptance

widened accordingly.

Loyalty was not yet fully secured, however. The reason was partly the

remaining system of patronage appointments. In the 1840s, Prime Minister

Peel’s close political ally, Sir Thomas Fremantle, complained that appoint-

ments were “ frequently given to persons in direct hostility to the Administra-

tion on the recommendation of opposition members of Parliament ”122 How-

ever, when Northcote and Trevelyan published their famous reform recom-mendations in 1853, an important emphasis was placed on how civil servants

could be controlled after their appointment.123. In the subsequent Parliamen-

tary debates, it was clear that controlling hirings and firings of bureaucrats

presented just one of a range of issues that the reforms needed to deal with

for which political control was of primary concern.124 Following this, controls

on the administration continued to tighten. Notably, from 1857 administra-

tors’ pensions were made conditional on a certificate from the Civil Service

Commission (established in 1855). By 1870, there was not much room for

disloyalty for those who valued their career, or their pension.

Concurrently, as in Denmark, a university degree became increasingly im-

120Harling, 1996; O’Gorman, 2001.121O’Gorman, 2001, 62-63.122Hughes, 1942, 58.123Silberman, 1993, 350-354.124Hughes, 1942.

40



portant for prospective public employees. For our purpose, we need not agree

with Gladden in his assessment that education made the English bureaucracy

into full blown executive loyalists.125 We need only agree that from the ed-

ucated recruits’ entry into public office, the “spirit of the service continued

and was even strengthened ”.126

Only the final push for executive loyalty occurred alongside reform of

the system of hiring and firing of bureaucrats. The “revolution” in public

service in 1780-1853127 helped bring the administration under the control of

the government, and to form the idea of public, as opposed to Royal or party

government, service. With the abolition of the last patronage appointments

in the ministries after 1853, executive loyalty became entrenched. From the

sequencing perspective, this was just in time. A build-up of meritocracy had

occurred for a while in English administration. In the wave of Economical

Reform in the late 18th century, the remainders of proprietary office holding

in England were abolished128 and the number of posts compatible with a seat

in the House of Commons was deliberately diminished as a means to lessenthe influence of the Crown.129 Only once executive loyalty was established

did Gladstone’s Order of Council of 1870 make examinations mandatory

and concentrate appointments and career management in the Civil Service

Commission and the Treasury.130.

With both autonomy and loyalty in place, the path was set for adminis-

trative effectiveness in the early 20th century. As in Denmark, civil servants

remained in office and worked diligently. The civil service had become large,

permanent, and its personnel an elite group intent on a public service career

and service to changing governments. This included personnel stability at

125Shefter, 1994, see also.126Gladden, 1967, 146-148.127Finer, 1952, 345.128Silberman, 1993, 324-326.129Parris, 1968.130Raadschelders and Rutgers, 1996b, 71-89; Silberman, 1993.

41



the very top. Increasingly, the administration took on the task of advising

their government131 but its role in policy-making never became obstructive

as in Prussia-Germany.

Between the wars, the English political system did not break down.

But this was not a bygone conclusion. As the contemporary scholar, Carl

Friedrich, wrote: “It is well-known that even in England the future of rep-

resentative democracy is threatened by class antagonism ”132 As in Denmark,

the state administration eventually played at supporting role in restoring the

economy, facilitating class compromise, and secure democratic survival. The

autonomous executive loyalists in the bureaucracy, notably in the Treasury,

did not pursue their own interests in the way the Junkers did in Germany.

Instead, Chancellors and their personnel pursued a mixture of expansionary

and budget balancing monetary and fiscal policies as well as regulation and

industrial policy. Unlike in Denmark, this ‘postwar settlement’133 was born

in political conflict rather than consensus. But tellingly, the inconsistent pol-

icy directions and implementation of the late 1920s, which were especiallyclear in the crisis years of 1929-1931, were more problems of conflicting pri-

orities in parliament alongside its decreasing ability to form strong majority

governments than any isolated bureaucratic problem.134135

So, when parliament installed an emergency government in 1931, which

came to last until WWII, a revived program of battling unemployment with

fiscal and monetary recovery policies were initiated alongside a closer co-

operation of between the Bank of England and the Treasury department.

This program was not only diligently implemented but the idea of a Na-

tional Government compromising Conservative, Liberal, and Labour inter-

131Horton, 2006, 35-36.132Friedrich, 1933, 194.133Booth, 1987, 517.134Williamson, 1992, Ch. 7.135For a recount of administrative effectiveness and stability and government ineffective-

ness, see the personal views of the 1916-1938 Cabinet Secretary, Sir HankeyNaylor,1984.

42



ests was on numerous occasions forwarded by ministry departments, notably

the Treasury. In effect, the popularity of the National Government was huge

and brought back public confidence in parliamentary government.136

Discussion

Hitherto, our paper has mainly been a historical corrective to the theory of

bureaucratic autonomy. We now briefly treat the relevant question of the

extent to which our propositions and findings can be generalized to current

problems of administrative effectiveness in new democracies.

We first like to point out that across the globe today executive loyalty

probably coincides highly with bureaucratic autonomy. As Dahlstrom, La-

puente, and Teorell find137, administrations in Europe, America, Asia, and

Africa cluster in two distinct groups according to ‘professionalism’ vis-a-vis

‘politicization’ for which the most professional bureaucracies, primarily in

Western Europe and North America, perform better. On the basis of ourtheory and analyses, we might interpret this as saying that the effective ad-

ministrations of Western Europe and North America could only fruitfully

be given autonomy because the executive loyalty of bureaucratic agents was

already firmly established. This links rather well with the large literature

arguing that legitimate national states managed by bureaucratic organiza-

tions have the longest, successful history in exactly these regions.138 In this

pattern, Germany might very well be an outlier, which makes our theory a

mere historical corrective.

However, quite to the contrary, we find this pattern intriguing in the

light of our theory because it shows that we need to understand the role for

administrative effectiveness and democratic stability played by bureaucratic

136Williamson, 1992, 232, 481, 495-498.137Dahlstrom, Lapuente, and Teorell, 2011, 28.138Tilly, 1975, see e.g.

43



agents and their loyalties in cases which have not had such long history

of state-building, namely in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Eastern

Europe, and Asia. As the Spanish case illustrates, there might be much

more to administrative ineffectiveness than politicization, and the works of

Linz and Stepan139 and Diamond et al.140 highlight the importance of state

legitimacy in developing countries for the forging of loyalty of key agents in

the political system, including the bureaucracy. In many places, politicization

may indeed be a central problem. But it is not the only problem. Moreover,

as the Spanish case shows, politicization is not the solution. It creates its

own problems.

As a more critical note, a sole focus on bureaucratic autonomy might thus

still leave us blind to one of the most important drivers of administrative ef-

fectiveness and democratic stability, namely political control via loyalty of

bureaucratic agents. After all, the German case tells us that granting au-

tonomy to a bureaucracy whose interests largely diverge from those of the

political executives may lead to shirking and sabotage in implementation inturn delegitimizing and destabilizing democracy. But even today’s scholars

of democratic governance argue along these lines by not only asserting the

importance of state capacity and bureaucratic organization; they see vibrant

civil societies and competitive party systems capable of producing strong gov-

ernments as vital checks on state power – in short, because they strengthen

the capacity for political control.141

It should be clear that a two-dimensional understanding of administra-

tive effectiveness is preferable for analyzing cases of today and the more

recent past. But how can we then examine empirically the impact of execu-

tive loyalty? The one-dimensional focus on bureaucratic autonomy vis-a-vis

politicization is attractive as it is fairly easily quantifiable by counting the

139Linz and Stepan, 1996, 7-24.140Diamond et al., 1997, xxiii.141Lipset, 1994, 3-5; Fukuyama, 2013, 11-12.

44



relative number of political appointments in state administrations worldwide.

We have no magic recipe for measuring executive loyalty however, as it is ba-

sically subjective of the bureaucrats employed. Unfortunately, Rauch and

Evans’142 finding that competitive salaries do not increase bureaucratic per-

formance only indicates that executive loyalty might be less instrumentally

manipulable than one could hope.

These precautions aside, any, at least rough, indicator of executive loyalty

may reveal whether the scaling administrative effectiveness on one dimen-

sion is a viable solution in causal analysis of its relationship with democracy.

And yet, the English case suggests a potential issue. When evaluating the

Northcote-Trevelyan report, policy makers were clearly aware that loyalty

ought to be secured before the bureaucracy was granted autonomy. This

indicates that an eventual scaling of autonomy and loyalty on a single di-

mension could be due not to the redundancy of the latter but to a causal

process. The German case obviously shows that autonomy is sometimes es-

tablished without executive loyalty. But if these cases are rare, a statisticalevaluation of loyalty’s relevance ought to go beyond blunt scaling analyses.

We are forced to leave these debates for further research.

Conclusions

In this paper, we have sought to expand the view of the literature on admin-

istrative effectiveness. We have argued that the contemporary focus on au-

tonomous recruitment and politicization, while largely correct, overlooks how

autonomous bureaucracies use their freedom from political influence. True,

autonomous bureaucracies perform better and are less easily corrupted. But

autonomy can bring its own set of problems if the circumstances are wrong.

In particular, we emphasize that administrative effectiveness requires not just

142Rauch and Evans, 2000, 68.

45



bureaucratic autonomy but also what we have termed executive loyalty .

Where bureaucrats are not executive loyalists, de-politicized recruitment

does not secure administrative effectiveness. Instead, bureaucracies become

incalcitrant and unwilling to implement the directives of their political lead-

ership. By contrast, where bureaucrats are executive loyalists government

directives are faithfully implemented as the bureaucracy accepts most, if not

quite all, policies coming from changing political leaders.

In addition, we emphasize that executive loyalty is more easily established

if it is ensured before bureaucratic autonomy is implemented in full. In par-

ticular, the tools used to reinforce executive loyalty in England and Denmark

– pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains and disciplinary tools, audits, and over-

sight – were less available to reformers facing the politically powerful Weimar

German bureaucracy. Our argument is thus twofold: Administrative effec-

tiveness needed both autonomy and loyalty and the sequencing in which the

two were established mattered.

Our empirical study of the origins of administrative effectiveness in in-terwar England, Denmark, Spain and Germany support our propositions.

In Spain, the politicized cadres of bureaucracy fuelled political polarization

while the disloyal cadres caused ineffective administration of the agrarian

reform. Both cadres paved the way for democratic breakdown by alienat-

ing workers and peasants. Here we concur with Lapuente and Rothstein’s143

perspective, though we add depth to it by expanding the scope of inquiry to

include loyalty.

In Germany, autonomy was gained rapidly by the Prussian bureaucracy

before it was loyal to anyone but itself and, occasionally, the Kaiser . Con-

sequently, the bureaucracy reacted with resistance to policies of changing

governments and reform attempts. Finally, this resistance in the interwar

era propelled popular discontent and ultimately the Nazi electoral victory.

143Lapuente and Rothstein, 2014.

46



Thus, in Germany autonomy came before executive loyalty and hamstrung

its development.

By contrast, the Danish and English cases illustrate a qualitatively similar

path to administrative effectiveness. In both cases, the bureaucracy acquired

autonomy but did so rather late. Executive loyalty was established earlier

in both cases. In Denmark, the gradually increasing impartiality after 1660

went hand in hand with administrators’ developing belief that adherence to

the decrees of first King then (after 1849) Parliament was their best course

of action. Consequently, even when the government alternation in 1901 put

strains on the system, the bureaucrats kept working faithfully to implement

the policies of changing governments.

Our exposition of the English case is similar but reflects better than the

Danish case the awareness of policy makers that loyalty ought to precede

autonomy. In the decades preceding the Northcote-Trevelyan report, loyalty

was consciously fostered before autonomy could become politically viable.

Loyalty was secured because reforms dating back to the 1780s continued toincrease government control over the bureaucracy; and because the concerns

of the policy makers postponed the establishment of autonomy until 1870.

As we have shown, the result was similar to the Danish though its origins

were rather different.

Our analysis points to executive loyalty as an important precondition

for administrative effectiveness, not least in interwar Europe. True, politi-

cization may be the more frequent problem for administrative effectiveness

today. But in many places, including in the contemporary developing world,

nurturing bureaucratic autonomy may create its own set of problems if the

bureaucracy is disloyal. And, as our English case shows, a lack of loyalty may

even be a reason why policy makers prefer a lack of autonomy despite the

many problems that follow. Thus, the interwar cases we have examined pose

new questions and suggest new conceptual and theoretical perspectives for

47



future research far beyond the spatial and temporal scope we have covered.

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