How Did the Use of the Main Battle Tank Reflect in the Strategic Planning of the Persian Gulf War?

Isaac Ward3-28-2015

The Persian Gulf War began on 2 August 1990 when Saddam Hussein directed his army to

invade and occupy the nation of Kuwait. Iraqi forces occupied the country and established defensive

positions along the southern border with Saudi Arabia. Assessments at the time believed that the

number of Iraqi divisions in Kuwait exceeded occupation requirements and comprised another

invasion force.1 Iraqi invasion of north eastern Saudi Arabia was considered imminent. The United

States mobilized its rapid reaction forces and began deploying combat air and ground forces to Saudi

Arabia on 7 August 1990. These units were the beginning of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)

led Operation Desert Shield to protect Saudi Arabia. During Operation Desert Shield, diplomatic talks

were taking place to compel a peaceful withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. However, offensive military

action was being planned by U.S. CENTCOM as early as August, but was not formally considered until

October. Commander in Chief of CENTCOM, General Norman Schwarzkopf, directed his staff to

begin planning an offensive to liberate Kuwait. The plan produced in October 1990 was known as the

‘Two Corps Plan’.2 This plan envisioned a diversion attack in southern Kuwait to fix the Iraqi defense

and reserves, with the main attack from the west in a left hook to envelope the Iraqi Army in Kuwait

and destroy the Republican Guard reserve in Iraq while simultaneously cutting off the retreat

towards Baghdad. The U.S. plan was extremely ambitious and focused on highly mobile armored

units to rapidly engage and destroy the Iraqi Army. After the United Nations resolution condemning

the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in December of 1990, the U.S. gained international support for

offensive action against Iraq, resulting in a coalition of European and Arab forces. The Persian Gulf

War is unique in the second half of the twentieth century in that it focused heavily in the use of

highly mobile armored and mechanized units, with the main battle tank as the primary ground

weapons system. The main battle tank is described in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe as “self-propelled armored fighting vehicle, capable of heavy firepower, primarily of a high

muzzle velocity direct fire main gun necessary to engage armored and other targets, with high cross

country mobility, with a high level of self-protection, and which is not designed and equipped

primarily to transport combat troops.”3 The use of the main battle tank was reflected in the strategic

thought during the Persian Gulf War through the CENTCOM selection of VII Corps as the main effort

in the ground operation, the Coalition scheme of maneuver, and the logistical support plan for the

Coalition attack into Iraq and Kuwait.

1 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Vol. 1, Washington D.C.: Department of Defence, 1992, 1-30.2 Robert Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 1993, 128-129.

3 U.S. Department of State, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces of Europe, Washington D.C.: GPO, 1990.

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U.S. Army VII Corps was deployed from Germany to Kuwait after President George H. W.

Bush announced on 8 November 1990 that he ordered the reinforcement of U.S. troops in Saudi

Arabia in preparation for a ground war.4 VII Corps was selected to deploy to the Gulf because it was

able to field two heavy armored divisions and a mechanized infantry division for combat operations.

The heavy armored divisions came from Europe, and had already undergone the latest round of

modernization within the U.S. Army by upgrading their main battle tanks from the original M1

Abrams tank to the new M1A1. The army’s modernization program, began in the 1970’s, focused the

provision of the latest versions of equipment to units that would likely see combat first in the event

of war. European units were considered the first line during the Cold War, and received the bulk of

the new M1A1 tanks.5 CENTCOM leadership chose VII Corps for their armor capability because they

would be the main effort against the elite Iraqi Republican Guard Corps, which fielded the modern T-

72M main battle tank. The M1A1 was superior to its predecessor as it had a larger main gun, better

armor, and a nuclear, chemical, and biological over pressure system.6 This modern equipment was

deemed vital in the war against Iraq in order to increase soldier survivability during combat. VII

Corps was not the only U.S. Army unit that had these capabilities, but they had an advantage of

training with their new equipment prior to being deployed to the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations

(K.T.O.).

The first Coalition partner to join with the U.S. in the Gulf was the United Kingdom. They

deployed two armor brigades from their bases in Germany as well, and formed the 1 st Armoured

Division in Saudi Arabia prior to the start of offensive operations. According to the original plan, 1 st

Armoured was to be attached to the U.S. Marines to act as the heavy armor shield against an Iraqi

counter attack, but the British commander, Lieutenant General Sir Peter De La Billiere, argued that

the capabilities of the division would be wasted in a supporting role. The British Army fielded the

Challenger I main battle tank to the Gulf, and argued that it would be better utilized if the 1 st

Armoured Division were attached to VII Corps and participated in the main attack against the Iraqi

Army. La Billiere states in his book Storm Command that his reasons for fighting to have 1st

Armoured attached to VII Corps were that the terrain in southern Kuwait was not suited to long

range fire and maneuver tactics and that the British wanted to be a part of the main effort in the

West-East envelopment of the Iraqi Army.7 The Challenger tank was just as capable as the M1A1 and

would be better suited to fight the primary tank battle against the Iraqi Republican Guard. In 4 Scales, Certain Victory, 133-134.5 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Vol. 2, Washington D.C.: Department of Defence, 1992, D-18.6 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, Vol. 3, Washington D.C.: Department of Defence, 1992, T-143.7 Peter De La Billiere, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War, London: HarperCollins, 1992, 92-93.

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December of 1990 the UK 1st Armoured Division was attached to VII Corps, further raising the heavy

armor capability of the corps in the attack.

Placing the most modern main battle tanks in the left hook, allowed for General Schwarzkopf

to shape the battlefield in the Coalition’s favor. The M1A1 and the Challenger I could engage the

Iraqi armor units at a much further distance than any tank fielded by other Coalition partners. The

open desert posed a logistical challenge, but provided an ideal opportunity to take advantage of the

high caliber guns on the M1A1 and Challenger I. Other Coalition partners such as Egypt and Syria

fielded Soviet produced T-72s that were similar to the Iraqi Army tanks. These units were used in the

diversion effort in southern Kuwait in order to fix the Iraqi Army in their positons. Schwarzkopf

needed to create fire superiority in the Iraqi desert and the other Coalition partners could not

provide that capability.8

General Schwarzkopf’s plan was to tie down the Iraqi Army in Kuwait with a frontal assault

by the U.S. Marine Corps and Coalition troops, while the U.S. VII Corps and XVIII Airborne Corps

penetrated deep into the Iraqi desert west of Wadi al-Batin, and turned east to cut off the Iraqi

retreat and destroy the Iraqi Republican Guard.9 Saddam Hussein assessed that the main attack

against his forces in Kuwait would occur as a two column attack along the east coast of Kuwait, and

from southwest Kuwait near Wadi al-Batin.10 Knowing his army could not match the superior

equipment of the U.S. and Coalition forces, Saddam directed his forces to build a defense-in-depth

strategy to delay any attack and produce large amounts of casualties.11 This would include a large

network of fortified fighting positions and minefields to force an attack into pre-established kill

zones. U.S. forces recognized Saddam’s strategy and developed a counter that would use precision

air strikes to degrade the Iraqi Army and a rapid ground attack to catch them off guard.12

Schwarzkopf wanted to keep Coalition casualties as low as possible, and that would mean prepping

the battlefield with airstrikes to degrade the Iraqi Army, as well as placing the best equipment in his

main effort of attack.

As commander of all Coalition operations in CENTCOM, Schwarzkopf outline his operations

intent as:

“Victory would be achieved through the destruction of the RGFC [Republican Guards Force

Command] in the KTO, preservation of the offensive capability of the combined forces, and restoration

8 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Vol. 2, I-38.9 Scales, Certain Victory, 128-129.10 Kevin Woods, Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2008, 138.11 Ibid, 140.12 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Vol. 2, I-18.

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of the sovereignty of Kuwait. Attacking ground forces were to penetrate and bypass static Iraqi

defensive forces which included infantry and other forces that were not mobile and could not pose a

threat to fast moving Coalition armor forces.”13

This shows the strategic importance that General Schwarzkopf placed on the capabilities of the main

battle tank. Fast moving heavy fire power were required to effectively engage and destroy the

armored and mechanized divisions of the Republican Guard. The M1A1 and Challenger I tanks were

well protected from infantry attacks, so long as they are moving. Strategically, the ground operation

was to move very quickly and keep pressure on the Iraqi Army in order to keep them from effectively

employing their reserves and counter-attacking the VII Corps envelopment. The open desert of

southern Iraq is ideally suited to long range maneuver warfare. The main battle tank can be used to

its full capability, without the hindrance of obstacles, terrain features, or urban environments to

restrict freedom of movement and firing range. Desert warfare is well suited for high speed armor

attack. Schwarzkopf needed the bulk of his armor west of Wadi al-Batin to cut the retreat of the Iraqi

Army. Marine and Coalition troops were primarily composed of light mechanized infantry and armor

units that employed the same type of equipment as the Iraqi Army. A more advanced main battle

tank was needed to ensure low casualties for the main effort, while maximizing the destructive

capabilities against the Republican Guard and other Iraqi armor units.

Logistics and sustainment was crucial to the operational success of Operation Desert Storm.

Armored and mechanized forces spearheading the attacks into Iraq and Kuwait required massive

amounts of fuel, ammunition, spare parts, food, and water to sustain combat operations. The main

battle tank was the key piece of equipment to destroy the Iraqi Army during ground operations, and

it required a constant resupply. This had to be considered by CENTCOM when they were planning

the VII Corps left hook across the desert and the XVIII Airborne Corps push north. The U.S. Army

under CENTCOM was responsible for the majority of supply operations for the K.T.O., as the Army

was the largest service component in theater. Initial support operations during Operation Desert

Shield required a massive deployment of personnel and equipment into the Kuwaiti theater, as well

as establish logistic agreements with the Saudi Arabian military and other Arab military forces.14

CENTCOM’s 22nd Support Command was responsible for the bulk of the theater logistics, and had the

responsibility of moving supplies and equipment from the Saudi ports to the tactical assembly areas

near the Kuwaiti border.

Schwarzkopf’s attack plan of using the left hook through the desert required him to withhold

deploying the VII and XVIII Corps to the Iraqi border west of Wadi al-Baten until the Air campaign

13 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Vol. 1, 317. 14 Ibid, 133.

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began. This would require a massive logistical effort to move two full corps into attack positions

simultaneously. One of the key operational successes of the M1A1 was that it maintained a greater

than ninety percent readiness rate throughout combat, and the U.S. Army attributes that to the use

of heavy equipment carriers to transport the vehicle long distances.15 VII Corps would load their

vehicles and crews onto the transport trucks and move them into positions along the Iraqi border.

These combat sustainment units were integral to the operational capabilities of the M1A1 because

they were required to transport them to attack positons. In order to achieve Schwarzkopf’s goal of

fast paced mobile warfare, a large amount of heavy transports were required.

Combat resupply of the advancing armored units was also a major consideration for the

strategic plan for desert warfare. The M1A1 Abrams has an operational range of approximately 130

miles.16 CENTCOM had to plan for the building of logistics bases within the attack positions for the

advancing units, as well as following the advance of the two U.S. Army corps during their attack

through the Iraqi desert.17 Fuel and ammunition were essential to combat operations for the

sustainment of the offensive in order to achieve the commander’s intent, and the main battle tanks

required a massive logistical effort to maintain the momentum. The Marine and Coalition taskforces

required logistic consideration as well, but due to their relatively short distance objectives and their

close proximity to the ports they were not as challenging as the U.S. Army attack through the desert.

The Marine and Coalition forces also did not have the heavy armor equipment of VII Corps. They

were primarily light mechanized infantry units or small battalions of armor.

The use of the main battle tank is reflected heavily in the strategic planning for Operation

Desert Storm. During initial planning, CENTCOM staff decided that a modernized armored corps was

needed in order to ensure complete success of a ground offensive. The U.S. Army modernization

program focused on providing modern equipment to units that would see combat first, and during

the Cold War, those units were stationed in Germany. VII Corps was chosen because it could be

deployed to Saudi Arabia quickly and it fielded the latest version of the M1 Abrams main battle tank.

The thermal imaging sights and the larger gun would allow the U.S. forces to engage the Iraqi T-

72Ms and BMPs at longer distances resulting in lower U.S. casualties and a higher kill rate against

Iraqi tanks. The strategic plan for the attack required a highly mobile force to perform a bold flanking

maneuver against the Iraqi Army. While the M1A1 required a massive logistical effort to sustain the

attack, the tank was ideally suited to the commander’s intent of fast moving attack and bypassing of

static infantry defenses. The left hook across the desert required speed and agility in order to

provide relief for the U.S. Marine and Coalition forces that were fixing the Iraqi Army in Kuwait. The 15 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Vol. 3, T-144.16 Ibid, T-143.17 Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Vol. 1, 334.

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logistical effort to sustain combat operations required detailed strategic planning. Armor units

required constant resupply, and CENTCOM had to ensure the momentum of the attack was

maintained. The use of the main battle tank could not have been possible without a massive logistic

support train behind it. Strategic vision for the Gulf War required highly mobile ground units to

maintain pressure on the Iraqi Army in order to avoid high casualties for Coalition troops. The main

battle tank was not decisive in the war, but it contributed to the success of the operation, and was

used as the spearhead to destroy the Iraqi Army and liberate Kuwait. The combination of air power,

naval ordinance, and ground attack resulted in victory against Iraq. Main battle tanks are the

backbone of high speed maneuver warfare, but cannot operate without mechanized infantry and

large scale sustainment operations. The Persian Gulf War is significant in the study of warfare

because it is the only war since World War Two to feature the armor in its intended role of tank on

tank warfare. Cold War military thought placed the tank as the central piece of equipment in ground

operations, and the Persian Gulf War saw the implementation of tanks as the attacking spearhead

for the last time in the twentieth century.

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Bibliography

De La Billiere, Peter. Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War. London: HarperCollins,

1992.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress. Vol. 1. Washington D.C.: Department of

Defense, 1992.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress. Vol. 2. Washington D.C.: Department of

Defense, 1992.

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress. Vol. 3. Washington D.C.: Department of

Defense, 1992.

Scales, Robert. Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War. Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of

Staff, U.S. Army, 1993.

U.S. Department of State. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces of Europe. Washington D.C.: GPO,

1990.

Woods, Kevin. Mother of All Battles: Saddam Hussein's Strategic Plan for the Persian Gulf War.

Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2008.

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