how san remo birthed the jewish national home · reat arab r e and the ef rab moveme an agreemen...

MIDDLE EAST QUARTERLY Summer 2020 Karsh: San Remo / 1

How San Remo Birthed the Jewish National Home

by Efraim Karsh

here is probably no more understated e-vent in the history of

the Arab-Israeli conflict than the San Remo conference of April 1920. Convened for a mere week as part of the post-World War I peace conferences, which created a new international order on the basis of indigenous self-rule and national self-determination, participants appointed Britain as man-datory for Palestine with the specific task of

putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government [i.e., the Balfour Declaration], and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.1

This mandate was then ratified on July 24, 1922, by the Council of the League of Nations—the postwar world organization and the United Nation’s predecessor. 1 British Secretary’s Notes of a Meeting of the Supreme Council, held at the Villa Devachan, San Remo, on Saturday,

Apr. 24, 1920, at 4 p.m., in E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 (hereinafter DBFP), (London: HMSO, 1960), ser. 1, vol. 8, pp. 176-7.

T

The leaders of the U.K., France, Italy, and Japan in San Remo,April 1920. The importance of the San Remo resolution cannot beoverstated as a turning point in the history of the Arab--Israeliconflict. It signified an unqualified recognition of the Jews’ rightto national rebirth in their ancestral homeland.

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ured by publiestablishing s for its realizhis goal wd on Novemwhen the

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Armed with this agreement, on February 27, the Zionists asked the postwar peace conference, which had begun its deliberations in Paris the previous month, to recognize “the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home” and to appoint Britain as “Mandatory of the League [of Nations],” tasked with creating

such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the

civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.5

The mandatory system to which the Zionists referred was enshrined in Article 22 of the League of Nations’ covenant, which sought to steer those “colonies and territories” of the defunct Ottoman and German empires that were “inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” toward independence as “a sacred trust of civilization.” By way of doing so, each colony or territory was to be administered by a League mandatory that was to guide it toward self-governance in accordance with the distinct “stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic condition and other similar circumstances.” More specifically, it stipulated that “Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia must be completely severed from

the Turkish Empire” and that certain communities in these territories

have reached a stage of de-velopment where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a

5 “Secretary’s Notes of a Conversation Held in M.

Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 27th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.,” Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference 1919 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942-47), vol. 4, doc. 9, pp. 161-4 (hereinafter FRUS: Paris Peace Conference).

Edmund Allenby, commander of the EgyptianExpeditionary Force, enters Jerusalem, December 11,1917. Allenby was contemptuous of the meagerFrench contribution to the fighting and encouragedArab leaders to resist French attempts to enforce theirauthority.

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EAST QUARTE

mandatory pntil such timhey are abletand alone.6

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ad been suppng the war,ce. Britain te designat

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to the ideaDavid Lloydart Georgesss the plan od on annation that to send a p

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he Plan adoptel 28, 1919,” Le, 1919, art. 22.

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“Minutes ofCommissione27th, 1919,”12, doc. 38, p

“Mr. C.R. CrCommission 10, 1919, FRdoc. 379, ppSection of Mandates iCommissioneChurchill CrParis Peace 751-848.

found rheads uture.

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Treaty of Verermany hadon had left fosend the rephe Turkish ce, with theublic only inue had been left to Britai

from Italy) the Ottomanew regional easy task as

themselves aure. Lt. Genf the Egyptwhich had dhe Levant, he meager Fg. He encouesist the

f the Daily ers PlenipotentFRUS: Paris P

pp. 133-4.

rane and Mrto Negotiate

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ace Conference,eport of the Aonal Commiss

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Aug. 28, 1919,vol. 12, doc. 3

Remo / 4

donor, deemed fied to se they

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Allenby, tionary

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of the y, March nce, vol.

to the rut, July , vol. 12,

American sion on by the

d Henry , FRUS: 380, pp.


to enforce their authority in areas designated to them by the Sykes-Picot agreement. He also cultivated Faisal as the “supreme authority in Syria on all Arab matters whether administrative or military,” giving the emir free rein to intimidate political opponents and promising him a voice in the decision-making process over the Levant’s future. No less galling for the French was the British refusal to withdraw the EEF from the Levant before the peace conference had reached its decision. Requests to increase the number of French troops in Syria were peremptorily declined; Britain remained firmly in control, leaving the French with a gnawing sense of impotence.9

Faisal’s Imperial Dream To complicate matters further, Anglo-

French differences were skillfully exploited by Faisal to further his grandiose ambitions. Even during the anti-Ottoman revolt, the emir had begun toying with the idea of having his own “Greater Syrian” empire, going so far as to negotiate this option with key members of the Ottoman leadership behind the back of his British war allies.10 When this ploy came to 9 See, for example, Allenby to Faisal, Oct. 13, 1918,

British Foreign Office (FO) 371/3384/175365; Faisal to Allenby, Nov. 2, 1918, and Allenby’s response, FO 371/3384/182643; Allenby to War Office, Oct. 19, 21, 22, 1918, FO 371/3384/175365, 175481, 177569; F. Georges-Picot’s telegram of Nov. 14, 1918, in Édouard Brémond, Le Hedjaz dans la Guerre Mondiale (Paris: Payot, 1931), p. 308.

10 Efraim and Inari Karsh, Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 194-7.

naught, Faisal tried to insert his imperial dream in the postwar peace agreements telling the Council of Ten, the supreme decision-making body of the Paris peace conference (February 1919), that “Syria claimed her unity and her independence” and that it was “sufficiently advanced politically to manage her own internal affairs” if given adequate foreign and technical assistance.11

Making no mention of his agreement with Weizmann, the emir refrained from referring to, let alone endorsing, the Balfour Declaration, proposing instead to leave Palestine’s future “for the mutual

11 “Secretary’s Note of a Conversation Held in M.

Pichon’s Room at the Quai d’Orsay, Paris, on Thursday, 6 February, 1919, at 3 p.m.,” FRUS: Paris Peace Conference, vol. 3, doc. 61, pp. 889-92; “Memorandum by the Emir Feisal, 1 January 1919,” in David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents (New York: Appeal Printing Co., 1928), vol. 4, pp. 297-9.

Emir Faisal (center), the leader of the nascent pan-Arabmovement, tried to insert his imperial dream in the postwarpeace agreements at the Paris conference, February 1919,declaring that Syria was “sufficiently advanced politically tomanage her own internal affairs.”

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consideraties intephrasing the countpopulatioover the a Jewish(in contrrendered no say oSharif Hunotional who souempire, would-bePalestinekingdomsince Syrowner,” iand him others.”13

Indehis Jewiespeciallythe deemovemenwe are cwill wishhome,”14 Crane coendorse kingdom frameworresentativwould “

12 “Secret

PichoThursConfe

13 Zeine N(Beiru

14 Laqueu

EAST QUARTE

ation of all erested.”12 T

not only gtry’s non-Jewon a veto poestablishmen

h national hrast to the B

them “civilover Palestinussein of Mleader of th

ught to estaband presume king of Syre’s inclusion

ms. As the emria was a “mit was only n

to “try to 3 ed, at a timish interlocy the educatepest sympnt … We wilconcerned, toh the Jews he was busy

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rk, he asseve “General “make clea

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ference, vol. 3, d

N. Zeine, The Sut: Khayat’s, 19

ur, The Israel-A

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par-This gave wish ower nt of

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mir put it on omerchandise wnatural for Brappropriate

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pathy on ll do our beso help them a most heay manipulatito subvert thon for a Grg Palestine. embled a hSyrian Cong

ar the wis

f a Conversatithe Quai d’O

ary, 1919,” FRUdoc. 61, p. 891.

Struggle for Ara960), p. 50.

Arab Reader, pp

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nt instructionorted the EEn. Gilbert Cd to ask foria, and, at tht it will

untries.”17 Though k

chinations, representativemuch of th

mmission,18

Abu Khaldun Smin Tarikh alIttihad, 1964)

Khairiyya QaDimashq bay1971), p. 67, of Modern Sy1995), p. 15.

“Report by BSituation in DBFP, vol. 4

“Confidential AFor the Use FRUS: Paris pp. 848-50; the InternatiTurkey,” FRUdoc. 380, pp.

as for a ngdom tine.

Syrian AmericEnquirwas larmembecircle nationa

ide during thtion in its

xtensive propmass demontical oppone“Feisal has tmpaign into

ns to all partEF’s chief polayton. “The

or complete he same timebe granted

keenly awas well a

e nature anhe evidence

King and

Sati al-Husri, Yal-Arab al-Hadit), pp. 262-4.

asmiyya, al-Hyna 1918-1920 fn. 2; Eliezer T

Syria and Iraq

British LiaisonArabia,” Dam

4, p. 264.

Appendix to thof Americans Peace Confere

“Report of theional CommissUS: Paris Peac764-5.

Karsh: San R

people tcan Commisry,”15 and rgely comprers of the of (mostly

alists whohe war and m

wake.16 Hpaganda cam

nstrations, anents and ortaken the whhis hands a

ts of the coolitical officee people hav

independene, to express d to other

ware of Fas the connd the flim

submitted Crane cho

awm Maisalun:th (Beirut: Dar

Hukuma al-Ara(Cairo: Dar al

Tauber, The Fo(London: Fran

n Officer on mascus, May 16

he Report upoOnly,” Aug. 2ence, vol. 11, de American Sesion on Mandce Conference,

Remo / 6

to the ssion of

which rised of

small Iraqi)

o had manned

He also mpaign, nd in-rdinary hole of and has ountry,” er Brig. ve been nce for a hope

Arab

Faisal’s ngress’s msiness

to the ose to

Safha al-

abiya fi l-Maarif, ormation nk Cass,

Political 6, 1919,

on Syria: 28, 1919, doc. 381, ection of dates in vol. 11,


endorse Faisal’s imperial dream over the objection of some of their advisors, re-commending, “For the sake of the larger interests, both of Lebanon and of Syria … the unity of Syria has to be urged” and that “Emir Feisal be made the head of the new united Syrian State.”19 However, at the time, ac-cording to a British estimate, only 15 percent of Lebanese favored Hashemite rule, and Lebanon’s Christian reli-gious leaders pleaded with the peace conference that the country “should not be placed in any way under an Arab and Moslem Government.”20

Similarly, while feigning “a deep sense of sympathy for the Jewish cause,” the com-mission dismissed the millenarian Jewish attachment to Palestine as valid justification for the establishment of a Jewish national home there. Effectively treating the Jews as a religious community rather than a nation, it recommended that “Jewish immigration should be definitely limited, and that the project for making Palestine distinctly a Jewish commonwealth should be given up,” thus reducing the country’s Jewish com-munity to a permanent minority in Faisal’s prospective Syrian kingdom. “There would then be no reason why Palestine could not be included in a united Syrian State, just as other portions of the country,” the com-mission wrote,

19 FRUS: Paris Peace Conference, vol. 12, pp. 789-91.

20 Reports by Clayton (Beirut), Oct. 15, 31, 1918, FO 371/3384/173729, 181781; Forbes-Adam (Paris), Sept. 26, 1919, DBFP, vol. 4, pp. 439-40.

the holy places being cared for by an International and Inter-Reli-gious Commission, somewhat as at present, under the oversight and approval of the Mandatary and of the League of Nations. The Jews, of course, would have repre-sentation upon this Commission.21

Nor was Faisal deterred from accompanying his machinations with in-timidation attempts whenever he deemed it necessary. When the peace conference reconvened in London on February 12-April 10, 1920—with the salient absence of the United States—to discuss the Turkish peace treaty, the delegates were warned by Allenby that

21 “Report of the American Section of the International

Commission on Mandates in Turkey,” doc. 380, pp. 794-5.

King-Crane Commission, Hotel Royal, Beirut, July 1919. HenryKing (seated, left) and Charles Crane (right) endorsed Faisal’simperial dream, recommending, “Emir Feisal be made the head ofthe new united Syrian State” to include Lebanon and Palestine.

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22 Meiner

vol. 1

23 For theMaisa14, 19

EAST QUARTE

ny decisionompatible

Arab aspiratoncerning Salestine or Motamia taken wut Faisal’s nce will nocknowledged ause great duture for whiceclines all resp

en this threat n March 8, tongress proca “within g Palestine,” th Iraq. Francthe country

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The Londoal’s self-e

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d void and ork for the los. However, t

to a Zioniof the emimplied a co

rtzhagen to Cu13, p. 218.

e text of the pralun, pp. 278-8920, DBFP, vo

ERLY Summ

in-with tions yria,

Meso-with-pres-t be by Arabs an

difficulties inch [the Arab] ponsibility.22

failed to havthe emir hadclaim him as its natural in political ace and Britai’s western (i

Palestine) paris requiremerom erupted

ne’s incorpoaimed kingdnother 211 w

on Conferenthronementn the Londonance declarin

proceedingong-awaited this did not aist gain as ir’s imperiarresponding

urzon, Feb. 19

roclamation, se8; Allenby to Col. 13, pp. 224-

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nd will n the nation

ve the desired the GeneraKing Faisal

boundariesand economiin were askei.e., Lebanonrts.23 And aent, betweenin Jerusalem

oration intdom with fivwounded.

ence t had nn conferenceng this movg to lay th

award of thautomaticallyFrance’s re

al ambition readiness to

9, 1920, DBFP

ee Husri, YawmCurzon, Mar. 13-5, 229-30.

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24 D

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erupted in Jnding Palest

ation into Foclaimed kin

e’s northernoyd George e, which laception of lical territorh the northeani on the coDan, or Hul

lfour maintaain the commurally belongborders to thndatory of Swing waters ent be of muc

Since thisrder of Syrianch mandate

kes-Picot’s estine’s nor

ught to winposed dema

cided by ptember 11,nch chief amated that

David Lloyd GTreaties (Lonp. 1144; “Mrespecting SAug. 11, 1919

Balfour to Curz302.

Jerusalem tine’s Faisal’s ngdom.

reducescope date nthe BrinterprPalesti

A revolv

n border, wibacking the

argely confoPalestine a

ry “from Dern border exoast, and acleh in the intained that mand of the wgs to it, whhe north, or Syria, to whof H[er]mo

ch value.”25 s line signia, which wase, and since i

internatirthern half, n France’s arcation befothe peace , 1919, Wadvisor on S“the French

George, The Tndon: Victor G

Memorandum bSyria, Palestine9, DBFP, vol. 4

zon, July 2, 191

Karsh: San R

e the terof its Syrian

nor acceptanritish and Zretation oine mandate.

heated ed around ith Prime Me proposed Zormed to hias comprisin

Dan to Beerxtending “upcross to Baniterior.”24 LikPalestine “

water-powerether by extby treaty w

hom the soun could not

ified the sos due to becit went way bionalization

the Zionissupport for

ore the mattconference

Weizmann mSyrian affairh would acce

Truth about thGollancz, 1938)by Mr. Balfoure, and Mesop4, p. 347.

19, DBFP, vol.

Remo / 8

rritorial n man-nce of Zionist f the . debate Pales-

Minister Zionist is own ng the rsheba” p to the ias, the kewise, “should r which tending

with the uthward

in any

outhern come a beyond

of sts had r their ter was e. On

met the rs who ept the

e Peace ), vol. 2, r (Paris) otamia,”

4, p.

MIDDLE E

Litani rivdifficultywith a simpressiomeeting Minister who indithe Frencdetails ofSyrian fsatisfactioquestion,are also d

By reconvenpositive late Januthe FrenAlexandrof his prJews butdefunct attempt home andimplemenfrom dopropaganduring laactively Palestinepolitical secretaryconferenfuture.

26 Weizm

LetterBrunsand I9, p. 2

27 Ibid.; Wp. 227

EAST QUARTE

ver line wity.”26 He wassimilarly upon after

with ForStephen Pic

icated that wch were not f this or thafrontier, proon of Fra” they “wou

doing someththe time

ned in Losentiments h

uary 1920, Cnch premiersre Millerandredecessor’s t sought to rinternationato undermid the Britishntation. “I ocumentary nda has greatast two monagainst Zio

e in a unifiedofficer rep

y George Cuce was de

mann to Philiprs and Papersswick and JeIsrael Universi213.

Weizmann to B7 (emphasis in

ERLY Summ

thout s left pbeat

a reign chon

while “deeply inte

at line of theovided thereance over uld like to shhing for Zion

the peacendon, howhad all but

Clemenceau ship, and h

d not only shaffinity to

resuscitate Salization schine the Jewh mandate to

have satisevidence

tly increasednths and is nonism and fd Syria,” theorted to Br

urzon on Maeliberating t

p Kerr, Sept. s of Chaim W

erusalem: Tranties Press, 197

Balfour, Sept. n the original).

F

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erested in the Palestiniane is genera

the Syrianhow that theynism.”27 conferenc

wever, thesvanished. Inhad resigned

his successohared nothingZionism and

Sykes-Picot’heme in an

wish nationao facilitate itsfied myselthat French

d in Palestinnow workingfor a Frenche EEF’s chieritish foreignarch 2, as ththe region’

11, 1919, ThWeizmann (Newnsaction Book77), ser. A, vo

26, 1919, ibid

French primMillerand

Zion

he n-al n y

e e n d

or g d s n al ts lf h

ne g h

ef n

he s

he w ks l.

d.,

GeoCouAmconSykdefeJewcoubouimpbeeAllicon

genled ConideaGeoBrahis his

28 M

29 “

30 L

me minister Ad had no affism and Jew

outset opolicy oernment.the Frenc

Matters caorge read a urt justice L

merican Zionnfidant, warnkes-Picot agfeat full realiwish [Nationuntry “in comundaries,” aplement the Ben “subscribeies and A

ncede the proThis sent

neral of the most of th

nference anda of a Jewishorge’s wordsandeis as havown importaown earlier

Meinertzhagenvol. 13, p. 22

“British Secretheld at 10, Saturday, Febvol. 7, pp. 18

Lloyd George, vol. 2, p. 116

Alexandre finity to ws.

You whow eaPalestina verypropaghow ebe to w

our adminisof His Maje. I am of the ch aim at noth

ame to a htelegram fr

Louis Brandnists and Pning that thegreement to ization of [tnal] Home”mplete disregand that thBalfour Decled to by Fran

Associated Poposed Zioni

Philippe BeFrench fore

he negotiatiod who was “vh National Hs) into a tiradving “an exance” (effectr claim that

n to Curzon, M20.

tary’s Notes ofDowning Strebruary 21, 1923-4.

The Truth abo62.

Karsh: San R

will realize asy it is in ne to conduct y dangerous ganda and easy it will wreck at its tration and esty’s Gov-opinion that

hing less.28

head when rom U.S. Sudeis, leader President We application

Palestine “the] promise” by dividingard [of its] hhe only wlaration, whince as well aPowers,” wst boundarieerthelot, seceign ministryons at the Lvery scornfulome” (to usede.30 He disp

xaggerated setively contra“President W

Mar. 2, 1920,

f an Allied Coneet, London, S20, at 11a.m.,”

out the Peace T

Remo / 9

Lloyd upreme of the

Wilson’s n of the “would

e of [a] ng the historic

way to ich had as other was to s.29 cretary-y, who London l of the e Lloyd paraged ense of adicting Wilson

DBFP,

nference SW1, on ” DBFP,

Treaties,


was entirely guided by Mr. Brandeis”). Further, he dismissed the Zionist proposal as “too extravagant to be considered for a single moment” before proceeding to lament Allied support for the “largely mystical” Zionist movement, which in his view was based on the misconceived hope of “rescuing large numbers of wretched Jews in Russia and Central Europe” at a time when “the great majority of these so-called Jews had [probably] very little real Jewish blood in their veins.”31

By now the two powers had agreed to the text of the Palestine clause in the Turkish peace treaty, which was broadly based on Lloyd George’s own definition: “Palestine: the boundaries to be defined in accordance with its ancient limits of Dan to Beersheba, and to be under British mandate.” The British prime minister was happy to leave the precise demarcation of the borders to a later stage and to inform Brandeis that his “geography was at fault, and that it might be as well if he studied more authoritative and accurate maps than were apparently at present at his disposal.” Even Berthelot calmed down, asking Lloyd George to inform Brandeis that France’s rejection of his “extravagant claims” notwithstanding, Paris “had no intention of adopting a hostile attitude, but was quite prepared to make liberal arrangement for the supply of water for the Zionist population.”32

31 “British Secretary’s Notes of an Allied Conference

held at 10, Downing Street, London, SW1, on Tuesday, February 17, 1920, at 3.30 p.m.,” DBFP, vol. 7, p. 107; “British Secretary’s Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, SW1, on Saturday, February 21, 1920, at 11 a.m.,” DBFP, vol. 7, p. 184.

32 “British Secretary’s Notes of an Allied Conference held at 10, Downing Street, London, SW1, on Saturday, February 21, 1920, at 11 a.m.,” DBFP, vol. 7, pp. 182, 185.

San Remo This feigned affinity proved very short

lived. When the Supreme Allied Powers met again on April 19-26, 1920, in the Italian resort town of San Remo to finalize the Turkish peace treaty, the French were back to their old game. Prime Minister Millerand, enraged by what he considered less than unequivocal British rebuff of Faisal’s imperial ambitions, which he feared would reduce the French mandate in Syria to a mere façade for the emir’s effective rule, exploited the Palestine mandate as a springboard for improving France’s regional position. As a result, the French delegation to San Remo did not content itself with disputing Palestine’s northern border but questioned the British and Zionist interpretation of the Palestine

The French delegation to San Remo, led byFrench prime minister Alexandre Millerand,questioned the British and Zionist inter-pretation of the Palestine mandate and indeedthe notion of a Jewish national home.

MIDDLE E

mandate—notion national attempt measure envisagedcondomin

No Curzon re“which Powers,”“in the poriginallythe idea. sympatheestablish expressinutmost “tneverthelproject aBalfour argued, submittedsince “hacceptancBalfour’s

The aback. “Macquaintehe correquintesseterms ofmunicateMinister

33 Lloyd G

vol. 2and TransSocie

34 “BritishSupreRemoDBFP

EAST QUARTE

—or indeed of a Jewhome—in

to recoveof Sykes-Picd Anglo-Frnium.33

sooner equested thathad been a be written inprecise formy given,” thaConceding t

etic to the aa national

ng France’s to satisfy theless, propoaltogether. Declaration the Palestin

d to the Leaghe could nce had [evs declaration

British foreM. Bertheloed with the ected his Fential Englisf the decla

ed in FebruPichon and

George, The Tr2, p. 1155; Ja

the Arab sactions of tety, 68 (1978):

h Secretary’s eme Council, ho, on SaturdayP, vol. 8, pp. 15

ERLY Summ

d the wish

an r a cot’s ench

had t the Balfouraccepted bynto the Pales

m in which an Berthelot bthat “the whoaspiration ofhome in Pa

willingneseir legitimatesed reconsInstead of

into the ne questiongue of Nationot recall er] been gby the Allied

eign secretarot was possib

history of thFrench counsh understaaration had uary 1918 approved by

ruth about the an Karl TanenMiddle Eastthe American 7, p. 39.

Notes of a Mheld at the Villay, Apr. 24, 1959-60.

mt

mer 2020

r Declarationy the Alliestine mandat

it had beenbrushed asidole world waf the Jews talestine” ans to do ite desire,” hesidering thi

writing thmandate, h

n should bons—not leasthat generaiven to Mrd Powers.” 34

ry was takenbly not fullyhe question,nterpart withatement. Th

been comto Foreign

y him as they

Peace Treatiesnbaum, “Franc, 1914-1920,

Philosophica

Meeting of tha Devachan, Sa920, at 4 p.m.,

According minister, theto the desira

national h

n, d te n

de as o d ts e, is

he he e st al r. 4 n y ” h

he m-

n y

s, ce ,” al

he an ,”

largwouneitgovPaleFranrefeTurmadform

intehistprinagrenaticusferenonraisCattionits madvmisfor as inte

at ththe veh

35 I

36 I

to the Italiaere was “agrability of inshome for the

ge number ould not budther been offvernment, nestine’s futu

ance was caerence in an rkish treaty,de by one Pmally accept

The Italianerceded. “It tory,” he sainciple the eement as toional home sion had ences regardn-Jewish comsed the entiretholics in thning Britain’mandatory o

visable to sssion that wthe Holy Plawell as me

erfaith disputThis entice

he London cissue of C

hicle for rein

Ibid., pp. 160, 1

Ibid., p. 162.

an prime reement as stituting a e Jews.”

had bWilsonGreeceand SitherefojustifieMr. Bahad be

f the Allied dge. Since thfficially endonor acceptedure administategorically official instr

, to an unoPower, whicted by the Aln prime minis

was uselesid. “It appea

Powers wo the desirabi

for the Jewrevealed A

ding the rigmmunities, ae issue of th

he East. Hens ability to eobligations, iset up an i

would proposaces in lieu oethods for thtes.36 ed Millerandconference, thChristianity’s

ntroducing th

168.

Karsh: San Re

been by Prn and also bye, China, iam. “He th

ore, he wased in sayinalfour’s decleen acceptedPowers.” Behe declaratio

orsed by the d as a bastration, he aopposed to

rument, suchofficial declch had nevellies generallyster Francescss to go intared to him

were generaility of institws.” Yet th

Anglo-Frenchghts of Paleand had, mohe status of Rnce, withouteffectively cait might havinternationalse new reguof the existinhe adjudicat

d into actionhe French has holy sites

he internaliza

emo / 11

resident y Italy, Serbia, hought, s quite ng that laration d by a erthelot on had French sis for argued, o “any h as the laration er been y.”35 co Nitti to past that in

ally in tuting a he dis-h dif-estine’s

oreover, Roman t ques-arry out ve been l com-ulations ng ones tion of

n. Even ad used s as a ation of

MIDDLE E

Palestine Sykes-Picinto unwoppositiohis Italihad reopthe Frencwould opportunPalestine it, the Paissues: “Tnational were all safeguardcommunino insupequestion Jewish boin Britainliberal spwould likdecisionscreated bLand.38

LloyWhile it act as pcommuniOttoman case. Britreatmentwas concsubject itbeen imp

37 “British

held Tuesdvol. 7

38 “BritishSupreRemoDBFP

EAST QUARTE

envisaged cot, only to

wavering Bron.37 Now ian counterpened the isch prime minnot miss ity to gain at Britain’s

alestine quesThe first wahome for thagreed. Th

ding of theities. That aerable difficof existing odies.” And n’s ability to pirit in dealinke the confs “the morby centuries

yd George womade sense protector oity so long rule, he said

itain was not of religioucerned, and t to the samposed upon t

h Secretary’s Nat 10, Downi

day, February 17, pp. 103-6, 10

h Secretary’s eme Council, ho, on SaturdayP, vol. 8, pp. 16

ERLY Summ

by run ritish

that rpart ssue, nister

the a say in a

expense. Thstion involvas that therehe Jews. Uphe second poe rights ofgain, he tho

culties. The ttraditional ridespite his a“display her

ng with this ference to faral situationof sacrifice”

ould have nofor a Europf the Romas Palestin

d, this was not Turkey aus and ethn

it was income conditionsthe Turks by

Notes of an Alng Street, Lon

17, 1920, at 3.38-12.

Notes of a Mheld at the Villay, Apr. 24, 1963-5.

Tt

mer 2020

administeringe way he sawed three rea should be on that, theyoint was th

f non-Jewishought, offerethird was thights of nonabsolute trusr well-knownquestion,” hactor into itn in Franc” in the Holy

othing of thisean power t

man Catholie was undeno longer thas far as thnic minoritieonceivable ts “which hay force after

lied Conferencndon, SW1, o30 p.m.,” DBFP

Meeting of tha Devachan, Sa920, at 4 p.m.,

The top Frenthat all the anti-Zionis

to go

g w al a y

he h d

he n-st n

he ts ce y

s. o ic er he he es o d a

ce on P,

he an ,”

GreduaPow“woBriteverela

dowinsetermdec“allandwhedecprovsiblorig191by o

exaoppthe the JewFranDecprecit h

39 I

40 I

nch diplomaJews in Frast and had no to Palestin

eat Britain” al administrawers,” whicould make tain to admin

en easily raisations with F

This view wn, only toertion of thms of the maclaration as “l the Jews d had no deereas Miller

claration’s svision that tle for puttinginally made17, by the Bother Allied

Curzon seactly the Frenposed to crea

first place, orights and

wish communance was agrclaration in tcise phrasinhad been or

Ibid., pp. 164, 6

Ibid., pp. 163, 1

at claimed ance were no desire ne.

series Makingtector CatholBritainadminiwould sulting

but would ation by twch in Lloyit quite impnister the cose difficultie

France.”39 prevailed. T

o resume the Balfour Dandate. Berth“a dead letter

in France sire at all torand suggessubstance wthe “mandatong into effee on the 8th

British governpowers.”40

eemed at a nch took excating a Jewisor were theyprivileges o

nities? He hreeable to inthe peace treng and wiriginally ma

66.

167.

Karsh: San Re

of bloody g France th

of Paleics at a time

n was in chaistering the c

not only bg and humilia

“simply leawo Great Euyd George’spossible for

ountry, and ites in regard

The French bthe attack oDeclaration helot dismissr” and claimwere anti-Z

o go to Palested repeatin

while omittinory will be rect the declh [2nd] Novnment and a

loss as toception. Wersh national hy anxious to of Palestine’had understoonserting the Baty, albeit noithout notinade by the

emo / 12

wars.” he pro-stine’s e when arge of country be “in-ating to ad to a uropean s view r Great t might to her

backed on the to the

sed the med that Zionist, estine,” ng the ng the respon-laration vember, adopted

o what re they

home in protect

’s non-od that Balfour ot in its

ng that British


government at a certain date; and he had endeavored to meet these objections, however misconceived they might be. But now the French delegation seemed to have substituted its own draft for the insertion of the declaration in the peace treaty even in a modified form, which was something that Britain, as the designated mandatory for Palestine, could not possibly accept. Besides, argued Curzon, “the Jews regarded the declaration of Mr. Balfour in its entirety as the charter of their rights, and they attached great importance to reference being made to the original declaration in the Treaty of Peace.” And though the French might believe that the Jews “had no reason to attach capital importance” to the declaration’s inclusion in the treaty, the “fact remained, however, that they did attach such importance, and, after all, they were the best judges of their own interests.” In these circumstances, was it really necessary to continue squabbling over an issue on which the British government had taken up a position from which it was practically impossible for it to retreat?41

With Millerand acquiescing in this request on condition that the relinquishment of French religious privileges not be formally mentioned in the treaty and that France’s point on the political rights of Palestine’s non-Jewish population be recorded in a procès-verbal, the terms of the mandate were quickly agreed on, to be subsequently incorporated into the Turkish peace treaty, which was signed four months later in the French town of Sèvres.42

41 Ibid., pp. 167-9.

42 “The Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey. Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920,” Macedonian Press Agency News and Document Archive, Athens, art. 95-7.

Conclusion “Among the more satisfactory items of

news from San Remo is the statement that Great Britain is to receive a mandate for Palestine which will be considered, in term of Mr. Balfour’s Declaration, a national home for the Jews,” read a London Times editorial on April 27, 1920:

We recently called attention to attempts that were being made to invalidate that Declaration, which embodied wisely, albeit tardily, the only sound policy the Allies could adopt towards the Jewish people … But though this op-position was at length overcome, and the promise given, the op-ponents of the promise have not wearied in their efforts to render it nugatory. They dislike the idea that the Jews should have a national home of their own and would fain persuade the non-Jewish world that the Jews are merely a religious denomination without special race character.

It is a historical tragedy that this criticism, which was primarily directed against “a section of the super-British Jews whose title to speak for the Jewish masses is as meager as their knowledge of them,” remains as valid today as it was one hundred years ago. Only now it is the Palestinian leaders (and their international champions) who remain en-trenched in the rejection not only of the millenarian Jewish attachment to the Land of Israel but of the very existence of a Jewish people (and by implication its right to statehood). Rather than keep trying to turn the clock backward at the cost of prolonging their people’s statelessness and suffering, it is time for their leaders to shed their century-long recalcitrance and opt for peace and


reconciliation with their Israeli neighbors. And what can be a more auspicious timing for initiating this sea change than the one hundredth anniversary of the San Remo conference?

Efraim Karsh, editor of Middle East Quarterly, is emeritus professor of Middle East and Mediterranean studies at King’s College London and professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University where he also directs the BESA Center for Strategic Studies. This article is part of a wider study prepared under the auspices of the BESA Center.