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July–August 2014

How the Other Fukushima Plant Survivedby Ranjay Gulati, Charles Casto, and Charlotte Krontiris

When we hear the words “Fukushima disaster,” most of us

think of Fukushima Daiichi, the nuclear power plant wracked

by three core meltdowns and three reactor building explosions

following the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan.

Without electricity to run the plant’s cooling systems,

managers and workers couldn’t avert catastrophe: People

around the world watched grainy footage of the explosions,

gray plumes of smoke and steam blotting the skyline. Since

the tsunami, Daiichi has been consumed by the challenge of containing and reducing the radioactive

water and debris left behind.

Less well known is the crisis at Fukushima Daini, a sister plant about 10 kilometers to the south,

which also suffered severe damage but escaped Daiichi’s fate. To shed light on how leadership

shaped the outcome, we’ve reconstructed that story here—from several firsthand interviews;

detailed reports by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the utility that owns both plants;

the Nuclear Energy Institute; and a number of public sources. In so volatile an environment, none of

the usual rules for decision making and organizational behavior applied. But the site superintendent,

Naohiro Masuda, and the rest of Daini’s 400 employees charted their way through the chaos, and

the plant survived without a meltdown or an explosion.

At a magnitude of 9.0, the earthquake was the largest in Japan’s recorded history, and the waves it

generated were three times as high as what Daini had been built to withstand. It was left with just

one diesel generator and one power line intact. That single power line supplied electricity to the

control rooms, where plant operators could monitor the water level, temperature, pressure, and other

vital metrics for each reactor and containment vessel. But three of the four reactors lacked

sufficient power to run a critical component of their cooling systems.

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In two minutes, the tsunami overwhelms Daini.

Slide to see before and after.

To achieve cooldown and prevent the kind of devastation that was unfolding at Daiichi, Masuda and

his team had to connect those reactors to Daini’s surviving power sources. But the team was still

reeling from a natural disaster of almost supernatural dimensions. What had happened here? How

could the workers move forward and take action when all their expectations had been so violently

shattered? Hanging over these questions was an even scarier one: Was the worst really over?

Natural disasters aren’t discrete events. The earthquake had been days in the making and would

generate aftershocks for more than a year. The tsunami wasn’t a single dreadful wave but a series

of them.

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FUKUSHIMADAINI

FUKUSHIMADAIICHI

COUNTDOWNTOCOOLDOWNJust10kilometersfromtheFukushimaDaiichinuclearpowerplant,whichsufferedthreecoremeltdownsandthreeexplosionsfollowingtheMarch2011earthquakeandtsunamiinJapan,sitstheotherFukushimaplant—Daini,which

To assess the damage and begin the dangerous work of restoring power to the reactors, Masuda

didn’t simply make decisions and issue orders. He knew he had to persuade people to act—against

their survival instincts. His technical competence, knowledge of the plant, and diligence helped him

earn their trust. But more important, Masuda acknowledged the evolving reality in which they were

operating. He shared the burden of uncertainty and doubt, engaging in what the organizational

theorist Karl Weick and others have described as the “sensemaking” process: He arrived at a

common understanding with his team members by revising and communicating what they “knew” so

that they could together adapt to each twist and turn.

As a result, workers at Daini didn’t lose focus or hope. While they acted, some things became more

certain (“What’s broken in the plant, and how can we fix it?”); some became less so (“Am I in danger

from radiation?”); and some remained as unpredictable as ever (“Will these aftershocks lead to more

flooding?”). Until the last reactor went into cold shutdown, Masuda and his team took nothing for

granted. With each problem they encountered, they recalibrated, iteratively creating continuity and

restoring order. As we describe below, they acted their way into a better understanding of the

challenges they faced.

A Closer Look at SensemakingSensemaking is adaptive behavior in which understanding and experience shape each other. We

humans are attached to our expectations—we cling to the familiar. But a crisis disrupts the familiar.

When past experience doesn’t explain the current condition, we must revise our interpretation of

events and our response to them. Bit by bit, we clarify an uncertain reality through action and

subsequent reflection. Weick called this phenomenon “enactment.”

Enactment isn’t a linear process, however. In a crisis, people often need to venture down some

wrong paths before finding their way. But the more publicly a leader commits to those paths, the

more difficult it will be to seek out a new, better understanding. How to engage in sensemaking

without becoming trapped by a flawed interpretation of events has been the subject of much

research (such as Weick’s analysis of the famous 1949 Mann Gulch wildfire in Montana). Masuda

navigated that fine line as he pursued cold shutdown for the plant’s four reactors.

To continue reading, register now or purchase a single copy PDF.Become a paid subscriber for full uninterrupted access.Already an HBR subscriber? Register with your account number for FREE access.

Ranjay Gulati is the Jaime and Josefina Chua Tiampo Professor at Harvard Business School and theauthor of Reorganize for Resilience (Harvard Business Review Press, 2010). Charles Casto was theNuclear Regulatory Commission’s senior executive responding to the Fukushima disaster and led U.S.government efforts in Japan for almost a year. Charlotte Krontiris is a researcher and a writer based inBoston.

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• Reply •

John Stapleton • 18 days ago

Re: SRO Cert. Modern commercial reactors are designed to operate withoutoff-site power. Many earlier and modern GE designed Boiling Water Reactors(BWRs) are in fact designed to operate (shutdown) with Loss Of Off Site Power(LOOP). If a LOOP event occurs, the plants are designed to automaticallyswitch to an on-site backup diesel generator (Fuku had one but the 46 ft tsunamidisabled it and some plants have two diesels) to carry safe shutdown functionselectrical loads. In the event the diesels malfunctions, there are Class One (Safety Grade) backup batteries on site. BWRs also have an internal steamsuppression pool of >one million gallons of water which quenches reactor steamrelieved through reactor safety-relief valves. Finally there is an on-site reactorsteam-powered Reactor Core Isolation Circulation (RCIC) system. that isdesigned to cool the reactor in the event of an accident. All of these systems areapproved by the NRC.

• Reply •

SRO Cert • 20 days ago

Commercial nuclear power reactors are not designed to operate without offsitepower for safety reasons. It could be done, but it would require special portablepower supplies and the defeat of several reactor trips.in order to withdraw thecontrol rods from the reactor.The NRC would never allow it.

• Reply •

edpheil • a month ago

So, how would the outcome have been different if one of the plants was kept on-line or restarted immediately to supply power to the sites?

Can one plant be operated with only on-site loads with this size plants?

Prashant • a month ago

The awesome leadership by Masuda and survival instincts functional teamsworked here. We cant exactly pin point which management theory worked here.If one is to save so many people then definitely is a big responsibility, can be

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• Reply •

If one is to save so many people then definitely is a big responsibility, can betaken by such natural leaders. More over his commands could be shaped to asuccess story because of the trust level with his immediate team to the verypersonal level , wise despite of loss of own loss of family members could notdemoralize the teams to deliver their wonder in crisis. What ever the transparentmethods to communicate to its team, they stick to their own commonsensedecided to use, they didn't gave it up on the way.

• Reply •

Sadanand Kadam • a month ago

Excellent leadership by F Daini ;without Karma luck factor can not help.

• Reply •

Lance Rains • a month ago

One shouldn't be Websters to point out to a Harvard organ that "disaster” and"catastrophe" entail massive devastation and loss of life. The Fukushimaaccident was neither, unlike somehow forgotten recent exploding oil rigs andMexican gas facilities. Three rare super-quake induced meltdowns in a row withzit casualties and public damage is more the result of conservative pressurevessel design than any Vegas odds luck or fluke. Just helping you stayaccurate unlike most the media in this area. thanks atomicinsights.com

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• Reply •

Chris Lamke • a month ago Lance Rains

Could you clarify your point, Lance? You obviously have a problem withthe article but it's not clear from your comment exactly what it got wrongor how you'd improve it. I don't see what you've contributed to thediscussion. What am I missing?

2

• Reply •

Woody Epstein • a month ago

Not to diminsh the most excellent work of Masuda-san, Fukushima Daini hadluck on its side.

In the wake of the tsunami, which also partially knocked out power atFukushima Daini, workers urgently gathered makeshift cables from theKashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant in Niigata Prefecture and otherlocations to cool Fukushima 2 plant's four reactors. A large number of workerswere brought in and they worked through the night taking down a baseball fieldfence on the compound to create a heliport, and the headlights of 20 workers'cars were used to guide helicopters carrying the cables. A total of ninekilometers of cable were laid over two days, and workers just managed to coolthe plant. Normally such work would have taken 20 days.

The reason the plant was able to employ such human wave tactics was that theMarch 11 earthquake occurred on a Friday afternoon, and there happened to beseveral thousand workers from cooperating companies on the premises.

Naohiro Masuda, head of the Fukushima 2 nuclear plant, commented, "Ishudder to think how it would have been if it had happened on a Saturday."

--- as reported in the Mainichi Newspaper, Japan, December 23, 2011

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