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Supportfordevelopingbettercountryknowledgeonpublicadministrationandinstitutionalcapacitybuilding

(EUPACK)

TopicalPaper:

Howtoimprovethequalityofpublic

administrationinEurope?Lessonsfromand

forcivilservicereform

Jan-HinrikMeyer-Sahling,UniversityofNottingham

KimSassMikkelsen,RoskildeUniversity

ChristianSchuster,UniversityCollegeLondon

July2018

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Tableofcontents

Introduction.......................................................................................................................................3

1. Whatweknowaboutwhatworksincivilservicereformandmanagement.............................5

2. Thechallengeofinstitutionalisingmeritrecruitment................................................................6

3. Thechallengeofovercomingpoliticisation................................................................................8

4.Thechallengeofsystemicprofessionalization............................................................................12

5. Whatwayforward?..................................................................................................................15

6. References................................................................................................................................16

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Introduction

The EUPACK project has generated comprehensive country knowledge on the characteristics of

publicadministrationinEUmemberstates.Itcoversawiderangeofthemesinpublicadministration

includingthesize,structureandscopeofgovernment,themanagementofthecivilservice,policy-

making and the co-ordination of government, transparency and accountability relations in public

administration.Theinformationprovidesaconsistentoverviewthatwill,forthefirsttime,allowfor

systematiccomparisonofpublicadministrationacrossEUmemberstatestofacilitatethetargeting

offuturesupportbytheEuropeanCommission.

MajorchallengesremainfortheimprovementofthequalityofpublicadministrationinEurope.They

include (i) the evaluation of the effectiveness of EU support provided so far in the area of

administrative capacity building, (ii) the factors that drive differences in the quality of public

administration across EU member states, and (iii) the identification of institutional designs and

practices thatenhance theperformanceand integrityofpublicadministrationandhenceabetter

understandingof ‘whatworks incivilservicemanagementinEurope’.Thescaleofthesequestions

shouldnotbeunderestimated,astheevidencetoanswerthemremainsremarkablylimited.

Thisbriefingnotefocusesonthelastofthethreequestions.Itdrawsoninsightsfromthestudyof

civil service reform and management as one of, if not, the most important dimension of public

administration. Inthiscontextcivilservicemanagement isunderstoodastheday-to-dayoperation

ofmanagingpeopleinpublicadministration.Itincludesmanagementfunctionssuchasrecruitment,

promotion, transfer, dismissals, salary management, performance evaluation and will further

addressquestionssuchastheadequatescopeofthecivilservice(Berman2015).

The briefing note will raise more questions than provide answers. This reflects our limited

understandingof ‘whatworks’ intheareaofcivilservicereformandmanagement(Meyer-Sahling,

Mikkelsen and Schuster 2018). This may be surprising, as there is a general consensus among

researchers and practitioners that the professionalisation of the civil service is essential for a

country’sdevelopment(EvansandRauch1999).However,welackadequateevidencehowtodesign

civil service management systems that improve the performance, integrity and hence quality of

publicadministration.Howimportantareformalexaminationsystemsforcivilserviceentry?Should

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we centralise civil service recruitment or should we delegate it to individual administrative

organisations? Shall we reward civil servants on the basis of their performance or shall salaries

mainly be determined by years of experience or other mechanisms? How does an effective

performanceevaluationinthecivilservicelooklike?

These are critical questions for civil service reformers. Questions of this kind often appear for

reformersatthelevelofEUmemberstatesandareindeedregularlyposedtoEuropeanCommission

officials. Without an answer to these questions, it is difficult to determine how to improve the

qualityofpublicadministrationinEUmemberstatesandwhatkindofinitiativestosupport.

Takinginsightsfromthestudyofcivilservicereform,thisbriefingnotewillpresentthreearguments

andconcludewithaproposalthefutureroleoftheEuropeanCommissioninpromotingthequality

of public administration in Europe. First, there is a broad consensus that merit recruitment has

positive consequences for the performance, motivation and integrity of civil servants, while the

politicisation of the civil service is widely associated with negative consequences (Dahlstroem,

Lapuente and Teorell 2012, Evans andRauch1999,Meyer-Sahling andMikkelsen2016,Neshkova

andKostadinova 2012,Oliveros and Schuster 2017). Second, civil service reformers and academic

researcherslackadequateevidenceonhowtodesigneffectivemeritrecruitmentsystemsandhow

to overcome problems of civil service politicisation in the first place. Third, there exists limited

knowledgeonwhatworksinotherareasasofcivilservicemanagementsuchassalarymanagement,

performance management and career management and how to best design civil service

managementstructuresforagivencontext(Meyer-Sahling,MikkelsenandSchuster2018).

FortheEuropeanCommission,thissituationpresentsbothopportunitiesandconstraintsintermsof

what to advice and how to support EUmember states in their quest for a betterworking public

administration. In particular, it provides an invitation to generate systematic evidence on how to

improvethequalityofpublicadministration inEuropeandtosupportmeasures inmemberstates

thatseektogeneratebetterevidenceonwhatworks incivilservicemanagement, for instance,by

means of regular civil service surveys that are used in several OECD countries. In doing so, the

European Commissionwould focus its efforts on learning and improving the capacity ofmember

statestomonitor,evaluateand indeeddesignreformsthatwill improvethequalityofcivilservice

managementonthebasisofrobustevidence.

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The briefing note is based on insights from the academic literature on public administration, in

particular,civilservicereformandmanagementandresearchconductedbytheauthorsontheissue

inCentralandEasternEuropeandtheWesternBalkansinthecontextofprojectsfundedbySIGMA-

OECD and the Regional School of Public Administration (ReSPA) (Meyer-Sahling 2009 and 2012,

Meyer-Sahlingetal2015).Inaddition,thenotewill,wherepossible,refertoevidencefromaproject

fundedby theBritishAcademyand theUKDepartment for InternationalDevelopmentand ledby

theauthorsontheconsequencesofcivilservicemanagementpracticesintransitionanddeveloping

countries(Meyer-Sahling,SchusterandMikkelsen2018).1

1. Whatweknowaboutwhatworksincivilservicereformandmanagement

Political scientists, economists, public administration andmanagement scholarswidely agree that

the quality of a country’s bureaucracy, in particular, the professionalization of its civil service, is

beneficial for its development. A ‘use-able’ bureaucracy is a precondition for the consolidation of

democracy(LinzandStepan1996). It isassociatedwitheconomicgrowthanddevelopment(Evans

and Rauch 1999). It is associated with less public sector corruption (Dahlstroem, Lapuente and

Teorell 2012, Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen 2016, Oliveros and Schuster 2017). It enhances the

performance of public policy, in particular, by improving themanagement of policy programmes

(Lewis 2008). In the context of European integration, bureaucratic quality is positively associated

with progress during the negotiations for EU accession and both the transposition and

implementationofEUpoliciesbymemberstates(HilleandKnill2006,FalknerandTreib2008).

Twofeaturesofcivilservicemanagementhavereceivedmostattentioninthecontextofthisdebate.

Ontheonehand,researchstressesthepositiveconsequencesofmeritrecruitmentpracticesonthe

performance and integrity of the civil service. On the other, it has been widely shown that civil

service politicisation has negative consequences. By contrast, there ismuch less evidence on the

impactofothercivilservicedesignelementsandmanagementpracticessuchassalarymanagement,

promotions,transfersandperformancemanagementpractices.

1Theprojectreportisavailableathttps://www.britac.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Meyer%20Sahling%20Schuster%20Mikkelsen%20-%20What%20Works%20in%20Civil%20Service%20Management.pdf

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2. Thechallengeofinstitutionalisingmeritrecruitment

Meritrecruitmentassumesthatcandidatesarerecruitedandselectedonthebasisoftheirskillsand

qualificationsratherthaninformalcriteriasuchapersonalcontacts,politicalsupportorbelongingto

particular ethnic or social groups (Meyer-Sahling et al 2015). In short, it assumes that the best-

qualifiedpersonisselectedforagivenrole.Accordingly,meritrecruitmentisarguedtoincreasethe

skillandcompetency levelsof thecivilservice.Moreover, it isarguedtocreateanespiritdecorps

amongthosewhohavegonethroughcompetitiverecruitmentandselectionprocessesandsetstheir

careersapartfromthoseofpoliticiansandotherpoliticalappointees.

While the benefits of merit recruitment are very plausible, it is less clear how to best organise

recruitment processes to achievemerit outcomes. Several design optionsmust be considered by

reformers. Shall job vacancies be advertised and if so where? Shall candidates sit competitive

entranceexaminationsincludingwrittentests?OrisapersonalinterviewandanassessmentofaCV

sufficientformeritrecruitment?Shalltherecruitmentprocessbecentrallyorganised,for instance,

byanindependentcivilservicecommission?Orisitpreferabletodelegaterecruitmentandselection

toinstitutionsthatseektofillvacanciesandshouldmanagersbegiventhefreedomtohirethestaff

theyseefitbest?

Sofarwehavefewanswerstothesequestions.Emergingevidencefromourresearchconductedfor

DFIDUKsuggeststhatpublicvacancyannouncementsaregenerallypreferable,astheyincreasethe

transparencyof recruitmentprocessesandwiden thepoolofpotential applicants (Meyer-Sahling,

SchusterandMikkelsen2018).However,theanswerstotheotherquestionsappeartobemuchless

generalizablebutaremoredependentonthecharacteristicsofthecontextthatisbeingconsidered.

First, written examinations are commonly assumed to help to screen the competencies of

candidates(HeywoodandMeyer-Sahling2013).Moreover,theymightincreasethetransparencyof

recruitment and selection and attract a wider pool of potential applicants, as they signal to the

outsideworld that recruitment and selection processes are professionallymanaged. At the same

time, critics warn that written entrance examinations may be too cumbersome, inefficient and

unabletoactuallyscreenrelevantskillsandknowledgeforjobsandcareersinthecivilservice.

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Theevidenceontheimportanceofwrittenentranceexaminationsismixed.Ithasbeensuggested,

forinstance,thatwrittenentranceexaminationsareausefuldesignoptionincountriesinwhichthe

generallevelofpoliticisationofrecruitmentandselectionishigh(Sundell2012).Bycontrast,when

politicisationislow,itmaybelessimportanttorelyonoverlyformalisticrecruitmentandselection

mechanisms.

To give a couple of examples from Central and Eastern Europe, Estonia and Latvia are the two

countries with the least politicised civil service in the region insofar as the central state

administrationisconcerned.Moreover,neitherofthemoperatescompulsorywrittenexaminations

forrecruitmentandcareeradvancement(Meyer-Sahling2009).However,theconclusionthatshould

bedrawnfromthisexampleisnotthatwrittenexaminationsareunnecessarybutthattheymaybe

lessimportantinthegivencontext.

Second, the degree of central involvement in recruitment and selection processes is even more

contested. Centralisation, on the one hand, tends to increase the consistency of recruitment and

examination processes. On the other hand, centralisation is often seen as inflexible and slow. In

particular, theNewPublicManagementadvocated thedecentralisationofpersonnelmanagement

powersinorderto‘letmanagersmanage’.

For now, there is little robust evidence on the pros and cons of centralisation versus delegation.

Most plausibly, it depends again on the characteristics of the context. Decentralisation may be

suitableinacontextoflowpoliticisationwheremanagersmayberelieduponusingtheirdiscretion

responsibly to select thebest-qualified candidate. The samemaynotbe true in a contextof high

politicisation, inwhichmanagersare subject topoliticalpressuresor theyare themselvespolitical

appointees.Indeed,emergingevidencefromtheWesternBalkanssuggeststhataprominentrolefor

linemangersisassociatedwithmorepoliticisationandmorefavouritism,presumablybecauseofthe

(irresponsible) use of discretion by managers. By contrast, centralised recruitment and selection

processesareassociatedwithlesspoliticisationandlessfavouritism.

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However, even if recruitment processes have been centralised and if compulsory written

examinationshavebeenintroduced,thereisnoguaranteethattheywillsucceedinbringingabout

the desired merit outcomes (Schuster 2017). The evidence from Central and Eastern and, in

particular, South Eastern Europe is that regulatory frameworks often retain legal loopholes that

allowfornon-meritappointments(Meyer-Sahlingetal2015).Theappointmentofactingmanagers

isaprominentexample.

Moreover,eveniflegalloopholeshavebeenminimised,onecannotexpectthatmeritoutcomeswill

beachieved.Whenacultureoffavouritismandpoliticalpatronageisdeeplyentrenched,politicians

andpolitical appointeesusually seekways to circumvent the formal rules of the game. Theymay

influencetheappointmentofselectioncommissions, instruct ‘independent’externalcandidatesor

leak examination questions, all of which undermine the principle of merit recruitment. In other

words, even if we identify a suitable design of a recruitment and selection process for a given

context, we need to pay particular attention to the quality of implementation andmight indeed

needtodevoteadditionalresourcestoachievingthedesiredresults.

3. Thechallengeofovercomingpoliticisation

In addition to the merits of merit recruitment, research and practice have paid considerable

attentiontothenegativeconsequencesofthepoliticisationofthecivilservice.Politicisationrefers

totherecruitment,promotion,retention,remunerationanddiscipliningofcivilservantsonthebasis

of political principles (Peters and Pierre 2004). Studies of politicisation tend to focus on

appointments and dismissals. Politicised recruitment is often seen as the direct opposite ofmerit

recruitment.However,politicalcriteriaarenottheonlynon-meritcriteria,asrecruitmentmayalso

takeintoaccountpersonalconnectionsandethnicbelonging.Moreover,thereissomedebateasto

whetherpartisanloyaltyandprofessionalcompetenciescontradicteachotherorwhethertheymay

gotogether,anissuetowhichwewillreturnbelow.

Ontheresearchsidethereisplentyofworkthathasidentifiedanegativeeffectofpoliticisationon

outcomes such as policy performance, corruption and the absorption capacity of EU funds (Lewis

2008, Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen 2016, Oliveros and Schuster 2017). Why is politicisation a

problem? Its negative consequences are usually traced to a number of mechanisms. Political

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appointeeshaveshortertimehorizons.Theyaremoredependentontheirpatronand,asaresult,

might stay in office for a shorter period of time. Politicisation is associatedwithmore personnel

turnoverinthecivilserviceandlessstability.Politicalappointeesarealsooften(butnotnecessarily)

consideredtobelessqualified,astheygottheirjobthankstopoliticalconnectionsratherthanskills

andqualifications(HeywoodandMeyer-Sahling2013).

Politicisationalsohas anumberofdirect and indirect effectson job satisfaction,workmotivation

and the intention to stay in the civil service (Lewis2008). For instance,when seniorpositions are

occupied by political appointees, staff in lower ranks have less opportunities to rise to the top

becausewhatmattersarepoliticalconnectionsratherthanperformance.Staffmaythereforeinvest

in political lobbying. Or they may simply see their career opportunities narrowed, become less

motivated and choose to leave the civil service altogether. We can therefore observe that

politicisation does indeed have a range of undesirable consequences for the quality of public

administration.

Ifpoliticisationisgenerallyfoundtohavenegativeconsequences,itispuzzlingwhygovernmentsdo

notmakemoreeffortstoovercomeit?Toanswerthisquestion,itisnecessarytolookmoreclosely

at the factorsandmechanisms that facilitate thepoliticisationof thecivil service in the firstplace

andindeedcontributetoitspersistence.Fourfactorsareparticularlyrelevant.

First, politicisation may be the result of ‘habit’ in the sense that it is deeply entrenched in the

administrative tradition of a country. The communist legacy of over-politicisation, for instance,

might explain to some extentwhy politicisation has been sticky inmany countries in Central and

EasternEuropeandinSouthEasternEurope.Yetsimilarargumentscanbemadeforothercountries

andregionsinEurope.

Second,politiciansand indeedbureaucratsandexternalobserversmightnotknowbetter, that is,

theymight lack theawarenessof thenegativeconsequencesofpoliticisation for theperformance

andintegrityofpublicadministration.Thismaysoundimplausibleforthosewhoresearchoradvice

onpublicadministrationreformbecausetheyfrequentlyencounterthesequestions inthecontext

of their professional life. But the reality is probably different, in particular,whenbearing inmind

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thattheevidenceoftheeffectivenessofcivilservicedesignsispatchyandnotwidelydisseminated.

Research that we have done for ReSPA on the Western Balkans, for instance, suggests that

politicianslackadequateknowledgeofrecruitmentandappointmentprocedures.

Third,politicalpartiesandpoliticiansareusuallythemaindriversofpoliticisation(Kopecky,Mairand

Spirova2012).Evenifweassumeforamomentthatpoliticiansareawareofnegativeconsequences

of politicisation, theymight actually draw selective benefits frompoliticising the civil service. It is

henceconceivablethat,undercertainconditions,de-politicisationispoliticallycostlyforpoliticians.

In particular, two types of considerations tend to make political appointments beneficial for

politicians.

In the first place, political appointments are ameans tobuildpartiesor political networks and to

consolidateelectoralsupport.Partiesandpoliticiansthereforemakeappointmentstorewardtheir

supporters (Grzymala-Busse 2007, Kopecky et al 2016). This motivation behind politicisation was

widespread in19thcenturyAmericaandremains important indevelopingcountries.However, it is

alsorelevantinmanySouthernEuropeancountries,forinstance,GreeceandpartsofItaly,anditis

commoninSouthEastEuropeanEUmemberandapplicantstates.

Politicisationthatfocusesonrewardingpoliticalsupporterswithjobsinthecivilserviceisoften,but

notexclusively,concentratedinthelowerranksofthecivilserviceandleadstobloated,over-staffed

civilservices.Itisoftenassociatedwithlowerlevelsofeconomicdevelopments,inparticular,alack

ofemploymentopportunitiesintheprivatesectorlabourmarket.

In the second place, political appointments are a means of controlling the civil service (Bach,

Hammerschmid and Loeffler 2015). Politicians make strategic appointments to control policy-

making,implementationandcoordinationinsidepublicadministration.Politicalappointmentsallow

ministersandpoliticalpartiestoaligntheirpolicypreferenceswiththoseofthecivilserviceandto

increase its political responsiveness. They expect that they help them implement a political

programme(eventhoughtheymightnotbeawareofthenegativeside-effectslistedabove).

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Politicalappointments for the sakeofpolitically controlling thecivil servicearewidespreadacross

Europe. They can be found in Central and Eastern Europe and in many Western European civil

services.Civilservicesthathavelargelyremainedde-politicisedattheverytopsuchasintheUK,the

Netherlands andDenmark are exceptions in Europe. Rather, forWestern Europe, there has been

debate over the increase of this form of politicisation during the last two or three decades, the

consequencesofwhichremainpoorlyunderstood.

Quite naturally, political appointments for the sake of political control aremore common after a

partychangeingovernment,inparticular,whenpartiesingovernmentchangefromoneendofthe

ideological spectrum to the other (Meyer-Sahling and Veen 2012). Especially in the newmember

states from Central and Eastern Europe, it is evident that politicisation at the top is higher in

countries that have regularly undergonemajor ideological shifts between government coalitions.

Poland,HungaryandSlovakiaaregoodexamplesof thispattern.However, themotivationbehind

politicalappointmentsisalsorelevantformanyWesternEuropeancountries.

What does the discussion of drivers of politicisationmean for initiatives to overcome it? First, in

ordertoaddressbadhabitsandalackofawareness,themostplausiblestrategywouldbetoexpose

politicalandadministrativeelitesinpoliticisedcountriestomoreandbetterinformation.Ideally,this

roleistakenbyanindependentmediaandpotentiallyaflourishingcivilsocietysector. Inaddition,

externalinitiativesmightaimatsystematicallyandcomprehensivelyincreasinglevelsofknowledge

anddebateofcivilservicemanagementpracticesinordertoovercomeobstaclestode-politicisation.

Second,itislikelytobehardertoovercomeincentivestomakepoliticalappointmentsforthesake

ofpartybuildingandpoliticallycontrollingthecivilservice.Thepoliticalcostsofabandoningthese

practicesmaybejusttoohighforpoliticians.Asaconsequence,manycivilservicereformproposals

will inevitablyfail. Ifpolitical incentivescontradicttheseproposals,theywilleithernotbeadopted

or, if so, politicians will seek ways and means to circumvent the rules when it comes to

implementation.

Ifitislargelyimpossibletoeliminatepoliticisation,thefocuswillhavetoshifttowardsstrategiesto

accommodateit.Tobesure,thereisnorobustevidenceonhowtodothisbutanumberofdesign

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options are worth further investigation. For instance, if politicians are unwilling to give up

appointmentpowers,civilservicestatutesmightneedtobedesignedinawaythattheyforcethem

to select candidates formanagerial positions from inside the civil service in order to ensure that

candidates have sufficient experience and expertise to perform their job at the highest level.

Alternatively, ifpoliticianswanttokeepthefreedomtorecruitfromoutsidepublicadministration,

mechanismsmight have to be put in place in order to rigorously test (i.e. filter) the professional

competenciesofpoliticalappointeesbeforetheyassumetheirofficialrole.

Astrategyof‘accommodatingpoliticisation’mayalsogainwideracceptanceinthepoliticalsystem.

Itwouldbemorerealisticanditwouldtakeintoaccountthatpoliticisationisfarmorewidespreadin

WesternEurope than isusuallyadmittedby internationalorganisations thatare involved inpublic

administrationreformassistance.Fornow,thereisnoevidencethatwouldshedlightondifferential

effects of politicisation in the East and West and North and South of Europe. However, the

experiencefrommanyWesternEuropeancountriesraisestheprospectthatstructuredorbounded

politicisation at the top of the civil service that involves high levels of professional competencies

among political appointees increases the responsiveness of the civil service without undermining

performanceandintegrityacrosstheentirecivilservice.However,itremainstobeseenhowmuch

politicisationistoomuchandwhichtypeiscostlyfortheperformanceofpublicadministrationand

whichisnot.

4.Thechallengeofsystemicprofessionalisation

Havingdiscussedthechallengesofinstitutionalisingmeritrecruitmentandovercomingpoliticisation,

howmuchcanwesayaboutotherareasofcivilservicemanagement?Tobebrief:ratherlittle.For

instance,which typeof salary system ismore conductive toperformanceand integrity in the civil

service?What is the impact of promotion and transfer systems? Can well-designed performance

evaluationsystemsmakeapositivedifference?Andwhataboutsomeofthedesignfeaturesthatare

regularlylistedinreformpapersandproposalssuchasthescopeofthecivilservice?

Startingwiththesalarysystem,mostofuswouldagreethatitmakesanimportantdifferencehow

wearepaidfordoingourjob.Yettheevidenceforcivilservicesystemsisscarce.Evidencefromour

research on developing countries suggests that salary levels contribute to job satisfaction of civil

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servants and their intention to pursue a career in the public sector (Meyer-Sahling, Schuster and

Mikkelsen2018).

Theevidenceismuchlessclearfortheimpactofsalarylevelsoncorruptionandintegrityinthecivil

service.Wewouldexpectthathighersalariesreducecorruptioninthecivilservice(VanRijckeghem

andWeder2001).However,researchonthesubject is inconclusive(Meyer-Sahling,Mikkelsenand

Schuster 2018). Thismay be puzzling but it also indicates that the focus on salary levelsmay be

misguided when focusing on the civil service. Indeed, it may be much more important that civil

servantsperceivetheirsalariestobefairvis-à-vistheircolleagues,theirsuperiorsandpeergroups

outsidethecivilservice.Yetthereisnoresearchonhowhorizontalsalaryequalityorverticalsalary

compressionaffecttheattitudesandbehaviourofcivilservants.

Second,sofarwehaveprimarilydiscussedtherecruitment,selectionandappointmenttothecivil

service.However, is itplausible toassumethat themodeofentering thecivil service stillmatters

five,tenoreventwentyyearsintothecareerinthecivilservice?Shouldwenotratherexpectthatit

ismuchmoreimportanthowacivilservantadvancedtohiscurrentjoborwilladvancetoabetter

job in the future rather than howhe/shewas recruited a long time ago? Promotion and transfer

policiesrefertothepresentor futureofacivilservant’scareerandmightthereforebeat leastas

importantasrecruitmentandselectiondecisions,ifnotmoreimportant(Meyer-Sahling,Mikkelsen

andSchuster2018).

Yet our knowledge of the impact of different types of promotion and transfer systems on the

professionalisationofthecivilserviceisscarce,too.Isitmoreeffectivetofocusonpredictabilityand

transparency, for instance, by means of seniority-based promotions? Or is it more suitable to

establishcompetitiveprocessesforpromotionswithinthecivilserviceorevenpubliccompetitions

that pit civil servants against candidates from theprivate sector and thewider public sector? For

now,researchandpracticehavenotproducedevidencethatwouldprovidegoodanswerstothese

questions.

Third, performance evaluation systemshavemade theirway into the public sector across Europe

over the last twodecades (Staronova2017).Commonwisdomassumes that theyareanessential

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management tool as much as they should affect the salary level and career prospects of civil

servants. Inpractice,performanceevaluationsystemsareoftencriticised for their ineffectiveness.

Theyarethereforeacommoncivilservicemanagementfunctionforwhichpolicy-makersatthelevel

of national governments seek advice but little evidence is available for public administration in

Europe.

Finally, comparisonsof civil service systems frequently focusonbroad categories such as the size

andscopeofthecivilservice.Theseareimportantmarkersfortheidentificationofdifferencesand

similarities.However, it isnotpossible tosaywhethera relatively largerornarrowerscopeof the

civil service isbeneficial.By implication, there isnounambiguousadviceonwhether the scopeof

thecivilserviceshouldbeincreasedinagivencountry.

Indeedthequestionofscopeissecondarytootherquestions.Thescopeofcivilservicelawsimplies

that certain policies apply to employees within the scope. This means that a change in scope

becomesaproblemforcivilservicemanagement,ifkeypoliciesofthecivilservicearechangedtoo.

In Estonia, for instance, the scope of the civil service lawwas radically shrunk in 2013,while the

categoryofpublicemployeeswasexpanded.Thechangematters insofarasemployeesaresubject

todifferentstandardsandprocedures.For instance,theyenjoy less jobprotection,donothaveto

attendethicstrainingandarenotsubjecttothepoliciesoftheCivilServiceEthicsCouncil.

Similar dilemmas can be found for other Central and Eastern European countries. In Poland, for

example,thescopeofthecivilservicelawhasbeenchangedseveraltimesinsofarastheboundary

between politics and administration is concerned (Heywood andMeyer-Sahling 2013). During the

first PiS-led governments between 2005 and 2007 the high and mid-level managers (Directors

General, Directors of Departments and their Deputies) were removed from the civil service and

transferredtoawiderstatestaffingpool that, fromtheoutside,hadfeaturesofaseparatesenior

civil service corps. In theory andpractice, however, itmeant that governingparties andministers

could make appointments to managerial positions without facing significant constraints. As a

consequence,thechangeofscopeprimarilymeantachangeinthescopeofpoliticisation.

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Insummary,thequalityofpublicadministrationverystronglydependsonthepeopleitemploysand

thewaytheyaremanaged.Yetthereisnogeneralconsensusonwhichinstitutionaldesignsarebest

suited to manage civil servants effectively. The positive consequences of merit recruitment are

widelyappreciatedbutafocusonmeritversuspoliticisedrecruitmentfailstotakeintoaccountthe

importanceofmanyothercivil servicemanagement functions.There ishencequiteanagendafor

investment in collecting more and, above all, better evidence which designs work more or less

effectivelyintheareaofcivilservicereformandmanagement.

5. Whatwayforward?

Whatare the implicationsof thisdiscussion for theEuropeanCommission’s role inpromoting the

qualityofpublicadministrationinEurope?Theconclusionsfromthebriefingnoteshouldbeclear:

Theevidencefortheeffectivenessofmanycivilservicemanagementfunctionsisoftennotavailable

or it is not robust.Moreover, the evidence that is available suggests that somepracticesmay be

generallybeneficial for thequalityof thecivil servicebut inmanycases thechoiceof civil service

designsmaybecontextdependent.

For the European Commission, the lack of robust evidence – as well as the lack of treaty-based

competenciesintheareaofpublicadministrationreform–wouldmakeitextremelychallengingto

developaEuropeanpublicadministrationreformpolicythatprescribesmemberstateswhattodo.

Instead, the European Commission might rather play a role as an ‘enabler’ that supports the

generationofevidencefortheidentificationofthetypesofdesignsandpracticesthatworkacross

andwithinmemberstates.

One of the most effective tools to enhance the evidence for managers and reformers is the

implementationof civil service surveys as they are regularly conducted in severalOECD countries

(OECD2016).Theyprovidedetailedinformationabouttheattitudesandbehaviourofcivilservants,

includingtheirsatisfaction,motivationandperformanceonthejobaswellastheirexperiencewith

humanresourcesmanagement,thequalityofleadershipandotheraspectsofpublicadministration.

Civilservicesurveysaremonitoringandevaluationtoolsthathelptoidentifystrengths,weaknesses

and hence areas of civil servicemanagement that are in need of improvement. They can further

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provide an effective management tool to engage the people in public administration, solicit

feedbackandrespondtoconcerns.

For the European Commission, civil service surveys would allow for the identification of shared

standardsandengagement in learningacrossEUmemberstates.Moreover,memberstateswould

benefit greatly from European Commission support as regular civil service surveyswould provide

much-sought-afterevidenceandestablishaninfrastructuretoconducttheminthefirstplace.Tobe

sure, civil service surveys are but one instrument in the public administration toolbox of the

EuropeanCommission.YettheywouldstrengthentheenablingroleoftheEuropeanCommissionin

thefieldofpublicadministrationreforminEurope.

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