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ThomasRuttig

HowTribalAretheTaleban?Afghanistanslargestinsurgentmovementbetweenits

tribalrootsandIslamistideology

EXECUTIVESUMMARY

RecentdevelopmentsinAfghanistanhave

underscoredthatthereisstillanimmenselackof

understandingandevenofinterestwithregard

tothenatureoftheTalebanmovement.1DiscussionsaboutwhethermoderateTaleban

existhaveovershadoweddeeperquestionsabout

thecharacteroftheAfghanTalebanmovement.As

aresult,thereisconsiderableconfusionasto

whetherthelargestandmostinfluentialinsurgent

movementismainlydrivenbyethnic,religiousor

politicalmotives.Thispaperaimstoclarifythe

oftencomplexforcesthatshapetheAfghan

Talebanmovement.Itexploresseveralcentral

questions,includingthefollowing:AretheTaleban

aPashtuntribalorevennationalistforceorare

they,astheyclaimtobe,supra-ethnicIslamistswhodonotacknowledgetribal,ethnicand

linguisticdifferencesbutonlyknowMuslims?In

addition,thispaperdiscussestheplaceoftribes

1ThispaperfurtherdevelopsthoughtslaidoutinThomas

Ruttig,TheOtherSide:DimensionsoftheAfghanInsurgency:Causes,ActorsandApproachestoTalks ,Kabul/Berlin:AfghanistanAnalystsNetwork,Thematic

Report01/2009,July2009.Itbuildsontwopresentations

givenataworkshoporganisedbytheAbbassiProgramin

IslamicStudies,atStanfordUniversityon3December

2009,andattheJamestownFoundations2009Terrorism

ConferenceTheChangingStrategicGravityofAlQaedain

Washingtonon9December2009.

andtheirinstitutionswithinAfghansociety.A

distinctionismadebetweenwhatisrealandwhat

ismyth,asconstructedbyAfghansandalsoby

foreignobservers.

ThepaperthendiscussestheoriginsoftheTaleban

movement,the(limited)roleofIslamistideology

andtheextenttowhichitcanbeconsidereda

Pashtunnationalistmovement.Furthermore,this

paperlooksatthebeginningdebateabout

whethertheTalebanhavemorphedintoaNeo-

Talebanmovement.

TodaysTalebanmovementisdualisticinnature,

bothstructurallyandideologically.Theaspectsare

interdependent:Averticalorganisational

structure,intheformofacentralisedshadow

state,reflectsitssupra-tribalandsupra-ethnic

Islamistideology,whichappearstobenationalistici.e.,itreferstoAfghanistanasa

nation2attimes.Atthesametime,the

movementischaracterisedbyhorizontal,network-

likestructuresthatreflectitsstrongrootsinthe

segmentedPashtuntribalsociety.Themovement

isanetworkofnetworks.Religious,tribaland

regionalcomponentsoverlapevenwhenitcomes

totheorganisationalprinciplesoftheTaleban.

2Thistermisnotspecificenough.InEurope,itevenhas

achauvinisticundertone.Nationalwouldfitbetter,and

manyAfghansthereforeoftenrefertonational(melli)almostsynonymouswithpatriotic,anotherword

dislikedbymanyinEurope.

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2 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? Individually,theTalebanaredeeplyrootedintheir

tribalsocieties.But,intheirself-identification,the

balancebetweenbeingPashtunandbeingMuslim

haschanged,asisthecasewithmanyAfghans.

Inthirtyyearsofconflictandgradualstate

collapse,Pashtuntribalsocietyhasundergone

drasticchanges.Traditionalsocialandpolitical

relationshaveincreasinglybeenweakenedand

dissolved.Theyoungergenerationsquestioned

theauthorityoftheelderswhotheyheld

responsiblefortheseconflicts.Thishadnegative

impactsonintra-tribalcohesion.Asaresult,the

jirga asthemajorconflict-resolvingmechanismofthePashtunshaslostmuchofitsauthority.

Powerfulnewcomersareabletoignorejirga

decisionswithimpunity.Mightoftentrumps

pashtunwalaiandevenIslamiclaw.Risinglevelsofeducationhavechangedthecharacteroftribal

representation.Diasporacommunitiesofcertain

tribeshaveemergedinthebigcities.Their

membersabsorbedmodernskillsbutmaintained

linkstotheiroriginaltribes.Thisway,influences

ofmodernismpenetratedeventherural

communities.Thisdiaspora-triberelationship

intensifiesintimesofcrisis.

InmanyPashtuntribes,themore-permanenttribal

shurahasreplacedthejirga.Someofthemstillrepresentaformoftraditionalself-organisation,

butmanyothersareconvenedbythenew

strongmen.Thismakesthemhierarchicalin

structure,incontrasttotheegalitarianjirgawhereideallyallmalemembersofacertaintribefinda

consensusaboutacertainconflict.Meanwhile,a

shuradeliberatesandgivesadvicetotheleader

whothendecideswhetherhemakesuseofitor

not.ManyPashtunsusebothterms,jirgaand

shura,interchangeablynow.

Today,sometribescoversuchalargeareathat

theyaresimplytoobigtohaveasingleleader

althoughitisdoubtfulwhethertherewasalways

oneundisputedleaderatanygiventimeonanygivenlevelofthetribalpyramid.Inongoing

competition,variousaspirantsforleadershipwouldfoughteachotherforprestigeand

influence.Leadershipandpowerwithinanytribal

segmentresembledanever-changingequilibrium.

ThelackofadynasticprincipleamongstPashtuns

standsinthewayofacoherentandcontinuous

triballeadership.

Furthermore,thetribalcodeofPashtuns,

pashtunwalai,needstobeunderstoodasanidealisedconcept.AsthePashtunsgenealogical

chart,itcanchangeintimeandspace.Categories

usedbyoutsidersasifsetinstone(likethemuch-

discussedDurrani-Ghilzaidivide)arefluent.

Differentlocalversionsofpashtunwalai(called

nirkh)areused.Incasesofconflictbetweengroups,adecisionwouldbemadeinadvance

whosenirkhtouse.

TheTalebanmovementemergedfromreligious

networksfromthe197889resistance,i.e.,itisa

broadermovementthatsawitselfasreligiously

motivated.Onlywhenthemujahedin,intheeyesofthelaterTaleban,violatedtheirownreligious

principles,didtheTalebanestablishtheirown,

nowultra-orthodoxmovement.Onlyaftertheir

initialmoves,weretheTalebanadopted,

supportedandinstrumentalisedbythePakistani

militaryestablishment.Today,manyTaleban

activitiesinAfghanistanssoutheastandsouth3still

centrearoundnetworksofulama-ledmadrassasandmosques.

Politically,theTalebanmovementaspirestoaims

thatarelargerthanitsindividualtribalrealms:

politicalpoweronthenationalAfghanlevelandthere-establishmentofitsemirate.Theyare

nationalists,butcannotbecalledPashtun

irredentists,i.e.,theydonotstrivefora

reunificationofallPashtunareasina

Pashtunistan.

TheTalebanmovementssupra-tribalideology,i.e.,

Islamism,keepsthedooropenfornon-Pashtun

elements.Thishasallowedittosystematically

expandintonon-PashtunareasoftheNorthand

West.Islamprovidesanumbrellathatcreates

cohesioninanotherwiseethnicallyaswellas

politicallyheterogeneousmovement.

ThesystemofreferenceindividualTalebanortheir

leadersalludetotribal,nationalistandIslamist

dependsonthecircumstancesunderwhicha

particulardecisionistakenandontheparticular

tacticalorstrategicaimatstake.

Thecombinationofvertical(religious/ideological)

andhorizontal(tribal)structuresgivestheTaleban

movementahighdegreeofcohesionwhile

maintainingorganisationalelasticity.Thiselasticity

initshorizontaldimensionbasedonPashtun

individualismallowsdiscussionandevendissent.Itallowsasufficientdegreeofautonomyoflocal

commandersandpreventsthemfromfeelingover-

controlled.Subsequently,themovementhas

experiencednosplits,oratleastnonethathave

seriouslyweakeneditsorganisation.

Themovementhasshownmorecontinuitythan

discontinuitybetweenthepre-andpost-2001

phasesinthemajoraspectsthatcharacterisesuch

3Inthispaper,Southeasternregionisusedforthe

threeprovincesofLoyaPaktiaandSouthernregionfor

Kandahar,Helmand,UruzganandZabul.Thelatter

regionisreferredtoasSouthwesternregionbysome.

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3ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? armedinsurgentmovements:theorganisational

structureincludingthecompositionofits

leadership,ideology,politicalaimsand

programme.Mostimportantly,themovementstill

adherestoitsundisputedandsinglemost

importantleader,MullaMuhammadOmar,the

amirul-momenin.TheTalebanLeadershipCouncil

stemsfromthepre-2001phaseandisstillmainlyKandahari.Thepresenceofnon-KandahariTaleban

leadersinthiscouncilismoresymbolicthan

significant.Theinfluenceofnewlyrecruited,

younger-generationTalebanfoot-soldierson

strategicdecision-makingisstillminimalalthough

thepresenceofMullaOmarstwonewdeputies

(afterthearrestofMullaBaradar)indicatesthat

nowboththeoldandthenewgenerationsare

representedonthislevel.Themajorchangeinthe

Talebanisthatuptolate2001itwasaquasi-

governmentwithastate-likestructure,whileafter

2001itwasforcedtoreorganiseasaninsurgentorguerrillamovementthatrunsaparallel

administration.Basedonthis,themovement

claimsthecontinuityofitsemirate,whichinits

eyesaforeigninterventionunlawfullyremoved

andreplacedwithapuppetadministration.

Thereisnoorganisedorrecognisablemoderate

(oranyotherpolitical)factionintheTalebanto

counterbalancethereligioushardliners.Itismore

usefultodifferentiatebetweendifferentcurrents:

pragmatic,politicallythinking,pro-talksTaleban

whounderstandthatapoliticalsolutionis

desirablebutwhostillareconservativeIslamists,comparedwiththosewhofavourapurelymilitary

approach,oftencombinedwithahypertrophic

recoursetoterroristmeans.Bothgroupscompete

fortheallegianceofthenon-orless-political

majburiandna-razfoot-soldiers.

ThefactthatalargemajorityoftheTalebanare

PashtunsdoesnotmakethemtherepresentativeofallPashtuns.Sincethelate1940s,apluralistpoliticalchoicehasalwaysexistedinPashtun

society.Thearmedconflictsofthepast30years,

however,havenarrowedthepoliticalspace.The

marginalisationofpoliticalpartieshasfurther

aggravatedtheproblem.Intodaysviolent

atmosphere,betweentheanviloftheKarzai

governmentandthehammeroftheTaleban,there

arenoviablepoliticalalternativesforPashtuns.

Tribescannotassumetherolesofindependent

actors.Rather,theyprovideanarenainwhich

politicalcompetitiontakesplace.Attemptsto

maketribesintoinstrumentsforstabilisation,as

hasbeendoneintheformationoflocaldefence

initiatives,ismisdirected.Rather,alternative

Pashtunpoliticalandsocialorganisationsshouldbegivenmorescopeandresources.Atthesame

time,itisnottoolatetostrengthentheinternal

cohesionofcertaintribesandtheirparticular

institutionsbysupportingtheirabilitiestore-

establishfunctioning,legitimatedecision-making

bodies(jirgas,shuras).Externalactors,however,

shouldonlyprovidealevelplayingfield,a

frameworkofsecurityandpossiblywhere

requestedtakeontheroleofneutralarbiter.

TheyshouldrefrainfrombeingseenastakingdecisionsonAfghans'behalfandbeawarethat

interferenceoftendeepens,insteadofremedies,

existingrifts.

TheAfghangovernmentsdraftAfghanistanPeace

andReintegrationProgramaswellastheWest-

dominatedapproachthatcreatesanartificial

divisionbetweenreconciliationand

reintegrationstilltreatstheTalebanproblem

mainlyasatechnicalone.Itsupposesthatmany

Talebancanbewonoverbyeconomicandsocial

incentivesandtheinsurgency,ineffect,split.

Thisunderestimatesthepoliticalmotivesthat

drivetheTalebaninsurgency.Furthermore,there

stillisanalthoughnotpubliclyexpressed

incongruencebetweentheUSapproach(usingthe

surgetoweakentheTalebanbeforeanytalks)

andPresidentKarzaisapproachthatstillseemsto

favourimmediatedirectcontacts.

TheJune2010peacejirgainKabulhasnotbrought

thenecessaryclarificationprocessforward.Itwas

notprecededbyabroadconsultationandlacked

genuinerepresentativeness.Onlyanapproachto

reconciliationbasedongenuinebroadparticipationandbuy-inbyAfghanscanleadtoan

outcomeinwhichtheTalebancanbeabsorbed

intothepoliticalmainstreamandAfghansociety.

Anapproachimposedfromthetopdown,evenif

coveredwithritualsofsurrogateparticipation,will

alwaysbevulnerablefromspoilers.

1. INTRODUCTION

RecentdevelopmentsinAfghanistanhave

underscoredthatwhilethecomplexissueof

reconciliationandreintegrationisdiscussedand

evenshapedintoprogrammes,animmenselackof

understandingandasitseems,evenofinterest

existsregardingthenatureoftheTaleban

movement.ThislackwasreflectedinWestern

governmentsapproachatandafterthe

internationalAfghanistanconferenceinLondonin

January2010whenthestillunder-developed

AfghanistanPeaceandReconciliationProgram

(APRP)oftheAfghangovernmentreceivedpolitical

approvalandevensomefinancialcommitments.It

continuedinthemainlywelcomingresponsefrom

WesterncapitalswithregardtotheJune2010NationalConsultativePeaceJirgainKabul.Butit

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4 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? alsowasevidentattheAfghan-leddiscussionsat

thejirgaitself.

PresidentHamedKarzaireflectedontheoutlines

oftheAPRPwhichwaspresentedtotheLondon

conferenceandtopartsofthedonorcommunityin

Kabulinhisopeningspeechtothedelegatesof

thejirga.Butthedocumentwasnotpresentedto

ordistributedamongstthem.Inthismajor

governmentdocument(althoughstilladraft)the

criteriaforpoliticalaccommodationwiththe

insurgentshavenotbecomeclearyet.Thisreflects

thestill-enormouslackofunderstandingofwho

theinsurgents(andtheirmaincompositeelement,

theTalebanmovement)areandwhataimsthey

pursue.Alternately,perhaps,itreflectstheview

thatadifferentiatedanalysisisnotnecessaryfor

theimplementationoftheprogrammeofwhich

PresidentKarzaisWesternpartnershave

unambiguouslyadoptedonlythereintegration

side.

TheNationalConsultativePeaceJirga,aswellas

thewaveofarrestofAfghanTalebanleadersin

PakistaninJanuaryandFebruarythisyear,4shows

thatmotivesofpowerandcontrolstilldominate

thepeaceandreconciliationagenda.Nointerest

wasshowninhowcommongroundcanbecreated

ateitherthenationalortheregionallevels.

DiscussionsaboutwhethermoderateTaleban(i.e.,

Talebaninterestedintalkingornegotiating)exist

haveovershadoweddeeperquestionsaboutthe

characteroftheTalebanmovementandhowitaffectsprospectsforpoliticalaccommodation.Asa

result,considerableconfusionexistsastowhether

thelargestandmostinfluentialinsurgent

movementismainlydrivenbyethnic,religiousor

politicalmotives.Thispaperaimstoclarifythe

often-complexforcesthatshapethemovement.

Thispaperexploresacentralquestion:Arethe

TalebanaPashtuntribalorevenanationalistforce

orarethey,astheyclaimtobe,supra-ethnic

Islamistswhodonotacknowledgetribal,ethnicand

linguisticdifferencesbutonlyknowMuslims?Do

thesetwoconceptsexcludeeachotherorcananddotheycoexist?Theanswerstothesequestions

haveimportantimplicationsforthedebateon

reconciliationandreintegration,astheyprovidean

indicationofwhetherandunderwhich

circumstancestheTalebanmaybereadytojoina

politicalprocessandwhattheywouldwanttoget

4SeeThomasRuttig,ImplicationsofMullaBaradars

ArrestAANBlog,16February2010,http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=646;ThomasRuttig,The

TalibanArrestWaveinPakistan:ReassertingStrategic

Depth?CTCSentinel,CombatingTerrorismCenteratWestPoint,vol.3(3)(March2010,),pp146.

outofit.5ThequestionofhowtribaltheTaleban

areisalsosignificantinthedebateonwhetherand

howso-calledtribalorcommunitydefenceforces

canorshouldbeusedtopushbacktheinfluenceof

theTalebanincertainareasofAfghanistan.

Tobetterunderstandhowtribalthemovementis,

thispaperfirstdiscussestheplaceoftribesand

theirinstitutionswithinAfghansociety,howthey

functioninrealityandwhatchangesand

developmentstheyhavebeensubjectedtoduring

thephasesofmodernisationinthe20thcentury

andthepost-1973conflictsinAfghanistan.A

distinctionismadebetweenwhatisrealandwhat

ismyth,asconstructedbothbyAfghansandby

foreignobservers.

ThepaperthendiscussestheoriginsoftheTaleban

movement,the(limited)roleofIslamistideology,

andtheextenttowhichthemovementcanbe

consideredPashtunnationalist.Furthermore,thispaperwilllookatthejustbegundebateabout

whethertheTalebanhavemorphedintoaNeo-

Talebanmovementafterthecollapseoftheir

regimei.e.,whetherthereismorecontinuity

thandifferencebetweenthemovementinitspre-

9/11incarnation,theIslamicEmirateof

Afghanistan(IEA),andtheresurgentmovementof

thepresenttime.

2. PASHTUNTRIBES,BETWEEN

MYTHANDREALITY

Muchhasbeenwrittenaboutthepashtunwalai,thecodeofconductandwayoflifeofthePashtuns.But

muchofithadbeenmystified,bothbyAfghansand

foreignobservers,notleastbecauseinthelightof

morethan30yearsofconflictthepastradiatesa

goldenlightofnostalgia.Inordertounderstand

whichrolestribesandtheirinstitutionsareplaying

today,alotofrubblehastobecleared.Although

pashtunwalaiisoftendescribedinitsidealformandasstatic,itactuallyevolvesanddiffersintimeand

space.Individualshavestartedtodominateinstitutions,whichwereoriginallytheembodiment

ofcollectiveinterests.

Withitscoreprinciplesof nangandtora,melmastia,nenawataiandbadal,tigaandbaramta,itstribalinstitutionslikethe khanandthemalek,thejirgaandthearbakai,

6aswellasthe

5Inmyfirstpaper(seeFN1)Iarguedthat

reconciliationismorethanjusttalksbetweenthe

governmentandtheTaleban:Itneedstobeabroader

conceptthatoverarchesthewholeAfghanpost-orstill-

in-conflictsociety.

6Honourandcourage,hospitality,seekingshelterby

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5ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? Pashtunsnotoriousfragmentation,embodiedin

theprincipleoftarburwalai(theenmitybetweencousins),pashtunwalaiisacomplicatedandunwrittensystem.Theknowledgeofitis

preservedbythewhitebeards(spingiri)andthejirgadar,thosewhohave[theknowledgeabout]thejirga.

7Itisnotsecretknowledgeandis

transferredtotheyoungergenerationsbyexample:Youngboysaresupposedtobepresent

atjirgasandseehowtheeldersdoit.

Alreadyinthe1970s,ChristianSigristwasusing

usedthetermacephalousandsegmented

societiesforthiskindofsocialorganisation,8with

itshierarchyofloyaltiesbetweenrelativesfrom

thelevelofthefamily( kor,inPashto,meanshouse)onthebottomuptothelevelofnation

(millat),country(mamlakat)orfatherland(watan).

9Loyaltyisonlyextendedwhenthe

particularlevelonthehierarchypyramidis

externallythreatened.Forexample,ifsomekorofonetribewouldbeinlatentconflictwithotherkorofthesametribeinoneparticularareaabout

land,forestorwaterusethesekorunawouldsticktogetheranddefendthemselveswithahigher

levelofloyaltywhenthreatenedbyanoutside

group.Onthetop-most(national)levelthiswould

meanthatwhenallAfghanethnicgroupsare

threatenedbyoutsideaggression,theycooperate

witheachother.ThiswasprovenduringtheSoviet

occupationinthe1980s.

submissionandrevenge,amoratoriumonaconflictand

thedeposittoguaranteeit,thetriballeaderandthe

villageelder,thetribalassemblyanditsreinforcement

instrument.ThebestarticleonpashtunwalaiformeisstillLutzRzehak,DasPaschtunwalitraditionelle

Normen,WertvorstellungenundBrucheder

Paschtunen,asien,afrika,lateinamerika15(1987)5,Berlin,pp82132.Surprisinglyenough,theredoesnot

seemtobeacomprehensiverecentEnglish-language

bookorarticledealingwiththetypesofpashtunwalaiamongstPashtuntribesinAfghanistanassuch,apart

fromthecolonial(andPakistan-focussed)standard

bookslikeOlafCaroe,ThePathans(Oxford,USA1984,reprint).Anumberofrecentpapersconcentrateonthe

jirgaaspectmostlyandonlydealwithpashtunwalaiat

theirperiphery.

7Onesourcealsoreferstoso-called nirkhi,arbiters,insuch

jirgas.ChristianSigrist,PashtunwaliDasStammesrecht

derPashtuneninRevolutioninIranundAfghanistan:mardomnamehJahrbuchzurGeschichteundGesellschaftdesMittlerenOrients(Berlin1980),p264.

8Acephalousmeanswithnocentralisedauthority,

alsocalledregulatedanarchy.ChristianSigrist:RegulierteAnarchie(Olten1967).

9Watanalsoisablurryterm.Itcanstandforthewholenation/countrybutalsoforthenarrowerareaoforigin

(avalley,etc.).

ThePashtunsareone,ifnotthelargest,ofthe

tribalsocietiesworldwide.Kinshipasaprincipleof

socialorganisation,nevertheless,isnothingspecial

tothePashtuns.Mostofwhatissaid,forexample,

abouttheSomalis10wouldmakesenseforthe

Pashtunsaswell:

AllSomalisarebornintothissocialstructureandbecauseitdefinesa

personsrelationshiptootherSomalisand

non-Somalis,kinshipisacriticalsourceof

anindividualsidentity.Knowledgeofa

personsclancanenableonetoidentify

theirelders,deducewheretheyreside

andwhomtheyarelikelytovoteforinan

election....Kingroupsformalliances,

divideandrealigninresponsetointernal

andexternaleventsandprocesses.The

clanorsub-clanthatapersonidentifieswith(orisidentifiedwith)willdependon

theprevailingcontextandissueathand,

suchasaccesstoenvironmental

resources,thecontrolofreal-estate,

competitionforpoliticalofficeora

collectiveresponsetosecuritythreats.

Thetraditionofexogamousmarriage11

meansthatSomaliscanhaverelativesin

severalclansdispersedoverlarge

geographicalareas....Clansand

genealogiesarethereforedynamicsocial

constructsthatcanbesubjecttodifferent

interpretationsandareusedtodescribe

andvalidatechangingsocialandpolitical

relationships.Theyare,asLuling12has

described,notonlygoodtofightwith(or

playpoliticsanddobusinesswith)but

goodtothinkwith....Inthecontextof

statecollapseandintheabsenceofstate

institutionsandotherformsofpolitical

10InMarkBradbury,BecomingSomaliland(London

2008),pp1315.

11Endogamousandexogamousarerelativeterms.As

arule,marriageamongstAfghansisendogamous,i.e.,

withinthebroadercommunity.Often,however,cousin

marriageispreferredtosavecostsandtokeepthe

property(land,etc.)together.Incontrast,exogamous

marriageisameanstocreatepoliticalandbusiness

alliances.

12ThequotedoriginalsourceisVirginiaLuling,

GenealogyasTheory,GenealogyasTool:Aspectsof

SomaliClanshipSocialIdentities:JournalfortheStudyofRace,NationandCulture(2006)Vol.12(4).

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6 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? organisationthekinshipsystemprovide[s]

astructureforinter-grouprelationsand

governance,fororganisingandmanaging

violenceandfororganisingtrade.

AllPashtunsknowtheircurrentparticularplaceon

theirpeoplesintricategenealogicalchartwithits

hundredsoftribes,sub-tribes,clans, kor13

etc.whichderivesfrom(assumed)common

ancestors.14Thesameistruefortheindividual

Talebanfighter.Heisabletosayexactlytowhich

tribe,sub-tribeetc.hebelongsunlesshedecides

otherwiseandsidestepstotheideologicallevel,

ofteninordertomakeapoliticalpoint.One

TalebaninterpreterinKandaharinlate2000

repliedwithemphasiswhenaskedtowhichtribe

hebelongs:Thisdoesntmattertome.Weare

Muslimsanddonotknow[i.e.,recognise]tribes.15

Theplaceatribeorsub-tribeoccupiesonthe

Pashtungenealogicalchartcanchangeintimeand

space.Atribemightgrowandsplitintosub-

tribesandsomesub-tribemightbecomeatribe

initsownright.Forexample,therelationship

betweentheBarakzaiandtheAtsakzai16in

southernAfghanistanevolved:Thelatterwas

originallyasub-tribeoftheformerbutpeoplein

theregionnowoftenputbothonthesamelevel

whenaskedwhichtribesliveintheirparticular

area.TheAtsakzaihavegrowntobecomeatribein

13

Iputsomeofthosetermsinquotationmarksbecausethesecategoriesarefluid.Asubtribehereis,inapurely

descriptiveway,justagroupofpeoplethatisconsidered

(orconsidersitself)partofalargertribe.Withoutgoing

furtherintodetail,thePashtunsdonotformasingle

tribe(thePashtuntribeasmediaoftensay)but

somethingacategoryhigher.Somecallitanationor

nationality,apeople(inGerman,Volk)oranethnicgroup.Afghantermsusedforit(qaum,millat,etc.)arealsoblurred.TherearedifferenttribesamongthePashtuns.

14QaisAbdulrashidastheancestorofallPashtuns.He

andhissonsSarban,BaitanandGharghashtaswellas

theadoptedKarlanareforefathersofthemajorPashtunconfederations.Theonesmostimportantin

Afghanistan,theDurraniandtheGhilzai,gobackto

SarbanandBaitan,respectively.SeeAkbarS.Ahmed,

MilleniumandCharismaamongPashtuns:ACriticalEssayinSocialAnthropology(London,HenleyandBoston1976),p7.

15Thesamelinewasnotoftentakenbyordinary

TalebanItalkedtoduringmystayinKabulin

2000/2001duringtheTalebanregime.Theyeagerlytold

mewhichtribetheybelongedto.

16OftenreferredtoasAchakzai,theDariform.TheDari

languagelacksthePashtunconsonantts(cf.tsengaye

[Howareyou?]inPashtoorCsarorZitronein

German).

theirownright.Incontrast,sometimes,awhole

tribedisappears.17

AlotofthishastodowiththePashtunsnomadic

origins,astheexampleoftheBabozai18tribe,again

insouthernAfghanistan,illustrates.WhileinZabul

theBabozaiareconsideredasub-tribeofthe

HotakintheGhilzaiconfederation;in

neighbouringUruzgantheyareseenasaNurzai

sub-tribeintheDurraniconfederation.19This

seeminglyparadoxicalsituationisbecauseBabozai

groupshadmigratedfromZabulwestwards

lookingforgreenerpasturesandmusthavebeen

accommodatedbyNurzai.Therearemanyreports

intheliteratureabouthow,inpastcenturieswhen

landwasstillavailable,largertribalgroupsgave

land,protectionorbothtoincomingsmallerones.

Suchamovewouldmakethenewcomerseither

clients(hamsaya,literallyinthesameshadow,i.e.,neighbours)ofthehostgroup(mainlywhen

non-Pashtun)or,asinthecaseofthePashtun

Babozai,anewsub-tribeoftheirbenefactors.This

casedemonstrateshowunreliabletribalcategories

areandhowtrickyitcanbeifoutsidersstart

treatingthemasiftheyweresetinstone(suchas

theDurrani-Ghilzaidivide,whichistreatedby

sometribalanalystsasdogma).

Today,sometribesparticularlyintheSouthern

region(GreaterKandahar)coversuchalarge

areathattheyaresimplytoobigtohaveasingle

leader.TheNurzai,forexample,stretchfrom

KandahartoHeratprovince.Howdifficultitisundersuchcircumstancestocometoapolitical

17LiketheSur(i)whoruledNorthernIndiainthe16

th

century.Theywereprobablyabsorbedbythelocal

population.

18TheBabozaicasealsoisofpoliticalrelevance:onewife

ofTalebanleaderMullaMuhammadOmarreportedlyisa

BabozaifromUruzganprovince.(MullaOmarsfamilyis

fromZabuloriginallyandbelongstotheHotaktribe,with

theexactsubtribeunknown.Hehimselfwasbornin

DehrawuddistrictofUruzganwherethefamilyhad

migratedtoandfromwherehe,withhisstepfather,

movedfurthersouthtoKandaharprovince.MostHotak

andNurzaicurrentlysupporttheTaleban.See:Abdul

AwwalZabulwal,TalibaninZabul:AWitnessAccountin

AntonioGiustozzi(ed.),DecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsfromtheAfghanField,London2009,p180.

19Often,thesetribalconfederationsareunderstoodas

purelygenealogical.But,astheBabozaicaseillustrates,

theyarealsoinfluencedbypolitics.AnAfghansource

importantlypointstothefactthatalsotheDurrani

emergedasapoliticalconfederation,calledgund(party),puttogetherbyapirinthereignofAhmadShahAbdali(later:Durrani)foraconcretepolitical

reason.MuhammadOmarRawandMiakhel,De

PashtanoQabiloShujreauMene [TheLineagesandDwellingsofthePashtunTribes],Kabul1999,p217.

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7ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? decisionbecameapparentbeforethe2005

parliamentaryelections:SomeNurzaitriballeaders

convenedaseriesofall-Nurzaiassembliesaiming

tofieldjointcandidatesonwhichthewholetribe

wouldconcentrateitsvotes.Butnocandidatewas

acceptabletoallNurzai.Asaresult,manylocal

Nurzaicandidatescompetedamongsteachother

andlostinmanyplaces;thetribesubsequentlyfeltunderrepresentedintheWolesiJirga.Nurzai

activistsinterviewedlaterdescribedhowitwas

impossibletoovercomesubtribalrivalriesand

personalegos.20

Thereare,inreality,nopermanentlyfixedplaces

onthePashtungenealogicaltreeandnoeternal,

unchangingtribalinstitutions.Muchofwhatistold

aboutthemaremyths,idealisedversionsofa

goldenpastthatprobablyneverexistedinapure

formanddefinitelynotacrossthePashtunareasin

thesameway.Versionsofpashtunwalaidifferby

locale.Theyarelocallycalled nirkhwhichmeanspriceandreferstothedifferentpricesusedto

settlebloodfeuds,21i.e.,badal,whichmeans

exchange.Someauthorsstipulate

two[major]typesofsocio-economic

organisationalsettingsthatarereflected

inthePashtunscodeofhonour,

accordingtothepredominantformof

landtenure:theqalanggroupamongst

sedentarytribeswherelarge,irrigated

privatelandholdingsexistandwhich,asaresult,issociallystrongerstratified(itis

namedafterthetaxshare-cropper

tenantsmustpaytothelandlords)and

thenanggroupamongstpastoralhill

Pashtunswhicharesociallymore

egalitarian(namedaftertheircentral

value,chivalry).22

20AuthorsinterviewsinKandahar,Februaryand

September2009.

21Examplesofdifferentnirkhsystemsaregivenin:

Sigrist,Pashtunwali(seeFN7),pp26475(forthe

tribesofPaktia)andTheCustomaryLawsofAfghanistan,AreportbytheInternationalLegalFoundation,[Washington]2006.Whenthejirgawascomposedof

differenttribalgroups,ithadtobedecidedinadvance

whosenirkhwouldbeused.Itoftencouldbethatofathirdtribalgroup.

22See:Ahmed,MillenniumandCharisma(seeFN14),p

76;PalwashaKakar,TribalLawofPashtunwaliandWomensLegislativeAuthority,http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/research/ka

kar.pdf.Ahmed,theoriginalsource,describesnangandqalangforPakistaniPashtuns.Itcanbeassumed,however,thattheprinciplealsoworksamongstAfghan

Furthermore,itishighlydoubtfulwhetherthere

wasalwaysoneundisputedleaderatanygiventimeonanygivenlevelofthetribalpyramid

hencethejirgaasan(ideally)egalitarianbody

wheredecisionsaretakencollectivelyandbased

onconsensus.Rather,itwasmorelikelythat

variousaspirantsfoughteachotherinongoing

competitionbyexchangingwealthandwisdom(aboutthejirga)forprestigeandinfluence(i.e.,

leadership).Powerwithinacertaintribeortribal

segmentlikelyhadanever-changingequilibrium.

Thesoutherntribes(DurraniandGhilzai,notthe

SoutheasterntribesofLoyaPaktia)knowthe

institutionofthekhankhel,thesub-tribeorclanfromwhichtraditionallytheleadersofa

particularsegmentofatribe,orthewholetribe,

oftencome.Butthisdoesnotpreventcompetition

norashiftofpowerfromclantoclan.

Suchchangesarequickerintimesofcrisis:For

example,inthePopalzaitribe,theformer khankhelledbyMuhammadAfzalKhan(whowaskilled

1978underthePDPAregime)hasbeenreplaced

bytheQaranaghtowhichtheKarzaifamilybelongs

(althoughnotundisputedly).OtherPopalzaiclans

aroundKandaharandpossiblyalsoTaleban

deputyMullaBaradarwhobelongstothesame

tribewoulddisputethattheKarzaisaretheleadersoftheirtribe.

23AmongtheDzadraninLoya

Paktia,themostinfluential(royalist)Babrakzai

familyhasbeeneffectivelyreplacedbythe

Haqqaniclan(theleadersoftheHaqqani

network,asemi-autonomouspartofthewiderTalebanmovement

24)sincethe1970s.Buteven

theHaqqanisleadonlypartsofthetribe,with

otherclanssuchastheoneofMPPachaKhan

Dzadranleadingotherparts.

ThislackofadynasticprincipleamongstPashtuns

standsinthewayofacoherentandcontinuous

triballeadership.Thishasbeenthecaseevenatthe

verytopofthepyramidinthePashtun-dominated

Afghanmonarchy,overthepastcenturies.Since

1747,notmanyrulerswerereplacedbyanobvious

heir;mostofthetime,successionwasdetermined

inprotractedcivilwarsbetweenbrothers,half-

brothers,cousinsandotherpretenders.Succession

isalsooftenless-thanstraightforwardonalower

level,asseenrecentlyonthesideoftheboth

lowlandPashtuns,likemanyDurrani,becausethe

patternoflandownershipissimilar.

23AuthorsinterviewsinKandahar,2008and2009.

24FormoreabouttheHaqqaninetwork,seeThomas

Ruttig,LoyaPaktia'sInsurgency:TheHaqqaniNetwork

asanAutonomousEntityintheTalibanUniversein

AntonioGiustozzi(ed.),DecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsfromtheAfghanField(London2009).

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8 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? currentgovernmentandtheTaleban.Forexample,

whentheleaderoftheArghandabAlikozaiin

Kandaharprovince,commanderMullaNaqibullah,

diedinOctober2007,PresidentKarzaicrownedhis

sonasthenewleaderofthetribe(i.e.,heputan

honoraryturbanonhishead).Immediately,the

TalebanattackednotonlyNaqibullahshousebut

alsothedistrictcentreinafightthatwasoneofthemostviolentthatyear,sensingthatthepresidents

perceivedinterferenceintheaffairsofatribethatis

nothisownhadfuelledinternalsupportforthem.

InanothercaseinneighbouringUruzgan,the23-

year-oldMuhammadDaudsucceededhisfather

RoziKhanaswuluswal(governor)ofChoradistrictafterthelatterwaskilledaccidentallyin

September2008.25Initiallywelcomedandeven

electedbythelocalpopulation(althoughinthe

presenceofrepresentativesoftheprovincial

governmentwho,itcanbeassumed,noone

wantedtocontradictatafuneral),Daudsoonran

intodifficultiesandwasunderminedbyasenior

unclewhothoughtthathehadmorerighttothe

positionthantheyoungman.Thisrivalwas

immediatelyadoptedandsupportedbyavery

influentiallocalpowerbrokerwhofeltsidelinedby

thelocalInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce

(ISAF)troops.

OntheTalebanside,MullaDadullah,acommander

whohadbecomenotoriousforhisextensiveuseof

suicidebombersandal-Qaidastylerhetoric,was

replacedbyhisyoungerbrotherMullaMansurafterhewaskilledbyNATOforcesinMay2005.

Mansurthenadoptedthetakhallus(by-orsurname)Dadullahtotransferhisbrothersimage

ofamartyrtohisownperson.(Hewaslater

demotedbyMullaOmarforrepeatedlyignoring

instructions.)Inotherexamples,thecommand

oversomeTalebanfrontsinUruzganchangedtoa

brotherorcousinaftertheoriginalcommander

waskilled.

Allthreecasesshowthatsonsorbrothersoftribal

leadersoftenhavedifficultiesfillingtheshoesof

theirfathers.

3. CRUMBLINGTRIBAL

INSTITUTIONS

Startingwiththe1973coup,30yearsofconflict

andgradualstatecollapsehaveincreasingly

weakenedanddissolvedtraditionalsocialand

25RoziKhanhadrushedtohelpafriendwhowas

attackedatnightbyunrecognisablegunmenhethought

wereTalebanbutturnedouttobeAustralianSpecial

ForceswhothoughtthatRoziKhanwasaTaleb.

politicalrelationsintheAfghansocietyingeneral

andinPashtunsocietyinparticular.Mass

migrationenforcedhighermobilityandnarrowed

theurban-ruralgap.Thisgraduallyundermined

andtransformedthetraditionalrelationshipsof

village,tribalandethniccommunities.Newelites

emergedthatchallengedtheeldersandtookover

theirplaces.Theyoungergenerationsquestionedtheauthorityoftheelderswhomtheyheld

responsiblefortheseconflictsor,atleast,fortheir

inabilitytosolvethemwiththetraditionalmeans.

Theimpactonintra-tribalcohesionwasnegative.

Manytriballeaderswereeliminatedbythe

PeoplesDemocraticPartyofAfghanistan(PDPA)

regime;otherslosttheirstatustothesocially

upwardsclimbersofthejihadperiod:thearmedcommandersanddrugbarons.TheTaleban

continuedthekillings.Theelderssonswerenot

abletofollowthemdirectlybecausetheylacked

theirauthority.

Asaresult,thejirgaasthemajorconflict-resolving

mechanismofthePashtunslostmuchofits

authority.Thepowerfulnewcomersonthe

nationalaswellasonthelocallevelareableto

ignorejirgadecisionswithimpunity.Thisis

illustratedbyanalmost20-year-oldlandconflictin

Choradistrict(Uruzgan)whereacommanderdug

anirrigationchannelanddistributedthenewland

amongstfollowerswithoutgivingthefirstright,as

traditionandshariademand,totheimmediate

neighbours.Challengedbygovernmentcourts,tribaljirgasandevenmediationbyulama,heisstill

ignoringalldecisionsthatwentagainsthim

thankstosuperiorfirepowerandprotectionfrom

Kabul.Today,mightoftentrumpspashtunwalaiandevenIslamiclaw.InanintactPashtuntribal

environment,ignoringjirgaandulamadecisions

wouldhavebeenheavilypunished.

InmanyPashtuntribes,thetemporary,egalitarian

institutionofthejirgahasbeenreplacedbya

multitudeofmoreenduringtribalshurasallof

whichpreviouslyclaimedtorepresentthewhole

tribe.Whilesomeshurasstillrepresentaformoftraditionalself-organisation,manyareconvened

bynewstrongmen,eitheronthelocalorthe

centrallevel,todemonstratetheirowninfluence

vis--visforeigners.Thismakesthemhierarchical

instructure,astrongcontrasttotheegalitarian

jirgawhere,ideallyallmalemembersofacertain

tribeorsub-tribe(inrealityallland-owningmales

insomeareasandthemishran,theeldersofthefamilies,inothers)findaconsensusaboutacertain

conflict.Meanwhile,ashuradeliberatesandgives

advicetoaleaderwhothendecideswhethermake

useofitornot.ManyPashtunsnowconfusethese

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9ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? institutionsandusebothterms,jirgaandshura,

interchangeably.26

Risinglevelsofeducationhavechangedthe

characteroftribalrepresentation.Beginningwith

theeducationalreformsduringKingAmanullahs

reign(191929),thetribalelitessenttheirsonsto

thecitiestostudy.Asaresult,diaspora

communitiesofcertainprovincesortribes

emergedinthebigcitiesandgrewinnumbers.

Theirmembersabsorbedmodernskillsandbegan

tousemodernmeansofcommunicationbut,at

thesametime,maintainedlinkstotheiroriginal

watanandtribe.Thisway,influencesofmodernismpenetratedruralcommunities.Today,

manylocaltribalcouncilsarestillheadedbythe

spingiri(whitebeards,i.e.,thetraditionalelders)whileeducatedmembers(engineersorteachers)

oftendealwithforeignaffairs,likecontactswith

visitingforeignersandtheacquisitionand

implementationofprojects.Thisdiaspora-tribe

relationshipintensifiesintimesofcrisis,suchas

regimechangewhenruralcommunitiesre-

integratetheirurbanisedmemberslinkedwitha

fallenregimebeitKhalqiorTalebansmoothly

andwithouttoomanyideologicalmisgivings.

However,inasignificantnumberofcasestribes

wereunabletoprotectthereturneesagainst

arrestandbeingkilledafter2001.Thisforced

manyoftheformerTalebanandtheiroriginal

tribalgroupsbackintothemovement.Today,

somekeysupportfortheTalebancomesfrom

communitieswhohaveprisonersintheGuantanamosystem.

27

Therisingpopulationandgrowingtribesmakeit

physicallyimpossiblethat,astraditiondemands,

26Acontemporarysourcereportsthatby1989,[t]he

wordshuraisnotusedinDari-speakingareastoreferto

local-levelconsultativebodiesandthatmorelikely...

the...wordmajliswouldbeused,thatshuraswere

mainlyformedbycommandersforthepurposeof

coordinatingmilitaryoperations(withsomeexpanding

intoadministrationofareas)andlargelyconsistedof

membersofonetanzeem(myemphasis).Thatis,thewordshurahashadaratherlatecareer.Thesameauthorsunderlinethatshuras,jirgasandmajliswerenot

ademocraticoneman[sic!]onevotesituationand

thattheconsensusdecisionoftenwasamajorityvote

inrealitybecausesomepersonsweremoreinfluential

and/ormorepersuasivethanothers.LynnCarterand

KerryConnor,APreliminaryInvestigationofContemporaryAfghanCouncils (Peshawar:AgencyCoordinatingBodyforAfghanRelief,ACBAR,1989),pp

23,10.

27WhileworkingwiththeUNintheSoutheasternregion

in2003andduringlatertripstothoseareas,theauthor

becameawareofexamplesfromGhazni(Andar,Muqur)

andPaktia(Zurmat).

allmalesgatherinajirga.Thisexacerbatesthe

trendthatparticipationinajirgareflectsgrowing

socialdifferentiation.Whileontheonehandthe

institutionofthejirgaiscrumblingorchangingits

featuresunderpressurefrommodernisationand

conflict,ontheotherhand,theuseoftraditional

institutionsofconflictregulationintimesofcrises

isbeingrevivedasafall-backposition.Whenthegovernmentisweakorabsent,shurasandjirgasfill

thelocalpoliticalandadministrativevacuumas

instrumentstomaintainlinkswiththeoutside

world.Today,[f]orthemajorityofAfghans,

disputesaresettled,ifatall,atthelocallevelby

villageelders[i.e.,jirgasandshurastheauthor],

districtgovernors,clerics,andpolicechiefs28

withoutanygovernmentroleandoftenwithoutit

evennoticingestimatesofupto80percentofall

conflicts.Inparticular,jirgasandshurasare

perceivedasmoreaccessible,moreefficient(in

termsoftimeandmoney),perceivedaslesscorrupt,andmoretrustedbyAfghanscomparedto

formalstatecourts.29

Atthesametime,theKabulgovernmentandits

internationalalliesneglectedandfailedtosupport

initiativesofkeyPashtuntribesthataimedatre-

establishing(inner-)tribalsolidarityorunityin

thepost-2001period.Thisleftthose(non-Islamist)

tribalforcesisolated,deprivedthemoffundsand

weakenedthemvis--vistheresurgingTaleban.

Forexample,asearlyas2003theMangalCentral

ShuraintheSoutheasternregionofAfghanistanimplementedadecisionthatbannedpoppy

growingonthetribesterritorythatstretchesover

anumberofdistrictsintwoprovinces,Paktiaand

Khost.ThiswascompletelyignoredbyKabuland

externaldonors,includingtheUK(thenthelead

countryfordrugcontrol).Donorsfailedtoreward

theMangaltribeforthisunilateraldecisionevenin

theslightestway,concentratingontheEastern

regionexclusively.Later,theMangalcommitted

themselvestodefendtheirterritoryagainstthe

TalebanbyatraditionalPashtunpact( tarun).TheMangalalsoplayedaprominentpartintheTribal

SolidarityCouncilwhichbroughttogetherPaktia

andKhostsmajortribesin2003/4,aninitiative

thatwasmetwiththesameignorantresponse

fromKabul.Thesameneglecthappenedtothe

DzadranUnityMeetingtheDzadranbeinga

28ThomasBarfield,NeamatNojumiandJAlexander

Thier,TheClashofTwoGoods:StateandNon-StateDisputeResolutioninAfghanistan(USInstituteforPeace,Washington2006),p2.

29AfghanistanHumanDevelopmentReport2007

(CenterforPolicyandHumanDevelopment,Kabul

2007),pp91,10.

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10 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? particularlyTaleban-influencedtribe

30with2,000

participantsinthespringof2007inDwamanda,

Khostprovince.Today,theMangalCentralShura

leftalonebarelyexistsanymore,anumberof

shurascompeteforleadership31andtheDzadran

remaindeeplysplitofferingeasyinroadsforthe

Haqqaninetwork.TheMangalarea,peacefulin

2003/4,nowisconsideredbytheUNtobeevenmorevolatilethantheDzadranareas.

Kabulsfatefuldecisiontopay arbaki32through

theprovincialgovernorsdiscretionalfunds

considerablyweakenedanothervitaltribal

institutionthathadstabilisedPashtunareas

lackinggovernmentpresence.Thispayment

systemstartedasearlyas2001,followedbymuch

closercooperationin2004and2005,duringthe

firstpresidentialandparliamentaryelectionswhen

arbakiguardedpollingstations,mainlyinthe

Southeasternregion,incooperationwiththe

AfghanNationalPolice.Subsequently,itbecame

moreerraticagain,dependingontheavailabilityof

fundsandtherelationshipoftheparticular

governorwiththecentralgovernment.Thisleft

manyarbakiunpaidformonthsatatimeand

loweredtheenthusiasmofindividualtribesmento

jointhisinstitution.When,forexample,Paktias

newgovernorRahmatullahRahmataformerUN

employeewho,therefore,wasseenwithsuspicion

inKabultookover,hewasnotgiventhesame

amountofoperationalfundsbythegovernment

thathispredecessorhadreceived.Officially,the

paymentofthesefundswasstoppedaltogether.However,somegovernorswithbettercontactsin

Kabulstillreceivedthemandwereabletopay

arbaki.Atleastinthesoutheast,anotherperiodof

morepermanentgovernmentfundingofarbaki

followedin2007.33

EvenAfghanleadersapparentlyfailedto

understand(orpurposelyundermined)the

characterofthearbakiasaninstrumentcontrolled

bythetribe,explainedatribalelderfromthe

30TheleadersoftheinsurgentHaqqaninetwork,

JalaluddinandSerajuddinHaqqani,areDzadran.

31DuringavisittoGardezinAugust2009,Iwitnessed

attemptsofvariousMangalshurastoclaimauthority

overthewholetribevis--visUNAMA.

32Tribal-basedself-defencegroupscomposedof

volunteers,suppliedbythetribeandmandatedbythe

jirga.

33SeeRuttig,LoyaPaktia'sInsurgency(seeFN24),pp

689;SusanneSchmeidlandMasoodKarokhail,The

RoleofNon-StateActorsinCommunity-BasedPolicing

AnExplorationoftheArbakai(TribalPolice)inSouth-

EasternAfghanistaninContemporarySecurityPolicy,30(2),pp3246.

regiontothisauthorinApril2007:IntheKings

timeitwasanhonourtobememberofanarbaki.Itsmemberswereprovidedwitheana[rations,weaponsandammunition]bythejirga.Topaythearbakimeanstorenderituncontrollablewhen

paymentsstop.ItseemsthattheKabul

governmentperceivestribalself-organisationasa

threatratherthanastabilisingfactorandprefersaformofpatronagethatisnotinclusivebutserves

onlyoneside.Thisneglectsthejirgasinherent

principleofmitigatingconflictinginterestsand

rathertendstodeepenconflicts.

4. WHEREDIDTHETALEBAN

EMERGEFROM?

LookingatthequestionofwheretheTaleban

historicallyemergedfromasamovement

contributestounderstandinghowstrongreligiousideasandconceptsshapetheirworldviewand

theirpoliticalaims.Arethoseconceptsthebasisof

theirideologyormerelyareactiontopolitical

circumstancesatacertaintime?

TheTalebanasadistinctmovementwasnot

partofthefirstuprisingsagainstthePDPAregime,

whichtookplaceinJune1978inthePechvalley

(nowNuristan)andPasaband(Ghor)andin1979in

LoyaPaktia,Herat,Nangraharandelsewhere.

Thoseweremainlyspontaneous,communityor

tribe-basedrevolts34againstthenewregimes

revolutionarylandandeducationreforms.But

fromthebeginning,theserevoltsincorporated

religiousmotivesandsometimesreligiousformsof

organisation.BeforetheChristmas1979Soviet

invasion,theinitialadversary,thepre-1980PDPA

regime,wasfoughtbecauseitwasseenas

communistandthereforegodless( kafer)bymanyAfghans.ButtheSovietinvasionaddeda

strongnationalisticcomponent:tofightaforeign

occupation.Thisletresistancegrowconsiderably.

Theideologicallystill-heterogeneousresistance

wasonlygenerallyre-interpretedasajihad,i.e.,asexclusivelyreligiouslymotivated,whilelevelling

otheraspectsofit,afterPakistanofficiallyand

exclusivelyrecognisedsevenSunniIslamist

34Interestingly,onecontemporarysourcedescribesthe

firstrevoltsasnon-ideologicalbutmainlydrivenby

reasonsresemblingthecurrentinsurgency,i.e.,arbitrary

arrestsandmisuseofpowerbygovernmentofficialto

settlepersonalscores.ThePDPAgovernmentinitially

hadwonthesupport(oratleastmadethemwait)of

manytribesbyorganisingjirgas.SeeDavidBusby

Edwards,OriginsoftheAnti-SovietJihadinGrantM.

FerrandJohnG.Merriam,AfghanResistance:ThePoliticsofSurvival(Lahore1988),pp24,324.

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11ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? resistancemovements(thePeshawarSeven

35)and

cutoffallotherresistancegroupsfromincoming

WesternandArabworldfinancialsupport.The

latterincludedsecularleftists(whofoughtfor

ideologicalreasonsandreflectedtheMoscow-

Beijingsplitofthecommunistmovement)and

ethno-nationalists.Attheirexpense,theriseofthe

Islamisttanzim36

wasboosted.Taleban,i.e.,madrassaandmosquestudents,werepartofthe

varioustanzim.

TheTalebanmovementemergedfromreligious

networksthatwerepartofthe197889

resistance,i.e.,abroadermovementthatsawitself

asreligiouslymotivated.Inthebeginning,taleban,ledbytheirteachers,organisedasmadrassa -ormosque-centrednetworks(fronts),mainlylinked

toHarakat-eInqilab-eIslamiandHezb-eIslami(Khales).TheydidnotconstituteamovementoftheirownyetbutwerealreadyknownasTaleban

fronts.37Onlywhenthemujahedin,intheeyesof

thelaterTaleban,violatedtheirownreligious

principlesbynotunifyingtobuildthepromised

IslamicstateafterthecollapseoftheNajibullah

regimein1992butfragmented(shirk38is

consideredamajordeviationinIslam)ina

competitionforpower,didtheyestablishtheir

own,nowultra-orthodoxmovement.

35ThesevenmajorSunnitanzimthatwereofficially

recognisedbyPakistanandthereforewereexclusively

entitledtoreceiveWesternandArabaidwereHezb

(Hekmatyar),Hezb(Khales),Jamiat(Rabbani),Harakat

(NabiMuhammadi),Ittehad(Sayyaf),Nejat(Mujaddedi)

andMahaz(Gailani).

36Tanzim(organisation)wasanArabictermusedby

Afghansforthevariouspolitical-militarypartiesthat

foughtinthedifferentperiodsofthecivilwar.They

includemujahedingroupsaswellasthenon-mujahedin

Jombesh.

37OlivierRoywitnessedTolabafrontsinUruzgan,Zabul

andKandaharinthesummerof1984.Theformerchiefof

PakistansarmystaffGeneralAslamBegsaidthathewas

partofanexperimenttoestablishTalebanforcesin

liberatedterritoriesofKunarin19856.ChristinaLambvisitedaMullahsfrontestablishedayearearlierin

KandaharthatinvolvedlaterTalebanleadersMulla

Razzaq,BorjanandMaulawiPasanaiin1998andwastold

thatithadbasesinArghandab,MalajatandZabul.The

firsteverTalebanfrontisreportedbyZabulwalfromZabul

alreadyin1979.SeeOlivierRoy,DieTaleban-Bewegung

inAfghanistan,MahfelNo.45(March-April1995),Berlin,p8,translatedfromAfghanistan-InfoNo.36(February

1995),Neuchatel;Talebanschonseit1985/86?,MahfelNo.45(March-April1995),p5,translatedfrom TheNews(Pakistan),3March1995;ChristinaLamb, TheSewingCirclesofHerat(London2002),pp5165;Zabulwal,TalibaninZabul(seeFN18),p181.

38Originally,shirkstoodforidolatryandpolytheismbut,

inafigurativesense,isalsousedforfactionalism.

Significantly,thosemujahedincommandersthat

laterbecamethemajorTalebanleadersstopped

fightingafterthecollapseoftheNajibullahregime

andwentbacktotheirmadrassastostudy.Asone

earlyTalebanactivistrelated,Manyof

us...withdrewafterDr.Najibsdefeatbecausewe

werenotinterestedinthewarbooty....Whenwe

sawthatthingsbecameworsedaybydayandfactionalfightingincreased,ourcentral

commanderMullaMuhammadOmarAkhund

startedfromQuettatobringtogethertheTaleban

inordertoestablishpeaceinAfghanistan.39

Theprimarymotivationofthemujahedin,and

thereforeofthefirst-generationTalebanofthe

1980s,canbedescribedaspolitical,basedona

religiousinfrastructure.Religiousmotivesthe

fightoftheMuslimtruebelieversagainstthe

infidelinvaderswerepartoftheirpolitical-

militarycampaignbutgenerallygainedanupper

handonlyinthewakeofthePakistan-inducedand

Western-supporteddominationoftheanti-Soviet

resistancebymilitantIslamists.WhentheTaleban

emergedasamovementaftertheSoviet

withdrawalin1992,itbecamemorestrongly

shapedbyreligiousmotives.Atitsbeginningstood

amoralreactionagainsttheatrocitiesandwhatit

sawasabetrayalofIslambythepost-Najibullah

mujahedinregime,theso-calledIslamicStateof

Afghanistan.Onlyafteritsinitialmoves,wasthe

Talebanmovementadopted,supportedand

instrumentalisedbythePakistanimilitary

establishment.

Whilethemadrassasormosquesatthecentreof

thoseoriginaltaleban(i.e.madrassastudent)

networkswerelocatedontheterritoryofcertain

tribes,thosetribeswerenottheprimaryreference

ofthesefightingTaleban.40Mullasinparticular

oftendidnotserveintheirowncommunityor

tribeandthereforewereconsideredpradai(stranger,outsider)amongstthestronglyin-group-

orientedPashtuns.Socially,asreligiousservice-

providers,mainlyforbirths,weddingsandburials,

andwithoutlandandstatusandtherefore

economicallydependentonthelocalkhans,mullasandevenhigher-rankingulamawereofinferior

status.41WhenrulerslikeAmanullah(ruled1919

39TheNews(Pakistan),3March1995,quotedand

translatedfromTalebanschonseit1985/86?,MahfelNo.45(March-April1995),Berlin,p.5.

40InZabul,anearlyTalebanfrontseemstohave

fragmentedalongtriballines(coincidingwithtanzim

lines)fairlysoon,however.SeeMartinevanBijlert,The

insurgencyinUruzganandZabul(forthcoming).

41Therankgiventomullasdiffers,though,fromtribetotribe.InmanyPashtuntribes,theyparticipateinthe

jirga.Whileinsome,theyevenactascustodiansof

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12 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? 29)andlaterMuhammadNaderandZaherShah,

PresidentMuhammadDaudandeventhePDPA

regimestartedpayingsalariestoasubstantial

numberofclergymen42andgavethemcontrolover

religiousfoundations(waqf),onlythecharacterofdependencechanged.Theybecamestate

bureaucratsintheeyesofthesociety.

Becauseoftheirroleintheanti-Sovietresistance,

theIslamicclergyparticularlythemullasrosefromsocialinferioritytoapositionofpolitical

power.Thispositionwasstrengthenedfurther

whentheTalebanregimemadethemitseyesand

earsinthevillagesandemphasisedthecollection

ofreligioustaxes,i.e.,ushrandzakat,traditionalincomesourcesforthemullas.Thisbuiltonthe

unofficialpoweramullaalreadyhad:Hewasoften

theonlyliteratepersoninavillageandhadthe

powerofthesermon.43

AftertheTalebanregimesfall,someulemathoseatthetopofmujahedintanzimgainedquasi-sacrosanctstatusasJihad(i)leaders.Under

theKarzaigovernment,theyserveasanunofficial

supremeadvisorycouncilgatheredbythe

presidentincrucialmomentstoobtaintheir

supportandblessingsforkeypolicydecisions.

ThisisstartingtoresemblethefunctionsofIrans

CouncilofGuardians,withoutbeinganofficial

institution.TheHighCouncilofUlema,headedby

theformerchiefoftheSupremeCourt,Maulawi

FazlHadiShinwari,playsasecond-tierroleinthis

influentialclericallobby.

44

Today,manyTalebanactivitiesinAfghanistans

southeastandsoutharestillcentredaround

networksofulama-ledmadrassasandmosques.

ForthesoutheastwheretheHaqqaninetwork,a

semi-autonomousentitywithinthebroader

Talebanmovementoperatestheinsurgent

networksarelargelybasedonoldornewly

createdDeobandinetworks.Theyareparticularly

stronginPashtunareasofGhazniandotherGhilzai

areastotheEast,likeKatawazinPaktikaand

pashtunwalai,inotherstheyarecarefulnottointerfereinthesematters.SeeSanaHaroon,FrontierofFaith:IslamintheIndo-AfghanBorderland(London2007),p68;OlivierRoy,IslamandResistanceinAfghanistan,(Cambridge1986),p36.

42Thispracticeactuallywasstarted,butonamuchlower

level,byAmirDostMuhammadKhan(reigned182663).

SeeHaroon,FrontierofFaith (seeFN41),p38.

43Haroon,FrontierofFaith(seeFN41),p89.

44ThomasRuttig,InstitutionenohneDemokratie:StrukturelleSchwchendesStaatsaufbausinAfghanistanundAnstzefreinepolitischeStabilisierung,SWPResearchPaper2008/S17,Berlin,pp1821.

WesternPaktiaaswellasinareasoftheDzadran

tribe(thebordertriangleofPaktia,Paktikaand

Khostprovinces).45Often,thesenetworksare

linkedtosimilaronesonthePakistanisideofthe

border.TheHaqqaninetworkssupply

infrastructureinPakistanwasbasedonmadrassas

atleastuntilmanyofthemweredestroyedby

droneattacks.TrivesfindingfromSoutheasternAfghanistanthatreligiousnetworksarestronger

inflatareaswhilethetribalencapsulationis

strongerinmountainousareas46canpossiblybe

appliedtosouthernAfghanistan,aswell.Here,the

roleofclericalnetworksinrevivingtheTaleban

after2001isreported,atleastfromNorthern

HelmandandZabul.47

5. HOWTRIBALARETHETALEBAN?

MostoftodaysTalebanfightersinparticularthediscontentandforced48onesinthesouthwho

aremainlymotivatedbylocalgrievancesrather

thanideologyandconstitutethemovementsbulk

areundoubtedlyPashtuns.49Thisjustifiesalook

atthequestions:HowrootedaretheTalebanin

Pashtuntribalsociety?AretheyareaPashtun

movement,oreventhemovementofthePashtuns?

50LikethePashtunsingeneral,the

45SbastienTrives,Afghanistan:Tacklingthe

Insurgency,theCaseoftheSoutheastPolitiquetrangre1(2006),pp56.

46Ibid.,p3.

47TomCoghlan,TheTalibaninHelmand:AnOral

HistoryinAntonioGiustozzi(ed.),DecodingtheNewTaliban:InsightsfromtheAfghanField(London2009),p137;AntonioGiustozzi,Koran,Kalashnikov,andLaptop:TheNeo-TalebanInsurgencyinAfghanistan (NewYork2001),p445.

48MyAANcolleagueMartinevanBijlerthasintroduced

theselocalAfghantermsintotheliterature:majburi(forced)andna-raz(discontent)Taleban.SeeUnrulyCommandersandViolentPowerStruggles:Taliban

networksinUruzganinGiustozzi,DecodingtheNewTaliban(seeFN47),pp1601.IpreferthemtoKilcullensaccidentalguerrillasandNaylorsauxiliary

Taleban.SeeDavidKilcullen,TheAccidentalGuerrilla:FightingSmallWarsintheMidstofaBigOne (Oxford2009);SeanD.Naylor,TheWaitingGame:AStronger

TalibanLiesLow,HopingtheU.S.WillLeave

Afghanistan,www.afji.com/2006/02/1404902.

49InareaswithgrowingTalebaninfluenceintheNorth-

East,theyincreasinglyattractnon-Pashtuns,particularly

UzbeksandperhapsevenTajiks.

50Officially,theTalebanrefertothemselvesasthe

IslamicMovementoftheTaleban(DeTalebanoIslami

GhurdzangorTehrik)andtheIslamicEmirateofAfghanistan(DeAfghanistanIslamiEmarat).Intheseterms,thereisnoreferencetoPashtuns.

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13ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? Talebanmovementbothasawholeandinits

constituentelements,issegmented.

Organisationally,theTalebanisanetworkof

networks.ItsmajornetworksaretheKandahari51

(ormainstream)TalebanandthoseoftheHaqqani,

MansurandKhalesclansintheSoutheasternand

Easternregions.Thenetworkoflatecommander

Dadullah(althoughweakenedafterhisdeath)ina

muchstrongerwaythenotherscutsacrosstribes

andregions.Allthesenetworks,though,are

associatedwiththeTalebanmainstream,recognise

MullaOmarastheirspiritualguide52andits

leaders(exceptpossiblyKhalesJr),andare

representedintheTalebansLeadershipCouncil

(rahbarishura).Thisrepresentation,however,seemstoberathersymbolic.

ThethreeSoutheasternandEasternnetworksare

moreregionalthantribal.Althoughtheircore

leadershipgroupsarerelativelystaticandmainlyrecruitedfromonetribe,i.e.,thatofthenetwork

leader(theHaqqanisfromtheDzadran,53the

MansursfromtheAndarandsmalleralliedtribes

andtheKhalesfromtheKhugiani),since2006,the

Haqqaninetworkmanagedtoexpandbeyond

classicaltribalboundariestoWardak,Logarand

Kabulprovinces.Also,theDadullahnetwork

expandedintoGhazniprovinceandfurthernorth,

beyondtheKandaharirealm.

Onthelocallevel,theTalebanfrontsarefirmly

basedintribesortheirsmallersubgroups.

Recruitment,operationsandsuccessionpatternsfollowtriballinesinamajorityofcases.Theselocal

networkshavedifferentlevels,ahierarchy

dependingonhowmuchareatheycover,froma

villageoraclusterofvillages( delgai)toawholewuluswali(jabha).OnlyinexceptionalcasesasintheSoutheastarethoseboundariescrossedand

thenetworksbecomeregional.Today,itis

estimatedthatsome80to90percentofTaleban

fightersoperateinorclosetotheirown

communities,notleastbecausemostTaleban

fightersarepart-timers.(Besides,therearealso

rovingunitsandadegreeofmobilityoften

51Thatis,theyarefromtheSouthwesternregionof

Afghanistan,centredinKandaharbutincludingthe

provincesofHelmand,ZabulandNimruz.

52Thesamegoesforthehithertoindependentlyacting,

localWahhabigroupsinKunarandNuristan.They

reportedlyhaverecentlyswornallegiancetoMulla

Omar.SeeThomasRuttig,OnKunarsSalafiInsurgents

AANBlog,14January2010,http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=570.

53AlthoughtheHaqqaniswereknownforrecruiting

commandersandfightersfromothertribesduringthe

anti-Sovietresistanceperiod.

KandahariTalebanaremovedinwhenlocal

groupsbehavetoosoftlywiththepopulation

butthoseareexceptions.)Thenumberoffighters

onelocalcommanderisabletomobilisealso

defineshispositionandinfluenceinthe

movement.DuringtheIEAperiodwhendifferent

networkscompetedforpositionsinthe

governmentTalebancommanderstriedtosavetheirownfightersbynotsendingthemtothe

frontlines.

Localpopulationstendtoseeexternalfighters

(thosefromotherprovincesandsometimeseven

districts)withsuspicionandsupporttheirown.In

2009forexample,inUruzganprovince,Tokhi

groupsontheso-calledWestbankofTirinkot

decidednottoallowexternalfighterstooperate

intheseareas.Onemajorreasonisthatlocal

fighterstendtoavoidexaggeratedviolencethat

couldcreatecyclesofrevenge.Also,theTaleban

layha54doesnotencourageoutofareaactivityandregulatesitheavily:Frontcommandersonthe

provincialordistrictlevelwhowanttocarryout

jihadoutsidetheirareaoforiginmustnotifythe

commandersintheparticularprovinceordistrict

andmustobeytheirorders.55

Significantly,strongtribalfissurelinesplaguethe

Talebanmovement.Themajoroneisthe

Kandahari-Paktiawal56rivalry.Fromthebeginning,

theTalebanrahbarishurawasdominatedbymembersoftheKandahariPashtuntribes,witha

somewhatequalrepresentationofthetwomajorPashtunconfederations,theDurraniandGhilzai,

andsmallergroupsliketheKakar.57Meanwhile,

southeastern,easternandnorthernPashtunsare

onlymarginallyandsymbolicallypresentinthe

Talebanleadership.

FormerTalebanreportahighlevelofmutual

mistrust.MainstreamTalebandidandstilldonot

allowanyonefromthesoutheastorelsewhereto

jointheirinnerleadershipcircle.(Eventheonly

Uzbekinthepre-2001originalTalebanleadership

54ThelayhaisabookofrulesforTalebanfighters,issuedbythemovementsleadership(nowinitsin3rdedition)

inmid-2009.DeAfghanistanIslamiEmaratDar-ul-Ensha,

DeTalebanoleparalayha,notdated(circaMay2009).

55DeAfghanistanIslamiEmaratDar-ul-Ensha,DeTalebano(seeFN54),articles37,38and39,pp413.

56PaktiawalisageneraltermforthetribesfromGreater

Paktia.

57SomeauthorsinadequatelydescribetheTalebanasa

predominantlyGhilzaimovement,probablyaprojection

bolsteredbygovernment-linkedDurranistrongmenin

SouthernAfghanistan.Seee.g.,ThomasH.Johnsonand

M.ChrisMason,UnderstandingtheTalibanand

InsurgencyinAfghanistan,Orbis(Winter2007),p4.

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14 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? hasnotbeenreplaced.)Thetwoexceptionsare

JalaluddinHaqqaniandAbdullatifMansur,both

fromPaktiaandleadersoftheirownsemi-

autonomousnetworks.Haqqani,aSoutheastern

Dzadran,hadreportedlybeenappointed

commanderofallTalebantroopsbyMullaOmar

immediatelyafter9/11.Currently,heisoften

countedamongsttherahbarishuramembersbutthisisfarfromcertain.Haqqaniscommanderrole

wasextremelylimitedintimeandsomeinterpret

hisappointmentasoneinwhichhewashandedan

impossiblemission.Earlier,whenhewasanIEA

minister,hedidnothavemuchinfluenceon

decision-makingandwasintentionallykeptatthe

sidelinesbytheKandahariTalebanleaders.58

MansursappointmentasheadoftheTalebans

politicalcommittee59theonetheoretically

responsiblefortalksinearly2009was

inconsequentialanddoesnotseemtorepresenta

changeinattitude.MansursnamewasnotmentionedonceinanyreportorTaleban

statementlinkedtothereconciliationissue.

Probably,thecommitteehasbeendowngradedat

atimewhenthereisnotmuchchancefor

dialogue.

Evenintheircoresouthernregion,despite

relativelystrongtribalintegration,theTaleban

leadershiphasbeenunabletopreventtribal

conflictsfromemergingonthelocallevel.In

Uruzgan,DurraniandGhilzaicommandershave

alreadytraditionallybeencompetingforthepost

ofprovincialcommander.Structurally,thisisunderpinnedbytheexistenceoftwolarger

separateTalebannetworksactiveintheprovince:

onemainlyDurrani-basedoperatingfromthe

HelmandandKandaharintheSouthandanother

mainlyGhilzai(Hotak,Tokhi)thatoperatesfrom

Zabulintheeast.Forthetimebeing,theDurrani

havetheupperhandwiththeappointmentof

RohullahAmin,aHelmandKhugiani.Butthefact

thatheisfromaminortribemightbeasignof

compromise.Inthesameprovince,amajor

blunderin2008thekillingofalocalSufileader,

PirAghaofPattan,inChinartudistrictsetaspiraloftraditionalrevenge(badal)inmotionandledtoadeepeningDurrani-Ghilzaienmity.Thiscostthe

Talebanaccesstoastrategicallyimportantarea

afterthelocal(Durrani)populationstrongly

reactedagainsttheatrocitycommittedbyaGhilzai

commander.Itevenestablishedalocalanti-

58MaulawiWakilAhmadMutawakkil,AfghanistanauTaliban[AfghanistanandtheTaliban](Kabul:BaryalaiPohantun,1384/2005),p33;authorsinterviewwithhis

formerdeputy,inKabul,May2008.

59Previously,AghaJanMotassem,aKandahariSeyyed,

wasinthisposition.

Talebancommunityforceunderayoungerbrother

ofthevictimwhichwasatthattimecompletely

unfundedbythegovernmentandmanagedto

keeptheTalebanoutofthisareaforawhile.This

wasaclearcasewheretheparochialinterestsofa

localcommanderoverrodethenon-tribalattitude

oftheleadership.

AtthecoreoftheTalebanmovement,inits

Kandaharimainstreamfromwhichitsleadershipis

recruited,theandiwali(comradeship)factorplaysadecisiveroleinkeepingthenetworkstogether.

AmongsttodaysTaleban,therearethreedifferent

typesofandiwalnetworks:religious(theiroriginalmadrassasandmosques),political(theiroriginal

tanzim)andtribal(theirancestryandwatan).Inanygivensituation,individualTalebanleadersas

wellasfighterscanchoosefromthesenetworks

inanygivensituation,whenmobilisation,support,

solidarity,etc.isneeded.Butthecommon

experiencethatunifiestheKandaharimainstream

wasgatheredduringthejihadagainsttheSoviets.

Meanwhile,thetribalcharacteroftheTaleban

becomesmorevisibleattheperiphery,distant

fromtheTalebanstrongholdsinthesouth,its

basesinPakistanandwherevertheleaderships

influenceisweaker.ThiswasthecaseinBadghis

priortotheelectionsinwhichthreetribalgroups

competedforleadershipandtheAfghan

governmentandtheinternationalforces

temporarilymadesomeinroads.TheTaleban

leadership,however,reactedmoreeffectivelyandregaineditsinfluencethere,mainlybyappointinga

strongfigure,AbdulMannanNiazi,asitsHerat

governor.Healreadyheldthispositioninthe

19962001periodandwieldsstronginfluenceall

overintheNorth-Westernregion.60

In2008,atendencytore-tribalisewasobserved

incoreTalebanareaslikeHelmand,Zabuland

Uruzgan:LocalTalebanretookcontrolintheir

particularoriginalareasfromout-of-areaTaleban

whowereaccusedofbeingheavy-handedtowards

thelocalpopulation.Thiswaspossiblyaresponse

toMullaOmars(earlierversionofthe) layhathatemphasisedkeepingfriendlyrelationswiththe

localpopulation:Atrocitieslikekillingspiesand

influentiallocalleaderswhoworkedwiththe

governmentalienatedthepopulation.Significantly,

thistendencyoccurredatthesametimethatsome

groupswithintheTalebantriedtoreachouttothe

60AfghanistanagreesTalibandealBBC,27July2009,

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8170003.stm;Ben

Arnoldy,Short-LivedCease-FirewithTalibanDims

ProspectsforBroaderDealsChristianScienceMonitor,27July2009,http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-

South-Central/2009/0727/p06s04-wosc.html;authors

interviews,Kabul,August2009.

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15ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? Afghangovernmentorinternationalactors,

indicatingthattheydidnotbelieveinamilitary

victoryeitherandwereconcernedabout

indiscriminateslaughterofAfghancivilians.

6. THETALEBANAS

NEO-NATIONALISTS?

Recently,someobserversdescribetheTaleban

propagandaasincreasinglynationalist:The

Talibanarebecoming,orindeedhavebecome,thestandardbearers,thechampions,oftheAfghan-

PashtunvendettaagainsttheAmericans.It'sanew

development,anewpoliticalandhistorical

force.It'snotfornothingthatthestruggleagainst

foreignoccupationandhumiliationistheone

themetheirpropagandahammersonandon.61A

newspaperarticleconfirms:Thelatestrefrainof

Talibancommanders,theirInternetmagazineandfromsurrogatesisthattheinsurgencyrepresents

Afghanistan'sPashtuns,whoareportrayedas

persecutedbytheAfghangovernment.Pashtuns

aresufferingeverywhere;ifyougoandcheckthe

prisons,youwon'tfindanyprisonersexcept

Pashtuns;whenyouhearaboutbombings,itis

Pashtuns'homesthathavebeenbombed,saida

TalebancommanderfromKandaharProvincewho

goesbythenameSangar[y]ar.62

Inaddition,formanyyears,somePakistaniauthors

havedescribedtheTalebanasaPashtun

movement.Inparticularthiscomesfromaschool

closetothemilitaryestablishmentbutanti-USat

thesametime.Itincludesfigureswhohadhelped

createtheAfghanTalebanlikePakistanichiefofthe

armystaffGen.AslamBegandformerISI(Pakistan's

Inter-ServicesIntelligence)chiefHamidGulaswell

asTalebanapologistslikecolumnistandformer

headoftheInstituteofStrategicStudiesin

Islamabad,ShireenMazari.Theyarguethethe

resurgenceoftheTaliban...nowhasbecome

enmeshedwiththeresurgenceofthePashtoontype

ofnationalismagainsttheoccupyingpowers.63

Fromthere,itisasmallsteptolabellingtheTalebanthemovementofthePashtunsandrulingoutanyviablegovernmentinAfghanistanwithouttheir

participation,inordertosecurePakistansinfluence

onanyfuturegovernmentinKabul.

61EmailconversationwithanalystCarloCalabrese,

January2010.

62AlissaRubin,TalibanOverhaulTheirImageinBidto

WinAllies,NewYorkTimes,20January,2010.

63FromaninterviewonanIndonesianwebsiteThe

Leaders,dated13February2007,

http://www.spf.org/the-leaders/library/15.html.

Indeed,theargumentthattheUS-ledintervention

oflate2001tookawaypowerfromPashtunsand

thatPashtunshavebeenitsmainvictims

originallyexpressedinPashtunexilecommunities

canbeheardinmanyPashtunareasof

Afghanistan.FollowingaseriesofUSSpecialForces

operationsthatclaimedciviliancasualtiesor,in

onecase,thelivesofafamilyofanactiveAfghanNationalArmy(ANA)officerinKhost,evenlocal

formerleft-wingersstatedthattheywouldbe

boundtotribalsolidarityiftheirtribedecidedto

jointheuprisingagainsttheAmericans.64From

ChakdistrictinWardakprovinceitisreportedthat

theTalebans

mobilizationoffootsoldiers...rests

largelyonanIslamicandnationalistic

discourseagainstforeignoccupiers....

Thus,thedecisionofTalibanfootsoldiers

tosupporttheTalibaninsurgencyinChakismuchmoresimilartothejihadagainst

theSovietoccupiers,onlynowtheUS,the

formersupporterofthemujahideen,is

seenastheenemy.65

Anotherelementoftenmentionedin

conversationsistheperceptionthatthe

governmentinKabulhadbeendominatedbythe

NorthernAlliance(NA),orthePanjshiris,inthe

post-2001yearsandstillis.Thisperceptionhad

beenfuellednotonlybymanipulationsofintra-

PashtuntribalrivalriesbylocalNA-affiliatedgovernmentofficeholdersandcommandersinthe

armedforcesinanattempttomaintaintheir

dominantpositioninthecentre66butoflatealso

bymembersoftheKarzaigovernment.

IthasbeenwidelyobservedthatPashtun

grievancesindeedhavetranslatedintosympathy

64Forexample,seemyarticlefromKhost:US-Truppen

machen,wassiewollentageszeitung(Berlin),24February2009.

65GhulamrezaFazlinaiemandNickMiszak,Mullah

OmarWantsYou!TalibanMobilisationStrategiesor

MotivationsofJoiningtheInsurgencyinAfghanistan19792009:IntheGripofConflict(MiddleEastInstitutee-book,Washington2009),http://www.mei.edu

/Publications/WebPublications/Viewpoints/ViewpointsA

rchive/tabid/541/ctl/Detail/mid/1623/xmid/831/xmfid/

11/Default.aspx.

66Exampleswitnessedbytheauthorwere(1)theroleof

theMinistryofDefencecommanderforthe

Southeasternzone,GeneralGulHaidaranallyofthen

DefenceMinisterFahimduringtheAhmadzai-Dzadran

rivalryoverthePaktiagovernorshipand(2)difficultiesin

obtainingfundsforschoolsinPaktialocallyinterpreted

aspurposelyholdingbackmoneybythenEducation

MinisterQanuni,anotherNAleader,in20023.

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16 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? andevenrecruitmentfortheTaleban.Butthisis

lessduetoAfghanssympathiesfortheTaleban

thantothelackofanysignificantpoliticalmiddle

groundeitherinthecurrentpolarisationbetween

theTalebanandthedeeplycorruptandtherefore

unattractiveKabulgovernmentorintheKabul

politicallandscapewithitstaintedmujahedin

tanzimandmarginalisednewpoliticalparties.Withmorepoliticalspace,Pashtunscouldmeaningfully

identifywithotherexistingpoliticalcurrents

fromnationalism(AfghanMillat),leftism(PDPA

successorgroups)andIslamism(ex-mujahedin

tanzim)tonewpro-democraticparties.

TheTalebanfaceafewmajorhurdlesthatprevent

themfrombecominganationalistmovementof

thePashtunorall-Afghanvariety.Theylackappeal

fornon-Pashtungroups,despitesomelocal

inroads.Thisisbolsteredbynon-Pashtuns

negativeexperiencesundertheTalebanregime

withitscurbsoneducation,freedomsandlocal

traditions(alsosharedbymanyPashtuns)and

elementsofethniccleansing.AsforaPashtun

nationalistmovement,theAfghanTalebanhave

nevershownanyinclinationtoidentifywiththe

irredentistdemandforthecreationofan

independentPashtunistanthatexistedonboth

sidesoftheDurandLine(thebordernot

recognisedbymostAfghansandmanyPashtuns

insidePakistan)betweenthelate1940sandthe

1970s.Thisisclearlyduetothefactthatthe

AfghanTalebanstillrelyonPakistanisupporttoa

significantextentandarenotinapositiontoirritatethisrelationship.TheAfghanTaleban

wouldprobablybebetterdescribedasanational-

Islamist67movementthatlimitsitsactivitiesto

Afghanistanandisnotinvolvedineitherirredentist

campaignsorinternationalistJihadism(moreon

thisissueinthenextsection).

7. THETALEBANSIDEOLOGY:

HOWISLAMICARETHE

TALEBAN?Thetermtalebanhintsatthemovementsreligiouscharacterandimpetus.Initsself-perceptionand

self-presentation,itisanIslamicmovementthat

doesnotrecognisetribal,ethnicorlinguistic

boundaries.Thisreflectstheorthodox,

conservativeIslamoftheHanafischool( mazhab)

67ThetermNational-Islamistisusedinanalogytothe

termnationalcommunistsinliteratureforthepre-1989

YugoslavorRomaniancommunists,withtheir

ideologicalcongruencewithMoscowthatdidnot

precludedivergentnationalinterests.

towhichmostSunniAfghansbelong.68MullaOmar

statedin2008:Ourreligionenjoinsonustoavoid

fromindulginginanykindofactivityinvolving

prejudicesbasedonethnicity.Theonlybond,

whichbindsus,isthebondofIslam.69Thisis

repeatedinthelayha,ahandbookwithacodeofconductfortheTalebinthefieldissuedbytheIEA

leadershipinMay2009.Article60statesthattheMujahedinshouldrefrainfromtribal/ethnic

(qaumi),linguisticandlocal(watani)discrimination.AhadithofAbuHurairaisaddedtoreligiouslybolsterthisinstruction.

70Anadditional

interestingaspectisprovidedbyWahidMuzhda

whohadworkedasaTalebanemirateofficialand

isnowapoliticalcommentatorinKabul:Beingan

ethnicTajikmyself,Ihavebeenwiththe

movementforhalfadecade.Theylistenedtoa

Chechennationalmoreraptlythanthehearing

theygavemeoraPashtunforthatmatter.71

Inreality,theTalebansideologyismuchlessclear-

cut.Aleadingscholardescribeditasaneclecticad

hocmixturefullofcontradictions,breakouts,

gaps,alterationsandhighlyidiosyncratic

interpretations.72Itstressestheimportanceof

ritualandmodesofbehaviour,includingoutside

appearance(clothes,haircut,shapeofbeard,

etc.).73

Butintheday-to-dayactivitiesoftheTaleban,

theologicalintricaciesdonotmattermuch.Itis

unclearhowmuchofareligiousdebateisreally

goingonwithintheTalebanmovementortheulamaclosetoit.Ifthereisany,itremainsinvisible

initspublications.Also,nosuchdebateis

68Oneformerhigh-rankingTalebandalemrepliedin

2009whenaskedaboutthereligiousbaseofthe

movementwithemphasis:WearenotWahhabi,weare

Hanafi.

69TalebanleaderurgesAfghanstoboycottdeceptive

electionsAfghanIslamicPress(Peshawar),7December2008.

70DeAfghanistanIslamiEmaratDar-ul-Ensha,DeTalebano(seeFN54),p57.

71Talibancan'tbebracketedwithPashtuns:Analysts

PajhwokAfghanNews(Kabul),2November2007.

72TranslatedfromBerntGlatzer,ZumpolitischenIslam

derafghanischenTalibaninDietrichReetz(ed.),

SendungsbewusstseinoderEigennutz:ZuMotivationundSelbstverstndnisislamischerMobilisierung ,ZentrumModernerOrient,Studien15(Berlin2001),pp17382.

73Giustozzi,Koran,Kalashnikov,andLaptop(seeFN47),

p12.SeealsoRuttig,TheOtherSide(seeFN1),pp1820.

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17ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? occurringontheinternetasinthecaseofal-

Qaida.74

SomeanalysesclaimthatthereisaTalebanUlema

Council,paralleltotheleadershipcouncil( rahbarishura).

75Indeed,ulemashurasgatheredat

varioustimesinKandaharwhiletheTalebanwere

inpower.Forexample,MullaOmarwas

proclaimedtheamirul-momenininMarch1996byagatheringof1,200religiousscholarscalleda

shura.76After9/11,anotherulemashurametand

decidedtorequestMullaOmartopersuade

OsamabinLadentoleavethecountryvoluntarily.

77Butalreadythenumbersofparticipantsinboth

eventsseemtoindicatethatthiswasnota

standingbody.Underthecurrentcircumstances,

withexpecteddroneattacksandISIsnatches,itis

evenmoredoubtfulwhethersuchabodycould

regularlymeet.InsideAfghanistan,shariacourts

consistingofoneqaziandtwoulemaeachare

partoftheTalebanparalleladministrative

structuresontheprovincialanddistrictlevels.

Theirresponsibilitiesaretosolvedisputesthatthe

districtandvillageulemahavedifficultyinsolving,

butapparentlynottointerpretsharia.78Itis

unclearhowmuchauthoritytheprovinceor

districtshariacourtsreallywieldvis--visthe

militarycommandersontheirlevel.Anecdotal

reportsconfirmthatinsteadtherahbarishuraitself(oritsmembers)occasionallyinvolvesitselfin

dispensingjustice.

IftherereallyisaTalebanUlemaShura,ithasneverpublishedanydocument,fatwaorstatement.Itrathercanbeassumedthatindividual

ulamaareinvolvedinadvisingMullaOmarorthe

rahbarishuraunderMullaBaradar79butthatboth

takethefinaldecision.Thisrelationshipbetween

theamirul-momeninandtheUlemaisreallyIslamic;itreflectsthehierarchicalshuraprinciple

incontrasttothePashtunsjirgaegalitarianism

basedonconsensus.80

76InLettreInternationalNo.84,(Spring2009),Berlin,

p72.

75DocumentsofUNAMAandPAG,seenbytheauthor.

76AhmedRashid,Taliban:Islam,OilandtheNewGreatGameinCentralAsia,London/NewYork2000,p41.

77AfghanClerics'DecisionsDeliveredtoOsama:Taliban

Envoy,PeoplesDaily(China),28September2001,http://english.people.com.cn/english/200109/28/eng20

010928_81241.html.

78DeAfghanistanIslamiEmaratDar-ul-Ensha,DeTalebano(seeFN54),pp378.

79ArrestedinPakistaninFebruary2010.

80AccordingtoTalebanex-ForeignMinisterMutawakkil,

thereneedstobeconsensusintheRahbarishuraitself

Ithasbeenstatedrepeatedly,thattheTaleban

haveatleastforwhileincreasinglyused

internationalistJihadistrhetoricintheir

propagandaandevenbecamemuchmore

integratedintheinternationaljihadistmovement

after2001.81This,however,seemstohavebeena

rathertransitionalperiodduringwhichMulla

Dadullah,killedin2007,copiedaz-ZarqawistacticsfromIraqbytrainingalargenumberofsuicide

bombers82and,evenmoresignificantly,usingthis

asaneffectivepropagandatoolgiventheWests

terrorismfears.(TheHaqqaninetworkwhichis

knownforitslong-standingspecialArab

connectionsfollowsthesameline.83)Dadullahs

course,though,triggeredaratherextensive

discussionwithintheTalebanin2007about

whethertheuseofsuicidebomberswhich,asa

rule,causemorecasualtiesamongstAfghan

civiliansthenamongstthoseseenbytheTaleban

aslegitimatetargets,i.e.,foreigntroopsandpeoplelinkedtotheAfghangovernmentwas

Islamic.SomeTalebanwerecitingtheQuranthat

killingMuslimsisharam(forbidden,i.e.,asin)andsubsequentlycalledpiousTalebanbysome

AfghansincontrasttoterroristslikeDadullah.

Theanti-Dadullahlinealsoseemstohavesupport

withinthemainstreamKandahariTaleban:When

MansurDadullahtookoverhiselderbrothers

placeandtriedtofollowthesamelinehewas

reprimandedbyMullaOmarandevenexpelled

fromthemovementforaperiodoftime.84There

werealsorumoursthatthekillingofDadullahwasenabledbyinformationfromwithintheTaleban

ranks.

Inaddition,thelayhaseemstobeareactiontothisperiodasitregulatestheuseofsuicide

bombers,rulingtoavoidalienatingthelocal

populationthroughcausingunnecessarycivil

casualties.Inarticle41(3)itstipulates:During

suicideattacks,thebestattemptsmustbe

undertakentoavoidthekillingofordinarypeople

andcasualties.MullaOmarreiteratedthis

whendecisionsaretaken.

81See,e.g.,Giustozzi,Koran,Kalashnikov,andLaptop

(FN47),p13.

82Dadullahevenstatedthathewantedtotakerevenge

forZarqawisdeath.SeeMullaDadullahvowstoavenge

ZarqawisdeathAfghanIslamicPress(Peshawar),9June2006.

83SeeThomasRuttig,LoyaPaktiasInsurgency(seeFN

24),p75.

84TalebansackmilitarycommanderBBC,29December

2007,http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/south

_asia/7164277.stm.

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18 ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? instructioninamessageontheoccasionofa

religiousholidayinOctober2008:

[B]everycarefulwhenyoufacethe

generalpeopleandyourinnocent

countrymen.Donotgoforanattack

whichhasapossibilityofharmingthe

generalpeople....Everyactwhichisnot

inharmonywiththeteachingsofIslamor

isnotaccordingtotheIslamiccivilization

ordoesnotlookgoodwiththeMuslim

Ummah...likeblastsin[mosques]and

wheretherearegathering[s]ofthe

generalpeople,lootingoftheproperties

onthehighways,cuttingnosesandearsin

thenameof[sectarian]differenceswhich

IslamforbidsortheburningofIslamic

booksmustbestronglycountered.85

Furthermore,internationalistjihadistrhetorichas

nottranslatedintoactionamongtheAfghan

Taleban.TherearenoAfghansinal-Qaeda's

hierarchyandnoArabsintheTalibancommand

structure86norhastherebeenasinglecasein

whichanAfghanTalebhadparticipatedina

terroristattackoutsidethemovementsareaof

operations,i.e.,Afghanistanandthetribalareasof

Pakistan.(ThisisdifferentfromthePakistani

Talebanwhich,viaalliedPunjabisectariangroups,

aremorecloselylinkedtoal-Qaida.)Therewereno

Afghansamongsttheplanehijackerson9/11.On7October2009,MullaOmarofficiallystatedthatthe

Talebandidnothaveanyagendatoharmother

countries,includingEurope,nordowehavesuch

agendatoday.87Inastatementontheoccasionof

theinternationalAfghanistanconferencein

LondoninJanuary2010,theTalebanLeadership

Councilstatedthat[t]heIslamicEmiratewant[s]

tohavegoodandpositiverelationswiththe

neighbouringcountriesinanatmosphereof

85DeAfghanistanIslamiEmaratDar-ul-Ensha,De

Talebano(seeFN54),p45;AmeerAl-MumeneenMullahMohammadOmarMujahidaboutthepleasureofEidal-Fitr,http://www.afghanvoice.com/index.php/news/news-in-english/237-ameer-al-mumeneen-

mullah-mohammad-omar-mujahid-about-the-pleasure-

of-eid-al-fitr.

86JasonBurke,MisreadingtheTalibanProspectMagazineNo.152(November2008),http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/2008/11/misreadingthe

taliban/.

87StatementoftheIslamicEmirateofAfghanistanontheOccasionoftheEighthAnniversaryoftheAmericanAttackonAfghanistan(7October2009),http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaTalib8anniv1009

.pdf.

mutualrespectandtakefar-reachingstepsfor

bilateralcooperation,economicdevelopmentand

prosperousfuture.88

Apartfromsomeindividuals,theAfghanTaleban

havenotboughtintoal-Qaidasjihadistagenda.

Whentheyusejihadistlanguage,theirprimary

targetisfund-raisingamongsttheirmajordonor

group:privatecitizensorgroupsorganisingmosque

collectionsinArabGulfcountriesforthem.

TheAfghanTalebansagendaisexclusivelyAfghan.

TheywanttoforcetheWesternoccupantforces

towithdrawandtore-establishtheirIslamic

emirate.Forthis,theyneedArabmoney,

sometimeschannelledthroughal-Qaida

connections,andperhapsdecreasinglymilitary

know-how.Asaresult,thecooperationbetween

thesegroupsisapragmaticsymbiosis,butonein

whichal-QaidaneedstheTalebanmorethanvice

versa.

89

Therefore,OsamabinLadengaveanoathofallegiance(baya)toMullaOmar,nottheotherwayaround.Thismustnotbemisinterpreted:Al-

Qaidadidnotbecomesubservienttotheaimsand

methodsoftheAfghanTaleban.Onthecontrary,

thispurportedsubservienceisausefulillusionthat

obscuresal-Qaidasfundamentalconflictswiththe

AfghanTalebansagenda.90Thereisplentyof

anecdotalevidenceaboutmutualracistprejudices

betweenal-QaidasArabsandthePashtunTaleban

whichfurtherlimitthepotentialforcooperation.

TheTalebanslackofenthusiasmforglobaljihadis

foundedontheirintentionnottorepeattheirpre-2001mistakes:toriskisolatingthemselves(orbe

isolatedagain)fromtheinternationalcommunity.

ManyintheTalebanblameal-Qaidawhich

plannedtheterroristattacksof9/11mostprobably

withouttheTalebansknowledgeforthefallof

theiremirateandthelossofpowerin2001.This

latentconflictalsomightcauseabreakbetweenthe

Talebanandal-Qaidaundercertaincircumstances.

88StatementoftheLeadershipCounciloftheIslamic

EmirateofAfghanistanregardingtheLondonConference,http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?t=13721.

89Afterheavylossesontheleadershiplevelandthe

transitiontowhatsomeauthorscallleaderlessjihad,

i.e.,withquasi-autonomousnationalgroupsthat,as

franchises,copyal-Qaidasideologyandstrategyand

onlyoccasionallyhaverealcontactwithitsleadership,

al-Qaidasmainapproachistohijacknational

movements,likethePakistaniandAfghanTalebanand

al-ShabaabinSomalia.Withoutthem,al-Qaidaonlycan

carryoutlimitedoperationsofitsown.

90VahidBrown,TheFacadeofAllegiance:BinLadins

DubiousPledgetoMullahOmarCTCSentinel(January2010),pp45.

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19ThomasRuttig:HowTribalAretheTaleban? However,theTalebansIslamistideologyprovides

aninstrumentthatcreatescohesionamongstthe

fightersfromsegmentedPashtuntribes.Oneof

themostimportantleadershipinstrumentsisthe

layha,publishedfirstin2006andupdatedinthespringof2009.Itisacodeofconductthatreflects

theIslamicprinciplestheTalebansideologyis

baseduponandtriestoruleoutce