' I G 0 N ~ I D E N T I A L -· ... --·--·-- ...... ----

HEADQUARTERS 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION A. P. o. 27

13 August 1944

Subject: POVl Interrogaticn Report.

To: All units, 27th Infantry Division, anG. attn.ched organizations.

The attached POVi interrogation report ~.s forv;arded for your information.

It is felt by this headquarters that it contains much of value to United States

Forces fighting in the Pacific. During the '~m~p-up" phase of operc'ltions

on SAIPAN in the MARIANAS a oonsidorable number of POVfs were captured by th<::

27th Infantry Division, Selected POV;s were interrogated by tho G-2 Section,

this headquarters, and this report is th0 result of one of such interrogations.

By command of Major General GRINER;

C 0 N F I D E N T I A L ------------

ltu7t;;;r1 .;~ MORTON ~/srf&russ • ~ Captain; AGD, Asst Adj Gone:ral.

Box-~ofder

Color Control Patches Green Yellow Red Magenta White

. . CONFIDENTIAL

HEADC!JARTERS 27TII INFANTRY DIVISION .. . '

13 August 1944

POW INTERROGATION REPORT

:rnterrogatt'!d by .!Jl.71g1.1age Team, 27th Inf_ •.. Div., 10 Aug. 1944

· Name: FlJRUTA, Kohei~ Rank: Superior Private. Age : 29. Unit:, HOI~ 11935, 3rd Co, 1st Bn., l36th Inf. Regt. Bn CO: Co.pt. FUKUSHD.aA. 3rd Co. CO: 1st tt. ISHIZAKI. . POW wns a member of the lst Replenishment Reserve. Captured on SAIPAN by 27th Irrf. Div.

. . A. HISTORY OF POW.

POW was born in HOKKAIDO, but his ~itzenship is registered in TAKAYAMA, G+FU Prefecture. His education consisted of Junior high school. In HOKKAIDO, his civilian occupation ~.s woodsman. He ~s conscripted into the army in 1938 and o.ssigne~ to the 35th Infantry Regiment, ,9th Division which was located at KANl~AWA.

'

With this division, he participated in tho SUCH01~{ o.nG. HANKO'JY occupation in CHINA tor basic co1~bat field training. Ho served in CHINA for one year and eight Bonths and vms then discharged into the reserve.

He was reco.ll~d into the Army on Zl April 1944, nne assigned to the l36th Infantry Regiment in GIFU Prefecture. POW stc.tes th£.t the l36th Infantry was in the division known o.s "NAGOYA" Division which wus only referred to by its code nnme HOMAHE. ~

B. DETAILS OF liOVEMENT TO SAIPJJ~.

POW states ·he left from YOKOR.iliJA NEW 9th o.ncl urrivec'. on SAIP.iiN on 15 Huy. Tho convoy consisted of three transi.'orts loaded with tr.oops o.nG. eight or nine escort vessels. Ho die not know the nano of hi~ ship but heo.rd it was a 7000 ton ship. He t},lso did not know wh(.t typo of vessels c.cted c.s escorts. POlV believes ull the 136th nncl 135th Infantry Hegimonts were on the trans­ports. Tho. convoy arrived without mishap.

. ' C. MOVEMENT OF. UNIT UPON LJJ\liHNG.

I, •

Deburkod on now pier and his co.'71B(:.iw was .stUtionod on tho ber.ch between GARAPllN and the Sugar Mill until the uttuck. · on ."D" Day, tho compc.ny mov0d

..

to the light house o.roa behind GA~ii-~.?li.N in reserve for the 1st Bn. His unit first came intq contact with u.s. forces north of the radio station in cru.RA~­KANOA and wus thero Ul1til tho oighth d~y. The unit then loft tho aroe. for the purpose of assembling wi:th c.ll HOJ.IARE units in CHJI.TCHJ'I.. pow· states tha.t only two-thirds. of tho rogimenta.l .. strength wus pros:Ont whon they ussomblod, an( thc.t

~ 1 -

C 0 N F I D E N T· I A. L - - - - - - - - - ··- - ......

Color Control B Green YelloW

CONFIDENTIAL .. ...,. _______ ... .;a.._

here they received nnval a nd artillery fires, und casualties were tremenc'.ous. The regiment then reformed its lines throur;h TAs 174-175 together with some tank units. However, they received nero artillery fire and communicatiops between units were disrupted so budly that all units fled separately. PO~ thought that the l36th· Infantry Regt was practically annihilated in the MT, Tli.POTCHAU area. ..

POV{ believes somo sort of higher headquarters existed noc.r TA l96V be­c4uso he saw a General Officer there. (NOTE: This is probably true as Lt. Gen. SAITO had a headquarters nenr hero) His company withdrew to Hill"Ablc" (TA l87A) and stnyed there for one week suffering heuvy casualties. r~cn its strength. W'd.S reduced to only one platoon, the remnc.nts 11 ro.n o.wny" to TJ~ 211. He bee~e lost from his platoon when he helped his squad lender to tho ever moving field hospital nenr HELL c~NYON. Here he met his wounded company com• mo.nder who wus forced out .of th0 hospital,. because of overcrowdinG uric', went with him to BANlillERU (July 3), where he heard th~t the heudqu~rters of the remaining units of the 136th Inf w~s ut TELEGRAPH HILL. ·

POW heard rumors ubout the 11 Bnnzo.i 11 cho.rge of 7 July while hiding in cuves south of the north airstrip but he did not pL..rticipc~to in it. In the· rneo.ntime his CO deserted him a.nd ho becc.me pretty dis;susted ubout this. (NOTE: linny Jo.p prisoners feel a grec,t antipathy towarC their officers). He threw awuy his rifle because th~y wore cuutiono~ not to shoot as this would r~venl their hiding plo.ces cmd he figured thoro vn~s no use in c£o.rrying a. weapon if he could not fire it. '

D. UOP UP.

POW stutes thnt tho .Amcrico.n troops with 'USMC on their uniforr.1 die?. not make any effort to soc.rch in cc.vos when they cumc through tho uroo. whore he was hiding but m~re ly wo.lke<l up the roc.d. POW CH.llllG out with his hc.nCs up with some civilio.n:J from cc.vo:> in T.A 279-0 during 27th Divis ion nop up opon.tions.

E. PROPAGANDA. BROlillCli.STS, ETC.

POW had heurd o.bout the publie hddress system broc.dco.st but he himself <lie not heur any. Opinion of these who he~rd it was thut tho ideas were ;ooC.. He h~d seen lent'lets but no one pc.icl cmy attention to then beco.use they wore dropped too curly.

POW hud henrd nbout the crucltios of tho Americo.n forces', but he cid not believe them bocnuse tho u.s. is a "very civilized no.tion11 • (NOTE: J,!c.ny POWs say this and it is felt tho.t the roo.son for this is thc.t they fo~r we may tuke ·some uction o.gninst them if they do not). The feeling thc.t the u.s. commits atrocities on POWS is univorsa.l in Jupnn o.lthough it is not mentioneci in pupers nor over the radio. He CLUl offer no definite suggestions for linproving the ideus written in the leaflets or broo.dcusts. He states that it is probably best for Niseis (AJA) or civilic.ns to go ur:tont; tho hieing solC:icrs nne civil­ians to convinc~ t~om th;:~ t they shoulC. s urrendor.

POW states th ... t he expkincd to civilians many tliaes thc.t they woulc not ba treated as military prisoners so they should give up. He further states, that because the civilio.ns follow the solcicrs, they hamper movements anc oper•

CONFIDENTIJ..L ________ __. __ _

Color Control Pa ch Green Yellow

. .. - ~

. .

. ' ~ . . ' ;:~ ~ ~, -~ ~ • • fl '

:; '-:::'- - )

v

CONFIDENTIAL

ntions considerably. (NOTE: This should. be true in all future operutions &nd tactical use might be made of it).

F. INFORMATION OF U. S. FORCES.

, As tar as PaN knows, the Jap Army offers no instruction in identification of u.s. soldiers and equipment, nor is intelligence training given to sol­dier,.

G. 8ITU,~TION IN JAPAN.

POlll believes that Japanese people in Jo.pan do not know the seriousness of tho world situation and will wake up from their creams anc really unite a.nd strive for victory when JAPAN is put under continuous bombing. I:J:nny people a.ro still taking lifo easy because they aro a.bsolutely confident of victory.

G. POW's OPINION OF OUR WEi1.PONS ii.ND FORCES.

1. Ho stutos that naval and nrtille~ gunfire were most effective. Str&f­ing is ineffective because the chances of getting hit o.ro slim. PO'.'v W&S not scured of bon.bing because he coulc.~ take cover and also ho sta.tcd that it wt:.s not very accurate. It w~s his opinion that ~nerican weapons wore superior to tho Japanese.

z. rVhen our riflemen took time und uimod. they were very o.ccurr. te. but when shooting indiscriminately from tho hip they rarely hit anything. He criticized our expenditure of ommunition, sbting th~t we were very wc.stcful of it. but felt thut it v~s necessary to curry out a successful a ttack.

3. The Ja.pa.nese coulc~ c\ lv.ays tell when tho Amorico.n Forces would o.tta.ck because a. terrific bombc.rclmont by <-lrtillery cmc: nt~.vul guns u.lwo.ys preceded our o. ttucks.

4. POW o.lso sto.tod th~.t l..i.:J.EJric nn troops ho.d u. tcnc'.ency to show them­salves in the open for no o.pp ~ront reason.

I. ORGJ~NIZL. TIOU.

Composition of Infantry Unit:

Each rifle squad ho.s 10 n.en nnd l um. 5 squads in ouch rifle platoon including 4 rifle squc.ds and l 11knoo 11

nortctr s qua.C: with 2 morturs. 4 platoons to compc.ny; 3 rifle platoons antl l heavy HG pla.toon with

3 HHG•s. 3 companies in an Inf Bn. Infantry gun unit was attached to either a company or bo.tto.lion

deponding on the situation. Conposition of infantry units is. govornod by the areas in which they

o.re stationed. Japanese forces o.re orgu.nizec differently for fight­ing in CHINA than in the SOUTH SEAS.

POW sta.tes he ho.d seen o.pproxima.toly one battalion of naval pa.ratroopers in tho GARAPAN areu.

NOTE: IN EVALUATING INFORMaTION CONTAINED HEliE IN. CONSIDElli.TION MUST BE GIVEU TO THE . FJ ... CT T"'ili~T IT.Hi\.S DERIVED .FROJ'l A PlUSONER OF W1.R • .

Stack Row

• 3 - .. . ·- ·---

Box-Fofder

Magenta

DECLASSIFIED

Authority \'JNO 1-~so J

White

C o;]~ F I D E N T I A· L __ ._ ________ _

HEADQUARTERS 27TH Il\TFANTRY DIVISION A. P. 0. 27

POW INTERROGATION REPORT

13 August 1944

Interrogated by ~n~unge Tenm 27th Inf .Div, ·a Aug. 1944

Name: YOSHIMOTO, Tsuneo. Age : 24. Runk: Superior Private. Vnit: 4th Co., 9th Tnnk Regiment (533 Unit). Duty: Tank Driv·er. Captured at SAIPAN by 27th Inf Div.

A. HIS TORY OF POW.

Departed from MANCHURIA 13 March 1944 for JAPAN. Suiled f~am YOKOHA11A 2 ·April r944. Arrived SAIPAN 10 Apri! 1944. POliiJ' sailed from YOKOH.Ai\1.! on the KATOGAWA MARU in a convoy of twenty six

transports · and thirteen escorts. ~om 4 April to 7 April, they were under attack by our submarines and em the 4th one ship wus sun.K' 'off IZU HICHITO o.nd on the 7th the tender TOKUMU:K.AN wc.s· sunk. .Another ship went down ·on 9 Apr ir.

On 10 April, nineteen ships of tho POW's convoy entered SAIPAN Ho.rbor. He believes mos~ of the ships c~rriod ammunition and food. Five tro.nsports and seven escorts continued on ~o 'GUAM. • The Regimental Heudquo.rters o.nd the 1st and 2nd compunies of tho 9th Tnnk Regiment went to GU~~ and · the 3rd, 4th x.Od 5th companies and maintenance unit rom~inod on SAIPlill. It wo.s rumored tho.t the 4th company vvus to go to TlNIAN but thnt had not been o.ccomplishod,

With the elements oT the TO. nk Regiuent landing on SAIPAN was an Artillery unit which POW ho.d heard· ho.C. just· roturned from the SOlJTH SEAS a. we'ek' before · they sailed from JAPAN.

,

B. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIP1•;iEWI'. '

POW stu tes thoro a.ro five ta.nk compunics iri a tc..nk regiment. Ec.ch Compo.zy has fifteen tanks (NOTE: Captured documents show .fourtecn) of which twelve c..re Type 97 Medium tanks, (NOTE: Other recor ds show only eleven), nnd three Type 95 light ta.nks. Ih addition, POW sta tes, thoro ~:.re six trucks in o. company. Two of the mediuu tanks nrc nnuod with u 47mm gun each, nne tho bo.lc..ncc with 5 7mm guns. •,

C. ACTION OF POl7if' s UNIT DURING OPEH11.TION.

On 15 Juno, the 4th Company vms u.t MAGICIENNE BAY and remained there until the 2nd or 3rd day, after tho landing. At 0930 of the 2nd or 3rd do.y, ·POW sto.tes, troy were ccimmittod ut CHJ.RAN-KANOA with only· eight to.nks pc.rticipo. tinf; in the attuck. Two of those v~ro damaged und only six roturnod.

- 1 -

CONFIDENTIAL ------------Stack

Green Yellow Red Magenta

DECLASSIFIED

Authority f\11\10 } ~ 0/

White

·-:-·

CONFIDENTIAL The Headquarters o.nd Maintcn'Qncc-unft 'V.erc-£l't '"CHATCHA anc:. the 5th company

at DONNAY with the 3rd Company in the vicinity of MT TAPOTCHAU. '

In the attack at Clli\RAN-KANOA. ~he 4th Company Commander was killed. His name was YOSHllnJRA, SHIGEO. captain. The name of the Regimental Cammander wus GOSHllKA. TlillASHI. Colonel.

In the POW's opinion, the tanks were committed on the orders of the ructicnl Headquarters and the mission was u failure because it wns not tho proper time to uso the tanks. However, he does any that the reason they wore used was that the Jap troops were faliing buck und could not repulse the landing due to our naval gunfire.

Early on the morning of 19 June, according to POW, (NOTE: Datos may be wrong us POW had great difficul~ in remembering them exactly) the Heudquurtors 3rd and 4th 9ompunies attacked again from an assembly urea near TA 162B where they had ussembled at night. They moved through the hills to the vicinity of GARAPAN and attacked South at 0300·0400. The mission was unsuccessful and only sevon tanks returned to the vicinity of SAIPlill SHRINE and thence to 162B. The Regimental Connnander wc.s killed us was the 3rd Company Commander. Commund wcs assumed by SHIBATA, Cnptuin of the 5th Company.

Jun~ 20th they rested.

On 21 June, all remaining tanks ' were formecl into one company (5th). Tho Pmv heard that they met three u. s. tanks coming from ASLITO noar TSUTSURAN, TA 151J, and destroyecl them without loss.

On tho night of 21 Juno, the rema~ning tanks withdrew to a point one kilo­meter north of CHATCHJ~. Only forty-six men of an original strength of 106 re­mained in the 4th Company. They remuined thero the 21st nnd 22nd, but hud no communi co. tion with other uni t.s •

At no9n on 22 June, the remnants of the TUnk Regiment gathered at the Tac­tical Headquarters of Lt. Gen. SAITO on tho East side of MT. TAPOTCW1U. All men who hud lost their to.nks woro to undertake c,.ny duty necessary. POW wc.s wounded that day und rcmnined in u cuvc. Thirty other men were also wounded by Junaricnn bombing.

POW stutod . thu t Lt. Gen. SAITO wus at tho Tactical Hoc.dquurters on the 22.nd. On tho right flunk of this Headquarters was the 4th Company, in the center, tho Maintenance Unit of o.pout fifty men; and on tho left flunk, the 3rd and 5th Companies of about sixty mon. On their loft wo.s the KATO Unit (Infc.ntry) of about five hundrod men. On tho right of the 4th Company was a SONAE Unit of nbout five hundred men (Infantry). On the 25th, the Tactical HoQdqu~rters mov­ed to the rear to the vicinity of TA 219J. (NOTE: This account checks accur­ately with intelligence reports of this Divis ion·. It ·would place the Rend­quarters of the Jo.p forco in T.ii. 187 u.pprox:imo.tely [,S reported by Major YOSHIDA (POW) Intolligonco officer, 43rd Division. It further accounts for tho number of icentificutions of tho tc.nk tmit which were found by the Division in its ad­vance oust of TliPOTCHAU.)

D. OTHER PERSONAL I TIES.

POW hud her.~-rd that Lt. Gen. OBATl•, CG of 31st Army wo.s ~t PALAU and wc.s

Stack

- 2 -CONFIDENTIAL ------------

Color Control Patches Green Yellow Red Magenta

,. :rfr'!Jf,; \

. . -.i""l:~.J:_. ~ ~: r ' J:l 1 ii,*i'"". ''. ·~· ~ i~:i"·.;;:;:::"":.~t;, ··~:

S;.... l' • ~ "·~~,lt,= -t~. f

White

C 0 N F I D E N T I A L ------------unu.ble to return to SA'IPAN on 11 June because of our c. ttuck. The r o wt.. s c. ru."llor thu.t he h:-ld buen killGd .

E. INF01tMATION ON COUNTE.l:V~. TTJ,CK OF 7 JULY.

POIV sto. ted tha.t he w:. s in a. cavo a.t +h.1 tine of the uttnck. He wus tol d thnt the total stren.z;th of forces tuking purt wus six thous cmd, mnc'..o up of twc thousu.m~ oilitc..ry, two thousand milit£~ry r:. ttc.ch0d (construction units, e tc) nnd two thous and civilic..ns.

F. POW's OPINION OF U.S. FORCES .c1.ND EQUIPN!ENT.

POW fe ure c: n a.vo.l gunfire more thun anything olse. one rouson for this wt:.s tho.t it wus unexpected, bc c0.usc POW hud the utmost conficcnco in the Jap Nt::.vy and felt it would protect them from attc.ck. Ho next feo.red bombinG under cer· tain conditions, i.e., when tho torruin gave no cover; a fter tha t c~nc struf· ing und then our artillery c~nd mort<..' r firo tc t night.

He expressed boliof tha t we must huvo some kind of sound detector or r u.clur (UMPATaNCHIKI) beca use uny noiso or movement on their p urt ut night brought down u concentr a tion of fire. The flo.ros ulso were u grcHJ.t cuus e of fe c.r t c­him-: In a ddition, he wc's o.1na.zed at tho grout quantities of equipment a.m~ o.rnmunition we hu<l c.nd wondoroc'c how we had brought it. POW thought very highly of our communic ations, str.ting us ono reus on for his belief in their efficiency thh t our front lines were never fired on by our own artillery.

G. POW's OPINION OF OUR DEFICIENCIES.

Criticize d our loud talk, smoking un<l noisy footsteps s inct' thoy :.. lwnys revealed our positions u.nd numbers.

POW stt...ted we nre very wasteful of rumnunition, firing M·l's o.ncl c.utomu. tic wenpons indiscriminately.

H. ORDER OF BATTLE.

PO''IV identified tho followin6 units a s being on SAI PJ:..N:

119.34 Unit (l35th Infc.ntry Regh:~.cmt) 11935 Unit (136th Inft:..ntry Regiment) ·.-KAJvAMUHA BUTAI--I:lfnntry. Probc.,bly u. reg;il:~.ent. .b.ccor C:. ing t9 POW, it

wns stationed in the vicinity cjf CHil.TCHA. Heavy FA Unit #929 from MANCHURIA. It hud fourteen 15crn. guns and was

loct.tod o.t tho base of HIN.ASHISU ].~T. Tl1 150. TERU BUT.I'I.I··An Arrn.y t c.nk unit not part of 9th Tank Re gime nt. HaC. nine

tanks {light and medium). SATO TAl--Another Army light tank coopany with elevcm t c.nks. Two of

them had be ~m knockod out und it wus brought under · · cor:l..TUnnd of 9th Tc.nk Regiment for control.

There were about twenty Navy wmphibious t unks on the isl c~d. Total number of t r..nks on Sli.IPAN wo.s uppr oxima to ly one hundr eC. .

Tho 9th Tonk Regiment ho.d came from ]ili'1.NCHURIA and r. ll personne l nbovo t:.

cortnin rnnk h<:1d t aken po.rt in the NOMOHAN cumpuign there.

CONFIDENTIAL ---~--------

- 3 -

Stack Row

Color Control Patches Cyan Green Yellow Red Magenta White

~ .i ~-' I

. ' ' • . '

,::~~~~~ ;" '., ?.:':v ~ .r"'"' ' , ; . <, ''··~-~yJi~,~~~1~%t~{'Wi -·

CONFIDENTIAL I. PROPAGANDA.

He hu.d heurd stories of our nistreatment of POWs but c~id• not believe then o.nd stated that o. number of others c'.id not. POW hucl henrd u.s. hc.c~ droppe c leaflets but h<~d paic~ no attention to them und h..:.d not reu.d o.ny.

P<JvY feels th"'t the only wo.y to persuade the fugitive ·Jc.p civili<..:.n~ to sur­render is to get s arneono who is in authority or respected by them to go in among them. Individuc.lly~ they desire to give themselv&s up, but in L group, they aro fearful of showing wea.kncss and pride keeps them fro;-.1 surrenc.cring;. At night they are ufruid of being shot by our troops.

In regard to the disgro.co of being taken prisoner, Pmv stt:ted thu.t. there is only such disgra.co whi~e they ht~vc the fighting spirit. After this hus bE:Jen broken dowp. by repoc.-tcd dofeo.t and they realize their position is ho~­less, there will no ·longer be this disgrace. He thougnt this might be ac: complished by continuo.! b011bing of JAPAN so that its unity is disruptcc'.. l!io shoulC. keep £•11 Japanese informed of the exc.ct stc...tus of affairs in the worlC c..p.d of our victories us this news is withheld from the people unr.:. s olt:iers. For instance, this ·POW c'.id not know we hue taken the MA.RSHALLS a.nc consider­ed SAIPAN would not be ~tta.cked for some time.

J. NEW EQUIPMENT.

Had hertrd thn.t the Jc.pcnese h L,t: ncnv t~,.;.nk types but ha.d nt:lver seen them.

He ho.d c..lso h urd th0.t they hnC. u new Lo.utoni..i.tic cunnon but knew nothing further.

K. TRA lliiNG.

T-here are two types of trc.ining for tt.nk porsonnel, l'onr; o.nC:: short. POi!\ hc..C. been trained for three Honths anG. then sent to 11.ii.NCHUrtiA cmc rcceive:G. 6 months additional trc.ining there. The t<...nk units contained l:lostly high school grn~uo.tes.

NOTE:. In evnluuting information contained herein, cons idera.tion must bt; giv!;';n to the fact tho..t it was clerivoC. from 1.1 Prisoner of ':ID.r.

CONFIDENTIAL

Color Control Pa c Green