hr70-14 x intelligence information report · 1981. 1. 1. · hr70-14 x intelligence information...

HR70-14

x Intelligence Information Report

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

S &EC PAGE 3 OF WI2PAGES

REPORT CLASS S E

COUNTRY Poland/USSR/Warsaw Pact Countries A REDFOR

H ISTO RICALSUBJECT Planning, Preparation, Operation and Evaluation of ~COLLECTIONWarsw Pct EercsesDIVISION DATE:Warsw Pct ~ercses06-18-2012

DOI 1981

SOURCE

Following on pages 4 through 121 is a paper entitled "Warsaw PactExercises. " The paper provides an in-depth study of long-texm and short-term planning, preparation, operation and evaluation of Warsaw Pact-exercises. Included in the paper is an explanation of the purpose andnature of each exercise series.

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WARSAW PACT EXERCISES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. THE LONG-TERM PLANNING PROCESS FOR TRAINING EXERCISES .. 6

A. THE JOINT ENTERPRISE PLAN AS THE BASIS FOR PROGRAMDIRECTIVES. ..... . ..........-.-.-.- 6

R. TRAINING PIRECTIVES OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OFDEFENSE.... .. ............................. .. 7

C. CONILNED ARMED FORCES TRAINING DIRECTIVES ..... . ... 10

II. THE VARIOUS EXERCISE SERIES...... . ..... :.. 13

A. LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES .. ..--.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. 13

B. PURPOSE AND NATURE. OF EACH EXERCISE ........ -. 14

!. TRAINING OF GENERAL STAFFS ......... 14

- ---- - -- 2.--"GRANIT" -EXERCISES---... . .:. -16 ---- - -- ---

3. "ZAPAD" EXERCISES I. . ........ 17

4. "SOYUZ" EXERCISES .... . .......... 19

5. "SH'CHIT" EXERCISES . ... . ......... 20

6. TRAINING OF TECHNICAL COMMUNICATIONS TROOPS . 21

7. "TRANZYT" EXERCISES .....--.-.-.-.-.-.-... -. 22

8. "VOLNA" EXERCISES -.-.-.-. ..--.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. 23

9. "LATO" OR "WIOSNA" EXERCISES .......... 23

10. JOINT, MULTI-NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE EXERCISES - - 2511. POLISH-SOVIET DIVISION-LEVEL EXERCISES ..... 26

12. JOINT CIVIL DEFENSE EXERCISES . ........ 27

III. THE EXERCISE PLANNING AND PREPARATION PROCESS ..... 28

A. NSWP EXERCISE PLANNING METHODS.... ..... ... .. 28

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I. PRE-EXERCISE PLANNING PHASE .. ......--.-.-.-. 29

C. EXERCISE PLANNING ELEMENTS . ....... -.-. 31

0. PARTICIPANTS IN PREPARATION OF EXERCISES ...... 34

E. PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES (WHO DID WHAT?) ... 37

F. EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS .... .......-.-.-. 50 -

G. SOVIET-POLISH INTERACTION IN EXERCISE PLANNING - 53

{I. TRAINING AREAS (SELECTION AND PREPARATION).. -.. 54

- "OPERATIONAL CAMOUFLAGE" OF EXERCISES.-.-.-.-.-... - 55 --

IV. UNDERSTANDING EXERCISE SCENARIOS..'--..--.-.-.-.-.-. - 59

A. ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE VERSUS NEW CONCEPTS '.-.-.-.-.-.59

R. SCENARIO CONTENT ....-. . .......... 60

C. EXERCISES AS A REFLECTION OF REALITY ........ 63

D. TESTING OF NEW IDEAS DURING EXERCISES 69. ....... . 9

E. ENEMY (NATO) DATA IN EXERCISES ..--.-.-.-..-.-. 70 -

V. ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF DIRECTING LARGE EXERCISES . . 74

VI. EVALUATION OF EXERCISES . gg

VII. WESTERN VIEWS OF PACT EXERCISES. ......... . gg

ANNEX 1: GENERAL STRUCTURE OF WARSAW PACT OPERATIONALTRAINING. ... . ......... . - 115

ANNEX 2: DIAGRAM OF CONVERSION OF POLISH COMMAND SYSTEMFROM PEACE TO WAR ....... .. ......... 118

ANNEX 3: CONCEPTUAL DIAGRAM: DATA FLOW IN "LATO" TYPEEXERCISES ........ ... .......... 119

ANNEX 4: DIAGRAM OF DEPLOYMENT OF ROLE-PLAYING GROUPS INFRONT-LEVEL EXERCISES (TRADITIONAL SOVIET METH00) - - 120

ANNEX-5: DIAGRAM OF DEPLOYMENT OF ROLE-PLAYING GROUPS INFRONT-LEVEL EXERCISES (NEW POLISH METHOD). -.'.'.'.-.121

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WARSAW PACT EXERCISES

I. THE LONG=TERM PLANNING PROCESS FOR TRAINING EXERCISES.

A. TH JOINT ENTERPRISE PLAN AS THE BASIS FOR PROGRAMDIRECTIVES.

The Joint Enterprise Plan was developed routinely by themilitary leadership of the Soviet Union,. which centrally managedthe military activities of the Warsaw Pact states. The legalbasis for this state of affairs was formulated by the CombinedArmed Forces' (CAF) Peacetime Statute, which authorized the PactCommander-in-Chief (CINC) to issue directives concerning thecombat readiness of the CAF, as well as their operational andcombat training. The statute also authorized the CINC toprescribe the CAF's annual joint enterprises (exercises, wargames, training, school briefings, etc.).

Based officially on the above premises, all exerciseactivities of the armed forces assigned by the individual WarsawPact states to the CAF were initiated and coordinated by the CAFCINC. In practice--at first informally, and then formally

- - following acceptance of the CAF Wartime Statute in 1980--the CINCissued exercise central directives, gu-de-1ines-and--plans---of-the--._- , _Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

As a result, the joint exercise plan came into being on twolevels of the central management of the Warsaw Pact States'military preparedness: the Soviet Ministry of Defense and theCombined Command of the Warsaw Pact.

The Ministry of Defense of the USSR, which was the highest -level at which directives were initiated, issued:

- The long-term program of training activities, with itsmost important component, "The Principles of Frequencyof Exercises of the main Branches of Armed Forces andTheir Respective Elements.'

- The main tasks relating to operational and combattraining of commands, staffs and tr0005.

1 The Warsaw Pact Joint Enterprise Plan consisted of a schedule of all ointexercises (Combined Armed Forces; front-level; armiy-level; air defense; naval;rear services). The plan a-lso incTluded scheduled meetings/"common

. undertakings" (Pact Military Council; Chiefs of the General Staff; Chiefs ofIntelligence; Heads of branches of arms and services).

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- Orders or organizational guidelines for the technicaltraining of the particular branches of the. arned forces,and arms of troops and services.

On the second level of command, the CAF CINC, as the FirstDeputy Minister of Defense of the USSR responsible for carryingout the above-mentioned directives of the Soviet. Ministry ofDefense, also tailored these directives to the conditions andneeds of the Warsaw Pact armed forces and annually issued:

- A Directive of the CINC of the Combined Armed Forces forthe Training of Combined Armed Forces.

- A Plan of Joint Enterprises of the Conbined ArmedForces.

8. TRAINING DIRECTIVES OF THE SOVIET MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

The origin of these directives in the Soviet Ministry ofDefense is unclear. One such directive appeared in January 1981during consultations between the General Staff of the SovietArmed Forces and the Chief of the General Staff of the PolishArmed Forces.

1. The Lonq-Term2 Program of Traini-ng-A-ctivi-ties or-iginatedwith the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, in cooperationwith the chiefs of the main branches of the Soviet armed forces,and was approved by the Soviet Minister of Defense. In the :Soviet General Staff, this document was compiled by the TrainingDirectorate of the Main Operational Directorate. The idea behindthis document was the establishment of a permanent system ofexercises which would be compulsory for a longer term, and whichwould insure appropriate preparation of the commands, staffs andtroops of all the branches, of the armed forces for wartimeoperations.

In principle, this program did not specify any aims orcontent of exercises, but merely listed their types and numbers.in annual, two- and five-year cycles. From the part of thisprogram presented by the Soviets during bilateral consultationsit appeared that, independently of the exercises organized andconducted by the central level (Soviet Ministry of Defense),commanders in the military districts, in the Groups of SovietForces (stationed outside the USSR) and in the fleets wereresponsible each year for the conduct of:

2 Not precisely defined.

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- One command-and-staff Front (army-level) exercise.3

- One army (corps)-level operational-tactic 1 exerciseinvolving the us of troops (annually with one army orone army corps).

- Two to four army (corps) command and staff exercises inthe field, with such armies' (corps) which did not takepart in the operational-tactical exergises. These -exercises involved the use of-troops.

- One operational command-staff exercise with air forcesor air defense forces, with the oarticipatinn of an airarmy and antiaircraft troops.

- One exercise involving rear echelon security (or of thetechnical specialist type).

- One staff training exercise in the field.

- Two to four tactical exercises (division-level), withthe use of troops (or tactical staff exercises).

Every two years-: ----- .--.

- One command-staff exercise with the participation of thecommanders and staffs of wartime military districts,together with a mobilization exercise and a separate tcivil defense exercise. -

- One experimental (research) exercise following theguidelines of the General Staff.or commands of branchesof the armed forces.

Experience from the 1960s and 1970s demonstrated that thesystem of exercises established by the Soviet Ministry of Defensewas implemented within the Warsaw Pact in a rather "flexible"fashion. Exercises included in the annual "Joint Enterprise Plan

- of-the CAF" were fully implemented, as were those organized anddirected by the Soviets (the Ministry of Defense of the USSR,

3 The stated level of each exercise (front-, army- etc.) indicated thehighest headquarters involved.

4 There were no minimum or maximum, levels of troop participation; an exercisewas considered "with troops" if any elements other than command and staffcomponents and command post support deployed.

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General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces or the Combined Conmandof the CAF), as well as those of national commands.

In general, the national commands took into considerationeconomic factors (expenses) and other elements (for instance,lack of sufficiently large training areas), and conducted eithera lesser number of exercises or limited their size and/or thescale of involved forces and means-or the duration, etc. Forexample, in Poland during the period 1969-1981, instead of onefront-level exercise per year as stipulated by the Soviet side, arule was established to plan such an exercise once every twoyears. Further, the frequency of-the organization and conduct ofarny- and division-level exercises of ground and air forces wasreduced, almost by fifty percent from norms postulated by theSoviet Ministry of Defense.

The Polish General Staff worked toward the goal of havingeach Polish division participate in the same number of exercisesover a five-year period. In practice, this goal was notachieved; such factors as the role of a division in the war plan(first echelon), the special skills of a division (e.g., rivercrossing), or geographical location (near the exercise trainingarea; near a Soviet unit, etc.) dictated that some Polishdivisions exercised more often than others.

2. The Main Tasks Relating to the Training of CommandsStaffs and Troo s were defined In the Training Order of theMinister oVf Deense of the USSR," issued once every two years. Inthe years in which the "Order" did not appear, "Directive -Guidelines of the Minister of Defense of the USSR" were issued. aBoth the 'Order" and the "Directive Guidelines" were prepared bythe Training Directorate of the Main Directorate for Operationsof the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, in cooperationwith the other departments of this staff and with input from thecommands of the main branches of the armed forces, and arms oftroops and services of the Soviet armed forces.

a. The Training Order of the Minister of Defense of theUSSR (approximately 20-z5 pages) provided an evaluation ofthe-training tasks for the preceding period and set forthnew tasks. These tasks were formuTated in categories such aswhat should be achieved in certain areas: politico-moralstate, combat and mobilization readiness, as well asoperational and combat preparedness of the various armedforces' branches and arms, of troops and services.

Among the attachments to the order was: "A Calendar P.lan ofthe Most Important Training Enterprises of the Soviet ArmedForces" for one year, and an orientation plan for the following -year. Another attached document described technical-materiel -norms prescribed to ensure the implementation .of these endeavors.

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b. The Directive Guidelines of the Minister of Pefers

of the U$$R usually were much shorter, and contained on .current, very general estimate of the implementation of th.tasks set forth in the Order of the Minister of Defense othe USSR. These guidelines confirmed the necessity ofconsistent implementation of the tasks in the forthcomingyear, and also introduced additional requirements or newtasks.

Attached to this directive was also a copy of the "CalendarPlan of the Most Important Training Enterprises" for the givenyear.

3. Orders and Organizational Guidelines for the TechnicalTraining of the Main Branches of Armed Forces and Arms of Troopsand Services were issued for each year by the Soviet Minister ofDefense. In principle, these guidelines "fleshed out" detailedtraining tasks contained in the order or the "DirectiveGuidelines" of the Soviet Minister of Defense. Orders andorganizational guidelines were coordinated with t'he General S:affof the Soviet Armed Forces prior to publication.

- -C-. COMBINED..ARMED FORCES TRAINING DIRECTIVES.5

Theoretically, all training documents, including plans oexercises of the Combined Armed Forces of Warsaw Pact States,were formulated by the military organs of the Pact, i.e., by thestaff of the CAF: In practice, despite a large degree ofindependence possessed by the CAF CINC in this case, the TrainingDirective of the CAF CINC and the CAF's Joint Enterprise Plan twere formulated on the basis of the above-mentioned trainingdocuments of the Soviet Ministry of Defense. -

Since the training documents of the Soviet Ministry ofDefense and of the Combined Command were issued at about the sametime (normally in October/November of each year), a method of so-called "parallel work" was widely used in the preparation of thisCAF document. The success of this method depended on the workingrelationship between the Soviet chiefs of the planning cells ofthe staff of the Combined Armed Forces and the respective chiefsof the planning cells of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, as wellas on the ability to elicit oral planning information from thesesources, working versions of orders, or directives of the SovietMinistry of Defense. In addition, these same sources providedtechnical guidance for the training of specific branches of thearmed forces, and arms of troops and services.

5 See Annex 1: General Structure of Warsaw Pact Operational Training.

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The training documents of the iWarsaw Pact, including CAFexercise plans, did not receive formal approval from the SovietMinister of Defense. Nonetheless, their working versions, before.being approved by the CAF CINC, were coordinated with the chiefsof all important organizations which participated in the planningof training of the Soviet Armed Forces. These chiefs formallyinitialled these plans, tentatively agreeing with their contents.

On the staff of the Combined Armed Forces, all activitieswhich involved preparation, coordination and publication of theCINC CAF directive concerning operational and combat training ofthe CAF and the Joint Enterprise Plan were coordinated by theChief of the Directorate for Operations, the Deputy Chief ofStaff of CAF for Operational Matters.

In the preparation of these docurents, the followingelements took part:

- The Training Department of the Directorate forOperations (as the leading and executive element).

- Appointed representatives of nearly all organizationalelements of the CAF staff, including:

-- Combat Readiness and Command Department units

-- Directorates of:- reconnaissance* air defense and antiaircraft troops0 air force* navyo rear echelons* rocket and artillery troopso engineering troops- chemical troopso communications

In the activities of the CAF Staff, there were fourdiscernible phases:

In the First Phase, which began each year after theSpring Session of the CAF Military Council (April/May), allparticipants of the CAF Staff planning process worked on theso called "inserts" to the Directive of CINC CAF. These"inserts" were provided via working levels to the Chief ofthe Directorate for Operations of the CAF Staff, and werebased on the working-level data from the Soviet MOD andparticipants' awareness of the situation in the Warsaw Pactarmed forces (such as conclusions from exercises, -inspections, and controls).

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In the Second Phase, which lasted through the months ofMay-August, designated functional personnel of theDirectorate for Operations (most frequently the chiefs ofWestern and Southwestern Theater axes, under the personalsupervision of the Chief of the Directorate for Operations,the CAF Deputy Chief of Staff), prepared initial drafts ofthe CINC CAF Directive and the Joint Enterprise Plan of theCAF, based on the various inputs. Both. documents, afterinitial approval of the CAF Chief of Staff, were coordinatedwith the Chief of the Main Directorate for Operations of theGeneral Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as withthe chiefs of interested operational directorates of the .nain branches of the armed forces, and of arms of troops andservices.

In the Third Phase, which usually occurred aroundSeptember/October, applicable portions of the CLINC CAFDirective--already agreed upon within the framework of the

--- -Soviet-lin-is.try -ofiDefense -as well as relevant.segments ofthe Joint Enterprise Plan of the CAF-were sent- by-the CAF---- ---Chief of Staff to the respective national commands foragreement. Comments submitted by national commands, if theywere acceptable to the Soviet side, were inserted into thedraft text of the above-named documents. If such commentswere not acceptable, the Soviet side negotiated untillitreached "an agreement of views" on all points, still beforethe final discussion of the plans. and before formal reviewof the training plans for the forthcoming year by the CAF -Military Council.

The Fourth Phase routinely took place during the Fallsession of the CAF Hilitary Council (October/November). Atthis time, the Military Council studied the training aspectsof CAF, including the Joint Enterprise Plan, for thefollowing year and approved appropriate recommendationsabout the exercises and training. During this meeting,after discussing training matters, the CAF CINC formallysigned the Directive and the Joint Enterprise Plan. Thesedocuments then were transmitted by the Council secretariatto the respective representatives of the national armedforces for implementation.

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1 . THE VARIOUS EXERCISE SERIES

A. LARGE-SCALE EXERCISES

In the 1970s and early 1980s, the following series of largeexercises were conducted within the framework of the trainingcommand organs and operational units (echelons of army size).

- Training for the general staffs of the armies of theWarsaw Pact, without any code names announced to member-states.

* Exercise of the Warsaw Pact's Unified Air Defense System[conducted under the cede nane of "GRANIT" (Granite)).

- Strategic-operational command and staff exercises in thefield, with communications means and participation ofall branches of the armed forces [conducted under thecode name of "ZAPA)" (tWest)].

- Strategic-operational command and staff exercises in thefield, with communications means and (after 1980) alsowith_actual participation of allied land forces, airdefense, air forces and naval elements [conducted underthe code name of "SOYUZ" (Union)].

- Maneuvers conducted generally on the territory of one(sometimes two) Warsaw Pact states, with actual-participation of designated units of all armed forces ofthe Warsaw Pact [conducted under the code name of"SH'CHIT" (Shield)].

- Technical exercises of communications troops of the CAF.

- Technical exercises of rear echelons of the CAF[conducted under the code name of "TRANZYT" (Transit)].

- Technical exercises of allied navies [conducted underthe code name "VOLNA" (Wave)].

- Command and staff front exercises, but including two orthree lower echelons of organization, with the use ofmeans of communications, and with armed forces of variedsize which were recommended to the particular nationalforces to be conducted with designated staffs (and onoccasion, with forces) of the Soviet Army. In thiscategory, cryptonyms or code names were assigned by thenational commands which conducted the exercise. In

- Poland, these were usually exercises of the "LATO" '

(Summer) or "WIOSNA" (Spring) type.

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- Joint trainina exercises of neighboring corps (armies,divisions) or air defense elements of Warsaw Pact States(with actual flights and simulated air targets). Thesetraining exercises had no assioned code names.

- Joint tactical exercises at division level, with forces ofSoviet and national divisions (usually one armored or onemechanized division, plus support forces for each side).Coie nam".es were assigned by the national commandconrductinq the exercises. In Poland, if the givenexercise was organized by the Soviet side,- it carried thecode n """' !'.fA" (Friendship). Exercises organized andre+n .::: :. Po lish side were named in accordance with}.no !resc ribrd ev desime t ed for the forces of particulardivisinns and sprcif-i ni ilitarv district. Thus, forexanole, exerrises in :hich the Silesian Military Dlistrictparticinatedi were named after predatory aninals, i..e.,"R2YS" (Lynx),"JENOT" (Pacconn),"Z!,1K" (Wildcat), etc.Fxcrcises involving Warsaw Military ^istrict divisionswere named after trees, i.e., "RRZOZ;" (hirch), "KLON"(naple), etc. Reoinninn in the early 1980s, suchexercises carried the code cane 'DRUZHBA" (Friendship),

-- ------ revar-dilss-nf__who prepared.._t.h.en. ___-

- Joint civil defense exercises of national border-regions (provinces, voivodes) along the neighboringWarsaw Pact states. Such exercises were not given anycode names. r.

B. PURPOSE AND NATURE OF EACH EXERCISE

The ains of each exercise were formulated separately duringits detailed planning and preparation. Nonetheless, in general,the specific, repetitive types of exercises were similar innature and served similar aims.

1. Training of General Staffs 6 of the allied armies waschiefly designed to improve the strategic: command functioning ofthe Warsaw Pact under the political and military leadership ofthe USSR. In the Warsaw Pact training system, such exercisesappeared for the first time in the second half of the 1970s. Bylate 1981, only three such exercises had taken place. All threewere organized and managed by the General Staff of the SovietArmed Forces. The CAF headquarters and staff played a dual role,serving as various leadership assistance organs for the exercise

6 The GDR "General" staff was called the "Hain" staff, because the Geranswere not permitted to have a General Staff.

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and also as operational training groups for the connanders of theWestern and Southwestern Theaters of Military Operations.

The Soviet side revealed neither the aims nor the content ofthese exercises to the NSWP states. There also were nopublications or any general assessments on this subject. It wasknown, however, from the contents of the exercise training data(franmentary; separate for each.national army), as well as fromthe discussions at military meetings of the Warsaw Pact organsthat all of these exercises were conducted for two main purposes:

a. Verification of the then-new Soviet concept ofr,!t gic i nnanid an' tnanareent of war nonerations in the

rrope.e theat.er of ~nr fnr the Theaters of rMilitarvrations.

.. lIplenentation of the new systen of conversion of- ro ined ?'raed Forces fromr neacetime to wartine,

Conversion fron a three-step to a four-step systen of conhatreadiness of the armed forces and the commencement of theinnlenentation of the integrated management systen toachieve higher levels of combat readiness (a systen code-naned "M1ONUMENT" (Monunent)].

Conforming to the routine appri-ed--by th-e--Soviet-s in all - ----- -- -

training endeavors, exercises combined within themselves eitherthe existing or planned elements of military solutions (concepts)as stipulated, or simply a planned deception. .Thus, an acceptedpremise in all these exercises was that data concerning militarycapabilities of the Warsaw Pact were altered to a lesser orgreater degree, and reflected only varying degrees of reality.Distorted infornation included data about names and numericaldesignations of operational, tactical and other units, theirnumerical strength, armaments and equipment, combat andmobilization readiness, deployment plans and war supplies, aswell as operational plans.regarding the use of the armedforces. On the other hand, all procedures and solutionsconcerning the deployment of the wartine systems of strategiccommand in the European Theater of War, as well as the methods ofconversion of the CAF from peacetime to wartime strictly followedthe rules which the Soviets intended to introduce in the early1980s.

All training exercises of the general staff were subjectedto a strict regime of protection of classified information whichencompassed, inter alia:

- Extreme limitations on the number of participants in theexercise (in principle, only .the most importantfunctional personnel of the general staffs, commandt and

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staffs of National Air Defense and the Navy).

- Strict controls on. the use of means of communicationduring an exercise (generally, radio silence).

- Employment of a closed-circle exercise method (game playwithin a narrow group of people in buildings which .werespecially designated for.this purpose, as well asrestriction to the minimum of routine methods of commandby use of technical means).

- Departure from the classical procedure of critique ofthe exercise with the participants about its purpose,themea, cnntent and conclusion.

- Increased counterintelligence security.

The exercises of the general staffs of the Warsaw .Pactallied armies will probably continue. [n the forthcoiing years,exercise themes might focus on the inprovement of the strategicleadership system for the management of conversion of theCombined Armed Forces from peacetime to wartime and the strategicdevelopment of these forces in the European war theater, by the

- Su-preme Soviet_ Command. It should not be excluded that, as newconcepts in this respect crystal-ize-,-they -could-well._be____subjected to verification and improvement during these exercises. ---

2. Exercises of the Unified Warsaw Pact Air Defense System[GRANIT" (ranite a ypes).-

The unified air defense system exercises of the Warsaw Pactstates (code named *GRANIT)," conducted irregularly, have takenplace since the creation of this system in 1969, and subsequentseparate agreements and detailed plans have been worked outregarding the implementation of this system between the USSR andthe specific non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states. The organizerand the manager of these types of exercises was always theCommander-in-chief of the Air Defense Forces of the USSR, whosimultaneously held the position of Deputy Commander-in-chief ofthe Combined Armed Forces for Air Defense matters of the WarsawPact States. The main objective of these exercises was thecoordinated interaction of Warsaw Pact air defense forces andmeans in countering mass air attacks by NATO. For the Sovietside, an equal (if not always announced) purpose was thesuccessive initiation of national commands into the integrationof their national air defense forces into the command of SoVietAir Defense. Based on the experiences of those exercises, in thelate 1970s the Warsaw Pact approved resolutions which foresawthat in wartime all NSWP national air defense forces, means andequipment will be subordinated to the C[NCs of the Combined Axmed -

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Forces in the Theaters of Military Operations.

The "GRANIT" exercises involved nearly all peacetime airdefense forces of Warsaw Pact states (generally without amobilizational increase), as well as some air and antiaircraftdefense troops of the remaining branches of armed forces (groundforces, air forces and navy) foreseen for the operations in theunified air defense system of Warsaw Pact states.

"GRANIT" exercise scenarios hypothetically posed the mostprobable variants of the possible. activities of a NATO air attackcountered, i'.+ ioe r exceptions, by the actual means and forcesof the ; r w 2ts..t , acting in accordance with actual airdefense ;lans. The exceptions invlolved chieflv the electronicsfrequencies reserved for .warti:re an1 the use of cleans and forcesof hidden radar assets designated for wartine use only.

"GRANIT" exercises included elerents which were played byapplying actual flights to simulated targets, with the practicaloperations of air defense. Actual flights of targets were, inprinciple, used to verify the so-called "tightness of the airdefense" of the various harsaw Pact states -

The most frequent forms of -operational camoufla-ge/decep-tion -------- _in GRANIT exercises were: limited radio communications, use ofback-up frequencies, deploynent of means and forces of the airdefense (especially electronic) at alternate positions, anddeployment of simulated air defense targets. -

3. Operational-Strategic Command and Staff Exercises WithMeans of Communication in the Field and With Participation ofDesi nated Forces of All Branches of Armed Forces, Under theCryptonym "ZAPAD" (WEST).

Exercises with the cryptonym "ZAPAD" were organized andconducted by the Soviet Defense Ministry. As of the end of 1981there had been only two "ZAPAD" exercises, and they differed fromeach other so much that one should really speak of two differenttypes of exercises under the same cryptonym. The first exercisewas conducted in May 1977 on the territories of the USSR, Poland,Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Thecommands, staffs and designated units of the Soviet armed forces(from the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the westernmilitary districts of the USSR), as well as armed forces of

The extent of Romanian participation in the "GRANIT" exercises is notknown. Romania did not agree to the transfer of the national armed forces tothe Soviet command, and did not sign any agreements to this effect. . -

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Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR took part.

The second "ZAPAD" exercise was conducted in September 1981exclusively on Soviet territory. The only participants wereSoviet armed forces (most likely from the Baltic and Belorussianmilitary districts), the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and SovietStrategic Rocket Forces. From the NSWP armed forces, delegationsof leaders. of the respective defense ministries were invited asobservers; no NSWP troops took part.

The pirnnse of the first "ZAPAD" exercise in 1977 was totest the new concept of management by the Soviet Supreme High

ommaind and the commanders of the Theaters of Military*leraitions, the strategic deployment of Warsaw Pact forces forwar and the cunduct by these forces of offensive engagements in.he ul.tern Theater of military Operations. Conclusions drawnfrom this exercise subsequently helped the Soviets to .forcethrough, in the Warsaw Pact forun, the new wartime commandst r cture. -

The ains of the second "ZAPAD" exercise in 1981 were notclear. From fragmentary information, it appeared that the moreimportant aims could have been:

-.-- Testing of the newest weapons systems and equipment ofthe Soviet armed forces-; a-nd deve-1-o-pment--ofrecommendations for further technical improvement by theSoviet armaments in ustry, based on conclusions drawnfrom this exercise..

- Testing of new concepts of conducting offensiveoperations in the Theaters of Military Operations usingOperational Maneuver Groups (OMGs).

- Testing of new experimental organizational structures forthe armed forces (among others, a corps acting as an OMG).

Exercise "ZAPAD-77", which had the character of an operationalexercise with a limited contingent of armed forces, involvedchiefly commands, staffs and their communications and security.lements, with only a small number of combat units. ZAPAD-81,

however, resembled a classic two-sided military maneuver andinvolved, in addition to commands, staffs and their communicationsand support units, large-scale combat units of all branches of thearmed forces, including SS-20 missile units. (Source Comment:

8 The existence of such an aim was suggested by the presence of a largenumber of representatives of the Soviet armaments industry, whom DefenseMinister Ustinov saddled with technical-construction and production tasks.

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"ZAPAD-81" involved a total of well over 100,000 troops--possiblyas many as 150,000.)

4. 0 erational-Strate ic Command and Staff Exercises["SOYUZ" (nion) with eployed Communications.

"SOYUZ" exercises, organized and conducted by the CAF CINC,appeared at the beginning of the 1970s and subsequently underwenta marked evolution. At the outset, these were only command-and- -staff map exercises in which a limited number of participantsfrom one to two Warsaw Pact states took part. (Usually,participants consisted only of the higher command and staffcadres assigned to wartime fronts, ground forces, air forces, andcommands of National Air Defenseand the Navy fleets.) As timewent by, these exercises became multi-level (front, arry,division and brigade), with means of communications in the field,involving as participants nearly full commands and staffs of theechelons mentioned above, as well as their communications andsupport units. At the end of 1980, these exercises took on thecharacter of military maneuvers with mass participation of combatunits: ground forces, air forces, air defense and allied navies.

In general, the main aim of "SOYUZ" exercises was the up--- ading of commands, staffs and -armed--fo-ce.sin-the._co.nduct of__offensive operations by Pact forces in the Theaters of MilitaryOperations. In the framework of this generally defined aim, manyspecific goals connected with the implementation of newoperational concepts were implemented. These were, inter alia, -

the conduct of air and air defense operations in the Theaters ofMilitary Operations, the use of OMGs for the deployment ofsuccessful operations into the depth of enemy territory, thestudy of operational and combat results, and the application byPact and NATO forces of new weapons systems and equipment. Ineach "SOYUZ" exercise, routine command and staff training-innuclear strikes was conducted.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the operational contents of"SOYUZ" exercises were placed on the back burner while the chiefaim of the exercise became military intimidation of Poland.Under cover of the "SOYUZ-80" exercise, the Soviet Union preparedan operation to introduce some 15 Pact divisions into Poland.After suspension of this objective, there were overt,demonstrative movements of Soviet and Polish troops in Polandunder the cover of the succeeding "SOYUZ-81" exercise. Thesemovements were intended to frighten the-Polish population and tosupport the Polish national authorities.

- In sum, one could sa that the main aim o-f "SOYUZ" exercises -was (and probably remains the preparation of the higher echelonsof Warsaw Pact commands for the conduct of offensive operatiolls

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in the Theaters of Military Operations. In exceptionalinstances, "SOYUZ" exercises also serve as a show of force, tocamouflage introduction of Warsaw Pact forces into the territoryof an allied state, and finally, very likely to conceal astrategic deployment of armed forces for war.

5. Armed Forces Maneuvers Under the Cryptonym "SH'CHIT"Shield.

"SH'CHIT" exercises, conducted since the middle of the 1960s,were the sole training undertakings of the Warsaw Pact in which, ina single operational area (usually on. the territory of one, andonly as an exception, on the territory: of two states), contingentsof all seven national armed forces of the Warsaw Pact wereenragerd. It was very important to t'- Soviets that each Wvar-.Pact state's armed forces be at least represented hy on.'and staff element at the operational level (a'iy or corps:, end uyone tactical unit (division or brigade), even if at reducecstrength. Thus, even in "SH'CHIT" exercises in the Western Theaterof Military Operations, Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak and EastGerman divisions were joined by Bulgarian, Romanian and lungariancontingents.

Theoretically, the organizer and the manager of the "SH'CIiT"- -exerci-se was -the-minister of defense of the state in which the

exercise took place. In practice, however, near1y a-1--aspectsof - - -"

this exercise were prepared by the CAF staff.

Although it was difficult to question certain training aims ofthe "SH'CHIT" exercises, it was generally accepted among themilitary circles of the Warsaw Pact that these exercises were, ineffect, political-propaganda demonstrations of the unity of powerand combat effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact.

The complete "SH'CHIT" maneuvers consisted of separate show-episodes of exemplary combat activities of the armed forces. Mostfrequently, such prepared demonstrations were:

- Preparation of the departure area .for an offensiveoperation.

- Breakthrough of a prepared enemy defense (with live fireand aircraft bombardment).

- -Crossings of wide waterways by a variety of methods.

- Conduct of the first massive nuclear strike. .

- Elimination of the effects caused by strikes involvingweapons of mass destruction.

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- Repelling of counter-strikes and pursuit of a retreatintienemy.

- Tactical airborne drops.

- Sea landing operations.

- Reinforcement of seized lines.

The "SH'CHIT" maneuvers took place according to a well-wornstereotype. After deployment to.their training areas, during thefirst few days of the exercise the staffs and troops exercisedwithin the limits of a designated episode of activities. Afterthorough preparation, the actual exhibition took place. During themaneuvers, selected representatives of the Uarsaw Pact troops alsohad propaganda meetings with the local civilian population. At theconclusion, a rally of "friendship and brotherhood of arrs" tookplace, along with a parade of the troops.

Observers from Western countries were invited to so-se"SH'CHLT" exercises. These observers were shown, however, afictional scenario, prepared especially for their consumption.This scenario differed from the real one in that the offensive

I- - -- character of- the military act-i-v-i-t-ies--was--hidden--from-t-he for-e-ign ___

observers, and aspects of defense were emphasized instead.

6. Exercises and Training of the Technical CommunicationTroops.

Exercises and technical training of the communication troops,in comparison with other types of educational undertakings of thelWarsaw Pact, were conducted frequently. Such exercises variedwidely. Among the largest undertakings of this type were thecomplex technical exercises of .communications troops .conducted on.the scale. of the Theater of Military Operations. A typical exampleof such undertakings, conducted under the management of the Chiefof Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, was "WIOSNA-1969" (Spring-1969). .This exercise included participation of the staffs andcommunications troops of:

- Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

- The Northern Group of Soviet Armed Forces (Poland)

- The Central Group of Soviet Armed Forces (Czechoslovakia)

- Polish Armed Forces

- Czechoslovak People's Army

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- National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic.

Other undertakings of this type were:

- Communications training of the general. (main) staffs ofthe Warsaw Pact.

- Training connected with the takeover of internationalcivilian communication facilities of the Warsaw Pact -states for war needs of the CAF.

- Complex communications training of the air defenseforces of the Warsaw Pact states.

- Communications training of the ailioed fleets in theBaltic and Black Seas.

Despite the fact that operational staff groups (and at timeseven entire staffs) participated in all the communicationsundertakings, operational content was generally relegated to theback burner; and often was even totally omitted. The chief aimand content of these exercises in.volved the upgrading of the

_ technical functioning of command communications, andcollaboration ucder-cionsiton--convention-a-l or-nuclea.r-war,.as __ _well as during a conflict in which the enemy would employelectronic warfare on a mass scale.

7. Technical Exercises of CAF Rear Echelons [Cryptonym

"TRANZYT' exercises were organized by the CAF staff andconducted by the CAF CINC. Their main purpose was the upgradingof the transportation, technical, materiel and medical supportfor the mass movement of the Soviet forces through the territoryof the Warsaw Pact states to the military operations regions, aswell as .upgrading of the methods for the uninterrupted logisticalsupport of these forces.

Lengthy preparations for these exercises, as well as theexercises themselves, were used-by the CAF command to justify theconstruction or upgrading of various infrastructure installationsof the Theaters of Military Operations by (and at the expense of)the allied armed forces. The more significant investments withwhich the national armed forces were saddled by the CAF commandin the framework of these exercises were, inter alia:

- Bringing the strategic rail and road lines up torequired technical norms.

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- Construction of loading and unloading points at railwayjunctions.

- Construction of rail and road access routes for reserveand alternate waterway crossings.

- Construction or modernization of bridges.

- Upgrading of border crossings, as well as permanent andtemporary (backup) .transloading areas.

R. Technical Exercise of Allied Fleets in the Baltic["VOLNA" (Wave) ,.-

'VULNA" e cises constituted sea maneuvers of a sort. Theywere organized ": the CAF staff and directed by the CAP CINC.Their main purposes wer,e to improve the cooperation of three -allied fleets (Soviet, Polish and GDR) in the conduct of commonoperations aimed at the destruction of NATO naval forces in thearea of the Danish straits and Wes-tern Baltic, the landing ofoperational troops on the Danish Islands and the deployment ofPact naval forces into the North Sea to support ground forces .inthe operational naritime sector.

"VOLNA" exercises were usually marked by the largest number- -- -- of-- ships--ai-rc-r-aft-and--s-hore uni-ts-of-al-l--three-f-eets.--I-n-- __-__

addition to naval forces, ground force units earmarked inoperational plans for action as the integral part of landingforces also took part, along with air defense and frontalaviation elements. Exercise landing operations were usuallyconducted at coastal sites in Poland and East Germany.

9. Frontal, Multi-Level Command and Staff Exercises WithDeployed Communications, [LATO" or "WIOSNA (Summer or Spring)J.

In the non-Soviet states of the Warsaw Pact which in wartimewould assign front-sized armed forces against NATO. this type ofexercise was considered the most important annual or biannualnational training undertaking. Such exercises were prepared andorganized by the national general staffs. but directed-by theministers of national defense. These exercises were conducted inconformity with the "Plan of Joint Enterprises of the CAF". Inaddition to NSWP forces, Soviet staffs and troops also took part,and were operationally subordinated to the exercising fronts.

In the Polish armed forces, the main purpose of the "LATO"exercise was the training of commands and staffs of theoperational level in the conduct of offensive operations with theemployment of conventional and nuclear weapons in a variety ofoperational sectors of the Western Theater of Military

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Operations. In the framework of the main purpose, depending onrequirements, a rather large number (usually 7-10) of specificaims of verification, upgrading, research, etc., was programmed.

In the "LATO" or "WIOSNA" frontal exercises of the PolishArmed Forces, in addition to the national forces, an operational,group of a combined-arms or tank rmy from the USSR's BelorussianMilitary District also took part. Occasionally, for a specifiedtime during the exercise, an air army from the Soviet Northern.Group of Forces would be subordinated to the Polish Front.Polish national forces which routinely took part were:

- Command and staff elements of the front (normally atfull wartime strength).

- Commands and staffs of combined-arms armies !normally atfull wartime strength).

- Command and staff elements of the National Air DefenseForces (in limited numbers), and commands :a starone or two National Air Defense corps.

- Command and staff elements of the Polish Navy.

- Wartime_ command elements of the military districts.

Depending on specifically assigned missions, so-called"designated troops," also were assigned, e.g.:

- Front-level brigade of operational-tactical missiles (inTimited strength).

- Within one combined-arms army, one mechanized division(limited strength).

- From the remaining combined-arms armies, their organicbrigades of operational-tactical missiles (limitedstrength) and one division staff, as well as somedivisional unit (at times, for instance, a tacticalmissile unit; at other times, a .divisional engineerbattalion). -

- From an air army, perhaps a staff of an air division and

9 This Soviet operational group normally consisted of 25-30 personnel,including the arny commander,- the army's chief of staff, the chief ofoperations from the army's staff, various chiefs of the arms and services of -the army, and support personnel (commo, etc.).

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an aircraft maintenance/ground support battalion.

- Various units of the National Territorial DefenseForces, central and district groups of direction andcontrol of military movements, engineering brigades,chemical defense forces, etc.

For the purpose of camouflage deception of the exercise--especially in creating fictional networks and fieldcommunications--a large number of communications units of theNational Territorial Defense were employed.

"LATO" or "WIOSNA" exercises did not reflect actualoperational plans. In order to camaoulflage the olanned sector ofactivities,.time of entry into battle, the direction of the nainthrust of strikes, immediate and subsequrnt 'issions, as well asother elements of the operational plan, the Pn'ish Frontexercised in three strategic directinna:

- Northern maritime (Neuhrandcenhur. '"abruk, nrussels-).

- Central (Leipzig, Frankfurt .,/t).

- Southern (Dresden, Stuttgart).

In the first case, the distortions from the actualoperational plansiere the- smallest. [n-this--case, cer-ta-i-n-------------_ _elements of the exercise did reflect, at times, actual plansrather closely (e.g., crossing of the KIEL Canal, airborne andsea landings on the SJELLAND Island, and others).- -

In "LATO" or "W10SNA" exercises, the newest Sovietoperational- concepts were implemented. Also, a so-called"perspective model of actions" was introduced, based on thepremise that Pact forces, as well as the forces of NATO, have attheir disposal weapons systems and equipment planned to be.introduced into the field somewhere between five to seven yearsin the future.

10. Common Trainin for Joint Operations b NeighboringCorps (Armies Divisions of the National Air De ense Elements ofthe Warsaw Pat.

This type of training, conducted in the Western Theater ofMilitary Operations and with the participation of variouselements of designated air defense units of the USSR, Poland,Czechoslovakia and East Germany, took place 2-3 times a year. Itusually was organized and directed by the Deputy Air DefenseCommander of the Warsaw Pact. The main purpose of these -exercises was to improve the interaction of the neighborin.g air

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defense systems in countering NATO air strikes in the borderareas where national responsibilities met. The training wasbased on actual air defense plans and procedures.

11. Joint Tactical Divisional Level Exercises InvolvingSoviet and P troops. UsuaTy ne Tank or One MechanizedDivision, Including Support and Backup roops, for each Side).

One such exercise took place in Poland .each year. Theseexercises were organized and directed by the Commander of the -USSR's Northern Group of Forces or the Commander of the Polishmilitary district whose division took part in the exercise, withresponsibility alternating annually.

The main purpose of these exercises was the uparading ofjoint operations in the conduct of common tactical tasks. Insuch exercises,-there existed a rather sharp national rivalry.The Soviets and Poles each wanted to show their hest sides, andthis led to the point where the exercise often becameunrealistic, with performance directed in advance and rehearsedrepeatedly before the actual exercise took place. As a result,these types of exercises did not reflect realistic operationalplans; instead, they were of a propaganda character, with TVcoverage and articles and pictures in the press. -

From the perspective of the Polish General~Saf-f, once-an -- - -exercise was designated as a division-level exercise with troops,it was considered to be in that category, regardless of thepercentage of the division's personnel and equipment which tookpart. In fact, over the nearly two decades (1963-1981) of theauthor's intimate involvement in the preparation and managementof Polish and Warsaw Pact exercises, he was never aware of anydivision-level FTX involving 100 percent of a division'spersonnel or equipment. During that period, each division-levelFTX involved at least 50 percent of the Polish division'sassigned personnel and equipment and, in most cases, thepersonnel and equipment percentages ranged between 60 and 90percent. There were no fixed minimum or maximum percentagelevels for division-level FTXs; the degree of participationdepended on many factors, e.g., scenario requirements; the authorof the exercise. The final decision as to which and how manydivisional elements actually would participate rested with thecommander of the Polish military district from which theexercising division came.

Poland had difficulty in staging division-level FTXs. Suchexercises involved alert (conversion to wartime status), forcemovements and widespread exercise play, and Poland basicallylacked the large training areas and financial resources to -support such exercises.

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12. Joint Civil Defense Exercises in the Areas Bordering ona Neighboring Warsaw Pact State.

In the early 1980s this type of exercise was not yetwidespread; they took place rarely,. and in .principle only on abilateral basis with the Soviets on one side and one NSWP stateon the other. Their official main purposes were the improvementof joint civil defense operations and the conduct of joint tasks,especially assignments for redeployment of forces and clean-up ofthe results of nuclear strikes in border transloading areas. Inpractice, the purposes were somewhat broader and aimed also atstrengtheninn the authority of the Soviet Combined Command forcoordinatiorn of civil defense undertakings in the Warsaw Pactcountries.

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Iil. THE EXERCISE PLANNING AND PREPARATION PROCESS.

A. WERE THE METHODS OF EXERCISE PLANNING IDENTICAL IN ALLWARSAW PACT STATES? IF THERE WERE DIFFERENCES, WHATWERE THEY BASED ON?

Organization and exercise planning (preparation) methods inspecific Warsaw Pact states were, in general, very similar intheir main aspects; however, in implementation, there weresignificant differences.

The guiding principles nenerally used by all organizers ofexercises were:

- ' Recognition and implenentation of the principle that thecommander and staff orcanizing the exercise are theresponsible entities.

- Entrusting the preparation of an exercise to specializedoperational elements (directorates or departments) oroperational-training elements, which formed the so-called "compact authors' teams."

--. -_ Supplementing the "compact authors'teams" withspeci alists-from -various--fi el ds--as-required. --- __ _

- Limiting the number of people preparing the exercise toan absolute minimum, and limiting the dissemination ofinformation about the exercise in such a way that theparticipants in the exercise planning would know onlythose aspects. which were essential to their specifictechnical expertise.

- Enforcing the principle of stages of work, with apreference for the method "from generalities todetail". In practice, it meant that the "LeadingThought" of the exercise was developed in the firststage of the formulation, which consisted of theexercise's general meritorical and organizationalframework. In succeeding ages of planning, thisframework was fleshed out.

- Preparation of the main documentary foundations of theexercises, based on Soviet examples such as the "LeadingThought," "Intentions of Both Sides," and the "Plan of.Conduct of the Exercise."

10 See pages 26-27 for more detail on the components of a "Leading Thought."

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Individual, markedly differentiated approaches could benoted in such instances as:

- The degree of direct involvement in the planning(preparation) of the exercises by the responsiblecommander and his staff, as well as their influence uponthe formulation of the content of these exercises.

- The degree of freedom given to the authors' teams in the.planning-preparation process of the exercise.

- 'he de ree of flexibility in the approach to therequired principles of operational art and tactics, aswell as the requirements of the field manuals.

- The number of personnel participating in th.e planningand the methods of their work.

- ^rocedures for review and approval of the plans.

- Timing for the planning-preparation process for specificexercises.

----- B- HOW-LONG BEFORE-EXERCISESD-I P_LAN.NING BEGIN?

Warsaw Pact exercise authorities had no uniform rules aboutthe time needed for the planning-preparation process ofexercises. The only requirement which drove t Me organizers of theallied training (mainly the Ministers of National Defense of theWarsaw Pact states, with the exception of the Soviet DefenseMinister), was the deadline for submission of the "intentions ofBoth Sides" and the Plan of Conduct of the Exercise" to the CAFCINC. This deadline was usually one month before the exercisewas to begin.

In general, the period of time used for the planning andpreparation of specific exercises differed considerably anddepended largely on the type of the exercise and the followingfundamental factors:

- Scale (strategic, strategic-operational, operational,-operational-tactical).

- Planned organization and methods of implementation(national or coalition; one- or two-sided; single ormultilevel; with or without command elements and meansof communications; with or without participation oftroops; CPX or FTX).

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- Number and type of aims (upgrading, coordination amongcommand organs, demonstrations, experience, testing,.-etc.).

Other important factors were the national characteristics ofthe organizers of an exercise, as well as the style of work,organizational talents of commanders and the areas of knowledge-ability of the authors' teams. -

On the basis of the experience of the 1970s and 1080s, onecould consider that the planning-preparation time for specificexercises was:

1. In the Polish Peo ple's Republic, where primaryimportance was placed on the Initiative of the authors' team andthe leadership role was limited to hecoming acquainted with theexercise's documentation, the average time was:

- Twelve to eighteen months for exercises o the"KRAJ"(Country) type.

- Eight to ten months for a frontal exercis ocf +"LATO"(Summer) type.

- Three moith for a-t-echnica-l-exer_cis e_ of -communications forces. -

- Four to five months for an army exercise with theparticipation of the troops.

- Two to three months for a tactical divisionalexercise involving the use of troops.

2. On the CAF Staff, where everything was regulated by theorder of the CIC and the role of the authors' teams was reducedchiefly to a timely and proper implementation of the orders, theplanning-preparation process was significantly shorter than inPoland. "SOYUZ" exercises were prepared at the CAF in barelythree to four months, as were "TRAN?.YT" and "FALA" exercises.

The above periods applied in normal, routine cases. Inexceptional situations, especially those dictated by politico-military considerations, the time period involved in thepreparation of specific exercises could be of much shorterduration. (For instance, "SOYUZ-81" supposedly was prepared inless than two weeks.) In another case, in 1968, the author ofthis study was a personal witness when, just before the entry ofWarsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia, an operational group ofthe staff at-Legnica, Poland, prepared and implemented a -technical communications exercise of the Warsaw Pact under the

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cryptonym "EFIR-68"1 1 by the order of the CAF CINC, SovictMiarshal YAKUBDVSKY, in barely three days.

C. WHAT DID PLANNING AND PREPARATION OF AN EXERCISE.INCLUDE?

According to the Soviet school of thought, accepted and

complied with by the NSWP states, the planning and preparationprocess of an exercise consists of: -

- Preparation of the so-called "Leading Thought" of theexercise.

- Oetailed preparation of the planned.course of conduct.

- Preparation of docunentation and materials for the

unpire teans and the role-nlayinq groups.

- Preparation of detailed control plans, verific rtion and

research.

- Preparation of the exercise critique.

1. Preparation of the "Leading Thought". was Generally- considered to be-most-important e-lement -of--the-exercisep-l-a-nng- -- -process. The "Leading Thought" was basically the general conceptof the exercise, and consisted of:

- Definition of the theme of the exercise.

- Definition of its main purpose and additional aims(upgrading, verification, research, etc.).

- Selection of the participants of the exercise anddefinition of the armaments and equipment whichshould be at their disposal.

- Definition of the time frame, duration and themethods of conduct of the exercise.

11 Exercise "EFIR" was conducted in the final phase of the preparations for the

amed intervention of the Warsaw.Pact forces in Czechoslovakia. In the framework ofthis exercise, a heavy net of radio and radio link communications was set up aroundthe borders of Czechoslovakia, with the purpose of achieving two goals:

- Demonstration of large concentration of Warsaw Pact forces against whichthe Czech Army would have no chance in combat, thuT depriving the leadersof that country of any realistic option for successful armed resistance.

- Deception about the directions of activities of the interventibn forces.

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- Selection of the areas (locations) for the exercise.

- Definition of the methods and means for theoperational camouflage of the exercise.

- Preparation of the so-called "Intentions of BothSides."

- Definition of the framework of the plan for theconduct of the exercise.

"Intentions of notl' Sides" constituted a framework for the -operationa" n'n"t of the exercise. These were prepared ingraphic fori en a nap, supplemented wit' a legend. On the mapwere, inter alie:

- Positions n :uth sides A 0 and: %act) before theexercise. Most frequent'y, there was a presentation ofthe location of the forces of 'ot'h sides before, or atthe moment of the outbreak of histilities.

- Sectors of action, main directions of strikes, and thetasks of friendly and enemy forces.

- Concepts of the use of ~massdestru-ci-on--weapons--by--both-- ____ -sides.

- An outline of the exercise's operational development.

- Applied and actual locations of command posts of theexercising levels.

- Mathematical presentation of the qualitative-quantitative relations between friendly and enemy forcesin different operational areas, and in various phases ofthe operation.

The legend, prepared in the form of text and tables, usuallypresented the origins of the war and. a description of specificstages and phases of its development, with emphasis upon thesituation of exercising units.

2. Detailed. meritorical preparation of an exercise. Thisusually took place after the exercise manager formaly approvedthe "Leading Thought" of the exercise, although the detailed,meritorical preparation could take place simultaneously with theformulation of the "Leading Thought" in instances when exercisedevelopers were pressed for time. This work consisted of:

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a. Graphic presentation on maps for each day ofactivities, and at times even for specific episodes of thedynamics of operational conduct. This presentationincluded:

(.) Enemy order of battle.

(2) Order of battle of key elements of friendlyoperational and combat groupings.

(3) Depictions of friendly and enemy losses.

(4) Description of friendly reserves of technicalsupplies (ammunition, rockets, hombs, fuel,medicines, spare parts, etc.).

h. Preparation, generally in the form of tables, of aplan. to transmit information.

c. Description (in a form of assumptions or generalnotes) of the ground, air and naval situations, and also thetechnical situation in the fields of reconnaissance,electronic warfare, communications, artillery and rockettroops, antiaircraft defense, defense against weapons of

inmass destruction, operational camoufla_ge, engineering, andtechnical and quartermaster rear services. ----

d. Definition and a graphic presentation of optimaldecisions of those participating in the exercise, with.rationale (generally in the form of the qualitative-quantitative relations of forces).

3. Preparation of documentation and materials for theumpire teams and role- playing groups Involved chiefly the studyof relevant extracts o the plan of the course'of the exercisefor specific functional persons, as well as a review of detailedplans of the exercise dynamics and the Information DisseminationPlan.

4. Preparation of detailed control plans, verification andresearch was based on the general premises of the LeadingThought.". Normally this preparation phase was not done by teamsof authors, but by technical elements within the TO & Estructure, such as the "[nspectorate of the Armed Forces,"mobilization, or scientific-research elements, etc.

5. Study of the critique (discussion) of the exercise wasbased on the preparation of its introductory, rather theoreticalcontent, which would be subsequently developed and improved dailyduring the course of the exercise. -

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0. WHICH OFFICES AND PERSONS TOOK PART IN THE PREPARATION OFTHE EXERCISES?

Preparation of the exercises routinely was theresponsibility of the operational TO & E elements of the levelwhich organized the exercise:

- In the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces- theMain Directorate of Operations.

- In the Staff of the CAF of the Warsaw Pact- theDirectorate of Operations.

- On the level of the Ministry of Defense, the militarydistricts and branches of the armed forces respective',preparation was done by the directorates or branches ooperations of these organizations, staffs of militarydistricts or staffs of the armed forces' branches.

In all operational directorates and departments were T . Ftraining elements which were specifically responsible forplanning and preparation of exercises. If an operationaldirectorate or department had no training element, thedirectorate or department was nevertheless responsible for.___s.uperyision of the preparation of exercises. This, for instance,was the case in the Polish General Staff, wfiere tieOperationaiTraining Department functioned independently, outside of theDirectorate of Operations. This separate department planned andprepared all exercises, operating largely independently, underthe general supervision of the Directorate of Operations.

The extent of involvement of other activities and persons(outside of operational elements) depended on the character ofthe exercise in question and the stage of its work in theplanning (preparation).

In certain states of the Warsaw Pact, e.g., in the PolishPeople's Republic and the German Democratic Republic, theseissues were regulated separately for each exercise by a detailedorganizational directive of the chief of staff of the managementof the exercise. The directive designated specific offices andpeople responsible for the preparation of the exercise.

In Poland, the following offices and personnel normally tookpart in the studies and preparation of front exercises of the"LATO" (Summer) type.

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in the initial stage of the work, while formulatinq the."Leading Ihought"

- Seven to ten officers from the Operational TrainingDepartment of the Polish General Staff, as the so-called"compact authors' team."

- One or two officers/intelligence specialists from theIntelligence Directorate (Z.I1.) of the Polish GeneralStaff.

'ive to seve ,>pport personnel (draftsnen; typists).

in the early period of time when this group had nospecialists assigned fron the National Air Defense, Air Forcesand Navy, the authors' team was augmented by a representativefrom each of these armed forces branches. In this stage of work,the authors' team took advantage of consultations of specialists(if necessary) from the fields of combat readiness, nobilization,automated command and control, communications, electronicwarfare, nuclear and chemical warfare, technical andquartermaster rears, operational camouflage and.others. These

------ -- consultants (frequently officers from the Directorate of -Operations of the Polish General Staff)- were-not--inc-luded- i-n the.._work on the concept of the exercise; they only presented theirviews regarding aspects of interest to the authors' team.

In the second stage of the work, as the detailed,preparation of an exercise gained momentum, the number oforganizational links and people directly involved in the detailedpreparation of the training increased to several tens and, attimes, exceeded 100.

Normally, aside from the compact authors' team, I.e. peoplewho took part in the formulation of the "leading Thought," thedetailed planning phase included:

- All remaining functional personnel from the OperationalTraining Division (in toto: 13-16 officers and 7-10support personnel).

- 10-15 officers from the Directorate of Operations of thePolish General Staff, including specialists from thefields of operational planning, command, combatreadiness, national air defense, air forces, navy,operational camouflage, electronic warfare, directionand control of armed forces movements, territorialdefense of the country and meteorolivgy.

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- 3-4 officers from the Intelligence Directorate (Z.l1) ofthe Polish General Staff.

- 2-4 officers from the Directorate *of OrganizationalStructures (I.IV).

- 10 to 15 officers from the Directorate of Mobilization(Z.X).

- 2-3 officers from the Directorate of Automated Commandand Control (Z.XIV).

- ltu 15 officets .frnr the Directorate of NormativeM mIcinistration (Z_.0 1

-3 nfri ers 'r.: the " ia Polit.i al Directorate.

- 5 to 7 officers fron organizations subordinated to theChief Inspector of the Country's Territorial Defense.

- 10-15 officers from the Main Quartermaster Headquartersof the Polish Armed Forces.

- 5 to 7 officers from organ-i-z-at-ons-subordinated_ to theChief Technical Inspector (in principle, from the Staff ---- -of Technical Services).

- 5 to 7 officers from the Headquarters of Signal Troops.

- 1-2 officers from the Office of the Chief of RocketTroops and Artillery Headquarters.

- 1-2 officers from Antiaircraft Defense TroopsHeadquarters.

- 1-2 officers from the Chemical Troops Headquarters.

- 1-2 officers from the Engineering Troops Headquarters.

-- 1-2 officers from the Personnel Department of theMinistry of Defense.

- 1-2 officers from the Headquarters of the MilitaryInternal Service.

- 4-5 officers from the Support Units' Grouping of theMinistry of National Defense.

The number of support personnel (draftsmen; topographers;typists) reached at times up to 150-200.

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On the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces of Warsaw PactStates in Moscow, the number of people taking part in thepreparation of the exercises was significally lower than inPoland. From the information available to the author on thissubject it appeared that these numbers, for specific trainingexercises, were:

- "SOYUZ" - 25-30 officers,

- "TRANZYT"- 15-20 officers,

- "FALA" - 15-20 officers.

L . WHAT DID THE SPECIFIC OFFICES AND PEOPLE DO? TO WHATEXTENT 010 THEY HAVE A FREE HAND MID FLEXIKiLITY? WHHREVIEWED AND APPROVED PLANS?

Such questions can he answered by an examination of atypical front exercise, organized and planned by the Ministry ofNational Defense of the Polish People's Republic. In thisrespect, the Polish experienre was somewhere between the Soviet.German and Romanian methods.

In the Po.lish People's Republic, the-1ii-nis-ter- of-Nat-i-onal---- -Defense (as the manager of the exercise) and the Chief of theGeneral Staff (as the chief of staff for exercise management)normally did not become directly involved in exercise planning.They also did not provide any general exercise directives. Untilthe completion of the planning work, their role was limited tooccasional remarks at meetings, briefings, or collegialgatherings. These remarks pertained to various ideas of threatfrom the NATO side and the need for finding counter-measures, allof which became parts of the minutes of these meetings and which -were transmitted to the authors of the exercise forimplementation.

The Polish Minister of National Defense and the Chief of thePolish General Staff were not, however, only passive consumers ofwhat eventually was planned by the actual authors of anexercise. During the review and- the approval of exercise plans,

12 In 1916-80, the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces introduced studiesintended to increase the effectiveness of organization and planning of largeexercises. In the framework of these studies, the researchers learned aboutsolutions used by the National People's. Arny of the GDR, the Armed Forces ofRomania and the CAF Staff. Some of these experiences were incorporated into the -Polish system and applied in the 1970s and early 1980s.

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they were deeply involved in the details, frequently demandingadditions and development of certain parts of the exercise. Theywere also in most cases the authors of certain new concepts andideas which were then included in the already completed plans assupplements.

The situation looked entirely different in the GDR, in theCAF Staff in Moscow and in Romania. From the data about thissubject which were accessible it appears that in the GOR, theMinister of National Defense personally involved himself in theplanning work from the very first stages. He frequently visitedthe exercise planning center of the Directorate of Operations ofthne !ai Staff o the German National Arrmy wher.e he would listen,at the working level, to various proposals of the authors' teamand approve them on the spot. The frequent presence of theninister at. the planning center was, however, in the view ofGerman participants in the planning process, more of a ceremonialnature, and did not involve the contribution of any new conceptsintroduced into the plans.

In the CAF Staff in Moscow, the CINC and the-Chief of Staffconsidered themselves to be the actual authors of the exercise.Accordingly, they viewed the authors' team which prepared the

- exercises as mere implementors of their decisions. In thisrespect they issued, via service--channel-sw--numerous- and-deta.i-leddirectives for exercise planning. These directives were thenimplemented with rigor. especially by the CAF Chief of Staff.The concepts of the CINC and the Chief of Staff were notespecially brilliant; they were rather limited and sketchy,restricting the initiative of the authors' team which planned anexerci se.

Still another approach to planning was apparent within theleadership of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense. Fromthe data which trickled from the Romanian General Staff, itappeared clearly that the chief concerns of that leadership werematters of confirmation, in each exercise, of the independence ofthe national Romanian commands from the Soviet CAF Command of theWarsaw Pact states. Emphasizing this aspect of the exerciseplans, the Romanian Minister of National Defense and the Chief ofthe Romanian General Staff delegated to the lower-level authors'teams nearly total freedom in the formulation of the operationalpostulates of the exercises.

In frontal exercises of the "LATO" type in Poland, thehighest person exercising direct, working-level supervision onbehalf of the Ministry of National Defense was the Deputy Chiefof the General Staff of the Polish Forces for OperationalMatters. Preparation of an exercise was, however, within theauthority of the Chief of the Operational Training Division of

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the Polish General Staff. 1 3 This general officer had inprinciple a nearly free hand, and great flexibility inplanning. He was required, however, to justify and defend themeritorical and organizational concept of the exercise,

- submitting them through channels to the Polish Minister ofNational Defense. For the purpose of preparing an exercise, hehad at his disposal:

- His T&O unit, representing a so-called "compact team ofauthors," including 13-16 officers as well as a sizeablegroup of generals and technical officers attached toassist this team.

1. The "compact teami o auithors" included the followingpersonnel:

a. Chief author of the exercise, who could in sone casesbe the chief of the Operational Training Department, or one ofhis most experienced deputies. The chief author personallv.prepared the exercise's "Leading Thought" and the ostimportant plans for its conduct, being assisted by theremaining members of the team and technical specialists frornvarious fields. The chief author also sometimes prepared a

- - critique for the Chief of Staff of the exercise leadershipgroup. As-a rules he--also- part-ic-ipated---in the--preparati.on ofthe critique for the chief of the exercise. - -

b. Chief of the Organizational Group, who could be adeputy of the department chief, or any other senior officer ofthe department. This officer, in cooperation with the chiefauthor, prepared an organizational concept of support for thework of the exercise leadership, including a plan ofdevelopment and work for the leadership of the exercise; aplan of development of simulation, player-groups in the field,umpires, etc; and a technical-materiel plan to support theexercise (housing, messing facilities, uniform supplies, meansof transportation, etc.).

.c. Senior officers of. the author's team were responsiblefor the preparation of the specific teatures of the centralexercise plan, e.g., the main and secondary premises, exerciseoperational plans, exercise alert plans, plans for the conductof the exercise, plan for dissemination of information, etc.

13 Preparation of comparable exercises in the CAF and in the Main Staff ofthe German People's Aruly in the GDR was within the authority of the Deputiesof the Chiefs of Staff for Operational Matters, who were simultaneously the -Chiefs of Operational Directorates of these staffs.

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2. Specific Central Institutions of the Ministry ofNational lefense--either organizational cells or functionalpersonnel representing these activities--engaged in the followingtasks in support of the compact team of authors:

a. Operational Directorate (I) of the General Staff:

- Consultation and participation in the preparationof operational problematics (selection ofexercise areas, definition of the front's actionsegment, its short- and long-range tasks,operational tining, limits on the use of weaponsof mass destruction, etc.), as well as assistancein the preparation of exercise operational glans.

- Consultation and assistance in the nlanning ofthe development required by the wartine con'andsystem of the exercise, exercise conversion o -commands and staffs from peacetine to warti°e,and the development of electronic uarfarrsystems.

- Consultation and assistance in the planning of- _the development required by the exercise system

- of directing -and -cont-ro_l_Li n_gof the moverient oftroops and metereological problermatics. --------- -------- .

Independently from the above-cited issues, Directorate Iroutinely prepared a realistic operational camouflage plan for"LATO" exercises, as well as a plan for control of combatreadiness.

The operational camouflage plan included the conduct ofelectronic camouflage of the exercise [generally under the code-name "ELEKTRON" (Electron)], devised to mislead NATO as to thepurpose and content of the exercise. The plan of control ofcombat readiness simply spelled out the complex control of thecombat readiness of those who participated in the exercise.

b. Intelli ence Directorate II of the General Staffof the Posh Armed orces (4A )

- Consultation and assistance in the formulation ofpremises concerning armed activities of NATO.

- Consultations and assistance in the formulationof the premises concerning the activities offront reconnaissance elements and the use ofspecial purpose forces.

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c. Organizational Directorate (VI) of the General Staffof PAF:

- Independent preparation of experimentalorganizational structures of units for thepurposes of testing during the exercise.

- Independent preparation of the. composition offront forces of the exercise .and exercisenumbering system of units. (Source Comment:This material had to conform to the instructionsand requirements uf the exercise's chief author.)

t. ilobilization, Replacement and Military ServiceDirectorate (X) of the Polish General Staft:

- :ndependent preparation of a plan for calling upreserve personnel for exercises. (Again,conforming to the exercise author'srequirements.)

- Independent preparation of a nobilization planfor the development of designated units taking

-_-- part -in-the--exerci-se. --- - ---

- Consultation and assistance in the formulation ofpremises for the functioning of the exercisesystem of replacement of war losses.

- Assistance in the formulation of the premises forexercise conversion of the armed forces frompeacetime to wartime.

e. Directorate of Automation of Command Systems (XIV)of the Polish General Staff:

- Computerized services as required by the authors'team.

- Independent preparation--within the exerciseauthor's guidelines--of a plan to assure computerservices for the management of the exercise andthe exercising commands and staffs.

f. Directorate of Normative Administration (XI) of theGeneral Staff of the Polish Armed forces:

- Preparation of the documents (in agreement withthe chief author of the exercise) of secretcommand, such as code tables, simplified

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numerical code tables, etc.

- Assistance in the preparation of theorganizational concept of assuring administrativesupport for the work of the exercise managenent,such as security, transportation, housing andmessing.

g. Main Political Directorate of the Polish Armed -Forces:

- Independent preparation of a plan (based on thegeneral exercise background) for the support ofrelevant Party, political and prnpaganda aspects.

- Independent preparation of premises for thedevelopment of special wartime propaganda for thefront during the exercise.

h. Or anizations Subordinated to the Chief Inspector ofthe Terri orial Defense of the Country:

- In accordance with the instructions of the chief- - ----. __ -- author of _the exercise,_preparat ion_of ____ _ ___

assumptions concerning the development and use ofterritorial defense units for the exercise, aswell as units of internal defense and civildefense elements.

i. The Main Quartermaster Headquarters of the PolishArmed Forces:

- Elaboration of the assumptions concerningquartermaster support for the operations of thefront (providing supplies of fuels and oils,medical, food, clothing, as well as complextransportation and evacuation means).

- Elaboration, in agreement with the chief authorof the exercise and with a representative oforganizations subordinated to the Chief TechnicalInspector, of the assumptions concerning suppliesof ammunition.for the front forces(prepositioning and delivery).

- Elaboration, in coordination with a representative ofthe Quartermaster of Communications Troops (SignalTroops), of the assumptions concerning development ofa training-type command system for the rear of thefront and the rear of the territory of the country.

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j. Organizations Subordinate to the Chief TechnicalInspector (in Principle, the Staff of Technical Services):

- Preparation of the assumption to ensure adequatetechnical support for the operations of the front(supplies of missiles and evacuation andmaintenance of armament and electronic and armoredequipment, as well as equipment for artillery,aircraft and antiaircraft defense, communications, -engineering and chemical warfare).

k. Headquarters of Signal Troops:

- Preparation of the plans for the development ofthe training:-type .tnd actual comm'and posts and

. comrunications svstems.

- Independent preparation uf directives concerningthe agreed system for the use of radio and radio-link means.

- Preparation, in coordination with Directorate 1______ of the General Staff, of the technical radio-

electronic concept fortie operatioa-l Camoufl-age --- ----- -of the "LATO" front exercise.

1. Headquarters of the Rocket Troops and.Artillery:

- Preparation of the premises concerning the use ofrocket troops and artillery.

m. Antiaircraft Defense Troops Headquarters:

- Preparation in coordination with air defense andair force specialists of the premises for the useof antiaircraft defense troops.

n. Chemical Troops Headquarters:

- Consultation and participation in the formulationof premises concerning the use of massdestruction weapons--both by NATO and friendlyforces--as well as post-strike analysis.

o. Headquarters of Engineer Troops:

- Consultaton and preparation of the premisesrelated to the provision of engineering support -for the operations of the front.

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p. Personnel (Cadre) Department of the Ministry ofNational Defense:

- Independent preparation of personnel aspects,based on the operational concept of the -exercise.This work consisted of preparation of a speciallist of officers selected to assume highercommand .or staff positions in the near future atthe level of front, army or branch of the armedforces. In addition, this department prepared aplan for periodic inclusion of these officersinto exercises for the purpose of verification oftheir cornand and staff abilities.

.i eatiquarters of the Military Internal Service:

- Independent preparation, based on the generalinformation about the exercise, of acounterintelligence plan to provide security forthe exercise. Also, this headquarters prepared aplan for the control of radio traffic used by themanagement of the exercise, as well as bycommanders, staffs and forces undergoing training.

r.-- Command of the Support Units -Grouping of -the - - -- --Ministry of National Defense: -

- Provide housing, messing, security and services for theleadership of the exercise, based on the directives of

the chief of the organizational. group.

Representatives of all Central Institutions of the Ministryof National Defense who were assigned to assist the exerciseauthors were subordinated to the Chief of Operational Trainingfor the duration of exercise planning. With very few exceptions,they were not allowed to keep their TO8E comman'ders (or chiefs)informed, since the latter often subsequently participated asplayers in the exercise.

Planning work was, in principle, conducted exclusively inspecially designated and equipped buildings of the General Staffof the Polish Armed Forces. This "Exercise Planning Center"(Centrum Planowania Cwiczen) featured displays with multi-usemaps with overlays and back lighting:

- In 1:1,000,000 scale (for preparation of the graphics ofthe "Intentions of Both Sides"). -

- In 1:500,000 scale (for the preparation of the aphics of -

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the dynamics for each day of exercise).

- In 1:200,000 scale (for the graphic presentation ofespecially important episodes of the exercise).

In addition, there were map displays of the so-called"information bank," which contained detailed data concerningactual dispositions and defense infrastructure of NATO and Pactforces in the Western Theater of Military Operations. -

No auxiliary material which contained any actual informationconcerning Pact defense (war) plans or military potential couldbe kept at the Center. This included such data as composition offorces, numerical designations of units and their level of combatand mobilization readiness, as well as the more importantoperational systems, such as command, combat readiness andmobilization, etc.

Al1 of the above-mentioned real data had to he appropriatelychanged and sanitized before being included in the exerciseplans. This was accomplished, in conformance with the generalpurpose of an exercise, by the appropriate Central Institution ofthe Ministry of National Defense and then provided for the use ofthe authors team. Thus, front composition of forces and

- exercise numerica-l-designations ofu.n_its were prepared by theOrganizational Directorate (VI) of the General Staff, at-terequest of the chief author of the exercise and in conformancewith his requirements and proposals. Exercise alert signals andexercise alert regions, also in conformance with the needs of theauthors' team, were prepared by Department V[ of OperationalDirectorate I of the General Staff. These exercise-type studieswere provided to the Exercise Planning Center, where they wereincorporated into the "information bank" and used for planning.

Planning of an exercise was conducted according to a graphicschedule prepared in advance and approved by the leadership ofthe General Staff. This graphic schedule described the duties ofthose responsible, as well as deadlines for completion andsubmission for approval.

In the Polish situation, there was a tendency to develop agreat deal of initiative at the working level of the participantsof the exercise. The chief author and the specialists fromvarious fields who assisted him could (and were even expected to)introduce new ideas in the scenario of the exercise, departingfrom well-known stereotypes of operational and tactical art.They were not allowed, however, to violate the canons ofpolitico-strategic character. Thus, in formulating a scenariofor the genesis of war in Europe, the side which initiated anarmed conflict always had to be NATO. An equally important and

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immutable canon which had to be Included in the content of eachexercise was the premise that, after the first border skirmishes,during which the opponent could succeed locally (the depth ofpenetration could, however, not exceed 40-50 kilometers), thearmed forces of the Warsaw Pact had to commence offensiveoperations on the first, or at the latest, on the second day ofwar (a so-called Korean variant). At the operational-tacticallevel (front; army), the content of the exercise could only beoffensive operations. in the 1960s, it was unthinkable for thescenario to envision the front moving to a defense posture withforces larger than one divsion. Subsequently, in the 1970s, itwas allowable to include a temporary situation in which the frontmoved to a defense posture with forces of one army. Such asituation could not, however, last longer than one to two days.Passing from conventional to nuclear warfare always had to beinitiated by NATO. Such initiation by NATO could he depicted by -NATO's limited use of nuclear-weapons or by NATO'd direrrtpreparation for use of such weapons.

In the premises of the exercises, the authors were alserequired to consider the so-called "operational-tactical norms",which were mandatory in the Warsaw Pact at that time. ihesepertained to the following topics:

-- = -Speed--and-t-iming- for deployment-of-forces. _ _

- The width of the operational sector of the front, armyand division.

- The depth of front- and army-size operations.

- The depth of daily operations; the immediate andsubsequent tasks of division, army and front.

- Tempo of an offensive.

- Density (per kilometer) and saturation (of specificunits) with tanks and artillery in breakthrough sectors.

- Limits of nuclear and chemical weapons designated foroperations.

- Limits of air and artillery support, etc.

From the experiences of the 1960s and 1970s, it appearedthat there were considerable differences among Warsaw Pact statesin the approach to these subjects. In the Soviet trainingsystem, the auth-ors of exercises had no- opportunity to ignore, orperhaps they did not want to violate, mandatory norms. Thus, .ifin a given time frame .the mandatory tempo of redeployment of

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forces called for 300-350 kilometers per day, then this parameterhad to be reflected as well i.n the tasks which were assigned tothe exercising units (for instance, "redeploy 350 kilometers inone day"), since in the subsequent conduct of the operations itwas assumed that forces fulfilled these tasks (e.g., redeployedno less than 350 kilometers per day).

In the Polish system of training, authors of exercises werechiefly required to formulate tasks for the armed forces whichwere in agreement with operational-tactical norms of tasks. Inthe conduct of the exercise operations, however, they hadconsiderahle freedom in creating any possible premises which-cnuld have been caused by countermeasures of the enemy. Inpractice, for instance, the result was that in the event of.redeployment, the exercising eleients had to receive theirredeployment tasks at the rate of 300-350 km/day, while theauthors of the exercise could simultaneously create suchdifficulties (and they did this frequently), e.g., air attacks byNATO forces, destruction of bridges, laying of mines by air,actions by diversionary-reconnaissance units, etc. that even whenthose who were exercising did their utmost, it was impossible forthem to achieve the established tempo. In the Polish case, itwas not unusual for the authors of the exercise to assume inadvance that in practice-forces cou-l-d-redeploy-only .at-a rate of___200-250 km/day.

Theoretically, such an approach served to illustratedifficulties in the future field of combat, as well as to traincommanders and staffs in extremely unfavorable situations. Inpractice, however, it really.meant questioning of the oftenunrealistic (in the view of the Polish -commanders) Soviettactical-operational norms.

Concrete planning factors which the authors of the exercisehad to take into consideration were the then "fashionable"strategic development trends and operational art and .tactics--NATO's as well as the Pact's. In addition, the trainingdirectives which stemmed from the directives of the CAF CINC andthe orders of the Minister of National Defense had to be taken -into consideration. In the exercises, it was also advisable tocohsider war experiences--chiefly the Soviet experiences fromWorld War II, but also experiences from "local wars," especiallythe Vietnam and Arab-Israeli conflicts.

In general, the authors of the exercises were bound by manydirectives and restrictions which they were to take into accountwhile planning large exercises. One should, however, understandthat in the Polish General Staff in the sixties and the seventies.such a working atmosphere was created that circumventing those -directives and restrictions was not impossible.

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Review and approval of the plans for a front exercise of -.hePolish Armed Forces took place -at three national levels, andfinally at the level of the Warsaw Pact (CAF) CINC. At thelowest level, the plans were reviewed by the Chief of theOperational Training Department of the General Staff of thePolish Armed Forces, who made decisions on a frequent basis (attimes, day-by-day). Such reviews had the character of workingdiscussions. In cases involving less concrete (or lesscontroversial) issues. there might be only short informationalremarks by the chief author of the exercise, followed by concreteproposals, which the department chief took .into consideration.

The second level of review was the Collegium of the Chief ofthe Polish General Staff. In principle, this organ consideredthe exercise plans twice:

- The first time, it reviewed the plans and. providedcomments on the "Leading Thought" of the exercise.

- The second time, it reviewed the plans after completionof all planning work.

During-the review of the plans, the.-membersof.the..Collegiun _ _noted their remarks and reservations (most frequently within thesphere of their own specialty). Thereafter, the Chief of theGeneral Staff concurred with these plans (signing them as hisown'), sometimes recommending minor corrections. -

The Minister of National Defense was the third and highestnational review and approval level for.exercise plans.Routinely, he considered these plans twice; initially one to.twomonths before the date of the exercise, when the plans weresupposed to be submitted for the approval of the CAF CINC inMoscow. He got a second look when he began his own preparationsto direct the exercise.

In the first instance, the Polish Minister of NationalDefense approached the issue superficially, being in principleinterested only in what extent the plans for the exercises

- corresponded with Soviet directives. If satisfied, he formallyapproved these plans. This entire process was rather a formalityand took no longer than one or two hours. Just before theexercise, when the defense minister was preparing himself tomanage the exercise, however, he approached the issue in quite adifferent fashion. The review of the plans at that point wasvery detailed, and could last from several hours to two days.

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The approval of the plans by the CAF CINC belonged to theso-called "delicate issues" (actually, argumentative issues) inwhich Soviet views differed considerably from the positions ofcertain national commands (chiefly the Romanians; partly thePoles).

The CAF CINC, representing the.Soviet side, stipulated inhis annual directives that the "Intention of Both Sides" besubmitted for his approval for all exercises conducted under the"Plan of the Most Important Joint Enterprises of. CAF." Some ofthe Warsaw Pact states conformed to this directive without anyreservations. Romania ignored it completely. Certain otherstates, such as Poland and reportedly Hungary, conformedpartially. The Polish tactic was to submit plans to the CAF CINCwhich were already approved by the Polish Minister of NationalDefense, hoping to accomplish two goals. The first goal was todemonstrate indirectly to the Soviets that, in the opinion of thePoles, the approval of exercises organized and conducted bynational commands belonged in the purview of those commands, andnot to the CAF CINC. The second goal was to deprive the Sovietsof the option of demanding significant changes in plans preparedby the Polish General Staff and already approved by the Ministerof Defense.

The Poles also tried to downplay the significance of thevery act of approval of the exercise plans by the CAF CINC.Whenever possible, the Chief of the Polish General Staffpersonally handled this issue. In a few sentences, he .informedthe CAF CINC about the exercise problems and pushed forward thedocument for his signature. The CINC, however, never approvedthe document on the spot.

In the first instance, all documentation of the exercise wasreviewed by the CAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, alongwith the chiefs of nearly all organizational elements of the CAFstaff. From the Polish side, explanations and answers toquestions were usually provided by the chief author of theexercise.

After the completion of the review process in the CAF staff,the exercise plans moved to the General Staff of the Soviet ArmedForces. In certain isolated cases, representatives of the Polishside were invited to provide explanations to the USSR's GeneralStaff on the spot. Only after explanations and resolutions ofall issues at this level did the CAF CINC approve the exerciseplans.

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F. WHAT RELATIONSHIP, IF ANY, WAS THERE BETWEEN PLANNING ANDTHE TRAINING CYCLE OF PARTICIPATING UNITS? HOW WEREPARTICIPATING UNITS SELECTED? DID THE CONSTRAINTS OFTIME, UNIT AVAILABILITY, FUNDS, OR FUEL AFFECT PLANNINGFOR EXERCISES?

The exercise principles outlined earlier in this reportregulated the frequency of exercises of specific elements of thearmed forces, that is operational units (fronts and fleets),operational-tactical units (armies and corps), and tactical units -(divisions, flotillas and brigades) of all the branches of thearmed forces and the principal defense systems (i.e., nationalair defense) and support (rear or transport, etc.). Theseprinciples did not stipulate the composition of the exercisingelement and did not define specific units which should take partin the exercise.~~Further, they also did not specify such vitalplanning elements as length of the exercise, nunber of personncl,type and amount of equipment (i.e., tanks, aircraft, shipsl, aswell as space dynanics. All of these elements were determinedindividually and separately for each exercise, :it jener '-guidance from CAF headquarters, and with details, provi'e: .neorganizers of an exercise.

The generalities, i.e., the main participants of an-exercise, etc. were defined rather rout-inely,=dependi-ng -on--th~e ---- - -character of the undertaking. The specifics, on the other hand,were determined on the basis of a detailed analysis of purposeand training needs, as well as in part by resource constraintsand availability of training areas. Thus, the same exercisingunits were called for the two-year cycled skeletal (cadre) frontexercises of the Polish Armed Forces. These were:

- On the Polish side, the commands and staffs of thePolish Front, three combined-arms armies and one airarmy.

- Command and staff of at least one corps of National AirDefense, as well as operational command and staff groupsof the Polish Navy.

- On the Soviet side, usually an operational group of thecommand and staff element of one combined-arms or tankarmy.

The above composition of an exercising front was routinelydesignated by the CAF staff in the CAF 'Plan ofointEnterprises."

The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (as the -organizer of an exercise) took into consideration the national

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characteristic of the Polish Front as well as the above-mentionedfactors, and routinely included 'in the exercise composition:

- The Central Institutions of the Ministry of NationalDefense, which detached from their peacetime structurethe command and staff of the Polish Front.

- Commands of military districts, which detached fromtheir peacetime structure commands and staffs of -combined-arms armies, as well as commands and staffs ofthe wartime military districts.

- The Air Force Command, which detached fro:, its peacetimestructure the command and" staff of an air army and thewIrtime Air Force headquarters.

In order to ensure the functioning of al; exercisincommands and staffs under field conditions, the composition ofthose exercising routinely included all units earmarked for themin wartime (brigades and regiments) for communications, services,and support. -

For the purposes of operational camouflage of a frontaleiercise through the act-ivat-ion of--f-icti-on.alnets- _and_directionsof communications, nearly all communications units of the Polish - - -National Territorial Defense (OTK) were routinely called up.These were units earmarked in wartime for the support of MNDcommand posts and leadership posts of the Committee of NationalDefense (KOK).

The composition of the above-mentioned exercising units wassupplemented with units of various types and designations, withthe idea of adding some specific, "modern" training goals. Forinstance, to improve coordination through the exercising commandsand staffs for executing the first nuclear mass attack, commandsand staffs of all operational-tactical rocket brigades and thetechnical field rocket bases could be used in an exercise. Inaddition, a limited number of tactical rocket/missile divisions,rocket transport divisions, etc., might be included.

If, for organizational or budgetary reasons it was decidedto include only some commands and staffs of operational-tacticalrocket/missile brigades, then selection was based on rotationalprinciples. A similar approach was taken in the cases ofselection of other tactical units and elements of armed forcesbranches and types of services, with the thought of reaching somespecific goals, such as upgrading, research or control.

The cycling (rotation) principles, although adhered to.never restricted the central echelon, which had a full freedom of

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choice and which was frequently guided by differentconsiderations (e.g., relocation or the state of training of agiven unit). Thus, for example, if for training purposes it was-intended to use some kind of an operational-tacticalrocket/missile brigade in the first mass nuclear attack after aredeployment of the line by 300-400 kilometers, then such abrigade was selected which made the implementation of thisintention possible because of its peacetime location, rather thanthe brigade which was due to take part according to theprinciples of rotation. A similar approach was taken insituations in which demonstrations were planned, such as tankscrossing water obstacles. If such a show was to be conducted,then the division which was best prepared for this purpose wasselected, rather than the nne which was next i-n turn on the basis)f rotadtion.

Timie and units available for use had no great influence onthe planning of exercises. Tine was allotted as needed to reachtraining goals. The season of the year, however, was selectedwith great care, basicall for two reasons:

- The desire to conduct exercises (especially thoseinvolving the participation of troops and heavyequipment), under the most difficult conditions, i.e.,during a cold winter, or during the fall and spring

- thaws - -

- The intention to avoid agricultural losses resultingfrom the activities of the armed forces outsidedesignated training areas. In such cases, the seasonwas selected which provided for the greatest activity ofthe armed forces in the agricultural areas before springplanting of the crops or after the fall harvest. Forcommand and staff or skeletal exercises, the season ofthe year did not play a great role, since staffvehicles, communications and support equipment movedchiefly on the roads and deployed only in the forests.

In large skeletal exercises, attempts were made to scheduleexercise activity so as not to conflict with the leave time ofthe control personnel. For this sole reason, as a rule noexercises were conducted during July and August.

Economic considerations were a rather large factor in theorganization of training programs for the troops. Financial andtechnical material limitations (fuel, engine/hours, kilometers ofresources use) were given priority at the lowest echelons(divisions, regiments, battalions). Higher echelons--the ,Ministry of National Defense, commands of military districts, andbranches of the armed forces--reserved for themselves

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considerable funds, kilometer limits, etc., which mhore thancovered the needs of exercises organized and conducted by them.

In the Polish Armed Forces prior to 1970, the costs ofexercises were never computed. Such computations began in the1970s, but only after the completion of exercises. Such asituation existed at least until the early 1980s. It isdifficult, therefore, to speak of any restrictions on theavailable technical-materials or financial means. Certainly,there was a lot of talk about the need to economize, althoughnever in any sense of restricting or reducing input, but ratherin the context of the most effective exploitation of resources toachieve training goals.

G. WHAT KIND OF INTERACTION WITH THE SOVIET UN!IOI rx.IS:,EhIN THE PLANNING OF JOINT EXERCISES?

In the mandatory system of directing the so-called "ornnon -flefense" of the Warsaw Pact states, which ensures for the So-:ietUnion total control over the planning of any military activi:y,including the planning of exercises, it is difficult to talkabout interaction. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union"coordinated" the planning of exercises unilaterally, beginningwith the first initial phase (issuance of an annual CINC CAFDirective for CAF and the -"Plan of Joint Enterprises of CAF"), toinclude the approval of plans for specific exercises prepre' -- -national commands, and control of these exercises.

Theoretically, national NSWP commands had a right to acceptonly what conformed to the interests of their national securityand what was feasible within their economic and technical-material limits. Long years of practice indicated, however, thatthe national commands (with the exception of Romania) identifiedtheir national security interests with those of the Soviet Union,and approved all Soviet initiatives without objection. The NSWProle in the planning of joint exercises was chiefly limited tothe implementation of Soviet directives and plans in their owncountries.

Certainly, in instances of detailed planning of a jointexercise recommended for conduct to a national command, theinfluence of that command on its planning could be quitesignificant. This was made easier by the fact that, at leastuntil the end of 1981, the Combined Armed Forces of the WarsawPact did not have any joint, i.e., common, field manuals; eachnational army used its own field manuals.. An equally favorablecircumstance was the significant differentiation between theorganizational structures of the separate armed forces of theWarsaw Pact states.

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In this respect, certain attempts at joint interaction wereundertaken, chiefly via presentations by the allies of the SovietUnion of views other than Soviet. These took place duringworking meetings of planners of joint exercises and concernedvarious issues, beginning with the estimate of the militarypotential of NATO in Europe and its offensive capabilities, toinclude the role and the place of National Territorial Defenseforces in the coalition defense system. Unfortunately, this wasan echelon which did not have sufficient "piercing power," andconsequently had no influence on the military solutions which -were formulated during the conduct of the exercises. The highernational military commands, servile toward the USSR, avoided eventhe slightest conflicts, creating a work atmosphere whichreflected a virtual race to incorporate the princioles of Sovietstrategy, operational art and tactics into the p'ans forexercises. These principles included the newest.Soviet views andsolutions taught at the Soviet military academies or propagatedin Soviet periodicals.

H. D0D THE EXERCISE AREAS REQUIRE PREPARATION?

In general, no. [n this instance, lip service was paid tothe principle that staffs and forces should exercise in

-- conditions approximating wartim.e and depend chiefly on their own,or the cooperating national or allied, means and foFces. Th-iT-- -----principle did not mean, however, that exercise areas were notprepared.

The greatest investment in resources and manpower was in thepreparation of military firing ranges on the territory of thestates in which episodes of exercises involving the actual use offorces and heavy equipment took place. Such preparations,however, were treated as lasting investments and were ratherbased on planning. At times, to satisfy specific needs for anexercise, certain existing installations or objects wereexpanded, improved, or even rebuilt.

Aside from the firing ranges, exercise training areas werenot prepared, except in a very few exceptional cases. Theexceptions were chiefly installations already planned forconstruction in the framework of the preparation of theterritories of Warsaw Pact states as part of the Theater ofMilitary Operations. In this respect, in the exercisepreparation phases,. and subsequently within the exercisesthemselves, the following preparations took place: constructionof vehicle and rail access roads and alternate bridge and ferrycrossings, preparations of sections of rivers for militarycrossings, preparation of isolated shoreline or beaches forloading of .heavy military equipment, construction of cablecommunications lines, construction of permanent, alternate or

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simulated National Air Defense missile launching sites, shelters,and earth-filled field aircraft emplacements, camouflagedinstallations, etc.

At times, tactical elements (often on their own initiative),conducted engineering preparations of alert and alternatemobilization areas, as well as antiaircraft ditches, or evenlight field shelters. Such activity was welcomed, providing thatsuch work took place away from actual wartime alert or alternate -mobilization areas--areas in which such activities were notallowed in peacetime.

I. WHAT KIND OF MEASURES WERE UNDERTAKEN TO CAMOUFLAGE THESIZE, AIMS AND PARTICIPANTS?

In the view of the military leadership of the Warsaw Pact,exercises with the participation of a significant number ofcommands, staffs, and troops belonged to the category of militaryactivities which could not be concealed from foreignintelligence. These leaders were, however, convinced that withproper security it was possible to hide the type, size, purpose,the actual conduct, reworked contents, and applied solutions ofthe exercise. With this in mind, activities were implemented onthree levels:

- Protection of the secrecy of the exercise.

- Conduct of operational camouflage activities.

- Counterintelligence support.

In protecting exercise secrecy, it was assumed that topsecret data lost this degree of classification (ceased to besuch) the moment it became available to a larger group ofpeople. On this basis, the principle was introduced and adheredto that personnel involved in an exercise could know onlywhatever was necessary to fulfill their duties and tasks (need-to-know principle). Special security encompassed variousdocuments and data of even the smallest segments of waroperations plans. Such war planning information was neverrevealed to people who were not given access to operationalplanning and were not directly involved in such matters. Suchinformation also was not reflected, not even to the slightestdegree, in the official summaries of exercises or materialspublished about them.

In the case of more important exercises, an intensifiedeffort to protect office secrecy would be in effect. Drafts,maps, and drafting papers had to be registered prior to theiruse, and entered into a special ledger. Access to working

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facilities where exercises were planned, or where activities.connected with exercises took place (typing offices, printingshops, drafting offices, etc.), was restricted to people workingthere. After the completion of exercises all documentation, withthe exception of materials designated for the archives, wasdestroyed by a special commission.

Various restrictions on the use of technical communicationsmeans, especially radio, were introduced during exercises.Transceivers were used only in exceptional circumstances, ininstances defined by the plan. Open text transmission viauncoded technical means was not permitted in any instance.Special classified documents related to command, such as codetables, voice cipher tables, radio call sign tables, as well asaddresses of functional personnel, map codes, etc., were preparedand used for managingl and commanding exercising units. In orderto assure discipline among exercise participants in the use oftechnical means of communications, the Military Internal Servicemonitored telephone and radio conversations and controlled radiotraffic.

Operational camouflage was based on the principle that an"information vacuum" about an exercise could not be permitted,since it would lead to intensified efforts by foreigni_ntelligence to decode it. Properly thought-out, well-plannedand astutely transmitted~~datato-foreign--nteli-gence could well-----lull the foreign collectors to sleep and mislead them about thepurpose, content, etc., of the exercise.

Operational camouflage of an exercise was an integral partof a long-term, broader, more complex effort to camouflage theoperational military potential of the.Warsaw Pact. This effortwas conducted by centralized means, following a standardized andcentral five-year plan. The planning of operational camouflage.was coordinated by the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces,bypassing the Staff of the Combined Armed Forces. This planningwas implemented by the national commands of the Warsaw Pactstates, who based it on their own five-year plans. Exercisesorganized and conducted .by the CAF were, at the request of thiscommand, camouflaged by the Soviet side,. in accordance with theplan of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, with a _proviso that a part of this effort was usually entrusted tonational commands.

The extent and scope of camouflage undertakings depended onthe type of exercise. In instances of exercises and training-ofthe Unified Air Defense System of the Warsaw Pact states, thebulk of the effort was placed on the camouflage of thefunctioning command system and the active radar field, as well asthe primary and alternate air defense missile sites. With the

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goal of misleading the reconnaissance and intelligence means ofNATO, simulated networks and command directions were activated,along with a system of simulated elements of radio-technicaltroops and missile sites. Simultaneously, a tight restriction onradio-electronic activities was put into effect, in order not tocompromise frequencies reserved for wartime.

In other situations--for instance, in fleet exercises withthe goal of upgrading the cooperation of naval and ground forcesin landing troops on the Danish Islands--camouflage was workedout in such a manner that foreign intelligence could concludethat these exercises were devoted to the defense of the maritimeshores. Means and nethods employed in this instance could be ofvarious types, beginningwith deception conducted by means of.controlled leakage of data via easy-to-read radio traffic anddisinformation through human agents.

The greatest efforts of the General Staffs of the WarsawPact armed forces were concentrated on the camouflage of largeexercises of the combined branches of armed forces, conducted onthe front and Theater of Military Operations levels. In suchinstances, in the Polish Armed Forces, special Polish radio-electronic camouflage measures were put into effect during"LATO"-type front exercises. As of the beginning of theseventies, a special electronic camouflage operation ("ELEKTRON")was put into effect in conjunction with such exercises. In theframework of "ELEKTRON," detached communications troops of the_

- - -. National Territorial Defense were used to simulate the commandorgans introduced for the "LATO" exercise. These forces weredeployed in totally different regions than the exercising staffs,and were moved in directions designed to mislead NATOintelligence. Further, their communications traffic wasprogrammed in a manner which was intended to deceive foreignintelligence as to the type of the exercise, Its aims, conduct,etc. In order to provide credibility to data broadcast over theairwaves, the military organs of operational camouflage, (in thePolish Armed Forces, Department IV of the Operational DirectorateI of the General Staff) provided specialized elements of theMilitary Internal Service and the Ministry of Internal Affairswith additional false data for "sale" via double agents. Theabove data were mixed with some real information about themilitary potential and activity of the Warsaw Pact which wasknown to be already in the hands of foreign intelligence.

In order to isolate foreign diplomatic personnel from theactual regions in which exercises took place, disinformation wasfrequently employed, along with the usual restrictions. This

'disinformation helped direct the attention of foreignintelligence toward the simulated exercise. regions.

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The methods of counterintelligence exercise support are notsufficiently known to the author of this study. From limitedobservation, it seems that such support began in the earlyplanning phase of an exercise, and ended only with the securingof all exercise documentation after its completion.

During the exercise planning phase, counterintelligenceofficers were in constant contact with the exercise planners. -They inspected the facilities in which the planning took place,and where technical work was done (drafting, typing pools.printing shops and computer facilities). For the period in whichexercises were conducted, larger forces and counterintelligencemleans were Irought in, using for this purpose the MilitaryInternal Service and other elements of the Ministry of 1nternalAffairs. The nanagement of the exercise was kept informed aboutmovements of diplomatic personnel and about other securityneasures being taken. After the completion of exercises, thecounterintelligence organs discreetly supervised the destructionof exercise materials and ensured the security of documentationdesignated for the archives.

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IV. UNDERSTANDING EXERCISE SCENARIOS-

A. TO WHAT FXTENT DID THE SCENARIOS OF JOINT EXERCISESREFLECT ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE AND TO WHAT F.XTENT.EXPERIMENTS OF NEW CONCEPTS?

The Warsaw Pact does not have such a distinction in practice(i.e., a division into the established doctrine and stricto sensuexperiments of new solutions). The Warsaw Pact states are guidedby the so-called coalition-doctrine, based on the Soviet potentialand experiences'" which, when translated into practical language.means not Just the following of any specific doctrine shaped by acoalition (such simply does not exist!, but rather an a priori .recognition of the Soviet. War doctrine. This doctrine arises,develops and is subject to experimentation mainly in .theenvironment of Soviet theoreticians and mil tary practioners,actually outside the realm of the CAF of the Warsaw Pact.

The experiences of the entire history of the Warsaw Pactindicate that this Soviet doctrine never reached the Pact alliesin the form of an idea, concept or experimental solutions, butrather in the form of revealed truths which were not subject todiscussion. Pact joint exercises themselves constituted one ofthe most important forums for the revelation of what in Sovietdoctrine was not only mandatory but also most modern. Scenariosof joint exercises, especially the exercise critiques, carried _the force of the most modern, official explanation of Sovietdoctrine. One could cite such explanations as one would anymanuals. Could one, in connection with this, state that newconcepts and solutions were included in the scenarios of thejoint Warsaw Pact exercises only after being fully tested in theSoviet armed forces and obtaining the final approval of itsmanagement? In general., such was the tendency; however, in

14 In the military terminology of the Warsaw Pact, the concept of a doctrineis not associated exclusively with a system of mandatory regulations andmanuals for military activities. This term, and more exactly "the war .doctrine" signifies rather a set of views regarding key problems concerningthe conduct of future wars, recognized officially by a given state or a groupof states and focusing on such views as:

- the character and ways of conducting foreseen war activities;- the main premises which stem from the character of foreseen war

activities, as well as strategic, operational and tactical premisesregarding all branches of armed forces and services contained inregulations, instructions and any other official manuals andpublications;

- the organization of the armed forces and their preparation for wartasks.

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practice there were many examples in which the Soviet sidepresented solutions which were not yet mature, and were far-removed from their ultimate shape.

It happened that way, for instance, with the concept of theconduct of air and anti-air operations in the Theater of MilitaryOperations, the concept of combatting cruise missiles, and evenin the concept of offensive operations in the Theater of MilitaryOperations involving the use of operational maneuver-groups. Inall these instances, the Soviets modified these conceptsrepeatedly, improving and changing their very premises. However,they never presented a clear issue to their allies, and neverimplied that concepts or solutions presented during jointexercises had a research or experimental character. On thecontrary, they did everything possible to ensure that the -concepts presented in. the scenarios were immediately accepted andimplemented in all NSWP armed forces, in every phase of thedevelopment of these concepts.

B. HOW MANY DETAILS WERE NORMALLY INCLUDED IN THE SCENARIOS?WERE RESULTS FORESEEN IN PLANNING? WERE OUTCOMESPROGRAMMED?

The__extent of detail in exercise scenarios varied widely anddepended on many factors, such as- the -t-ype-o-f-exercise-(commandand staff on maps or in the field with troops, one- or two-sided. --etc.), its purpose, scale and organization and methods of -

conduct. Normally, the time needed for preparation and theindividual traits of character of the organizers also werefactors which had to be considered. The most important, decisivefactor, however, was the Soviet's structured approach. TheSoviets not only did not allow any new elements andimprovisations. (a position which could be understood), but alsoexcluded the possibility of multi-variant solutions, and inconsequence, drove the results of an exercise. The entireconduct of'an exercise, including its-result, had to he basicallyforeseen in advance in planning which determined the characterand the number of details normally included in the scenarios.

In conformance with Soviet demands, the key aspects of thescenario were formulated in-the "Intentions of Both Sides." Thescenario's full development, however, was worked out in detailedpreparation of the "Plans of the Conduct of an Exercise."

1. "Intentions of Both Sides." In concept, this documentdepicted the potential of forces and means, strategy anddoctrine, as well as plans and the consequences of enemy actionon the one side. On the other side, friendly forces, plans andconsequences of action, based on the mandatory doctrine, werealso presented in a conceptual context.

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Among the mandatory details which had to be included in the"Intentions of Both Sides" were, inter alia:

a. The groupings of enemy and friendly forces with the.elements of higher echelon, neighbors, and the system ofterritorial defense of the country before the onset ofaction.

b. The most important elements of operational (action)plans of enemy and friendly forces (sectors of action, maindirections of strikes, near-time and subsequent tasks,concepts of use of mass-destruction weapons, commandconcepts, etc).

r... An outline of the operational development (resultsof action).

d. Numerical information which characterized the mostimportant parameters of the dynamics of the operation (thewidth of the sectors of action, depth of tasks, the tempo ofoffensive operations with and without the use of mass-destruction weapons, the duration of operations, etc.)

- -- e - Quantitative--and qual-i-tative--juxtaposition-of_..friendly enemy forces in various directions of action and invarious stages of the operation.

2. "Plans of the Conduct of .the Exercise." These plans hadthe character of detailed scenarios worked out in advance,including all *of the phases of development and the courses ofactions, including "sample" decisions of exercising commanderswhich they should have undertaken in specific stages, days. orepisodes of operations. Plans of this type normally wereprepared for each day of an exercise. Among the mandatorydetails to be included were, inter alia:

a. Information about the enemy, at the beginning andend of each day of the operation (combat):

(1) Entemy order of battle and deployment in the sectorsof action of the exercising elements, In the sectorsof neighbor's activities, as well as in the depth ofthe theater (if they influenced directly orindirectly the course of the operation).

In practice the information about the enemy wasoften expanded even further. For examfle, for thefront exercising in the central strategic directionof The Western Theater of Military Operations,nearly all forces of NATO's Northern and CentralArmy Groups were depicted, as well as NATO's Second-

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and Fourth Tactical Air Forces, Joint Forces ofDanish Straits and the Western Baltic, US andBritish air forces based in Great Britain, NATOnaval forces operating in the North Sea, the basicelements of the French Armed Forces, as well asforces of border police and of the territorial(regional) defense of the FRG.

The deployment of the enemy was shown at twolevels below the exercising elements. For instance,for a two-level exercise (front and Army), thedeplovnent of NATO ground forces down to battalionlevel was shown. NATO missile forces (surface-to-surface; surface-to-air) were shown down to hattervlevel.

(2) The most important elements of the logisticalsupport and infrastructure of the TMO.

(3) The general intentions of the enemy, the nostimportant elements of the enemy plan of action anthe manner of execution of this plan.

b. Information about friendly forces, also at the- --- -eqi nni-n- and~end of -each day:-------- - -- - _ - - ---

(1) Strength levels and deployment of all elements ofthe operational combat grouping (down to two levelsbelow the exercising elements).

(2) Selected elements of higher level forces and theintent of their action.

(3) General deployment of neighboring units, their tasksand intent of action.

(4) Elements of territorial defense of the country andthe infrastructure of the TMO.

(5) An outline of "sample" decisions for thoseexercising, including:

- Definition of a decision regarding the type ofaction (for instance, move to offensiveoperations with the whole strength of forces,pursue, or defend with a part of the forces).

- The main direction of thrust (the main effort).

- Concept for the use of conventional and mass-destruction weapons.

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- Deployment of forces and their tasks.

- Means of joint operations.

- Command and control concepts.

- Information justifying the decisions.(calculations concerning qualitative-qualitative -correlation of forces, conclusions from the fieldevaluation, calculations of time, meteorologicalconditions, etc.)

(6) An outline of ways to implement the decision.

C. TO WHAT EXTENT DID EXERCISES REFLECT OPEP.ATIONAL PLANS'-

Prior to late 1981, there was no known instance in which afront- or army-level exercisewas conducted in accordance withactual operational (war) plans. This was rigorously prohibitedand scrupulously observed; violating this taboo was consideredtreason. On the other hand, there was no known instance o* anexercise (with the exception of special exercises for operationalcamouflage) whose .premises would depart from the real premises of

-operationa-1--plans. -Had such attempts taken__place, the pro-posedexercise scenario would have. failed to obtain approval early inthe planning process.

What then was routinely changed to distort the picture ofreal operational plans? In the first place, as a principle, thefollowing elements were distorted: combat composition, numerical-designators of units and the timing of their combat and.mobilization readiness. There were, however, no rules governingwhether the distortions were to be toward an increase or decreasein the number of forces. In exercises organized by the Soviets,one could note certain tendencies to distort on the side ofinflation, i.e. somewhat greater numbers of Soviet forces were.shown, and these uere shown in a higher .state of readiness thanin reality. In exercises organized by the Polish side,distortions of the Polish forces were relatively minor. Thecomposition of a Polish front and. army was.generally accepted asit was foreseen by the operational plans. Only the numericaldesignations of units were changed, through the use of a simplekey involving addition or subtraction of a number (for instance,10). Times needed for mobilization of specific units and theirattainment of combat readiness were either shortened orlengthened. Care was taken, however, to make sure that thegeneral balance of resources and forces of an a-rmy and a frontreflected near-reality. Normally, differences were plus-minus5-7 percent.

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The Soviets were also very sensitive about revealing theactual peacetime locations of Units and their alert andmobilization areas. In connection with this, their distortionssometimes went so far that any attempt at reconstruction ofreality from the materials of an exercise did not seem possible.

The Poles preferred not to resort to fiction. They basedtheir premises on the fact that hiding of the peacetime locationof units--starting at the level of a mechanized regiment, tankregiment, artillery brigade or an air regiment--in contemporarytimes was not possible. They thus used actual data, includingthe territorial boundaries of their peacetime and wartimemilitary districts, as well as the areas of responsibility of thenational air defense forces and the navy. Only fictionalmobilization areas and areas of the formation of new militaryunits (for instance, divisions and reserve regiments) wereaccepted. Even these distortions, however, were not very -drastic. The Poles used the same criteria in selecting fictionalareas as in selecting actual areas. For instance, if there was arequirement for an alternate alert area for a unit where troopswere led from the barracks for replacements of forces andsupplies to be located at a distance not further than an hour's.march and close to roads for deployment in the operationaldi.rection, then the exercise area_ as a rule had to satisfy thesecriteria. Also, for example, if a military dTistr-ic-wast-form-- ----- ---in wartime a reserve division in the region of Silesia, then theexercise areas would be different, but would be located inSilesia.

One of the key dilemmas of the organizers of exercises wasthe programming of exercise dynamics in such a way that theyapproximated to the maximum what was foreseen by the scenarioplanned with unusual details of the real future war, and yetwould not reveal key elements, which included:

- Methods of wartime strategic deployment of armed forcesin the Theater of Military Operations.

- Timing, boundaries, and direction of introduction intothe battle of various fronts and armies.

- The main and auxiliary directions of strikes.

- Targets for strikes by conventional and nuclear weapons.

- Near-time and subsequent tasks for fronts and armies.

- Operational limits of nuclear and chemical weapons.

- Command, control and communications systems.

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- State of reserves of technical-material means and theirdispersement.

Exercise methods of strategic deployment of the armed forcesin the Theater of Military Operations reflected rather faithfulythe premises of operational plans. In principle, the routine ofconversion of forces from peacetime to wartime was neverchanged. Alert notification signals were sometimes altered forexercise purposes in increasing the level of combat readiness;however, these alert signals were transmitted via identical meansto be used in the event of real emergency, and via typica'communications channels..

The wartime systems of command *or front and army werealways deployed in their actua' mode, and in the time frameforeseen by operational plans. The only distortion in thesecases was the deployment of specific command posts in theexercising areas. Attempts were made, however, to deploy frontand army CPs approximating the distances foreseen by the plans.

In all exercises, operations of deployment of front and armyforces were rather faithfully reflected. Sectors fordeploymentof forces, routes for specific units, as well as departure areasfor offensive operations were routinely changed. The scale of

--- distortion-in such cases varied, and-depended-on -the-gene.ra.concept of an exercise. At one time, for instance, in exercise"ZAPAD-77,".the changes were minimal (the Soviet Baltic,Belorussian and Ukrainian Fronts were redeployed on maps throughthe territory of Poland and Eastern Germany, through sectorswhich were nearly identical with actual operational plans). Inanother instance, however, during the training of General Staffsof the Warsaw Pact forces in 1979, the changes introduced seemed.to result in an extreme distortion of reality.

In all instances of army and front deployments, however, thenumber of redeployment routes was identical with actualoperational plans, and march-assembly order approximatedreality. The wartime system of directing and controllingmovements of forces was deployed and put into operation. Unitswere redeploLed to locations and with the timing approximatingthat foreseen in operational plans. The same criteria were usedin the selection of areas for daily rest, and for regeneration ofreadiness. Organization and methods of air .cover for redeployingforces, as well as engineering, communications, technical-material and medical support, followed actual plans.

Timing, boundaries, and directions of introducing fronts andarmies into combat belonged to the most protected elements of theplan, and these real data were never used in exercise scenarios.The simplest and most frequently used distortion measure was achange of the direction of action. In principle, all fronts and

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armies situated in the depth of the Theater of Military Operationsexercised as a rule in several strategic (operational) directionsof the theater, and only one of these directions approximated areflection of operational plans. For instance, Polish Front forcesexercised, in principle, in three strategic directions of theWestern Theater of Military Operations, while only one (Northern-Maritime) was nearly identical with.the operational plans. If thePolish Front exercised in the operational direction foreseen for .it, then distortion possibilities were not too .great. In such aninstance, the timing of its introduction into combat could differ

from actual plans by up to 24 hours, either earlier or later. Thesector of introduction of the Polish Front into combat and itsoffensive operation in such a case also differed, butinsignificantly. The lines of demarcation between fronts wereconsidered very sensitive, since they revealed the flanks andgaps. In exercises, the boundary lines were never the same,although their shifts (to the left or right) were no greater than30-50 kilometers. The shifts of demarcation lines between armieswere even smaller, and sometimes--as for instance with a Polisharmy in action in the operational direction of JUTLAND--thedemarcation lines were identical with those shown in actual plans.

- Boundaries .of introduction. of forces _into_ combat differed,however, significantly. This stemmed in part from the exercisepremise (always the same) that the conflict was initiated byNATO, exploiting the element of surprise, whose forces achievedsome success in the first border skirmishes. The forces of theWarsaw Pact then always began offensive operations fromunfavorable positions in Pact territory.

As a result, the exercise boundaries of entry of fronts intocombat were usually pulled back from the FRG-GDR borderTfromthose which were planned:

- In exercises organized by the Soviet side, by 30-40kilometers.

- In exercises organized by the Polish side, up to 100-120kilometers. (Source Comment: The Soviets were alwaysreluctant to'approve these deep NATO penetrations.)

All of the above information relates to a Polish Frontexercising along the direction of action foreseen by theoperational plans and without the introduction of agreed(stipulated) state borders. between NATO and Warsaw Pactcountries. In instances in which such borders were defined (forinstance during the training of the general staffs of alliedforces in 1979, and during exercise ZAPAD" in 1981), suchcomparisons cannot be applied.

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In exercises organized in the directions of action foreseenby the operational plans, the main and auxiliary directions ofstrikes1 as welt as the near-time and subseouent tasks of frontsand armies reflected the real wartime premises to a large extent,in respect to the space, and in respect to the forces of NATO.Thus, for instance, the Polish Front moved to offensiveoperations in close conformity with the operational plan (as withnearly all exercise scenarios organized in the Northern-Maritimeoperational direction), in two divergent directions:

- Ludwigslust, Verden, Brussels.

- Gustrow, Rendsburn, Skagen.

The main Polish strikes took place in the Ludwigislust-Brussels direction, in conjunction with the Soviet front forneifrom the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and in coonerationwith the Combined Baltic Fleet. In the near-tine task, thePolish Front attacked forces of the First FRG Arry Corps, theFirst Dutch Army Corps, and the German-Danish JlITLAND Arny Corps,taking control of the northwestern territory of the FR,(somewhere up to the river EMS) and the southern part of theJUTLAND Peninsula, including the border areas of Denmark. In itssubsequent task, the Polish Fr6nt destroyeda part of th----reserves of the Northern Army Group as well as the Joint NorthernForces of the Danish Straits, and of the Western Baltic, takingcontrol of the territory of the Netherlands, Belgium andDenmark. For the purpose *of seizing SJAELLAND (ZEELANO) Island,a sea-air landing in the strength of three Polish divisions (6thAirborne Division, 7th Sea Landing Division and 15th MechanizedDivision) was organized. In the exercises, this landing tookplace on the third or fourth day of war (in the framework of the -near-time tasks). The actual operational plans, however,envisioned this operation for the sixth to eighth day of war(i.e., in the framework of subsequent tasks).

Within such tasks, all .of the Polish combined-arms armies(1, 2 and 4) as well as the Third Air Army exercised their actual-operational plans. The Second Army deployed from the basis ofthe Silesian Military District and-operated in the first echelonof the Front on the main direction of the thrust. In the initialoperation, operating with a Soviet tank army of the CentralFronti, it attacked the forces of the 1st Dutch Army Corps andelements of the 1st FRG Army Corps, also gaining control of theWESER River sites in the area south of VERDEN. In the subsequenttask, operating with the same Soviet tank army and the 4th PolishArmy deployed from the Warsaw Military District, the Second Armyattacked the reserves of the Northern Army Group and took controlof EMS river sites. In a subsequent operation, it deployed in anoperation toward the borders of France aimed at the control ofBrussels.

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The 1st Polish Army (from the Pomeranian Nilitary District)moved to offensive operations in the direction of JUTLAND.Operating with the Combined Baltic Fleet, it attacked, in thenear term, the forces of the JUTLAND Army Corps and took controlof the KIEL CANAL. In the subsequent task, it attacked thereserves of the joint Danish and Western Baltic forces, alsotaking control of the border regions of Denmark up to the limitsof FREDERICJA AND ESBJERG. In a subsequent operation, itattacked the remaining regular territorial and regional Danishforces, takina control of JUTLAND and the remaining island-partof Denmark, with the exception of BORNIHOLM ISLAND, against whicha Soviet paradrop was planned.

The 4th Polish Arny, fron the Wlarsaw !ilitarv.District,always operated as the second echelon of the Polish Front. Itentered the battle on the sixth to eirlhthi day of war, from behindthe right flank of the 2nd Polish Arrny, and initiated anoffensive operation in the direction of RRE'MEN-AtISTER.DAM.

In exercises organized on unplanned directions, thescenarios could reflect nerely general prenises (concepts), orparameters of actual planned operations. This related inparticular to the extent of the width of sectors of the front andarmies. These scenarios often reflected good data on thestrength--of enemy-forces, the type of of-fells-ive-planned-,---t-he-- -- - --planned attack tempo, the density of tanks, artillery, and otherequipment planned for the breakthrough segments, and along themain and auxiliary directions of operations, etc.

The quantitative-qualitative limits on nuclear and chemicalweapons, accepted in all known exercises for front and armyoperations, and the targets for strikes with these weapons aswell as conventional means re lected not so much the concretepremises of operational plans, but rather general concepts.

From the examples of the exercises of the Polish ArmedForces, it appears that the exercise limits of the weapons ofmass destruction for front operations were 3D-35 percent higherthan those foreseen by operational plans. Since nuclear planningwas the exclusive province of the Soviet General Staff, there wasno way to ascertain to what extent. the numbers of weapons andyields accepted in the exercises for the nuclear strikes on thepart of the Front corresponded to the real plans.

Exercise strikes with nuclear weapons did not alwayscorrespond to reality; however, the nature of the targets was, inprinciple, always identical. The Front and armies executed -nuclear strikes chiefly against nuclear-capable targets and enemyforces located within the sectors of their operational activity,starting at battalion level and upward. Stationary targets,however, (e.g., nuclear and chemical weapons storage sites,

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hardened command posts and communications centers, airfields,ports, etc.) were targetted by Soviet strategic forces.

Pact exercise scenarios varied regarding the timing of nuclearuse, with nuclear initiation usually linked to the progress of theWarsaw Pact.offensive. Prior to girca 1977, Pact exercisescenarios reflected NATO using.nuclear weapons first and the Pactresponding with a "full, mass strike" using strategic, operationaland tactical.systems. (Comment: The author could recall no -instance of limited or gradual nuclear use by Pact forces.)

After circa 1977, Pact scenarios generally depicted anear-simultaneous NATO-Pact nuclear exchange, with the Pactdetecting NATO preparations for nuclear use and launching its ownmass strike.

The level of the technical-material reserves and theirdisposition (how much of what and at which level) largelyrefected real data, although as a rule this level wasintentionally lowered somewhat. Levels higher than actual ones,however, were never accepted.

D. HOW WERE NEW IDEAS INTRODUCED FOR TESTING DURINGEXERCISES? _WHO COULD. DEMAND SUCH TESTS?

As mentioned earlier, new concepts and solutions of adoctrinal nature arose and were tested in the environment ofSoviet theoretical and military practitioners. Ideas whichoriginated in the NSWP countries, on the other hand, pertainedprimarily to new technical-construction solutions and theirapplication in the weapons systems of the Pact. Examples of suchideas were the Polish system of air defense command automation(CYBER-DUNAJEC), which increased the technical-combatcapabilities of the Soviet system (VOZDUKN 1P), or the Czech152-mm self-propelled artillery piece (DANA), which competed withits Soviet counterpart. In such instances, the Ministry ofNational Defense of the interested country used the jointexercises to demonstrate the system's technical combat merits, inthe framework of the routine attempts of introduction of proposedequipment into the armament system of the Warsaw Pact.

Such demonstrations were, however, not..connected with anyformal research and evaluation of the armament samples ormilitary equipment introduced during the exercises. Officialresearch and evaluation actually were conducted exclusively inspecialized scientific-research and construction-developmentinstitutes of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countriesinvolved in purchases.

Other ideas were of much lesser import, and concerned mainlyminor improvements on alert and mobilization systems, the tactics

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of forces on the field of battle, organization,. and methods attechnical-material support, training of troops, etc. Such ideaswere often introduced at the meetings of the military collegialorgans of the Warsaw Pact, and-were demonstrated by their authorsin the framework of an exchange of experiences at the jointexercises. There were, however, no known cases of any NSWPcountry introducing an idea and demanding its evaluation.

E. tIHAT WERE THE TYPE.S AND THE SOURCES OF DATA USED TO.SIMULATE THE NATO SIDE?

The samre standard types of sources and data about thenotential and means of NATO which were used in other activities-,ere used in the preparation of exercises and in operationalnlannine. In this reaard, with the exception of certainrestricted data (s.ensitive because of source or value of data forwar ains), there were no deceptive/false data or estimatesused. In all instances, without regard to whether it wastraining, exercises, planning of the development of armed forcesor operational planning, the forces and capabilities of NATO hadto be presented as faithfully as they actually were at any givennoment, or as they could possibly be in the future, in the giventiming of the planning horizon.

Each national armed force of the Warsaw Pact used its oi- - ------data about the enemy. This information was issued by their ownIntelligence Directorates of the General Staffs. Data about thepotential of forces and equipment of foreign armed forces(especially NATO) were agreed-upon and standardized, in theframework of allied coordination, with the Main IntelligenceDirectorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRUI, which coordinatedthe military intelligence and information activities of allWarsaw Pact states.

In the Polish People's Republic, the standard types andsources of threat data (intelligence publications) were:

1. "Informator About the Armed Forces of CapitalistCountries. This SECRE publication, of about 200-250 pages,updated and issued annually, was designed for the chiefs of theCentral Institutions of the Ministry of National Defense, -commanders of armed forces branches, military districts, andchiefs of arms of troops and services.

"Informator" contained data concerning the defense potentialof NATO as a whole, its individual members, and the mostimportant European capitalist states, including the neutral ones(e.g., Austria, Sweden and Switzerland). Permanent chapterscontained general data concerning the structure of NATO, itsstrategy and doctrine, combat readiness and mobilization systems,organizational structure of units and detailed data regarding the

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composition of ground, air, and naval forces in Europe, tineUnited States, and Canada (numerical designators, order ofbattle, bases, etc.). Attached to the "Informator" were graphictables reflecting manpower potential and data concerning the mostimportant weapons systems (aircraft, surface-to-surface andsurface-to-air misfiles, tanks, etc.), as well as an order ofbattle map depicting NATO units and the most important NATOdefense infrastructure in Europe.

2. "Vademecum 1 5 About the Armed Forces of CapitalistStates." This SECRT publication of about 250-300 pages, updatedevery several years, was designed for *a wide circle of recipientsdown to and including regimental level (or independentbattalion). It contained detailed data concerning organizationalstructures of the armed forces of capitalist countries, theirarmaments and equipment, operational tactics, etc.

3. Variously classified (SECRET. or CONFIDENTIAL)monogSraphic studies. devoted to a single specific therje of fnrninnarne o ces (e.g., air defense, logistics, mobilization, etc.)There were many of these studies on a wide variety of subjects.

4. The Reconnaissance Communique, a SECRET, bi-weeklvpublication, was designed primarily tor the upper-levelnanagement--of--the-C-entral Institut-ions-of the-Minist-ry--of---- --- - - --National Defense, commanders of armed forces and militarydistricts, and chiefs of arms of. troops and services. Thesecommuniques contained data about the activities of NATO armedforces during the preceding two-week .period, as well asinformation on all new improvements throughout NATO in the fieldsof military armament and equipment. They also contained dataabout personnel changes in command and key positions, plusbiographical sketches of foreign forces commanders (division-level and above).

5. SECRET "information" pieces about more important.NATOexercises were published successively during the conduct of theseexercises, with complete analysis and evaluation of the exercisepublished a week or two after exercise completion.

6. A daily "0perational Re ort," classified SECRET, alsowas published. Thls repot was esigned to inform the leadershipof the Ministry of Defense about the most important undertakingsimplemented by the armed forces of NATO, including data abouttheir combat readiness and results of their inspections on theregional and global scales.

I5 Translator's note: "Vadenecum" is a word of Latin origin meaning an itemor a handbook which professionals carry with them for consultation.

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Since all of the source materials about NATO reflectedpeacetime data, so-called "Identifiers of Enemy Units" were alsoprepared for exercise purposes (for controllers arid players).These publications presented a given wartime state of NATO armed.forces (prepared by the authors of an exercise), and theircomposition and numerical system of units. Determination of sucha wartime state of NATO's armed forces resulted usually in manydiscussions and controversies between command/operationspersonnel and the specialists of military intelligence.Commanders and officers of operational elements (the actualauthors of exercises), who were obliged to base the content of anexercise on the premise that war is a result of aggressivenessagainst Warsaw Pact states, tended toward an artificial "buildup"of wartime structure of NATO's armed forces--a "buildup" whichwas not reflected in realistic plans. Intelligence officers,however, having at their disposal supposedly credible dataconcerning limited reinforcement capabilities of NATO forces in ashort period of time, were decidedly against such inflation ofthe NATO threat.

In exercises organized by the Poles, a compromise wasusually worked out. It was based on the premise that, regardingthe general data of the Intelligence Directorate concerning NATO

- - -- plans--for increase of forces during crisis-andwartime, it wasconsidered that NATO was able to implement these plans partly insecret and partly under the cover of exercises, in a considerableshorter period of time. NATO was never, however, credited withgreater forces than those indicated by actual intelligence data.

In exercises organized by the Soviet side, the authors ofexercises did not pay much attention to the views of.intelligence, especially regarding the issue of the militarypotential of the FRG. It was not extraordinary to consider thatBundeswehr forces could be doubled in the first days of war andreach a manpower level of one million troops.

Simulating NATO activities depended on the type of exerciseand methods of its conduct. Two-sided exercises, in which oneside acted in the role of NATO forces, were rare occurrences. Ifsuch an exercise was conducted, then it was most often attactical level (battalioh, regiment, or division), or involvedonly a two-sided war game on maps. In multinational two-sidedexercises, because of political and propaganda reasons, units ofone national army could not play the role of NATO forces againstanother Warsaw Pact army.

In one-sided exercises with troops, simulation of NATOforces was done by specially designated elements acting inaccordance with NATO organizational lines and tactics, armedforces, aircraft, ships, etc. As in multinational two-sidedexercises, it was inadmissable to have units of one national army

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act as pretenders against another national army. The onlyexception involved exercises of air defense of the Warsaw Pact.In such exercises, aircraft of one national armed force wereroutinely used to simulate NATO aircraft operating against Pactforces.

In .large command and staff and skeletal exercises,exercising commands and staffs were informed about NATOactivities by:

- Written directives, orders, maps, and premises.

- The umpires.

- Role-playing groups playing the role of reconnaissanceorgans of the exercising level and combat .units indirect combat contact with the enemy.

The time, content, and means of transmittal of informationwere usually established in advance, in the "Plan of Conduct ofthe Exercise" and the "Plan of Dissemination of Information."

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V. ORGANIZATION AND METHODS OF DiRECTING LARGE EXERCISES

A. WEPE ANY OTHER PEOPLE RESPONSIRLE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATIONOF PLANS AND FOR ORGANIZING EXERCISES AFTER THEEXERCISE SCENARIO HAD BEEN WRITTEN?

The preparation of an exercise's plans and its all-encompassing organization were the responsibility of the team of -authors. Implementation of the plans, however, was the soleresponsibility of the management of the exercise, formedseparately for each exercise. The structure of the managementfor a front exercise of the "LATO type" (staff, umpire team, andthe exercise's role playing Group) is outlined below:

1. Connact Mananenent of the Exercise consisted of:

- The Exercise Manager (usually the Minister ofNational Defense).

- The Chief of Staff of the Exercise Management(routinely the Chief of the Polish General Staff).

Deputies of- the Exerc-ise Manager-for__ National ____Affairs (other than the Polish Armed Forces), whichparticipated in the exercise. On the Soviet side,the deputy manager of the exercise was usually theactual Deputy of .the Chief of Staff for OperationalMatters for the military district involved, or thechief of Northern Group of Soviet Forces (dependingon where the exercising staffs and troops camefrom). In the event of participation by othernational armies (for instance, the East Germans orCzechs). the Vice-Ministers of Defense were usuallyappointed as the deputy managers of the exercise.

- The Deputy Exercise Manager for National TerritorialDefense and Civil Defense (routinely the ChiefInspector of the Territorial Defense/Vice-Ministerof National Defense).

- The Deputy Exercise Manager for Political Matters(usually the Chief of the Main Political Directorateof PAF/Vice-Minister of National Defense).

- The Deputy Exercise Manager for Rear QuartermasterMatters (the Chief Quartermaster of PAF/Vice-Minister of National Defense).

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- The Deputy Exercise Manager for Technical RearMatters (routinely the Chief Technical Inspector ofPAF/Vice-Minister of National Defense).

- Assistant to the Exercise Manager for PersonnelMatters (normally the Chief of Personnel of theMinistry of National Defense).

- Assistant to the Exercise Manager for Counter-Intelligence Support (Chief of the Military InternalService).

- The Manager of the Exercise Critique Group (mostfrequently the first Deputy of the Chief of theP'olish General Staff).

As a general rule, the Polish compact management team of anexercise did not become involved in the direct management of theconduct of the exercise, but limited its activities exclusivelyto either individual or group observation of the exercise'sconduct, listening to the reports of these exercising andconsidpring and approving key decisions concerning current issuesduring the exercise, which were. prepared each day by the staff ofthe management. Despite this, the most important decisionsconcerning the conduct of exercise-operations-were--inprinciple-.- _ _the exclusive authority of the exercise manager. These could beundertaken in his name only by the chief of staff of the exercisemanagement team. Other members of the compact management teamobserved episodes of the exercise assigned to them by theexercise manager and reported their comments to him.

2. Exercise Management Staff

The chief task of the exercise management staff was theimplementation of the prepared exercise plans. These plans werecorrected and brought up-to-date on a daily basis.

The exercise management staff was headed by the Chief ofStaff of the management staff. Usually, he had four deputies:

- For operational matters (normally the Deputy of theChief of the Polish General Staff for OperationalMatters).

- For mobilization matters (the Deputy Chief of the PolishGeneral Staff for Organizational-Mobilization Matters).

- For automated command matters.

- For communications.

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The Exercise Management Staff had a flexible organizationalstructure which had a tendency to continually increase the numberof elements functioning within, as well as involve greater andgreater number of officers.

The heart of the staff and its most important component partwas the operational roup, at times identified as the center ofexercise management. consisted of 50-6O officers whopreviously had taken part in the preparation of the exercise.The group's main task was the management of the current conductof the exercise. Within the framework of this task, theoperational group, often acting in the role of a higher command(i.e., CAF CINC in the Theater of Military Operations and thePolish Ministry of National Defense), transmitted directives,instructions and orders, as well as command codes established for.the period of the exercise. The group also monitored andevaluated the conduct of their implementation and, depending onthe activities of those exercising, programmed the conduct of theexercise for 24-hour periods. Parallel to this, the operationalgroup also managed the activities of the umpire team, role-playing group, simulation, control, and support groups, etc.

Within the operational group functioned an operational teamwhich consisted of six to nine officers selected from among thecompact au-thors' team of the exercise. This-team coordinated the- - - - -execution of all of the above-mentioned tasks assigned to theoperational group. Within the specific branches of the armedforces, arms and services, and the rear, there were technicalteams of:

- National Air Defense forces (three to four officers).

- Air Forces (two to three officers).

- Navy (two to three officers).

- Electronic Warfare (two to three officers).

- Rocket and Artillery troops (two to. three officers).

- Antiaircraft Defense troops (two to three officers).

- Engineering Troops (two to three officers).

- Chemical Troops (two to three officers).

- Signal Troops (two to three officers).

- Quartermaster Rear (seven to ten officers).

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-- Technical Rear (five to seven officers).

In addition, the operational group included an "Operational DutyService," composed of three to four officers. This element wasdirectly involved with accepting reports from exerciseparticipants and transmitting to them various directives, orders,instructions, etc.

In addition to the operational group, the staff also had:

- An Organizational Group of about 20-30 officers from theOperational Tra ning Department and the grouping of theMinistry of National Defense security and supportunits. The group was responsible for housing, messing,security, and transport for the exercise managementteam.

- An Active Communications Group of about seven to tenofficers from the headquarters of the Signal T roops.This group was engaged in the deployed communicationssystems for the management of exercise players and role-

, playing groups.

- An Informatics Support Group _of three to_four officers------ --from Directorate XIV of the Polish General Staff. Thiselement was responsible for computer support for themanagement of the exercise.

- A Combat Readiness and Command Combat Group. The coreof this group usually consisted of officers fromDirectorate. I of the Polish General Staff, with thecomposition of the group depending on the number ofunits designated for the control and its limits. Themain task of the group was the control of thedevelopment of the wartime command system for theexercising forces. -

- A Mobilization Readiness Control Grou of about 20 to 30officers from Directorate X of the Po ish GeneralStaff. This group was responsible for control ofmobilization development of the exercising commands andstaffs, as well as verification of the functioning ofthe wartime reserve replacements.

- A Counterintelligence Support Group of two to fourofficers from the Military Internal Service. This groupwas responsible for counterintelligence support of theinstitutions of the Polish General Staff. Activities ofthis group were directed personally by the Chief of the

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Military Internal Service.

- A Political Support Group of three to four officers fromthe Main Political Directorate of the Polish ArmedForces. This group was responsible for the propagandaframework of the exercise (e.g., publication of fieldnewspapers, leaflets, bulletins, organization ofmeetings of "friendship and brotherhood of arms", andencounters between soldiers and the civilianpopulation).

- A Research Group (at times, two or three such groups).e research groups were composed of officers-scientists

conducting specific problem research.

- A Civil Defense Group of five to six officers from theNational Civil Defense Inspectorate. This group wasresponsible for the involvement of the Civil Defenseunits in support of military activities (usually toprovide assistance to the troops in recovery from theeffects of attacks by weapons of mass destruction).

- A Group from the Ministry of Internal Affairs (about--- -three officers-.---This group_was responsible for

exercise cooperation (with the armed forces)^of the 7----- --Ministry of Internal Affairs troops (militia, detachedground and sea forces of the Border Defense Troops, et.al.).

3. The Umpire Team

The Umpire Team was composed of a relatively large group ofgenerals and other officers spread out among the exercisingcommands, staffs and troops, representing primarily the exercisemanagement. The team consisted of:

- Umpires attached to exercising commands and staffs.

- Umpires attached to units.

- Field umpires.

In front exercises of the "LATO" type, the most importantgroup of umpires was the one assigned to the exercising commandsand staffs. The role and tasks of the umpires changed as themanagement methods for large skeletal exercises in the field inthe Polish Armed Forces improved. Traditionally, following-theSoviet example, the umpires who were constantly with theexercising commanders and staffs fulfilled two basic functions:

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- The formulation of operational and combat situations bytransmitting various informational data to thoseexercising, in conformance with the scenario about theenemy and friendly forces.

- The supervision and evaluation of the behavior anddecisions of those exercising, as well as an assessmentof the correct execution of tasks, i.e., conformancewith field manuals and the principles of operationalart. The umpires doled out awards (for recognized -successes in operations) or punishments (for delays inachieving aims and operational tasks; for causing largelosses in personnel and equipment, etc.).

In the early 19705, because of difficulties in directing"the exercise combat field" by the staff, a concreteorganizational and methodological innovation was introduced,involving the dispersal of umpires over large areas. Thisinnovation shifted the main responsibility for the formulation of -operational and combat situations from the umpire teams attachedto the exercising staffs to the exercise management role-playinggroup, deployed near the exercise management staff.

It was a rule that, to each exercising element (front,armies, divisions), the following were attached:

- An umpire attached to the commander. This umpire alsoserved as the chief umpire of the element.

- An umpire attached to the staff. He served as thedeputy to the chief umpire.

- A group of technical umpires, which was assigned to themost important organizational elements of the staff (forinstance: operational, reconnaissance, antiaircraftdefense troops, rocket and artillery troops, etc.).

The overall number of umpires could not be smaller than thenumber of. command posts established by the exercising elements.Thus, if the front deployed a Command Post (SD), an alternateCommand Post {TZbf, a Rear Comman1 Post (TSD), and a CombinedCommand Post of Antiaircraft Defense and Fighter Aircraft FrontCommand, then there had to be a minimum of four umpires, one foreach cgmmand post.

Generals and officers who were of equal (or sometimessenior) rank and position to those exercising were selected asexercise umpires. Thus, the umpire attached to the Frontcommander would be one of the Vice-Ministers of National Defense(usually a general who previously had served as a front

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commander), and the umpire attached to the Front staff would be ageneral who previously filled the TO&E position of the Front'sChief of Staff, etc.

Unit um ires were appointed to supervise the activities ofexercising units at division, brigade and lower levels. As arule, each exercising unit had at least one umpire. At largerunits (.i.e., division), there would be a senior umpire andseveral other umpires.

Umpires attached to exercising commands and staffs, as wellas unit umpires, were required to provide to the exercisemanagement, in compliance with a plan, oral or written reportsevaluating the activities of the exercise players.

Field um ires were appointed to direct rea'-time, one- ortwo-sie practical military activities in the field, based onthe exercise scenario. They were not attached to any units., butrather to a specific area of planned military activity. Theyinfluenced the conduct of those activities chiefly bytransmitting to the exercise players agreed visual signals oragreed symbols: "killed". "injured", "destroyed", or "damaged."

4. Role-Playing Groups

----- - -- In the improved system of- conduc-ting---l-a-rge-skeleta-l- ---- -exercises, the role-playing groups assumed the role of the, linksof wartime structures of front, army, branches of armed forcesand military districts--elements which were not called out toplay the exercise, but which were necessary to create realisticcommand relations. In addition to the routine introduction ofskeletal commands to the exercise, and staffs of the combined-arms army, air army, and a limited number of combat units, therewere hundreds of tactical organizations and units in the wartimestructure of the Front. These were armored and-mechanizeddivisions, an airborne division, a sea-landing division, airforce divisions, reserve divisions, reserve regiments,operational-tactical rocket brigades, artillery brigades,antiaircraft defense missile brigades, engineering and chemicalregiments, brigades and reconnaissance units, and troops ofelectronic warfare, as well as a large number of rear serviceunits of various types and designation which were not-called forthe exercise. The role-playing groups played specifically theroles of non-participating divisions, brigades and sometimesbattalions.

I-n the late 1970s, for front exercises of the "LATO" type,50-70 such groups were calledinvolving up to 200 or moreofficers. Each role-playing group, usually composed of three tosix officers, played a role of one or several tactical

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organizations or units. For instance, one of the groups might playthe role of the command and staff of a.mechanized division;another, the role of four operational-tactical rocket brigades;still another, the role of several special groups active in therear of the enemy, etc. All role-playing groups were sited in onelocation, most frequently in tents and located at an airfield nearthe exercise leadership staff which directed their activities.Exercising commands and staffs maintained communications with the.role-playing groups, making it possible for them to practicerealistic command over units participating in their wartimestructure.

R. FROM WHERE WERE EXERCISES DIRECTED' HOW WAS THEMAfIAGEMENT COMMAND POST ORGANIEO'

Large exercises on the level of front, army or branch of medforces (with the exception of the National Air Defense Forces)were generally directed from one, two, or occasionally threeselected sites of work of the management. At times, these siteswere called Management Posts.

In exercises organized by the Polish Ministry of NationalDefense, the management of exercises was nearly always deployed toair bases which were located centrally in relation to theexercising staffs and-forces (i-f this -was--po-ssible-,--or-as close as_possible to the exercise players. In instances in which theplayers distanced themselves considerahly from the deployment ofthe management, as the dynamics of the operations developed, themanagement posts would be moved, following the path of the fieldcommand posts of the exercising elements. Staying as close aspossible to those exercising was dictated by organizational (easiercommunications), and economic considerations (lower costs ofdeployment of communications systems, and use of means oftransportation). Air bases were preferred, since they offered thebest conditions for frequent transfer of the exercise managementpersonnel, by aircraft or helicopters, directly from the place ofwork, without the obvious appearance of columns of vehiclesapproaching air bases with high-ranking military dignitaries. Airbases were also ideal for deployment of large fields of tents inwhich the role-playing groups were located.

The Soviets were not in favor of using unprepared ad hocinstallations for this purpose. For their exercise management,they selected for their headquarters' locations the well-protectedinstallations of their military districts or military groups (Group

16 As a rule, exercises of National Air Defense were directed from thepermanent comiand posts of these forces.

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of Soviet Forces in Germany; the Northern Group of Forces; CentralGroup of Forces), equipped with stationary, complex communicationsystems. In principle, the Soviets never used facilities of thetSWP armed forces.

Exercise management posts were provided only with office-typeequipment. Usually, spaces were designated in installationsvacated by the local personnel for the compact management group andorganizational staff elements. One of the largest areas at themanagement site was usually occupied by the operational team of thestaff. In this area, decisions of those exercising were followedand analyzed on the spot, as were the impacts of these decisionsand the preparation of the most important decisions concerningfurther conduct of the exercise. At this. location was a huge work-map, on which all of the important data concerning the conduct ofthe exercise were posted. The Soviets usually used a normal map,colored pencils and color markers (or at times fluorescentpaints). The Germans and the Czechs used maps with magnetichacking, which allowed unrestricted movement of drawings andtactical symbols. The Poles used special stands with maps coveredwith transparent material, which facilitated a rapid depiction ofthe up-to-date situation.

A communications center normally was deployed in the- ---- vicinityof-the Managemen.t Post..This center was linked to the

stationary communications system of the Ministry of National- --- -Defense. Special connections to the classified Soviet governmentcommunications system on high frequency ("W. Cz") and securemilitary communications ("Ti") were attached to the command postsof front, armies, branches of armed forces and the militarydistricts, for the purpose of directing an exercise. The securemilitary communications system was. linked to one headquartersechelon below (i.e., as low as division). In addition,enciphering stations and special field post office nets also weredeployed. Management command posts did not have their owncomputer center, but were connected by special data transmissioncables to the central computer centers of the Ministry ofNational Defense.

Role-playing groups which played the roles of elementssubordinated-to those exercising in the front exercises of thePolish Armed Forces were normally deployed n the vicinity of themanagement post. Security usually was beefed up around eachmanagement post. The entire installation was protected byincreased guard posts and specialized posts for the protection ofspecific work and administrative areas. Often, within a radiusof several kilometers around the management post, militarypatrols and patrols of counterintelligence personnel in civilianclothing were deployed. Military traffic control personnel alsowere deployed on access roads. All personnel of the management

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post were provided with special passes authorizing entry to theinstallation and its specific components.

C. HOW WERE EXERCISES STARTED?

The beginning of nearly all exercises was preceded bytraining briefings by the most important functional personnelinvolved in the management of an exercise, such as the chief oforganizational elements of the management staff, chief umpires,chiefs of simulation groups, role-playing groups, inspection andcontrol groups, research groups, etc. Briefings were conductedjust prior to the beginning of exercises in order to retainsecrecy of exercise premises. At these pre-exercise sessions,participants were informed about the "Leading Thought of theExercise" and the framework of its conduct. In addition,specific, detailed instructions for action and necessarydocumentation were issued. After the briefing, the participantsmoved directly to designated units or their places of work.

In principle, all exercises began routinely, with theintroduction into the exercising elements of a higher state of-combat readiness and conversion of the units from peacetime towartime_structure. In front and army exercises, this conversionwas especially necessary, since in the peacetime structur-e- ofthe _armed forces of the Warsaw Pact (with certain exceptions inSoviet forces), some elements did not exist, for all. practicalpurposes, but were to be formed only in the time of threat withinthe framework of deployment of the wartime command system. Inreality, every national armed force of the Warsaw Pact had theirown specific procepyres for conversion from peacetime to wartimecommand structure. In Poland, three stationary command posts ofthe Mjlistry of National Defense were formed, (PPWCP, CP-1, andCP-2) based on the peacetime structure of the Centralinstitutions of the Ministry of National Defense, as well as theCommand and Staff of the 1 ront, in three mobile field commandposts (CP, ACP and RCP).

17 See Annex 2: Diagram of Conversion of Polish Command System From Peace toWar.

18 PPW - Command Post at the present place of work. (Polish: DMP).CP-1 and CP-2 - Cowhand Posts 1 and 2.(Polish: SD-I and SD-2).

19 CP - Command Post (Polish: SD).ACP - Alternate Cohanrd Post (Polish: WSD).RCP - Rear Comand Post (Polish: TSD).

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At the same time, .on the basis of peacetime militarydistricts, appropriate commands of combined-arms armies wereformed, as well as three mobile field command posts for each army(CP; ACP; RCP), and respective commands of wartime militarydistricts (three stationary CPs, similar to the Ministry ofNational Defense in each military district). The command forPoland's peacetime air forces detached from itself a command for

- an air army, (after 1980, the "Command of Front air forces"),three CPs. and the Office of the Wartime CTiFefof Aviation -Support, which were included in the CP of the Ministry -ofNational Defense.

In the USSR, commands of military districts transformedthemselves into the commands of fronts and into wartime militarydistricts. in the GDR, based on the military districts, commandsof corps and headquarters of wartime military districts wereformed. In Czechoslovakia, the Front headquarters was formedfrom the Western Military District headquarters.

Forming of the wartime command structure for exercisepurposes took place in principle in accordance with actual plansand principally under exclusive control of special organizational-TO&E cells of general staffs (in Poland, the responsible office

- - was the-Department-of Combat Readiness and Command of theOperational Directorate of the Polish General Staff)^.-- - ---

Wartime command organs at the operational-tactical level ofthe armed forces of the USSR, GOR and probably Czechoslovakia.were, in principle, deployed in hardened command postsconstructed near their permanent peacetime locations. After acertain time period (usually, after the end of operationalplanning), the command elements were moved from these sites tothe exercise areas. The Poles, who did not have at theirdisposal appropriate permanent structures, deployed the newlyformed command organs directly into the exercise areas. if theexercise commenced by an updating of the exercise operationalplan, or by a complete replanning of the operation, then some ofthe personnel--along with the Front or army commander--remainedat the site of permanent location until the end of the planningprocess, at which time they were transferred by air (aircraft orhelicopter) to the field command post deployed in the exercisearea.

Usually, following deployment of the wartime command system(sometimes parallel with its deployment), full combat readinesswould be ordered for the exercising units. Reaching full combatreadiness took place by various methods: selectivel, byselected groupings of units, or by all exercising unitssimultaneously; graduall (in secret), or in general alertform, In every case, however, occupation of the alert areas

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foreseen by real plans or actual mobilization areas was strictlyforbidden. Units deployed for exercises, as a rule, were.subjected to "Peacetime Limitations," based on the principle thatthe commander who ordered a full combat readiness defined certainundertakings which were foreseen by the plans but which did notneed to be implemented. For instance: Do not take along yoursupplies of "iron reserves" (Reserves of vehicles, equipment, orsupplies "untouchable" except in wartime); do not call reservepersonnel and transportation means to active duty; do not takealong wartime reserves of technical-material means, ,etc.

D. HOW WAS THE EXCHANGE (ROUTING) OF DATA ORGANIZED IN LARGESKELETAL EXERCISES? DID THE MANAGEMENT OF EXERCISES ANlEXERCISING ELEMENTS USE THE SAME COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMSAND COMMAND PROCEDURES WHICH WERE FORESEEN FOR WARTIME?

Arrangements of communications systems for command andmanagement, as well as the circulation of data in exercises wereaimed at two, in a tense mutually exclusive, goals. The firstwas the use of typical systems, management procedures and commandprocedures approximating actual crisis or wartime conditions,with the intention of their verification and improvement. Thesecond goal was the concealment of these real systems andprocedures from identification by the NATO side.

As a result, actual command communications systems andprocedures -were used mainly in instances which guaranteed theirprotection against the opponent (NATO). or when other solutionsmade circulation of data necessary for the conduct of theexercise impossible.

At the time of the conversion of exercise elements frompeacetime to wartime footing, stationary communications systemsof the NSWP defense ministr es and of the CAF of the Warsaw Pactwere used, along with the actual procedures to be applied in suchsituations. In exercises organized by the Polish Ministry ofDefense, alert signals designed for increased state of combatreadiness were not transmitted via the management organs of theexercise (umpires; inspection-control groups), but rather via theOperational Duty Service of the General Staff, acting accordingto the exercise plan and using an automated alert system-"TESA-Tg": a telegraphic system). For the purpose of securityprotection of the alert processes from the opponent (NATO),telephonic or radio ("MIRT") components of the complex alertsystem were never used.

In joint exercises organized by the Combined Command of theCAF and the Soviet Ministry of Defense, procedures were the same,with the exception that the Operational Duty Service of thePolish General Staff acted merely as an intermediary in the

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transmittal of signals originating with the Soviet General staff.

During the period of operational planning (usually duringthe first one or two days), the most important content of anexercise was played in closed, controlled conditions, withmaxiumum restrictions on the use of technical communicationsmeans. Nearly all data necessary for operational planning werehanded by the umpires to those exercising in writing, in the formof premises. In exceptional instances, some supplementary (orless important) information was transmitted by code. Submissionof the decisions of those exercising (operational plans), as wellas the transmittal of tasks (directives and orders) to lowerechelons took place exclusively via personal contacts, or in theform of. documents transmitted via a special field post office.

During the play of the dynamics of an operation, theexercising commands and staffs directed the dynamics of theactivities based on the operational plans prepared by them andapproved by higher echelons (in the case of fronts, by playingthe role of ge C1!NC of the Western Theater of MilitaryOperations).

At operational levels (i.e., front and army), these planswere updated or amended with the "development of the situation atthe_.front," usuallyonce every 24 hours. ._.This__"development ofthe situation at the front," based on a previously preparedscenario, was created-by the exercise management staff and passedto the players via umpires and role-playing groups, and also viatransmittal of additional tasks to those exercising. (Aconceptual scheme of the data circulating system in a two-level,front-army skeletal exercise is shown at Annex 3.) -

The informational data circulating system for Soviet andNSWP exercises was basically the same; differences concerned onlythe deployment of the role-playing groups. According to theSoviet method (illustrated by the diagram at Annex 4), the role-playing groups were deployed in the vicinity o.f exercisingelements. These groups usually had at their disposal rathermodest communications means (most frequently, cable), via whichthey exchanged data with exercising commands and staffs. Theydid not, however, maintain constant contact .with the exercisemanagement staff. If any changes occurred in-the plan of thedynamics of operation (action), the leaders of the role-playing

20 The plans for the initial front operation, encompassing actiotrat the- depth of 600-700 km, were intended for 12-14 days. The front operation

included two army-type operations, each encompassing action at the depth of300-400 km, conducted during 6-7 days.

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groups were called in by the management staff and given newinstructions for play.

According to the Polish method (illustrated in the diagramat Annex S), the role-playing groups were located in the area ofthe Management Post, where they were directed by personalcontacts and on a current basis. As with the Soviet variant, therole-playing groups had limited communications means (usually,the classified "Ti" system) via which they received orders foraction from the exercising commands and submitted combat reportsfrom the "field of hattle" to these commands.

In theory, for the period of the play of the operationaldynamics, all exercising elements had the same command andcontrol communications systems deployed and active which theywould have at their disposal in wartime. Using these systems forexchange of data was, however, limited by numerousrestrictions. Technical limitations based on the use of onlydesignated radio frequency hands, as well as the appropriateselection of means which should be used at any given movement forthe transmittal of data were the responsibility of communicationselements. Further, users of the communications systems weresubjected to other limitations, based on the stringent criteria

-for selection. .of data which couldbe transmitted via technicalcommunications means. All data related to the exercise were- - ---considered "Secret," and could not be transmitted in the clear.Important data could be transmitted only via the Sovietgovernment 1assified communications cable net "Wcz" (highfrequency), or via encoded messages. In less vital instances,the military classified telephone communications system "Ti"could be used.

Classified command methods (signal tables, coded maps, etc.)were required when using non-secure communications.Communications and counterintelligence organs strictly monitoredadherence to security principles and, in instances of violations,offenders were subjected to disciplinary action.

Fear about disclosure of classified information, the burdenof the use of complicated methods of classified communicationsand the lack of familiarity with the use of technicalcommunications means created an organic hesitancy among thecommand and staff personnel about using those means, especially

21 High frequency transmissions via cable (Wcz) were considered secure, sincethe system precluded release of signals into the air. Telephone equipmentused for this communications system had to be placed on another desk away fromother telephones.

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radio. Despite official pressure to use the TOE means ofcommunications, users at all levels were reluctant to do so.According to estimates by the Polish General Staff, it appearedthat in two-level (front-army) skeletal exercises, the level ouse of the technical means of communications for data exchangez2was:

- In communication between e management staff and theFront, about 3-5 percent.

- In commu cation between the Front and armies, 5-10percent.

- In communication between armies an ,their tacticalelements and units, ?5-20 percent.

The highest use, reaching 80-90 percent use ofcommunications systems, was noted between exercising staffs andthe actual units or their substitutes, the role-playing groups.

Another factor in the low level of use of the technicalcommunications means was the very type of skeletal exercises inwhich the greatest attention was paid not so much to the

- - - - commanding--of forces (which, as-a rule_.either were _not_ thereat ___all, or were present in limited numbers), but to the process ofmaking decisions. These processes were analyzed and evaluated,chiefly on the basis of personal contact at the field commandposts. The compact exercise management team devoted up to 90percent of its time to this effort, listening to reports ofvarious functional personalities of exercising staffs(reconnaissance and operational elements, arms of troops andservices, etc.), presented on the subject of their estimate ofthe situation, as well as recommendations for commander'sdecision and the final decisions of the commanders.

In sum, the principle exchange of data in command and staffand skeletal exercises, even during the play of the operationaldynamics, took place via personal contacts and exchange ofwritten documents, with only an insignificant part via technicalcommunications means.

22 Data from memory.

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VI. EVALUATION OF EXERCISES

A. HOW ARE EXERCISES EVALUATED? BY WHOM?

Evaluation of exercises was one of the most important tasksfaced by the management of the exercises. The process consistedof evaluations of activities of those exercising in the contextof the challenges by the potentia'l opponent (NATO', and thepossibility of meeting these challenges by those exercising.Evaluations also included assessment of the application ofrequired doctrinal norms and principles by those exercising.Evaluations of the effectiveness and efficiency of friendly(Pact) armaments systems and technology were avoided.

In tactical and operational-tactical exercises with troops,an evaluation presented no significant difficulties, since theresults of the activities of the units could not only he observedbut frequently measured, using the mandatory effectiveness andefficiency norms of tactical combat. Criteria of evaluationsbased on these norms were established for nearly all spheres ofmilitary art, beginning with alert departure from permanentlocations, through the crossing/forcing of water obstacles, tothe firing of various types of weapons, and air bombardments.Preparation of summary evaluations of certain exercises wasguided by mandatory instructions for the conduct of-inspections -- - --and by control headquarters.

Evaluations of command and staff and skeletal exercises weremore complicated. In such cases, evaluation depended ondifficult-to-assess talents of all staff teams and commanders in

i ~ the fields of planning, organization, and .conduct of contemporaryoperations. In this respect, there were no established methods;every organizer of an exercise approached this task in adifferent manner, attempting to gather as many facts as possiblefor the formulation of exercise evaluation.

The most frequently used methods of gathering informationfor exercise evaluation were:

- Constant, direct observation of the activities ofexercise elements in various combat-like situations.

- Analysis and critique of exercise decisions.

- Empirical research of selected command problems.

Observations and feelings of the compact management of anexercise were of decisive significance. An exercise manager andhis deputies, including the chief of staff,. devoted 80 to 90percent of their time (about 12-15 hours daily) to visiting units

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of those commands and staffs which were exercising. Dluring suc.hvisits they listened to reports and briefings from the mostimportant fudlctional personnel. (intelligence; operational; armsof troops and services; technical and quartermaster rear) aboutthe subject of evaluation of disposition and proposals fordecisions, as well as the final decisions of commanders. It wasa general rule that each exercising element be subjected to suchan examination at least once, and often two or three times,during the exercise. Umpires conducted constant, round-the-clockobservation of all exercising elements and presented the results -of their perceptions to the management of the exercise in theirdaily and summary reports at the end of the exercise.

Analysis of the decisions taken by the exercise players wasthe responsibility of the management staff. These analyses wereprepared usually on a 24-hour cycle, and were based on a dailyoperational report (sent by the exercising staffs) and reports ofthe umpires. Analyses of the decisions of those exercising,along with its critique, were presented to the compact exercisemanagement during the daily briefings at the end of each exerciseday.

The so-called "designated forces" and role-playing groupswere chiefly used for empirical research. "Designated forces"were symbolic units; however, they also were consideredrepresent-atlive units,-by--means -of-wh-i-ch--a-study of the- _ ____ _implementation of decisions undertaken at the high level (front;army) could be made. Thus, for instance, for analysis andevaluation of command via front- and army-level of nuclear means,the role of "designated forcesF could be played by elements ofone or several operational-tactical brigades .(i.e., one firingbattery and one technical battery), a portion of one technicalfield rocket base (one or two technological elements), as well asa command and staff element of one armored or mechanized divisionwith its organic unit of tactical rockets. Unit umpires wereassigned to all elements of "designated forces," with the maintask of following what kind of orders reach the implementingelements and how thes.e orders were carried out.

The function of the role-playing groups in empirical-- research was significantly smaller. Even so, they were a good

source of information about which orders for the exercisingcomands and staffs were transmitted to the subordinate forces,when these orders arrived, and how quickly and in what way theexercise players reacted to the situations arising on the fieldof battle. Managers of role-playing groups were required topresent reports of this type to the exercise management.

An overall and final evaluation of exercises was theresponsibility of managers of.these exercises. They did thisafter the completion of exercises, at special summary critiques,

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with the participation of the management cadre of tne exercisinyelements and invited quests, amnony whom often were tne FirstSecretaries of the Party and other Party and governmentdignitaries. The formal character of the summation was notwithout influence upon the content of announced evaluations. Inmost instances, the summations were subordinated to politicalpropaganda goals and many objectively factual observations,gathered with great difficulty (especially the negative aspectsof exercises), were never brought up. Summaries (evaluations) of.exercises were routinely published in classified specialinformation bulletins, or in special publications dedicated tospecific types of exercises, with a recommendation for commandersto take advantage of such miterials in the process of training oftneir forces. Certain evaluations of exercises, usuallysupported by observations conducted by the representatives of thePact's Combined Command, were reflected in the directive of theCAF CINC for training for the subsequent training year. Shortreviews of exercises, based on the same principles, werepublished in the "Review of Staff and Technical Committee of CAF"(Sbornik shtaba i Technicheskovo Komiteta UbedyinyonnikhVooruzhennikh Si). -

B. WERE THE EXERCISES EVER HALTED, TO REPEAT THEM ONCEMORE, IN ORDER TO REACH A CORRECT RESULT, UR TO PROVIDEINSTRUCTION TO THOSE TAKING PART?

At the level of sub-units, i.e., up to and includingbattalion, this was one of the typical and frequently usedmethods of training. Once in a while, certain episodes ofregimental exercises were halted and repeated once more. At thetactical level (i.e., division), such reruns were implementedprobably only during the time frame of preparation for Pactexercises of the "$H'CHIT" (Shield) type. These exercises.despite a great-to-do about them, were. not exercises but ratheran assembly, calculated for demonstrative show. For these showsto appear in their best light, certain segments had to berehearsed many times.

There were no known Instances of halting and repeatingoperational-tactical exercises at the levels of front, army, orbranch of services. In case of shortcomings or weaknesses in thework of exercising commands and staffs at those levels, managerslimited the matter to a reprimand, recommending correction ofdeficiencies by a designated date. In more glaring cases--errorson a large scale, or derelictions--the exercise would belengthened, including in its scenario some additional, repetitivetype of episodes. Between 1964 and 1981, there were two suchinstances known. The first was during a joint front exercise"NAREW-64," when an accidental firing of three operational-tactical rockets with 'theoretically" armed nuclear warheadsoccurred because of an error in signals. The angry manager-of

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the exercise, Polisn Marshal SPYCHALSKI, on that occasionextended the duration of the exercise by 48 hours, and cnanyeuthe previously prepared scenarios completely. The secondinstance took place seven years later, during the "LATU-71"exercise. On the last day of the exercise, in the euphoria ofsuccess, the exercising commands had beyun to stand down, havinghalted the commanding of subordinate forces and begunpreparations for return to the barracks. Also in this instance,the manager of the exercise (General JARUZELSKI) extended theduration of the exercise by one day, during which he recommendeda replay of one additional episode of planning of successiveoperations, which was quite onerous for those exercising. Therewere nn known instances of similar cases in Soviet exercises.

C. WERE SOME EXERCISES CONSIDEREU AS AN OPERATIONALEVALUATION OF UNITS AND COMMANDERS? WERE THEY EVERMANIPULATEU Iu ASSURE SOMEONE'S FAILURE OR SUCCESS?WHAT HAPPENED TO THOSE WHO FAILED INSPECTIONS?

Tactical and operational-tactical exercises were consideredas the highest verifier of combat effectiveness of units,tactical elements and operational-tactical (as well asoperational) maturity of their commanders and staffs.Evaluations resulting from such exercises, next to inspection andcoinplex-control -evaluations, were-the-basis-of-the-combat --- ------- - -characteristics of a unit. These evaluations were entered intothe chronicles of a unit, and were included in personalperformance ratings of commanders and chiefs of staff.

Behind political-Party activities, exercises were the secondmost important basis for selection of command cadres. There weretens of examples of shining military careers begun or acceleratedjust by exercises, or reverse examples when exercises were thebeginning of the end of a career of commanders who were notalways bad or untalented. Rises and falls of careers had,however, nothing to do with the arrangements of exercises fromthe standpoint of someone's purposeful failure or success.Though such eventualities are difficult to exclude,. in general,exercises were primarily (if not exclusively) arranged from thestandpoint of aims and training tasks. On the basis of- eachnormally programmed exercise, however, it was possible to arrangesomeone's success or failure, and this was a frequent practice.If one wanted to help or promote someone (and this happened mostoften), then he was simply briefed on the scenario of anexercise, informed when and how he should undertake a decision,and (not infrequently) prepared studies were provided to himwhich he had to remember by rote and implement during theexercises. This practice occurred actually on all levels,although most often in situations in which commanders wanted tosupport their preferred candidate for approval for a higher levelpost, or for the first general-officer rank. The autnor of this

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study is aware of at least more tnan 10 instances in wnicn tnechiefs of operational units of military districts and brancnes ofarmed forces prepared, as the.authors of exercises and at the 'recommendation of their commanders, prearranged successes--nearlyalways with intended results--for the candidates for divisioncommand and for the rank of brigadier general. The autnor ofthis study, as the author of many exercises, was himself thebeneficiary of many such similar "honors," pre-ariny at therecommendations of his superiors successes for certainpersonalities of the central level, military districts, andbranches of armed forces.

Cases of arranyed failures for someone were a rareoccurrence. If something of this sort did take place, then itsufficed simply to order an exercise or to conduct an u nexpectedinspection, and the rest was taken care of by more demanding andoften one-sided criteria of evaluation. Tne first negative(unsatisfactory) evaluation during an inspection test usuallyresulted in some form of reprimand, with a recommendation tocorrect deficiencies in a prescribed period of time. If, durinthe next inspection an unsatisfactory rating was repeated, thecommander was transferred to a lower duty position, most otten inmilitary training or in the forces of the territorial defense.

D. WHEN SOVIET AUTHORITIES EVALUATEU EAST EUKUPEANPERFIRkMANCE, 1HUW SPECIFIC WERE SOVIET ~REMAKKS? - -- - - -D[D THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES EVALUATE PERFORMANCEAT THE LEVEL OF REGIMENTS OR LOWER?

The most typical instances in which the Soviets evaluatedperformances (state of combat readiness for war tasks) of theirallies were:

- Inspections and control.

- Joint exercises, organized by the Soviet side.

- Summaries of a training year of the Combined ArmedForces of the Warsaw Pact.

In each category, the means of evaluation, the character of the -content, and the remarks differed substantially.

During an inspection and control, the Soviet side (theCombined Command) selected specific, representative units. Forground forces, for instance, the representative units might havebeen command and stiff elements of one peacetimes.militarydistrict, one armored or mechanized division, one artillerybrigade, and several independent units of types of armed troops(engineering, antiaircraft, chemical, etc.). In all units,combat readiness and mobilization readiness were routinely

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checked and evaluated separately, as were the morale-politicalstate, combat and technical training, and knowledge about foreignforces, etc. A decisive factor in an evaluation was theexecution, within the framework of an inspection exercise, of atactical task typical for the specific unit (e.g., for an armoreddivision--an attack from a marcn with a water barrier crossing;for a brigade or an engineering regiment--construction of acrossing bridge or ferry-crossing, etc.).

For each inspected unit, separate reports were prepared.These reports contained a detailed analysis of the state ofinspected activities and their evaluations on a five-point scale,a final suiniary evaluation .for each unit, and post-inspectionrecommendations.

During the critique of joint Warsaw Pact exercises, theSoviets usual ly focused their rema.rks on the reso lutionofproblems during the exercises rather than on the evaluation ofspecific allies or specific levels of command.

In front- and army-level exercises, the most frequentlycritiqued problems were:

- Conversion of armed forces from peacetime to wartime anddeployment of command systems.-

- Planning of an operation.

- Deployment of strategic, operational-tactical and combatgroupings in the Theaters of Military Operations inspecific operational directions, with special emphasis onredeployment of forces over large distances, underconditions of strong enemy reaction from the air.

- Conduct of electronic warfare.

- Conduct of air and air defense operations.

- Movement to offensive (attack) operations on selected axes,and seizing of the initiative in the whole sector ofaction.

- Cooperation among various branches of armed forces, andarms of troops and services.

- Organization for a breakthrough of prepared enemy defenses.

- Destruction of surrounded enemy forces.

- Execution of the first mass strike with weapons of massdestruction.

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- Recovery from the effects of mass destruction weapons.

- Development of offensive (attack) operations unoerconditions of two-sided use of nuclear and chemicalweapons.

- Work by staffs in various operational and combatsituations.

Specific problems were critiqued in relation to situationsplayed, chiefly in the context of challenges on the part ofNIATO. In addition, evaluators critiqued the reactions of thoseexercising to such challenges, their decisions, as well as meansof implementation through various exercising levels, often invertical arrangement (from the highest to the lowest level), andhorizontal (examples of resolutions of the same problems uyvarious elements of the same level, i.e., various armies ord ivisions).

In the Soviet system of analysis and evaluation of EastEuropean performances, the most important element was the annual,official summary of the traininq year of the Combined ArmedForces. this summary was presented by the CIt6 of the the CAF inhis briefing at the meeting of the Pact Military Council, and wasincluded in the written "Directive of the CINC for the Training

- of CAF," issued at the same time. ---- -- -- - ---- - - - -

The briefings of the CAF CINC and his directives containedon one side the synthetic evaluations of training gains for thepast year; on the other, tasks for the coming year. Evaluationsand tasks in specific training areas (for instance, combat andmobilization readiness, training of generals and officers,training of ground and air forces, air defense, fleets, rear,etc.) made reference to the Combined Armed Forces as a whole, andnot to particular national armies. At times, if one of the NSWParmies distinguished itself by a particular achievement, the casewould be mentioned by name. If the Soviets wanted to point outsomeone's shortcomings or weaknesses, they did this in animpersonal fashion, hoping that the addressee would recognizehimself. The Soviets specifically criticized only the Romanians,mainly Romanian isolationism, which in the Soviet perception madeappropriate play of assets and forces of air defense of thesouthwestern flank of the Warsaw Pact impossible.

E. WHAT ROLE DID SOVIET EVALUAT.I0NS PLAY? HOW 010 THEGENERAL STAFFS REACT TO POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE SOVIETEVALUATION?

Everything depended on the general attitude of the Sovietstoward the specific countries, and sometimes toward functional

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personalities. The Romanians never agreed with the sovietevaluations and seemed to ignore them totally. The tBul garians,the Germans and the Czechs--although for different reasons--accepted (nearly blindly) all that originated with the Soviets.The Poles and the Hungarians listened with attention and nodded,then reacted in a fashion most convenient for them.

In Poland, one of the most serious concerns was the resultof inspections and controls. Comments included in inspectionreports were carefully studied by the leaders of the PolishMinistry of National Defense. Often, based on these comments,the Polish General Staff prepared a central plan to correct theshortcomings and deficiencies. Units which were weaker wereparticularly singled out. Certain post-inspection conclusionsand recommendations which the Polisn General Starr coniside're!dproper and purposeful would be integrated into the Ministry ',rNational Defense training order, or their inclusion ,oria s"recommended for training directives of the conuIanrrrs" or Iilitarydistricts and branches of armed forces.

The critique of Warsaw Pact exercises was treated by tnePolish General Staff as the most authoritative, latest exampl~ urSoviet war doctrine which was to be adopted oy the Polisn arreUForces. Soviet remarks, however, were approacned with

_ __ _ flexibility. Comments_and suggestions-which-did__notreguir_e_-- ____considerable financial expenditures and which could beimplemented within the framework of the existing organizationalstructures generally were accepted without reservation, andattempts were made to satisfy Soviet demands.

In instances which resulted in more significant ecunonicburdens or deeper structural changes of the armed forces, a wait-and-see attitude was usually adopted. If the Soviets exertedsubsequent pressure, the Polish General Staff presented the case.with appropriate recommendations, for decision by the Minister ofNational Defense, or at times by the Prime Minister of the PolishGovernment or the Committee of National Defense. There are manysuch examples. One such case involved the issue of methods ofdevelopment of the wartime command system of armies and thePolish Front. After 1977, on every possible occasion butespeciaTy during exercises, the Soviets reproached the Polesthat they were improperly deploying the wartime command system ofthese elements. Their- reservations concerned two issues. First.they were against the Polish practice of the- formation anddeployment of command and staff elements of the Front from tneCentral Institutions of the Ministry of Defense. The Sovietsconsidered that this wartime front organ should be formed in afashion similar to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia; that is,from one of the military districts.

The second issue concerned the site of wartime deployment of

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the Polish Front and its armies. According to the Soviets,commands and staffs of the Front and armies should haveconstructed, in the vicinity of their peacetime locations,permanent, hardened command posts equipped with command andcommunications means which could be rapidly manned by properpersonnel and could take over the command of forces. The Poleswere reluctant to become involved~in an expensive program which,in their opinion, would he of little use in wartime. Therefore,they formed the command posts near the sites of the permanentlocation, but with anobile means (chiefly combat -command vehiclesand staff hoses), and immediately deployed into operationald irect i ois.-

Despite the obvious weakness of the Polish solution, priorto late 1981, at least, the Polish General Staff successfullyresisted Soviet pressure, and Stuck to its solution.

Another example concerned Soviet sugyestions for the wartimeformation and deployment of additional reserve divisions, and areserve command and staff element of an army. The Polish GeneralStaff did not want to ayree to this; nowever, under Sovietpressure, the Poles had to submit the issue for the dec_s_i_o.n_of- - - -_---the pTiie minister, who in this instance took the side of tneUSSR.

Soviet remarks, reported in the summary of the trainingyear were adapted by the Polish General Staff to the conditionso tThe Polish Armed Forces, an'd were included in the mostimportant training documents of the Ministry of National Defense(in the MNU orders for the training of the PAF for the givenyear, and in the plan of the most important training undertakingsof the Polish armed forces). In accepting and implementing.theSoviet evaluations and tasks, the personnel of the Polish GeneralStaff did not, however, evince any great zeal, and it was notunusual to see the greater part (at times 60%-70%) of the Sovietcommands ignored completely.

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VII. VIEW FROM THE .WEST

A. HOW QUICKLY COULD A PACT EXERCISE BE PREPARED TO HIDE ACTUALOPERATIONAL ACTIVITY (E.G., AN INVASION OF IRAN OR'ROMANIA)?WOULD THERE RE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THIS AND LONG-TERM PLANNINGEXERCISES? WOULD PLANS OF PREVIOUS EXERCISES BE AVAILABLE TOREPEAT A FALSE EXERCISE. OR TO ACCELERATE PLANNING?

If the organizer and the chief planner of an invasion, theSoviet General Staff, considered such an exercise necessary for anyreason, then preparation would not.take too much time, either toplan an invasion (if such a plan were not already on hand) or toreview or update an existing plan. Fror previous experience, itwould seem very unlikely that any central exercises would beprepared in conjunction with an invasion plan. Instead of justone, we would certainly have to consider a range of false,simulated, demonstrative and also real exercises being prepared byvarious elements of the invasion forces, subordinated to the aimsof invasion.

Viewed chronolonically, these could be:

1. False exercises, under the cover of which units would bebrought up to wartime level, or to the level definedby an invasion - - -

plan, and the ultimate adjustnent of their structure of armament.and equipment for the expected tasks.

Taking into consideration the peacetime manning levels ofSoviet units stationed in the USSR as well as units of other forcesof the Warsaw Pact which could be used in an invasion, one shouldexpect that 30 percent would be needed to provide required manpowerin the ground forces alone. Depending on needs, this bringing upto the desired strength level could take place by shiftingpersonnel from one unit to another, by calling up reserves forexercises or for training, or even by a partially hiddenmobilization. The possibility also exists that the Soviets coulduse a combination of these means. For the purpose of avoidingpublicity and in order to keep the operation hidden for as long aspossible, there probably would be no preparations for centralexercises. Replenishment and eventual reorganization of invasion -units would be entrusted to the commanders of Soviet military.districts and to the national commands of Warsaw Pact states(should they be required to provide forces for invasion), who wouldexecute the operations under the cover of local, routineexercises. The use of exercises as a pretext does not limit theoperation to exercises of any kind prepared or conducted at thelevel of military districts or the national commands. In 1968,during Pact preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia, thefirst echelon of the intervention forces assigned from the PolishPeople's Republic was built up to around 90 percent strength by the

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transfer of personnel from other units, with only 10 percent comingfrom the cal l-up of reserves for exercises. The buildup of thePolish intervention forces (an army composed of two divisions) tookplace under a pretext of exercises, though no exercises actuallywere prepared and conducted for this purpose. The buildup of thesecond echelon, by means of reserve call-up, was begun at themovement of the entry of Warsaw Pact forces into Czechoslovakia.This second-echelon build-up, however, was suspended in view of therapid success of the invasion.

2. Practical ("OJT type") exercises of invasion units,replenisned to a new personnel level or flesned out bymobilization.

According to Soviet training doctrine, newly fleshed outunits, upgraded by mobilization or via reorganization of otherunits, should undergo a brief cycle of practical, JJi trainingexercises, from the lowest level up through division. Only aftersuch a division-level exercise was a unit considered fit forcombat. These exercises were conducted in military training areas,and their duration depended on the situation. On an average, theywere conducted for periods of time ranging from 24 hours up to afewdays. These exercises were organized at division level.Exercises of specific units were conducted by their actualcommanders, and in accordance with their own plans, with centraland intermediate levels exercising only general supervision.

3. Actual training exercises and training for .the preparationof invasipn forces to execute planned tasks.

If there were enough time, the invasion forces would besubjected to political indoctrination, and would undergo specialtraining and exercises preparatory to action under conditions whichthey might encounter during the invasion. The program for thistype of training and exercises would be centrally prepared,although implementation would be entrusted to lower levels. Fromdata which seeped into the Polish General Staff, it appeared thatthe Soviets in 1979 were preparing their units for the invasion ofAfghanistan for about two months. The exercises took place in manymilitary training areas located in the Ukraine and in the AsiaticRepublics of the USSR.

4. False exercises under cover of which the invasion forcesare re rouped and take over convenient border transit positions foroperat ons, and in favorable conditions can even enter theterritory of the country which is the target of invasion orintervent on.

Such operational activities probably would oe conducted underthe pretext of one or several typical exercises for a given Theater

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of Military Operations. In the event of an invasion of Ponania -!rany other Warsaw Pact state, the. pretext of "SOYUZ' or "SHIELP"exercises could be used, which even in this instance would notsignify that such an exercise actually would be preoared andconducted.

Despite the fact that he himself was involved in the planningand command center of the 1968 Pact- invasion of Czechoslovakia, theauthor of this report could not recall whether either the chieforganizer of this invasion, the General Staff of the Soviet ArmedForces, or the operational command headed by Soviet MarshalYakuhovsky had any exercise prepared for this specific purpose. Inthat instance, in order to keep the waiting operational forcesbusy, the Legnica group of Marshal Yakubovsky prepared ad hoc, day-to-day directives and exercise tasks, the implementation of whichwas never subsequently controlled. During that period no one, fronthe highest level down to the middle command level, wanted tobecone seriously involved with exercises which were basically usedto mark time. In those hours in 1968, the center of attention wa 3focused on the other problems: How to conduct operation "DANIIIEf 3most effectively? How to neutralize the small but well-armed andwell-equipped Czechoslovak army? Where actually were theCzechoslovak units located? How would they react to the entry ofWarsaw Pact forces? How to treat the restless civilian population?

The scenario of false exercises of the Warsaw Pact forces of1968 was supposed to have been repeated, in a somewhat improvedfashion, during the period of the socio-political crisis in Polandin 1980. The improvement consisted chiefly of the fact that theentry of some 15 Warsaw Pact divisions into Poland was simply to becalled the "SOYUZ-1980" exercise. The only information regardingthis exercise which the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forcestransmitted to the Polish military leadership (on 1 December 1980)was an approximate composition of the invasion forces, the time ofreadiness to cross the eastern, southern, and western borders ofPoland, and the regions of Poland designated for their operations.

The examples given here are useful comparisons, as both theCzechoslovak regime of DUBCEK and the Polish duet of KANIA-JARUZELSKI evinced virtually no indications of decisiveresistance. On the other hand, in the event of a Pact invasion ofRomania the USSR would have to expect a simllar reaction to the oneencountered in 1956 in Hungary. Such expectations would tend tomake the Soviets more careful, and probably would drive them to do abetter job of camouflaging preparations for a move against Romania.

23 The invasion of Czechoslovakia was conducted under the code name "DANUBE.

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In the event of an invasion of Iran, the Soviet Union wouldihave to act in an entirely different manner, primarily becausethey would have to deal not so much with a short-term invasionbut rather with a classical local war, in which the .element ofsurprise could well play a key role. They would probably have towork harder at camouflaging invasion preparations, in order tomake the idea of an ongoing exercise believable.

5. Exercises of the operational camouflage type.

For the purpose of confusing the picture of a plannedinvasion, in addition to other forms of operational camouflayeand disinformation, exercises of an operational camouflage typealso could be conducted. Such exercises could oe organized andconducted along similar lines to large command and start andskeleton-type exercises--using either forces and communicationsmeans especially organized and deployed for that purpose ororganic resources of the invasion forces tnemselves. A classi.example of the latter solution was exercise "EFI-b,"implemented just before the August 19bd invasion ofCzechoslovakia. As mentioned earlier, the chief aim or the"EF1R-68" exercise was to demonstrate a greater concentra.tiun orWarsaw Pact forces than that which actually gathered at tneborders of Czechoslovakia, and to portray the force as

iverwhelming, so that the CzechosToiak army would-se-eno point in ---- - -

resistance. This move also was designed to depriveCzechoslovakia's Party and government leadership of any option or -will to resist.

6. False exercises, under cover of which combat readinessof certain elements of the Soviet Armed Forces and their eventualallies could be increased for a period of time, during which aninvasion could be launched.

Should .an invasion be unsuccessful, or as a contingencyagainst other possibilities, combat readiness of selected Sovietforces of air defense, strategic air forces, fleets, ano groundforces would be raised, along with forces of other Warsaw Pactstates. Prior to the start of the invasion, undertakingsconnected with it would probably be implemented under the pretextof inspections or combat readiness training. It snould wtot oeruled out that, in such an instance, the commands of armed forcesbranches, military districts and-groupings of Soviet farcesoutside of the USSR borders could, at the recommendation of theGeneral Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, prepare some kind ofersatz exercises, to create a pretext for maintaining anincreased level of readiness. -

The package of false, demonstrative, pretended and realexercises presented here certainly does not exhaust all

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possibilities which could precede a Soviet invasion :,.rrinstance, Romania or Iran. Also, it is unlikely that in allconditions and situations, the entire range of exercises wouldtake place, or that the sequence of exercises would coincideprecisely to.the one outlined here.

Pragmatically, the Pact's false exercises would be simplifiedto the maximum. The whole preparation, i.e., the documentary part,could be reduced to several simple, laconic premises, on the basisof which some kind of training tasks for the armed forces matchin-the real operational activities would be formulated. The. exercisesprobably would not contain the routine dynamics and tension, andexercising forces would have nuch more tine on their hands toexecute tasks assigned to then. There would be no umpires assignedto commands, staffs, or units. There also would not ho any role-olaying groups, or any simulations. There also would e an ahsenceof the classical leadership staff of the exercise.

Key differences also could he noticed in the coposition ofparticipating forces. In long-term planning exercises, because of

economic constraints and the restricted capacities of nilitaryfiring ranges, there is a very careful selection of means andforces, counting nearly every tank and every nilitary vehicle. *sa result, routine exercises usually involve chiefly commands and

--- - ----- staffsof--l imited -combat--compos itio-n.-Long-t.erm p.lanning_exerci.ses.which involve more than two divisions in their full combat strengthare a rarity. In false exercises designed to hide preparations forinvasion, one could easily see a large number of units, fullyreinforced, with a large percentage of mobilized reservists. Thesereservists are easily recognized: they are a bit older, and arepermitted to have longer hair, or even moustaches.

For normal exercises, units deploy without combat munitions,and medical support elements are simulated. For invasionpreparations under cover of a fictional exercise, however, unitswould he provided with full allowances of munitions andexplosives. Additionally, it is likely that large numbers .ofmedical personnel and transportation for wounded also would bemobilized. Also, the combat composition of tactical elements(divisions) would be reinforced with a significant number ofhelicopters of various types.

From this structure, however, there could be certain types ofweapons and military equipment which might be excluded. Forinstance, in the event of an invasion of Romania, the surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, heavy field artillery,antiaircraft artillery, bridge construction engineering units,decontamination units, etc., would probably not be required, andwould not accompany the invasion force. .

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In operational camouflage and demonstrative exercises, onewould be able to monitor increased radio traffic and, within this,instances of open-text messages. In false exercises, however,which hide actual operational activity, extremuely tightrestrictions on the use of technical means of communications,

especially radio, would be in effect.

B. WHAT SHOULD A WESTERN OBSERVER KNOW, LOOK FOR, AND BEWARE

OF, B0TH UN THE GROUND ANU IN TECHNICAL COLLECTION OfSIGNALS AND PHOTOGRAPHY?

It would seem that a Western observer should, above all,realize that Warsaw Pact exercises constitute the highest form ofpreparation for war tasxs, and as such could be rich sources ofrelatively reliable data concerning various areas and aspects oftheir preparation. In the reali of exercises, a Western observercan seek answers to nearly all questions which puzzle him, startingwith changes in Soviet war doctrine, the most concrete dataconcerning the .overall concept of armed forces organization andstructure, their armaments and equipment, combat readiness andmobilization systems, command, communicatiuns, and combat as wellas the technical material support up to the most concrete elementsof wartime operational plans. Included in exercise data alsoshould be a wealth of information on tne dispersal of key

-- instailations of strategic -defense si-nif-i-cance, such as -hardened - --

underground command posts, etc.

Among all joint Warsaw Pact exercises, those code-named"ZAPAD" and "SUYUZ" can potentially provide the most authoritativeand complete portrait of Soviet views on ways and means of theconduct of war in Europe. Taking. into consideration pastexperiences, a Western observer should not delude himself that suchexercises will ever be conducted in conformance with actual Pactoperational plans. ie should, however, not simply dismiss thescenarios of such exercises as fictional training, since they doreflect these plans rather faithfully, albeit in distortedrealities of time and space.

Air and anti-air operational concepts, continually beingimproved by the Soviet side, appear in most exercises to closelyapproximate actual plans, as do the concepts of strategicdeployment of the armed forces in the Theaters of MilitaryOperations, their introduction into battle, and the concept ofdeployment of offensive operations with the use of operationalmaneuver groups.

Next to the key doctrinal premises, in the exercises "ZAPAU"and "SOYUZ" a Western observer should seek data concerning thefunctioning of the actual strategic command system of the WarsawPact armed forces. The decisions of the Warsaw Pact states,

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undertaken in ly/9dU, concerning the wartime appointment of asingle (Soviet) Cormmand and (also Soviet) Commanders-in-Chief ofthe Combined Armed Forces in the Theaters of Mili.tary Uperations,left little doubt that tne Soviet leadership will use chiefly"SOYUZ-" and "ZAPAU-type" exercises to work out detailed andprecise prototypes which would be advantageous for them. Among themost important issues which remained unanswered in the 1979/8uwritten agreements, and which lent themselves to a variety ofinterpretations, was the role of the national organs of stateauthority of the NSWP states in the decisions on war and peace, and -the possible participation of their states and armed forces in awar ay inst t:e Countries of NATd.

Going furtner, trlese exercises could certainly provide answersto such questions as: At what moment will the Soviet command take -direct control over tne national arme. torces of the Warsaw Pact,and how wil I the tranformation from the peacetime to wartime stateof readiness take place? Uoes tre management system of increasingthe higher states of comnat readiness of the Combined Armed Forces,established for that purpose unuer the cryptonym "MONUMENT," allowfor any margin of decision for tne national oryans of authority andnational commands?-

"ZAPAU" and "SUYUZ" exercises also could nelp a Westernobserver in.locatiny-the actual underground command posts of theCAF High Commands in the TMJ, planned to be activated-in wartime, -and perhaps even the underground headquarters of the Supreme HighCommand. The first stage of the construction of these super-secretinstallations, implemented under the cryptonym "ALBATROS," wasfinished in the early ly6s, and it appeared from the statements ofthe Soviet military leadership (KULIKOY, GRIBKOV) that these siteswill be partly manned by the personnel who are there on alert dutyin peacetime. There exists, therefore, a considerable probabilitythat in certain phases of "ZAPAO," and especially "SOYUZ"exercises, these installations could be reinforced with additionalpersonnel and included in the command process as a matter of.testing.

Tracing the "ALBATROS" targets, a Western observer shouldconsider that their ultimate inclusion into the command process inpeacetime-can occur only, under conditions of maximum security.Personnel entering these installations will certainly. be carefullyselected, and probably will be exclusively Soviet. The totalnumber of these individuals in the command positions in theTheaters of Military Operations will certainly not exceed adozen. In civilian clothing, they could be moved by air to thenearest airfields (in the Polish People's Republic, most likely -tothe Soviet airbase at BRZEG) and moved thereafter by car or minibus

to their place of work. A similar procedure could be used forvisits to these installations by exercise management personnel.

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There exists a possibility that, during monitoring ofcommunications traffic during "ZAPAU," or especiaiy ")YU,,exercises, Western observers could identify new communicationscenters, and possibly high-level command posts appropriate to thelevel of a Theater of Military Operations connected to thesecenters. From the viewpoint of the author of this study, -tnesecould well be the new command, control and communication systems ofthe headquarters of the TMO, established in 1979/80, thouncertainly deployed in exercises in field conditions which shouldnot be identified with "ALBATROS" installations. If there were anymeans of communication used in the regions of "ALBATkOS"installations, they would most certainly be exclusively Soviethiyh-frequency cable communications, or a more modern system.

Among otner important problems whicn could he tne suhject orresearch in the exercises discussed, (especially in "ZAPAU"exercises), would most certainly be the broadly derined"construction" (BUOUWNICTWO) of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact armedforces. In this regard, attention should be focused as mucn oliorganizational-structural aspects as on arms and equipment. In theopast, tire Soviets used "LAPAU" exercises to signal certain ipartan:structural changes or, as in 19i81, to present their newestdevelopment in the armed forces structure, organization of certaintypes of operational elements, armament and tecnnical equipment. Itwould appear Likely that this trend could well be continues in thefuture. Tracing such issues, a Western observer should beespecially sensitive to an eventual structural merger, first in theSoviet Armed Forces, then possibly also in the remaining Pactarmies, of air forces and troops of air defense, and subordinationof these to the combined-arms commanders at front level.

Such integration processes, signaled by the Soviets in theearly 1980s, were to lead to the elimination of the duplicationof many aspects present in branches of the armed forces. Inreality, observers should look at these changes--withoutdiscounting these motivations--as a trend toward a shift of themain effort of the combined armed forces to the external front,in order to increase their offensive capabilities, especially inthe air space.

With equal diligence, a Western observer should follow thedevelopment of the organic air forces .of combined-arms armies.These armies, initially equipped with helicopters and projectedto be provided also with attack aircraft, (including V/STOL), andthe experimental corps organizational structure foreseen for usein the Western Theater of Military Operations as an operationalmaneuver group of the front, were demonstrated for the first timeby the Soviets during Z b-81,"

It is difficult to predict in which direction the "ZAPAO

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and "SOYUZ" exercises will develop. Many of the senior suvbo tmilitary leaders involved in these exercises in the 19/Us andearly 1980s have passed from the scene. There exists a certainprobability that, despite past and future personnel snifts in theSoviet military leadership, the organizational-methodologicalpremises of "ZAPAO" and "SOYUZ" exercises could change in theirdetails, while the generalities remain the same.

In other areas, somewhat deeper changes are possible, notonly in the personnel sphere but in the organizationalstructure. In conjunction with the establishment of the wartimeSupreme Command and the High Command of Forces in the Theaters ofMilitary Operations, it seems likely that one of these two mostimportant Warsaw Pact exercises (prohably "ZAPA11") could nedevoted to the upgrading of the strategic operational commnand nnthe scale of the European Theater of War. The other exercise(probably "SOYUZ") would likely be limiteo to the level ,t theTheater of Military Operations.

Personnel and structural cnanges will most IkeIjlhave nngreat influence upon the character, operational premises orfrequency of the conduct of such exercises as:

-- Front-level skeletal exercises involving Soviet as wellas otherWarsaw .act nat-ional armies, -with tcn-e-- ---- - -- --- - ---participation of detached Soviet forces.

-- Pact maneuvers of the "TARCZA" (SkilELU) type.

-- Joint tactical exercises of the "DRUZBA" (FRIENUSHIP)type, with the participation of troops in the field.

These exercises all should be treated by Western observers as anexcellent and sufficiently representative basis for keeping trackof changes in the Soviet military doctrine for ground forces fromfront level down to regiment and independent battalion, as wellas oT other branches of armed forces exercising with thesetroops. Observers of these exercises should be able to concludethat the concepts and problem-solving processes observed duringthese exercises are either already. generally accepted within theWarsaw Pact or are the forerunners (by a number of years) of whatwill later apperr in Soviet field manuals or other officialpublications and regulations.

In these exercises. Western observers also should not counton identifying activities which conform to actual operational warplans; however observers should know that.-while exercises ofthe "TARCZA" and "DRUZBA" types are useless in this respect,Soviet and NSWP frontal type exercises could reveal relativelyextensive elementsofthese plans, especially if they are

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analyzed carefully over a period of five to ten years. Observersshould make their analysis in tne context of; and in conjunctionwith, other exercises such as "TRANZYT" (Transit), "VULNA" (Wave)and other operational undertakings such as operationalpreparations of the territories of the Warsaw pact states as apart of the Theater of Military Operations.

In keeping track of the skeletal Soviet front-levelexercises conducted in the areas of the Western militarydistricts of the USSR, as well as front-level exercises of thePolish, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian armies, Western observersshould focus especially upon the application of the wartimecommand systems of these fronts and of the armies whichconstitute them. All data in this sphere of activity will beimportant for a number of reasons. In the first place, theseactivities probably will be the very first concrete manifestation.of either exercise-type or actual operational activities of theseelements which lend themselves to interception from theoutside. In the secona place, these activities could demonstrateto Western observers the routine, out actual mechanism of thedeployment of the wartine command urgans Dased on the peacetiwestructures of these essential levels. In the third place,certain of these data could well reveal the field sites of partlyhardened command posts foreseen for use in the event of crisis orin the initial phase of an actual war.

In order to keep track of the deployment of the wartimecommand systems of the fronts and armies, all available means andmethods at the disposal oT estern observers should beemployed. Using these means and methods, observers should beaware, however, that the technical interception of communicationstraffic as well as reconnaissance satellite photography might notbe helpful or sufficient here, and these methods should besupplemented with other technical means. It would seem that oneuseful approach could be the posting of direct human observersnear peacetime locations of these commands and staffs and also inthe vicinity of communications and support units. In the past,the military leadership of the Warsaw Pact was convinced that theNATO countries had at their disposal such a system of agents'observations and monitoring of the activities of the mostimportant elements of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. Accordingly,

-leadership took appropriate Steps to camouflage every operationalor exercise activity to an appropriate degree. Experiencerevealed, however, that it is impossible to camouflage everythingfrom human eyes. in view of this, an agent placed near.a target(especially if he had at his disposal his own apartment.) would-have no particular difficulties in estimating the situation andmonitoring its development. -

In order for Western observers to read from outside the

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operational contents of skeletal front exercises played over alarge area, tne key elements will most likely be the technicalinterception of signals and photography.

In the technical interception of signals, the Westernobserver should know that, in conformance with the principles ofsecret command, Pact radio communications would be used only asthe last resort, most frequently by lower echelons and then onlyin the dynamic phases of an exercise. An intensive exchange ofradio messages at higher echelons (front, armies, branches of armedforces) could frequently indicate normal technical testing ofnetwork capacity and radio directions without transmitting anyoperational contents. It could also indicate tnat this traffic isconducted by communication facilities functioning within theframework of operational camourlaye of an actual exercise. Inattempting to analyze which facilities are working with the actualcommand relations and the managewtnt of an exercise and wnich aremerely simulating such activity, the observer should, inter alia,consider the fact that older-generation equipment is generallyusedfor camouflage purposes. Thus, the observer should consider anydata transmitted in clear text as very suspicious.

Potentially, the most important and valid data can be obtainedby Western observers from intercepted discussions andcorrespondence conducted "Tn-classified;--(or -attines-even open) --- ------- --stationary communication systems of the defense ministries of theMarsaw Pact states, and on the field telephone systems of the-Soviet government's high frequency and military ("Tl")communication systems. Stationary telegraphic communicationsystems of the defense ministries of the Warsaw Pact states areused routinely for the management of the processes of increasingstates of combat readiness to higher levels, and at times (in themotion phase of exercises) for the transmission of codedoperational directives of the Supreme High Command of the CombinedArmed Forces and the High Commands in the Theaters of MilitaryOperations.

The stationary telephone communications nets (both classifiedand open), however, were normally used for the management of theexercise deployment of the armed forces in the Theater of MilitaryOperations, especially for the management and control of themovements of troops, management of exercise activities of theforces of territorial defense and civil defense, as well as.

- exercise replacement of war losses. These means of comrmunicationcould also be used by the field umpires, and at times, by the role-playing groups.

In monitoring the air waves, Western collectors should seekout new-generation equipment as a tool to understand the exercisingcommands and staffs which could open new possibilities of an

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ultimate decoding of the secrets of the correspondence. Une suchmodern device on which science and research (as well asconstruction-development organizations of nearly all Warsaw Pactcountries) worked was supposed to have been the Automated FieldSystem for Cor~anding the Ground Forces of the Warsaw Pact--so-called PASUV. This system, which was to have the capability oftransmitting pictures of texts of documents and graphics-over lonydistances, was introduced experimentally on the tactical level inthe early 1980s. In the second half of the 1980s, it was also tobe introduced at the level of combined-arms armies. In the SovietArmy, especially in the groups of forces and in the westernmi litary uistricts, where the equipment for the forces and tnemilitary technology normally was ar least five years ahead of theNiSWP states, the Automated CommandnU hield system (VASIV) Should navebeen visible liuch earlier, and could appear also at front level.

In routine front-level iskelCtdl exercises tnere will be fewtargets for photography, save for staffs, their colmmunicationsunits and a rew combat units (at times, only suu-units playiny therole of so-called "designated troops"). "Hunting" for theexercising cumuands and staffs, Western collectors should take intoconsideration that each command element, from the tactical element(divi sion) to a front, deploys three mobile command posts (commandpost, alternate command post, and rear command post). These posts

_ are ch.ief_ly. d.eployed_ in-the rear, _in larye_forest .area's-and-(.if at - - --- - ---- - -all possible) in military training areas. Military areas arepreferred, especially by the Soviets. In order to avoid theexposure of the locations of their sites, the command posts aredeployed mainly under the cover of night, or during times oflimited visibility. For these reasons, and also for themaintenance of an appropriate contact with the "fighting troops."the sites for deployment of particular command posts weresystematically changed. In the dynamic phases of exercises, adivision could shift its command posts twice during a 24-hourperiod; an army, once in a 24-hour period, and a front once every48 hours. [t was also recommended that such shifts take place atnight. Should the hours of darkness be too short for shifting ofany command post (and this usually was the case during the summer),the relocation could commence during the day; however, it had to becompleted before dawn. In sum, for the purpose of tracking andphotographing Pact mobile field command posts, Westecn collectorsshould apply a variety of the arts of photography, including meanswhich would permit night photography or pnotography under limitedvisibility condition's.

In the past, during front-level skeletal exercises, especially

24 PASUV is the Soviet abbreviation for PJLUVAYA AVTIMATICHESKAYA SISTEMAUPRAVLVANYA VOYSKAMI.

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those conducted by NSWP armies, a Western observer could encountera relatively larye number of special vehicles (staff buses, commandvehicles, and others) moving in columns along the roads or deployedin the field, which simplified location and identification of thecommand systems of exercising elements. This state of affairs was,however, criticized rather widely in Pact military circles.. It wasconsidered that a large number of special staff vehicles was aglaring luxury which could not pass the test in wartime, since itwould make a quick and secret maneuver more difficult and would notassure appropriate defense, especially against weapons of massdestruction. Additionally, such a large number of vehicles exposedtne sites of the deployment of command posts, etc. As a morerealistic solution to this problem, a restriction on the equipmentof the commnand pust was considered, in order to limit tne numuer atmulti-functional vehicles serving the automated command system("PASUV") as well as the use of simple means of transportation orpersonnel used by the military. It was also pointed out thatpermanent civilian structures, such as schools, vacationfacilities, etc. could be used for command posts, thus proviuin 9better camouflage, cover and defense from the weapons of massdestruction.

Until the end of l9b5, the developmenc plans of the armedforces of the Warsaw Pact did not forsee any concrete chanyes in

--- tne required struct-ure of command posts, their equipment, andmethods of deployment. Nonetheless, the envisioned resolutionsseemed to be rather close to implementation, and deserve closescrutiny by Western observers, since they could radically changethe picture of what has been observed in recent years in tracingthe command system of Warsaw Pact armies in the field.

In addition to the exercising staffs, facilities which warrantphoto coverage would seem to be the so-called "designated troops,"insignificant in appearance, but capable of providing considerabledata about the dynamics of front-level skeletal exercises. Shouldthe Western observer be able to identify their traces and confirmtheir activity in time and space, he could recreate the keyelements of operations being played.

Regarding ground forces, the most spectacular photo targetswould seem to be the staffs and troops taking part in the "SH'CHIT"(Shield) and "ORUZHBA" (Friendship) exercises. Interpretingphotography of these exercises, conducted chiefly in militarytraining areas, the Western observer should focus his attention onseeking new armaments systems and technical equipment of the troopsat the tactical level. As mentioned earlier, these types ofexercises were to a large extent set-piece demonstrations, and eachnational army attempted to present everything which was the newestand the best. Equally valuable could be such photography whichwould make possible even fragmentary verification of the

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organizational structures of the units and their TU&E armaments anaequipment. This could be especially valuable because, for"SH'CHIT" and "DRUZHBA" exercises, attempts were made to deployparticipating units with their full TOE complements.

- Despite the Soviet changes in the structural makeup of the AirDefense troops, it would seem that the heretofore practiced way ofconducting exercises "GRANIT" (Granite) and the training incooperation of these forces will be retained in the future. Theseundertakings should be followed and documented in detail by Westernobservers, since they are conducted strictly according to theactual plans of the air defense of Warsaw Pact states. The onlyfictional aspects of the air defense exercises are the simulatedNATO air operations. Models of NAT air attacks and the methods oftheir execution are, however, programmed on the basis of the latestintelligence data which reflect the state of knowledge of theWarsaw Pact about the potential and methods of operational means oran air attack by NATO.

With the assistance of the technical interception of signalsand photography, Western observers can systematically update dataabout the comoat grouping of the unified air defense system of theWarsaw Pact states (the system of the stationary command posts, theprimary, alternate, and simulated missile firing sites, thelocations of radio-electronic troops; the p-imary ad al-tenateairfields, as well as highway airfield segments of the air defenseair forces, etc.)

In the technical interception of communications signals, -attention should be focused on the traffic of the automated commandsystem of the air defense--ALMAZ (national levels), VUZOUKH 3M orVOZDUKH 1P--supplemented with. the CYBER and DUNAJEC equipment (forcorps level), and VECTOR (for tactical levels). While interceptingelectronic signals, the Western observer should know that, duringexercises and routine operations in peacetime, certain wartimefrequencies which are sensitive to interference by certain types ofequipment (probably missile guidance control) are never used.Similarly, it °is forbidden to activate the hidden radar systemdeployed in conjunction with P-40, which also is reserved forwartime.

In peacetime, these P-40 radar stations on tank carriages arekept hidden in underground shelters. "GRANIIT" exercises or othertraining requirements could create unique situations in whicheither the whole system or some of its components could be broughtout of the shelter for testing of the maneuver of rapiddeployment. Since it does not seem proba.le that this hidden radar -system would ever be activated in peacetime, the only trace of itsexistence would be the physical appearance of P-4U radar stations(or a follow-on system) at ground-level sites, which could be

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chiefly ascertained by photographic documentation. While searchingfor a hidden radar field station, the Western observer should takeinto consideration that these systems are deployed in the vicinityof missile sites.

From the remaining larger exercises, the training of generalstaffs of allied armies deserves particular attention from theWestern observer,'as do the."TRANZYT" exercises of technical rearelements of the Combined Armed Forces. The common characteristicof both undertakings is that they take place'in most cases witn few.alterations in the actual data concerning defense resolutions ofthe Warsaw Pact.

In the training of tne Pact general stdtts, observers canfollow especially the actual activities concerning the systeum ofconverting the armed forces and tne economy or Warsaw Pact statesfrom peacetime to wartime, and also acquire extremely valuable dataconcerning the supply and support of the technical-mate.rial andhuman needs by the particular states of the Warsaw Pact'soperational forces. From data of a given exercise, one coulurecreate with a large degree of accuracy the actual levels orwartime reserves of particular types of munitions, rockets, bombs.fuels and oils, spare parts, medical supplies, food rations, etc.From "TRANZYT" exercises, the Western observer _has a _potential _ -opportunity to identify the key infrastructure installations in theTheater of the Military Operations which are needed for the transitof Soviet forces through the territory of the NSWP states, such as:

- Railway and road transit lines of strategic significance.

- Strategic transloading sites at the Soviet border.

- Railway reserves, road bridges, and waterways crossings..

- The system of bases and warehouses for technical-materialsupport. of the Soviet forces.

The rear exercises ("TRANZYT") seem to be relatively easier toidentify and to follow (especially by direct observation orphotography), because of the participation of relatively large andspecific road-engineering, railway and bridge, fuel pipeline,ammunition transport, and other logistics units, Primary attentionof an observer who follows such exercises snould be concentrated onthe border areas between the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states, inthe areas of the tributaries of large rivers and also along themain east-west roads and railways.

Training of the general staffs. in contrast to exercises ofthe "TRANZYT" type, will most likely be difficult to pick up and .tofollow, chiefly because this training probably will be conducted in

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closed conditions and in permanent facilities. Also, tneexercising elements will as a rule employ stationary, classifiedcommunications systems. In some training of this type, operationalgroups of commands and staffs of fronts, air defense forces and thenavy could also take part, and could be involved in the activationof additional field command systems for tnese troup's. Suchactivities would be more easily identified and penetrated by aWestern observer. From past experience, however, it appears thatin the realm of field communications, the Western observer cannotcount on much useful data. It would seem tnat in order to recreatethe contents of training, an insight into the messages transmittedby the stationary communications system of the SfAVKA will benecessary, at the least.

C. WHERE SUriUL-U HUMAN ANd IN1TELLIGtiCE EFIJlS u:. FdLUsE -BEFURE, OURING AND AFTER AN ExEkC1SE, ti LEARcN ,wrEABOUT ITS PURPUSE, SIZE, PAlfIGlcANTS Ndo kLr:tia7.

The aims of large Warsaw Pact exercises, tneir daily schedule,scope, the composition of those exercising, and the results wereknown in all their detail only by a very limited number of peopleat the management level and by the compact authors' teams. Suchdata in generalized form were provided either in toto or in part,on a need-to-know basis, to the most important participants ofexercises (routinely...from 150 to -250--persons-) -during the s-ummaries ----(critiques) of the exercises. The critiques of the majority ofexercises were issued in printed form and disseminated toauthorized functional personnel for official use. For example, inan NSWP army, if it was the organizer of an exercise, a ratherlarge number of copies was traditionally distributed. (In thePolish Peoples' Army, usually up to 100-15U and more.) These-copies were distributed to the most important institutions of theMinistry of National Defense, commands of branches of armed forces,military districts, chiefs of troops and services, arnd the militaryacademies. Participants from other Warsaw Pact armies usuallyreceived only one copy. The Soviets routinely distributed thiscopy with a restriction that it was destined for the exclusive useof the Minister of National Defense. The minister, at least in thePolish case, rarely retained this document himself, transmitting itusually to the General Staff. After passage of a certain period oftime, the copy of the Soviet critique of exercises could be foundeltier in one of the operational elements of the General Staff orin a library, with a restriction on who may check it out.

The aims of exercises, their detailed scenarios, theirparticipants, as well as their results, also could be seen in thedocumentation from these exercises. During thg.time of thepreparation of an'exercise or during its conduct, there wereusually more than ten copies of full documentation, and hundreds of .copies of selected parts. Tens of "conceptual" personnel take part

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in the preparation of exercises and have access to thedocumentation connected with it. Further, at least as manymilitary and civilian support personnel were involved (typists,draftsmen, printers, xerox operators, classified registrypersonnel, etc.).

In sum, exercise data were known to a relatively large numberof people at various levels of the military hierachy, from the veryhighest to the very lowest. Still more people had access toexercise documents, with a significant number having access evenbefore exercises began. Jbtaining relevant intelligence data fromthese sources might not be simple and easy, but is notimpossible. If, for whatever reason, one would nave to rely onso-called national means, then the only way to accomplish the aimof the collection of data would seem to be an increase i theupgrading of the effectiveness and usefulness of the monitorinyorall military activities of Warsaw Pact states, on the basis ofwhich the training undertakings could be more visihle. A keyelement for an ultimate upgrading of the usefulness andeffectiveness of the monitoring process would seem to bepenetration of the stationary system of classified communicationsof the STAVKA, or at the least, the most important communicationslinks between the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces and thegeneral-staff-s-of the NSWP armi es-.--Equa-l-ly-important- -would-seem-t-o -------be the development of a reliable capability for rapididentification of the wartime command systems at the levels of theTheaters of Military Operations, fronts, armies, fleets, and theirtactical elements, activated for operational and exercise needs, aswell as the possibility of interception and reading of messagesinvolved in this traffic. The main effort should be directedtoward the classified Soviet Government high frequency, and themilitary "Ti" communications systems, as well as the automatedcommand and control systems of the air defense troops (ALMAZ,VOZDUKH 3M, and VECTOR), and ground forces automated field commandsystems (PASUV), and also those of the fleet (PASUF).

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j

ANNEX 1

GENERAL STRUCTURE OF WARSAW PACT OPERATIONAL TRAINING

All Warsaw Pact states accepted the Soviet training structure,in which exercises constituted one of the most important forms ofoperational training. In this structure, the operational. trainingwas divided into:

- freining of generals, admirals and officers.

- Training of connuand organs and operational elements(echelons of army size).

1. fraining of Generals. Admirals and Officers.

The main types of training for generals, admirals and orticerswere: -

- dperational tactical training.

- Technical military training.

-- - Speciali-st-(technic-ail)-t-raini-ng - ---- -- ---

- Methodology training.

The most important forms of the above types of training were:

- Independent work.

- Command activities.

- Operational courses for commanders.

- Operational reconnaissance and field trips.

- Conferences and scientific-military councils.

In the independent work, the following methods are usuallypracticed:

-- Independent studies of the theory of art of war.

-- Completion of independent tasks (assignments).

-- Exercises for the improvement of procedures.

In the framework of command activities and operational courses

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for commanders, the following methods were employed:

-- Lectures, reports and seminars.

-- Practical activities using armaments and equipment.

-- Exercises including assignment to functionalpositions.

-- Demonstrations of activities.

2. Training of the command organs and operational elements(echelons ut army size). lhe main forms of this type of trainingwere:-

- Staff exercises.

- War games. -

- Command and staff (or staff) exercises.

- Operational exercises involviny the use of troops ana_ma neuvers. -_-

- Operational-mobilization and specialist-technicalexercises.

- Operational field trips.

All of the following elements of the above undertakings wereclassified according to:

- The scale.

- Organization and the method of conduct.

- Aims.

According to the scale the exercises were divided into:

- Strategic.

- Operational-strategic.

- Operational-tactical.

According to the organization and the,methods of conduct, tneexercises were divided no

- Independent or joint (coalition).

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- Une-sided or two-sided.

- With command organs and means of coumitunications.

- Single or multiple echelons.

- With participation of troops or with designated troops.

- Mip or field exercises.

According to the aims, the exercises.we re divided into:

- Improvement of command organs and teamwork.

- Demonstration.

- Experimental-research.

- Inspection and control.

E

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SIMPLIFIED DIAGRAM OF THE CONVERSIONOF THE POLISH. COMMAND SYSTEM FROM PEACE TO WARTIME "

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