hrw: "between a drone and al-qaeda" - the civilian cost of us targeted killings in yemen

7/27/2019 HRW: "Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda" - The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen

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"BETWEEN A DRONE AND AL-QAEDA"The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen

H U M A N

R I G H T S

W A T C H


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Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda

The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen


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Copyright 2013 Human Rights Watch

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Printed in the United States of America

ISBN: 978-1-62313-0701

Cover design by Rafael Jimenez

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For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hrw.org


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OCTOBER 2013 978-1-62313-0701

Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda

The Civilian Cost of US Targeted Killings in Yemen

Map of Strikes ..................................................................................................................... iSummary ........................................................................................................................... 1Key Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 9Methodology .................................................................................................................... 10I. Background .................................................................................................................... 11

Yemen and Al-Qaeda .............................................................................................................. 11Targeted Killings and US Counterterrorism Activities in Yemen ................................................ 17

II. Case Studies ................................................................................................................ 291. Wessab: Strike on Alleged Local AQAP Leader .................................................................... 292. Al-Masnaah: Attack on Low-Level Militants .......................................................................... 383. Beit al-Ahmar: Strike on Local Leader, Child Detained ......................................................... 424. Sarar: Attack Kills 12 Civilians ............................................................................................. 525. Khashamir: Killing of Anti-AQAP Cleric ................................................................................. 596. Al-Majalah: Cluster Munitions Kill 14 Al-Qaeda Suspects, 41 Civilians ................................. 66

III. International Law and US Policy .................................................................................. 80General Legal Considerations ................................................................................................ 80Legal Framework for the US in Yemen ......................................................................................83Laws of War ........................................................................................................................... 84International Human Rights Law ............................................................................................ 86Failure to Investigate and Provide Redress .............................................................................. 87Obamas May 2013 Policy Guidelines ..................................................................................... 89Armed Conflict Over with Al-Qaeda? ........................................................................................ 91

IV. Recommendations ....................................................................................................... 93To the Government of the United States .................................................................................. 93To the Government of Yemen ................................................................................................. 94To the Friends of Yemen .......................................................................................................... 95To United Nations Bodies and Mechanisms including the General Assembly, Human Rights

Council, and Special Rapporteurs on Extra-Judicial Executions and Countering Terrorism ........ 95Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................ 97


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I HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH |OCTOBER 2013

Map of Strikes


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1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH |OCTOBER 2013

Summary

On the evening of August 29, 2012, five men gathered in a grove of date palms behind the

local mosque in Khashamir, a village in southeast Yemen. Moments later, US remotely

piloted aircraft, commonly known as drones, launched three Hellfire missiles at the group.

The strike killed four of the men instantly, hurling their body parts across the grounds. The

blast of a fourth missile hit the fifth man as he crawled away, pinning him lifeless to a wall.

Yemens Defense Ministry described three of the men as members of Al-Qaeda in the

Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the Yemen-based armed group that has been fighting the

Yemeni government, and which the United States calls the most active affiliate of Al-Qaeda.

The men were killed, it said, while meeting their fellows.

But the two fellows they were meeting had no known links to AQAP. Rather, they were

respected members of their community, Salim bin Ali Jaber, a cleric and father of seven,

had long preached against AQAPs violent methods. The other was the clerics cousin

Walid bin Ali Jaber, one of the villages few police officers. Relatives said the three alleged

AQAP members demanded a meeting with the cleric because the previous Friday he had

made a particularly strong denunciation of AQAP at the local mosque. Walid Jaber had

joined the meeting as a security measure.

The strike in Khashamir is one of six unacknowledged US military attacks against alleged

AQAP members in Yemen that this report examines. Each of the airstrikes bears the

hallmarks of a so-called targeted killing, the deliberate killing by a government of a known

individual under color of law.

Two these attacks were in clear violation of international humanitarian lawthe laws of

warbecause they struck only civilians or used indiscriminate weapons. The other four

cases may have violated the laws of war because the individual attacked was not a lawful

military target or the attack caused disproportionate civilian harm, determinations that

require further investigation. In several of these cases the US also did not take all feasible

precautions to minimize harm to civilians, as the laws of war require.


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BETWEEN A DRONE ANDAL-QAEDA 2

Some of those targeted by US forces as terrorist suspects may not in fact have been valid

military targets. Where the laws of war apply, combatants may lawfully be attacked.

Persons who accompany or support an organized armed group, but whose activities are

not directly related to military operations, such as engaging in recruiting or propaganda,

are not lawful military targets.

Where the United States acts as a party to the armed conflict between the Yemeni

government and AQAP, US military actions fall within the laws of war. Should the fighting

between the US and AQAP not meet the threshold for an armed conflict, any attacks carried

out independently of the Yemen-AQAP conflict, including some or all of the attacks

detailed here, would fall under international human rights law. Human rights law only

permits the use of lethal force where there is an imminent threat to human life.

Beyond international legal considerations, the evidence strongly suggests that the strikes

did not adhere to policies for targeted killings that US President Barack Obama disclosed

in a speech in May 2013.

These policies, which more closely reflect a law-enforcement model than a war model,

provide that the United States will conduct strikes only against individuals who pose an

imminent threat to the American people; when there is a near-certainty that no civilians

will be killed or injured and when the target is present. President Obama also said the

United States does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individualterrorists; our preference is always to detain, interrogate, and prosecute. While the

attacks detailed in this report predate Obamas speech, the White House said on the day

he disclosed the policies that they were either already in place or will be transitioned into

place over time.

The Yemeni government has conceded that two of the six attacks described in this report

resulted in deaths and injuries to civilians. It has made payments to families of some of

the civilians killed but has failed to adequately compensate many others. The US

government has not publicly acknowledged involvement in any of the six attacks, and

while US officials say they work with local authorities to provide condolence payments to

civilian victims, we are not aware of any evidence that it has done so in Yemen. Regardless

of the lawfulness of specific attacks, the deaths of numerous civilians and the lack of


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compensation to most families has fueled public anger and frustration in Yemen against

the United States, doubtless to the benefit of AQAP.

We Yemenis are the ones who pay the price of the war on terror, said Faisal bin Ali Jaber,

a relative of the cleric and policeman killed in Khashamir. We are caught between a droneon one side and Al-Qaeda on the other.

Targeted Killings

The US Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), which is a semi-covert arm of the

military, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are estimated by research groups to

have carried out 81 targeted killing operations in Yemen: one in 2002 and the rest since

2009. The strikes by drones, warplanes or cruise missiles by various counts have killed at

least 473 combatants and civilians. The United States has also carried out hundreds of

targeted killing operations, primarily by drones, in Pakistan and a small number of such

strikes in Somalia.

After many years of neither confirming nor denying such strikes, President Obama and

other top US officials began publicly acknowledging the targeted killings program in 2010.

However, citing national security concerns, the administration has provided only the

barest information about individual strikes. For example, US authorities have not revealed

the number of strikes, the number of civilians and alleged combatants killed or wounded,

or, with a few exceptions, the target of the strikes. Moreover, the administrations legal

rationale for such killings, outlined in various speeches and fact sheets by the

government in the past two years, has been inadequate.

Yemeni President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi has publicly praised the US drone campaign in

Yemen, but his government has been almost as silent as the United States on details.

Case Studies

Human Rights Watch investigated the six strikes during two trips to Yemen in 2012 and

2013. These attacks, one from 2009 and the rest from 2012-13, killed 82 people, at least 57

of them civilians. At least four of the strikes were carried out by drones, a fifth strike by


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either drones or warplanes, and a sixth one by cruise missiles releasing cluster munitions,

indiscriminate weapons that pose unacceptable dangers to civilians.

This report assesses whether these attacks comply with the laws of war. It also considers

them with respect to the guidelines that President Obama disclosed in May 2013 for

targeted killings. Those guidelines seem reflective of international human rights law,which prohibits the use of lethal force in law enforcement situations except when

absolutely necessary to protect human life.

In addition to the attack in Khashamir, this report details the following strikes:

Wessab, April 17, 2013: Two drones launched at least three Hellfire missiles at acar in Wessab, a township in Dhamar province in central Yemen. The missiles

killed a suspected local AQAP leader, Hamid al-Radmi, as well as his driver and

two bodyguards. The strike appears not to have complied with the Obamaadministration guidelines because it appears that al-Radmi could have been

captured rather than killed. Al-Radmi was one of the most visible figures in

Wessab, traveling openly to mediate disputes among residents, and meeting

regularly with security and political officials. While linked to AQAP, it is not

evident that he played a role in military operations that would have made him a

valid military target.

Al-Masnaah, January 23, 2013: One or more Hellfire missiles launched from a dronekilled all four people in a truck in the village of al-Masnaah as they traveled to

nearby Sanhan, a town about 20 kilometers southeast of Sanaa, the capital. Two

passengers were suspected AQAP members. The two others, the driver and his

cousin, were civilians hired by the AQAP suspects to drive them to Sanhan.

Depending on the military importance of the two targeted AQAP members, under

the laws of war the strike may have caused disproportionate harm to civilians.

Yemens Minister of Interior exonerated the two cousins of any ties to the targets in

a letter to the families, but relatives said neither the Yemeni nor the US government

provided the families any compensation.

Beit al-Ahmar, November 7, 2012: A drone strike killed Lt. Col. Adnan al-Qadhi, anofficer in an elite Yemeni army unit who was a suspected local AQAP leader, in Beit

al-Ahmar, a military town 15 kilometers from Sanaa. The strike also killed one of his

bodyguards. Inconsistent with the Obama administration guidelines, the evidence

suggests that Al-Qadhi could have been captured rather than killed. Nor is it clear


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that he played a military operational role for AQAP. In April 2013, AQAP issued a

video in which an 8-year-old boy, held with his father, a soldier, confessed that

military officers instructed him to plant a tracking device on al-Qadhi.

Sarar, September 2, 2012: As two drones flew overhead, two warplanes or dronesattacked a vehicle heading north from the city of Radaa in central Yemen. The strike

in the hamet of Sarar killed 12 passengers, including 3 children and a pregnant

woman, in violation of the laws-of-war prohibition against attacks that do not

discriminate between civilians and combatants. The driver and a 13th passenger

survived. The strikes apparent target, tribal leader Abd al-Raouf al-Dahab, was not

in the vehicle, and it is not clear that he was even a member of AQAP. The Yemeni

government admitted the attack was a mistake but for months provided the victims

families only limited compensation: 100 Kalashnikov assault rifles and cash for

burial costs. Only in June 2013, after Human Rights Watch and other groups raisedthe case with the United States, did the Yemeni authorities compensate the

families for the deaths.

Al-Majalah, December 17, 2009: As many as five US Navy Tomahawk cruisemissiles armed with cluster munitions struck the hamlet of al-Majalah in southern

Abyan province. Yemeni government officials described the attack as a Yemeni

airstrike that killed 34 terrorists at a training camp. According to a Yemeni

government inquiry, the strike actually killed 14 suspected AQAP fighters, including

the apparent primary target, Muhammad al-Kazami, but also at least 41 local

civilians living in a Bedouin camp, including 9 women and 21 children.

Subsequently, cluster munition remnants killed at least 4 additional civilians and

wounded 13 others. This attack may more properly be viewed as a violation of

international human rights law. However, even within a laws-of-war analysis, the

attack used indiscriminate cluster munitions, and caused indiscriminate and

possibly disproportionate civilian casualties. The families have not received any

compensation for the deaths or injuries.

US and Yemeni officials did not respond to written questions from Human Rights Watch on

the six cases and on targeted killings policies. A Yemeni government official with

knowledge of the strikes, who spoke to Human Rights Watch on condition of anonymity,

acknowledged that in some cases, the targets status with AQAP fall into a gray area:


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It is not clear in some cases whether they are actually military commanders

or operators of attacks. But they recruit openly, openly. . . Striking is not the

most ethical position [in some of these cases]. But if you dont strike them,

will they recruit more? That is the debate.

The official said that the Yemeni government has virtually no control over much of Yemen,

and therefore is too weak to capture many suspects: Our security apparatus is in

shambles. . . . So what do you do? The easiest option is, you take them out.

International Law and US Policy

The legality of a targeted killing under international law may depend on whether the

attack was conducted during an armed conflict or during law enforcement operations.

International humanitarian law, the laws of war, apply during armed conflicts between

states or between a state and a non-state armed group. International human rights law

applies at all times, except where superseded by specific laws of war.

The laws of war permit attacks only on enemy combatants and other military objectives.

Combatants include members of armed groups taking a direct part in hostilities, but not

those who play a purely non-military role. Civilians and civilian objects are protected from

attack. Not all attacks that cause civilian deaths or injuries violate the laws of waronly

those that target civilians, do not discriminate between civilians and combatants, or causecivilian loss that is excessive compared to the anticipated military gain. Parties to a

conflict must take all feasible steps to minimize civilian harm, including by not deploying

in densely populated areas. States have an obligation to investigate serious violations of

the laws of war and prosecute those found responsible.

During situations of law enforcement, in which international human rights law applies,

lethal force may only be used as a last resort where there is an imminent risk to human life.

The standards set out by the Obama administration for targeted attacks appear to reflect

this law enforcement approach, requiring that the target pose an imminent risk to the

United States, cannot reasonably be captured, and can be attacked without putting

civilians at risk. However, the administration has not said that it was adopting an approach

consistent with human rights law.


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The use of drones does not directly affect the legal analysis of a particular attack. These

remotely piloted vehicles and the missiles and laser-guided bombs they carry are not

illegal. When used appropriately, drones enhanced surveillance capabilities can help

minimize civilian casualties in combat operations. But as with other aerial attacks, drone

operations may be hampered by poor intelligence or a failure to minimize the risk ofcivilian harm.

Even if some of the attacks described in this report do not violate the laws of war, they

appear to fall short of the thresholds set by the Obama administration for carrying out

targeted killings. Attacks that do not meet the US policy guidelines would contravene law

enforcement standards under international human rights law.

The applicability of a war model to US operations against Al-Qaeda has increasingly been

called into question. Hostilities between a state and a non-state armed group are

considered to be an armed conflict when violence reaches a significant threshold and the

armed group has the capacity and organization to abide by the laws of war. Hostilities

between AQAP and the Yemeni government have risen to the level of an armed conflict in

recent years. That is less clear with respect to hostilities between AQAP and the US

government. This distinction is legally important because the United States asserts it is

carrying out operations against Al-Qaeda and associated forces to protect US interests

and not because it is a party to the Yemen-AQAP conflict.

Under that rationale, the US government should be applying a war model to its

counterterrorism operations in Yemen only if there is a genuine armed conflict between the

US and AQAP. Otherwise the United States needs to be acting in accordance with the

higher threshold for the use of force under applicable law enforcement standards found in

international human rights law.

Al-Qaeda and other non-state armed groups that the United States considers to be

associated forces, such as AQAP, continue to threaten US interests, but President Obama

has long disavowed the paradigm of a global war on terror. The sporadic nature and

smaller scale of any successful operations against US targets by these groups in the 12 years

since the attacks of September 11, 2001, further diminishes the relevance of this model.


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Should the United States continue targeted killings in Yemen without addressing the

consequences of killing civilians and taking responsibility for unlawful deaths, it risks

further angering many Yemenis and handing another recruiting card to AQAP. In response

to these killings, AQAP has issued statements accusing the United States of fighting a war

not just against Al-Qaeda but against all Muslims. Residents have set up roadblocks andheld demonstrations in which they chant anti-US slogans. Yemens National Dialogue

Conference, tasked with drafting the countrys new political and constitutional roadmap,

has called for criminal penalties under domestic law for any targeted killings that violate

international law.

In Khashamir, every man, woman, and child has seen the photos of Salim and Walid Jaber,

the cleric and policeman, after they were struck by drone-launched missiles. The images

show the mens bodies charred and in piecesrelatives said they identified Salim Jaber by

his cheekbone, and Walid Jaber by the remains of his handgun and his ornate belt.

Now when villagers see these images, said a relative, Faisal Jaber, they think of America.


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Key Recommendations

The governments of the United States and Yemen should immediately take measures to

reduce civilian casualties from targeted killings in Yemen and to ensure these strikes

comply with international law.

To the Obama Administration

Explain the full legal basis on which the US carries out targeted killings, includingthe attacks detailed in this report. Publicly clarify all policy guidelines for targeted

killings and disclose when each standard went into effect.

To the Governments of the United States and Yemen

Ensure that all targeted killings conducted during armed conflict situations accordwith the laws of war, including by taking all feasible precautions to minimize harm

to civilians. Outside of armed conflict situations, use lethal force only when

absolutely necessary to protect human life in accordance with international human

rights law.

Implement a system of prompt and meaningful compensation for civilian loss oflife, injury, and property damage from unlawful attacks. To address the backlash

from civilian deaths, institute a system of condolence payments for losses in which

there is no assumption of liability.

Conduct prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into the cases in thisreport and other cases where targeted strikes may have resulted in unlawful

killings. Make public the findings and seek disciplinary measures or criminal

prosecutions as appropriate.


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Methodology

This report is based on six weeks of field research carried out by Human Rights Watch in

Yemen between September 2012 and June 2013. The report details six US airstrikes in

Yemen that killed 82 people, at least 57 of them civilians. One strike was in 2009 and the

rest were in 2012-13.

A Human Rights Watch researcher and two consultants interviewed more than 90 people for

this report, most in the Yemeni cities of Sanaa, Aden, and Radaa, and the town of Wessab, as

well as in person in the United States, electronically, and by phone. Interviewees included

witnesses to airstrikes, relatives of those killed, lawyers, human rights defenders, journalists,

political and security analysts, diplomats, and Yemeni government and security officials.

Human Rights Watch contacted Yemenis through local and international nongovernmental

organizations, and lawyers for victims or suspects. We carried out interviews in English or in

Arabic, often using interpreters. Most people were interviewed individually. We informed the

interviewees of the purpose of our research and did not pay them or offer them other

incentives to speak with us. In some cases, we have withheld the name, location, date of

interview, or other identifying information to protect the interviewee from possible retaliation.

We reviewed dozens of videos and photos taken in the immediate aftermath of the strikes

in question, many of which showed remnants that helped identify the types of weapons

used. In some cases we also examined remnants taken from the scene. We also read

scores of international and Yemeni media reports and, in the few instances available,

Yemeni government documents on the killings.

Human Rights Watch was not able to visit most of the strike areas for security reasons.

Yemeni consultants visited two attack sites, Sarar and Wessab.

Human Rights Watch sent written requests for comment on these strikes to the US Central

Intelligence Agency, the White House, and the Department of Defense, as well as to

Yemens Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The only agency to formally respond was the CIA,

which declined comment. Future responses will be posted on the Counterterrorism page of

the Human Rights Watch website: www.hrw.org.


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I. Background

Yemen and Al-Qaeda

Yemen is a country of 25 million people on the southwest tip of the Arabian Peninsula. It

was fertile ground for Islamist fighters well before the formation of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula (AQAP) in 2009. Much of Yemens rugged terrain is largely outside the central

governments control.1 One of the poorest countries in the Middle East, it has a soaring

population of unemployed young people. It is running out of oilthe governments main

revenue sourceand water.2

AQAP and its antecedents gained strength during the 33-year presidency of Ali Abdullah

Saleh, whose government devoted more attention to fighting rebels known as Huthis in the

north, quashing a secessionist movement in the south, and juggling tribal interests than to

countering armed Islamist militants.3

During the security vacuum created during the 2011 uprising in Yemen, AQAP created a

domestic offshoot, Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans of Islamic Law), that occupied several towns

in the south. Saleh ceded the presidency in February 2012 to his longtime vice president,

Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, who pledged to lead the country to general elections in 2014.

Origins of Yemens Islamist Armed Groups

In the 1980s many Yemeni youth considered it a rite of passage to fight in Afghanistan with

US-backed mujahideenagainst occupying Soviet forces. Yemenis continued to train in

1 For a comprehensive account of Al-Qaedas history in Yemen, see Gregory D. Johnsen, The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda,

and Americas War in Arabia(Norton, November 2012); and Chapter 1: Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula: Precedessors,

Objectives and Strategy, in A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen, (Gabriel Koehler-Derrick,

ed.), Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 2011, pp. 18-63, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-false-

foundation-aqap-tribes-and-ungoverned-spaces-in-yemen (accessed July 30, 2013).2 United Nations Development Program, Republic of Yemen country page, http://www.undp.org.ye/ (accessed June 10,

2013). See also UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Humanitarian Bulletin Yemen, Issue 15, June 2013

(accessed June 10, 2013).

3 Huthis are revivalists of the Zaidi strand of Shiism. An army coup in 1962 ended centuries of rule by a Zaidi imamate and

established the former republic of North Yemen. Clashes between Huthis and government forces included six rounds of civil

war from 2004 to 2010.


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Afghanistan under Taliban rule through the 1990s, with the acquiescence of both the

Yemeni government and influential tribes and clerics.4

Osama bin Laden, whose father was Yemeni, saw the country as an ideal operating base.

Fighters who had trained with bin Laden in Afghanistan formed an armed militant groupcalled Islamic Jihad in Yemen in 1990, which was succeeded by the Islamic Army of

Aden- Abyan in 1994 and Al-Qaeda in Yemen (AQY) in 1998.5

President Saleh incorporated many of the returning Afghan war veterans into his security

forces, using them to fight Huthi rebels in the north as well as separatists in the south.6

This marriage of convenience began to fray in October 2000, when AQY attacked the Navy

destroyer USS Coleoff the coast of Aden, Yemens southern port city, killing 17 US sailors.

Under pressure from the United States and its allies, Saleh pledged to rein in the group. In

response, a new generation of Yemeni armed militants began viewing the Yemeni

authorities as an additional target. Many of these militants had honed their fighting

abilities in Iraq, where they had joined the fight against the US-led invasion in 2003 with

little interference from the Yemen government.7

That next generation coalesced after a breakout of 23 Al-Qaeda-linked suspects in 2006

from a Political Security Organization prison in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, apparently

4 Johnsen, The Last Refuge, pp. 3-18. Many of the Yemenis incarcerated at Guantanamo Baythe largest bloc of detainees

at the US military prison there were apprehended in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Yemenis number about 90 of the total of

164 Guantanamo detainees at the time of writing. Fifty-six Yemenis at Guantanamo have been cleared for transfer for

nearly four years. Only two Yemeni detainees face formal charges. The conviction of a third Yemeni detainee was vacated

by a federal court and the US government was appealing that decision. For more on Guantanamo Yemenis, see Human

Rights Watchs Guantanamo web page, http://www.hrw.org/topic/counterterrorism/guantanamo and Human Rights

Watch, No Direction Home: Returns from Guantanamo to Yemen, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/03/28/no-

direction-home-0.5A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen, (Koehler-Derrick, ed.), pp. 18-35,

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-false-foundation-aqap-tribes-and-ungoverned-spaces-in-yemen. See also Council on

Foreign Relations, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Backgrounder, May 24, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-

qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369 (accessed July 30, 2013).6 Johnsen, The Last Refuge, pp. 35-47; Christopher Boucek, Shazadi Beg, and John Horgan, Opening up the Jihadi Debate:

Yemens Committee for Dialogue, in Leaving Terrorism Behind: Disengagement from Political Violence, Tore Bjrgo and John

Horgan, eds. (New York: Routledge, September 2008), pp. 182-89.7 Former president Saleh supported Iraq during the first Gulf War of 1990-91 and initially tolerated the travel of scores if not

hundreds of Yemenis to fight in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003. See, e.g., Johnsen, The Last Refuge, p. 143, and W. Andrew

Terrill, The Conflicts in Yemen and US National Security, US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, January 2011, p. 54,

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=1040 (accessed June 13, 2013).


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with inside help.8 In 2007, AQY killed eight Spaniards and two Yemenis at a tourist site in

eastern Shabwa province. In 2008, the group shot dead two Belgian tourists and their

drivers in Hadramawt, in the southeast. That same year suicide bombers struck the US

Embassy in Sanaa, killing 17 Yemenis and one Yemeni-American. AQY also in 2008 launched

its own magazine, Sada al-Malahim(The Echo of Battles). The following year, an AQY suicidebomber killed four South Korean tourists and their Yemeni driver in Hadramawt.9

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

In January 2009, Al-Qaedas Yemeni and Saudi organizations merged into Yemen-based Al-

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The Yemen-based group quickly set its sights on

international and regional as well as domestic targets. That December the United States

designated AQAP as Al-Qaedas most active branch.10

Estimates of AQAPs size range from several hundred to a few thousand members, many of

whom participate in military operations. The groups inner circle is believed to have

anywhere from 50 to 100 members, of whom 10 to 24 are considered key figures. 11 The top

tier includes the groups commander, Nasir al-Wuhayshi. In August 2013 Ayman al-Zawahiri,

8 For a detailed account of the improbable breakout, see Johnsen, The Last Refuge, Chapter 14, The Great Escape.9 Yemen Profile: Timeline/Al Qaeda in Action, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14704951

(accessed July 29, 2013), and A False Foundation? AQAP, Tribes and Ungoverned Spaces in Yemen(Koehler-Derrick),

Significant Events, p. 5, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-false-foundation-aqap-tribes-and-ungoverned-spaces-in-

yemen (accessed July 30, 2013).10 Designations of Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Senior Leaders, Press Statement, US State Department,

January 19, 2010, /www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/01/135364.htm (accessed October 12, 2013). President Obama

reiterated that claim in his keynote speech on counterterrorism policy in May 2013. See The White House, Remarks by the

President at the National Defense University, Washington, DC, May 23, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (accessed May 23, 2013).

11 Human Rights Watch interviews with AQAP experts including Gregory Johnsen, New York, June 13, 2013; journalist Abdul

Razzaq Ahmad al-Jamal, Sanaa, April 24 and May 8, 2013; Nabil al-Bokairi, president, Arab Studies Center, Sanaa, April 25,

2013; and Abdul Salam Muhammad, president, Abaad Studies and Research Center, Sanaa, April 24, 2013.

In 2011 John Brennan, then President Obamas chief counterterrorism advisor and at this writing CIA director, said that the number

of AQAP members that the United States was actively targeting totaled a couple of dozen, maybe. See Brennan, Remarks at

Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws, Q&A,

September 16, 2011, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/09/video-of-john-brennans-speech/ (accessed August 22, 2013).

In April 2012 Brennan estimated AQAPs overall membership at more than 1,000. See Brennan on bin Laden raid, and

dangerous Yemen, CNN.com, April 20, 2012, http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/04/20/brennan-on-bin-laden-raid-and-

dangerous-yemen/ (accessed June 13, 2013).

A year later the US State Department estimated the number of AQAP members at close to 1,000. See US State Department,

Country Reports on Terrorism 2012: Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, May 30, 2013,

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209982.htm (accessed May 31, 2013). Other sources estimate the group has

hundreds of fighters and thousands of followers. See, e.g., Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Associated Press, August 7,

2013 (accessed August 7, 2013).


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the head of Al-Qaeda central, reportedly named al-Wuhayshi his Masul al-Amm, an Arabic

phrase that translates to general manager.12

Many AQAP fighters have deployed exclusively for an insurgency against the Yemeni

government, including those fighting with Ansar al-Sharia, the domestic offshoot that thegroup created in 2011.13 AQAP has described Ansar Al-Sharia as a vehicle to spread the

groups strict interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) in areas under its control.14

In Saudi Arabia in August 2009, an AQAP suicide bomber attempted to kill Muhammad bin

Nayef, who headed the kingdoms counterterrorism efforts. AQAP also claimed

responsibility for the attempted bombing of a US airliner en route to Detroit on Christmas

Day 2009 by a Nigerian man who unsuccessfully tried to detonate explosives in his

underwear. That year, AQAP claimed responsibility for another failed plot in which it placed

explosive-laden ink cartridges aboard two US-bound cargo planes.15

In July 2010, AQAP launched an English-language magazine, Inspire, aimed both at

recruiting English-speaking members and justifying the groups actions among the

general non-Arab Muslim population. Inspires contributors included the American

cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who was killed in a US drone strike in Yemen in 2011. Its first

issue drew attention worldwide for its pressure-cooker recipe, Make a Bomb in the

Kitchen of Your Mom.16

12 Human Rights Watch interview with Johnsen, June 13, 2013. See also Eli Lake, Meet al Qaedas New General Manager:

Nasser al-Wuhayshi, Daily Beast, August 9, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/09/meet-al-qaeda-s-

new-general-manager-nasser-al-wuhayshi.html; and Daniel Klaidman, Meet the Terrorist Who Most Terrifies Americas

Terrorist Hunters, Daily Beast, August 8, 2013, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/08/meet-the-terrorist-who-

most-terrifies-america-s-terrorist-hunters.html (both accessed August 9, 2013).

13 Human Rights Watch interviews in Yemen and New York with 12 security analysts, journalists, diplomats and Yemeni security

officials who track AQAP, September 2012 and April-September 2013. The US-based Council on Foreign Relations describes

AQAPs primary goals as consistent with the principles of militant jihad, which aims to purge Muslim countries of Western

influence and replace secular apostate governments with fundamentalist Islamic regimes observant of sharia law. Other

declared AQAP objectives include overthrowing the regime in Sanaa; assassinating Western nationals and their allies, including

members of the Saudi royal family; striking at related interests in the region, such as embassies and energy concerns; andattacking the U.S. homeland. See Council on Foreign Relations, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Backgrounder, May

24, 2012, http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian-peninsula-aqap/p9369 (accessed August 9, 2013).

14 See International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, Online Question and Answer Session with Abu Zubayr Adel al-Abab,

April 18, 2011, http://www.islamopediaonline.org/sites/default/files/abdu_zubayr_english.pdf (accessed June 10, 2013).

15 Yemen Profile: Timeline/Al Qaeda in Action, BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14704951

(accessed July 29, 2013).

16 Inspire, September 2010, http://whitehouse.gov1.info/cyber-warfare/inspire-magazine.html (accessed July 29, 2013).


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In 2012, the CIA thwarted a plot by AQAP to blow up a US passenger jet with an upgrade

of the underwear bomb that had failed to properly detonate in 2009.17 At his

confirmation hearing as CIA director in February 2013, John Brennan, then President

Obamas chief counterterrorism advisor, confirmed he had told news analysts that the plot

was never a serious threat because the United States had inside control over it.18

Inside Yemen, AQAPs primary targets are Yemeni government security and foreigners. The

groups attacks have killed hundreds of government military and intelligence personnel.

Generally AQAP has not targeted Yemeni civilians, but the group has killed several

Yemenis it labeled apostates, homosexuals, or spies for the Yemeni and US

governments.19 In October 2013 AQAP killed a German bodyguard to Germanys

ambassador to Yemen.20 At the time of writing AQAP was holding several foreigners for

ransom, including a Saudi diplomat.21

In 2011, AQAPs offshoot Ansar Al-Sharia seized two main towns and nearby villages in

southern Abyan province during the political vacuum created by Yemens 2011 uprising

Yemeni government forces fled their posts as Ansar fighters descended on Abyan.22

17 The Associated Press broke the story, See CIA 'foiled al-Qaida bomb plot' around anniversary of Bin Laden death,

Associated Press, May 7, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/may/07/cia-al-qaida-bomb-plot (accessed June 11,

2013).The US Justice Department responded by seizing the call records for more than 20 telephone lines assigned to The

Associated Press. See Govt Obtains Wide Phone Records in Probe, Associated Press, May 13, 2013,

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/govt-obtains-wide-ap-phone-records-probe (accessed June 11, 2103).18 Nominee for CIA chief says casualties from drone strikes should be public, Reuters, February 15, 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/15/us-obama-nominations-brennan-drones-idUSBRE91E18N20130215 (accessed

June 11, 2013).

19 See American Enterprise Institute, Online Critical Threats Project, AQAP and Suspected AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker

2010, 2011, and 2012, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/aqap-and-suspected-aqap-attacks-yemen-tracker-2010, and

Gulf of Aden Security Review reports for 2013, http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/gulf-aden-security-review (accessed

June 11, 2013).20 The ambassador was not present, according to Germanys Foreign Ministry. See Yemen gunmen kill German guard, as U.N.

worker kidnapped, Al Arabiya, October 6, 2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/10/06/German-

envoy-escapes-kidnap-attempt-in-Yemen.html (accessed October 12, 2013).

21 Ibid.

22 Mohammed Jamjoom and Hakim Almasmari, Islamic militants fight Yemen troops for control of city, locals say, CNN.com,

May 30, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/05/29/yemen.unrest/index.html?hpt=T2 (accessed June 11, 2013). See

also Ahmed al-Haj, Yemeni Leaders Accused of Allowing Islamist Takeover, Associated Press, May 29, 2011,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/29/ali-abdullah-saleh-abdullah-ali-elewa-_n_868633.html (accessed June 11 2013).

Several political observers argue that President Saleh in 2011 allowed Ansar al-Sharia to take over the towns in Abyan to provoke

widespread panic and prompt foreign governments and Yemeni citizens to retain support for him during the uprising. Others

believe the president was simply too preoccupied with his own political survival at the peak of the Yemen uprising to stop the

takeover, which would have required transferring forces to Abyan that were protecting the presidential palace in Sanaa.


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Ansar al-Sharia declared the areas it controlled to be a caliphate and imposed its

interpretation of Islamic law on local populations. At the same time, the group won over

some residents by providing water and basic services.23 AQAP recruited hundreds if not

thousands of fighters from the ranks of Yemens unemployed youth, many of whom

defected to pro-government forces after Ansar al-Sharias retreat from Abyan.24

A combination of Yemeni troops, pro-government militias, and US and allegedly Saudi

airstrikes routed Ansar al-Sharia from Abyan in June 2012 after months of fighting in

which both Yemeni and Ansar forces appeared to violate the laws of war.25 Ansar fighters

dispersed into more remote parts of Abyan as well as other provinces largely outside the

governments reach.

In December 2012, AQAP offered a bounty for killing the US ambassador to Yemen or any

US soldier in the country.26 At the time of writing AQAP continued to clash regularly with

Yemeni government forces and kill ranking intelligence and security officials in

bombings and drive-by shootings including in Sanaa and the southern port city of

Aden.27 In August 2013, al-Wuhayshi, the commander of AQAP, was reportedly

intercepted while electronically plotting attacks on US targets with al-Zawahiri, the head

of Al-Qaeda central, prompting the Obama administration to temporarily shutter 22 US

diplomatic missions worldwide.28

23 See, e.g., Profile: Yemen's Ansar al-Sharia, BBC News, March 17, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-

17402856, and Rukmini Callimachi, Yemen Terror Boss Left Blueprint for Waging Jihad, Associated Press, August 9, 2013

(both accessed August 10, 2013.)

24 Human Rights Watch interviews with Yemeni political analysts, Western diplomats, and journalists, Sanaa, September

2012 and April-May 2013.

25 Human Rights Watch, Yemen: Dozens of Civilians Killed in Southern Fighting, news release, July 9, 2011

(http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/09/yemen-dozens-civilians-killed-southern-fighting). See also Amnesty International,

Conflict in Yemen: Abyans Darkest Hour, December 2012

http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE31/010/2012/en/5c85d728-a9ab-4693-afe9-

edecc2b8670e/mde310102012en.pdf, (accessed June 10, 2013).26 Qaeda in Yemen offers bounty for U.S. ambassador, Reuters, December 12, 2012,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/31/us-yemen-us-qaeda-idUSBRE8BU02I20121231, (accessed June 11, 2013).

27 Yemen Raids Al Qaeda Headquarters, At Least 10 People Killed As Army Retakes Building, AP, October 3, 2013,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/03/yemen-al-qaeda-raid_n_4035746.html (accessed October 4, 2013).28 Lake, Meet al Qaedas New General Manager: Nasser al-Wuhayshi, Daily Beast, August 9, 2013,

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/09/meet-al-qaeda-s-new-general-manager-nasser-al-wuhayshi.html

(accessed August 9, 2013).


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Targeted Killings and US Counterterrorism Activities in Yemen

The use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have

about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, because for all the focus

on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe.29

US President Barack Obama in May 2013 speech on counterterrorism policy

The US government is the largest western donor to Yemen, since 2007 providing more than

US$1 billion to the country, most of it for counterterrorism programs. Since 2009, targeted

killings, the deliberate killing by a government of a known individual under color of law,

have played an increasingly prominent role in US counterterrorism efforts in the country.

Yemen also receives security and development support from the Friends of Yemen, a group

of 39 countries and international organizations.30

Training Yemeni Counterterrorism Units

More than half of the $1 billion in US assistance was earmarked for training and equipping

two counterterrorism units headed until 2013 by former president Salehs close relatives,

according to a US General Accounting Office report. The report found that decision makers

lack the information necessary to adequately assess the results of that assistance.31

The two Yemeni unitsthe military Special Operations Forces and the paramilitary

Counter-Terrorism Unitrarely engaged in counterterrorism operations outside the capital,

and during the 2011 uprising were deployed to guard then-president Saleh.32 The Special

Operations Forces were commanded by Salehs son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, who also headed

the Republican Guard. The Counter-Terrorism Unit was run by Salehs nephew, Yayha Saleh,

29 Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, May 23, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (accessed October 10, 2013).30 The Friends of Yemen include Saudi Arabia and other Gulf neighbors; the United States, European countries including the UK,

France, and Germany; the United Nations, the League of Arab States, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. For a

comprehensive review of US assistance to Yemen, see Jeremy M. Sharp, Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional

Research Service, November 1, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf(accessed August 9, 2013).31 US General Accounting Office, U.S. Assistance to Yemen: Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Emergency Food Aid

and Assess Security Assistance, GAO-13-310, March 20, 2013, p. 24, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-310, (accessed

June 11, 2013).32 Ibid., p. 19. See also US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012: Chapter 2, Middle East and North Africa

Overview, May 30, 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209982.htm (accessed May 31, 2013).


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as part of the Central Security Forces. Both the Republican Guard and Central Security

Forces committed serious human rights violations during Yemens 2011 uprising.33 All of

these forces were being reorganized in 2013 as part of a broader Yemeni security-sector

restructuring overseen by the United States and the European Union.

First Targeted Killing in 2002, Resumption in 2009

In 2002, Yemen became the site of the first known US targeted killing by a remotely piloted

aircraft, or drone. A US Predator launched an attack that killed Abu Ali al-Harithi, the head

of AQY. The strike also killed five other alleged AQY members including Abu Ahmad al-

Hijazi, a US citizen.34

For seven years the United States conducted no further known targeted killings in Yemen,

while the number of such strikes skyrocketed in Pakistan. The United States resumed

targeted killings in Yemen in 2009 within days of designating AQAP a terrorist organization.

Since then, research groups estimate that the United States has carried out an estimated

81 targeted strikes in Yemen with manned aircraft, drones, or sea-launched cruise missiles.

The number of people killed in these strikes has not been reported by the United States or

Yemen. Research groups report that at least 473 people have been killed in these strikes,

the majority of them combatants but many of them civilians.35

The United States had viewed Saleh as a fickle counterterrorism partner.36 But President

Obama has praised his successor, President Hadi, as a staunch ally in US efforts to

33 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, No Safe Places: Yemens Crackdown on Protests in Taizz, February 2012,

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2012/02/06/no-safe-places-0, and Unpunished Massacre: Yemens Failed Response to the

Friday of Dignity Killings, February 2013, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2013/02/12/unpunished-massacre-0.34 Al-Hijazi also was known as also known as Kamal Darwish. See, e.g., The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Yemen:

Reported US Covert Actions 2001-2011, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/03/29/yemen-reported-us-covert-

actions-since-2001/ (accessed July 6. 2013).35 These groups include The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a London-based non-profit research organization, Yemen

Covert Actions, 2002-2013, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2013/;

The Long War Journal, an investigative website of the neo-conservative Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Charting the

data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 2013, http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php;

and the New America Foundation, a centrist US policy institute in Washington, DC, About Drone Wars, Yemen,

http://natsec.newamerica.net/about.36 Human Rights Watch interviews with 12 US government officials and Western diplomats, 2008-2013. US concerns about

Saleh have been widely reported in international media. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Yemens Leader President Hadi Praises US

Drone Strikes, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/world/middleeast/yemens-leader-president-hadi-

praises-us-drone-strikes.html?ref=abdurabbumansourhadi (accessed June 10, 2013).


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counter AQAP.37 Under Hadi, the number of targeted killings quadrupled in 2012 from the

previous year. Although the pace slowed in 2013, at this writing US forces reportedly

carried out 22 drone strikes in Yemen during the first nine months of the year, for the first

time exceeding the number of strikes in Pakistan.38

US airstrikes have killed at least nine alleged high-value targets, a Yemeni government

official with knowledge of the strikes told Human Rights Watch.39 These include four

suspected AQAP leaders, most notably American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, whom the Obama

administration called the head of the groups foreign operations, and Said al-Shihri, its

deputy commander, who had survived at least two previous US strikes.40 Several other

AQAP leaders are believed to remain at large including at least three of the groups four

founders: AQAP commander al-Wuhayshi; military commander Qasim al-Raymi; and bomb-

maker Ibrahim al-Asiri.41

Secrecy of Targeted Killings

President Obama and other top US officials have officially acknowledged the targeted

killings program in general terms since 2010 and the use of armed drones in the program

since 2012.42 But the United States with few exceptions refuses to officially confirm or deny

its role in specific strikes, whether in Yemen or elsewhere. Nor will it disclose other basic

details such as casualty figures for combatants or civilians, who or how many individuals

37 Obama praises Yemeni leader, makes no mention of Guantanamo, Reuters, August 1, 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/01/us-yemen-usa-idUSBRE9701H420130801 (accessed October 8, 2013).

38 There were 21 strikes reported in Pakistan during the first nine months of 2013. See New America Foundation, Drones-

Pakistan Analysis,

http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysishttp://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/analysis, and LWJ,

Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 2002 2013,

http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php (both accessed October 10, 2013).

39 Human Rights Watch interview with a Yemeni government official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, September 2013.

Details of interview withheld at interviewees request.40 Ahmed al-Haj, Al-Qaida branch confirms No 2 Killed in Yemen, Associated Press, July 17, 2013,

http://news.yahoo.com/al-qaida-branch-confirms-no-2-killed-yemen-102604944.html (accessed July 17, 2013).41 Human Rights Watch interview with Johnsen, June 13, 2013, and Johnsen, How We Lost Yemen, Foreign Policy.com,

August 6, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/06/how_we_lost_yemen_al_qaeda?page=0,1.42 See then-US Department of State Legal Advisor Harold Kohs speech The Obama Administration and International Law,

March 25, 2010, http://www.cfr.org/international-law/legal-adviser-kohs-speech-obama-administration-international-law-

march-2010/p22300 and Greg miller, Brennan speech is first Obama acknowledgment of use of armed drones, Washington

Pst, April 4, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/brennan-speech-is-first-obama-

acknowledgement-of-use-of-armed-drones/2012/04/30/gIQAq7B (accessed October 11, 2013).


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are on its kill list, or the extent or findings of any post-strike investigations. It also will not

release its videos of drone strikes.43

Most targeted killings in Yemen are carried out by the US Defense Departments Joint

Special Operations Command (JSOC) in coordination with the CIA. The CIA reportedly hasauthority over virtually all targeted killings in Pakistan and maintains an information

blackout on its strikes, despite mounting pressure to reveal basic details.44 JSOC is almost

as secretive. Media reports in the first half of 2013 predicted President Obama would

announce a transfer of strike authority from the CIA to the US military but at the time of

writing he had not done so.45

Yemeni government officials at times have falsely stated that US airstrikes in Yemen were

the work of the Yemeni Air Force.46

Lack of access to the attack areas, most of which are too dangerous for international

media and investigators to visit, makes it extremely difficult to verify casualty figures,

conclusively determine how many of those killed were civilians, and learn the full

circumstances of a strike.47

43 Drones are equipped with video recording devices that record everything viewed by the drone operator. For more information

on the value of drone video cameras to post-strike investigations see Human Rights Watch, Precisely Wrong: Gaza Civilians

Killed by Israeli Drone-Launched Missiles, June 2009, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2009/06/30/precisely-wrong-0.

44 At John Brennans Senate confirmation hearing as CIA director, members of the Senate Intelligence Committee including

its chairwoman, Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California, repeatedly complained that there was too little transparency about the

targeted killing program, sometimes producing misleading information in the news media. See, e.g., Mike Mazzetti and Scott

Shane, Drones are Focus as CIA Nominee Goes Before Senators, New York Times, February 7, 2013,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/us/politics/senate-panel-will-question-brennan-on-targeted-

killings.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed August 24, 2013).

In March 2013, a US federal appeals court ruled that the CIA could no longer refuse to respond to Freedom of Information Act

requests from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) about its targeted killings on secrecy grounds, since US officials had

publicly discussed the targeted killings programs existence. The following August, the CIA filed another legal brief arguing

that even the disclosure of how many documents it possessed on targeted killings would damage the Governments

counterterrorism efforts. See Drones FOIA - Defendant CIAs Motion for Summary Judgment, ACLU, August 9, 2013,

http://www.aclu.org/national-security/drones-foia-defendant-cias-motion-summary-judgment (accessed August 12, 2013).

45 Peter Baker, In Terror Shift, Obama Took a Long Path, New York Times, May 27, 2013,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/us/politics/in-terror-shift-obama-took-a-long-path.html?pagewanted=all (accessedMay 27, 2013).

46 In 2009, for example, the Saleh government claimed it had carried out a deadly strike in southern Abyan province that

killed at least 41 civilians, although it was later proven to be the work of US-launched cruise missiles. The cable and the

strike are detailed in the Al-Majalah chapter in this report. See also General Petraeus Meeting With Saleh On Security

Assistance, Aqap Strikes, US Embassy Cable, Wikileaks.org, January 4, 2010,

http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10SANAA4.html.47 The same difficulty exists for verifying casualties from US targeted killings in Pakistan and Somalia.


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In a major speech on counterterrorism on May 23, 2013, President Obama said there is a

wide gap between the casualty assessments of his government and nongovernmental

organizations but did not elaborate.48 Brennan in February 2013 told the US Senate

Intelligence Committee that civilian casualties during targeted killings are exceedingly

rare.49 Human Rights Watch is skeptical of these claims in light of the numerous crediblereports of civilian casualties in Yemen and Pakistan.

Brennan also said the administration should make public the overall numbers of civilian

deaths resulting from US strikes targeting Al-Qaeda.50 When the United States kills

civilians during targeted killing operations, he said, the United States government should

acknowledge it.51

Yet the United States has publicly confirmed only two targeted killing operations in Yemen

since 2009those that killed three US citizens.52 Only one is known to have been the

intended target: the cleric al-Awlaki, whom the US alleges was an AQAP leader, although it

has refused to disclose all but one source for the evidence against him. The other two US

citizens included Awlakis teenage son, Abd al-Rahman Anwar al-Awlaki, and Samir Khan,

the editor ofInspire.53

The United States did not publicly acknowledge a direct military role in Yemen until mid-

2012, when it assisted Yemeni forces in carrying out air strikes against AQAP and Ansar

al-Sharia in Abyan province. President Obama said at the time that the United States was

48Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, May 23, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.

49 US Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of John O. Brennan to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,

Responses to Pre-Hearing Questions, February 7, 2013, intelligence.senate.gov/130207/prehearing.pdf.50 US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Nomination of John O. Brennan to be the Director of the Central Intelligence

Agency, Responses to Post-Hearing Questions, February 16, 2013, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130207/posthearing.pdf

(accessed June 11, 2013).51 Nominee for CIA chief says casualties from drone strikes should be public, Reuters, February 15, 2013,

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/15/us-obama-nominations-brennan-drones-idUSBRE91E18N20130215

(accessed June 11, 2013).

52 The 81 reported strikes are detailed by The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Yemen Covert Actions, 2002-2013,

http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/01/03/yemen-reported-us-covert-actions-2013/; The Long War Journal,

Charting the data for US air strikes in Yemen, 20022013,

http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php; and New America Foundation, About Drone

Wars, Yemen, http://natsec.newamerica.net/about (accessed October 10, 2013).53 US Attorney General Eric C. Holder, Letter to Congress on US Counterterrorism Operations, May 22, 2013,

http://www.justice.gov/ag/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf (accessed June 12, 2013). Khan was killed with Anwar al-Awlaki on

September 30, 2011. Awlakis son was killed in a separate strike in Yemen two weeks later.


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not killing persons who did not pose a direct terrorist threat to the United States and its

interests.54 However, the United States continued to withhold all details of its strikes.

Around the same time, the Obama administration reportedly authorized the CIA and JSOC

to carry out so-called signature strikes, which target individuals based on a pattern ofbehavior rather than specific information about their activities, in Yemen.55

Pain Now, or Pain Later

As discussed below, President Obama in May 2013 disclosed a higher threshold for

targeted killings, saying members of Al-Qaeda and undefined associated forces would

be targeted only if they were part of a continuous and imminent threat to the United

States, and that they would be killed only if capture was not feasible.56

Two months later, following reports in July 2013 of a plot against the United States by AQAP

commander al-Wuhaysi and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Obama administration temporarily

shuttered 22 diplomatic missions worldwide,57 and launched nine drone strikes in Yemen

over a two-week period, killing about three dozen alleged AQAP members.58

President Obama denied any backtracking on his targeted killing policy.59 But a senior US

official was quoted that month in the New York Timesas saying that the United States had

expanded the scope of people we could go after in Yemen in response to the alleged plot.

54 President Obamas 2012 War Powers Resolution 6-Month Report, June 15, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-

office/2012/06/15/presidential-letter-2012-war-powers-resolution-6-month-report (accessed June 15, 2012). See also the

speech of John Brennan, then Obamas counterterrorism advisor and now the chief of the CIA, Council on Foreign Relations,

Washington, DC, August 09, 2012, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/transcript-of-john-brennans-speech-at-the-

council-on-foreign-relations/ (accessed June 10, 2013).

55 Eric Schmitt, U.S. to Step Up Drone Strikes Inside Yemen, New York Times, April 26, 2012,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/world/middleeast/us-to-step-up-drone-strikes-inside-yemen.html?_r=0 (accessed

June 10, 2013). The US already was reportedly carrying out signature strikes in Pakistan.


office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (accessed May 23, 2013).57 Lake, Meet al Qaedas New General Manager: Nasser al-Wuhayshi, Daily Beast, August 9, 2013,

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/09/meet-al-qaeda-s-new-general-manager-nasser-al-wuhayshi.html

(accessed August 9, 2013).58 Why the White House blessed the recent Yemen drone strikes, NBC News, August 16, 2013,

http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/16/19948299-why-the-white-house-blessed-the-recent-yemen-drone-

strikes (accessed August 16, 2013).59 Eric Schmitt, Embassies Open, but Yemen Stays on Terror Watch, New York Times, August 11, 2013,

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/world/embassies-open-but-yemen-stays-on-terror-watch.html?_r=0 (accessed August

12, 2013).


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Before, we couldnt necessarily go after a driver for the organization; itd have to be an

operations director, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Now that

driver becomes fair game because hes providing direct support to the plot.60

Two of those killed were on Yemens list of most-wanted terrorists, a Yemeni governmentofficial told Human Rights Watch.61 But NBC News reported that most of those killed in the

strikes in July and August of 2013 were not high-ranking AQAP members and none of the

three alleged AQAP members identified in one strike had operational significance,

raising further questions about administrations application of its stated policy:

The militarys roster was delivered to the White House, said [one US] official,

along with a message that eliminating the targetsmost of whom were

lower level militantswas a question of pain now, or pain later. The

White House could choose between criticism for alleged excessive use of

drones or deal with the consequences of sparing the militants.62

Target Approvals

President Obama reportedly reserves the final say over every targeted killing.63 In Yemen,

President Hadi has said he personally approves each strike as well.64

President Hadi said counterterrorism missions are monitored from a joint operationscenter in Yemen staffed by military and intelligence personnel from the United States,

Saudi Arabia and Oman.

60 Ibid.

61 Human Rights Watch interview with Yemeni government official who spoke on condition of anonymity, September 2013.

Further details withheld at interviewees request.

62 Why the White House blessed the recent Yemen drone strikes, NBC News, August 16, 2013,

http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/16/19948299-why-the-white-house-blessed-the-recent-yemen-drone-

strikes. A senior US official is quoted making similar comments in Schmitt, Embassies Open, but Yemen Stays on Terror

Watch, New York Times, August 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/12/world/embassies-open-but-yemen-stays-

on-terror-watch.html?_r=0.

63 Jo Becker and Scott Shane, Secret Kill List Proves a Test of Obamas Principles and Will, New York Times, May 29, 2012,

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all (accessed

October 8, 2013).64 Greg Miller, In interview, Yemeni president acknowledges approving U.S. drone strikes, Washington Post, September 29, 2012,

http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-29/world/35497110_1_drone-strikes-drone-attacks-aqap (accessed June 10, 2013).


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A career military officer, President Hadi has publicly praised drone strikes, describing the

remotely piloted vehicles as more advanced than the human brain. He acknowledged

errant strikes early in the targeted killings campaign, but said that both Yemen and the

United States have taken multiple measures to avoid mistakes of the past.65

As a military guy, Hadi is terribly impressed with the technology, one foreign diplomat

told Human Rights Watch. But, he added, even if the Yemeni president reviews every strike,

he gives the United States carte blanche on the final decision.66

AQAP Surge and Backlash

Popular discontent with the US airstrikesevidenced by demonstrations, roadblocks, and

confirmed in interviews with scores of Yemeni citizens as well as security analysts,

diplomats, and journalistshas generated hostility toward the United States and

undermined public confidence in the Yemeni government. Security analysts believe this

significantly bolsters the ranks of AQAP.67

Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen scholar and AQAP expert, estimates that the number of rank-

and-file may have tripled since the United States resumed targeted killings in 2009, from

300 to more than 1,000.68

AQAP analysts say the growth may stem from several factors that include a security

vacuum in Yemen during the 2011 uprising. And US officials contend that the numbers

would be higher if the United States was not actively carrying out attacks. But the backlash

against US killings beyond AQAPs inner circle is most frequently cited as the primary

cause of opposition to the strikes.

65 Ibid.66 Human Rights Watch interview, New York, May 2013. Details withheld at interviewees request.67 Human Rights Watch interviews with AQAP experts including Gregory Johnsen, New York, June 13, 2013; journalist Abdul

Razzaq Ahmad al-Jamal, Sanaa, April 24 and May 8, 2013; al-Bokairi, April 24, 2013; and Abdul Salam Muhammad, president,

Abaad Studies and Research Center, Sanaa, April 24, 2013, as well as with a Yemeni government official who spoke on

background, September 2013.

68 Human Rights Watch interview with Johnsen, June 13, 2013. See also Johnsen, How We Lost Yemen, Foreign Policy.com,

August 6, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/06/how_we_lost_yemen_al_qaeda (accessed October 10, 2013).


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The New York Times reported in 2012 that the United States was focused on killing or

capturing about two dozen AQAP operative leaders in Yemen, not an entire domestic

insurgency.69 Johnsen said that the number of primary US targets may now be down to 10

or 15. On August 5, 2013, the Yemeni authorities released a list of its most wanted

terrorists that contained 25 names.70 A Yemen official said that of those, three had sincebeen detained and two had been killed in drone strikes, reducing the number to 20.

According to Johnsen:

A lot of people are dying in those strikes. Yet the head of AQAP is still alive,

his military commander is still alive, and its top bomb-maker is still alive.

The fallout from all of these deaths is something the US doesnt seem to

quite take into account.71

Some if not many of those killed by the United States outside AQAPs core membership

may have been fighters in the domestic insurgency against the Yemeni government.72 But

as a policy matter, such killings risk doing the United States more harm than good by

alienating large segments of the Yemeni population.73

Any backlash in Yemen is compounded because even when strikes hit AQAP fighters who

may be lawfully targeted in an armed conflict situation, they are usually killing members of

tightly knit families and tribes, not fighters from outside their communities. The United

States can target and kill someone as a terrorist, only to have Yemenis take up arms to

defend him as a tribesman, Johnsen said.74

69 Eric Schmitt, U.S. Teaming With New Yemen Government on Strategy to Combat Al Qaeda, New York Times, February 26,

2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/27/world/middleeast/us-teaming-with-yemens-new-government-to-combat-al-

qaeda.html?_r=0 (accessed June 16, 2013). As previously noted, John Brennan, then President Obamas chief

counterterrorism advisor, said in 2011 that the number of AQAP members the US was targeting a couple of dozen, maybe.

See BrennanQ&A, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/09/video-of-john-brennans-speech).

70 Government of Yemen press release, August 5, 2013. Copy on file with Human Rights Watch.

71 Human Rights Watch interview with Johnsen, June 13, 2013.

72 For example, some airstrikes launched by the United States apparently killed combatants as they wore suicide vests and

were preparing to attack Yemeni military forces. See Scott Shane, Election Spurred a Move to Codify U.S. Drone Policy, New

York Times, November 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/world/white-house-presses-for-drone-rule-

book.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed July 20, 2013).

73 Ibid. See also interview with Council on Foreign Relations fellow Micah Zenko, Have U.S. Drones Become a

Counterinsurgency Air Force for Our Allies? ProPublica, November 27, 2012, http://www.propublica.org/article/have-u.s.-

drones-become-a-counterinsurgency-air-force-for-our-allies (accessed August 19, 2013).74 Johnsen, How We Lost Yemen, Foreign Policy.com, August 6, 2013.


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Despite President Hadis embrace of the strikes, many Yemenis consider them a violation

of national sovereignty and note that the Yemeni parliament has never authorized US

armed intervention in Yemen.75

In July 2013 Yemens National Dialogue Conference, tasked with drafting the countrys newpolitical and constitutional roadmap, called for criminalizing under Yemeni law any

drone strikes and other killings during counterterrorism operations that violate

international law.76 That language is multiple steps from being translated into action and

would in any case duplicate legal standards already in effect on the international level.

Nevertheless, its approval by the conference, which represents a broad spectrum of

Yemeni society, suggests the extent of domestic opposition to targeted killings.

AQAP has also been quick to capitalize on that anger. In a 2013 issue ofInspiremagazine

the group wrote that the real target of US drones is not terrorism but Islam:

In Yemen, they roam over Muslim houses, terrorizing children, women and

the weak. Moreover they bombard suspected targets in villages, towns

and cities without the need to identify the real identity of the target,

whether Al-Qaeda or not. Obama is declaring a crusade! These missiles

have no eyes and their launchers are more blind [sic]. They kill civilians

more than mujahideen.77

Another factor contributing to backlash is that many Yemenis seem to fear the US

airstrikes and Yemeni military and police forces more than they fear AQAP.78 During the

countrys 2011 uprising, Yemens military and police forces killed numerous protesters

or otherwise used excessive lethal force against largely peaceful protests. This does

not discount the many serious abuses committed against civilians by AQAP and Ansar

75 Human Rights Watch interviews with dozens of Yemenis during six visits to Yemen, 2012-13, as well as media reports and

interviews with political analysts.

76 National Dialogue Conference, Report on the Results and Recommendations of Phase I (Arabic), July 8, 2013, p. 31,

section 3. Copy on file with Human Rights Watch.77Inspiremagazine, Winter 2013, http://info.publicintelligence.net/InspireWinter2013.pdf (accessed July 23, 2013).

78 Human Rights Watch interviews with dozens of Yemeni citizens during six visits to Yemen, as well as 12 Yemeni and

foreign security and policy experts, diplomats, and journalists who track AQAP, Sanaa and Aden, February 2012-May 2013.


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al-Sharia. But the available evidence suggests that the vast majority of the hundreds of

people killed by AQAP since its inception are members of the Yemeni security forces.79

US Long-term Counterterrorism Strategy for Yemen

If the United States considers Yemeni popular support to be important in its operations

against AQAP, reducing civilian casualties should be a top priority, regardless of

whether the civilian deaths were the result of violations of international law.80 The

United States learned this lesson after US and NATO airstrikes against Taliban forces

killed hundreds of civilians in Afghanistan. As the senior US military commander in that

country acknowledged in 2010: If we kill civilians or damage their property in the

course of our operations, we will create more enemies than our operations eliminate.81

In his May 2013 speech on counterterrorism policy, President Obama said the next phase

of countering violent militancy involves addressing the underlying grievances and

conflicts that feed extremism.82

Several Yemeni and Western political analysts and civil society activists who spoke to

Human Rights Watch concur, arguing that any counterterrorism strategy in Yemen also

requires a sustained commitment to addressing the factors that make the country fertile

ground for violent militancy. That means fostering democracy and a more accountable

government, and increasing access to basics such as water, health, education, and jobs.83

The United States doesnt need drones to fight AQAP, said Nashwan al-Othmani, an

Aden-based journalist and political activist. Just bread and cheese.84

79 See, e.g., Critical Security Threats, AQAP and Suspected AQAP Attacks in Yemen Tracker, May 12, 2012,

http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/aqap-and-suspected-aqap-attacks-yemen-tracker-2010.

80 See International Law and US Policy chapter of this report for details on US international legal obligations for

targeted killings.

81 Commander of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Refined Counterinsurgency (COIN) Guidance, August 1,2010, http://natolibguides.info/counterinsurgency/documents (accessed August 19, 2013).


office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university (accessed May 23, 2013).

83 See, e.g., Letter to President Obama on Yemen, coordinated by the Hariri Center for the Middle East at the Atlantic Council

and the Project on Middle East Democracy signed by 30 foreign policy experts, March 26, 2013,

http://pomed.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Yemen-Policy-Initiative-Letter-to-Obama-6-25-12.pdf84 Human Rights Watch interview with Nashwan al-Othmani, Aden, May 3, 2013.


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But social and economic issues are only part of the equation if they ignore the political

grievances and government repression that also fuel support for militancy. The United

States and other concerned governments should press the Yemeni government to adopt

measures to end human rights violations by all government and allied forces and hold

perpetrators to account.

In 2012, the US government for the first time provided more development assistance than

overt security assistance to Yemen$198 million US for economic and humanitarian aid

compared to $158 million for counterterrorism and other security assistance.85 At the same

time, the United States continued to support a blanket amnesty for former president Saleh

and all his aides for any political crimes they may have committed during Salehs 33-year

presidencypart of a deal to usher Saleh out of power, while continuing targeted killings

in Yemen. In mid-2013, the United States also predicted that the war on terrorism would

continue for years.86

85 US State Department, Fact Sheet: U.S. Assistance to Yemen, March 7, 2013,

http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/03/205816.htm.86 Karen DeYoung, Policy on drone strike authorization doesnt need to change, Defense official says, Washington Post,

May 16, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-05-16/world/39310141_1_drone-strikes-sheehan-aumf (accessed

July 29, 2013).


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II. Case Studies

1. Wessab: Strike on Alleged Local

hrw: "between a drone and al-qaeda" - the civilian cost of us targeted killings in yemen

Documents