hsid ancient philosophy lecture 14 the problem of evil, consolation of philosophy, book iv

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HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy , Book IV

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Page 1: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

HSIDAncient Philosophy

Lecture 14

The Problem of Evil,Consolation of

Philosophy, Book IV

Page 2: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Housekeeping Anything? Take roll, Brian WRITE THIS DOWN:

“http://mugwump.pitzer.edu/~bkeeley/class/hsid/” <-- powerpoints are here.

Next week? Final exam details

Page 3: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The Problem of Evil Question: why does evil exist? Why do bad things happen to

good people? Why do the innocent suffer?

A problem for all. If you are an atheist, an agnostic, a scientific materialist, you have the problem of how values (good/bad, pretty/ugly, etc.) can exist in a world of facts.

If values exist, then what is the foundation or basis of them? Science tells us what is the case, not what ought to be the case.

Page 4: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The Problem of Evil Bk IV, Ch. 1, lns 3-7. Lady Philosophy will show that: The powerful men are in fact

always the good The wicked are always the abject

and the weak Vices never go unpunished Nor virtues unrewarded The good always achieve

success and the wicked suffer misfortune.

A tall order!

Page 5: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The Problem of Evil Boethius, as a theist, has a

different version of the problem: How is his image of God consistent with the apparent existence of evil in the world.

In other words, how can he reconcile the image of God he presents at the end of Book III, with the fact that he is in jail (awaiting a rather nasty execution), while his accusers are living it up in Rome?

Page 6: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Note She will do this without

reference to an afterlife (b/c belief in an afterlife requires faith and he wishes to present an argument that even the non-faithful can agree with)

(Bk IV, ch 4, lns 22-23)

Also, the argument has two parts: Bks I-IV, and a different, better argument in Bks V-VII

Page 7: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The first, weaker argument

Q: What do all people seek? A: A good life, something that

they think will make them happy. Q: Is this true of what we call

“evil people”? Thieves, liars, terrorists?

But notice, if the analysis presented in Books II & III is correct, we see that evil people are going about seeking happiness in the wrong way. Relying on power, wealth, etc., won’t get you happiness!

Page 8: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The first, weaker argument

So, if happiness is what they seek, then only the good will succeed (because they are the only ones going about it in the right way!)

All the evil seem to be able to do ultimately is make themselves more and more miserable.

Page 9: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The first, weaker argument

“So since both seek the good, but good men attain it while evil men certainly do not, can there be any doubt that good men have capability, whereas evil men are weak?” (IV, 2,15)

Page 10: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The first, weaker argument

Further, Lady Philosophy argues that the alleged “power” of evil actions is no power at all. All it can do is destroy.

It takes a skilled carpenter to build a barn. Any moron with a sledgehammer or a match can destroy one.

Page 11: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The evil are not even fully human

At several points, Lady Philosophy argues that to the extent that an individual pursues evil, the less fully human he or she becomes.

In one sense, those who are evil don’t exist (their bodies exist, but they don’t exist as genuine human beings, IV, 2, 34-36).

In another sense, by pursuing things not proper to humans, they are more like animals than humans (IV, 3, 17-21)

Page 12: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Chapter 4 Some very counterintuitive things

about how punishment makes the wicked happy (because it shows them the error of their ways and gives them a chance to turn their lives around and start pursuing what might actually make them happy).

Page 13: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The Stronger Argument At chapter 5, Boethius-the-

character basically says: “Yeah, all that’s fine & dandy, but what the heck am I [a good person] doing sitting in this darn jail!?”

For all this discussion of the nature of good and evil and their respective power, there still seems to be a lot of chaos in the world; good and evil just all mixed up together.

The world seems to be ruled by Lady Luck (Fortune), not God.

Page 14: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

(IV, 6, 2-3): “Philosophy smiled briefly, and said: ‘The topic to which you challenge me is the greatest of all to investigate; it is virtually inexhaustible. It is the sort of subject in which when one doubt is excised countless others spring up like the Hydra’s heads, and there would be no limit to them if one did not restrain them by applying the most penetrating fire of the mind.” [Note: she calls on reason here, not faith.]

Page 15: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Ch 6, line 7-10: “The birth of all things, the entire development of natures subject to change, and all that is in any way stirred to motion, derive their causes and order and shapes from the unchanging steadfastness of the divine mind [i.e., "God" = being that created the universe]. This mind… decides upon the complex plan of the course of events. This plan, when envisaged in the total clarity of the divine intelligence, is called Providence; but as related to things which that intelligence moves and orders, it has been labeled Fate... That the two concepts are different will readily become clear if we mentally consider the force of each. Providence is the divine reason itself, established within the highest originator of all things, who disposes them all, whereas Fate is the order imposed on things that change, through which Providence interlinks each and every object in their due arrangement….”

Page 16: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

“…Providence indeed embraces all things alike, however different and however boundless, whereas Fate organizes the separate movement of individual things, and allocates them according to place, shape, and time. [That is, in our universe, like things seem to be associated with like things. Dogs give birth to dogs, not zebras. However, in a sense, God created all things, so must be able to join together the most varied objects in his Divine Plan of the universe.] Thus when this arrangement of temporal order is a unity within the foresight of the divine mind, it is Providence, whereas when that unity is separated and unfolded at various times, it is called Fate.”

Page 17: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Ch. 6, line 53-56: “But—’how hard it is to say all this as though I were a god!’ [a quotation from Homer]—for it is not right for a man either mentally to grasp or to explain in words all the workings of God's creation. [Although, he's been trying hard for the past 92 pages!] It must be enough merely to realize that God, the author of all things in nature, orders all of them and guides them to the good. He hastens to maintain in his own image the things which he has brought to birth, and through the chain of necessity imposed by Fate, he excludes all the evil from the boundaries of his commonwealth. [God doesn't, in fact, create anything evil.] So if you were to observe Providence dispensing all the plenty which men believes to exist on earth, you would not imagine that there was any evil present at all there! [If we saw things from God's perspective, we would see that all alleged 'evil' was actually good.]”

Page 18: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

So, his solution to the problem of evil is that all alleged evil is merely an illusion created by our limited perspective on the world.

We cancan know that God exists and that God must have a very different vantage point on the world than we do.

We can’tcan’t know what the world looks like from that vantage point, even though can know that it is more comprehensive.

Therefore, it’s possible that what seems evil to us is good on the larger scheme of things.

Page 19: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Consider this analogy: The relationship between a five-

year-old and an adult. She knows that adults know a

heck of a lot more than she does. (They can drive the car and make dinner and fix toys.)

They also make her do things that seem downright “evil” to her (those darn brussel sprouts!)

But she can reason that they have her best interest in mind even if she can’t know what they now. (And this need not be based solely on faith.)

Page 20: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

This fate/providence argument and the earlier argument about the weakness of evil are Boethius’ explanation for reconciling his belief in the consolation of philosophy with his current situation.

He is confronting the consequences of his beliefs and trying to address a reader’s likely problems with it

Of course, he can’t stop now, because his solution to the problem of evil generates another problem…

Page 21: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The Problem of Free Will,

Consolation of Philosophy, Book V

Page 22: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Ch. 6, line 53-56: “But—’how hard it is to say all this as though I were a god!’ [a quotation from Homer]—for it is not right for a man either mentally to grasp or to explain in words all the workings of God's creation. [Although, he's been trying hard for the past 92 pages!] It must be enough merely to realize that God, the author of all things in nature, orders all of them and guides them to the good. He hastens to maintain in his own image the things which he has brought to birth, and through the chain of necessity imposed by Fate, he excludes all the evil from the boundaries of his commonwealth. [God doesn't, in fact, create anything evil.] So if you were to observe Providence dispensing all the plenty which men believes to exist on earth, you would not imagine that there was any evil present at all there! [If we saw things from God's perspective, we would see that all alleged 'evil' was actually good.]”

Page 23: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Argument againstagainst compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge & Free

WillCh. 3, lines 3-6, p. 100: “There seems to be a considerable contradiction and inconsistency… between God's foreknowing all things and the existence of any free will. If God foresees all things and cannot be in any way mistaken, then what Providence has foreseen will happen and must inevitably come to pass. So if God has prior knowledge from eternity not only of men’s actions but also of their plans and wishes, there will be no freedom of the will; for the only action and any sort of intention which can possibly exist in the future will be foreknown by divine Providence, which cannot be misled. If such actions and aspirations can be forcibly diverted in some direction other than was foreseen, certain knowledge of the future will no longer exist, but instead there will be vacillating opinion; and I regard it as sacrilege to believe this of God.”

Page 24: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The dilemma, in essence Boethius is presenting the problem of free will

as a dilemma pitting God's omniscience against our free will: Either God has perfect knowledge of everything that's ever going to happen (which implies that every “moral” decision you will ever make was already decided at the beginning of the universe), or you have the ability to make genuinely free decisions about your life (which implies that there is something that God doesn’t know, namely what the outcomes of your free decisions will be).

Poker analogy: Boethius is going “all-in”“all-in” at this point

Page 25: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

A tempting (but false) start

Chapter 1 raises the issue of chance or randomness.

Philosophy argues that strictly speaking, there is nothing random in this world, although our ignorance makes us think there is.

Example: the buried treasure. This sets up the latter solution

Boethius presents, but ultimately randomness is not the same as freedom.

Page 26: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

The Three Components of Boethius's Proposed

Solution1) A theory of knowledge

2) The distinction between eternity and time

3) The distinction between simple and conditional necessity

Page 27: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

1) A theory of knowledge Once again, keep in mind that God's position and point-

of-view on the world is vastly different from ours. He takes from Aristotle this break down of the nature of knowledge (which differs somewhat from Plato)

1. Sensation: all living things have this to a degree. 2. Imagination: higher animals possess this; dogs can

remember where the food is when in the cabinet. 3. Reason: humans possess this; they not only build up an

image of a thing, but can abstract them and hold them in their minds, while comparing the relationships between them. However, this form of knowledge must proceed step-by-step, as in logic and math.

4. Intelligence: souls, or spirits separate from a body, can know truth without having to reason about it. They can see truth immediately without having to go through steps. Analogy: intuition.

Page 28: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

2) Eternity vs. Time All created beings are temporal. We

live within time. One thing happens then another. You come into existence. You live a while. You go out of existence. (At least, your body does!)

God, on the other hand, is the creator (by definition). He created everything that exists in time. He created time itself. God transcends time. God is not a temporal being, but rather is eternal. He must live in “the eternal present”.

Page 29: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

2) Eternity vs. Time

Ch. 6, ln 16, p. 112: Philosophy says, “…your judgment will be more correct should you seek to envisage the foresight by which God discerns all things not as a sort of foreknowledge of the future, but as knowledge of the unceasingly present moment.”

Page 30: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

3) The distinction between simple and

conditional (or logical) necessity

What we commonly call “necessity” really comes in two forms. Consider the two claims:

a) There will never exist a sphere of pure gold 1,000,000 miles in diameter

b) There will never exist a sphere of enriched uranium (U235)1,000,000 miles in diameter.

Both of these statements are (probably) true, and in a sense, both are necessarily true. But the truth of A) is only conditionally true. B), however, is a simple necessity.

Page 31: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

3) The distinction between simple and

conditional (or logical) necessity

The “walking” example (p. 113). If I see somebody walking, it is necessary (in a sense) that she is walking (otherwise, I wouldn't be seeing this!). But this action (walking) is voluntary on her part. Given that she chose to walk (this is the “condition”), she can be said to be conditionally necessarily walking.

Page 32: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Putting it all together Ch 6, ln 18-24, p. 112. P: “Why, then, do

you demand that things surveyed by the divine light be necessary, when even men do not pronounce as necessary the things they see? Surely, when you observe things before you, your seeing them does not impose any necessity on them?”

B: “Of course not.”

Page 33: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Putting it all together P: “But if it is appropriate to compare the

divine present with the human, then just as you men see certain things in this temporal present of yours, so God sees all things in his eternal present. Hence this divine foreknowledge does not change the nature and character of things; God sees them as present before his eyes as they will emerge at some time in the future. Nor does he make confused judgments about things; with a single mental glance he distinguishes those future events which will occur by necessity from those which will not. …”

Page 34: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Putting it all together “…Consider this parallel. When you observe at

one time a man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the sky, even though you see them simultaneously, you distinguish them, and you judge the first movement to be voluntary, and the second to be necessary. So it is with the divine reason, as it looks out on the whole world; it certainly does not dislocate the nature of those things which for God are in the present, but which in their temporal aspect are in the future. So when God knows that something is about to take place, something which he is well aware need not come to pass, this is not an opinion but knowledge which rests on truth.”

Page 35: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Putting it all together

In other words, if Boethius is correct, God's foreknowledge/ omniscience need not conflict with our free will. He is in a position to know things without forcing them to happen. He can know the outcomes of our free choices.

Page 36: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite

AKA: “Pseudo-Denys” 5th-6th century author thought

in Medieval period to be either The “Dionysius” converted by St. Paul or “St. Denis” a French theologian

Forgery? Well, that’s a modern concept.

Page 37: HSID Ancient Philosophy Lecture 14 The Problem of Evil, Consolation of Philosophy, Book IV

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite

Key concepts: Positive vs. Negative Theology

(“via negativa”--Apophatic theology)

“Unknowing” Two senses of knowing