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COINAND AND GENERA.L STAFF COLLEGEFORT LFAVEMYORTH..KA.NSAS

ARCHAVES Logistics Specialized CourseCGSC FT LhAVL~NWORTH KAN Regular Cla ss 1948-1949

DEC 111952ACCESSION NO_ ___-U LLGlSTRY_________

UnDERGROUND FACILITIES FORSTORA~GE INTHEl ZONIE OF INTERIOR

COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH IBRARYFORT LEAVENWORTH, KS

3 1695 00513 8649


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COM~NlD AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE 6021Department of LogisticsFort Leavenworth, Kansas

19(Date)

STUDENT RESEARCH DIRECTIVE FOR SUBJECT NUMBER .1-16

STUDENT(Name) (Rank) (ASN)

FACULTY ADVISOR (Name) (Room No.) (Tele. No.)SUBJECT Underground Facilities for Storage in the Zone of Interior.

PURPOSE:To present the problem of underground facilities for storage inth e Z/I and develop principles which should govern the develop-ment and use of such facilities in peace and -war.


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subject. The student is encouraged to modify the above scope as hemay find necessary to outline and define the specific problem hevisualizes and proposes to develop in his research study.

2. The references below are furnished to give the student enoughmaterial with which to begin his research. It is anticipated that thestudent will make use of other available sources in order to give ade-quate scope to his subject, and to include latest developments pertain-ing to the subject.REFERENCES:Pan SecNos. 85 and 86.........The Depot System and its operation in Future Warfare.(Dept of Log. Student Analytical Studies 1947-48)N-15083D .............. *Source Material on the National Security Program

Vi Jan 1947.M406 0.73 B6.... . . . . . . .Armored Cavalry Journal - p. 2, Industry Underground.C-11896 ............... Program of Installations, WD Progress Report, 51

Iay 1947.R -15 62 8.. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .D ep ot Operations, WND Progress Report, 31 May 1947.0-15632................Post War Installation Study (For Planning Purposes

only) 28 September 1945.N-15257 A & B....,.....History of Storage Operations, Army Service Forces,

December 1941 to December 1945.M ilitary Review Article prepared by Lt. Col. Goshorn.


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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGEii| Ei iIDepartment of Logistics

.... . Fort Leavenworth, KansasFile No. 1-16 24 May 1949SUBJECTs Underground Facilities fo r Storage in the Zone of Interior.TOs Director, Department of Logistics, C&GSC.

1. PROBLEM. -- To present the problem of underground facilitiesfor storage in the Zone of Interior, and develop principles whichshould govern the development and use of such facilities in peaceand war.

2. ASSUMPTIONS. -- a. That the United States will become anactive participant in the next World War.

b. That the industrial potential of the United States willbe a high priority target in the next World War.

3. DISCUSSION. -- a. Germany and Japan experienced the needfor underground installations during World War II. Both countriesgained little advantage from use of such facilities because they


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Maejor disadvantage is the high initial cost. (Annex 8) .

4. CONCLUSIONS. - a. Protection for depots in the Zone ofInterior is necessary to safeguard vital military materiel fromdestruction during an unannounced attack.

b. A balanced program of dispersed, underground, andabove-ground depots will give the maximum protection at minimumcost.

5. ACTION RECOMENDED. -- a. That the Director of Logistics,GSUSA, take appropriate steps to establish a program, having as itsobjective the development and use of underground storage facilitiesin the Zone of Interior.

b. That the Chief of Staff, United States Army, be re-quested to approve and publish, for the guidance of staff plannersconcerned, the recommended principles and policies attached.(Annex 3).

c. That this study be approved and forwarded to the


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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGEFORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

SUBJECT: Underground Facilit ies For Storage in the Zone of Interi4TO

C( xndantuedGSC

(IDENTIFY THIS MEMORANDUM SLIP WITH PAPERS TO WHICH ATTACHEESUBJECT MATTER

1. I concur in the recommendations of the attached researchstudy.

2. Request that this study be transmitted to the Directorof Logistics, GSUSA, by means of a letter, (Annex 2)which has been prepared fo r your signature.

or.FRO M ililfiliA

DATE AN D

F. A. BENNINGColone l, FA

DirectorDept of Logistics


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DRAFT

COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGEFORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

SUBJECT: Underground Facilities fo r Storage in the Zone of Interior.TO: The Director,

Logistic Division, GSUSAThe Pentagon,Washington 25, D. C.

1. The attached staff study, Underground Facilities fo rStorage in the Zone of Interior, is transmitted to you fo r consid-eration and appropriate action.

2. The research study was prepared by a student in thisCollege and concurred in by the Director, Department of Logistics,The reconmendations made fo r the development and use of under-ground storage facilities in the Zone of Interior appear to haveconsiderable merit.


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"l' "i iiiAINEX 3 IIE

RECOMMEMDED PRINCIPLES AN ) POLICIES

The principles and policies listed below are believed applica-ble to a general program fo r development and use of undergroundstorage installations in the zone of the interior.

1. Planning. -- Planning fo r adequate protection of the Armystorage system must be started without delay. The long span oftime between planning and actual construction and use makes thispolicy mandatory.

2. Economy. -- A depot program must be developed that strikesa practical balance of dispersed, underground, and above-groundstorage facilities. Such a program will give the maximum protec-tion a t minimum cost.

3. Development -- The required facilities must be developedduring peacetime in order to achieve its objective, namely, theprotection of vital materiel from destruction during a sudden

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storage system and its expansion to meet wartime requirements mustbe retained at the General Staff, U. S. Army, level to insure thatit meets over-all Army requirements.


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AMNEX 4

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND e

1. Summary - Underground depots, as such, were not con-structed by any nation. Both Germany and Japan resorted to hastydispersal and underground installations programs in the laststages of World War II. Lack of proper planning is evident in th eprogram of each country. Bombing attacks on Germany's transporta-tion net prevented more effective use of dispersed and undergroundinstallations.

The U. S. storage facility at Atchison, Kansas, demonstrates i!Sthe feasibility of converting existing mines into usable space.

2. Conclusions. -- Although consideration of storage facili-ties was no t an outstanding feature of foreign underground instal-lations programs, it is believed that the following general con-clusions are applicable to any underground program:

a. There must be early and comprehensive planning fo r any


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te successful Allied bombings of the V weapons plants,caused a change in the thinking of the German authorities andthese plants were moved underground. The continued bombings leftGermany no recourse, and by 1944 a large scale program was under-way to place vital production underground. This program containedprovisions fo r the excavation and construction of military storageand supply depots, but the need for protecting industrial installa-tions was greater. 2/ As a result, German wartime storage was animprovised use of abandoned tunnels, brewery vaults, and beer cel-lars. _/

b. Germany generated approximately 83 percent of the 279verified foreign underground installations. i/

o. The German program was hastily conceived and imple-mented; its results were not satisfactory. Lack of space, poor lay-out, lack of ventilation and sanitation were contributing factors. 3/

d. Germany tried most types of protective measures, in-


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built since 1940. Power plants and light industry are included inthe program. The plants are small, well-planned and well-engineered.

b. Japan started underground dispersal in the earlymonths of 1945. Work was started on a t least 23 installations, andat the end of the war about 2.9 million square feet had been com-pleted. The outstanding part of the Japanese program is that itemphasizes the futility of inadequately planned and hastily imple-mented underground dispersal programs. For the most part, thesefeatured crude, substandard working conditions and lack of facili-t ies. In some eases, even roads and railroads were lacking. _/

o. United States. -- The United States, under control ofthe Department of Agriculture, operates the U. S. Natural CoolerStorage facil i ty at Atchison, Kansas. This underground facility isa limestone mine used to store surplus agricultural products pur-chased by the government, I/ It demonstrates the feasibility ofconverting existing mine space into useable underground storage


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0i, ANEX 5

PRESENT U. S. STORAGE SYSTEM1. Summary. -- Depots perform the vital function of storing,

distributing, and providing base maintenance fo r the Army in th eZone of Interior. In general, the peacetime depot system formsthe nucleus fo r needed wartime expansion. A close relationshipexists between depots, centers of population and industry, as wellas the transportation system of the nation.

2. Conclusions.a. Depots are a vital step in furnishing supplies and

equipment to the Army.b. Location of storage facilities near industrial centers

is desirable to save time in transit and lower transportation costs.c. The transportation system of the nation is the artery

that moves Army supplies to the point and at the time needed.d. The peacetime depot system is generally expanded to


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(3) As reserve depots to store materiel for: otherdepots, war reserve, special operational projects, and other pur-poses.

(4) Additional functions may be assigned depots, suchass assembly of end items, maintenance operations, salvage func-tions, procurement, and many others. 2/

b. It is readily apparent from the above that, based onits mission, the scope of activity ut each installation may be verybroad, and the facilities required will be varied in nature.

o. With perhaps a few exceptions, the facilities, includ-ing some manufacturing arsenals, fo r base maintenance of the manythousands of items used by the Army are closely integrated with thedepot system.

5. Expansion durin World War II. -- At a cost of over onebillion dollars the Army's storage and shipping facilities were ex -panded from thirty-two depots to over one hundred and fifty during


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study of this map reveals that nearly 50 percent of present depotsare located in the northeastern industrial region of the UnitedStates. This area is roughly represented by a rectangle, whoselong axis extends from St. Louis, Missouri, to Boston, lassachusetts;short axis from Detroit, Michigan, to Baltimore, Maryland. Minorconcentrations are located around the San Francisco, California,Seattle, Washington, and Salt Lake City, Utah, areas.

7. Depot-Population Relationship. -- One resource a depotmust have is manpower, skilled and unskilled. Therefore, it isessential that depots be located near centers of population. Indus-trial areas generally coincide with areas of dense population. Aglance at Map B shows that no less than fifteen depots are concen-trated in the relatively small, but highly populated, area betweenWashington, D. C., and New York, New York, a distance of approxi-mately 200 miles. Other smaller concentrations exist in the Chicago-Toledo area, in the vicinity of St. Louis, Missouri, around San


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tern. The greatest density of railroads is observed to be east ofthe Mississippi. The rail net has great directional flexibility inthe eastern part of the country. It thins out to three major trans-continental lines west of the Mississippi, where considerably lessflexibility of direction exists. Along the west coast, the systemit almost rigidly north-south.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

y/ TM 38-420, 1946.2/ DA. SB 38-3, Part I, 1948./ N-16266 Logistics in World War II. Army Service Forces, WarDepartment, July 1947.


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ANNEX 6p 1,42

NECESSITY FOR PROTECIPbIP -- I L

1. Summary. -- The likelihood of war is such that its dismis-sal would not be realistic. The important new means of warfare toconsider are: faster long range aircraft; the atomic bomb; and

guided missiles. The airplane can now reach any part of the world.The atomic bomb is one of the great destructive forces to be con-sidered in future warfare. Guided missiles development is reachingthe point where they, too, will become a major threat. Any majorpotential enemy must be extended the capability of possessing now,or being capable of developing within the immediate future, anycombination of the important means of warfare. The major targetsenvisaged fo r these weapons will be industrial centers, populationcenters, large ports, and military concentrations of decisive im-

portance.2. Conclusions. --

60,--PII~~Y L

I": i


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circumstances, it is the duty of responsible military and civilleaders of the nation to make plans that will ensure the securityof the country on the one hand, while working diligently to wardoff disaster on the other.

I 5. Characteristics of the Important New Means of Warfare. --The important new means of warfare that affect this problem are:the airplane, the atomic bomb, guided missiles, and bacteriologicaland chemical warfare.

a. The airlane. - World War II made it quite clear thatair power increased the sphere of active hostilities to include thesource of a nation's strength, i.e., its industrial potential andcivil population. Our present planes are faster and have greaterload-carrying capacities and greater ranges. The recent non-stop,around-the-world fl ight by a United States Air Force bomber empha-sizes this fact. The implication of all this, of course, is thatif the United States can fly non-stop around the world, so can any


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with their cost in national resources. i bingstrategic planners cannot waste this type weapon on targets thatwill not have a decisive effect on the course of a war. / Therange of targets considered decisive are included in the following,but are not necessarily limited to , nor in, the priority listed:

(a) Industrial centers(b) Population centers(c) Large ports and inland transportation centers(d) Atomic weapons plants(e) Seats of government(f) Military concentrations of decisive importance

(3) It is doubtful if any one depot could ever be con-sidered decisive by itself to warrant an attack using atomic bombs.It has been pointed out, however, that a large portion of our depotsare located in the industrial heart of the nation, as well as beingin populated areas. Some are located near our large ports. On at


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bility o the depot system is directly reJ.&Ti6ba ia$so iationw th iadustrial areas and centers of population.

do Bateriological and Chemioal Warfare. - This type ofwarfare would affect the storage system inasmuch as it would strikeat the labor force, or contaminate areas in the vieinity of thedepots. This would have the effect of slowing down cargo movement.As yet, it is not a force in the destructive sense.

6. Enemy Capabilities. Insofar as the atomia bomib is con1-cerned, indications are that it will be several years before anypotential enemy will succeed in producing it, There are no knownreasons why fast, long range planes and the development of guidedmissiles should be out of reach of a determined nation. The real-istic approach demands the extension to a potential enemy of everypractical capability involving new developments in -warfare.


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~I-.Em.hE~ANNEX 7

PROTECTIVE MEASURES

1. Summar. -- The United States, traditionally, does nottake the initiative in a preventive war. Active defense alonecannot protect the Army depot system.. Passive measures, such asdispersion and underground storage facilities, are necessary toprotect vital military stores.

2. Conclusions. -- Practical protection of the depot systemis possible through active defensive measures, augmented by aplanned program of limited dispersion and underground storage facili-ties.

3. Offensive Operations. -- By offensive operations is meanttaking the initiative and attacking immediately any potentialenemy that threatens the national interests. This course is notpractical for several important reasons:

a. A large or, at least, a suitable force fo r this pur-


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of stook-piles, dispersal, a oS coparticularly significant segments of industry. Such aprogram in the economic field can also be worked out sat-isfactorily only in peacetime. 1/ (page 30)

An adequate active defense system, backed up by properlyplanned and timely executed passive measures, gives the greatestassurance that the vital war reserves will be intact and ready tosupport the nation's military strength when needed.

5. Dispersion. -- Dispersion, practiced within limits, ispractical and reduces the total cost involved in purchasing pro-tection for the depot system. However, it is important to rememberthe vivid lesson from World War II concerning the vulnerability oftransportation systems:

The most serious weakness in the underground anddispersal program was the reliance on the railroads fortransportation. Most of the plants depended on rail-roads both fo r their raw materials and distribution oftheir products. This contributed to the overloading ofthe railroads, which were already severely damaged byaerial attacks. The condition was further aggravated bythe general lack of storage space for either materials


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oapacity at theThis is an indication that well planned and properly locadli

underground storage facilities will give ample protection to theArmy depot system.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

j7 N-13766 iummayReprt (PacifeliWar). The United StatesStrategic Bombing Survey, Washington, D. C. 1 July1946.

/' Robinson, Major General C. F. "German Underground Installa-tios". militar Engineer, Volume 39, Page 469(November- -1947)

R-16487-E Underground Installations Report - Foreign Instal-lations. Prepared fo r Chief of Engineers, U. 8. Armyunder contract W-49-129-Eng-59 by Guy B. Panero -31, 1948.

ii___


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ANNEX 8

UND2ERGROUND~ STORAGE I11%,~ TIN$ 7

i. Summary. -- Sites are available and construction of under-ground storage depots should present no difficulties. It has beenestimated that construction of depots in existing mines will costabout 22 percent less, while depots in new sites will be about 51percent more, than a comparable above-ground depot. It is pre-dicted that yearly operational costs will be slightly higher fordepots in existing mines, while depots in new sites should becheaper to operate than an above-ground depot. Only minimum useshould be made of underground storage installations, due to th elarge construction costs involved. Peacetime construction is nec-essary to achieve the greatest economy. Only by having undergroundstorage facilities before an attack can the objective of protectionbe achieved.

2. Conclusions.


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Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York, N pof this report are summarized in this annex.

4. Availability of Sites.a. The report considered seventeen industrial regions in

the nation, the most important of which is the northeastern sectionof the United States. Areas considered are shown in Appendix 1,which was extracted from the report. 1/

b. Existing mines. -- Limestone, salt, and lead-zincmines are considered practical sources of subterranean space forconversion. This type material is believed to require the leastamount of construction effort to give protective cover. In theregions studied, there exists a potential total of 327 millionsquare feet of space, composed of 106 million square feet in drift-entry limestone mines and 221 million square feet in shaft-entrylead-zinc and salt mines. Drift-entry mines permit running highwayand rail facilities into the underground site, and, fo r this reason,


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S'i ' 4

capacity and supply handling facilities of the Atlanta General Sup-ply Depot. In general, it was specified that the depot volumeshould have 24,750,000 cubic feet net usable storage volume, shouldbe capable of moving 6,000 tons per day, and should have a workingforce of approximately 7,500 people on three shifts. Other detailsare summarized in Appendix 3. 2

b. Above-ground depot. -- In order to develop comparativecost data for construction and operation of typical depot installa-tions, the Panero engineers made a proposed above-ground layout tomeet specifications of the prototype general depot. The estimatedconstructional and operational costs of this project were used asa basis for comparing costs of proposed under-ground storage in-stallations. Factors considered are summarized in Appendix 4.Estimated cost for this hypothetical depot was placed at $38,988,800.Detailed cost breakdown will be found in Appendix 7. 2

c. Depot in an existing mine. -- The mine selected is


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near Chattanooga, Tennessee. There appears to be no difficulty inmeeting prototype requirements in this area. Summary of factorsconsidered are listed in Appendix 6. Estimated cost for this devel-opment is placed at $58,879,100, or 51 percent greater than th eabove-ground depot. Detailed breakdown of costs will be found inAppendix 7. Estimated yearly operational costs are 1.2 percentless than the above-ground depot. Operating costs and personnelrequirements are tabulated in Appendix 8. 2 The major advantagesof a depot placed in a newly excavated site are: the greater flexi-bility of design that permits more compact storage areas for moreefficient depot operation; the depth of cover that can be providedfo r protection is generally greater than that provided by mines.The major disadvantage is the higher construction costs, althoughthis is partially offset by lower predicted yearly operating costs.

6. Other Planning Considerations.a. Space. -- The potential available underground space is


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STime required. The Panero engineers estimate plan-ning and construction time for underground installations as followrs:in an existing mine, 12 to 20 months; in a new site, 24 to 30months (Appendix 7). / Add to this the planning time required inhigh government and military echelonis, and it becomes apparent thatany program for procurig underground installations may take aslong as four to five years. This emphasizes the necessity forearly planning and decisions in order to-have underground storagefacilities in being before a war.

e. Depth of Protective Cover. - Estimates of protectivecover necessary fo r maximum protection of underground installaftions.vary from 250 feet of rock to 1,000-1500 feet of overburden. Thisindicates the need for a test program to determine minimnum protec-tion required for the anticipated maximum destructive force suchinstallations must withstand.

f. Economy of Peacetime Construction. -- Construction of


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-mmAPPENDIX 2

COMPARATIVE DISTRIBUt ' 'IIIINDUSTRY AND UNDERGROUND SITES

RegionNew EnglandNew York-PhiladelphiaBuffalo-Roche sterPittsburghBirmingham-ChattanoogaDetroit-Cleve andCincinnatiChicagoSt. LouisMinneapolisKansas City

*Distributionof Workers1,067,0002,441,000

404,000479,000291,000988,000457,000

1,173,000252,000127,000256,000

DistributionIn Millions ofExisting Nines

of SpaceSquare Feet

New Sites0.710.758.062.02.6

135.0

8.036.9

204.07.08.76.610.01.0

66.5

98.8

8.579.3

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IN8'JEXI>111%*\8 s ^1 RX

SUMARY OF FACTORS FOR PRT0OYE'Dh

1. Functions.a. To provide storage facilities for the following technical

and administrative services: Quartermaster, Engineers,Signal, Ordnance, Medical, Chemical, Transportation, and

Adjutant General.b. Be capable of handling a total moving storage volume of

6,000 tons per day.o. Facilities shall be provided to handle this volume by a

combination of rail and truck transportation, but eithermethod must be adequate to handle the entire load.

2. Storage Volume.--Total net usable storage space of 24,750,000cubic feet, exclusive of aisles and docks.

3. Traffic Volume.--To handle an estimated total of 156,000 tonsper month--78,000 tons incoming and 78,000 tons outgoing.

4. Railway car requirements.--Total of 170 cars per day (in and

"I-; -


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APPENDIX 4 j I,SU1MARY OF FACTORS - ABOVE GROUNDIA t A

CHOICE OF SITE1. For comparison, a hypothetical site representing a portion of

the present Atlanta General Depot was selected. Area required:738 acres.

SITE FACTORS2. Availability of transportation, labor, power, water supply,

sewage disposal, identical to those now used by Atlanta GeneralDepot, in general, all favorable. Site is level and easily de-veloped. Strategic location is less favorable than undergroundinstallations, since it is nearer the Atlantic coast.

CONSTRUCTION3. Utilities, roads, railroads, electric power, and water supply

included to meet standard requirements.4. Construction of required buildings will follow current standard

practice.


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APPENDIX 5

SUNAIRY OF FACTORS - DEPOT IN EXISTING MINE #

CHOICE OF SITE

1. Mine selected is the inactive Medusa limestone mine at Wampum,Pennsylvania.

SITE FACTORS2. The major factors governing selection of a potential underground

site fo r this purpose are:a. Strategic location fo r safety, protection from bombing,

structural soundness, height above flood levels.b. Space dimensions; layout; floor grade and drainage.c. Accessibility, geographical, as well as mine entry and

approaches.d. Labor, housing, sources of supply, transportation, power,

and water.MINIMUM STANDARDS

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mine area. Surface inspections only have been made. A de-tailed structural examination by mining experts is required asa prerequisite to development of this site.

6. Mine floor is well above high water level an d there is no recordof flood interference with mining operations.

SURFACE DEVELOPNE NT7. Roads.--A network of two-lane paved roads is projected to con-

nect with existing highways and extended to connect with roadsentering the mine on three sides.

8. Railroads.--A spur is planned that will extend through the mine.Connection will be possible to the two railroads serving th earea. No classification yards are planned in the immediatedepot area.

MINE ENTRANCES AND EXITS9. Seven portals are planned: 2 railroad, 1 combination railroad

and truck, 3 truck, and 1 personnel. In addition, six emergency


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trations, heavy reinforced concrete slabs will be installeddirectly under the rock ceiling. This slab is designed to pro-tect against falling rook that might be dislodged by bombs orthrough natural causes.

OTHER FACILITIES12. Power requirements can be met from outside sources. Alarm and

communication systems, fire-fighting protection, water supply,heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning are planned. Nodifficulties are apparent in providing these services. Vari-ous types of decontamination equipment are provided to insurefresh air in necessary areas.

PROTECTION FACTORS13. Overhead cover is estimated to be a minimum of 50 feet. It is

believed that this amount of cover will insure protection

against a direct hit by a 2,000-pound bomb. This protectionis increased where personnel concentration is heavy by con-


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"~-I~eusI16 .LV iJ6-" W!:' 4; ---ARz


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APPENDIX 6 i ,

SUTMARY OF FACTORS FOR DEPOT IN NEWLY EXCAVATED SITE#

CHOICE OF SITE1. Site selected in one near Lookout Mountain at Chattanooga,

Tennessee.SITE FACTORS2. A number of sites throughout the country meet these requirements:

a. Relief over the proposed area of not less than 200 feet,providing cover of not less than 150 feet.

b. Area of not less than 3,500,000 to 6,000,000 square feet,

with 200 feet of relief.c. Steep cliff permitting not less than six to eight widely

spaced entries without long approach passage ways.d. Good, heavily bedded rook formation of not less than fifty

feet thickness of valley floor level.e. Possibility of access to existing highway and railroad. ~ia

il:r


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tures ares i 0e d .iling heights of 17feet, depressed rail and truck roads.

CONSTRUCTION6. Concrete floors, as well as concrete slabs under ceilings, in

area of heavy personnel concentration.PROTECT ION FACTORS7. Cover ranges from 150 to 1,000 feet, which will protect depot

from heaviest bombs used during last war. In some oases, overpassages and roads, cover will range from 50 to 15 0 feet* Lat-eral protection is no problem since mined-out areas do notexist.

8. Entrance and exit protection is based on multiplicity of por-tals; however, there is inherently more protection due to th egreater cover over the portals.

9. Protection against gas and other toxic gases is provided bythe same mechanical methods as fo r the existing mine site.


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APPENDIX 7SUMMAIRY OF COMPARATIVE CONSTRUdION COSTS

Areas, Square FeetLandSite ImprovementsUtilitiesAccess & Approach WorkBuildings and PlatformsBuilding EquipmentTotal Land & ConstructionOperating EquipmentTotal Land, Const. & EquipOverhead-Engineering & In-spection (On Const Only)

TOTAL PROJECT COST

AboveGround

(3,830,300)$735,000717,000

4,801,600

21,077,7005,135,650

$32,466,9502,714,000

$35,180,950

3,807,850$38,988,800

100%

ExistingMine

(3,1530,800)$441,500156,000

4,440,1254,113,1508,176,8906,970,905

$24,298,5703,227,000

$27,525,570

2,862,830$30,388,400

Newly Exca-vated Site(5,467,200)

$267,500101,400

5,672,00013,821,00023,111,1207,481,590

$50,454,6102,402,000

$52,856,610

6,022,490$58,879,100-


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. .. . .


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COMPARATIVE OPERATING COSTS 1/(Based on yearly volume of 1,872,000 tons)

labor**Supplies, Parts,

Contractors#Fixed charges

Total All Costs

AboveGround

*$25,594,000

4,856,0002,044,000

$32,494,000

ExistingMine

#$27,256,000

4,930,0002,051,000

$34,237,000

Newly Exca-vated Site

*$24,175,000

4,755,0003,120,000

$32,050,000Cost per tonPercentage

$17.35100

$18.29105.6

$17.1598.8

Notes: *Based on $1.18 wage rate in Atlanta and Chattanooga areas.#Based on $1.29 wage rate in Wampum area.**General costs for maintenance and operation to includewater, fuel power, spare parts, and other items fur-nished by contract.

+Depreciation and interest on capital with suitable adjust-ments for variables among three types of installations.Interest based on 1 3/4 percent current rate fo r longterm government loans.


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ANNEX 9

BIBLIOGRAPHY . J t '

1. TM 38-420, 1946.2. DA. SB 38-3, Part I, 1948.5. Robinson, Major General C. F. "German Underground Installa-

tions", Military Engineer, Volume 39, Page 469 (November 1947).4. Robinson, akjor General C. F. "Industrial Vulnerability toBombing", M ilitary Engineer, Volume 61, Page 1 (Jan-Feb 1949).5. N-16266 Logistics in World War II. Army Services Forces, WarDepartment, Washington, D. C. -July 1947.6. N-13766 Summary Report (Pacific War). The United States Stra-

tegic Bombing Survey, Washington, D. C. 1 July 1946.7. R-15429P V Weapons in London. Physical Damage Division, TheUnited States Strategic Bombing Survey January 1947.8. N-13375 B Over-all Report (European War). The United States

Strategic Bombing Survey. September 30, 1945.9. R-16487-A Underground Installations Summary. Prepared fo rChief of Engineers, U. S. Army, under contract W-49-

129-Eng-59, by Guy B. Panero - Engineers, New York17, N. Y. October 31, 1948.

10. R-16487-D Underground Installations Report - Storage Depot.


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WAR DEPARTMENT o o NONS125' 120 1151 o*10, too-9

00a6 Acomp q9w as* 80

SECOND EDITION-A MS 2


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SNA CRP"AAM, UBNOTOFEN SCMEDIAL DPARMENTCHECALWARARERV E NRA LMASUBD PO OF AM ERN OIN

CHEMIAL WAFARE E VCD.TANTeEeERA'S, E TMENTDeA.NGsAt.UBDEee-OFAilABEL ED FDPTANH S PTSARAOGASRNGSIVPTF LAYL ERIE

QUARERMSTEO QURTEMASER ORP QURTEMASER O PORNNC EPRUETMEAL# EPRMETGRCYU EPTO.CA.RCORP OFENGNEES SOERVLLEJ!UOEPT OFlUB DIY ODNACE 4~p-C ne, UTSIGNL COPS EAVEWORH, SBDEOT O 11M S ITA* CE NCA D FDPO MAA SBEPTOFINSSD~STJSJ'UBEOTO4A4ACTYSGNL87ACOLUBUS F DPOTARERMATERCORP W PRINFIED,3SBDEOT O P LADEPNICRSONGINE RASK

MEDICAL DEPART ENT BSOUBEPO FHLAI bAYTON, SUBDEPOT OF LXN IMEMPHIS SF DEPOT DATTYASPTTCO[,CHEMICAL WRFARE 6 8 0 0AQUARTERMASTE CORPS

O UDPT H IO0CORPSOF ENI EER QUARERMATERCRAUBURN SUBDEPOT OF LATHA

CHEMICAL WA ARE SERVICEMEDICAL DEPARTME NTY R

O UPOT OF T I4Ro _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

120 116* ELMIRA, SUBDEPOT OF VOORH&U.SVILLE 10(FvrOditi. . 1924 A~ DCGTTC H&R POINTSQUREMS R iisnQG143wsTER CORPS QUARTERMASTER CORPS RAVENA, SUBDEPOT OF VOORNEESVILLE QATRATR2 161ODACDEATNTORDNANCE DEPARTMENTSIGNAL CORPS ORPSN GINEEPRSNCHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE SG CORPS NIERMIAL CDEPARS ETMISCELLANEOUSTRANSPORTATION i 10 0 1 0* RICHMOND ASF DEPOT, CHEMICAL WARFARE MEDICAL AT PUEBLO CR0

QATRATRURSADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT ORDNANCE AT LOUISVILLE MID ADJUTANT GENERAL 5 5 0 0 0QURTSOERMASTERURS QUARTERMASTER AT UMIATILLA ORDMC PA MENEESQUARTERMASTER AT NAVAJfl ORDMEICL EARMETQUARTERMASTER AT PUEBLO 0110 NOTE EXCLUDES LOCATIONS AT WHICH DEPOTS HAVE SEEN ALLOCATED AUXIL IARY

STORAGE SPACE

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82/84

WAR DEPARTMENT IJNAYl4IONS

SSEC:OND EDITION -AMS 2

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